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**NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE
INTEGRATION**

by

Jon Anthony O'Connor

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Steven Ashby
Robert Simeral

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NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION

Jon A. O'Connor
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., Roanoke College, 1994

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2004**

Author: Jon Anthony O'Connor

Approved by: Steven Ashby
Thesis Advisor

Robert Simeral
Second Reader

James Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This thesis contends that Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence would be more effective in the Global War on Terrorism if they were more integrated. Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration should bring Sailors and Marines together in all aspects of warfare to conduct coordinated intelligence.

This does not imply that Sailors and Marines should be unified into one force. In fact, it is the unique skills of each service that make them indispensable to the other. Naval Intelligence provides the large scale team of professionals, the robust onboard systems, and communications, and the air intelligence/targeteering expertise. The Marine Corps provides detailed human intelligence in austere, anti-access environments. Designed for highly accurate targeting and raids ashore, Marine Corps intelligence can provide the timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence needed to fight the global war on terrorism for Expeditionary Strike Groups, Carrier Strike Groups, and even Surface Action Groups.

The Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations calls for further integration from both the Navy and the Marine Corps. As Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21 merge into Naval Power 21, the need for further Navy and Marine Corps integration becomes clear. This will challenge current organizational mindsets. Nevertheless, sea based Sailors and Marines will have to be able to operate side by side seamlessly in order to be victorious in the Global War on Terrorism.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTEGRATION

Intelligence has always played a key role in U.S. military operations. The Navy and the Marine Corps have served their respective operators well in the past as separate elements. With the advent of the Global War on Terror, however, the needs of the nation have changed dramatically. Only an integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team can effectively respond to the challenges of this new war. VADM Jacoby states, “There should be no stovepipes in Intelligence – collaboration is the greatest combat multiplier we have today, and our intelligence professionals must be prepared to operate jointly.”¹

The Naval Operational Concept for Joint Operations clearly states that there is an ongoing need for further Navy and Marine Corps integration in order to develop more effective warfighting concepts, doctrine, and capabilities to meet the threats of the 21st Century. The merging of Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21 into Naval Power 21 is one such effort to unify strategy. Naval Power 21 will clearly outline how the services can fight more effectively as an integrated team to meet the threats of the 21st Century.²

Currently, the Navy can use a constellation of national and theater sensors to collect and analyze large-scale troop movements, airfields, SAM systems, and other fixed targets as was proven in the last gulf war. Terrorist cells, however, can remain concealed from traditional national sensors. Terrorist cells hidden under jungle canopies and in urban areas, for example, could elude detection and be resistant to aerial attack.

The Marine Corps has intelligence units available to collect intelligence ashore. Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) teams and HUMINT Exploitation Teams (HETs) are trained to go in advance of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to ensure the

¹ VADM L.E. Jacoby. “Keys to the Future of Defense Intelligence”. *Intelligence Community Notes*. (Jan 2004): 2.

² U.S. Department of the Navy, *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations*. (Washington DC, June 2003), i.

security of the landing zones.³ R&S can collect on smaller scale ground activity, but the Marine Corps has limitations as to the availability of systems on the ground to disseminate the intelligence collected. Marine Corps Intelligence on the ground also has limitations as to connectivity with national assets and intelligence that may be relevant to the operation. In addition, a sea based, FORCEnetted force would limit the size and number of intelligence systems needed ashore.

An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team would serve to improve the overall capabilities of both services. The Navy would benefit from ground-based intelligence for strikes in jungle or urban environments for example. The Marine Corps would benefit from the Navy's more sophisticated onboard system connectivity with linked communications to forces ashore. As Naval Power 21 concepts such as Sea Basing and FORCEnet become the new way of waging war, the need for Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration is all the more urgent.

The objective of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Integration is to provide the best possible product to the warfighter. The goal of integration should be the optimization of combined arms warfare in a conflict by bringing together the skills provided by each service. The right mixture of intelligence can provide the warfighter the intelligence he or she needs to strike the right target at the right time with the right weapon while defending his or her force from counterattack. Knowing what resource is best for the particular mission is a part of the training that is required. This training is valuable for Navy and Marine Corps integration, but also within a joint force structure.

B. INTEGRATION NOT UNIFICATION

Integration in this context means a unity of effort towards accomplishing the specific mission. This does not imply that Sailors and Marines should be merged into one service. On the contrary, it is the unique skill sets of each service that allow them to work so well as a team. Naval Intelligence's skills with seaborne threats, shipboard systems, and coordination with theater and national assets are complemented perfectly by the Marine Corps' skills with ground-based reconnaissance and surveillance, human intelligence, and counterintelligence.

³ LtCol Michael Groen, USMC. "Blue Diamond Intelligence: Division-Level Intelligence Operations During Operation Iraqi Freedom". *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Feb 2004): 22.

Ideally, there should be no attempts to mimic the other service or to duplicate efforts. Integration only requires training and understanding on how the other service operates and what they can bring to the overall mission. Leave the skill sets with the respective service, but bring those service members together in the various shipboard intelligence centers for planning, briefing, and analysis. Additionally, integrate staffs ashore with interservice exchanges of personnel. Such integration concepts should be introduced early in a service member's career. The Navy and the Marine Corps as well as the Army and the Air Force will benefit from this integration effort.

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II. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ALIGNMENTS

A. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Fusion Analysis

Naval Intelligence interfaces with various national and theater level assets to produce a tailored, useful product to the warfighter. This is not easy. There are volumes of information available to the intelligence professional aboard ships today ranging from raw data to refined analysis. The information routinely is contradictory, inaccurate, or simply incomplete. Even with the introduction of data mining tools and intelligent search agents, the analysis of this information by an experienced intelligence officer or intelligence specialist is essential onboard a deployed vessel. Working in coordination with FORCEnetted systems, the intelligence professional is capable of finding the relevant and accurate information that he or she can translate into useful intelligence for operations.

The challenge of this process is more understandable when it becomes clear how much information and intelligence is available. JWICS, SIPRNET, GCCS-M, and NIPRNET provide information from various national agencies, theater assets, joint intelligence centers, news sources, and organic (platform-based) collection systems.

Intelligence can take many forms as well. They are based on their means of collection. The intelligence professional can conduct all-source fusion analysis to evaluate intelligence reports for their validity and relevancy to the operator. Although this process can be time consuming now, new human-systems interfaces and data mining tools will enhance the speed of the analysis by providing more relevant and refined information to the unit analyst. The resulting intelligence is invaluable to the conduct of operations. Even with the dangers of being overloaded with raw data, it is still better to have a broader range of information available to make analytical determinations and predictions.

The Navy is currently developing and fielding a unique system to integrate sensors, weapons, warriors, platforms, command and control, and networks together in a robust and seamless way to introduce a new way of warfighting in the 21st Century. This

system is called FORCEnet. CVs, CVNs, LCCs, LHDs, and LHAs will have a fully staffed and fully FORCEnetted intelligence center onboard from which they can provide the intelligence needed for an operation or campaign. These systems will be connected to theater and national assets using advanced, digital communications. Shipboard Challenge Athena communications and the Global Broadcast Network (GBN) receive high data rates from the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) via satellite.⁴

2. Carrier Strike Group Intelligence

Naval Intelligence support to operations traditionally has taken on several forms. The majority of emphasis for Naval Intelligence has recently been in support of strike warfare. Intelligence professionals, Intelligence Officers and Intelligence Specialists are assigned to carrier airwings (CVWs) to provide accurate intelligence to Naval Aviators for mission planning purposes using all-source fusion analysis. CVW intelligence briefs threats to the mission, debriefs returning pilots for intelligence data, continuously updates the strike plot, and provides target intelligence. Bomb hit assessments are then sent out to the theater intelligence center for analysis.

The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) staff has an N2 and an assistant N2. The CSG N2's primary responsibility is to the CSG Admiral and to all the components of his or her CSG. This N2 provides a full spectrum of intelligence from tactical intelligence for the CSG to force protection intelligence for CSG vessels for port calls.

Finally, the carrier intelligence team operates the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC). This team provides intelligence for the carrier's commanding officer, maintains the spaces inside CVIC, and provides secure systems connectivity for CVIC.

Each component of the CSG has worked well together over the years. As these units are integrated into FORCEnet, the more effective the intelligence will be provided to the warfighters. FORCEnet stands ready to transform the process.

3. Expeditionary Strike Group Intelligence

The Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) represents a new concept for the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Expeditionary Strike Group takes the primary three ships in the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which are the LHA or LHD, the LPD, and the LSD,

⁴ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Vision, Presence, Power*. (Washington DC, 2003), 128.

and augments them with a CG, a DDG, an FFG or DD, and an SSN. Although this force structure has been used in the past, the means by which they will be employed will truly be innovative. The result will be a combined arms platform capable of accomplishing an additional range missions beyond the ARG alone.

In the ARG, Navy and Marine Corps intelligence could work separately. The Marine Corps only used the amphibious vessels as a platform from which to enter a fully accessible theater of operations to embark onto land. Once there, Navy and Marine Corps operations would essentially be separate. The Marine Corps would handle the land campaign as the Commander, Landing Force (CLF) while the Navy would manage threats to the ARG ships as the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF).

The ESG does not represent business as usual for either the Navy or the Marine Corps. In order for key concepts of Naval Power 21 to be realized, the Navy and the Marine Corps must integrate more fully. Nowhere is Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration more essential than in the ESG.

4. Surface Action Groups and SSGNs

In addition to CSGs and ESGs, Naval Intelligence extends out to Surface Action Groups (SAGs) and will extend to SSGNs. Naval Intelligence is vital to the effective execution of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs). Intelligence on the cargo and crew of merchant vessels is essential now more than ever during the Global War on Terrorism. Intelligence Specialists on surface combatants, designated as 3905s, currently support these operations. MIOs may present another opportunity to bring Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence personnel together. Marines could be used to augment SEAL teams in performing MIOs on opposed boardings.

SAGs and SSGNs in the future require extensive targeting intelligence for TLAM strikes ashore. As SAGs and SSGNs move to support ground forces ashore, Navy and Marine Corps integration is essential to prevent blue on blue engagements and accurately target enemy units in the vicinity of blue forces.

5. Challenges to Naval Intelligence

The traditional intelligence cycle has successfully supported strike warfare for decades aboard carriers. It proved itself once again in OEF and OIF. In the rocky, desert environments of Afghanistan and Iraq, national, space-borne intelligence collectors were

effective in acquiring targets. Theater UAVs also augmented collection efforts. Although this was sufficient intelligence support for the air campaigns in both wars, ground forces were still needed to conduct the subterranean and urban searches.

The Global War on Terror will challenge current intelligence cycles. This new war may take our forces to different regions of the world with different terrains. Regions covered with jungles, forests, swamps, caves, and large urban environments provide challenges for both intelligence collection and analysis for strikes and raids ashore.

For example, primitive terrorist encampments in tropical jungles would be hard to detect. They are hard to image or penetrate using active sensors. Currently micro UAVs, unattended ground sensors (UGS), and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) are being developed to explore and penetrate austere environments around the world. Until these sensors are fielded in greater numbers in the future, however, human intelligence remains the single most effective means of collection.

Small terrorist encampments would require highly precise air strikes or raids to be effective. Accurate intelligence from R&S units becomes indispensable. National intelligence can currently draw attention to these threats. They can then pass off more detailed intelligence collection to military assets and bring the level of accuracy needed for a precision strike or raid.

On the other end of the spectrum, the Global War on Terrorism may take U.S. forces into the urban environments of the world. The urban environment offers plenty of hiding places for terrorist cells surrounded by innocent bystanders, hospitals, mosques, churches, and non-governmental organizations. The urban environment also offers terrorists connectivity with the Internet, cell phones, and telephone lines. A terrorist that relocates regularly can avoid detection in the near term. The Internet has thousands of chat rooms and encoded sites from which terrorist cells can communicate and coordinate attacks.

Urban environments around the world offer some of the most challenging military targets. For the Navy, smaller, more precise weapons may be the answer. However, the extensive detail of the intelligence needed for these types of attacks also requires HUMINT in combination with future micro-UAVs, SIGINT, and perhaps OSINT reporting.

B MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE

1. MAGTF Intelligence

The primary mission of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) intelligence is to support all elements of the MAGTF from the Command Element (CE) down to the single Marine on the ground.⁵ Marine Corps Intelligence provides the Marines on the ground with the relevant intelligence those Marines need to conduct their operations whether that is a raid or a full-scale assault on the beach.

Intelligence is collected through reconnaissance on the ground. These Marine Intelligence teams have a variety of organic collectors available to them to collect on enemy troop movements. They can collect on the type of terrain, the enemy order of battle, movements of forces using HUMINT Exploitation Teams (HETs), Reconnaissance and Surveillance Teams (R&S), and Radio Reconnaissance Teams to collect SIGINT on enemy intentions.⁶

Whether at sea or ashore the Marines rely heavily upon theater and national assets for intelligence support. While at sea, there remains an issue with a redundancy of effort with their Navy counterparts in collections and watches. While ashore, Marine Corps Intelligence personnel set up mobile sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) to support their commanders. A collaborative effort between Navy and Marine Corps personnel would keep the command elements at sea and reduce the size of the equipment and logistics footprint ashore using FORCEnet and Sea Basing concepts.

2. Challenges to Marine Corps Intelligence

Naval transformation remains the primary challenge to the Marine Corps. Naval Power 21's concepts of Sea Basing and FORCEnet are reshaping the way the Navy and Marine Corps fight. If the Marine Corps is to employ Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) and Sea Basing in the future, then they will need to review how they perform their intelligence support for their commander and coordinate that support at sea. STOM involves the concept of using the naval forces at sea to maneuver ground forces and to deliver ship-based artillery and fire support for power projection ashore.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Marine Corps Strategy 21*, (Washington DC, 2003), 2-3.

⁶ Ibid.

A sea based MAGTF either at the MEU or MEB size will be able to use the sea as a maneuver space using the Naval forces available to them. Marine Corps Intelligence will remain focused upon the ground objectives but integration with the Navy, while sea based and FORCEnetted, will facilitate a better intelligence flow of information to and from national resources while relaying the tailored relevant intelligence to the dispersed forces ashore so they can more effectively collaborate.

C. CURRENT INTEGRATION SUCCESSES

1. On the CSG

Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence has already undertaken several initiatives to become more integrated starting with the Navy and Marine Corps staffs at the Pentagon.

A Marine Corps hornet squadron occasionally augments the CVW. When this happens, the Marine Squadron Intelligence Professionals are fully integrated into the CVW intelligence team during work ups. In fact, airwings that are integrated have found Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals to be very beneficial in discussing the ground picture for more effective support in the carrier's strike plot in CVIC.

In addition, the Marine Corps squadron has benefited from the resources in CVIC for strike warfare.⁷ In particular, the CVW Targeteer provides invaluable targeting intelligence to the Marine Corps squadron. The Marine Corps squadron benefits from this targeting process. Navy and Marine Corps integration specifies that the Navy Targeteer has valuable intelligence to provide to both the Navy and Marine Corps squadrons and can do so without compromising his or her support to the Navy. In fact, Targeteer support to the Marine Corps is beneficial to the overall effectiveness of the mission.

CVW intelligence integration goes further. Naval Intelligence officers are assigned to work with Marine Aviators to develop strike planning profiles and processes. This integration has paid benefits to both services. The Navy benefits from Marine Corps skills in ground intelligence and intelligence support for close air support missions and the Marine Corps gets to deploy a squadron on the carrier to forward deploy. The Marine Corps also benefits from Naval Intelligence support afloat.

⁷ Donald R. Bouchoux. "Navy-Marine Corps TacAir Integration is the Future". *Proceedings*. (Mar 2003): 106.

2. On the ESG

On the ESG there also have been a series of intelligence integration successes. Navy and Marine Corps Cryptologists, knowing that they have similar skills, have decided to integrate manpower and resources together on the LHAs and LHDs to more efficiently work duty rotations and eliminate redundancy of effort on the watches.

The ESG concept has boosted interest in further integration of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence teams afloat. While the MEU remains at sea, Naval Intelligence can support them with their own shipboard systems.

The Marine Corps' the Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) has served them very effectively in past conflicts. Its thorough planning style is exactly what the Marines need for assaults ashore. The R2P2 process is starting to be adopted by the entire ESG in order to support ESG strike operations as a whole using a Navy and Marine Corps team.⁸

Finally, Marine Corps Intelligence is better suited, but not perfect in supporting SEAL teams. The detail provided by the Marine Corps on the ground picture is pertinent to the SEAL teams need to plan raids ashore in support of operations. Currently, a few Marine Corps Intelligence units provide some support to deployed SEAL teams.⁹

3. Other Staffs

Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence has had many successes at integrating at the staff level. Of course military staffs come in all shapes and sizes and missions. Numbered Fleet Staffs offer opportunities for Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals to integrate plans and analysis at the operational level of warfare.

Shore staffs are extremely conducive to an integrated staff environment as well. Whether it be for exercises, planning, facility support, or force protection, Navy and Marine Corps integrated intelligence staffs can quickly come together to work as a team to provide the best possible intelligence to their warfighters.

⁸ LtCol Aldridge, USMC, interview by author, notes, USS Peleliu LHA 5, 25 August 2003.

⁹ CDR Cole, USN, interview by author, notes, USS Peleliu LHA 5, 24 August 2003.

4. Fleet and Joint Intelligence Centers

For theater level intelligence reporting, Fleet level staffs and Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) are additional venues for Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Integration. Here, Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals can work at the strategic level to support Naval Operations.

They can work alongside Army and Air Force Intelligence Professionals at the Joint Intelligence Centers to produce intelligence to the warfighters at every level of warfare.¹⁰ Service specific skills are still valuable for intelligence preparation of the battlespace, but joint collaboration becomes more vital every year.

¹⁰ Major Anne Weinberg, USMC, interview by author, notes, Pentagon, 11 July 2003.

III. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE AND NAVAL POWER 21

A. CONTINUING INTEGRATION

Although there have been many successes up and down in the integration process for the Navy and the Marine Corps, there are still opportunities for further integration of intelligence efforts as Naval Power 21 concepts quickly become a reality for the fleet. Naval Power 21 is an integration concept set forth in the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOC) signed by the CNO and the CMC. Naval Power 21 is a merging of the tenets of Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21.¹¹ The resulting doctrine will merge the talents and capabilities of the Navy and the Marine Corps seamlessly in the battlespace.

Intelligence integration needs to take place at all levels of warfare. Intelligence integration afloat for planning, staffing, and coordination should employ a Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team concept to support the overall, integrated Navy and Marine Corps Team. The resulting team will be able to provide the persistent reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence needed for 21st Century warfare.

B. NAVAL POWER 21

1. Sea Strike

Sea Strike is at the core of Naval Power 21. The tenants of Sea Strike are centered around the Navy and the Marine Corps' ability to project power ashore. For the CSG, this will mean enhanced, precision strike by using ISRT (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting) capabilities, time-sensitive strike, information operations, and ship-to-objective maneuver.¹² For the ESG, Sea Strike will mean power projection through three different means, from the sea, from the air, and from the land.

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations*. (Washington DC, June 2003), i.

¹² U.S. Department of the Navy, *The Naval Transformational Roadmap*. (Washington DC, July 2002), 2.

The goal of Sea Strike and Navy and Marine Corps integration is the optimization of combined arms warfare and to improve effectiveness of an integrated force as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

This approach provides more capabilities to the Combatant Commander and more options for the President. These leaders will have the capability through the Navy and the Marine Corps to not only strike the right target at the right time, but also be able to employ the right weapon for the job. The right weapon in combined arms warfare includes a spectrum from psychological operations up to a 2000lb GPS guided bomb.

For Sea Strike to be effective, it depends upon actionable intelligence. Navy and Marine Corps intelligence will allow for hyper-accurate strike capabilities to enhance time-sensitive, precision strike and to reduce fratricide. ISRT combines the four disciplines together in a seamless and integrated process. This intelligence will be exploited using the Joint Fires Network (JFN). The JFN will allow for Time-Critical Targeting (TCT)/Time-Critical Strike (TCS) by quickly providing targeting data to the nearest or most effective shooter.¹³

For Marines ashore or embarked on the ESG, FORCEnetted intelligence will provide for greatly enhanced combined arms operations including: close air support, surface gunfire support, artillery support, and combat search and rescue (CSAR).

Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence is able to provide the warfare commander the specific and accurate data better together than separately. Again, on the CSGs, Marine Corps Intelligence can provide invaluable ground intelligence for close air support and strike warfare. On the ESG, the Marine Corps can provide even more accurate ground intelligence through their R&S teams ashore. In fact, because of their presence on the ground, the ESG can provide more accurate ground intelligence for their organic strikers.

With the introduction of ship-based unmanned vehicles and their associated sensor modules, Naval ISRT will be enhanced dramatically. Unmanned vehicles will include: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Each

¹³ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Vision, Presence, Power*. (Washington DC, 2003), 140.

category of unmanned vehicle will possess different kinds of interchangeable, mission specific sensor modules unique to that platform's capabilities.

For example, a squadron of UAVs with atmospheric sensor modules deployed from the CSG and the ESG can loiter over targets to provide targeting data and real-time bomb hit assessments for the warfare commander. In this way, Navy UAVs at various altitudes can provide ISRT to Navy and Marine Corps commanders during a campaign.

Only organic sensors located on FORCEnetted, unmanned vehicles would provide the timely, target specific data that is needed during the Global War on Terrorism. In the sea basing concept, the strike groups will need organic collection assets in order to perform their missions most effectively. Given the requirement to operate in anti-access environments, the need for organic assets becomes clear.

The staff's Navy and Marine Corps intelligence officers should manage these and other ISRT assets. The intelligence team, through national assets, has the knowledge to know where these assets would best be used to exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities. Operations Centers should have an intelligence watchstander's station. From here Intelligence Professionals can direct ISRT assets during a time critical campaign or strike for the commander in real time. Intelligence will also be able to provide situational updates to the commander from national or theater intelligence centers. Again, this intelligence station will help augment FORCEnet capabilities.

This watch station represents a significant step in further integrating intelligence with operations. Both Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence personnel could man this station depending upon the operation. This would allow them to collaborate to accomplish the mission at hand. During a strike or a raid, the leading staff intelligence officers from both the Navy and the Marine Corps should occupy this station. The benefits of integrating Navy and the Marine Corps Intelligence with operations will become clear as FORCEnet connects forces on the battlefield.

2. Sea Shield

Sea Shield is another key element in Naval Power 21. It involves full dimensional protection of the strike group. The CSGs and the ESGs can protect the

group and maintain access in a high threat environment.¹⁴ The Department of the Navy states that, “Persistent supremacy of the sea and littoral battlespace continues to be at the heart of U.S. national strategy.”¹⁵ Sea Shield will provide theater and air missile defense, littoral sea control, and homeland defense.¹⁶ Sea Shield operations within the ESG can be conducted in three major areas: air, surface, and subsurface.

FORCEnetted integrated intelligence will allow for Sea Shield manned and unmanned assets to network and develop a user defined operating picture of the surrounding threats to the CSG or ESG using various sensor modules. For example, aircraft, submarines, and surface combatants will be able to share a common integrated undersea picture from which the decision maker can more effectively track and prosecute enemy submarines. This would be the same for a common, integrated air picture and a common, integrated surface picture. This process allows for more focused operations with the end result being a faster, more accurate elimination of threats to the strike groups and protected assets.

All of these sea shield elements represent information that can be transformed into useful intelligence. This intelligence can provide the commander the best situational awareness of the battlespace possible. This intelligence will be graphically displayed within the strike group’s Operations Center. In the high-tempo war of tomorrow this near real-time, accurate intelligence is indispensable to the warfare commander to protect his or her forces.

3. Sea Basing

“As enemy access to weapons of mass destruction grows, and the availability of overseas bases declines, it is compelling both militarily and politically to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, networked sea bases.”¹⁷ Strike Groups can act alone as a small Navy and Marine Corps sea base or it can be expanded to include additional strike groups and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPSs). Sea Basing allows more effective Sea Strike and Sea Shield capabilities by

¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Vision, Presence, Power*. (Washington DC, 2003), 7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Navy, *The Naval Transformational Roadmap*. (Washington DC, July 2002), 3.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of the Navy, *The Naval Transformational Roadmap*. (Washington DC, July 2002), 8.

combining strike groups. Sea Basing objectives are to accelerate employment time of forces and allow for enhanced positioning of joint assets.¹⁸

The sea base will be able to expand up to the size necessary to conduct large-scale operations from the sea. Sea Basing multiplies the Sea Strike and Sea Shield capabilities of the force using FORCENet concepts. Finally, the Sea Basing concept makes it essential that further Navy and Marine Corps integration occur. Integration in logistics, fires, intelligence, command and control, force protection, and information operations are critical to the effectiveness of the sea base.

For example, a sea based MEB can be augmented by Navy F/A-18s and EA-6Bs for additional striking power and electronic attack. Navy and Marine Corps special operations forces can be tailored and expanded to cover an even broader range of missions and targets within the theater of operations. It is clear that the sea base quickly becomes a formidable power projection force, but only if Navy and Marine Corps integration continues including intelligence integration.

Integrated Sea Basing will provide the Combatant Commander a full set of flexible response options based upon escalation dominance. In other words, in case the enemy escalates the conflict to the next level, U.S. forces can always top that by bringing more forces, more quickly to the campaign than the enemy can possibly hope to field. This fact alone acts as a powerful deterrence to conflict escalation in future campaigns. Sea Basing also provides flexibility in staging large combat forces in support of a campaign.

Sealift represents an essential component to the effectiveness of the Sea Basing concept. Again, Navy and Marine Corps logistical integration is another key to bringing about maximum efficiency and subsequent success of the operation. MPSs, which do not have to enter a port to offload supplies, will be able to ferry the right logistics supplies to the sea base at the right time in support of the forces at sea and ashore. “Prepositioned ships and surge sealift directly support Marine Corps Assault Echelon and Assault Follow-On Echelon operations, as well as Naval Construction Battalion (Seabee) Force units.”¹⁹

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Navy, *The Naval Transformational Roadmap*. (Washington DC, July 2002), 4.

Sea Basing is the impetus for further Navy and Marine Corps integration and intelligence integration. As Marines remain at sea for resupply, command and control, force protection, and operational maneuver from the sea, the need to integrate with the Navy's FORCEnet becomes more urgent. The resulting integration through FORCEnet will be more effective than with the two units working independently.

For Sea Basing, FORCEnetted integrated intelligence will network the various ships of the sea base together not just through user defined interfaces, but through VTCs, intranets like the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), collaboration tools, and other communication systems that will link together not just operations cells, but the planning and intelligence cells of the sea base. This will allow for staffs and associated planners to be located on not just one ship, but dispersed throughout the sea base.²⁰

4. FORCEnet

FORCEnet lies at the core of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence in the 21st Century. FORCEnet is the system of systems that integrates weapons, warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, and platforms together. FORCEnet will develop tailored information about the operational environment, network it out on an open architecture, and display it to the right decision maker at every level of warfare at the right time in a way that he or she can quickly understand it to enhance their knowledge and awareness of the operating environment.

A major component of FORCEnet involves intelligence support that refines and analyzes the massive amount of information for the decision maker. Networking real-time, accurate intelligence into the process is vital to the commander. Additionally, the need for a user defined intelligence picture employing both Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals needs to take place at all levels of warfare.

CNO Tasker #65 calls for the integration of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence, but it also goes one step further. It calls for the horizontal integration of intelligence with operations and command and control (C2). Navy FORCEnet and other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives under VADM Cebrowski, USN (Ret.) are

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Navy, *The Naval Transformational Roadmap*. (Washington DC, July 2002), 26.

²⁰ CDR James Dick, USN, CNO N513, interview by author, Pentagon, 02 July 2003.

working to shorten the sensor to shooter timeline.²¹ The FORCEnet concept will maintain the decision making advantage during a campaign. Intelligence professionals will be called upon to work along side operators in a near real-time environment. A combined Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team will have to be accurate and relevant within a greatly abbreviated timeline.

“FORCEnet is the architecture of warriors, sensors, networks, decision aids, and supporting systems integrated into a highly adaptive, human-centric, comprehensive maritime system that operates from seabed to space, from sea to land.”²² Organic sensors on UAVs, UUVs, aircraft, submarines, and ships and non-organic sensors at the theater or national level will collect the relevant intelligence for the decision maker.

As mentioned, FORCEnetted, integrated intelligence is essential to the combined sea based operations of the Navy and the Marine Corps. VADM Jacoby states, “Integration of highly skilled intelligence professionals with leading edge technology to discover information and create knowledge provides warning, identifies opportunities, and delivers overwhelming advantage to our Warfighters, Defense Planners, and Defense and National Security policymakers.”²³ In Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing integrated intelligence will play a key role in supporting the warfighters and the warfare commander. Through ISRT, the JFN, and support from national and theater intelligence assets, integrated Navy and Marine Corps intelligence provided to the warfighters will be revolutionary in its speed, accuracy, and relevancy.

Three-dimensional display tools have great potential for bringing together cognitively manageable information and intelligence for the analyst. Various user defined screens and displays will provide raw sensor data, all source fusion intelligent agents, and the decision maker’s intelligence requirements. For example, these interfaces can provide 3-D cutaways of the ocean, the air, and the ground picture including targets, threats, and terrain in either two or three dimensions.

²¹ U.S. Department of the Navy, *CNO Tasker #65: Develop a plan to integrate USN-USMC logistics, command and control, and intelligence organizations*. (Washington DC, 01 July 2003), 1.

²² U.S. Department of the Navy, *The Naval Transformational Roadmap*. (Washington DC, July 2002), 4.

²³ VADM L.E. Jacoby. “Keys to the Future of Defense Intelligence”. *Intelligence Community Notes*. (Jan 2004): 2.

User defined interfaces will be used extensively in FORCEnet. Decision makers as well as analysts will have these tools and interfaces available to them to enhance the flow of relevant, timely, and accurate intelligence and information throughout the fleet. Aircraft, ships, submarines, and ground forces of the strike group will be linked together in FORCEnet. This will allow all members to receive and digest the intelligence that is relevant to them regardless of where they are within the battlespace. Additionally, this system would allow for speed of decision and pinpoint accuracy for strikes and MEU(SOC) raids inland.

FORCEnetted, sea based, integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence is keeping with the spirit of Naval Power 21. Additionally, it meets the requirements laid out in CNO Tasker #65. Finally, Navy and Marine Corps intelligence integration puts the Navy and Marine Corps Team ahead of the pack to meet Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives regarding network-centric operations.

5. Global Concept of Operations

Sea Power 21's Global Concept of Operations develops the concept of having various strike groups. The Navy has created ESGs, CSGs, SSGNs, and SAGs so that the total number of available Naval Strike Groups rises to 33 independent strike groups instead of 12 Carrier Battlegroups. This increased presence allows for maximum flexibility to the Combatant Commander. Naval forces will be readily available to respond at short notice.

The Global Concept of Operations allows the Navy and the Marine Corps to sustain the 1/4/2/1 U.S. strategic requirement for the armed forces. This states that forces have to be able to provide for homeland defense, provide forward deterrence in four theaters, swiftly defeat two aggressors simultaneously, and deliver decisive victory in one of those two conflicts.²⁴ This strategy and increase of forces around the globe will provide for greater presence but will demand even more timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence from both the Navy and the Marine Corps.

This strategy will require a shift in force structure. As information overload becomes more of a problem and the Global War on Terrorism requires fewer forces with

²⁴ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Vision, Presence, Power*. (Washington DC, 2003), 10.

greater intelligence, the demands placed upon Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals is due to increase around the fleet. An integrated Navy and Marine Corps intelligence team would be better suited to meeting the great intelligence demands of the post-September 11th world.

The ESG already has a robust Navy and Marine Corps team onboard. The CSG needs to employ a greater number of Marines for staff, ship, and airwing support. CSG Marine Intelligence could support the ground intelligence picture including better intelligence accuracy for combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions. All strike groups would benefit from the intelligence integration process complemented by sensor modules.

6. Sea Trial and Sea Warrior

Sea Trial is an essential process in integrating the Navy and Marine Corps Team. Training is key to unlocking the potential of the integration process. Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration is contingent on the right training going to the right people at the right time. Additionally, cultural and service barriers need to come down between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Communication is key to understanding each service and being able to fully appreciate what each service can bring to the fight.

In the 21st Century, the Navy and the Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals need to exercise and operate together as one unit in order to most effectively engage in combat operations with a single objective. The Marine Corps, when combined with Naval components, represents a large portion of the power projection capability of the sea services.

The Marine Corps already performs the most effective combined arms warfare out of any of the services. Marine Corps Intelligence represents a robust, layered ISR collection capability on the ground. However, they can learn to be better and more effective working in combination with U.S. Naval Operators and Intelligence

Professionals. CAPT Petra stated, “Combat operations today demand that carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, and Marine expeditionary units work as effective combined-arms teams.”²⁵

Although initial training should remain separate and focused on the needs of each service, the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence pipelines should learn to appreciate the combat capabilities of each other while going through basic training, the Naval Academy, ROTC, Officer Candidate School, and at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC). Once this is established, the Navy and Marine Corps Team will understand the greater combat potential found in integrating operations as well as intelligence.

The Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) at Dam Neck, Virginia is an excellent venue to begin Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration initiatives. New Intelligence Officers and Intelligence Specialists from the Navy and the Marine Corps have a unique opportunity to learn from each other and integrate within the schoolhouse. This initial, integrated training at NMITC will have an impact on integration in the fleet.

Again, training at NMITC will still proceed to teach Sailors and Marines the specific skills that they require to do their jobs the best at sea and on the ground. It is this sea and ground orientation that is valuable in the integration process. The integration training will focus on getting the Sailors and Marines to work as a team on a staff and in the tactical environment.

The integration of training also needs to educate the Navy about the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps about the Navy. It should cover all areas of operations from intelligence to flight deck operations. Each member should have an appreciation for what other members of the team can do for him or her. Each member of the Navy and Marine Corps Team should be encouraged to brainstorm issues in their workspace on how to improve interoperability and the integration of effort in the battlespace.

Exercises are excellent means to enhance classroom training. Exercises will force the team to integrate together to accomplish the mission. There has been progress on this

²⁵ CAPT H. A. Petra, Jr, USN and John Keefe. “Give Integration Meaning”. *Proceedings*. (Mar 1998): 105.

issue already onboard ESGs through the Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2). Planning together will reinforce the value of integrated efforts.²⁶

Opportunities to cross train personnel should be encouraged. Tours of duty that integrate Marines with Sailors and Sailors with Marines will only add to the further appreciation of the people and the skills found in each service. Staffs at sea and ashore should be integrated. This will encourage a feeling of jointness at even the most junior levels of the organizations. Again, the end result of all of this training is a better intelligence product to the operator leading to a more efficient and effective campaign. This can be accomplished by pulling the resources and talent of the Navy and the Marine Corps Intelligence Team together.

C. THE FLEET RESPONSE PLAN

In addition to the Global Concept of Operations, the Fleet Response Plan will also require more, trained personnel for sea duty. The Fleet Response Plan will transform the Navy from a regularly deployed force to an employable force. The CSGs and ESGs will become surge ready assets after their maintenance and training phases. Six to seven CSGs will be in a surge capacity at any given time in the Navy. ESGs will also adopt a plan for operations.²⁷

An integrated and employable Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team will be in even greater demand. Integrated intelligence teams need to be trained, equipped, and ready on all six CSGs and ESGs.

²⁶ LtCol Aldridge, USMC, interview by author, notes, USS Peleliu LHA 5, 25 August 2003.

²⁷ ADM Robert Natter, USN, "Creating a Surge Ready Force". *Proceedings*. (Sept 2003): 56.

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IV. CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION

A. ORGANIZATION THEORY

There still remain several institutional barriers to successful Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration that inhibit the policies laid out by the CNO and the CMC in the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations.²⁸ The reasons behind these barriers to a new intelligence doctrine may be best understood by applying organization theory. Barry Posen, author of *Sources of Military Doctrine*, states that, “Organization theory can be used to explain organizational behavior wherever we find large, functionally specialized bureaucracies.”²⁹

Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations represent two functionally specialized bureaucracies within the larger bureaucracies of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and ultimately the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. Power is distributed in organizations to achieve a functional specialization.³⁰ These U.S. Government organizations represent some of the largest and most powerful organizations in the world with their origins going back to the American Revolutionary War. These organizations have a powerful influence on military doctrine and are characteristically slow to transform this doctrine.³¹

In applying organization theory, the first step will be to outline the casual factors within the organization. Each one of these factors affects the other and explains how organizations function. These are: purpose, people, and environment.³²

Purpose is the central motivation of an organization. Without a purpose the organization loses focus and ceases to be relevant. Many organizations redefine their purpose, or mission, to match the environment in order to remain relevant.

²⁸ Morton Halperin. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986. P. 52.

²⁹ Barry Posen. *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984. P. 35.

³⁰ Ibid., 36.

³¹ Morton Halperin. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986. P. 27

³² Barry Posen. *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984. P. 42.

People, usually specialists, work within the organization to fulfill the purpose of the organization. Nevertheless as Posen points out, “While purpose demands rationality, people may not be able to provide it.”³³

The environment drives the purpose of the organization. The environment remains ever-changing and uncertain which requires the purpose of the organization to adapt to remain relevant in the future. The environment also presents obstacles for an organization to achieve its specified purpose.³⁴ The environmental challenges could be physical, economic, political, or intraorganizational.

A military organization is aware of these casual factors and deals with them by reducing internal and external uncertainty through the implementation of procedures and policies.³⁵ Internal uncertainty can be reduced by drafting standard operating procedures (SOPs) to get people within the organization to function with some degree of uniformity towards the defined purpose. SOPs can be implemented up and down within the organization’s hierarchy. While internal uncertainty will always exist, SOPs do effectively manage it within the organization.

External uncertainty represents a greater challenge to the function of the organization and perhaps even its survival. External uncertainty, or environmental uncertainty, includes other organizations and potential enemies around the world. One measure is to protect valued assets from other organizations.³⁶

Organization theory also suggests that members within the military organization remain distrustful of members external to the organization for several reasons.³⁷ The first reason is that members within the organization represent the specialists. People outside that organization, in contrast, are not experts and should not be trusted to make effective

³³ Barry Posen. *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984. P. 43.

³⁴ Ibid., 43.

³⁵ Ibid., 44.

³⁶ Ibid., 45.

³⁷ Morton Halperin. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986. P. 39.

policy choices for the organization. Although military organizations remain dependent upon the government for their budget, they want to have free rein in deciding where the money should be spent.³⁸

Military organizations deal with environmental uncertainty from the enemy by developing a series of contingency plans by staging and stockpiling various assets to quickly and effectively respond to the contingency crisis. Military organizations prefer offensive doctrines because it allows for planning and exercises that attempt to reduce uncertainty in future conflicts both internally and externally. The organization can set the tempo of the battle on its own terms from the start. Secret plans, weapons, and intelligence on the enemy all contribute to reducing environmental uncertainty.³⁹ Offensive doctrines also allow for greater autonomy of the military organization from other organizations.

Organization theory also attempts to explain organizational behavior in regards to integration and innovation. Posen states that, “The setting of priorities among military forces and missions is a key aspect of political-military integration. In multi-service military organizations, civilian intervention is critical to the setting of priorities.”⁴⁰ He goes on to state that, “Setting priorities among the services, and among forces or branches within services, is a central task of grand strategy.”⁴¹ This suggests that if military organizations want to retain their autonomy then they should develop doctrine that remains consistent with the country’s grand strategy. Posen argues however that this is not likely, “Left to themselves, a group of services cannot make a military doctrine that will be well integrated with the political of the state’s grand strategy.”⁴²

According to organizational theory, organizational behavior also inhibits military innovation.⁴³ Military organizations are more inclined to change gradually rather than to innovate quickly. SOPs and the delegation of tasks and authority are the backbone to

³⁸ Barry Posen. *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984. P. 46.

³⁹ Ibid., 45.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 53.

⁴¹ Ibid., 53.

⁴² Ibid., 54.

⁴³ Morton Halperin. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986. P. 49.

military organizations. Change and innovation might result in a breakdown of this system at the time of a crisis. As a result, technology alone will not result in a military innovation. However, looking at history, technology successfully demonstrated in a war will be more quickly adopted. Finally, Posen states that, “In multi-service establishments, civilians have the possibility, depending on the strategic position of the state, of choosing among competing services.”⁴⁴

Finally, organization theory may be able to offer some approaches to effectively reducing institutional friction and barriers to transformation and integration.

B. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Both Naval Intelligence and Marine Corps Intelligence are specific military organizations that have developed their own doctrines. Organization theory can be applied in an attempt to better understand their behavior.

The purpose of Naval Intelligence is to provide intelligence for a specified Naval or Joint Taskforce to reduce uncertainty within the battlespace and enhance the decision making advantage for U.S. Armed Forces. Naval Intelligence interfaces with various national and theater level assets in its efforts to produce a tailored, useful product to the warfighter.

The people in this organization are Naval Intelligence Professionals comprised of Intelligence Officers, Cryptologists, Intelligence Specialists, and Cryptologic Technicians. These professionals remain highly specialized throughout their careers within the intelligence organization. Again as organization theory sets forth, these professionals are highly skilled and specialized to accomplish their purpose, but they still remain human beings. As an organization of human beings they seldom approach perfect rationality needed to pursue the purpose with efficiency.⁴⁵

The environment of the Naval Intelligence organization consists of both internal and external elements. The Naval Intelligence organization is embedded into the U.S. Navy’s much larger organization. The Naval Intelligence organization continues to change and adapt to meet the demands of Naval Operations around the globe. The

⁴⁴ Barry Posen. *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984. P. 57.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

external environment that Naval Intelligence must deal with is the geopolitical, military, and international events around the globe that present an uncertain environment for Naval Operations.

According to organization theory, the Naval Intelligence organization manages both internal and external uncertainty in order to best achieve its purpose. As Posen states, internal uncertainty can be managed by SOPs. SOPs for the Naval Intelligence organization are produced by the organization itself, which is the preferred means according to organization theory, or SOPs are given to the organization by the overarching organization. Posen states, “Those with formal authority over the organization are a cause of uncertainty.”⁴⁶ Organization theory also sets forth that once military organizations establish SOPs, they are resistant to change them because of the potential danger to personnel or mission failure.

The Naval Intelligence organization’s primary purpose is to manage external uncertainty for the larger Navy Organization. The Naval Intelligence organization manages and reduces external uncertainty by collecting intelligence. The more intelligence that can be gathered through national, regional, or shipboard means, then the more effectively the organization can reduce external, or environmental, uncertainty.

Other measures to reduce uncertainty for the Naval Intelligence organization might include exercises using standard wargames to review and reinforce SOPs and support the traditional offensive doctrines of the larger Navy organization. The Naval Intelligence organization’s SOP does include the intelligence requirement for defensive intelligence in order to protect the larger offensive organization from attack. However, this doctrine remains one of aerial strikes and naval warfare.

Civilian intervention is met with suspicion according to military organization theory. Currently, the 9/11 Commission is working on recommendations for intelligence reform. Organization theory would argue that this civilian intervention may be the only effective way to bring older SOPs and doctrines back in line with current national grand strategies. The recommendations of the Commission and how they affect the Naval Intelligence organization are yet to be seen. Either plural organization or is

⁴⁶ Barry Posen. *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984. P. 45.

Change in the Naval Intelligence organization is encouraged in order to bring in new technologies to support the intelligence collection mission. However, there remain older aspects to the national intelligence system that are slow to change and adapt to the new asymmetric and hidden threats. Doctrine has also been slow to change to meet the new threat. Organization theory points out that if new intelligence technologies are not proven or disproven in combat then doctrine is unlikely to innovate accordingly. Organization theory suggests that civilian intervention is needed in order to spur innovation. The 9/11 Commission may be trying to do just that.

C. THE MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

The Marine Corps Intelligence organization may be much smaller than the Naval Intelligence organization, but still possesses many of the attributes of an organization consistent with organization theory.

The purpose of Marine Corps Intelligence is to provide intelligence to their designated Marine Commanding Officer also to reduce uncertainty within the battlespace and enhance the decision making advantage for the Marine Corps and ultimately the U.S. Armed Forces.

The people in this organization are Marines. Marines as an organization represent a unique cadre of individuals within the Department of Defense. Marine Corps Intelligence professionals are comprised of Intelligence Officers and enlisted Intelligence Analysts. These professionals remain highly specialized in specific intelligence and counterintelligence fields for the first half of their career and generalize later in their career. As with Naval Intelligence, these professionals are highly skilled and specialized to accomplish their purpose, but they still are not perfectly rational human beings.

The environment of the Marine Corps Intelligence organization also consists of both internal and external elements. The internal elements are derived from specific direction by the larger Marine Corps organization. The external environment that Marine Corps Intelligence must deal with is enemy threats and military activity.

SOPs for the Marine Corps Intelligence organization are very specific to the particular unit for which it was written. Established Marine Corps SOPs are extremely resistant to change again because of the extreme danger of Marine Corps operations.

Marine Corps Intelligence reduces external uncertainty for their commanding officer by collecting intelligence of the battlespace. Other measures to reduce uncertainty for Marine Corps Intelligence include regular exercises to review and reinforce SOPs to train new members and enhance warfighting effectiveness. This organization has been established with the purpose of supporting the traditional offensive doctrine of the Marine Corps. This doctrine encompasses close air support, amphibious warfare, raids, and land warfare.

Change in the Marine Corps Intelligence organization comes slowly. Marine Corps doctrine has traditionally been slow to change. Civilian intervention to spur innovation would not be well received.

D. A NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Clearly, based upon organization theory, it is in the best interests of both organizations to innovate and transform on their own even though this would result in a period of uncertainty for both Intelligence organizations and their respective services.⁴⁷ According to organization theory these organizations have within them, exclusively, the specialists needed to advise and innovate in a way that could be beneficial to the entire organization in the long run. If left to civilian intervention, both organizations may not get what they would want.

Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration is a course set out in the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations to provide innovation and a course correction for both the Navy and the Marine Corps Intelligence organizations. Organization theory may offer some insights into what an integrated Navy and Marine Corps organization might look like and perform.

The purpose of this integrated organization would be to provide intelligence for a specified Naval or Joint Taskforce to reduce uncertainty within the battlespace in the air, on and under the sea, and over the land to include all terrain types and climates. The goal of this integrated team would be to greatly enhance the decision making advantage for all

⁴⁷ Morton Halperin. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986. P. 51.

U.S. Armed Forces. They would accomplish this by interfacing with various national, theater, shipboard, and ashore assets to produce a tailored, useful product to all the warfighters.

The people in this organization are both Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence professionals with perhaps intelligence representatives from the other services. Although they would remain highly specialized, they would work more closely together to improve Joint performance. Organization theory may underscore that human beings are not rational, but an integrated organization may be able to overcome the shortcomings of individual organizations by reviewing each other's SOPs and intelligence operations. This still may not be entirely efficient, but it would improve the effectiveness of the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team in accomplishing their combined purpose.⁴⁸

The environment of this Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Organization will still consist of both internal and external elements. The internal environment would continue to remain a challenge as long as the larger Navy and Marine Corps organizations remain independent and suspicious of one another. The external environment would be less of a problem since there would be an increase in intelligence sharing and manpower to collect on various geopolitical, military, and international events.

SOPs and doctrine for both Naval Intelligence and Marine Corps Intelligence would have to be rewritten by the organizations themselves. SOPs would only have to be rewritten to the degree that it accommodates integration. This would reduce the uncertainty of having another organization without the expertise to write it for them. There will be a transition period where there may be a potential danger to personnel or mission failure, but a new, well drafted SOP and accompanying doctrine will prove to bring more success than failure in the Global War on Terrorism.

This integrated Intelligence organization's primary purpose would still try to manage the vast external uncertainty in warfare. More intelligence can be gathered by an integrated Intelligence organization than by one organization acting alone.

⁴⁸ Barry Posen. *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984. P. 43.

Exercises and wargames that integrate Navy and Marine Corps warfighting elements more effectively would reinforce the need for further integration for new offensive doctrines against asymmetric threats. This new offensive doctrine should combine the attributes of both forces to bring multiplied capabilities to the battlespace to include: aerial strikes, close air support, naval warfare, amphibious warfare, raids ashore, and land warfare.

Civilian intervention is met with suspicion according to military organization theory. If civilian intervention can be avoided by initiatives within these Intelligence organizations then the resulting integrated products will be more in line for what is needed by this integrated organization. If these initiatives fail or are not implemented, then civilian intervention may be the result. Organization theory states that this approach may be the only way to update organizations so they are consistent with grand strategy.⁴⁹ The 9/11 Commission is a current example of civilian intervention to enforce grand strategy.

Technological innovation should remain the norm for this integrated Intelligence organization. New sensor modules and unmanned vehicles promise to be a force multiplier in the future. This integrated organization's mission would be to adapt to asymmetric threats and hunt down and locate terrorist cells and encampments all around the globe. Intelligence doctrine needs to change to meet this new threat as well. Organization theory suggests that civilian intervention is needed in order to spur innovation. The goal of this integrated Navy and Marine Corps team would be to discourage civilian intervention by enacting policies, procedures, and doctrines on their own that would be consistent with the new asymmetric threat around the globe.

E. CULTURE AS AN INTERVENING VARIABLE IN ORGANIZATION THEORY

There are some alternate points of view to organization theory as to what drives organizations to make the decisions they do. Posen states that military organizations make decisions based upon both internal and external uncertainty and how to reduce uncertainty in order to accomplish the organization's purpose.

⁴⁹ Barry Posen. *Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, 1984. P. 58.

Elizabeth Kier in her article suggests that military organizations make decisions based upon their own cultural constraints and the constraints placed upon them by civilian authority and not by factors in the external environment.⁵⁰ She states that military doctrine is a result of longstanding military culture. She states, “The preferences the civilians and the military bring to doctrinal decisions respond to cultural more than to structural or functional characteristics.”⁵¹ Culture is extremely hard to define, but clearly has an impact in the structure of a military organization and its doctrine.

Both the Navy and the Marines Corps have a long history of culture and tradition, which does influence their behavior. “The emphasis on ceremony and tradition, and the development of a common language and *esprit de corps*, testify to the strength of the military’s organizational culture.”⁵² Military culture is an important part of the military, but in the United States Armed Forces culture does not drive decision making exclusive of the uncertainty of the external environment. The very existence of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations is a testament to the value placed on coping with and adapting to external uncertainty in the military.

Culture applies in Posen’s organizational theory in the casual force of people. People remain imperfect and influenced by the behavior of others and by their military organization’s particular and proud culture. It is within the people that culture, whether good or bad, influences organizations.

Cultural barriers do stand in the way of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration. Acceptance of cultural differences is a step in the right direction. There may also be measures taken by both the Navy and the Marine Corps as a whole and by the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations to break down cultural barriers. By adopting similar physical fitness standards, fitness reports, and even uniforms, military leaders and policy makers may see greater progress being made in the integration of

⁵⁰ Elizabeth Kier. “Culture and Military Doctrine.” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995): 67.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 69.

Navy and Marine Corps culture not only in the Intelligence organizations, but service wide. Kier states, “Changing military doctrine is hard, but it is harder still if we neglect culture’s role.”⁵³

Whereas military culture affects military doctrine, strategic culture affects civilian grand strategies. Alastair Iain Johnston states, “Most of those who use the term culture tend to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.”⁵⁴

American culture drives civilian oversight and policymakers to intervene or to not intervene into the affairs of the military. If the U.S. military commits an act that is outside of American strategic culture then swift action will be taken. Again, culture drives behavior, but it remains impossible to quantify how much impact culture really has regarding decision making in either the military or civilian realm.⁵⁵ There is and will remain tension in civil-military relations based upon culture and organization. Johnston states, “There is considerable evidence in anthropology and social psychology that the construction of group identities involves the creation of in-group- out-group tensions.”⁵⁶

Culture is something to be acknowledged as a factor in decision making, nevertheless it should not remain a hindrance to progress, innovation, or transformation. Military organizations should not become victims of culture especially in warfare. Culture should be accepted, accommodated, and should remain a factor in policy making and decision making for American policy and military doctrine. As Colin S. Gray states, “The proposition of extra-culturality is ridiculous.”⁵⁷ Culture as well as doctrine needs to change and adapt to the transforming threat to be effective.

⁵³ Elizabeth Kier. “Culture and Military Doctrine.” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995): 93.

⁵⁴ Alastair Iain Johnston. “Thinking about Strategic Culture.” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995): 34.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁵⁷ Colin S. Gray. “Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation of Theory Strikes Back.” *Review of International Studies* (1999), 25: 62.

The integration of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations must take into account culture, but it should not be driven by culture or allow cultural barriers to persist between Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations whether at sea or ashore. Winning the Global War on Terrorism will require a Joint effort from all of the U.S. and allied Armed Forces.

V. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL TO THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT

A. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization is also essential for responding to the Global War on Terror. Terrorist cells have demonstrated that they can endanger the lives of innocent Americans around the globe and now within the United States. Terrorists can inflict enough carnage with conventional weapons and explosives alone. Terrorist cells with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) present a nightmarish future for American citizens as well as the whole world. Americans would live in a world in which they would never feel safe again. The Department of Defense is aware of this potential danger to the United States and its citizens and has endeavored with other departments and agencies to take measures to ensure the safety of Americans all over the globe.

Intelligence has come to the forefront as the critical enabler for the Global War on Terror campaign. The United States has been forced to adopt a doctrine of preemptive strikes and raids on individual terrorists and terrorist encampments to prevent further terrorist attacks.

U.S. forces have the capability to attack these terrorist cells, but lack the specific intelligence required and the legal authority to initiate a campaign. The U.S. intelligence analyst is skilled in the analysis phase of the process. What is missing is a robust and focused collection system. There is a need for greater funding to improve intelligence collection capabilities.

B. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) taught the United States that it could not always count on allies to provide airfields and ground support to American forces. The Navy and the Marine Corps were ready to respond to the task at hand by projecting power over 800 miles inland from the sea with tactical aircraft and Marines on the ground. These carrier-based tactical aircraft destroyed the Taliban air defenses within a

matter of days. The Marines established a foothold at Camp Rhino in Southern Afghanistan. OEF demonstrated to the world the combined combat power of the Navy and Marine Corps Team.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) further demonstrated the value of Naval forces as Turkey and Saudi Arabia denied their airfields to U.S. Air Force aircraft. Carrier-based aircraft engaged in strikes in Iraq along with ship launched TLAMs. Meanwhile, a Marine Expeditionary Force invaded Iraq along with the Army in a coordinated assault. Again, the Navy and Marine Corps Team answered the call of the United States.

Marine Corps Intelligence did have success with HET coordination and Dragon Eye organic UAV support during OIF. Nevertheless, tactical commanders in OIF still lacked the resolution and clarity they needed from intelligence. Many of these problems came from their lack of clout to request tasking of national and theater intelligence collection assets. Finally, information overload continued to be a problem.⁵⁸ Small, tactical Marine units ashore have the capacity to receive only relevant, actionable intelligence into their decision maker's user defined interface. FORCENet will have the capability to provide this tailored intelligence to an integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization.

OEF and OIF still represented conventional-type wars against conventional forces with the exception of the labyrinth of caves in Afghanistan. The Global War on Terror has only begun, but the days of conventional campaigns is coming to an end. The Global War on Terror is moving to target the greater and more elusive threat from non-state actors. Not all these terrorist groups can be destroyed through conventional means. What is needed is intensive intelligence combined with a small, highly accurate strike force. A force that represents the optimization of combined arms warfare.

⁵⁸ LtCol Michael Groen, USMC. "Blue Diamond Intelligence: Division-Level Intelligence Operations During Operation Iraqi Freedom". *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Feb 2004): 22.

C. THE ROAD TO VICTORY

1. Pulling Resources and Skills Together

The Navy and the Marine Corps can pull together their intelligence collection assets. The Navy and the Marine Corps should continue their development of organic intelligence collectors in the form of unmanned vehicles equipped with various sensor modules to augment theater and national intelligence collection assets. Organic, sea-going intelligence collectors will aid in the meticulous collection of a particular target of a strike or raid. Organic collectors will also aid in the overall ISRT capability and mission flexibility of the maritime forces. Finally, organic collection assets will be essential in real-time, FORCEnet operations.

2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

As the pace of campaigns increases, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) will have to be thorough before the conflict and be able to be rapidly adapted during the execution phase of the campaign. Although theater Joint Intelligence Centers can assist in this preparation process, deployed Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals will be responsible to their commanders for the final product.

The IPB has to be detailed enough for the single Marine on the ground and broad enough for the entire campaign. If the Navy and the Marine Corps Team is to retain the decision advantage, the information advantage, and the force advantage, then the operational tempo calls for continuous operations as well as continuous adaptation. This can only be fully achieved with an integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization. A thorough IPB will become even more essential as the tempo of the campaign is increased by FORCEnet concepts.

3. The Need for Cooperation with Special Warfare

Navy SEALs and other U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to contribute to this new campaign. Their expertise in night operations, intelligence, and strike will be indispensable. Special Operations Forces remain a small, specialized force and need conventional force augmentation during the Global War on Terrorism. The traditional SOF missions will not go by the wayside, but will go to the Marine Corps. Special Operations Capable, Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU(SOC)s) have the

potential to assume many of the Special Operations missions. MEU(SOC)s can also work in conjunction with SEALs and other SOF units for larger operations.⁵⁹

Integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence will provide the intelligence needed for these operations using the sea base and FORCEnet. For example, Marine Corps Intelligence has the ability not only to support the needs of the Marine Corps, but also to the U.S. Navy SEALs to some degree. SEALs require ground specific intelligence that is more akin to Marine Corps Intelligence resources.

4. The Importance of the Expeditionary Strike Group

The ESG has a much more accurate ground intelligence picture by virtue of the intelligence assets they have onboard. An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team onboard an ESG can provide the warfare commander and the regional combatant commander detailed ground intelligence.

This detailed intelligence is developed using a concept called layered ISRT.⁶⁰ The ESG can direct their intelligence assets towards a particular terrorist group as directed by the Combatant Commander. The ESG can send their P-3 forward to collect imagery of the terrorist encampment and collect signals intelligence. The ESG Staff Intelligence Officer can interface with national intelligence agencies to provide further details of the terrorist group and encampment.

The ESG can then send additional assets to collect additional intelligence. The ESG's submarine could be sent forward to collect imagery of the coastline and collect additional SIGINT. Each layer of intelligence provides further detail and the combatant commander can decide to collect additional layers of intelligence.

Meanwhile the ESG is moving into strike position with its range of strike assets to attack the terrorist encampment. The submarine deployed forward can release its SEAL team via the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). SEAL teams inserted onto the ground can use intelligence gathered so far to locate the terrorist encampment and then report to the ESG commander.

If the encampment is too big or too well defended for the SEALs to attack, then the ESG commander can use the embarked MEU(SOC) of Marines to attack the terrorist

⁵⁹ CDR Cole, ESG 1 SEAL team LNO, interview by author, USS Peleliu LHA 5, 26 August 2003.

⁶⁰ RADM Conway, ESG 1 Commander, interview by author, USS Peleliu LHA 5, 28 August 2003.

encampment. Marine Corps Intelligence through R&S teams, HUMINT exploitation teams, or SIGINT teams may enter the battlespace to assist SEAL team reconnaissance. The ultimate goal is to provide the best IPB for the MEU(SOC).

The MEU(SOC) rapid response planning process (R2P2) will be underway with the detailed IPB provided by integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence. A raid conducted by Marines or SEALs are usually the most effective means of combat against a non-state actor like a terrorist group. Intelligence support must be intensive for these operations in preparation for the raid, during the raid, and the resulting debrief.

Naval Intelligence assets like the P-3, the FLIR equipped MH-60R, the surface combatants and the submarine will monitor the operation. The intelligence collections officer can also employ theater UAVs and other theater level collection assets through requests for information to the theater Joint Intelligence Center.

When it is time for the actual raid, the ESG commander will be present in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) onboard the LHA or LHD with an integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence watch within the JOC. The Navy and Marine Corps Team can provide the commander the joint intelligence picture in detail in order to support the raid. The Naval Intelligence Officer will provide the commander the intelligence picture from the surrounding Naval Intelligence assets as well as theater assets. The Marine Intelligence Officer will provide the commander the detailed ground picture as the raid occurs as well as providing updated intelligence to the Marines on the ground.⁶¹

A successful raid will likely to ensue because of integrated, layered ISRT that thoroughly prepared the battlespace prior to the attack. An intelligence debrief of the Marines as well as captured enemy forces will provide additional, invaluable intelligence for future operations. In this way, layered, integrated intelligence provides the best product to the warfighter and the Combatant Commander.

⁶¹ RADM Conway, USN, ESG 1 Commander, interview by author, notes, USS Peleliu LHA 5, 28 August 2003.

5. Enhancing Carrier Strike Group Accuracy

The CSG is extremely capable at strike warfare on a large, conventional scale. Extremely precise and accurate weapons are needed for the Global War of Terror. Weapon yields may actually need to be reduced to create the desired effect.⁶² Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals have the ability to provide the much needed ground picture for carrier-based strikers and for CSAR. All airwings should have at least one Marine Corps hornet squadron onboard. This would guarantee the presence of needed Marine Corps ground analysts in the CVIC.

CSGs, that are tasked to attack terrorist encampments, could also adopt a similar, layered ISR capability to improve precision strike. CSGs already use national and theater collection assets to support strikes including P-3s and UAVs. SHARPS-equipped F/A-18F Super Hornets can conduct reconnaissance over a target encampment and feed that imagery back to the CSG's CVIC. The CSG submarine and surface combatants can also provide SIGINT and IMINT of the target zone.

The CSG can request a SEAL team to support the operation from Special Operations Command. The SEAL team can be inserted into the target area using the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) from the submarine like the ESG. The SEAL team can conduct intelligence on the terrorist encampment for the CSG commander as well.

The CSG, however, does not have the option of using the MEU as raiders. However, the CSG can do combined arms warfare using SEAL intelligence on the ground. The SEALs in coordination with an air strike from the CSG can employ precision warfare against a terrorist encampment.

Additionally, the CSG could consider carrying a contingent of Marines onboard the carrier for small raids against terrorist cells. This platoon of Marines could be special operations capable and trained to provide ground intelligence in the form of HUMINT, SIGINT, and R&S for IPB. Again, detailed IPB is essential for high precision strike warfare including close air support (CAS).

⁶² CAPT Charles Zingler, USN, CNO N20, brief, Naval Postgraduate School, July 2003.

The Marine platoon could coordinate with ground forces ashore to ensure that carrier-based aircraft could provide the best CAS possible in a ground campaign. Finally, a Marine platoon with the CSG could provide force protection for the strike group. Again, an integrated Navy and Marine Corps Team provides better intelligence, greater strike options, and better support to the warfare commander during the Global War on Terrorism.

6. Organic Unmanned Vehicles are Indispensable

Both ESGs and CSGs could benefit from an organic unmanned vehicle (UV) capability. Ship-based UVs, configured with the correct sensor module, would be directed by the strike commander of the battlespace and operated by the Intelligence Officer. These UVs would be able to provide a stare capability over the target area for campaign execution and bomb hit assessments. UVs can also act as communications relays, SIGINT collectors, and target designators for attackers.

Some UVs will be able to carry weapons modules as well in support of a strike or a raid. Finally, aircraft could be equipped with small expendable wingtip UAVs to scan the target area, get target confirmation, and receive real-time bomb hit assessments. These wingtip UAVs would be small enough to be easily transportable. It would also small enough to avoid enemy air defenses and be able to fly low over the target area. These wingtip UAVs could even be gliders. It could be equipped with a small camera and be remote controlled by either the pilot or naval flight officer.

Small Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) can be launched from submarines and surface vessels as easily as a torpedo. They would also be equipped with various oceanic sensor modules to collect on a broad spectrum of surface, air, subsurface, and even land-based threats and potential targets of opportunity.

7. Employing the Sea Base

Through the Sea Basing concept CSGs and ESGs can come together to form a larger sea base from which to launch operations against larger terrorist strongholds or even state level actors. The sea base would be an extremely powerful and scalable platform from which to launch a major campaign. Command of the sea base could be given to the ESG commander, the CSG commander, or to a sea based Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander.

The ESG could provide the detailed ground intelligence for the sea base and then move Marine ground forces ashore. The CSG could provide the striking power for larger operations or campaigns. When combined together, this force can project power ashore through combined arms warfare. Aircraft can support ground forces, destroy air defenses, destroy enemy ground forces, and enemy command and control. While this part of the campaign is being executed, SEALs on the ground can collect additional intelligence and conduct smaller raids. Essentially, this sea base has the potential to project power ashore using various forms of combat in unison. This represents the optimization of combined arms warfare. From the sea base, the JTF commander is truly at the operational level of warfare.

The only way effective intelligence support can be provided to this intricate level of warfare on the sea base is through a sophisticated, afloat intelligence center that integrates Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations at sea. As forces become more and more dependent upon detailed intelligence for strikes and raids, it is clear that only a combined effort will truly answer the requirements of the warfare commander and the theater Combatant Commander.

D. COUNTERPROLIFERATION

1. Stopping WMD Smuggling on the High Seas

An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team should not just be applied to attacking terrorist encampments throughout the world. The possibilities for faster, more accurate intelligence from integration are limitless. Another area of application is stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction from both rogue states and non-state actors, who support terrorist groups.

The United States has made it a priority for the various intelligence agencies to report and track WMD programs and possible smuggling after September 11, 2001. While various government agencies are doing an effective job on counterproliferation, the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization can enhance U.S. Counterproliferation efforts through detection and then the Navy and Marine Corps can assist in the capture of these weapons and the people who plan to use them.

2. Detection of WMD

The Navy and the Marine Corps together can help stem WMD proliferation through various capabilities. The first is the intelligence collection on and evaluation of suspected WMD sites and the vessels that may be transferring them.

The first capability is derived from the intelligence collection abilities of the Navy and the Marine Corps. As ESGs and CSGs are deployed around the globe, they add to the eyes and ears of the U.S. Government. They can provide intelligence from intercepted signals, they can conduct human intelligence on the ground, they can use organic imagery assets, and finally, they could uncover WMD programs while engaged in a raid ashore or while conducting reconnaissance for an operation.

It is this intensive, afloat intelligence collection capability that has been lacking in the past. As U.S. Naval forces become more proactive around the globe during the Global War on Terrorism, they will have the opportunity more and more to assist in counterproliferation efforts.

Counterproliferation operations require the same range of intelligence assets used in counterterrorism operations. The layered ISRT approach used to track terrorist cells is suitably intricate and thorough enough for tracking and locating rogue WMD labs and storage sites. The ESG does this well, but this type of operation could also be accomplished by the Marine Corps equipped CSG or Surface Action Group (SAG).

The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) tries to track merchant ships around the world that may be transporting WMD and other illegal arms to rogue states or terrorist groups who plan to use them. This has been a mission of ONI for years, but has recently had renewed attention given the Global War on Terrorism. The CSGs and ESGs at sea can augment this tracking by using their various means of integrated intelligence collection. In addition, the port facilities of the world are monitored for suspicious containers and cargo by human intelligence.

3. Interdiction

The next step is taking the appropriate action on the intelligence provided from both Navy and Marine Corps intelligence resources. The Navy and the Marine Corps have the capability to act in conjunction to limit the proliferation of WMD. ESG-based

Marines can raid a suspected compound to seize the weapons, destroy production facilities, capture the scientists, or attack the perpetrators.

In addition, the Navy and the Marine Corps can conduct Maritime Interception Operations (MIOs) on merchant vessels suspected of transporting WMD from one rogue state to another or to a terrorist group. The Surface Action Group (SAG) is the best-suited strike group to assume this type of mission. Again, the SAGs would benefit from a Marine Detachment (MARDET) onboard with their associated Marine Corps Intelligence personnel to augment Navy 3905 support onboard. This MARDET would conduct opposed boarding operations like the SEAL teams.

These vessels can be stopped by SAGs and boarded by Marines or SEALs and searched. If weapons are found they will be seized. The ship will then be impounded and the crew detained. In this way, the Navy and the Marine Corps can assist in preventing the proliferation of WMD around the world.

E. DEALING WITH ANTI-ACCESS ENVIRONMENTS

1. Jungles, Forests, and Swamps

An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team would give both services a better capability for operating in austere environments ranging from the jungle to a city or town.

In the jungles, forests, and swamps of the world, Marine Corps R&S teams on the ground have the capability to see and hear what national and theater sensors cannot. HUMINT exploitation teams can use tips from the CIA or the State Department to obtain leads on terrorist camp locations and then set out to locate the exact position for a follow-on strike or raid. Seismic sensors and ground SIGINT collectors around a possible encampment will only augment this capability. FORCEnetted teams on the ground collecting intelligence will provide the ground picture for the follow-on force.

The Navy can support these operations through several means. Land basing of forces in these environments is problematic for computer systems, support, and facilities for personnel. Additionally, the jungle environment offers poor force protection options for forces on the ground. Sea based forces will have the necessary support facilities onboard.

Strikes from the sea into these environments can be in the form of raids by Marines, SEALs, or air strikes from ship-based aircraft, gunfire, or TLAMs. Using Sea Strike with Marine Corps Intelligence support will add precision to air strikes that otherwise could not hit targets under the this ground cover. Intelligence tied to operations will provide speed, relevancy, and accuracy to raids ashore, and culminate into optimized combined arms warfare.

2. The Urban Environment

Within the urban environments, the value of Marine Corps Intelligence is even more apparent. Marine Corps HUMINT teams can infiltrate a city long before the strike group arrives offshore to assist other governments in tracking and locating terrorist elements within the cities. Once these terrorist elements have been located using HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT collection, then plans can be made for highly accurate naval strikes and raids from the strike group.

In urban combat, strikes and raids have to be extremely precise to reduce any chance of collateral damage to other buildings and to reduce the possibility of injuring innocent bystanders. Raids should also be fast and covert to avoid casualties. Intensive intelligence gathering again through layered ISRT will aid in these types of operations.

This approach maximizes the capability for the strike group to maneuver into a region, project power ashore quickly, and leave a small footprint of forces ashore before, during, and after an operation. This type of sea based maneuver warfare requires few forces, precision strike, and highly intensive intelligence collection during all phases of the campaign. This intensive intelligence collection can only become a reality by integrating Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations.

Strike groups will maintain escalation dominance through the sea basing concept for almost any contingency. CSAR forces will be standing by to support strikes and raids ashore. In addition, ESGs have an entire MEU available to send ashore in case of escalation. CSGs have an entire airwing of strike aircraft available for an operation. FORCENet will easily integrate additional forces to the sea base as necessary. All of these operations will continue to call upon an adaptable, flexible, integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization through FORCENet.

The Global War on Terrorism is so vast in scale that other agencies cannot hope to do the job alone. The integration of Navy and Marine Corps assets under this concept creates a force that is consistent with America's overall national security strategy. This integrated force would be designed to better interface with other U.S. Government agencies and conduct strikes, raids, or other operations consistent with the defense of the United States of America.

VI. CONCLUSION

Intelligence will play an increasingly important role in U.S. military operations. However, intelligence requirements of the cold war and the post-cold war world will no longer suffice to ensure the security of Americans at home and abroad. Naval Intelligence alone does not have the detailed ground picture needed for future conflicts in the Global War of Terrorism. Marine Corps Intelligence does not have the connectivity or experience in working on a sea base. Only an integrated Navy and Marine Corps will bring those capabilities to the 21st Century battlespace. CNO Tasker #65, will bring about a process of integration that will prove to be advantageous for both services during the Global War on Terror.

An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization with Naval Operations will improve the speed of attack and lethality for both services and the armed forces as a whole. Integrated intelligence will improve strikes and raids in a variety of terrains including jungle and urban environments. Additionally, the sea base will benefit from shipboard intelligence systems.

Naval Power 21 clearly outlines how the sea services can fight more effectively as an integrated team through FORCENet and Network Centric Operations to meet the threats of the 21st Century. This will make them more integrated with the Army and the Air Force at the tactical level of warfare, where Joint initiatives are essential.

The Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team will flow intelligence through FORCENet analytical tools. Near real-time intelligence support to the commander will ensure information dominance within the battlespace. An integrated intelligence picture at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare will provide full spectrum dominance at every echelon of command. The horizontal integration of intelligence with command and control and operations will be revolutionary in this respect. Unmanned vehicles and Marine Corps Intelligence on the ground will make intelligence integration a reality.

The objective of Navy and Marine Corps integration should be to provide the best possible product not only to the commander but also to the warfighter in the air or on the ground. The optimization of combined arms warfare in a conflict will provide the

warfighter the intelligence he or she needs to strike the right target at the right time with the right weapon. This self-optimization will allow these organizations to reach their objective more efficiently without the need for civilian intervention.

Integration will require training together in an effort to improve interaction between Sailors and Marines. Again, it is the unique skill sets of each service that make them valuable to each other. Naval Intelligence skills complement Marine Corps Intelligence capabilities on the ground. Ideally, there should be no duplication of effort.

Integration calls for a greater cultural and functional understanding on how the other organization operates and what they can bring to accomplishing the mission objective. This can be accomplished by bringing those service members together on the ships, in the staffs at sea and ashore, and provide greater opportunities for interservice training in the schoolhouses and during exercises.

The Global War on Terrorism calls for smaller, faster forces that rely heavily upon highly accurate intelligence to find the elusive threat. With the limitations of national assets, the Navy and the Marine Corps can pull together their intelligence resources and skills to improve overall maritime force performance.

Sea-based intelligence collectors tasked by intelligence professionals in support of operations is part of the new paradigm. Unmanned vehicles and their associated sensor modules remain essential to locate terrorist cells in austere, anti-access environments. A FORCEnetted sea base with a real-time common operating picture fed by organic and national intelligence sensors will provide operators on the ship, in the air and on the ground with essential intelligence in the future.

The ultimate goal of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration is winning the Global War on Terrorism and confronting the future threats to the United States. This is a goal shared by every member of the U.S. Armed Forces. The intelligence skills of each service will prove to bring greater, overall strength an integrated maritime force. Admiral Clark and General Hagee assert that Navy and Marine Corps integration is essential in Naval Transformation and winning the Global War on Terrorism. Progress at sea on the CSGs and the ESGs is occurring right now and promise to pave the way for a more effective and integrated force for the 21st Century.

The Navy and the Marine Corps need to capitalize on the strengths of their differences while eliminating the weaknesses within their organizations. This will result in an optimized combined arms force that will provide a full spectrum of capabilities to the Combatant Commander and greater options for the President as the United States enters the 21st Century. An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization promises to be the cornerstone of such endeavors. Through integration initiatives, the Navy and the Marine Corps will continue their 229-year-old tradition of being America's expeditionary force.

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