The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

IN SEARCH OF A PEACE OPERATIONS FORCE STRUCTURE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID A. KELLEY
United States Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2001

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
IN SEARCH OF A PEACE OPERATIONS FORCE STRUCTURE

by

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Kelley
United States Marine Corps

Mr. William Flavin
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: David A. Kelley
TITLE: In Search of a Peace Operations Force Structure
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 1 March 2001 PAGES: 31 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper argues that the current U.S. military force structure is not optimally structured at present to meet peace operations requirements, and presents a variety of options, which the United States could pursue to address future peace operations. The paper makes the assumptions that the United States will be actively engaged in Peace Operations for the foreseeable future, will remain committed to its two Major Theater War (MTW) strategy, and is unlikely to increase overall force structure in the near-term. Of the seven alternatives presented in the paper, three represent options that could be pursued exclusively within the Department of Defense (DOD) to meet the entire range of peace operations. A fourth alternative presents a DOD option that would address lower level peace operations only, such as humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping. Two more alternatives provide more dynamic approaches involving the Department of State and the United Nations, again to meet the lower level spectrum of peace operations. A final alternative offered is a U.S. policy alternative which could be used in conjunction with some of the other alternatives, and specifically addresses U.S. support for peacekeeping missions, but one which has a direct impact on the structuring and employment of U.S. military forces. The United States is clearly at a crossroads in transforming its military to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. The U.S. must position itself to respond effectively to these missions where interests are at stake through redefining policy, restructuring the force, and/or leading the changes within international or regional security organizations to meet these challenges. The alternatives presented attempt to outline a wide spectrum of options - some requiring little change, others requiring sweeping change - in order to stimulate the discussion. It is somewhere between these alternatives that the U.S. will need to define its approach to future peace operations. Although the U.S. military "toolbox" is heavier than that of any other country, owing to a much wider array of tools to choose from, experience has shown that we have no tool specifically or adequately designed for peace operations. It's time to look at "machining" the right tool for the job.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. III

IN SEARCH OF A PEACE OPERATIONS FORCE STRUCTURE ................................................................. 1

PURPOSE .................................................................................................................................................. 1

DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 1

POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT OF U.S POLICY ON PEACE OPERATIONS ............................ 1

ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 3

ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS .................................................................................. 4

#1 - CONTINUE USING CURRENT FORCES ON AN "AS-NEEDED" BASIS: ........................................ 6

#2 - EARMARKING U.S. FORCES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS ............................................................ 9

#3 - INCREASED USE OF RESERVE / NATIONAL GUARD FORCES .................................................. 9

#4 - DEVELOPING A JOINT FORCE CONFIGURED FOR PEACE OPERATIONS SHORT OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT .......................................................................................... 11

#5 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE PEACEKEEPING FORCES ................................................................. 13

#6 - CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO A STANDING UN PEACEKEEPING "LEGION" ...................... 14

#7 - PROVIDE ONLY U.S. UNIQUE SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ................................................................................................. 17

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 18

ENDNOTES ................................................................................................................................................ 21

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................ 25
IN SEARCH OF A PEACE OPERATIONS FORCE STRUCTURE

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to address U.S. force structure options to support future peace operations. With the increase in U.S. military deployments in support of peace operations over the past ten years, the current force structure, based on fighting two major theater wars simultaneously, may lack the flexibility and skills necessary to meet the tasks short of warfighting. A variety of options will be considered based upon an analysis of U.S post-cold war policy regarding peace operations, and some assumptions as to what that policy is likely to be in the future.

DEFINITIONS

Critical to this discussion is a clear understanding of the terminology associated with peace operations. **Peace Operations** are defined by joint U.S. doctrine as “A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.” Joint doctrine defines **peacekeeping** operations as “Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.” And the joint definition for **peace enforcement** operations is the “Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.” It is necessary for the reader to firmly grasp these definitions at the outset as subsequent references to the terms will be strictly in accordance with the joint definitions. At no point will the terms peacekeeping or peace enforcement be used interchangeably. The term Peace Operations will be used when addressing issues applicable to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT OF U.S POLICY ON PEACE OPERATIONS

Following the cold war the United States pledged greater activism in peace operations around the world. On September 21, 1992, then President Bush (the senior) outlined a variety of measures that the United States would take to better support peace operations. President Clinton supported the Bush position during his inaugural address by stating “when our vital interests are challenged or the will or conscience of the international community are defied, we
will act – with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary.n3 Following a few setbacks in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina within the first months of his term, President Clinton clarified the U.S. position on peace operations by making the following statement to the UN General Assembly in September 1993 – “If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no”.4 He also followed this up with Presidential Decision Directive 25 (The Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations) in May 1994 that imposed strict conditions for U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping.

Throughout his campaign for the presidency, George W. Bush repeatedly called for a reduction in the use of U.S. military forces in peace type operations around the world. During the Presidential debate in Boston on 3 October, 2000, Bush stated “I want to rebuild our military to keep the peace. I want to have a strong hand when it comes to the US and world affairs. I don’t want to try to put our troops in all places at all times. I don’t want to be the world’s policeman. I want to be the world’s peacemaker by having a military of high morale and a military that’s well-equipped.6 Expanding on this in the Saint Louis debate on 17 October, Bush essentially laid out the Weinberger Doctrine as the criteria under which the U.S. should deploy military forces, and added, “I’m concerned that we’re overdeployed around the world. You see, I think the mission has somewhat become fuzzy. [Should I become President] the mission of the United States military will be to be prepared and ready to fight and win war, and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place. There may be some moments when we use our troops as peacekeepers, but not often.6

Since winning the election, G.W. Bush and his cabinet have moderated their stance somewhat regarding U.S. involvement in peace operations. On 18 January 2001, in response to a question regarding the removal of American peacekeepers from the Balkans, President-elect Bush stated that he planned to reassure them [the European Community] that his administration will be “reliable and steady,” that “I’m not going to let politics, internal politics, force me to abandon friendships.”7 During that same week, Secretary of State designate Colin Powell mapped out an activist foreign policy with considerable continuity from the outgoing administration. The United States, he said, has “an interest in every place on this Earth.”8

Since August of 2000, the United States and other wealthy countries within the UN have come under increased pressure from developing countries to provide more troops for UN peacekeeping missions. The catalyst for the criticism is the fact that “developing nations now contribute more than 75% of the nearly 30,000 UN troops taking part in 15 missions around the world.”9 Although the U.S. and the other wealthy members of the UN will be billed for nearly
85% of the $3 billion cost for UN peacekeeping this year [2000], "you can’t have a situation where some people contribute blood and some contribute money" said Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister who headed up a UN panel that studied peacekeeping and presented proposals for reform in August, 2000. As of 31 December 2000, the United States personnel contribution to UN peacekeeping operations stood at a total of 885, comprised of 849 police and 36 military members serving as observers. Despite the low number of U.S. military personnel supporting UN peacekeeping missions, the United States has approximately 10,885 troops involved in other peace enforcement operations around the world with 3,900 in Bosnia, 6,000 in Kosovo and 985 in the Sinai.

ASSUMPTIONS

Having laid out the background data for U.S. involvement in peace operations, let us now establish some baseline assumptions, which will serve to frame the discussion throughout the rest of the paper. The first and most important assumption to this paper is that the United States, as the lone superpower in the world, will remain engaged in peace operations around the world for the foreseeable future—at least the next 10-15 years. This assumption is based upon a variety of factors - from the aforementioned international pressure, to the Colin Powell statement, and in spite of the tough talk of our recent Presidents. Additionally, our military has made significant strides in adapting to increased calls to respond to these operations since the beginning of the last decade. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions have come to occupy a more central position in military doctrine than ever before. Over the past ten years the U.S. military, at both the joint and service levels, has developed overarching doctrine for peace operations as well as lower level tactics, techniques and procedures. In fact, most of the fundamental doctrine on these type operations was formally published by the middle 1990’s with updates since that time based on lessons learned. The 1999 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Report entitled “Making Peace While Staying Ready For War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations”, stated, "Peace operations are the most probable, if not the most demanding missions that the military is likely to face in the near future. Thus, some defense analysts would argue that the military should be designed (at least in part) to conduct them.”

A second assumption is that the U.S. will continue to provide financial support to UN/international peace operations, albeit at lower level than is desirable to the UN. The 7 February 2001 U.S. Senate vote to immediately reimburse the UN $582 million in back dues is a positive indication of future U.S. support. Also, the U.S. will continue to provide high
demand-low density assets/support, such as strategic lift, logistics, communications, intelligence and the like for international peace operations. It is assumed that future U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies will remain committed to addressing two Major Theater War's simultaneously, as well as meeting smaller scale contingencies worldwide. And finally, overall U.S. military force personnel strengths and fiscal resources will remain constant for the next several years.

ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS

Having presented the assumptions, the following addresses some of the generalities common to all force structure alternatives. A variety of force options exist, albeit with associated advantages and disadvantages, ranging from cost to readiness. The significant differences between peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations have led to some of the proposed force structure options focusing on solving peacekeeping concerns vice the entire, overarching peace operations umbrella, which also encompasses peace enforcement. Many critics will argue that a force structure designed for strictly peacekeeping lacks the flexibility and capability to protect itself, or be useful, in a potentially volatile situation where conditions suddenly cause the peacekeeping mission to transition to peace enforcement. This is clearly a possibility, and force structure options designed for peacekeeping alone incur a greater degree of risk in this regard.

However, one could argue that the significant and obvious differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations dictate that they receive separate force structure solutions. As opposed to peace enforcement operations, which are offensive in nature, and aimed at imposing the enforcers will on the adversarial party, peacekeeping is basically a defensive operation in which the peacekeepers conduct passive activities to maintain the peace. Commanders in peace enforcement operations can utilize many, if not all, of the warfighting tools they have trained with throughout their careers. In peacekeeping operations there is little room for creative force employment on the part of the commander. His creativity must be focused more on non-traditional military concepts to enhance his chances of success with the mission at hand. Negotiations, public and civil affairs activities, and psychological operations are among the more useful implements in the commanders tool kit. The principal key to success in peacekeeping operations is impartiality on the part of the peacekeeping force. Impartiality can equate to some extent with unfamiliarity – unfamiliarity in the sense that the peacekeeper has no real or perceived interests in the area of the operation. Thus, the “perfect” peacekeeping force would be provided by a capable, distant nation with no “agenda” in the area
of the peacekeeping operation. Additionally, peace operations in general, and peacekeeping operations in specific, require close coordination at every stage between military and political leaders. As noted by one U.S. Army leader in 1993:

Peace operations, with their primarily political rather than military goals, demand closer and more continuous coordination between the appointed political authority and the military commander than in war to insure that military objectives achieve political objectives while protecting the force, its legitimacy, and its neutrality.\textsuperscript{16}

In studying a peace operations force for the future, any analyst, as well as political and military leaders will undoubtedly draw on past U.S. experiences in these operations. Since World War II, the United States has participated in and supported several types of these operations, ranging from traditional peacekeeping missions, like the multinational force and observers (MFO) in the Sinai, to more complex and multidimensional operations, like the United Nations (UN) transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) or the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).\textsuperscript{17} Add to these the complexities and challenges most recently confronted in the Balkans, and the sum equates to numerous divergent considerations which the force structure analysts and decision-makers must contemplate. The following force structure options consider both the lessons learned and future requirements for peace operations.

There are a few constant factors, which will apply to each of the alternatives. One concerns the unique capabilities that the United States provides international and regional organizations in military operations. Examples include; air and sealift, command and control resources, and logistical and intelligence support. These assets are critical to the success of peace operations regardless of the alternative pursued. Additionally, since air and navy forces are able to contribute to peace operations with less significant changes to their normal peacetime and wartime roles, the focus of these alternatives is on the ground force structure. The basic force size needed to support U.S. military involvement in peace operations (Alternatives #1 - #4) and provide for a rotation base, is a Division. To respond to peace operations, this division-sized force will need to be task organized to include non-divisional type units required for peace operations. For example, in the case of the U.S. Army, this could potentially entail permanently reassigning assets normally maintained at the Corps level, or at Echelons Above Corps (EAC) to this peace operations force structure. The force structure alternatives we will address are as follows:

#1 – Continue using current forces on an “as-needed” basis
#2 – Earmarking U.S. Forces for Peace Operations
#3 - Increased use of Reserve / National Guard Forces
#4 - Developing a Joint Force Configured for Peace Operations short of Peace Enforcement
#5 - Department of State Peacekeeping Forces
#6 - Contributing forces to a Standing UN Peacekeeping "Legion"
#7 - Provide only U.S. unique support and financial support to peacekeeping operations

Where appropriate, I will highlight some comparisons between the alternatives presented here and the CBO report which provided four potential options for restructuring the U.S. Army to better support peace operations.

Alternatives #1-#3 will focus on U.S. force structure alternatives to address the entire spectrum of peace operations, from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping through peace enforcement.

#1 - CONTINUE USING CURRENT FORCES ON AN "AS-NEEDED" BASIS:
This has been the traditional U.S. approach for executing peace operations. This alternative allows forces to concentrate on warfighting skills on a regular basis, with adjustments to training for peace operations only when the need arises. At the conclusion of the peace operation, the unit returns to conventional training. An example of this method is provided by the battalion sized combat forces, which have deployed to the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) since 1982. The entire U.S. force structure would be available for peace operations by tailoring the force mix through task organization. This alternative proves the most inexpensive financially since it requires little or no change in the current practices. However, deployments over the past ten years in support of these operations are clearly taking their toll on the warfighting readiness and morale of certain units involved.

A recent study conducted by Charles Moskos on Task Force Falcon in Kosovo from 30 August to 6 September 2000, contradicts the previous statement and deserves some discussion. The results from Moskos' weeklong study indicate increased morale and readiness within the unit owing to their participation in the peace operation. Moskos stated morale was higher for soldiers who got out of the compound and interacted with the populace, as well as for those soldiers who were confined to the compound, but were doing "real jobs", such as mechanics and medics. This is understandable, as is the increase in readiness for those who are able to continuously work at their MOS skills while deployed. Moskos noted that the overwhelming consensus among the soldiers of Task Force Falcon was that what they lost in
weapons practice and field exercises was more than compensated for by real-life experience in small-unit operations. He also quoted one senior commander as saying, if soldiers after a peacekeeping deployment need months of combat retraining when they return to their home station, "they weren't well trained to begin with."  

The Moskos study presents a snapshot in time and is not necessarily a suitable portrait of the "standard" peace operation. The report rightly emphasizes the fact that soldiers in Task Force Falcon are performing superbly in executing a challenging mission. But, one could expect morale to be high in an environment such as the one created in Task Force Falcon where living conditions are not all that different from those at their home stations. At Camp Bondsteel, 6 person rooms with TVs are the norm, along with toilet and shower facilities in the same building. Some sixty percent of the soldiers use the internet on a daily basis for personal email and information, and another 20% claimed they used it on a weekly basis. A host of MWR opportunities and R&R packages also serve to improve the morale of soldiers. These types of amenities should always be part of the "position improvement" for any long-term operation, but are 1) not always possible to develop, and 2) hardly conducive to preparing soldiers for the rigors of their warfighting mission.  

Although any real-world operational experience in a foreign country is beneficial to enhancing a soldier's confidence, and a unit's cohesion, what are the associated costs? Moskos' report fails to address the deficiencies associated with those MOS's where skills are readily perishable if not consistently practiced. Included in this category are MOS's such as artillery fire direction personnel, tank crew members, and those associated with the planning and execution of combined arms operations. Despite the quote of the senior leader above, these perishable skills do take months to retrain to standard upon return to home station. Add on to that a period of leave to which deployed soldiers are undoubtedly in need of, and there is at least a ninety day turnaround period before the unit is ready to take on a warfighting mission. Additionally, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute hosted a Kosovo After-Action-Review (AAR) in February 2001, which highlighted the negative impact caused by a lack of up-front funding for peace operations in Kosovo. Essentially, unit funds used to conduct pre-deployment peace operations training resulted in a lack of critical, post-deployment funding needed to re-hone warfighting skills.  

In any peace operation where concurrent combat-skills training is not conducted, warfighting skills for the units involved will erode. As noted earlier, top-notch battalion sized combat forces have deployed to the Sinai as part of MFO since 1982, with a degradation of combat proficiency throughout their deployment. For a six-month deployment to the Sinai,
these forces are actually unavailable to support existing war plans for about an eighteen-month period when one considers the train-up time required prior to the deployment, the actual deployment, and post-deployment personnel recovery and training required to regain combat proficiency. This cycle would certainly continue under the current methodology and this alternative.

The current U.S. philosophy when sending combat units to conduct peace operations is that they can rapidly be pulled out of the peace operation if needed for a warfighting mission. This is a dangerous philosophy, which fails to adequately account for the difficulties associated with short-notice redeployment and change of mission. Besides the potential impact on the peace operation from which the force will be removed, there will be the need for some period of combat skills retraining following a peace operation. There will also be a host of personnel issues associated with post-peace operation deployment and pre-combat deployment (i.e. leave, Permanent Change of Station orders, end of service obligation) that must be tended to. The greater the personnel turbulence during this period, the greater the need for unit retraining prior to combat operations. How long will it take to swing peace operations forces to combat operations? Most conservative estimates indicate about six months. Even the current Commander of Task Force Falcon (again despite the quote of one of his leaders above) recently commented that it would take 90 days for his soldiers to regain their previous combat proficiency after they have completed their Kosovo assignment and return to Germany.21 With time added for the personnel issues already mentioned and the actual movement of the force, five to six months would seem a realistic estimate to transition a peace operations force into combat operations.

One final note here. The U.S. would realistically only be able to extract forces from those peace operations on the lower end of the scale, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Forces conducting peace enforcement operations would likely be engaged (or poised to engage) in combat operations with the enemy. Although they might require less train up time to support a warfighting plan, their ability to disengage from peace enforcement duties, without significant risk to the force and to the mission, is highly suspect.

This alternative, which is the current modus operandi of the U.S., places U.S. forces in a reactive posture, having to train to the tasks of peace operations as the need arises. Based upon my assumption regarding the National Security and National Military Strategies, U.S. military forces will continue to be trained as warriors first, and for peace operations later – if at all. Starting with recruit training, they will be inundated with training that focuses on the principles of war, maneuver, centers of gravity, decisive force and the like. However, this option
will remain lucrative to leaders who dislike change and believe that individuals trained for warfighting can easily adjust to any tasks below that level – such as those that fall within the realm of peace operations.

#2 - EARMARKING U.S. FORCES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Under this option specific U.S. units would be assigned the collateral mission of being prepared to respond to peace operations. Although this option shares many characteristics with Alternative 1, the primary difference is that an earmarked force would regularly receive peace operations training in support of it’s Mission Essential Task List (METL) as part of its recurring training requirements. Additionally, earmarked forces would provide a strong foundation and test-bed for peace operations doctrine, command and control, training and education, and form habitual relationships with international / regional peace operations organizations. This force would be earmarked from within existing force structure and thus, be less costly. This force would train for the entire spectrum of peace operations, and would be prepared to accept specialized augmentation as needed to meet the specific mission requirements, be it a peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or humanitarian assistance operation. This alternative is much like the CBO option calling for cycling the readiness of some active Army units.

As an example, 10th Mountain Division could be designated as the Peace Operations Force for the Army, and 3d Marine Division could be so designated for the Marine Corps. Both organizations would require “rounding out” to provide the necessary rotation base, and augmentation with the appropriate non-divisional personnel needed to successfully execute the full range of peace operations.

The greatest deficiency with this option stems from the divergence of the missions assigned. If not relieved of it’s war plan responsibilities, the creation of such a “general purpose” force could easily result in a force lacking true proficiency in both warfighting and peace operations skills. The U.S. could choose to overcome this by focusing this force on peace operations while accepting a greater degree of risk in responding to the second major theater war.

#3 - INCREASED USE OF RESERVE / NATIONAL GUARD FORCES

This concept is well underway within the U.S. at present. Use of the reserve force is not only a suitable alternative, but in many ways a requirement, since many of the unique capabilities required for peace operations are most heavily based in the Reserve Force structure. This alternative allows the majority of the active duty forces to remain focused on their warfighting missions, with less expense to the warfighting skills of the reserve force due to
the use of specialized units. A rotational base would enable peace operations duties to be shared by the entire reserve force structure. Economically depressed areas, where unemployment is high, could be targeted as primary providers for peace operations volunteers or forces within the rotation base. For long-term missions, rotations can be scheduled far enough in advance (as is currently being done in the Balkans with a five-year schedule), to enhance training of units for the mission, and to allow those personnel, and their communities, to adequately prepare for their absence from their civilian requirements. Active forces would continue to respond to rapidly evolving peace operations requirements.

There are a number of concerns with this alternative that must be addressed. Peace operations can be time consuming, and existing laws would require refinements to ease mobilization criteria and active deployment standards. Long-term motivation among both the reserve force and the communities within which they reside is also a concern. People join the reserves for a variety of reasons, one of which, it is assumed, is to fight for America in times of crisis. Another reason is because they do not want to become a full-time soldier. Peace operations may prove to be exactly what the reservist / national guardsman has attempted to avoid; employment in potentially mundane vice crisis oriented operations, and extended active duty commitments. As the CBO report noted, "In the Army, a large percentage of the high-demand capabilities in the combat-support and combat-service-support areas are in the reserve component... Such "high-demand/low-density units can be subject to frequent deployments, which can have a deleterious effect on their morale and retention." Local employers would likely be unsupportive of extended leaves of absence for reservists, particularly if recurring, and in light of the potentially limited active duty involvement in the same missions. Local public support could easily diminish as the mission continued over time, particularly in cases where employers are holding job positions vacant for deployed reservists or national guardsmen.

A recently published argument against using the National Guard in peace operations is made in the Phase III report of the Hart-Rudman Commission, which specifically recommends that the National Guard should be given homeland security as a primary mission. Should this be implemented (and some may argue that it is already underway with the establishment of Civil Support Teams) State Governor's are likely to be increasingly hesitant to deploy their own first line of defense to trouble spots in foreign lands.

Alternatives #4 - #6, which follow, will focus on addressing specific components of peace operations, notably peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance vice all operations under the peace operations umbrella. Alternative #7 is a policy recommendation regarding U.S. support
to peacekeeping operations, which could be used in conjunction with some of the alternatives (specifically Alternative #1), likewise having an effect on force structuring.

#4 - DEVELOPING A JOINT FORCE CONFIGURED FOR PEACE OPERATIONS SHORT OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Under this alternative, a joint force would be configured specifically for, and dedicated to training exclusively for peace operations short of peace enforcement - primarily peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance (H/A) missions. This force would possess the equipment, weapons, and personnel best suited to these missions. Light infantry, engineers, logisticians, military police, and civil affairs experts are examples of the types of ground forces commonly required. Primary training for this force would focus on peacekeeping and H/A tasks, and highlight defensive tactics and force protection measures. Each military service would contribute the specialized personnel and resources needed to form a flexible and responsive force peacekeeping/H/A force. This option would enhance the foundation and test-bed advantages mentioned above in Alternative #2. In the event of a U.S. major theater war, these forces could be employed in defensive roles, such as supporting civil affairs, rear area operations and local security tasks, thereby freeing up warfighters and reserve forces normally assigned these missions for other tasks.

With a significant amount of the U.S. force structure engaged in and training for peace operations already, it may be prudent to officially form a portion of that structure as a dedicated joint peace operations force. A service-designated force could form the nucleus for a joint peace operations force with joint augmentation upon mission receipt, or be permanently assigned those assets and be designated as a standing Joint Task Force (JTF).

Under this option, Joint Peace Operations Forces would be most responsive if placed under the combatant command of Joint Forces Command to provide oversight for training and ensure rapid worldwide deployability for smaller scale peace operations contingencies. However, another option would be to have regionally based peace operations forces under regional CINCs, specifically in the Pacific and European Areas of Responsibilities (AORs). Currently configured regional, rapid-response contingency forces may provide the base structure from which to build upon. For example, III MEF based in Okinawa, Japan is smaller than either of the CONUS based MEF's, yet provides the sole Marine Corps rapid response capability for CINCPAC. Based on the size and capabilities of the ground combat, aviation combat, and service support elements within III MEF, it could be postulated that it is better suited to rapidly respond to Peace Operations, such as it did in East Timor in 1999, than to a
higher level combat operation. III MEF lacks the organic heavy combat capability in terms of tanks, and sufficient artillery, which would likely be required of early deployers for a peace enforcement operation.

Similarly, the U.S. Army Europe has adopted standard training cycles for its Brigades that focus on peacekeeping tasks for six months of the year, in response to operations in the Balkans. With the National Guard poised to assume some of the responsibilities in the Balkans, U.S. Army Europe could continue to provide a portion of its force as the nucleus of a European based rapid-response peace operations force. Since these forces would be dedicated to the lower level peace operations (peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance), the U.S. would continue to retain responsive forces for those operations where vital interests are at stake and require an immediate response from combat ready troops.

This proposal is similar to the CBO concept of reorganizing existing active Army forces for peace operations. As discussed earlier, the United States has a justifiable concern in separating peacekeeping from other peace operations, particularly peace enforcement. Although peacekeeping operations are indeed benign and passive in nature, as we have seen over the past ten years in places like Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, they can rapidly revert to higher intensity conflict in a matter of moments. For those peacekeepers on the ground, it is their ability to quickly transition into peace enforcers, which can mean the difference not just between mission success or failure, but more importantly – life or death. Such a force would require the defensive capability to protect itself under the “worst case” scenario until an offensive capable force could arrive to quell the disturbance. Both the Okinawan based Marine forces and European based Army forces possess this defensive capability, thereby minimizing the associated force protection risk.

Another concern with this option stems from the specialization of the force and the associated opportunity costs. With a significantly reduced military force structure since 1990, does the U.S. really want to dedicate a sizeable portion of that structure to lower level peace operations? As I have alluded to above, we have already stretched the structure thin, with 2½ MEF’s vice the 3 the Marine Corps advertises, and 2-Brigade Divisions throughout much of the Army. In short, not all Marine MEF’s are the same, nor are all Army Division’s the same, and neither of them are what they were ten years ago. U.S. leaders must look beyond the “type” of organization to see what actually comprises it in structuring the force to meet both peace operations and warfighting requirements. Based upon our assumptions, and the unlikely increase in force structure, leaders are again confronted with assuming increased risk for the second major theater war in responding to future peace operations.
The Hart-Rudman Commission Phase Ill Report calls for restructuring, empowering, and increasing the resources of the Department of State for the 21st Century. With this in mind, we are confronted with an excellent opportunity for our discussion to explore non-military, or at least non-DOD type solutions to the lower level peace operations - such as peacekeeping. This concept is akin to a recommendation made by the late Colonel Harry Summers when he stated "to 'wage peace' we need to create a new and expanded Peace Corps under the auspices of the Department of State." Since peace operations are particularly political in nature and require such close linkage with diplomatic efforts, it could be argued that State is the most appropriate Department to maintain such a force. There is undoubtedly an untapped resource of individuals within the United States who would readily provide their services in assisting to create or maintain peace throughout the globe, but who want absolutely nothing to do with the military. This volunteer force would be comprised of specialized individuals such as policemen, engineers, linguists, civil affairs experts, etc, minus the combat specialists. This "citizen" force would enhance its viability as a neutral, impartial peacekeeping or H/A force through its lack of military affiliation.

As might be expected, "the devil is in the details". To have credibility this force would require extensive training. Prerequisites for training include basing, equipping, and expertise in command and control, intelligence, logistics and operations - in short, the kinds of things inherent in military operations. These challenges could be overcome, but, in today's trend toward fiscal prudence, the costs may indeed be prohibitive. The Department of State would need a significant increase in their budget, and potentially significant DOD support to get this program off the ground, however, the American people may be more supportive of additional dollars being vectored to the DOS for peace operations rather than to DOD.

Smaller scale options, short of developing an established force within the Department of State, are also viable. The Department of State could expand their current program of contracting out specific peace operations tasks, and perhaps ultimately build upon their success in this area to develop a force structure. Observers, peace monitors, civil affairs experts and the like clearly fall into this contractual-task category.

A number of organizations currently provide services of this kind. As an example, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) has provided peacekeeping monitors for both the U.S. Department of Defense and the Department of State for use across the globe, and provides a wide range of services from assisting foreign ministries of defense to providing
humanitarian relief. MPRI claims to draw its workforce from a database of some 8,000 former defense and other professionals with expertise across a wide variety of essential areas.

Some regional organizations directly seek out volunteers via the internet. For instance, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) publishes billet openings in support of peace operations in Kosovo on its home page. From the above, it is easy to see that there exists both a need, and a pool of non-military resources available, to address many of the aspects of peace operations.

Although this option targets peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance as the primary mission areas at present, over the long-term this could expand to include peace enforcement operations. This expansion could potentially occur within the next ten years as a growing pool of military personnel currently gaining actual experience in all forms of peace operations leave military service and add their names to the databases of companies like MPRI.

Many Americans are likely to view the creation of a Department of State force as a form of “reinventing the wheel”. Why buy something we already own? Why create a State Force that may have to rely heavily on DOD for much of its support, but lacks the capability of a DOD force? From a DOD perspective the obvious disadvantage of this alternative is that DOD would likely be the bill payer for this option, specifically in terms of competing budget dollars and expertise in training this force. Even if contractors were used to train the force, it is likely that the money to pay the contractors would be money that formerly found its way into the DOD budget. There is also the concern of placing non-military personnel, inadequately trained for warfare, into an environment where warfare may erupt. This concern can best be summarized by the Dag Hammarskjold statement that “Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it.”

Regardless, international and domestic politics and security strategies have changed significantly since the late UN Secretary General made that statement, and at a minimum, the U.S. should study this option as a way of addressing some of the requirements that fall between Peace Corps missions and lower level peace operations.

#6 - CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO A STANDING UN PEACEKEEPING “LEGION”

The original UN Charter called for countries to designate forces for automatic call-up by the UN in support of peacekeeping operations. This was not aggressively pursued during the Cold War, but came to the forefront in the early 1990’s through a concerted UN effort to secure “the commitment of 100,000 troops and other specialists,... who could be deployed on short notice to crisis spots.” Staunch opposition from Security Council States and other developed
countries in the UN derailed this initiative for all practical purposes, but the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, more commonly referred to as the “Brahimi Report” published in August of 2000, has rejuvenated the discussion. Although not recommending a standing UN force, the panel notes, “Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building of a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. The analysis [that follows] argues that at least some of these circumstances must change to make rapid and effective deployment possible.”

The vast majority of U.S. involvement in UN missions over the years has been in the form of financial or logistical support - not troop support. Although adamantly opposed by the United States Congress, this alternative would provide an immediate response capability to the UN to address peace operations. Since no UN peacekeeping mission can be undertaken without the consent of the Security Council, the U.S. would maintain veto authority over any such missions where vital or important interests were not at stake.

A couple of different options are provided in forming this force.

Quotas could be assigned to member states on a fair share basis, with member states being allowed to provide more than their fair share if authorized by the Security Council. Contributing member states could select forces from within their existing force structure, or provide volunteers in a manner as described in the Department of State Alternative above, as long as the forces ultimately provided met established UN criteria. Thus, contributing member states would be responsible for the basic/soldier skills training of the force provided. Once provided by member states, the UN would assume operational control over the force, as well as responsibility for any additional mission specific training and equipping, perhaps maintaining a ready brigade on active status at all times. The remainder of the forces would essentially remain in a reserve UN status in their home country - as part of their national military force, or as part of the civilian community.

Another option would be to have each of the Security Council members start by sponsoring a battalion each of multinational UN forces, where each Security Council member is responsible for garrisoning, training and equipping the force resident in their particular country. For example, the U.S., as a Security Council member, could sponsor an “Asian” battalion comprised of companies, and separate Platoons from the Asia-Pacific region, and provide a
company to the “Americas” Battalion led potentially by a U.S. or Canadian Battalion Staff and sponsored by Security Council member France.

This second option provides the greatest degree of preservation of warfighting skills and traditional missions for the U.S. military, while increasing the neutrality and impartiality of the UN peace force by stripping it of any particular “national identities”. This force promises to be best suited to peacekeeping operations, and could be expanded to a brigade size contingent for each should the concept prove itself effective, and needed. This alternative contains the least risk for the U.S. by keeping almost all American military forces out of potentially volatile peacekeeping situations where they present a lucrative target, yet possess only the modest defensive capability of a peacekeeper.

Both of the options under this alternative would demonstrate significant U.S. resolve and commitment to the international community regarding peacekeeping operations. Under control of the Security Council, and without an “offensive” combat capability, there should be no fear within the U.S., or any other country, of this force transforming the UN into an overpowering international organization with a military machine to impose its will. Additionally, by providing a battalion sized force or less, the U.S. would stay within the bounds of the UN Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 72-264), which authorizes the President to provide U.S. armed forces to serve as observers, guards, or in any non-combat capacity, upon request of the UN, limited to 1,000 personnel.  

The difficulties in implementing this alternative are, however, numerous. The UN Military Staff Committee needs to be enlarged and strengthened: especially the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Start-up costs for equipping and training such a force will be high, and to many nations, including those comprising the Security Council - prohibitive. Costs associated with keeping the force, or elements of it, permanently active also represent an increase over the current system. Garrisoning of the force may be less problematic for the United States. There are still a number of underutilized DOD facilities (as indicated by ongoing DOD recommendations for another Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)), from which the U.S. could designate a suitable training garrison for these forces. This is not a new concept. For example, in 1993 the City of San Diego took steps to promote the use of the Naval Training Center, which was scheduled for closure by BRAC, as “an ideal headquarters and training center for U.S. peacekeeping forces – and perhaps peacekeeping forces of other countries as well.”

Interoperability problems could be addressed by standardizing communications equipment; vehicles and weaponry with a one-time buy of such items. Based on the nature of
peacekeeping missions, the emphasis on equipment should be one of functionality and reliability vice the normal military approach for state of the art equipment, which out-performs their adversary's. Standardizing requirements to a single language, specifically English, could overcome the language issue if the host Security Council option is pursued. The regular training regimen would include English language training, and a significant number of interpreters, translators, and linguists would be employed initially to get the program underway.

Contracting out for retired or former military members, Foreign Service officer types, and other specialists with experience in peace operations or possessing critical skills can greatly streamline the leadership, training and preparedness of these UN forces.

The biggest obstacle encountered is that to make this alternative work a strong commitment of finances and effort is required by all member states and their political leaders, particularly the United States. Unfortunately, this level of commitment does not currently exist, nor is it likely to until the deterioration of world events, to include both warfighting and peace operation scenarios, force draconian changes to the way the international community views collective security.

#7 - PROVIDE ONLY U.S. UNIQUE SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Although more of a policy alternative than a force structure option, its ramifications clearly affect the employment of U.S. ground forces. The principal thrust of this option would have the U.S. clearly state to the international community that future U.S. support for peacekeeping missions would not include U.S. ground combat forces. Some observers have concluded that U.S. forces are ill suited to conduct general peacekeeping operations. They claim this is especially true in a United Nation's environment because, "the nature of the UN coalition roles and mission are at variance with American military character, doctrine, traditions, and the concepts of both decisive force and victory."33

As long as the U.S. remains the sole superpower in the world, U.S. peacekeepers will likely present a more lucrative target (than other country's peacekeepers) to those factions who would prefer to see a peacekeeping mission falter. Under this option, the U.S. would support peacekeeping operations by providing diplomatic and financial support, as well as those unique military capabilities (such as strategic lift, communications and logistical support) mentioned previously. The U.S. would also continue to provide individual observers and monitors in small numbers as it does currently. This contribution is not only the minimum expected of a superpower, but it is also truly the minimum needed to ensure the success for many
peacekeeping operations. Additionally, it is politically justifiable both internationally and domestically.

Under this option, the U.S. would continue to employ ground combat forces in support of peace enforcement operations where our national interests are concerned, but would work toward the earliest transition possible to a UN or regional peacekeeping force. Many countries currently have the ability to provide adequate peacekeeping forces to UN or regionally organized peacekeeping missions. Their training focuses on specific peacekeeping and force protection tasks, neither of which requires U.S. combat troops or their sophisticated weaponry. If needed to expedite the transition to a UN or regional peacekeeping force and as stated in PDD-25, the U.S. can play an integral part in providing training and facilities to better prepare those international forces participating in peacekeeping operations.

Under this option the U.S. continues to lead by example with diplomatic, financial, and appropriate military contributions to all forms of peace operations. In justifying this option to the international community the U.S. would emphasize that the risks accepted by deploying U.S. ground combat forces in support of peacekeeping operations (in terms of warfighting readiness and availability of ground combat forces would be shared by every nation who depends on those same U.S. troops to assist in their defense during crisis.

CONCLUSION

There are tradeoffs with each of the alternatives discussed above, and clearly elements of each could be combined to form different options. U.S. policy makers must prioritize the criteria utilized in defining the force structure developed to meet our warfighting and peace operations requirements. This paper has focused on mission suitability, retention of U.S. warfighting capability, degree of difficulty in developing the force, and cost as the primary criteria in establishing a force to address peace operations. That sequence also represents my prioritization of the criteria.

The first three alternatives presented represent options for U.S. force structuring which would address the entire range of peace operations. Alternative #1 (Continue using Standing Forces on an "as-needed" basis) would clearly cost the least and require little change from current practice but is the least suitable for the mission. Alternative #2 (earmarked U.S. forces) and #3 (Reserve/National Guard forces) are adequate but fail to optimize any of the criteria. The "earmarked" general purpose force risks a lack of proficiency in both warfighting and peace operations skills, and the continued use of Reserve forces during periods of relative peace could
eventually draw sharp criticism from the American public, and may also result in recruiting and retention issues for those components.

Should the U.S. decide to stay the course by continuing to use current forces on an "as needed" basis, as outlined in Alternative #1, then I strongly recommend that the policy outlined in Alternative #7 (provide only U.S. unique support and financial support to peacekeeping operations) be applied. This policy would clearly keep costs to a minimum and preserve U.S. warfighting capability by offering up ground combat troops for peace enforcement missions only. The U.S. must be open and honest in presenting this case to the international community, and be prepared to accept the sharp criticism, which will undoubtedly follow. However, for the U.S. to continue to press her military forces to be proficient peacekeepers while accepting no degradation in their warfighting readiness is like demanding that a professional bull rider be a professional calf roper as well. As a “cowboy” he can probably ride a horse, and he can probably throw a rope, but mastering the skills required to proficiently rope calves will require time practicing – and that’s time away from bullriding.

Alternatives #4 through #6 address lesser contingencies under the peace operations umbrella, specifically peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance type operations. Alternative #4 (dedicated joint forces) fails to optimize any of the criteria, but among the strictly U.S. military options it provides the most suitable alternative to address what is truly the most problematic element of peace operations for the U.S. - peacekeeping. Retention of warfighting skills is the opportunity cost here for Army/Marine ground combat units assigned, but would have minimal impact on other elements of the joint force, and would be offset to a great degree by the potential defensive uses for this force in a warfighting scenario. This alternative is my second recommendation overall, but first among the strictly U.S. alternatives for addressing lower level peace operations.

Although desirable, fiscal realities and “degree of difficulty” make Alternative #5 (Department of State Peacekeeping Forces) an unlikely prospect in the near term. Such a force, however, should be explored as a long-term objective. Politically incorrect, yet highly recommended is Alternative #6 (Contributing forces to a standing UN Peacekeeping “Legion”). This option satisfies the criteria of mission suitability and retention of U.S. warfighting capability completely, and its cost may be lessened to some extent by burden sharing among all UN member nations. The hurdles to overcome in forming such a force would pale in comparison to the long-term advantages gleaned from its’ success as a peacekeeping force. Since this alternative addresses peacekeeping only, the U.S. would continue to respond to other peace operations, such as humanitarian assistance or peace enforcement with organic military forces.
as the need arose. These missions are, as mentioned above, less problematic for the U.S. military, and do not normally require the lengthy commitment associated with peacekeeping operations.

A UN peacekeeping “legion” would satisfy realists by preserving the warfighting integrity of U.S. military forces, and greatly reduce the risk of political and military entanglements, which so often accompany peacekeeping operations. It would simultaneously satisfy the pluralists by increasing U.S. participation in international collective security and by enhancing the likelihood of multinational solutions to the world’s problems. More importantly, UN peacekeepers would be specialized in their duties, tackling a mission that the United States military has historically had difficulty in accomplishing. This alternative would provide the best low-risk means to achieve U.S. ends in consonance with the existing, and foreseeable, national security strategy.

The United States is clearly at a crossroads in transforming its military to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. Despite the variety of projected “threat scenarios” being postulated for the future, most analysts looking in that direction have agreed that under any scenario, the future will also include a growing number of crises which fall within the category of peace operations. Like it or not, as a superpower, the U.S. will remain engaged throughout the globe in these operations. The U.S. must position itself to respond effectively to these missions where interests are at stake through redefining policy, restructuring the force, and/or leading the changes within international or regional security organizations to meet these challenges. The alternatives presented above have attempted to outline a wide spectrum of options - some requiring little change, others requiring sweeping change – in order to stimulate the discussion.

If the reader accepts the assumptions presented at the outset of this paper, then he/she is also likely to concur that it is among the alternatives presented that the U.S. will need to define its approach to future peace operations. The choices are not easy given overall U.S. force structure and changes made to support increased involvement in peace operations come with the acceptance of increased risks in addressing U.S. warfighting missions. However, given the absence of near-term peer competitor, now is the right time to decide on the future approach to peace operations and implement the requisite changes. Although the U.S. military “toolbox” is heavier than that of any other country, owing to a much wider array of tools to choose from, experience has shown that we have no tool specifically or adequately designed for peace operations. It’s time to look at “machining” the right tool for the job.
ENDNOTES


10 Ibid.


13 Ibid., 3.


20 Thomas W. Spoehr, "This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the US Commitment to the MFO", Parameters, (Autumn 2000), 118.


25 COL Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA (Ret.), "U.S. Participation in UN Peacekeeping Organizations," Strategic Review, Vol XXI, No. 4, (Fall 1993), 72.


32 Sid Cornell, “Use the NTC for a Peacekeeping Center,” San Diego Union Tribune, 4 October 1993, B-5.

33 Lewis and Sewall, 51.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Spoehr, Thomas W. “This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the US Commitment to the MFO”, Parameters (Autumn 2000): 118.

Summer, COL Harry G. Jr., USA (Ret.), “U.S. Participation in UN Peacekeeping Organizations,” Strategic Review Vol XXI, No. 4, (Fall 1993): 72.


