Consequence Management
Program and Integration Office

Washington, DC

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS
WMD CST

DOCTRINE HANDBOOK
Executive Summary

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Executive Summary – This document overviews Department of Defense doctrine for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civilian Support Team (CST) organization, capabilities, and employment.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION

Improving our Nation’s Preparedness. Since the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City, the President and Congress have steadily increased the concern, focus, and pace for improving our nation’s ability to respond to WMD attacks within the United States. Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62 direct the federal government to strengthen its abilities to combat weapons of mass destruction terrorism. Congress directed the federal government to enhance its capability to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Congress also charged the federal government with providing enhanced support to improve the capabilities of state and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such incidents at both the local and national level.

The Secretary of Defense has recognized that National Guard and other Reserve Component units are “forward deployed” for civil support and we can leverage their manpower, training, and experience to aid citizens in perhaps their greatest times of need. The functions they perform in this role parallel functions they must execute to support military forces engaged anywhere in the world.

Assessment Teams. One of the key functional units required when military forces initiate a response is an assessment element. These are the same assessment elements the Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) use to determine requirements for other responding forces. They are trained to assess the situation, advise the on-scene commander, and facilitate the flow of other needed forces into the area. In October 1998, Congress authorized and funded the fielding of the first 10 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams to perform this assessment function and support an integrated response to WMD incidents. This fielding started the development and evolution of new capabilities and concepts to ensure that DoD could support evolving interagency response plans. To further integrate DoD support of other federal assets and attain the widest possible coverage of the Continental United States, a unit was fielded to a state in each of the ten federal regions of the United States. In October 1999, Congress authorized 17 additional teams to provide coverage and support to the rest of the country.

WMD CST Stationing. WMD CST stationing is designed to support an expeditious response to all major population centers within the Continental United States via the units’ organic ground transportation. WMD CST equipment and vehicles are also air deployable. States were selected to optimize population and geographical coverage and to minimize the overlap in response areas of the teams. The resulting distribution of the 27 teams places 90 percent of the nations’ population within 250 miles of a team. Factors such as transportation access, facilities, proximity to airlift, and nearness to other state and regional planning organizations are also important stationing considerations.
The 27 CST Teams are in: Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, California, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia
Tiered Response. In the United States, response to an emergency is primarily a local responsibility. When faced with emergency incidents, or threats of incidents, local governments employ Emergency First Responders (EFRs) including fire, police, and emergency medical services. They are supported by emergency dispatch systems and emergency operations centers. When local resources are overwhelmed by an event, or if the required specific technical capabilities are not available, local leaders may exercise existing mutual aid agreements to request additional support from neighboring communities, and seek supplemental assistance through county and state emergency management systems. If the state, including its National Guard, lacks sufficient assets to mitigate a disaster, either in quantity or technical response capability, the Governor may request federal assistance. The President directs the federal response to disasters, both natural and man-made. For most disasters, the “all hazards” Federal Response Plan (FRP), guides the cooperative process that orchestrates the actions of the federal agencies. For an incident involving a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), assets from all tiers of the emergency management system will be needed nearly simultaneously to minimize the impact.

- Full response requires local, state, and federal assets
- State response includes National Guard
- Military support requires Total Force involvement
Incident Command System. The Incident Command System (ICS) is used by the civilian emergency response community to manage operations at an incident site. Use of the ICS system is mandatory for organizations that respond to hazardous materials incidents and is becoming more standardized in all civilian emergency operations. ICS establishes a standard and consistent template for response operations. The Incident Commander (IC) is normally the most senior qualified individual (on-scene) from the local organization with the greatest number of response assets (typically the local fire or police chief). ICS is a modular system that uses common terminology and incident action plans in five functional component areas: command, operations, logistics, planning, and finance. These five components are flexible; the size and intensity of an incident will drive the actual make-up of the components. ICs make specific requests for assistance through the emergency management system if they do not have the assets required for the response. The IC will remain in control of the response even when state and federal assets are employed. The ICS will be integrated into a Unified Command System as state and federal assets become increasingly integrated.
Roles and responsibilities of the Incident Command System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMAND</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The IC is the person in charge at an incident and who must be fully qualified to manage the response effort. Initially, the IC will be the senior first-responder to arrive at the scene.</td>
<td>As the situation progresses the IC will come from the department with the greatest responsibility for the site, i.e. Fire Department for fires, explosions, and Hazmat incidents. Most state and local emergency response systems have formalized the ICS to determine who will fill the critical functions based upon the type of incident encountered.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*The major responsibilities of the IC include:*  
- Performing command and control activities for all personnel and resources responding to the scene  
- Establishing and maintaining the Incident Command Post (ICP).  
- Protecting life and property at the scene.  
- Maintaining accountability for responder and public safety, as well as for task accomplishment.  
- Establishing and maintaining and effective liaison with outside agencies and organizations, including the EOC, when activated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLANNING</th>
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<tr>
<td>In smaller events, the IC is responsible for planning, but when the incident a larger scale, the IC establishes the Planning Section.</td>
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</table>

*The primary responsibilities of the Planning Section are:*  
- Collection, evaluation, dissemination and use of information about the development of the incident and status of resources.  
- Creation of the Incident Action Plan (IAP) which defines the response activities and resources for a specified time period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar to the S3, this section carries out the response activities described in the Incident Action Plan.</td>
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</table>

*The Primary responsibilities of the Operations Section are:*  
- To direct and coordinate all operations, ensuring the safety of Operations Section personnel.  
- Assist the IC in developing response goals and objectives for the incident.  
- Help implement the IAP  
- Requests (or releases) resources through the Incident Commander.  
- Keep the IC informed of situation and resource status throughout the operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOGISTICS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Similar to the Army S4/G4, this section provides logistical support for the operation.</td>
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</table>

*The primary responsibilities of the Logistics Section are:*  
- To procure and stage the required resources for the operation  
- To procure facilities and materials for the operation  
- To procure equipment and the required personnel to operate the equipment for the IC  
- To coordinate with volunteer organizations for feeding and care of ICS and First Responder personnel

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINANCIAL/ADMINISTRATIVE</th>
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<tr>
<td>This section is responsible for tracking costs and reimbursement accounting. This section is very important during operations which may result in a Presidential Declaration</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The primary responsibilities of the Financial/Administrative Section are:*  
- Tracking what types of support and personnel arrived and when  
- Tracking reimbursable rates for people and equipment used at the scene  
- Submitting reports to the State for State and Federal reimbursements
**State Emergency Management Response** Though State Emergency Management (SEM) systems vary in name and structure, their function is to coordinate response between state, county and city governments, community businesses, and private organizations. SEM agencies will also coordinate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency when available state assets are insufficient to meet the requirements for incident mitigation. These functions are executed using a state emergency response plan. The National Guard, one of many state agencies with considerable resources, is frequently used to respond to disaster situations that require additional state personnel or capabilities. The Adjutant General is the leader of the state emergency management agency in 23 states. Guardsmen remain under the command and control of the Governor during this response.

The state emergency management agency coordinates movement of state response assets into an incident scene to fill requirements not supported by the local responders. For Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, or Radiological (NBC/R) incidents, the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, provide well-trained assessment to support the response, and function as a lead element for the National Guard. Their knowledge and understanding of the emergency management system and their expertise in NBC/R response operation and assets can provide tremendous assistance to the local Incident Commander.

States without an assigned WMD CST may request a WMD CST from another state. States without a WMD CST may request an additional unit if necessary. These requests may be facilitated by the use of interstate compacts such as the Emergency Assistance Management Compact (EMAC) currently in place in 27 states and one territory. However, compacts are not mandatory for interstate assistance.

**Federal Assistance.** Local and state governments routinely respond to a wide array of domestic emergencies without any federal assistance. Even some WMD incidents may not overwhelm local response capabilities, but may require technical advice and assistance that is not readily available in local or state agencies. A large-scale incident, may overwhelm local and state responders, requiring considerable federal assistance.
Requests for federal assistance from civil authorities are coordinated through the Federal Response Plan (FRP) process. If local or state authorities request federal help, the lead federal agency (normally FEMA for consequence management) assigns that request to one of 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). If the agency responsible for that function needs additional assistance, it may request military support through the Secretary of Defense or the on-scene Defense Coordinating Officer. Military elements capable of providing the necessary response are then sent to the area to perform the tasks. The WMD CST can aid the local IC in developing the requests for assistance that go to other state and federal WMD response teams.

If the expertise, equipment, or capabilities of a WMD CST are required to supplement other WMD CST or other federal response units, the unit can be federalized and deployed as a part of a federal support package. An WMD CST may also be deployed into a state as part of a DoD Special Event support element, e.g., Olympics, National Political Conventions, and others.

Requests for WMD CST Support. Local, county, and state officials may request support. Normally, these requests flow through the same process as other emergency requests for state assistance. As soon as a WMD incident is suspected, the EFRs will notify the Emergency Operation Center (EOC). Upon notification, the county may report to the state EOC for tracking and assistance, if required. This report, or subsequent status reports, provide the state an opportunity to alert and notify the WMD CST for state response. The state emergency management agency, working in close coordination with the state’s National Guard operations center, will process requests for assistance. The Governor, or designated representative, can approve the request and have the National Guard operations center deploy the WMD CST to the incident site. These units are designed to be an initial asset from the
State with the ability to communicate using the Unified Command Suite and have an understanding of other specialized response assets available. The CST may deploy to an incident site prior to the declaration of a state emergency or prior to the declaration of the request for assistance from the federal government.

State requests for WMD CST support can originate from the Governors' Office, officials in an affected community (Emergency Management Center) or from the state National Guard Headquarters. Federal requests may originate from any agency, including the Lead Federal Agency, a supported Commander-in-Chief, or the JTF-CS.

Upon receipt of a request for support, if the request has not been previously validated by the state headquarters, the Commander must validate the request for assistance. Simple questions must be answered to ensure the request is valid and that the team can perform the required functions.

- Who is making the request?
- What is (are) the request(s)?
- Who normally performs the function?
- What is the “real” requirement?
  - Who is supported?
  - What needs to be done?
  - Where and when is it needed?
- Do we have the capability to provide it?
  - With proper assets/equipment?
  - Safely with trained personnel?
  - Legally and cost effectively?
- Are there any issues or special considerations?
- How much will it cost?
- When is the mission complete?
MISSION. The WMD CST will deploy to an area of operations to perform three primary missions:

- **Assess** a suspected NBC/R event in support of a local IC;
- **Advise** civilian responders regarding appropriate action, and;
- **Facilitate** requests for assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and federal assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage.

The WMD CST is designed to support the IC and local emergency responders, but is not intended to replace those functions normally performed by the EFR community or communications carried out under the Incident Command System (ICS). Where these systems are in place, formal requests for assistance will flow through them, and any support provided is in conjunction with support being resourced through the ICS. Prior coordination with EFR in the geographic coverage area will ease the transition during the response to an emergency incident.

The mission of the WMD CST has been developed and congressionally authorized for **consequence management** support for an incident or attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Consequence management activities are those activities that occur after an incident has occurred. Crisis management activities are those that occur prior to an incident, primarily focused on incident prevention and law enforcement. The WMD CST is not designed nor intended to deploy for Crisis Management activities. The simplified unit mission statement (Advise, Assess, and Facilitate) clearly connotes the support role. Additional mission information is available in the WMD CST Operations Handbook. Controlling authorities for the WMD CST (i.e., the Governor and the Adjutant General) should carefully consider the impact of deploying the WMD CST in support of non-WMD response situations prior to directing such an employment.

In addition to the response capabilities of the WMD CST, the unit brings a number of ancillary capabilities to the state in which it is assigned. In particular, the expertise and focus of the unit provides a multi-disciplined integration of NBC/R information as well as dedicated group assigned to understand the potential response organizations and plans within the state. Pre-incident coordination with other state and local emergency response agencies and organizations will greatly facilitate a “post-incident response” and can greatly increase statewide proficiencies in response.
**Organization.** The WMD CST is made up of 22 full-time National Guard service members. It consists of six teams: command, operations, administration/logistics, communications, medical, and survey, who have been specially trained and equipped with state-of-the-art equipment to supplement local and state response organizations and provide a technical reach-back capability to other experts who may assist the local response.

**Capabilities.** WMD CST provides significant capabilities for WMD attack assessment advice, and facilitation of requests for assistance. The team is designed for rapid response, using unit vehicles as the primary transportation method. Most of the equipment is stored in the vehicles for rapid deploymen, but is designed to be removable for maximum flexibility. The vehicles and equipment have been certified for air transport, including two key vehicles specially designed for each team. The first is the Unified Command Suite (UCS), built by the Navy based on the Joint Base Station, to provide interface across the varied first responder frequencies and other response organizations, and communications to command and control agencies and technical support. Through the UCS and hubs maintained by Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the team can reach-back to experts in an NBC response at a number of agencies and connect to key modeling and simulation capabilities at labs throughout the United States. This reach-back to technical support adds tremendous capabilities for the Incident Commander. The second vehicle is the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS), based on the one used by the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), but enhanced for biological detection capability. The team acts as the on-site observer for experts from around the country and can take the samples, readings, and observations the experts need to provide invaluable assistance to the Incident Commander.
The personnel are OSHA Level A trained and certified. The unit can provide threat agent presumptive or confirmatory analysis employing modular laboratory equipment, maintain and bridge communications with and between local, state and federal response forces, and can reach-back to ADP-based hazard identification, modeling, and other experts in an NBC/R response.

To maintain the “value added” to the civilian emergency response community and to ensure the viability of the WMD CST mission, the Department of Defense is committed to maintaining a technology edge for the WMD CST units. As new and emerging detection and assessment technologies are identified, the Department will pursue procurement of these items to maintain the high level capabilities of the unit.

**Equipment.** WMD CST units are equipped with standard systems to perform their mission in support of local, state, and federal response officials. This equipment is documented in their Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). All changes to the TDA must be requested through the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and approved by CoMPIO to ensure each unit is standardized. The unit’s equipment includes:

- Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provided for the team Level A, B and C Protective Ensembles, M40 Series Protective Masks and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

- Sampling equipment with immunoassay tickets, chemical and biological sampling kits, and radiation detection equipment.

- Unified Command System (UCS) provides an enhanced architecture ensuring communications and data connectivity between federal, state and local response forces. It is a self-contained, air transportable (via C-130, C-141, C-5, C-17) system, capable of continuous fixed and mobile operations. Its systems include HF (1.5-50 MHz), MIL STD 188-141A ALE, MIL STD 188-110A Modem, UHF LOS (225-400 MHz), VHF Tactical FM (30-88 MHz) SINCgars, SATCOM/LST-5A, COMSEC.

- (KG-84C, KG-99A, KY-57), Secure Phone, FAX, Tele-computer, and Printer, Teleconference/Video, GPS, and a 15 KW power generator.

- Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) provides the capability to further analyze and observe survey team samples. Information derived from survey and sampling operations will be used to influence or add confidence to the consequence management decision(s) made by the Incident Commander. The air conditioned lab includes two work stations, internal and external lighting, a 7KW generator, refrigerator, a fluorescent microscope, a gamma spectrometer, a HAPSITE Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer, a glove box and filter system, and an interface to the Unified Command Suite for transmission of digital sample information.
**Command and Control.** Military forces employed in MSCA activities shall remain under military command and control at all times.

The National Guard, as primary state response force, will normally remain under the command and control of the Governor. The CST teams normally operate in a state status under the command and control of the Governor through the Adjutant General. In this capacity CST teams are deployed under United States Code Title 32 and their mission is conducted under the state emergency management framework. All additional support required for the teams (i.e., additional security, logistics, communication, procurement) will be supplied by the State National Guard Organization through the standard Military Support for Civilian Authorities (MSCA) procedures. Civil Support Teams assigned to a state will normally operate within their state of assignment or within another state when directed by the Governor or Adjutant General. State-to-state compacts or memorandums of agreement may facilitate this response across state lines.

The Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) has been established under Joint Forces Command at Norfolk, VA. The JTF-Civil Support provides command and control for responding federal military forces, less the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). The JSOTF directly supports the crisis management activities. First and Fifth US Armies maintain a Response Task Force Headquarters staff, ready to respond in 4 hours and be fully operational at the scene for 24 hours. If these teams are activated under Title 10 of the United States Code, the operational control will be transferred to the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) JTF-CS. The WMD CST, as the “tip of the military support spear” is a vital source of on-scene information for all DoD response forces. The JTF-CS will monitor CST reports and communications.

CST Teams assigned to a state could operate within their state of assignment or within another state under one of four potential authorities:
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team (CST) Doctrine

Secretary of Defense. Adherence to the rules of *posse comitatus* once federalized must be addressed prior to making this decision.

Chain of Command / Command and Control. The chain of command for the WMD CST is dependent upon their duty status. The WMD CST, like all other National Guard units, is a Federal organization stationed within a state. Under Title 32, the Governor and the Adjutant General provide command and control for the unit. The WMD CST is organized under Title 32 of the US Code, however, is subject to federalization like all other National Guard asset.

- **Title 32.** Under United States Code Title 32, the WMD CST can respond operationally to a WMD incident either within its state of assignment or into another state as directed by authorized state authorities. When deployed under Title 32, the mission will be conducted under the states’ emergency management framework. All additional support required for the unit (i.e., security, logistics, communications and other sustainment issues) will be met by the state National Guard organization through standard Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) procedures. While serving in a Title 32 Status, the provisions of *posse comitatus* do not apply to the WMD CST personnel.

- **Title 10.** When WMD CSTs are federalized to support either a DoD Special event or in response to a major federal incident, the units fall under the command and control of the designated military response headquarters designated as having responsibility for the incident response. Currently, the JTF-CS, assigned under the United States JFCOM has operational responsibility for WMD response within the United States. The WMD CST will provide similar functions for the JTF-CS in either status; however upon federalization, the CST loses *posse comitatus* protections and sustainment responsibility for the CST will come under Federal authorities.

**Compacts.** Although numerous state compacts exist, the Department of Defense only maintains visibility on the EMAC. Since being approved by Congress in 1996 as Public Law 104-321, twenty-seven states and one territory have ratified EMAC, and several other states are in the process. The only requirement for joining is for a state’s legislature to simply ratify the language of the compact. States are not even required to assist other states unless they’re able. Current signatories include:

- Arkansas
- Delaware
- North Carolina
- Florida
- Georgia
- Indiana
- Iowa
- Kentucky
- Louisiana
- Maine
- Maryland
- Minnesota
- Mississippi
- Missouri
- Montana
- Nebraska
- Nevada
- New Mexico
- North Dakota
- Oklahoma
- Puerto Rico
- Rhode Island
- South Carolina
- South Dakota
- Tennessee
- Texas
- Virginia
- West Virginia
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a mutual aid agreement and partnership between states that exists because, from hurricanes to earthquakes and from wildfires to toxic waste spills, all states share a common enemy: the constant threat of disaster.

- EMAC allows states to assist one another during emergencies: EMAC offers a quick and easy way for states to send personnel and equipment to help disaster relief efforts in other states. There are times when state and local resources are overwhelmed and federal assistance is inadequate or unavailable. Out-of-state aid through EMAC helps fill such shortfalls.

- EMAC establishes a firm legal foundation: Requests for EMAC assistance are legally binding, contractual arrangements which makes states that ask for help responsible for reimbursing all out-of-state costs and liable for out-of-state personnel. States can rest assured that sending aid will not be a financial or legal burden for them.

- EMAC provides fast and flexible Assistance: EMAC allows states to ask for the assistance they need for any emergency, from earthquakes to acts of terrorism. On the other hand, states are not forced to send any assistance unless they are able to. EMAC’s simple procedures also mean states can dispense with bureaucratic wrangling.

While states are capable of managing most emergencies, there are times when disasters exceed state and local resources that require outside assistance. Usually this assistance comes from federal agencies. However, not all disasters are eligible for federal disaster assistance. EMAC provides another way for states to receive interstate aid in a disaster. Even when federal assistance is merited, EMAC assistance may be more readily available or less expensive. EMAC assistance may supplement federal assistance when the latter is available or replace federal assistance when unavailable. Most important, EMAC allows for a quick response to disasters using the unique resources and expertise possessed by member states.
**Response Posture.** Composed of 22 full-time Title 32 personnel with the limited mission of assessing a WMD incident to determine the type of agent that may have been used; advising civilian Incident Commanders on possible agent effects; possible steps to mitigate the effect; and facilitating the flow of additional WMD response elements into an incident site. This multi-disciplined team cannot indefinitely maintain a full alert posture 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, but can be prepared for quick deployment. While not expected to maintain a 24-hour operation, the WMD CST will maintain a level of readiness that will allow for a rapid response within objective timelines. The readiness posture of the unit will vary based upon a number of factors, including professional development, leave, training and exercise participation, and other administrative requirements. These factors must be carefully managed and scheduled to minimize the operational impact and ensure an adequate response capability is maintained. Pagers are provided to facilitate a rapid recall and permit an expeditious response to requests for assistance validated by the Adjutant General (or his representative) from local or state responders.

The unit response posture will commensurate with existing threat levels, to insure the WMD CST is prepared to deploy when notified. The primary means of deployment will be using organic unit vehicles and moving via ground routes. Air movement of team and vehicles via DoD or state aircraft or helicopter transport to a predetermined staging area and follow-on transport to the incident site is an alternate form of transportation. Although the systems are designed to be air transportable and the teams have received training in load planning, there is no dedicated airlift for this mission and this deployment mode will not normally be the most expeditious within the teams normal area of responsibility.

The objective for “time on scene” arrival will be dependent upon the posture of the unit once notified. Several factors affect response times and capabilities, including the time of day an incident occurs, distance to an incident site, method of transport required to arrive “on-scene,” and any other movement detractors such as weather or road restrictions. Personnel are not required in the WMD CST facilities on a 24-hour basis. For this reason, an incident response called for during off-duty hours will take longer. Alert procedures will be implemented within the CST for rapid recall of assigned personnel. Assembly of personnel at the unit facility must be factored into the overall response time. If ground transportation is possible, the THREATCON guidelines apply. In the event that a WMD CST must be air transported, additional time must be factored in for preparing the unit equipment and personnel for movement, i.e., movement time to the air-field includes loading and off-loading and follow-on movement to the incident site.

Pre-positioning is an effective method of employing the WMD CST to support a DoD-approved or state-directed special event such as an Olympic venue or National Convention. In this posture the WMD CST can provide “near immediate” support and can be integrated into support plans developed for the event.
The following table dictates response objectives for specific Threat Conditions (THREATCONS). CJCS Handbook 5260, Cdrs Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Distance to Incident</th>
<th>“Time on Scene Objective”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal / TREATCON ALPHA</td>
<td>&lt; 150 Miles</td>
<td>6-8 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal / TREATCON ALPHA</td>
<td>150 Miles but &lt; 250 Miles</td>
<td>8-10 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREATCON BRAVO</td>
<td>&lt; 150 Miles</td>
<td>4-6 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREATCON BRAVO</td>
<td>150 Miles but &lt; 250 Miles</td>
<td>6-8 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREATCON CHARLIE / DELTA</td>
<td>&lt; 150 Miles</td>
<td>2-4 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREATCON CHARLIE / DELTA</td>
<td>150 Miles but &lt; 250 Miles</td>
<td>4-6 Hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THREATCON NORMAL** exists when there is no known threat. The unit has received no notice of an impending incident.

**THREATON ALPHA** exists when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel. The exact nature and extent are unpredictable and circumstances do not fully justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO. However, it may be necessary to implement selected THREATCON BRAVO measures as a result of intelligence or as a deterrent. THREATCON ALPHA must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

**THREATCON BRAVO** exists when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing hardship, affecting operational capability or aggravating relations with local authorities.

**THREATCON CHARLIE** exists when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent. Implementation of this measure for longer than a short period of time will probably create hardship and affect peacetime activities of a unit and its personnel.

**THREATCON DELTA** exists when a terrorist has occurred, or when intelligence indicates that a terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

Commanders at any level can establish THREATCONs, and subordinate commanders may establish a higher THREATCON as local conditions warrant. Threat levels should be established through coordination with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. WMD CST units will not be involved in the gathering or analysis of intelligence information, however should establish liaison with organizations assigned this responsibility.
Operational Constraints. The WMD CST is not certified as a confined space entry and operation force. Duty status may impose additional constraints if the unit is ordered to support an incident response in Title X status.

Personnel Advancement. There are numerous opportunities for career progression of CST team members within the AGR program. Potential assignments include service on the JTF-CS which provides the potential for progression all the way to the grade of Major General. Other assignment possibilities include service at the National Guard Bureau, the Army, Air or OSD Staffs (Director of Military Support Staff, Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support, or the Special Assistant for Military Assistance to Civil Authorities in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.) Opportunities also exist in other units including Air Force Civil Engineering Squadrons, Army Chemical Brigades and Battalions, Communications Squadrons, Readiness Flights, and others. Finally, opportunities exist in the State Area Commands as Plans, Operations, and Military Support Office.
CHAPTER IV
WMD CST MISSION DEVELOPMENT

Planning. One of the greatest “value added” areas of the WMD CST is the pre-incident planning and support they provide in preparation for actual deployments. Participation in local, state and federal regional planning meetings and exercises ensure the team’s capabilities are understood and applied appropriately. Through the conduct of education, training and exercises with emergency response personnel and supporting organizations, the team can have a significant impact on the preparedness of the areas they support.

WMD CST planning must be coordinated with the system(s) the team will support:

- Local Emergency Action Plans – County or City (community) leader action plans to manage disaster-related events while informing and coordinating state level emergency assistance. Emergency action plans developed by first responders and local hospitals to manage fire, injury, and law enforcement actions. Joint WMD CST and first responder EAP training facilitates operating procedures and response coordination.

- State Emergency Response Plan – coordinated plans to mobilize and make use of state resources to manage disaster related events. State ERP may or may not mirror FRP. State (ERP) WMD preparedness may be linked to available resources (e.g. Nunn-Luger-Domenici Domestic Preparedness training, standing up a WMD CST or CST (Light) WMD response force).

- Federal Response Plan – groups’ disaster assistance into 12 functional areas called Emergency Support Functions (ESF). The FRP provides standing mission assignments to designated departments and agencies with primary and support responsibilities to carry out ESF activities. Incorporates a vigorous WMD incident response.

Logistical Support. The WMD CST support civil authorities in consequence management operations, as part of the overall interagency effort to prepare for and respond to domestic WMD terrorism.

- The Defense Consequence Management Support Center (DCoMSUPCEN) is a DoD activity established to supply, sustain, and assist with initial equipment fielding for designated WMD Response Forces. The DCoMSUPCEN conducts stock management and warehousing, warranty management, integrated logistics support, and coordination and monitoring of forward area resupply and sustainment.

- The DCoMSUPCEN Emergency Resupply Activity (ERA) provides environmental, prepositioned reconstitution and float packages formed into pre-packaged stand-alone sets to be transported to resupply units engaged in operations, contingencies, special event support or exercises.

Standard Operating Procedures. Each team develops SOPs that are continually updated to reflect evolving WMD CST doctrine, command guidance, and exercise lessons learned.
Coordination. Detailed coordination of WMD CST unit's activities in the pre-incident phase should consider the following to ensure the orderly progression through all phases of WMD CST operations.

- Sources of threat information (FBI, local law enforcement, etc.)
- Detailed maps of the area (including imagery, blueprints, etc. if available.)
- Force Protection and Rules of Use of Force
- Special requirements (e.g. linguist support)
- Security clearance requirements for an active role in FRP and/or State ERP WMD response planning and or briefings
- Methods to determine the occurrence of a release, and the area or population likely to be affected by such release
- A definative interaction plan during the pre-incident phase to enhance the ability of the WMD CST to work with other response organizations during an actual incident response. WMD CST elements working in conjunction with their state, Plans Operations and Military Support Officer (POMSOs) should identify key players in the emergency response community and foster working relationships which will facilitate emergency response activities.
- Joint exercises with first responders, local state and federal emergency management agencies in their assigned area of responsibility.

Warning Order. Warning Orders received from the state or federal authorities should give the Commander, WMD CST as much advance notification of a (short) Notice, No-Notice or Immediate Response mission to facilitate his recalling and prepare the WMD CST for deployment.

Operations Security (OPSEC). Perimeter security for the incident site (cold, warm and hot zones) is provided by the supported Incident Command System and Law Enforcement organization. WMD CST personnel carrying weapons will be governed by the Rules of Use of Force established for the response mission.

- Tactical and Administrative Measures – WMD CST personnel will adhere to the established communications plan (call signs, frequencies and reporting procedures).
- Team leaders will be aware of potential media interest and limit discussion of unit operations to approved Joint Information Center (JIC) media releases.

Communications Security (COMSEC). Access to the UCS vehicle will be restricted to WMD CST personnel and authorized guests. UCS operators will restrict access to
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team (CST) Doctrine

WMD CST satellite and radio frequencies. Encryption equipment will be accounted for and safeguarded at all times.

UCS Vehicle

UCS Vehicle
CHAPTER V. OPERATIONS

Response Phases. Response operations are defined in five phases: Pre-Incident, Alert, Deploy, Response and Post-Incident.

In the **pre-incident phase**, the team completes planning, training, maintenance, and exercises to prepare for and improve response operations. Key planning activities include:

- Liaison with Civil Authorities.
- Identify all responder agencies within the area of operations and coordinate for pre-incident training and exercise opportunities for WMD CST teams.
- WMD CST Medical Team should make frequent on-site coordination with EMS, hospital care providers, and public health authorities. Planning for patient evacuation, decontamination and treatment protocols are just a few of the topics that are key to successfully mitigating a WMD incident.
- Coordinate with supporting and supported military organizations, other National Guard and Reserve Forces within their respective states, Joint/Response Task Force personnel, and other active emergency response elements (i.e. Army Technical Escort Unit).
- Maintain awareness of the many DoD agencies with whom they may have contact in a WMD response role.
- Maintain close contact with local, state, and federal law enforcement officials. Any information indicating a WMD incident potential within the area of operations should be relayed among appropriate response organizations.
• Factor in stresses of preparing for encounters with life-threatening Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological agents.

• Account for unique challenges of operating in an NBCR environment.

• Use risk analysis as a commander’s tool for ensuring the safety of the personnel operating in a hazardous or threatening environment. A risk analysis is not meant to replace sound judgement.

In the alert phase, the Command Team receives the Alert/Warning Order, validates it, executes the unit recall, assembles the unit, alerts the reach-back and integrated logistics support systems, begins identifying required information, and plans the deployment. Members are equipped with pagers to expedite this process.

Support from other WMD CST units. When an WMD CST unit is deployed for an incident response through normal Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) procedures as outlined in DoD Directive 3025.1 deployment channels, the WMD CST units located in adjacent states and regions will be notified to heighten their response posture. Due to the limited time frame for which an WMD CST can maintain operations, other WMD CST units, and other National Guard assets, may be deployed to support an incident response. In the event that an WMD CST is activated by a state Adjutant General or Governor, the National Guard Bureau operations center will be notified as soon as possible. Upon receipt of this notification, WMD CST units in adjacent states and regions will be notified to raise their alert posture to the High Threat level.

In the deployment phase, the team receives a valid deployment order, and deploys to the Area of Operations to connect with the local IC and/or the supported emergency response organization. The primary means will be using organic unit vehicles and moving via ground routes. Air movement of team and vehicles via DoD or state aircraft or helicopter transport to a predetermined staging area and follow-on transport to the incident site is an alternate form of transportation. Each mode requires detailed planning, coordination and training to effectively be executed.

In the response phase, the team performs its primary mission. Functions of the primary mission include:

Establish the WMD CST operations center at the incident site to provide command and control for all WMD CST operations:

• Mission planning and coordination
• Battle tracking
• Liaison with the lead federal agency, Joint Task Force, and Incident Command System
• Force protection plan – MOPP Levels
• Redeployment

Conduct an assessment.

• Collect the necessary information and develop the plan for identify unknown substances and/or collecting samples for analysis. This includes medical surveillance, site safety, decontamination, and communications.
• Establish reach-back communications links to designated scientists and subject matter expert labs for advisory, confirmatory, and technical information.

• Perform the survey, as required, to complete the assessment.

Advise the IC based on initial and follow-on assessments:

• Identify the WMD Hazard – key force protection and life saving task to support a WMD incident involving a known or unknown agent(s). The agent or contaminating substance must be identified – then the physical and chemical properties that make it hazardous – capable of causing harm – can be determined. After identifying the WMD hazard, the WMD CST can provide initial assessments of the effects or potential impact on public health, property, and the environment. JACE provides the WMD CST Commander a unique set of assessment tools to support initial and follow-on advisory information provided to the Incident Commander.

• Determine downwind hazard areas - There are a number of methods to determine the downwind hazard area from a WMD incident. The WMD CST can determine downwind hazard distances by:
  
  • Utilizing electronic reach-back computer link with DTRA and other state of the art modeling centers.
  
  • Performing manual modeling using organic computers and hazard modeling software tools employed by DTRA and other modeling centers.

The ICS/IC has the initial responsibility for incident site restrictions, establishing the required exclusion areas (Cold, Warm and Hot Zones) and determining the downwind hazard area. WMD CST modeling and reach-back tools can support the IC in the refinement of the downwind hazard prediction and initial hazard area determinations.

  • Protect the responders and public from the threat of exposure
  
  • Protect property and the environment
  
  • Isolate the incident scene and deny unnecessary entry
The employment of a radiological, chemical or biological agent by terrorist(s) requires the incident site be identified in three areas to safely conduct consequence management operations. These three areas - Hot zone, Warm zone and Cold zone are the operational areas, established at the incident site where only specific types of operations are permitted.

The initial hot zone is the area that the IC judges to be most affected by the WMD incident/agent. This includes any areas that the contaminant has spread or is likely to spread. Access is only permitted to personnel who are properly trained and protected and victims and casualties that need to be evacuated. The IC sets the parameters of this zone after giving consideration to the WMD agent, the volume released, the means of dissemination, the prevailing meteorological conditions and the potential effects on local topography.

Incident command system priorities within the hot zone may include rescue, search and mitigation. WMD CST priorities include identifying explosive or other physical obstacles to entry, agent detection, agent identification, sample collection and executing a safe extraction. The hot zone is also the location that contamination reduction begins (contains the front end of the decontamination station).

The warm zone is the operational area safe from downwind exposure and includes the bulk of the decontamination station where Survey Team and equipment decontamination is accomplished. Access control points connecting the hot and cold zones are also established. The level of protection worn in the warm zone is related to the level of protection that the Survey Team wears when operating in the hot zone. The same basic considerations used for the hot and warm zone influence the extent of the cold zone. In addition, the cold zone must be readily accessible and provide
the means for safety and rest. It must also be large enough to accommodate local, state and (if required) federal WMD response forces and to serve as the staging area for personnel and equipment. The operational priorities of the cold zone include providing all command and control for operations being conducted in the warm and hot zones, and insuring an area of security for emergency personnel and response forces conducting operations.

- Employing the less preferred ATP-45 manual modeling procedures.

- Determine facilities and populations at risk – Employing organic computer based hazard modeling software and through the UCS linked reach-back architecture, the WMD CST will establish its reach-back capabilities.

- Project protective measures – for first responders, emergency medical personnel operating at the incident site and medical treatment facilities and law enforcement agencies operating downwind of the incident site.

- Advise Responders on Protocols -
  
- Military chemical agents
- Military chemical agent precursors
- Known military biological agents
- Unknown biological agents (cocktail weapon)
- Dispersed radiological material

Facilitate additional response forces to mitigate the incident.

- Identify other state and federal assets that may be useful in mitigating the effects of the event.

- Help the IC develop requests for assistance for additional state or federal response capabilities.

- Provide information to assets identified to respond and bridge any civil-military communications gaps or issues.

The WMD CST may maintain engagement for further incident mitigation if state or federal authorities determine that it should be employed in a capacity, beyond its primary mission of assess, advise and facilitate. The redeployment decision will be made in concert with the Incident Commander.

In the post-incident phase, the unit redeploys, debriefs operations, performs equipment maintenance and resupply, reconstitutes its operational readiness, and resets its response posture.
Communications. Communications are a vital capability of the team. Not only is it equipped to assist in bridging communications between response units, but it can also provide on-scene information to other state and federal units preparing deployment to the site. Organizations are then prepared appropriately and understand the requests that will be made of them when they arrive, saving considerable time.

The main communications support for the deployed WMD CST units comes from the Trojan Spirit Team located at Fort Belvoir, VA, who provides NIPRNET, SIPRNET, voice and messaging services via a satellite link from the UCS to Fort Belvoir. This will give the deployed WMD CST access to the Defense Information System Network (DISN).

UCS also has the capability of direct link radio contact with the State National Guard Headquarters and the National Guard Readiness Center or any other organization with similar equipment. On-site, teams within the WMD CST will have the ability to communicate within the unit using authorized radio nets. Select teams (e.g. Command and Operations Teams) will have the capability to communicate on any radio net UCS has operational via the Tactical Digital Intercom System (TDIS). TDIS allows pushbutton access to any of the nets.
Frequency Management –

- Satellite Communication – secured frequencies are held by Fort Belvoir and assigned to individual WMD CST Elements.

- UHF/VHF Communications – coordination is accomplished at the State level to ensure frequencies are available prior to and during the response mission.

Messages and Reports – The WMD CST will submit the following reports as required by local policy and higher HQ’s guidance.

- Location Reports
- Departing Home Station
- Arriving at the incident site
- Logistics Report
- Situation Report
- Casualty Report – as directed by JTF-CS and/or RTF Operations Order, DoD and/or US Army Regulations
- Serious Incident Report – as directed by JTF-CS / RTF OPORD
- Readiness Reporting – The WMD CST will submit recurring Unit Status Reports (USR) in accordance with AR 220-1. These reports determine the unit status by comparing selected personnel, equipment and training factors and obtaining the commander’s overall assessment of the unit. The Personnel Computer/Army Status of Resources and Training System (PC/ASORTS) is the primary means for preparing and submitting unit readiness reports.
Control measures for WMD CST Operations

- Warning and Deployment Order(s) authorizations
- Formalized support requests for National level event(s)
- State Emergency Management Operations Center (EOC) have coordinated requests for WMD CST support with the:
  - Governor
  - Deputy Governor
  - The Adjutant General
  - Director, Emergency Management Operations

- Chain of Command – initially established with the dissemination and receipt of the Warning and Deployment Orders. The chain of command in support of a Federal response may be modified as the response force is built to the desired level (e.g. DCO is identified, JTF-CS publishes a revised force list).

- Situation Reports – submitted in accordance with the Senior Military Commander’s mission guidance.

**Weapons Policy.** The WMD CST is not designed nor intended to be a counter terrorism unit nor a crisis management / law enforcement unit. Unit personnel are authorized weapons for self-protection; however, a commanders risk assessment will be completed prior to arming unit personnel deploying on an actual response. Local, state and federal law enforcement personnel have police responsibilities at an incident site, not the personnel assigned to the WMD CST. Although each state authorized an WMD CST unit may have different statutes that apply to the arming of military personnel within the National Guard, no unit members should be assigned military weapons for other than accomplishing the units assigned mission, response to a WMD incident. When deploying outside of the state of assignment, special coordination with the gaining state should be completed prior to deploying with weapons. Prior to issuance of a weapon, unit members will comply with guidance provided by the National Guard Bureau for qualification and certification.
CHAPTER VII
TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Training. The CST training plan starts with individual training, builds to team and full unit collective training, and culminates in a full scale, realistic collective training experience modeled on the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs). The operational success of the CST teams is founded in the expertise and capabilities of its members for conducting domestic support operations in a NBC/R environment. As the CST teams operate in support of the local IC (usually a fire chief or police chief), they are trained to operate with the civilian emergency first responder (EFR) Incident Command System (ICS). This “response delta” is aggressively addressed in the individual and collective portions of the CST training.

Service members selected for the CST element are fully qualified in their respective military occupational specialties and branches and must complete appropriate professional development education. As part of their qualification, CST element commanders will attend the Chemical Officers Pre-Command Course. Proponent schools will allocate seats at courses like the Chemical and Medical Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, if needed. Upon completion of specialty/branch qualification, the service members of the CST elements are enrolled in the CST institutional training program.

All members of the CST elements will attend approximately seven months of intensive individual training tailored to the specific responsibilities of their assigned duty positions. The instruction includes both classroom and substantial hands-on, performance-oriented instruction. This joint, interagency, multifunctional CST institutional training maximizes the use of current civil and military courses, standards, and instructors and leverages their expertise and capabilities.

This training program employs the U.S. Army Chemical School as its foundation, and includes courses taught by the civilian EFR community (such as state fire academies and civilian first responder professional organizations) as well as courses from the U.S. Army Medical Department, U.S. Army Forces Command, the Director of Military Support, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Fire Academy, the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Emergency Management Institute. The program consolidates more than 600 hours of instruction per student with survey and Medical Team members exceeding 750 hours. Individual training requirements include live agent training at the Chemical School’s Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) and suit training for Level A and Level B Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

The individual training builds individual competencies in NBC/R procedures; operation of specialized detection equipment; and knowledge of hazardous waste operations practiced by the civilian Emergency First Responders (EFR).

The collective training for the CST elements begins with CST subordinate team training and progresses to full unit training, culminating with a CTC-like experience conducted regionally in realistic response locations. The collective training plan requires that exercises be conducted with first responders and encourages joint and interagency training.
CST team members also participate in Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) city training Table Top Exercises (TTXs) and Functional Exercises (FXs).

Continued cooperative efforts among state and federal partners refine and improve the individual, institutional, and collective training for CST teams, ensuring standardization and interoperability for our nation’s response community.

Sustainment Training. Individual sustainment training requirements will be identified and directed by the National Guard Bureau.

Advance Distributed Learning. Many of the skills necessary for maintaining WMD CST proficiencies are those that are rapidly perishable if not continuously trained and exercised. To support the sustainment training requirements of the team and minimize associated costs, multiple advanced distance learning mechanisms will be used. Interactive CD ROMS, Internet/Web Based instruction, satellite broadcasts and advanced distributed simulations should be used to meet training sustainment requirements.

Exercise Strategy. CST teams participate in three types of exercises: Simulation Exercises (SIMEX); Live Training Exercises (LTX); and Regional Training Exercises (RTX). SIMEXs and LTXs are conducted as early as possible after the completion of individual and collective phases of respective training program. CST teams are required to undergo one SIMEX and one LTX annually. Participation in RTXs will occur as soon as possible after completion of a SIMEX and LTX. Participation in RTXs will be coordinated between CST teams, the JTF-CS and the federal, state, and local responders within their designated federal region.

Simulation Exercises (SIMEX). SIMEXs will focus on CST and Follow-on Response Elements key leaders and will be conducted similar to current constructive SIMEXs. Constructive SIMEXs use computer software (JANUS, SPECTRUM tailored to unit mission) to replicate units, their behavior and associated outcomes. SIMEXs will be conducted after the completion of initial individual and collective training for all CST teams.

Live Training Exercises (LTX). LTXs focus on enhancing proficiency on CST METL tasks and are conducted in the same manner as current Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) LTXs. These LTXs can be either of the three traditional LTX categorizations, Stand Alone, Integrated, or Mission Support. Stand Alone LTXs, single function exercises requiring only one branch (e.g., chemical) to accomplish a collective task, and Integrated LTXs, multifunctional exercises requiring the integrated employment of two or more branches to accomplish a collective task, will be the predominant CST LTX categories.

Commanders and Div (Ex) Observer Controller-Trainees (OC-T) should develop creative, real world LTX scenarios, with the goal to achieve realistic training replicating the unit’s operational mission and environment. Members should complete a SIMEX prior to participation in an Integrated LTX to maximize the benefit of the training event.
Regional Training Exercises (RTX). The ultimate goal of an RTX is to improve operational readiness. Joint federal, state, and local RTXs offer maximum training opportunities across all METL tasks. Additionally, they provide excellent opportunities for interagency cooperation and coordination among responders. The Nunn-Luger-Domenici (NLD) city training program offers training opportunities in both Tabletop and Functional Exercises.

Tabletop Exercises (TTX). The TTX usually involve senior staff, elected or appointed officials or other key staff with emergency management responsibilities gathering in an informal setting to discuss simulated emergency situations. This type of exercise is intended to stimulate discussion of various issues concerning a hypothetical situation and the plans, policies, and procedures, or systems guiding the response to and recovery. Generally, participants consider such questions as coordination, assignment of responsibilities, post-event mitigation priorities and similar issues. The TTX is typified by a non-threatening, low stress environment and is an excellent format to use to familiarize newly assigned/appointed emergency management personnel and senior officials with established or emerging emergency management concepts, plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities.

Functional Exercises (FE). The FE is designed to test or evaluate individual capabilities, multiple functions, or activities within a function or interdependent groups of functions. Exercise activities are usually under a time constraint and an evaluation or critique is normally held at the end of the exercise. Unlike the usual conference room setting typical of a TTX, the FE will take place in an operations center, field environment, or a combination of the two. A typical FE might be designed to test and evaluate the centralized emergency operations capability and response of one or more elements of government or an Emergency Support Function (ESF) under the FRP in a stressful environment. The exercise location could be an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with real or simulated outside resources.

Full-Scale Exercises (FSE). The FSE is used to evaluate the operational capabilities of emergency management systems, interactively, over an extended period of time. The exercise involves testing a major portion of approved EOP elements and organizations in a realistic, highly stressful environment. Actual mobilization and movement of personnel and resources are required to demonstrate coordination, response and recovery capability. Normally the EOC is activated and field command posts may be established. FSE are the largest and most complex of the three types of exercises and may involve participation at the Federal, regional, State, and local levels.