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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. This is a very special meeting. We have the Secretary of State with us. We appreciate that we are in the process of concluding a rollcall vote on the Senate floor, but the time of the Secretary and of all members is valuable. Therefore, I will proceed with my opening statement. Hopefully, we will be joined shortly by the ranking member of the committee, Senator Biden, and then we will call upon the Secretary for his testimony.

At some point, as I have advised the Secretary, we are hopeful to have a quorum of our membership. At such appropriate time as I see that we will continue the Law of the Sea markup, hopefully can have a vote and at least take committee action on that important convention as a part of our work today.

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is pleased to welcome Secretary of State Colin Powell. Mr. Secretary, we are eager to hear your views on the status of our alliances, the Bush administration’s plans for making further progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, the status of negotiations pertaining to the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula, and your assessments of the State Department’s budget.

During last year, American foreign policy achieved an extensive list of accomplishments, some of which have gone unnoticed but shall not today. The President put forward bold plans to fight the global spread of AIDS and to establish the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which will encourage political and economic progress in developing nations that embrace positive reforms. Congress worked closely with the White House and the State Department on these initiatives, and passed legislation that would implement them.

Our commitment of substantial funds to the Liberian crisis and to the Middle East Partnership Initiative have similarly dem-
onstrated the United States intends to provide leadership in fighting poverty and disorder that are so often at the root of conflict. The United States continues to make progress in securing international assistance for counterterrorism efforts throughout the world. In particular, great strides were made during 2003 to solidify cooperation from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. Many nations in Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia have continued to be good allies in the war on terror.

In our own hemisphere, the Colombian Government, with U.S. support, has made measurable progress in increasing personal security for its people. Murders and kidnapings were down significantly in 2003. Colombians are traveling in parts of the country that until recently were thought to be too dangerous.

In Russia, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and its associated programs continue to safeguard and destroy the arsenal of weapons of mass destruction built by the former Soviet Union. Through the G–8 Global Partnership Against Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, we have secured $10 billion in commitments for this endeavor from our allies over the next 10 years of time. Congress passed legislation that allows the Nunn-Lugar program to be used outside the states of the former Soviet Union and, with President Bush’s strong encouragement, chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye in Russia has been accelerated. We must ensure that the funding and momentum of the program is not encumbered by bureaucratic obstacles or undercut by political disagreements.

The United States has also moved forward in the area of arms control negotiations. Last year, at the request of the President, the Senate ratified the Moscow Treaty governing the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. In coming weeks, the Foreign Relations Committee intends to report the resolution of ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Senate. This protocol will strengthen the international community’s ability to detect illegal weapons programs. Yesterday President Bush called for immediate ratification of the Additional Protocol.

Libya’s decision to open its weapons of mass destruction program to international inspection and its acceptance of responsibility for Pan Am 103 constitute a remarkable success for United States foreign policy, resulting from close cooperation with allies, specifically Great Britain, firm diplomacy, and the demonstrations of our resolve in Iraq and Afghanistan.

State Department diplomacy played an important role in the growing opportunity for rapprochement between India and Pakistan. If this initiative can produce a more stable and prosperous subcontinent, our own security will be immeasurably improved.

American diplomacy also contributed to movement toward a peace agreement in Sudan, the ratification of a constitution in Afghanistan, and the conclusion of a breakthrough tax treaty with Japan, which will be a boost to any American company doing business in that country.

During the last year, even as our relationships with some of our NATO allies were strained by the war in Iraq, the Senate ratified the treaty admitting seven Eastern European nations to NATO. The administration also secured agreement for a central NATO role
in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In my view, NATO must build on these successes by defining a broader mission for itself in maintaining stability in the greater Middle East. This should include an expanded NATO presence in Afghanistan outside Kabul and a role in Iraq’s stabilization. Progress in these areas by NATO would help heal the rifts created by disagreements over the use of force in Iraq.

Our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, though difficult, have produced important successes. The people of those two countries are better off now than they were under Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Schools are operating. Police forces and national armies are being trained. Free media is being established and women are participating in society in many more ways than they have done before.

However, our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate we must be better prepared to undertake post-conflict missions. To this end, the Foreign Relations Committee has organized a Policy Advisory Group that is attempting to come to grips with how the State Department and our government as a whole should organize and prepare itself to deal with complex emergencies. Some of the best national security minds in Washington have participated in these discussions, including Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman. I anticipate that the committee will put forward a legislative proposal in the coming weeks.

Public diplomacy is another area where deficiencies must be corrected if our policies are to succeed in the Middle East and elsewhere. I was heartened by the appointment of Margaret Tutwiler as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. She has worked well with our committee and is committed, as you are, Mr. Secretary, to boosting the effectiveness and frequency of our communications with foreign populations. I believe this will require a sea change in the orientation of the State Department, particularly as it relates to training, language expertise, and avenues of professional advancement.

Regionally, more attention must be paid to Latin America. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Haiti face severe challenges to their constitutional governments, and Mexico’s importance to our prosperity and security continues to be misunderstood and undervalued by policymakers in both executive and legislative branches. President Bush’s immigration proposal is an excellent starting point, but the U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship must be elevated to a higher priority.

With the establishment of the Global AIDS Initiative and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, this administration has done more to improve our engagement with Africa than any administration in recent memory. I believe, however, that our policies will not be fully successful in Africa until we improve our economic engagement with the continent. To this end, I am hopeful for strong administration support of the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA, which I have introduced in the Senate.

Mr. Secretary, this partial but lengthy list of foreign policy successes and priorities demonstrates how expansive the global challenges for the United States are. We want to hear from you about
the needs of your Department in this era when it occupies the front lines in the war on terrorism.

I want to compliment you personally on your efforts to expand funding for the State Department and for foreign assistance programs. You have brought strategic vision to budgetary questions involving the Department and this committee could not ask for a better partner in explaining the importance of our international affairs budget to the American people.

The progress we have made in the last 3 years has begun to reverse the damaging slide in diplomatic funding that occurred during the 1990s. Most Americans recognize the importance of investments in national security, but often our national conception of foreign affairs focuses too heavily on the crisis of the moment and fails to appreciate the painstaking work that occurs every day in the State Department and in other agencies. To win the war against terrorism, the United States must assign U.S. economic and diplomatic capabilities the same strategic priority we assign to military capabilities.

We must continue our investment in diplomats, embassy security, foreign assistance, and other tools of foreign policy. If a greater commitment of resources can prevent the bombing of our embassies, secure alliance participation in expensive peacekeeping efforts, or improve detection of terrorists seeking visas, the investment will have yielded dividends far beyond its costs.

I yield now to my distinguished friend Senator Biden for his opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., RANKING MEMBER

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is great to have you before us, Mr. Secretary. We are a friendly crowd, and I have told any staff member if they editorialize with their facial expressions they are fired. I want to just say for the record, I get as angry as you when that happens. But you are in friendly territory here, among Democrats and Republicans.

Let me say I associate myself with some of the remarks my colleague the chairman has made. There are a number of successes that are out there. But it is the nature of this oversight process, we tend to focus on those things which are in limbo or where there is disagreement.

I want to say at the outset before I give you my formal statement that I also know that, having been here for now I guess seven Presidents, that there are always and should be, and it is healthy, disagreements within administrations about policy, but once policy is determined there is a team, everybody is on the same team. So I am going to be asking you some questions here which for all I know you might have been on the other side of an argument internally, that may be more consistent with what I think should have happened or maybe not. But I do not want you to—we have known each other a long time and I know you will not; this is not about you, this is about policy areas I would like to explore.

So welcome. I realize this is now the political season. We are going into a Presidential election. But the problems we face and the seriousness with which we have to address them, particularly
in your job and ours, it does not stop because it is a political season, and hopefully we can move beyond a lot of that.

Our Iraq policy I believe at this moment appears to be a little bit in limbo. The June 30 deadline for transfer of sovereignty is looming and Mr. Sistani’s demand for elections has put in doubt our ability to proceed on key points of the November 15 agreement, which is starting to look a little more difficult to implement here.

I have had the opportunity, as I know my colleague the chairman has and others, to have some private and frank conversations with the Secretary General of the United Nations. We all understand his dilemma as well and we are trying to figure our way through this. I agree that we need to end the appearance of occupation as soon as possible, but it is also vital, it is also vital that Iraqis have some confidence in the process and believe that a neutral referee is going to be on the scene after June 30 so that the current disputes do not escalate into a civil war.

I think, quite frankly, as you know because I am like a broken record with you on this and with others in the administration, I believe we have missed some meaningful opportunities to share the burden more fully with our friends and allies in Iraq, and I hope we do not miss the final opportunity because I think we are at a point where everyone in Europe, including the French, have decided that, notwithstanding their occasional unwarranted and untoward comments and actions, that success in Iraq is essential. I think everybody is, sort of like that old expression: Nothing to focus one’s attention like a hangman’s noose. Failure in Iraq is of greater danger, quite frankly, to the French and the Europeans than it is even to us, because it is their front yard and our back yard.

So I think the elements are there to significantly broaden the coalition to take on responsibility for securing the peace in Iraq, and I look forward to hearing some of your thinking, if time permits today—if not, I know you are always available—on the U.N. role in Iraq’s future beyond generic assertions that it is going to be significant, or whatever phrase the President uses, also on the possibility of holding direct elections for a transitional government.

On the security side, I had the privilege of preceding you in Brussels at the NAC when you appeared on a Friday calling for NATO to participate in Iraq and eventually take that over. I could not agree with you more. I would like to talk to you a little bit about that if time permits, and I would appreciate an update, if you are able to in open session, on recent discussions with our NATO allies on those matters. Obviously, if you would rather not do some of this in public, even though it is not, quote, “classified,” but would limit your negotiating ability, I appreciate that.

On Afghanistan, I am very pleased the administration has agreed to expand the International Security Force. I do not want to get you in trouble, but if I am not mistaken a guy named Powell suggested that a couple years ago. But progress I think has been awfully slow. I have had the opportunity, as others have, to spend some time with a man I have great respect for and I know you do, General Jones, our Supreme Allied Commander-NATO, and as you know he has some concerns about the pace as well. The administration’s security solution, which is these small Provincial Recon-
struction Teams, I quite frankly think are inadequate to the task, and at some point maybe we can talk about that.

So too are the resources for reconstruction. You did a great job heading to Japan immediately after our successes in Afghanistan. The President declared—his words, not mine or yours—a “Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.” I quite frankly think that we have got a long, long, long way to go, notwithstanding we are occupied in other parts of the world as well.

Afghanistan is again the world’s top supplier of opium, and the ability to help them construct a legal economy has been sort of difficult, in large part because in significant parts of the country warlords continue to control the total environment.

I want to commend you for your recent op-ed piece in the Moscow press, with which I agree completely. Russia, as you observed, has traveled an enormous distance since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike you, however, I and I suspect the chairman and others as well are very concerned about the recent backsliding in Russian democracy, especially regarding the rule of law and independent media, and also about continuing Russian brutality in Chechnya and meddling in Georgia and Moldova.

One issue that begs for a coherent policy is nuclear proliferation. Yesterday the President delivered an important speech on that subject and I am very glad to see he has turned his attention to this subject in a much more concentrated way. I support many of the President’s proposals, such as encouraging countries to criminalize proliferation activities, getting all countries to sign and implement the Additional Protocols of the IAEA, and enhancing the IAEA’s oversight, safeguards, and verification capability.

But we cannot just rely, in my view—I am not suggesting you think otherwise, but—we cannot just rely on the preemptive use of force if we are going to contain this deadly threat. But I worry that in too many cases ideology for the first 3 years of this administration has trumped or at least gotten in the way of nonproliferation policy.

The President says he wants to reexamine the essential bargain, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and I think it warrants being reexamined. But in return everybody has to remember what that bargain was, that in return for not pursuing nuclear weapons states can receive assistance for civilian nuclear power applications. But there was another part of that central bargain of the NPT, which was that—that I believe this administration has ignored. That is that the nuclear powers will gradually move away from nuclear weapons while non-nuclear weapons states refrain from acquiring them.

Over the last 3 years I believe we have sent mixed signals at best and negative signals at worst, that the United States has undermined our message that other nations must forgo the bomb. For during this period the administration has raised the specter of the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. We have begun exploring new nuclear weapons of dubious utility, and we have walked away from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

It does not really embolden the rest of the world to think that we are keeping the second part of that implicit bargain in NPT,
which was that we would move away, move in the opposite direction.

A year ago, Deputy Secretary Armitage, who I do not want to ruin his reputation, but of all the people I have ever dealt with in my entire career of almost 32 years now he is the straightest, most up-front, and most honest interlocutor I have ever encountered. Now, that probably is going to cause him to be fired, but I really mean it. He is first rate. He testified, when we asked him on the crisis of North Korea, he said that he saw no crisis in North Korea because, “I think we have got some time to work with this.” But he added: “I do not think, given the poverty of North Korea, that it would be too long after she got a good amount of fissile material she would be inclined to engage with somebody, a non-state actor or a rogue state.”

I hope the administration heeds your close friend’s warning here. I know we have the multi-party talks, but quite frankly I do not see them going very far now, either. The administration has been working the North Korean issue with varying degrees of intensity since it took office. In that time the situation has gone from bad to worse. It may have happened anyway no matter what the administration was. It may not be controllable.

But North Korea has kicked out international inspectors, has removed the 8,000 fuel rods that have been stored in Yongbyon, and says it has reprocessed them, which is the most logical thing to happen, although we cannot confirm with absolute certainty that they have done that. We are left to wonder when the administration will view North Korea’s growing stockpile of nuclear materials as an urgent matter that warrants serious, immediate negotiation.

In Pakistan, after numerous assurances that no proliferation was occurring, we are now told that Dr. A.Q. Khan acted for years to sell nuclear technology without the knowledge or consent of the Pakistani Government. Quite frankly, I think that is incredibly fictitious. The idea—and I could be wrong; I am going to ask you about this—that Dr. Khan could be loading up the equivalent of C–141s and flying off material to other parts of the world and the ISI or the Pakistani military not know he is doing it, I find that absolutely, totally, completely beyond my comprehension.

I hope I can be proven to be wrong on that. But the fact of the matter is it is difficult to believe, and I look forward to hearing the administration’s assessment of this matter and how the United States should respond from this point on.

A year ago the administration doubted the usefulness of international inspectors. Today we must conclude that inspectors, for example in Iraq, did a good job. The IAEA deserves credit for its inspections in Iran over the last year, and we have agreed that the IAEA will help monitor the dismantlement of Libya’s program. Such an important institution I think deserves our strong support, not the sniping. It has not come from you, but it has come from this administration consistently since it has taken office.

Finally, let me say a few words about the budget. Once again, I commend you for securing a significant increase in the foreign affairs budget. I think we have had some great Secretaries of State, but in my time here I have known of no one who has engendered the loyalty, the thanks, and the gratitude of the employees of the
State Department more than you. You have done with them what you did when you were the commander of every unit you ever commanded and when you were the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You have instilled pride in them. They know you are fighting for them. I think it has had a marked increase in their ability, capability, and confidence, and I want to publicly commend you for that.

I happened to be with a group of State Department folks and two high-ranking people, who were high-ranking officials and Democrats in previous administrations, and to hear them talk about what you have done for the Department would please you very, very, very much. I do not think we recognize it often enough and how important that is. It is raw leadership you have provided, and once again you have fought for their budget and your budget.

The major increase is devoted to the Millennium Challenge Account and combating HIV-AIDS, two programs that are just getting off the ground, but these increases I am concerned may appear to have come at a price. Development assistance programs, which the President pledged would not suffer as a result of the Millennium Challenge Account, are reduced in the FY 2005 budget request. There may be a rationale for that I do not understand, but I would like to talk about that. So are refugee programs and aid to Russia and other neighboring states. Other important programs such as the anti-narcotics programs and international broadcasting are essentially straight-lined, with no increases for inflation.

I think one of the things—there is a lot of things that the chairman and I agree on and there is unanimity in this committee, one of which I think is the significant need for a fundamental reworking and beefing up of our public diplomacy. I think it takes a great deal more than we have in this budget.

I know you were—I think you were there early on when the President asked several of us in the Oval Office right after 9–11 and after Afghanistan and we were worried about the Arab street to put together a program. I would like to resubmit to you a program that we put together, the total cost of which over a period of time is about a half a billion dollars.

I think we need something robust. I think we need something significant. I think that the chairman and Mr. Hyde are committed to, not working on the proposal I make, but working on such a proposal. So I hope, notwithstanding the fact it is basically flat-lined here, you will have an open mind to hearing some of our suggestions. We are a global power with global responsibilities and we cannot let our attention on Iraq and the Middle East cause us to lose our focus on other vital regions of the world.

There is a lot more to talk about. We could do this for a week. There is so much at stake here. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I am going to stop here. I look forward to having the opportunity today and, I know we cannot get it all done today, but over the next month or so to go into more depth on some of the issues that are raised here.

I will probably warn you—not warn you—advise you I want to talk a little bit about Pakistan at the front end of this meeting and then maybe about Iraq and nonproliferation if there is time. But again I compliment you on the esprit de corps you have created,
which has often been missing at the State Department. It is a big
deal and you deserve all the credit, all the credit.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
I think, Secretary Powell, you can receive the ambience of a
strong bipartisan support for the Department and for your work
and on so many issues, and we appreciate that.
Would you please proceed now with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary Powell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
a prepared statement for the record and would submit it at this
time.
The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full.
Secretary Powell. And I will provide some brief remarks sum-
marizing that statement after I respond to a few of the points that
you made, Mr. Chairman, and those made by Senator Biden.
Let me say what a pleasure it is for me to appear again before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is always a joy to be
with the members of the committee and your very professional,
very experienced, very well-behaved staff. So I am very pleased to
see that this morning.
Mr. Chairman, you listed so many areas that I could spend 5
hours talking about, but I will not do that. But it kind of was stun-
ning to me to hear someone else list all the things that we have
been working on. In the State Department we tend to be running
the ground game. We tend not to be able to throw deep passes all
the time. But every day, in so many different ways, wonderful dip-
lomats and other individuals from all over the government, accred-
ited to our missions around the world, are out there getting the job
done for the American people.
Suddenly you find a Libya that is willing to give up its weapons
of mass destruction. Suddenly you find a Sudan that is closer to
peace than it has ever been in 20 years. Suddenly you go from a
situation where India and Pakistan were almost at war with each
other 18 months ago and we were worried about nuclear conflagra-
tion on the subcontinent, to a point now where they are cooperating
with each other in moving forward and even starting to inch up on
the difficult issue of Kashmir. And we find that Pakistan feels suf-
ficiently confident in their position and, with our help and pres-
sure, we are dealing with the the A.Q. Khan situation and we are
going to get that network all ripped up.
The Moscow Treaty, the proliferation security initiative—all the
things you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we are proud of, and
especially proud of the young men and women of the Department
who have done this for the American people, for the President, and
for his foreign policy.
You paid me great tribute and I deeply appreciate that, but I
could not have done it without the support that I received from this
committee, from all the Members of Congress, and all the other
committees that I report to. When I go out and visit our embassies
and I give them a little pep talk, a “meet and greet,” as they are
called—and you gentlemen and ladies have been kind enough to do
it for us as you go out and visit our embassies—but I never finish
one of those meet and greets without saying: And by the way, I want you folks to know that Congress supports you and the American people support you.

I also tell them: I will go up and make the request for money and not only they give me what I ask for, they want to give me more, and I have to kind of say, no, that would not be right; I can only support the President’s request, I cannot go any further, do not give me any more money.

But it is a reflection of the appreciation that you have for what they are doing, and it is so important to those young men and women to know that it is not just the Secretary who understands and appreciates what they are doing, but that you appreciate what they are doing, you support them, and that the American people support them. That is what makes it all work.

As I have told the committee on many occasions beginning I think at my very first hearing, I am a foreign policy adviser to the President, but I have also been given an organization to run, and I know a little bit about running organizations. I told you we would recruit. I told you we would fix the information technology system, we would fix our building operation, and our security procedures. I think the Department has done all of those things and done it in a manner that the Congress should have every reason to be proud of and approve of. We could not have done it without the support of this committee, and once again I thank you for that.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure in the course of our questioning we will get into all of the many issues that have been raised by you and by Senator Biden. What I would like to do is just go through my statement completely and then we can get into the various issues.

The President’s FY 2005 international affairs budget request for the Department of State, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies totals $31.5 billion and it is broken down as follows: foreign operations, $21 billion; State operations, $8.4 billion; P.L. 480 food aid, $1.2 billion; international broadcasting, $569 million—and I always am trying to see if we can raise that number because of the challenges that we face of the kind Senator Biden mentioned—and the U.S. Institute for Peace, $22 million.

The President’s top foreign policy priority is winning the war on terrorism. Winning on the battlefield with our superb military forces is just one step in this process, just one element of our campaign. To eradicate terrorism altogether, the United States must help create stable governments in nations that once supported terrorism, nations like Iraq and Afghanistan, and we must go after terrorist support mechanisms as well as the terrorists themselves. We must also help alleviate conditions in the world that enable terrorists to bring in new recruits.

To these ends, our foreign affairs agencies will use the FY 2005 request money to continue to focus on the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. We will continue to support our coalition partners to further our counterterrorism, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. And we will continue to do everything we can to expand democracy and help generate prosperity, especially in the Middle East as well as in other parts of the world.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 48 percent of the President’s budget for foreign affairs supports the war on ter-
rorism, our No. 1 priority. For example, $1.2 billion supports Afghani reconstruction efforts, security efforts, and democracy building. More than $5.7 billion provides assistance to countries around the world who have joined us in the war on terrorism. And $3.5 billion indirectly supports the war on terrorism by strengthening our ability to respond to emergencies and conflict situations. Finally, $190 million is aimed at expanding democracy in the greater Middle East, which is crucial if we are ever to attack successfully the motivation to terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, two of the greatest challenges confronting us today are the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, and let me first turn to Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council have made great strides in the areas of security, economic stability, and growth, as well as in democratization. Iraqi security forces now comprise more than half of the total security forces in the country.

In addition, the Coalition Provisional Authority has established a new Iraqi Army, issued a new currency, and refurbished and equipped schools and hospitals. As you know, the CPA is taking steps to return sovereignty to the Iraqi people this summer.

Much work remains to be done. Working with our coalition partners, we will continue to train Iraqi police, border guards, and Civil Defense Corps, and the army in order to ensure the country’s security as we effect a timely transition to democratic self-governance and a stable future. At the same time, we are helping provide critical infrastructure, including clean water, electricity, reliable telecommunications, and all the other infrastructure systems that are necessary for this country to get back up on its feet.

Thousands of brave Americans, in uniform and in mufti, are in Iraq now, working tirelessly to help Iraqi succeed in this historic effort. Alongside their U.S. military colleagues, USAID, State Department, and Departments of the Treasury and Commerce and so many other government organizations are working together to implement infrastructure, democracy building, education, health, and economic development programs. These efforts are producing real progress in Iraq.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to implement the 15 November agreement. We are working hard to finish work on a basic administrative law that Iraq will use until they are able to put into place a full constitution. We are still committed to having a transitional government in place that we can turn responsibility over and sovereignty over to on the 30th of June.

We have been in touch with the U.N. team that is now in country, led by Ambassador Brahimi, who we know so well and who did such a great job in Afghanistan. He has met within the last 24 hours with the Ayatollah Sistani and we are waiting for a fuller report of his activities.

Clearly, we all would like to see elections as soon as possible, so there is no question about the legitimacy of the government to make sure that the new government is representative of all the people of Iraq. But elections take time, take preparations. We are hoping that Ambassador Brahimi will come out with some ideas as to how we can continue to march toward early transfer of sov-
ereignty, but also deal with the concerns that have been raised with respect to full elections.

Obviously, the security situation is challenging. We see that in the bombings that have taken place recently, where the insurgents there, the terrorists who are there, the old regime elements, are now going after police. They are going after those individuals who have been brought in to protect Iraqis, and they are now killing their own citizens as well as continuing to strike coalition targets.

These regime-remaining elements will be dealt with. I think you will see that over time the terrorists will be dealt with by our military forces, by our coalition partners and their military forces, but increasingly by Iraqis taking on the burden for their own security.

This is not the time to shrink back from the challenge that is ahead. This is the time to move fully forward so that we do not lose this opportunity to create a democracy for the people of Iraq which will benefit the region and benefit the world.

A lot of debate is taking place right now with respect to the reason for the conflict, whether or not there were stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. That debate will continue and many different groups are looking into it—two congressional committees, Director Tenet has a group looking at it, and the President has formed a commission also to look at it, and others are examining this question.

There is no doubt in my mind, however, that Saddam Hussein had the intent, never lost the intent. Nobody has ever said he lost the intent. He had the capability in terms of the infrastructure, in terms of the knowledge as to how to use these weapons. He was developing delivery means, new delivery means for these weapons, both in the form of missiles and UAV’s. The one question that we are still debating is: Did he have stockpiles and what happened to them if he did have them?

The best intelligence information available to the President and all of his advisers, available to the intelligence community, available to the United Nations, available to the United Kingdom and France and Germany and all others, left no doubt in our mind that he had stockpiles; in addition to all of these other elements of his capability, when matched with his intent, presented a threat to the region, to his own people, to the world, to the United States.

The President did not just jump in and act preemptively. He took it to the United Nations and made the case to the United Nations. We got Resolution 1441 passed. I then took our intelligence case to the United Nations last February 5. It was not a political case. It was a solid intelligence case that represented the best judgment of the intelligence community. That is why Director Tenet and I spent 4 days out at CIA looking over all the holdings that he had to make sure that we were confident of our judgment, and that is why Director Tenet accompanied me to that meeting.

We were confident at that time that we knew the intent, we knew most of the elements of his capability, and we expected to find stockpiles.

The work is not finished. The Iraqi Survey Group continues its work. Dr. Kay does not believe we will find those stockpiles, but we will continue to work to prove once and for all whether or not there is anything there.
But Dr. Kay, who says he does not think anything is there, also says he is absolutely convinced we did the right thing, that Saddam Hussein was in material breach of his obligations, no question about it, violated all U.N. resolutions, to include 1441, and if left to his own devices, if released from the pressure of the international community, if released from the pressure of sanctions, there is no doubt in Dr. Kay’s mind, nor is there any doubt in my mind, that you would have seen those programs take new life and come back to haunt the region, haunt the people of Iraq, and haunt the international community as we worried about the nexus between those kinds of weapons and terrorism.

So while we debate this question, while we debate this question about the stockpiles, I hope there is no question in the mind of any American citizen, and if there is we need to dispel it. The President acted on good, solid information that was available to us at that time and that he did the right thing, and the world is a lot better off with no Saddam Hussein. We do not have to worry about the question of weapons of mass destruction in the future, nor do we have to worry about finding any more mass graves that have been filled by this awful person who is no longer in power.

What we have to do now as a Nation and as an international community is to come together and help the Iraqi people to build a new society based on a solid foundation of democracy and living in peace with its neighbors.

Senator Biden asked about how we are working with the international community. We have a strong coalition. We are not there alone. There are many other nations with us there. Japan has now just dispatched troops and, for the first time since World War II, they have been able to do this, in the spirit of helping the Iraqi people.

We think we will get greater support from NATO. As Senator Biden noted, I am working and so is Secretary Rumsfeld and other colleagues in the government, working with NATO to structure a role. No NATO member has opposed a future role for NATO in Iraq. They want to focus on Afghanistan right now, but we are considering what NATO might do in Iraq.

We should not fool ourselves into thinking there are huge pots of troops waiting around in NATO nations who have not yet contributed to this effort that we will suddenly have access to if NATO as an alliance agrees to this. I think it unlikely we will get large numbers, if any numbers, of German troops or French troops. But I think it is possible to structure a role for NATO, taking over one of the zones perhaps in Iraq, that could enjoy the support of all of the NATO nations.

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is another high priority for this administration. The United States is committed to helping build a stable and democratic Afghanistan that is free from terror and no longer harbors threats to our security. After we and our coalition partners defeated the Taliban government, we faced a daunting task of helping the Afghan people rebuild their country. We have demonstrated our commitment to this effort by providing over $3.7 billion in economic and security assistance to Afghanistan since 2001.
Through our assistance and the assistance of the international community, the Government of Afghanistan is successfully navigating the transition that began in October 2001. Afghanistan adopted a constitution last month and is preparing for democratic national elections in June. With technical assistance from the United States, Afghanistan successfully introduced a new stable currency in October 2002 and is working to improve revenue collections in the provinces.

The lives of women and girls are improving as women pursue economic and political opportunities and as young girls return to school or in many cases go to school for the first time ever in their lives.

Since 2001 the United States has rehabilitated 205 schools, 140 health clinics, and trained 13 battalions of the Afghan National Army. Also, President Bush’s commitment to de-mine and repave the entire stretch of the Kabul-to-Kandahar highway was fulfilled. The road had not been functional for 20 years. What was once a 30-hour journey has now been reduced to a journey of only 5 to 6 hours. But more importantly, we are starting to connect the country back together once again through this kind of road effort and road efforts that will be forthcoming in the next year.

While the Afghanistan of today is very different from the Afghanistan of September 2001, there is still much left to accomplish. In the near term, the United States will assist the Government of Afghanistan in its preparation for elections next June to make sure that they are free and fair. To demonstrate tangible benefits to the Afghan people, we will continue to implement assistance on an accelerated basis, and the request before you today contains $1.2 billion in assistance for Afghanistan that will concentrate on education, health, infrastructure, and assistance to the Afghan National Army.

Mr. Chairman, the challenges we face in Iraq and Afghanistan are huge and complex, daunting and dangerous, but we can overcome them. It is hard to rebuild with one hand and fight off attacks with the other, but we are going to do it. We are going to fight off these attacks and we are not going to walk away from either of these two countries until the mission has been accomplished.

We regret every life that is lost, whether that life is American, British, Canadian, Spanish, Italian, German, Iraqi, Afghan, or any other of the brave and dedicated people who are involved in this effort. But these men and women know and their families know that they do not risk life and limb in vain. They know that together we are changing the world. We are bringing freedom and democracy to people who have never known it before or who have had it denied to them for ages. We are drying up the swamps in which terrorism can flourish. We are bringing hope where hope was a forlorn stranger just a short time ago. And in the Taliban and in Saddam Hussein, we have eliminated two of the world’s most dangerous regimes.

Mr. Chairman, as part of the war on terrorism President Bush established a clear policy to work with other nations to meet the challenges of defeating terror networks with global reach. This commitment extends to the front-line states that have joined us in the war on terrorism and to those nations that are key to success-
ful transition to democracy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Our assistance enables countries cooperating closely with the United States to prevent future attacks, to improve counterterrorism capabilities, and to tighten border controls.

As I mentioned earlier, the FY 2005 budget provides for more than $5.7 billion for assistance to countries around the world that have joined us in this effort, including Turkey, Jordan, Afghanistan of course, Colombia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. While progress has been made attacking terrorism organizations globally and regionally, much work remains to be done, and the President’s budget strengthens our financial commitment to our coalition partners to get this work finished.

Mr. Chairman, one aspect of the war on terrorism is going after weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation. Thank you for what you have done with the Nunn-Lugar program over the years. That is one of the key programs that goes after this challenge. You have seen what has happened now that we have bottled up Libya and removing their potential to be both a source and an owner of weapons of mass destruction. You have seen what has happened in Pakistan recently.

Yesterday President Bush spoke at the National Defense University, as you noted, and outlined a new approach from the administration to this growing danger. He described how we worked for years to uncover the A.Q. Khan network. We never ignored it. We knew all about it. But we had to quietly go about identifying all elements of this network and dealing with it, and by learning more through our efforts with Libya about the network we were able to take the case to President Musharraf and let him know of the danger that lurked inside of Pakistan, a danger to Pakistan, a danger to the rest of the world.

The President spoke to President Musharraf on a number of occasions. I spoke to President Musharraf about this on a number of occasions. My staff did a quick check last night and President Musharraf and I have had 82 phone calls over the last 2-plus years, many of which dealt with these kinds of issues. And I am very pleased at the action that President Musharraf has taken in response to his recognition of the danger presented by this network, as well as the encouragement we have given him to deal with this danger.

I think the President’s speech yesterday provides new opportunities to go after this proliferation challenge and I am sure it will enjoy the support of this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I could go on and go down every one of the items that you listed or every one of the items that Senator Biden listed, but I might find myself repeating too many points that would take away from the time available for members of the committee to raise the specific questions and give me a chance to respond to those questions.

So let me close, Mr. Chairman, merely by saying once again how much we appreciate all the efforts that this committee has made to support us and to say how proud I am of what my Department has been doing in all these areas, whether it is matters of war, getting rid of a tyrant like Saddam Hussein, or whether it is matters of peace, solving regional conflicts in Liberia, in Sudan, in the
Congo, seeing results in Libya, seeing some improvement in Iran, or whether it is going after some of the greatest problems we have on the face of the Earth that are not tyrants or wars, but are disease and pestilence, poverty, ignorance.

The Millennium Challenge Account, our HIV-AIDS work, the wonderful work done by USAID, all of these efforts are so important in creating the kind of world we want to live in, and they often go unsung. People do not often write headline stories about food being delivered or inoculations being administered or great people out in USAID-land or in our embassies that, day to day, go and get this work done for the American people.

On their behalf, I thank you for your support, and I am prepared for your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the State Department's portion of the President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2005.

The President's FY2005 International Affairs Budget for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies totals $31.5 billion, broken down as follows:

- Foreign Operations—$21.3 billion
- State Operations—$8.4 billion
- P.L. 480 Food Aid—$1.2 billion
- International Broadcasting—$569 million
- U.S. Institute of Peace—$22 million

Mr. Chairman, the President's top foreign policy priority is winning the war on terrorism. Forty-eight percent of the President's budget for foreign affairs directly supports that priority by assisting our allies and strengthening the United States' diplomatic posture. For example: $1.2 billion supports Afghanistan reconstruction, security and democracy building, and more than $5.7 billion is provided for assistance to countries around the world that have joined us in the war on terrorism, and $3.5 billion indirectly supports the war on terrorism by strengthening our ability to respond to emergencies and conflict situations. Moreover, $190 million is aimed at expanding democracy in the Greater Middle East, in part to help alleviate the conditions that spawn terrorists.

In addition, $5.3 billion is targeted for the President's bold initiatives to fight HIV/AIDS and create the Millennium Challenge Corporation, both of which will support stability and improve the quality of life for the world's poor—and, again, help to relieve conditions that cause resentment and despair.

Mr. Chairman, let me elaborate a bit on how some of these dollars will be spent.

WINNING THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Winning on the battlefield with our superb military forces is just one step in defeating terrorism. To eradicate terrorism, the United States must help create stable governments in nations that once supported terrorism, go after terrorist support mechanisms as well as the terrorists themselves, and help alleviate conditions in the world that enable terrorists to bring in new recruits. To this end, in FY2005 the State Department and USAID will continue to focus on the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, support our coalition partners to further our counterterrorism, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, and expand democracy and help generate prosperity, especially in the Middle East.

Building a Free and Prosperous Iraq

The United States faces one of its greatest challenges in developing a secure, free and prosperous Iraq. The USG is contributing almost $21 billion in reconstruction funds and humanitarian assistance to this effort. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are expected to provide another $4 to $8 billion in loans and grants over the next three years. These resources, coupled with the growing assistance of international donors, will ease the transition from dictatorship to democ-
racy and lay the foundation for a market economy and a political system that respects human rights and represents the voices of all Iraqis.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) have made great strides in the areas of security, economic stability and growth, and democratization. Iraqi security forces now comprise more than half of the total security forces in the country. In addition, the CPA has established a New Iraqi Army, issued a new currency and refurbished and equipped schools and hospitals. And, as you know, the CPA is taking steps to return sovereignty to the Iraqi people this summer.

Much work remains to be done. Working with our coalition partners, we will continue to train Iraqi police, border guards, the Civil Defense Corps and the Army in order to ensure the country’s security as we effect a timely transition to democratic self-governance and a stable future.

At the same time, we are helping provide critical infrastructure, including clean water, electricity and reliable telecommunications systems which are essential for meeting basic human needs as well as for economic and democratic development. Thousands of brave Americans, in uniform and in mufti, are in Iraq now working tirelessly to help Iraqis succeed in this historic effort. Alongside their military colleagues, USAID, State Department and the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce are working to implement infrastructure, democracy building, education, health and economic development programs. These efforts are producing real progress in Iraq.

Winning the Peace in Afghanistan

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is another high priority for this Administration. The U.S. is committed to helping build a stable and democratic Afghanistan that is free from terror and no longer harbors threats to our security. After we and our coalition partners defeated the Taliban government, we faced the daunting task of helping the Afghan people rebuild their country. We have demonstrated our commitment to this effort by providing over $3.7 billion in economic and security assistance to Afghanistan since 2001.

Through our assistance and the assistance of the international community, the government of Afghanistan is successfully navigating the transition that began in October 2001. Afghanistan adopted a constitution last month and is preparing for democratic national elections in June. With technical assistance from the U.S., Afghanistan successfully introduced a new stable currency in October 2002 and is working to improve revenue collection in the provinces.

The lives of women and girls are improving as women pursue economic and political opportunities and girls return to school. Since 2001, the United States has rehabilitated 205 schools and 140 health clinics and trained thirteen battalions of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Also, President Bush’s commitment to de-mine and repave the entire stretch of the Kabul-Kandahar highway was fulfilled. The road had not been functional for over 20 years. What was once a 30-hour journey can now be accomplished in 5 or 6 hours.

While the Afghanistan of today is very different from the Afghanistan of September 2001, there is still much left to accomplish. In the near-term, the United States will assist the government of Afghanistan in its preparations for elections in June to ensure that they are free and fair. To demonstrate tangible benefits to the Afghan people, we will continue to implement assistance on an accelerated basis.

The FY2005 Budget contains $1.2 billion in assistance for Afghanistan that will be focused on education, health, infrastructure, and assistance to the ANA, including drawdown authority and Department of Defense “train and equip.” For example, U.S. assistance efforts will concentrate on rehabilitation and construction of an additional 275 schools and 150 health clinics by June 2004, and complete training and equipping of fifteen army battalions. The U.S. will also extend the Kabul-Kandahar road to Herat so that people and commerce will be linked East and West across Afghanistan with a ground transportation link between three of the largest cities.

Support for Our Coalition Partners

As part of the war on terrorism, President Bush established a clear policy to work with other nations to meet the challenges of defeating terror networks with global reach. This commitment extends to the front-line states that have joined us in the war on terrorism and to those nations that are key to successful transitions to democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our assistance enables countries cooperating closely with the United States to prevent future attacks, improve counter-terrorism capabilities and tighten border controls. As I indicated earlier, the FY2005 Budget for International Affairs provides more than $5.7 billion for assistance to countries around the world that have
joined us in the war on terrorism, including Turkey, Jordan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines.

U.S. assistance has also resulted in unparalleled law enforcement and intelligence cooperation that has destroyed terrorist cells, disrupted terrorist operations and prevented attacks. There are many counterterrorism successes in cooperating countries and international organizations. For example:

- Pakistan has apprehended more than 500 al Qaeda terrorists and members of the Taliban through the leadership of President Musharraf, stronger border security measures and law enforcement cooperation throughout the country.
- Jordan continues its strong counterterrorism efforts, including arresting two individuals with links to al Qaeda who admitted responsibility for the October 2002 murder of USAID Foreign Service officer Lawrence Foley in Amman.
- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has endorsed an ambitious transformation agenda designed to enhance its capabilities by increasing deployment speed and agility to address new threats of terrorism.
- Colombia has developed a democratic security strategy as a blueprint for waging a unified, aggressive counterterror-counternarcotics campaign against designated foreign terrorist organizations and other illegal, armed groups.

The U.S. and its Southeast Asian allies and friends have made significant advances against the regional terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah which was responsible for the Bali attack in 2002 that killed more than 200 people. In early August 2003, an Indonesian court convicted and sentenced to death a key figure in that bombing.

Since September 11, 2001, 173 countries have issued orders to freeze the assets of terrorists. As a result, terror networks have lost access to nearly $200 million in more than 1,400 terrorist-related accounts around the world. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other multilateral development banks have also played an important role in this fight by strengthening international defenses against terrorist finance.

While progress has been made attacking terrorist organizations both globally and regionally, much work remains to be done. The FY2005 President's Budget strengthens our financial commitment to our coalition partners to wage the global war on terror. Highlights of the President's request include $700 million for Pakistan to help advance security and economic opportunity for Pakistan's citizens, including a multi-year educational support program; $461 million for Jordan to increase economic opportunities for Jordanian communities and strengthen Jordan's ability to secure its borders; and $577 million for Colombia to support President Uribe's unified campaign against drugs and terrorism.

In September 2003, at the United Nations, President Bush said: "All governments that support terror are complicit in a war against civilization. No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup and recruit and prepare. And all nations that fight terror, as if the lives of their own people depend on it, will earn the favorable judgment of history." We are helping countries to that judgment.

Mr. Chairman, one of the aspects of the War on Terrorism that gives us a particular sense of urgency is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and transport.

Yesterday, President Bush spoke at the National Defense University (NDU) and outlined the Administration's approach to this growing danger. The President described how we have worked for years to uncover one particular nefarious network— that of A.Q. Khan.

Men and women of our own and other intelligence services have done superb and often very dangerous work to disclose these operations to the light of day. Now, we and our friends and allies are working around the clock to get all the details of this network and to shut it down, permanently.

We know that this network fed nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.

At NDU yesterday, President Bush proposed five measures to strengthen the world's efforts to prevent the spread of WMD:

- Expand the PSI to address more than shipments and transfers; even to take direct action against proliferation networks.
- Call on all nations to strengthen the laws and international controls that govern proliferation.
- Expand our efforts to keep Cold War weapons and other dangerous materials out of the hands of terrorists.
• Close the loophole in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that allows states such as Iran to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.

• And, finally, disallow countries under investigation for violating nuclear non-proliferation treaties from serving on the IAEA Board of Governors.

As the President said yesterday, the nexus of terrorists and WMD is a new and unique threat. It comes not with ships and fighters and tanks and divisions, but clandestinely, in the dark of the night. But the consequences are devastating. No President can afford to ignore such a threat.

Expansion of Democracy in the Middle East

We believe that expanding democracy in the Middle East is critical to eradicating international terrorism. But in many nations of the Middle East, democracy is at best an unwelcome guest and at worst a total stranger. The U.S. continues to increase its democratic and assistance activities in the Middle East to promote democratic voices—focusing particularly on women—in the political process, support increased accountability in government, assist local efforts to strengthen respect for the rule of law, assist independent media, and invest in the next generation of leaders.

As the President emphasized in his speech last November at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), reform in the Middle East is of vital importance to the future of peace and stability in that region as well as to the national security of the United States. As long as freedom and democracy do not flourish in the Middle East, resentment and despair will continue to grow—and the region will serve as an exporter of violence and terror to free nations. For the United States, promoting democracy and freedom in the Middle East is a difficult, yet essential calling.

The promising developments upon which to build. The government of Jordan, for example, is committed to accelerating reform. Results include free and fair elections, three women holding Cabinet Minister positions for the first time in Jordan’s history, and major investments in education. Positive developments also can be found in Morocco, which held parliamentary elections last year that were acclaimed as free, fair and transparent.

In April 2003, the Administration launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), an intensive inter-agency effort to support political and education reform and economic development in the region. The President continues his commitment by providing $150 million in FY2005 for these efforts.

To enhance this USG effort with a key NGO, the President has doubled the NED budget to $80 million specifically to create a Greater Middle East Leadership and Democracy Initiative. NED is a leader in efforts to strengthen democracy and tolerance around the world through its work with civil society. We want that work to flourish.

As President Bush said in his November speech at NED: “The United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace.”

Public Diplomacy in the Middle East

And the advance of freedom is aided decisively by the words of freedom. Democracy flourishes with freedom of information and exposure to diverse ideas. The President’s FY2005 Budget promotes expansion of democracy in the Middle East by providing public access to information through exchange programs and the Middle East Television Network.

New public diplomacy efforts including the Partnerships for Learning (P4L) and Youth Exchange and Study (YES) initiatives have been created to reach a younger and more diverse audience through academic and professional exchange programs. In FY2005, the P4L and the YES programs, funded at $61 million, will focus more on youth of the Muslim world, specifically targeting non-traditional, non-elite, often female and non-English speaking youth.

U.S. broadcasting initiatives in the Middle East encourage the development of a free press in the American tradition and provide Middle Eastern viewers and listeners access to a variety of ideas. The U.S. revamped its Arabic radio broadcasts in 2002 with the introduction of Radio Sawa, which broadcasts to the region twenty-four hours a day. As a result, audience size for our Arabic broadcasting increased from under 2 percent in 2001 to over 30 percent in 2003. Based on this successful model, the U.S. introduced Radio Farda to broadcast to Iran around the clock. Building on this success, the FY2005 President’s Budget Request provides over $70 million for Arabic and Persian radio and television broadcasts to the Middle East.
In early 2004, the United States will launch the Middle East Television Network, an Arabic language satellite network that will have the capability of reaching millions of viewers and will provide a means for Middle Easterners to better understand democracy and free market policies, as well as the U.S. and its people.

OUR NEW APPROACH TO GLOBAL PROSPERITY

President Bush’s approach to global economic growth emphasizes proven American values: governing justly, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom. President Bush has pledged to increase economic engagement with and support for countries that commit to these goals through an ambitious trade agenda and new approaches to development assistance focusing on country performance and measurable results.

The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)

In February of 2003, we sent the Congress a budget request for the MCA and legislation to authorize the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the agency designed to support innovative development strategies and to ensure accountability for results.

The MCC will fund only proposals for grants that have clear, measurable objectives, a sound financial plan and indicators for assessing progress.

The Congress appropriated $1 billion for MCA for FY2004. The FY2005 Budget request of $2.5 billion makes a significant second year increase to the MCA and paves the way to reaching the President’s commitment of $5 billion in FY2006.

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)

President Bush recognizes that the fastest, surest way to move from poverty to prosperity is through expanded and freer trade. America and the world benefit from free trade. For this reason, one of his first actions upon taking office in 2001 was to seek TPA, allowing him to negotiate market-opening agreements with other countries. The President aims to continue vigorously to pursue his free trade agenda in order to lift developing countries out of poverty, while creating high-paying job opportunities for America’s workers, businesses, farmers and ranchers and benefiting all Americans through lower prices and wider choices. As the President said in April, 2001 at the Organization of American States: “Open trade fuels the engines of economic growth that creates new jobs and new income. It applies the power of markets to the needs of the poor. It spurs the process of economic and legal reform. It helps dismantle protectionist bureaucracies that stifle incentive and invite corruption. And open trade reinforces the habits of liberty that sustain democracy over the long term.”

Since receiving TPA in 2002, the President has made good on his promise, completing free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore, which were quickly approved by Congress and went into effect on January 1. We have recently completed negotiations with five Central American countries on the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and are working to bring the Dominican Republic into that agreement. Earlier this week, we announced the conclusion of an agreement with Australia. Negotiations are ongoing with Morocco, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Bahrain, and on the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). We are concluding comprehensive agreements that include market access for goods and services, strong intellectual property and investment provisions, and include commitments for strong environmental and labor protections by our partners. These arrangements benefit Americans and our trading partners.

Building on this significant progress, the President intends to launch free trade negotiations with Thailand, Panama, and the Andean countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru. The President has also stated his vision for a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013, to ignite economic growth and expand opportunity in this critical region. Finally, the President is committed to wrapping up successfully the World Trade Organization’s Doha agenda. The United States has taken the lead in re-energizing these negotiations following the Cancun Ministerial.

CARING FOR THE WORLD’S MOST VULNERABLE CITIZENS

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

When President Bush took office in January 2001, the HIV/AIDS pandemic was at an all time high, with the estimated number of adults and children living with HIV/AIDS globally at 37 million, with 68 percent of those individuals living in sub-Saharan Africa. From fiscal years 1993 to 2001 the total U.S. Government global AIDS budget was about $1.9 billion. As part of the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President proposed $2 billion in fiscal year 2004 as the first installment of a
five-year, $15 billion initiative, surpassing nine years of funding in a single year. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief represents the single largest international public health initiative ever attempted to defeat a disease. The President’s Plan targets an unprecedented level of assistance to the 14 most afflicted countries in Africa and the Caribbean to wage and win the war against HIV/AIDS. In addition, programs will continue in 75 other countries.

By 2008, we believe the President’s Plan will prevent seven million new infections, treat two million HIV-infected people, and care for 10 million HIV-infected individuals and those orphaned by AIDS in Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

Announced during President Bush’s State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, the Emergency Plan provides $15 billion over five years for those countries hardest hit by the pandemic, including $1 billion for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The FY2005 Budget provides $2.8 billion from State, USAID, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to combat global AIDS, more than tripling funding for international HIV/AIDS since the President took office.

Over the past year, we have worked with the Congress to pass legislation laying the groundwork for this effort and to appoint a senior official at the State Department to coordinate all U.S. Government international HIV/AIDS activities. Ambassador Randall Tobias has been confirmed by Congress and has now taken steps to assure immediate relief to the selected countries. He announced mechanisms to initiate services in five key areas, such as care for orphans and vulnerable children as well as care and antiretroviral treatment for HIV-infected adults.

As a crucial next step, the FY2005 Budget Request expands on the Emergency Plan. By working together as a highly collaborative team, and placing primary ownership of these efforts in the hands of the countries that we are helping—just as you will recall the Marshall Plan did so successfully in post-WWII Europe—the Department of State, USAID and HHS can use significantly increased resources quickly and effectively to achieve the President’s ambitious goals in the fight against global AIDS.

Mr. Chairman, President Bush summed it up this way in April of last year, “There are only two possible responses to suffering on this scale. We can turn our eyes away in resignation and despair, or we can take decisive, historic action to turn the tide against this disease and give the hope of life to millions who need our help now. The United States of America chooses the path of action and the path of hope.”

These dollars put us squarely on that path.

Emergency Humanitarian Assistance—Helping Others in Need

The President’s Budget Request reflects a continued commitment to humanitarian assistance. The request maintains U.S. leadership in providing food and non-food assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons, and other vulnerable people in all corners of the world. In addition, the budget reflects the findings of the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) evaluations completed for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and for USAID’s Public Law 480 Title II international food assistance, which confirmed a clear purpose for these programs.

In 2003, the Administration provided funding to several international and non-governmental organizations to assist nearly 200,000 Angolan refugees and internally displaced persons return home after decades of civil war.

In an Ethiopia enveloped by drought, the Administration led international efforts to prevent widespread famine among 13 million vulnerable people, providing over one million metric tons of emergency food aid (valued at nearly half a billion dollars) to the World Food Program and NGOs, funding immunizations for weakened children, and supplying emergency seeds to farmers.

In Sudan, the Administration worked with the United Nations and the Government of Sudan so that vital assistance could be delivered to the Sudanese people. This year the U.S. will provide about $210 million in vital assistance to the people in the south, including approximately 125,000 metric tons (valued at nearly $115 million) in food aid, as well as non-food assistance, such as sanitation and water. We anticipate that a comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan will allow us to expand significantly our development assistance to help the Sudanese people in effecting a long-awaited recovery following decades of civil war. The FY2005 Budget includes $436 million in humanitarian and development, economic, and security assistance funding, much of which will be contingent upon a peace settlement between the government and the south.

The FY2005 Budget ensures that the Administration can continue to respond quickly and appropriately to victims of conflict and natural disasters and to help
those in greatest need of food, shelter, health care and other essential assistance, including those in areas starting to recover from conflict and war, such as Liberia. In particular, the budget requests funding for a flexible account to give the President the ability to respond to unforeseen emergency needs, the Emergency Fund for Complex Foreign Crises, funded at $100 million.

KEEPING AMERICANS SAFE AT HOME AND ABROAD

Mr. Chairman, we also have a sacred responsibility to look to the security of our citizens, here and overseas, when that security is a part of our responsibility.

Capital Security Cost Sharing Program

The State Department has the responsibility to protect more than 60,000 U.S. Government employees who work in embassies and consulates abroad. Since the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the State Department has improved physical security overseas; however, as many of you are well aware, many posts are still not secure enough to withstand terrorist attacks and other dangers. To correct this problem, in 1999, the State Department launched a security upgrade and construction program to begin to address requirements in our more than 260 embassies and consulates.

Working with the Congress, President Bush has accelerated the pace of improving and building new secure facilities. Moreover, we have reorganized the Overseas Buildings Office to manage the effort with speed, efficiency, and effectiveness. Within the budget, we are launching a plan to replace the remaining 150 embassies and consulates that do not meet current security standards over the next 14 years, for a total cost of $17.5 billion. To fund construction of these new embassy compounds, we will begin the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) Program in FY2005. We will implement this program in phases over the next five years.

Each agency with staff overseas will contribute annually towards construction of the new facilities based on the number of positions and the type of space they occupy. We arrived at the cost shares in the FY2005 President's Budget Request in consultations with each agency and the State Department's Overseas Buildings Office.

CSCS is also a major component of the President's Management Agenda Initiative on Rightsizing. Along with securing facilities, we have focused on assuring that overseas staffing is deployed where they are most needed to serve U.S. interests. As agencies assess the real cost of maintaining staff overseas, they will adjust their overseas staffing levels. In this way, new embassies will be built to suit appropriate staffing levels. The program is already producing rightsizing results. Agencies are taking steps to eliminate unfilled positions from their books to reduce any unnecessary CSCS charges, which in turn is leading to smaller embassy construction requirements.

Border Security

Prior to September 11, 2001, the State Department's consular officers focused primarily on screening applicants based on whether they intended to work or reside legally in the United States. In deciding who should receive a visa, consular officers relied on State Department information systems as the primary basis for identifying potential terrorists. The State Department gave overseas consular officers the discretion to determine the level of scrutiny that should be applied to visa applications and encouraged the streamlining of procedures.

Today, Consular Affairs at the State Department, working with both Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services at the Department of Homeland Security, are cooperating to achieve our goals more effectively by sharing information and integrating information systems.

The Department of State has invested substantial time, money, and effort in revamping its visa and passport process as well as its provision of American Citizen Services. The Department has more than doubled its database holdings on individuals who should not be issued visas, increased training for all consular officers, established special programs to vet applications more comprehensively, increased the number of skilled, American staff working in consular sections overseas, and improved data-sharing among agencies. The State Department, along with the Department of Homeland Security, is currently developing biometrics, such as fingerprints, digital photographs or iris scans, for both visas and passports in order to fulfill requirements of the Patriot and Border Security Acts and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

As a part of the State Department's efforts to screen visa applicants more effectively, and in particular to ensure that a suspected terrorist does not receive a visa to enter the United States, we will be an active partner in the Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC). The TSC, established in December 2003, will maintain a single, consolidated watchlist of terrorist suspects to be shared with Federal, state, local and private entities in accordance with applicable law. The Department of State will also participate in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), a joint-effort aimed at reducing the potential of intelligence gaps domestically and abroad.

To achieve our goal of secure borders and open doors, in FY2005 the State Department plans to expand the use of biometrics to improve security in the visa and passport processes; more effectively fill gaps worldwide by hiring people with specific skills including language expertise; improve and maintain all consular systems; and more broadly expand data sharing with all agencies with border control or immigration related responsibilities. The budget in FY2005 includes $175 million for biometric projects including photographs and fingerprints to comply with Border Security and Patriot Acts.

The Border Security program underwent a PART analysis in the development of the FY2004 and FY2005 budgets and this budget request reflects the results of those analyses. The Department is moving ahead on program management improvements that clearly link to the Department of Homeland Security goals related to visa policy.

THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DIPLOMATIC READINESS

We created the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) in 2002 to address staffing and training gaps that had become very adverse to the conduct of America's diplomacy. The goal of DRI was to hire 1,158 new foreign and civil service employees over a three-year period. These new hires, the first over-attrition hires in years, would allow us to provide training opportunities for our people and greatly improve the Department's ability to respond to crises and emerging priorities overseas and at critical domestic locations. To bring these new people on board—and to select the best men and women possible—we significantly improved Department hiring processes, to include recruiting personnel from more diverse experience and cultural backgrounds and people who could fill critical skill gaps. In the process, we broke records in recruiting and thus had the best and the brightest from which to select.

The Department of State will be reaping the benefits from this process for many years to come. We also created new mandatory leadership and management training, enhanced public diplomacy and consular training, and made significant increases in the amount of language training available for new Foreign Service Officers. DRI hiring has supported the Department’s efforts in responding to crises since September 11th and provided the additional resources necessary to staff overseas locations that truly represent the front line in the war on terrorism.

Some of these positions, however, are being diverted to support new requirements not envisioned by DRI, such as permanently staffing new embassies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and possibly in Tripoli. Because of this, the FY2005 Budget Request provides additional resources to continue our DRI commitment.

DRI has allowed the Department to focus on recruiting, training and retaining a high quality work force, sized to requirements that can respond more flexibly to the dynamic and demanding world in which we live. We need to continue it.

USAID has begun a similar effort to address gaps in staffing in technical skills, calling it the Development Readiness Initiative. USAID plans to hire approximately 40 Foreign Service Officers in FY2004 under this initiative. This Budget Request includes authority for USAID to hire up to 50 additional Foreign Service Officers in FY2005, in order to fill critical skill gaps identified through a comprehensive workforce analysis.

Mr. Chairman, I have focussed your attention for long enough. There is more in the President’s Budget Request for FY2005; but what I have outlined above represents the top priorities for the State Department. I will be pleased to answer any questions you have about these priorities or about any other portion of the budget request in which you are interested. If I cannot answer the question myself, I have a Department full of great people who can; and I will get you an answer for the record.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Let me suggest that for our first round of questioning we have an 8-minute limit. I will begin the questioning.

Secretary Powell, you have addressed the decision to go to war in Iraq and some of the issues that have been discussed by others. Let me simply say that Senator Biden as chairman of this com-
mittee conducted some extensive hearings in the summer of 2002. This committee was privileged to hear from a number of sophisticated Iraqis, scholars about Iraq, as well as officials of our government both past and present. I believe that we developed a very good idea, prior to any decisionmaking phase, of the complexity of the situation, and the gravity of the problem facing the world, as well as the United States specifically, and the credibility with regard to the lack of cooperation of Saddam Hussein.

Now, following the July and August recesses in both of our branches of government, the President called a meeting on September the 5th that I remember vividly. Senator Biden and I were invited to be a part of that. As I recall, you were there, and leaders of Congress, leaders of the administration. The President said: We are going to the U.N. He detailed leaders he was going to call. He commissioned you, as you have said today and, very modestly, after arduous negotiation, obtained Resolution 1441.

He also said that he was going to coopt the Congress. He was going to ask us for a vote giving authority for military action in the event that Iraq continued to be uncooperative and defied the world, both as a measure to help you in your negotiations, but likewise as a marker of the credibility of our country.

I remember asking him: How soon do you want it? And he said: Some time in this calendar year. The committee, under Senator Biden’s leadership, crafted a resolution.

I mention this because the Biden-Lugar resolution has been bandied about a good bit by many who found it satisfying, others who did not. Leaving that aside, it was a serious attempt in a bipartisan way on the part of this committee to indicate our support for the fact that our country needed to be credible in the world and likewise supportive of the President.

Now, our specific resolution did not find favor with White House counsel, I would say quite frankly. I regret that was the case, but I simply note that for the record. In due course other arrangements were made. Senator Biden and I both voted for the resolution as it finally came before the Senate, as did a fair number of our colleagues on this committee. And I say this for myself, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, I believed that in front of me was all of the intelligence that was in front of you. We had access if we were diligent in wanting to pursue it.

So it was not a question of being misled, misguided. We had to make judgments as public servants, and we did. Now, I mention all of that because there was one thing that we also drew to the attention of the administration, and that was the lack of preparation as we saw it, in the event we came into conflict, for the day after the conflict ended. If we were confident in our Armed Forces, confident in the battle plan, we were not confident the day after, literally.

We expressed that again as the new chairman came, namely myself. We had hearings, and sometimes we had lack of cooperation from Pentagon witnesses and from others who might have been informed, but who also might not have been. There may not have been that much of a plan. It is alleged that you had plans. It is alleged that somehow or other the administration did not have all the best planning there.
However it may be, this is a serious matter. Jerry Bremer and his group have been doing, in a pragmatic fashion, very well. The mission of Kofi Annan and the U.N. now is very important. The President embraced it, and so have we as leaders in the Congress.

I get to this point: simply that we really need to work together to think through what this country does in nation-building. That used to be a bad term. It is not now. I heard General Jones at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich saying again, as he told our committee: We are going to be there, we are going to stay, we are going to have a successful Afghanistan, we are going to build the nation. That may not have gotten through to everybody in America, but it certainly has with this administration and those of us in Congress who support the thought that there ought to be in your shop, in Defense, the National Security Council, somewhere, a group of people who are prepared to build nations as a part of our foreign policy.

Not that we want to do this every day, but we have at least two instances now that are very big in scale and that must be very successful.

I have mentioned our Policy Advisory Group and we have discussed this a bit, as well as Mr. Grossman’s participation. Is it my understanding that you or members of the administration, quite apart from what we are discussing over here, are discussing these issues, and that you may come forward with either an administrative order or legislation that you want us to act upon?

If the latter, I would just say that we are eager to be helpful. We are not trying to rearrange the administration, but we really are trying, as we did before, to spur the kind of thinking that we think is important on behalf of our country. I think you are resolved to do the same thing. Can you make any general comment about this preparation of the hereafter? Granted that we have two tough issues ahead of us, but we may have many more down the trail?

Secretary Powell. Mr. Chairman, first of all I am very pleased that you have created this Policy Advisory Group and very pleased that Under Secretary Grossman is working with you. We are thinking and considering different alternatives within the administration and working with colleagues in the Defense Department, the National Security Council, and elsewhere. I have written you a letter which came up last night describing some of the things we are working on: creating a reserve corps of people within the Department that I can reach out and grab. The very fact that you have allowed me to increase staffing over the last few years allows me to start to put in place that kind of reserve corps of people that I can call upon.

In a conflict situation—and I have been involved in a few over the years, from Panama through Desert Storm through Afghanistan and now this current gulf war—it has to be of necessity, the military, the Department of Defense, in the first instance after the conflict. They are there, they have the capacity, they have the resources that are not available in any other branch of government.

It does not mean that the other branches of government do not have a role to play. We do. But initially and traditionally, if you look at Japan and Germany and elsewhere, it is the military that
has the organizational ability and the resources to take charge of a place.

For those in the room who may be old soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines, there is an old general order: Take charge of this post and all government property in view. That is what the military does well, and that is what was done in this instance of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Now Don Rumsfeld and I are going through the transition period with Ambassador Bremer and I am starting to stand up a very large mission that will take over from the CPA when sovereignty is transferred to the Iraqi people. But we are looking as to how we can do this better, because there has always been not the smoothest meshing of gears in every one of these operations I have been involved in. The Pentagon does it, takes over quickly, and then they look around for who takes it over from them, and we are usually doing a little too much ad hoc-ism at that point. I think we do have to do a better job of this.

I look forward to working with the committee on this matter. I have to be a little careful about buying into anything yet because I think ultimately the President has to have the flexibility to decide what he wants the administration to do in any particular circumstance, and to put it in as a matter of law, this is something we should discuss at considerable length, Mr. Chairman, and make sure we do not do something that binds a future President.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would agree, but at the same time the urgency is there. I hope and I pray that the President sees that as you do, as we do. That is one reason for raising this question publicly in this forum today.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would just add one footnote and that is that still there lies the problem of the day after, quite apart from the turnover from the military to you. This may be an issue that has to be addressed by our military, and perhaps by the President again. In other words, if the forces that are lean and mean eliminate the military elements of a Saddam Hussein or the Taliban or whoever, who polices? Who keeps the ministries open, the oil fields sound, the rest of the situation in order? Maybe military police, but if so then, even with the lean and mean fighters, there need to be a lot of police who come in.

I am not trying to revisit the whole strategy. This is your job and that of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and others. But there is a gap here and we are concerned about it. You are concerned about it. The country is concerned about it, because it just did not work very well. In fact, there were semi-disastrous elements in what otherwise was a remarkable military operation.

So that we do not see repetition of this, it seems to me that we need some confidence-building in our own public policy. That is the purpose of raising these questions. If not you and the State Department, who? And hopefully you are a participant—obviously you are—in those conversations and it would be preferable for us to try to legislate and not to get into an argument with the administration.
The preferred course would be for the administration to suggest a program, in which legislation may be a part, and in which administrative adjustments could be made quickly.

I yield now to my distinguished friend Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I cannot think of anything that this committee can do that is of greater organizational and structural consequence than to engage this question. You put together an incredibly impressive bipartisan panel of experts that served in many administrations to help us understand the needs and come up with organizational structures to deal with it and I think it would be a significant contribution if, working together, we were able to deal with this in a structural way.

Let me pursue part of the chronology that the chairman pursued about our hearings and our meetings on September 5, et cetera. Throughout this period we were having these meetings and these discussions and these hearings and our meetings at the White House, and the President was available to me and to others, ranking members, senior members, during this period, I spent hours with him, cumulative with him, more than 5 hours, maybe less than 10, but hours, discussing these subjects.

One of the constant—I should not say debates—intersections of disagreement he and I had during this period was whether or not Saddam was an imminent threat. You said in your testimony today in stating the case why what we did was the correct thing to do that we acted on good, solid information. I do not doubt for a minute you acted on information. I do not think it was good and solid. We thought it was good and solid. I think it has proven not to be so good and so solid.

I am not trying to quibble. I am not in any way questioning your integrity. I believe you acted and stated what you thought to be the facts, and they may turn out still to be the facts, some of them.

But one of the things, I might say—and you were the only one during this period—and I am going to ask to have submitted to the record a cursory gleaning of the statements made by senior administration officials about whether this was an imminent threat. No one used the word “imminent,” but they did use “immediate,” “moral,” “urgent,” “grave,” “serious and mounting,” “unique,” “there is a desire to strike America with weapons of mass destruction now.”

I would note the only thing we could find in the record other than the statement that Secretary Powell made at the United Nations in February was Secretary Powell admitted, quote, “Iraq threatens not the United States.” That is what you said during—in terms of whether there was an immediate threat. Your quote was that you admitted that Iraq threatens, “threatens not the United States.”

Now, that was before February. Again, the reason I am raising this is to go to this larger issue of what we knew and what we did not know and what we prepared for and what we did not prepare for.

I would ask unanimous consent that these statements, that I do not suggest are dispositive or include all statements relevant, but the ones we honestly tried to find what people were saying at the
time to characterize the threat, be submitted for the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The submission will be published in full.

[The statements referred to follows:]

IMMENINT VS. GATHERING—ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS

Although President Bush did not use the words “imminent threat” directly, his spokesman did and the President and other high ranking officials used synonymous phrases: “immediate threat,” “mortal threat,” “urgent threat,” “grave threat,” “serious and mounting threat,” “unique threat,” and claimed that Iraq was actively seeking to “strike the United States with weapons of mass destruction”—all just months after Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted that Iraq “threatens not the United States.”

TIMELINE

March 20, 2003: The U.S. launches its first strikes against Iraq.

May 1, 2003: President Bush declares an end to major combat operations in Iraq.

HOW PRESIDENT BUSH AND HIS ADMINISTRATION DESCRIBED THE IRAQ THREAT BEFORE THE WAR

“This is an American issue, a uniquely American issue. And it’s—as I reminded the members, that—I say uniquely American issue because I truly believe that now that the war has changed, now that we’re a battlefield, this man poses a much graver threat than anybody could have possibly imagined. Other countries, of course, bear the same risk. But there’s no doubt his hatred is mainly directed at us. There’s no doubt he can’t stand us. After all, this is a guy that tried to kill my dad at one time.”—President Bush in Houston, September 26, 2002.

“On its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency.”—President Bush, October 2, 2002, after reaching agreement with House leaders on Iraq resolution.

“This is about imminent threat.”—White House spokesman Scott McClellan, February 10, 2003.

“No terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.”—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002.

“Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent—that Saddam is at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons. I would not be so certain. And we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons.”—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, September 18, 2002.

“There are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place. Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists.”—President Bush, October 7, 2002.

“There is real threat, in my judgment, a real and dangerous threat to America in Iraq in the form of Saddam Hussein.”—President Bush, October 28, 2002.

“I see a significant threat to the security of the United States in Iraq.”—President Bush, November 1, 2002.

“The Iraqi regime is a serious and growing threat to peace.”—President Bush, October 16, 2002.

“The Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency.”—President Bush, October 2, 2002.

“There’s a grave threat in Iraq. There just is.”—President Bush, October 2, 2002.
The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence.”—President Bush, September 12, 2002, speaking at the United Nations.

“Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons. Iraq poses a threat to the security of our people and to the stability of the world that is distinct from any other. It’s a danger to its neighbors, to the United States, to the Middle East and to the international peace and stability. It’s a danger we cannot ignore. Iraq and North Korea are both repressive dictatorships to be sure and both pose threats. But Iraq is unique. In both word and deed, Iraq has demonstrated that it is seeking the means to strike the United States and our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction.”—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, January 20, 2003.

“He’s a threat that we must deal with as quickly as possible.”—President Bush, September 13, 2002, remarks to press.

“In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. This threat hides within many nations, including my own. In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale . . .

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance.”—President Bush before the UN on September 12, 2002.

Iraq is “a serious threat to our country, to our friends and to our allies.”—Vice President Dick Cheney, January 31, 2003.

“Iraq poses a serious and mounting threat to our country. His regime has the design for a nuclear weapon, was working on several different methods of enriching uranium, and recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, January 29, 2003.

“Well, of course he is.”—White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett responding to the question “is Saddam an imminent threat to U.S. interests, either in that part of the world or to Americans right here at home?” January 26, 2003.

“The danger is already significant and it only grows worse with time. If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today—and we do—does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?”—President Bush, September 7, 2002, speech in Cincinnati.

“The world is also uniting to answer the unique and urgent threat posed by Iraq, whose dictator has already used weapons of mass destruction to kill thousands.”—President Bush, November 23, 2002, radio address.

“The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those deadly weapons programs and describe why they are real and present dangers to the region and to the world.”—Secretary of State Colin Powell, February 5, 2003, at United Nations.

Iraq was “the most dangerous threat of our time.”—White House spokesman Scott McClellan, July 17, 2003.

“I would look you in the eye and I would say, go back before September 11 and ask yourself this question: Was the attack that took place on September 11 an imminent threat the month before or two months before or three months before or six months before? When did the attack on September 11 become an imminent threat? Now, transport yourself forward a year, two years or a week or a month . . . So the question is, when is it such an immediate threat that you must do something?”—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, November 14, 2002.
“Iraq is busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents, and they continue to pursue an aggressive nuclear weapons program. These are offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so that Saddam Hussein can hold the threat over the head of any one he chooses. What we must not do in the face of this mortal threat is to give in to wishful thinking or to willful blindness.”—Vice President Dick Cheney, August 29, 2002 speaking to veterans of the Korean War in San Antonio, Texas.

“The message I plan to give all the leaders I speak to and to the Arab public is that the cause of this problem that we have is in Baghdad. It is Saddam Hussein who refuses to abandon his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations has an obligation and, as part of the United Nations, the United States has an obligation to do everything we can to cause him to come into compliance with the agreements he made at the end of the Gulf War. He threatens not the United States. He threatens this region. He threatens Arab people. He threatens the children of Egypt, the children of Saudi Arabia, the children of Kuwait with these weapons. He has used them before, so I think we all have a solemn obligation to keep him in check.”—Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at press briefing in Cairo, Egypt on February 24, 2001.

Senator Biden. Now, again the reason I raise this is in discussions during this period with the President the question was two-fold always: one, not whether Saddam was a bad guy. I voted for this resolution. I think the resolution that Dick and I put together was a much more sound and substantive and rational way to approach this, but that is obviously, we authored it so we think it is better.

But, having said that, I nonetheless voted for the resolution because I thought it was very important you have the power to go and negotiate at the United Nations knowing that you could say: The Congress is behind us; if you do not move with us, we may have to move ourselves.

Now, but during this period in my discussions with the President it always was, my discussion, how immediate this threat was, how urgent this threat was, how much time we had to wait, how much time could we wait, how much time did we have to build a coalition, how much more time were you to be given in your effort to build a coalition? That is the place where I found myself always at odds with the President’s point of view.

Now, here we are at a time when things are better than they were several months ago, in my view, but at a critical point about what we do now, what we do now in terms of the November agreement we made and in face of the comments and insistence by Sistani, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, that there be immediate, full and popular elections, which you and I both know is not possible. I mean, even if we agreed to it there is not the voter rolls, there is not the mechanism, there is not the means.

You have asked Secretary Annan to play a significant role in Iraq by trying to mediate a resolution to the political standoff with Sistani and others. As you have pointed out, Brahimi is meeting today or has met and will be soon reporting.

Is there in your view any possibility of the Secretary General staking out a strong and definitive proposal for a U.N. role in Iraq absent his knowledge, foregone knowledge, that you have worked out with the Perm Five what we would all be willing to do? I kind of see this as putting the cart before the horse. We definitely want the U.N. and Kofi and Brahimi to negotiate this. I am not speaking
about any conversation I have had with Annan, but my impression is, speaking with U.N. officials, is that they are not at all sure whether they are willing to take a strong stand and what to recommend, absent knowing that at least the Perm Five in the Security Council are all on the same page.

Am I missing something here?

Secretary POWELL. I have had many conversations with the Secretary General and with Mr. Brahimi and the President has met with the Secretary General on this subject as well. The Secretary General’s role right now and Mr. Brahimi’s work is for the purpose of assessing the situation and coming back with advice to the Secretary General and through the Secretary General to the rest of us as to what might be possible with respect to elections and what might be possible with respect to the political process in general.

I do not think that Ayatollah Sistani has insisted on immediate elections.

Senator BIDEN. No, he has not.

Secretary POWELL. He said elections, and who can argue against elections? But what is possible in the immediate future with respect to putting an election together? We are anxious to hear what Mr. Brahimi and the Secretary General will have to say about that. I would not want to prejudge the outcome of Mr. Brahimi’s mission. He will be back soon enough and then we can make a judgment.

What I said to the Secretary General in our conversations is that: I think you have a vital role to play. You have a role to play now before sovereignty is transferred, in helping us understand what is possible, what can get all of the Iraqis together behind a particular approach. And you have an even more important role to play after sovereignty is transferred, when I think the U.N. will be required to be there in considerable strength, with considerable authority, to help write the final constitution and to help organize full elections throughout the whole country for a totally representative national assembly, and from that national assembly to come up with a government, an executive branch that will be representative of the people’s wishes.

So I see it in two phases: the current phase, where the U.N. is engaging again and will provide us advice based on their experience and based on the work of Ambassador Brahimi; and when we get to the transfer of sovereignty, then the U.N. will have an even more important role to play.

I think that the current Resolution 1511 is adequate for the moment; no need for another U.N. resolution. But once we reach that point where sovereignty is transferred, it might be quite appropriate at that time to have a U.N. resolution that captures the situation at that moment and gives the Secretary General whatever additional authority or instructions the Secretary General believes he needs to carry out the work with the new transitional government of Iraq.

I think at that point it will not be a difficult task to get not only the Perm Five behind such a resolution, but to get the whole Security Council behind such a resolution. The last three resolutions on Iraq dealing with the situation we are in now were all passed unanimously by the Security Council.
Senator Biden. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just follow this up and then I will cede.

I do not doubt what you just said. My problem with it is this: Since all the parties—and you have been talking with the parties; I have not talked with all the parties. I talked with the Kurdish leadership. I have had a chance to meet with some, Shia leadership and not any Sunni leadership, quite frankly.

What I think is happening is we are in the mean time supposed to—they are in the mean time supposed to come up with this interim law. Everyone, without knowing what is going to follow on to Bremer, is laying down their absolute demands. The Kurds think we made a deal on federalism. The Shia are insisting on popular elections. The Sunnis have a different deal.

I really think we are making a mistake, for what it is worth, not having these discussions with the Perm Five now as to what specifically the follow-on entity to Bremer will be, so that the parties who are now negotiating, from their perspective, the best deal they can get into the initial piece of legislation that is going to be the basis upon defining the future country, where they will not have to figure they have to play their hole card all the way through. I think we are making a mistake, just for the record, of not having these negotiations privately with our Security Council friends now about what that entity will be—in no way undercutting the President's position that Bremer stays in charge until sovereignty is turned over, in no way embarrassing the administration for a change of position or anyone else.

But it just seems to me that, absent that, you may find the three major entities in Iraq so committed to extreme positions that we end up in a circumstance not being able to put this puzzle together. But that is just one man's view and I will come back to that. That is the reason I asked the question.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.

 Senator Chafee.

 Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I think Senator Biden's line of questioning was good, but I do want to change tacks a little bit. I will just say on the whole discussion of weapons of mass destruction there are 23 of us in the Senate that did not think there was an immediate threat, and I even went so far as to say a year ago: I do not think we are going to find any weapons of mass destruction. I just did not see the proof. We wanted to see real hard cold proof. I never saw that.

 But what I would like to ask is that—at the end of last year the Bush administration commissioned a study of the Arab Muslim world, the Derijian study, and they traveled extensively throughout the world and issued their report: "Changing Minds and Winning the Peace." I do not think there is any doubt that, with foreign fighters coming into Iraq, that the problem extends beyond just Iraq and goes throughout the Muslim world.

 What Mr. Derijian and his people said as they issued the report is that: "Hostility toward America has reached shocking levels." They also said: "Large majorities in the Arab Muslim world view U.S. policy through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict." Now, you might argue with that, but that is what their study said.
Whether that is right or wrong, that is what their study said, the Bush administration's own study.

In the President's hour-long State of the Union, he did not mention once, not one syllable, of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and here today in your statement you did not mention that either, although you did run down, of course, Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Libya, Sudan, Liberia, and other countries—not one mention of what is happening between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

You might deduce from the Derijian report that our success in Iraq depends on at least some progress, not necessarily significant, but some effort, of which I do not think there is any visible display of that, not even any effort, not a mention in the State of the Union, not a mention here.

So my question, Mr. Secretary: Can you tell me what we are doing, just straight facts? Shoot straight with the committee, Mr. Secretary. What are we doing on this conflict?

Secretary Powell. Well, first of all on the Derijian report. We appreciate the work of Ambassador Derijian and his team and we are taking the report to heart and doing whatever we can to fix our public diplomacy and outreach efforts to deal with the problems that he saw.

With respect to the conflict, we are doing a great deal. We are in touch with both of the parties. We are following closely Mr. Sharon's proposals of recent weeks about evacuating the settlements in Gaza. What we have said to the Israelis: That is interesting; we want the settlements closed, but we want to know exactly how that is going to be done and where will those settlers go and how does it affect settlement activity in the West Bank. We have to understand the total picture.

We have been pressing and I spent a good part of yesterday pressing the Palestinian side, through the various Foreign Ministers that I spoke to yesterday, to come forward with a security plan to start taking action against terrorists in a very significant and decisive way. Only when that happens, only when Prime Minister Abu Ala can wrest more control away from Chairman Arafat, will the security forces that are in the Palestinian community, in the Palestinian Authority, and direct them against these terrorist organizations, not to start a civil war tomorrow morning, but to go after these terrorist organizations. Unless that is done, we are going to be frustrated in seeing the two sides start to march together down the road map.

The Israelis are now making some unilateral moves. We do not want to see a solution that is so unilateral that it does not really provide the kind of stability that we are looking for. But the Palestinians must move and we made that clear to them.

Two weeks ago, Ambassador Wolf, who is in charge of our monitoring group, was sent out to talk to the parties. We will have another team going out within the next week or so to follow up on some of the ideas that Prime Minister Sharon has put forward to make sure we understand them and how we can use those ideas and hopefully movement on the Palestinian side on security to get this process moving.

We also have been in touch with our European Union colleagues. I spoke to the Foreign Minister of Ireland yesterday, who is the
current President of the European Union. He met with the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority to convey the same kind of message to him.

So even though it was not highlighted in the State of the Union Address and not in my shorthand presentation this morning, I can assure you that it is a matter of utmost urgency for us, because we fully understand that this conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis is the source of a great deal of the anti-American feelings that exist in that part of the world and does affect what we are doing in Iraq and that part of the world.

I would do anything to find a magic bullet to solve this one. But the problem is the same problem that has been there for the 3 years that I have been working this account, and that is terrorism, terrorism that still emanates from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other organizations that are not interested in peace, not interested in a state for the Palestinian people. They are interested in the destruction of Israel.

Until the Palestinian leadership and Authority says no, stop, will not happen, we are not going to tolerate it and we are going to go after those organizations that feel that way, it will be difficult to get the kind of progress we need moving down the road map. The road map is still in place, still supported by the President. We are ready to act on it.

The immediate goal that I have is to get Prime Minister Sharon to meet with Prime Minister Abu Ala. Contacts are taking place and we are working that, and I hope that that meeting will happen soon and that may give us a basis to engage more fully if the two sides will begin to engage one another.

Senator CHAFEE. How would you comment on extraneous initiatives that are taking place, the Geneva Accords, that seem to be—that seem to exist because of the leadership vacuum that many accuse this administration of having?

Secretary POWELL. The Geneva Accord, as it is called, the proposal that was put forward, really is consistent with the third phase of the road map. It is a way to move through the third phase of the road map, and so I was quite pleased to receive the authors of that in my office and talk to them about it. But it is not an alternative to the road map.

There was a bit of a controversy when I decided to receive those individuals and the other individuals who put forward another idea. But we are open to all ideas. No reason we should not listen to the various ideas out there to see how they might complement the road map.

Senator CHAFEE. Do you think that in the end we are going to end up where Geneva suggests we end up?

Secretary POWELL. There are many approaches to getting to a final solution. There are many ideas out there as to what one does with Jerusalem, many ideas with respect to what a Palestinian state might look like living side by side in peace with Israel. So the Geneva authors had one idea. There are many other ideas out there.

But what we have to do is get started down phase one of the road map, and that begins with ending terror. Once you end terror and once you get the parties moving forward, then there are all
sorts of ideas for phase twos and phase threes, phase two and phase three, to bring into being a Palestinian state with interim features associated with it and then ultimately to get to a final Palestinian state living in peace side by side with Israel.

My focus is on getting this started, and if we can get into phase three there are lots of ways to look at phase three solutions. But we have got to get started with phase one.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I will just say that I could not agree with you more and condemn and deplore the suicide attacks. However, you might argue that ever since Cain killed Abel there are going to be criminals and to suggest that until these suicide attacks are ceased we cannot engage ourselves I just think is unrealistic. There are always going to be criminals, unfortunately.

Secretary POWELL. I agree, there will always be somebody, no matter what the Palestinian side does, there will always be somebody who will want to come forward and try to blow it all up with a suicide attack. But what we are not yet seeing is determined effort on the part of the Palestinian Authority, with the security forces available to them, to go after these perpetrators in a systemic, definitive way.

I put the blame squarely on Chairman Arafat for his unwillingness to speak out, use the moral authority as a leader that everybody says he has, not just to occasionally give a statement condemning this, not only to condemn this kind of activity, but take action against those organizations that he knows are committing these acts. If he would show that kind of effort and that kind of commitment, then we could stand the occasional attack that takes place because we know that the Palestinians have become a partner in going after the perpetrators of these attacks.

We have not seen that yet and that is what is frustrating this effort.

Senator CHAFEE. If I could just take one more second, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Just one more.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From the other side, they would certainly say: How about the route, not the existence of the barrier, the route of the barrier, the holding of prisoners without charges, and of course the existence of the settlements? Those are the big issues——

Secretary POWELL. They are the big issues.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. That they would say we are not addressing.

Secretary POWELL. Those are issues that have to be dealt with. Settlements, detentions, the fence, all of these are problems. We know how to talk about and deal with these problems with the Israeli side and we know the frustration it causes for the Palestinian people. But we cannot allow these problems to serve as an excuse for suicide attacks or the use of terror to try to find a solution.

Senator CHAFEE. I agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

A rollcall vote is proceeding on the Senate floor. Senator Feingold has been patient and if it is your preference, Senator, we will pro-
ceed with your questioning. Members may feel free to go to the
floor while Senator Feingold is questioning. We will try to return
to hear his questions.
But the committee will recess at the end of your period if we are
not back. I hope the members will come back because we still have
the Law of the Sea ahead of us in addition to Secretary Powell.
Please proceed, Senator Feingold.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Powell.
Let me first commend the administration and the Government of
Great Britain for the careful diplomatic efforts that have resulted
in a significantly less threatening Libya than we have known in re-
cent times. The Libyan Government’s abandonment of weapons of
mass destruction programs and their willingness to submit to
verification are obviously tremendously positive developments.
But as we reconsider the nature of our relationship with Libya,
I am concerned that we not overlook Libya and its history of destab-
ilizing activities, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Do you be-
lieve that the era in which these activities were the norm has come
to an end and what evidence supports such a conclusion?
Secretary POWELL. It has not yet come to an end. Libya over the
years has shifted its attention and focus to different parts of Africa.
When it sort of fails in one part of Africa, it sort of pops up some-
where else fomenting difficulty.
As part of our political approach to Libya, we have made sure
that one of the agenda items to be discussed is their activities in
Africa, which must cease to be destabilizing, cease to fund despot
regimes, and cease to cause trouble. We have had a real break-
through with Libya over this weapons of mass destruction issue,
but we are not unmindful of the nature of that regime still and we
are not unmindful of some of the unhelpful activities they have
participated in over the years, to include unhelpful activities in all
parts of Africa.
Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that answer, especially since I
have watched some of this with regard to Zimbabwe and Sierra
Leone and Liberia and the like.
Secretary POWELL. Yes.
Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Secretary, we have all been told to pre-
pare for another supplemental request relating to Iraq some time
after the election. I have made my views very clear on the wisdom
of financing foreseeable expenses through off-the-books emergency
supplements that treat these needs as if they come as some sort
of surprise.
But I want to ask you if we should also anticipate a supple-
mental request for Sudan if the administration’s laudable peace
initiative comes to fruition. I see that this budget request includes
significant increases for Sudan, but I wonder if this will be suffi-
cient if a peace agreement is achieved. What about the potential
peacekeeping effort in Sudan that we have heard about? How will
that be paid for? I certainly hope that the answer is not that other
existing African accounts will be squeezed to find those resources.
Secretary POWELL. I hope I am faced with the problem of finding
money for peacekeeping activities in the Sudan and in Cote d’Ivoire
and other places all at the same time, because we need peace in
those regions of the world. But there was just so much we were able to budget for with the knowledge that we have now about the demands that are going to be placed on us. Liberia, $200 million in the last supplemental, $245 million for U.N. peacekeeping activities.

If Sudan goes the way I hope it goes and we do find a comprehensive peace agreement before us, this might require 8 to 10,000 United Nations monitors, and not all of that is programmed for and we would have to consider how to generate additional resources for it. I do not know when we would need those resources. But I would not want to find those resources in other parts of my African accounts, because they all are needed. We need more overall.

Whether this will result in an 2005 supplemental, there are no plans right now for a second supplemental for 2004 or how it will be dealt with, I cannot answer at the moment. I do not have the requirement at the moment, either.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I will ask one more before we recess.

What can you tell me about the administration’s plans to engage the people of Somalia in the year ahead? I see that the child survival request includes nothing for Somalia this year and the development assistance request represents roughly a 65 percent decrease from the requested fiscal year 2003 level.

I do of course applaud the administration’s East African counterterrorism initiative, but that initiative recognizes that there are real threats in Somalia, and we know that some of the most troubling actors on the international scene are the only ones involved in providing basic services to some people in parts of Somalia, such that parents can send children to an extremist school or to no school at all.

Should not our strategy include a Somalia component, rather than just focusing on states around Somalia?

Secretary POWELL. Senator, I would have to go into the accounts to see what the change has been over time. I do not have that immediately at hand.

Somalia has been a political basket case for many years. We have seen a little progress recently and hopefully we are now starting to put in place a government that we can work with and an ability to deliver assistance in a comprehensive way, with certain knowledge that it will be used properly. But I would prefer to give you an answer for the record as to what the trend has been.

[The following response was subsequently received:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The Honorable RUSSELL FEINGOLD,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR FEINGOLD:

I am writing in response to your question to Secretary Powell on February 12, 2004 regarding funding levels and political engagement in Somalia.

United States policy objectives in Somalia are reducing the threat of Somalia-based terrorism and establishing stable, representative governance acceptable to the Somali people. United States assistance to Somalia, including Somaliland, has largely consisted of humanitarian aid, including food. In 2003, the United States pro-
vided: approximately $4 million in child survival and health (CSH), development assistance (DA) and demining funding; $1.25 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for education and democracy and governance programs; and $19.2 million in P.L.-480, Title II food aid. FY 2004 estimates include about $1 million in CSH and DA and $10 million in P.L.-480 Title II assistance. The FY 2005 request includes about $1 million in DA, and no funding for CSH or demining funding. P.L.-480 Title II emergency food aid is not planned or budgeted by country in advance of the current Fiscal Year. Food for Peace (FFP) figures are based upon the assessment of the severity of food insecurity and the corresponding levels of need, and as a result, P.L.-480 Title II assistance for Somalia is expected to continue at present levels.

Our capacity to engage Somalia has been limited since 1991 as a result of the lack of stability and accepted governance institutions in Somalia, including Somaliland. To advance the goal of increased stability and governance in Somalia, the United States provided $250,000 in financial support to the Somalia reconciliation conference that began in Kenya in October 2002. The conference involves Somali entities in southern Somalia, but not Somaliland in the northwest, which has chosen not to participate in the reconciliation process.

Although the reconciliation conference has often been delayed by factional feuds, semi-breakdowns and administrative problems, participants in the conference recently reached an agreement regarding the structure of a future central Somali government. We continue to support the Somali reconciliation process and encourage participants to continue their efforts towards resolving their remaining differences.

The Department of State continues to evaluate appropriate means for further engagement with Somalia, including Somaliland, recognizing that our ability to engage is limited by security concerns and the absence of internationally accepted governance. The Department of State believes that funding levels for FY 2004 and requested amounts for FY 2005 are adequate to support country programs at the present engagement level, which we are carrying out through non-governmental organizations throughout the country. At current levels, assistance programs for Somalia are alleviating suffering and promoting stability while helping Somalis develop a more self-sufficient population as they address peace, transition and development problems.

We hope to continue working closely with Somali participants, regional actors and our international partners to resolve remaining issues and towards a peaceful solution to the Somali conflict.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

PAUL V. KELLY,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Secretary, I look forward to following up with you on that.

The committee will stand in recess.

[Recess.]

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I want to thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for their continuing active and energized leadership on this committee. And of course I want to thank Secretary Powell for being here today. It is always a pleasure to have the Secretary before the committee. My constituents and I have great respect and admiration for his long record of service to this country.

I hold listening sessions in each of Wisconsin’s 72 counties every year. These meetings give me an opportunity to hear from my constituents about what is on their minds, about their priorities and their ideas. More than ever before, I am hearing from my constituents about international affairs. The people of Wisconsin are concerned about our national security, as am I. They are committed, as am I, to our first national security priority, the fight against terrorism. They are concerned, as am I, about the situation in which we find ourselves in Iraq. And the people of Wisconsin are concerned about what some have called our soft power—our nation’s stature and our power to persuade and inspire—which is a source of tremendous pride for many Americans. It is a part of our identity. And when they believe that this element of our national power is diminished, my constituents are dismayed, as am I.

And so in the year ahead, we must remain clearly focused on combating the forces that attacked this country on September 11, 2001. This means nurturing relation-
ships around the world to ensure that critical intelligence-sharing and coordination are sustained and strengthened. It means cutting off terrorists’ access to financing and helping to bring order to weak and chaotic states where international criminals thrive. And it means resisting the temptation to conflate this issue with others for the sake of political convenience. And we must resist deluding ourselves into believing that even the best possible outcome in Iraq will somehow magically transform the Middle East or the entire Muslim world.

At the same time, I believe that we must ensure that our country is not associated—mistakenly, but unfortunately widely—with intolerance or bullying or hypocrisy around the world. We must continue to support those working to enhance respect for human rights and the rule of law. We must empower those working to combat corruption, we must assist those responsibly working to address the crushing poverty and devastating health crises that cloud the future of far too many around the world.

I look forward to hearing more from the Secretary today, and to working with my colleagues and the administration on these issues in the year ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting is called to order again and the Chair recognizes Senator Voinovich for his questions of Secretary Powell.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to say thank you very much for your service to our country. I am very happy that you are continuing to, with all the other things on your plate, pay attention to the management of the State Department. From what I am getting back from the people in the Department, you are doing an outstanding job. They have never been happier because you have been paying attention to your internal customers so they can take care of their external customers.

Now, the issue of Iraq. I would hope that as often as possible you can get on national media and explain what we are doing over there. I really think that we are not underscoring enough to the American people the importance of democratizing Iraq and the greater Middle East to the national security of the United States and peace in the world. I like to put it that we want those millions of Muslims chanting “freedom and democracy” and not “jihad” against the United States and against the world.

That being said, as you know, I am very interested in southeast Europe. I am interested in terror, and in organized crime and corruption, which I think in that part of the world is a greater threat than terrorism, and last but not least, I am spending a lot of time on anti-Semitism that is growing in the world today, which is of grave concern to me and I know to you.

In terms of southeast Europe, we put a lot of money there. It is very fragile yet. We still do not know, for example, if we are going to have a government in Serbia-Montenegro. Things are a little bit unstable in Macedonia. And Kosovo—and this is kind of important because UNMIK, a U.N. operation, has been there for 5 years and from the information that I have gotten back from the OSCE and from the U.N. High Commission on Human Rights, the resolution has not been implemented.

I met with Michael Steiner, 2 years ago and said: You set these benchmark goals, but how are you going to implement those goals? It is 2 years later and now they are starting to put some specificity to them. I would really like to know what the State Department is doing to see if we cannot get some action there, because I think
if we do not get on it we could have a destabilized southeast Europe, with Kosovo perhaps being the match that will ignite it.

Also, the USAID over there has been cut back some $211 million in the SEED account since FY 2002 and I think we still need to put some more money into that area if we expect to be successful.

Could you respond?

Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. We follow events in southeast Europe very closely. I met with Prime Minister Rexhepi of Kosovo recently and discussed with him the importance of sticking to the plan that has been put forward on meeting the standards by early 2005 before trying to go any faster than the traffic will bear.

I will have to look at the specific dollar amounts that have been allocated to USAID. It is always a matter, as you know, Senator, of trying to balance across a large number of countries with finite resources.

With respect to anti-Semitism—

Senator V OINOVICH. Pardon me. It is not $21 million. It is $211 million.

Secretary POWELL. I am sorry. It is a difference.

And with respect to anti-Semitism, it is an issue that I have discussed with my European Union colleagues quite a bit. As you know, we have been participating actively in the anti-Semitism conferences that the OSCE has been sponsoring. Mayor Rudy Giuliani represented us last year and we are putting together another strong, high-power delegation to represent our interests at the conference this coming spring, the end of March.

We pledged, with respect to our efforts in Kosovo and other parts of the Balkans, that we would go in together and out together with our allies. That remains our policy. When we took office we had some 10,000 U.S. troops in the region. We are now moving down to about 3,300. In Kosovo the success is that Serb forces no longer threaten the ethnic populace, institutions of limited self-govern ment are functioning.

More work remains to be done. We and our allies, as you know, together with the U.N. have launched a process to help Kosovo achieve the eight international standards in democratic governance and inter-ethnic reconciliation that are needed to benefit the people, and hopefully they will do that—

Senator V OINOVICH. Mr. Secretary, I would like to say that the benchmark standards were set 2 years ago and since that time we are now talking about having groups that are going to look at how do you specifically achieve those eight goals. I know you told Rexhepi, the Prime Minister, that our policy now is standards and not status.

Secretary POWELL. Right.

Senator V OINOVICH. But there is no way, no way, when you look at the report from the U.N. High Commission on Refugees, that they are going to ever have a chance of being at a place where you look at granting status next July, because they are so far behind in terms of achieving the goals that have been set.

I am really concerned that it is not getting the attention it needs. I tried to get somebody from the U.S. to head up that operation because I figured that was the only way that we could maybe get
something happening there. But it is not getting done. Every time it gets to a point where there is a little tension, we back off from them.

I think that some of them feel that it is inevitable and they are going to do what they can. I mean, there are less people coming back into the country than are leaving. There is an attempt to just cleanse the whole place from anybody else but the Kosovar. They continue to destroy churches and monasteries. People have no freedom of movement.

It is very, very bad, and I think somebody in your shop should really get on that and really ride it, get in the saddle and ride it hard, or it may just get out from under us.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator. I think we have been following it and riding it hard. But let me go back and review the whole policy. We believe that the way we have come together on the standards before status solution was the way to move forward. But in light of what you have just said, I need to review that again to see whether or not we are right or wrong on this and whether or not there is not time enough to achieve the standards by next year.

You say there is not and they will not be achieved, and if that is the case then we have to be looking at other alternatives. So I need the time to go review that.

Senator VOINOVICH. I really would appreciate your doing that. So often, it is the revolving door. For example, the KFOR over there, every 6 months they change command. It is like dotting the i's and crossing the t's and just staying with it and staying with it to get something done, and I do not think we have made that kind of commitment there.

I would like to get a response from you about what it is that you see and maybe how you can improve the situation.

I would be interested also in the issue of USAID in terms of the money that is being spent there and why has it been reallocated to someplace else when I think we continue to need the money in that area.

Secretary POWELL. The data my staff has just given me says that in FY 2005 it is $72 million and in FY 2004 it was $72.5 million. But let me get the exact figures and provide them to you for the record, Senator.

[The following response was subsequently received:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The Honorable George V. Voinovich,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Voinovich:

During Secretary Powell’s February 12 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you raised concerns about assistance funding levels for Southeast Europe, particularly Kosovo.

The United States provides assistance to Southeast Europe primarily under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act. For Kosovo, our assistance focuses on democratization, rights for and integration of minorities, and market economic reforms and law enforcement assistance to help establish a secure environment—all of which are embodied in the “Standards for Kosovo” document that the United Nations Security Council endorsed last December.
Overall SEED assistance totaled $621 million in FY 2002 and, as you noted, our FY 2005 budget request is $410 million, a decline of $211 million. As you also noted during the hearing, the FY 2005 request for Kosovo is $72 million, compared to nearly $79 million in the current year. As the region has progressed in building stability and advanced in Euro-Atlantic integration, we have been able to reduce our appropriation requests accordingly. In Kosovo, the decline is primarily due to the reduction in the numbers of police that we provide to the UNMIK International Police force. As UNMIK gradually transfers more police responsibilities to the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS), we have been asked to contribute fewer U.S. police officers. The proportion and levels of development assistance, implemented by USAID, have remained relatively stable.

Thank you for your support for the Administration’s commitment to peace and stability in Kosovo and the wider region. U.S. assistance and leadership are key to establishing and maintaining security, promoting inter-ethnic dialogue, addressing humanitarian needs and strengthening democratic forces both in Kosovo and the wider region. Please let us know if we may be of further assistance in any way.

Sincerely,

PAUL V. KELLY,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
spond when those mistakes are learned. That is what I really want to talk about.

In your testimony you say the top priority is winning the war against terrorism. I am glad because I think that should have been the top priority for a long time since 9–11. Some of us believe, and others disagree, that we got a bit diverted from that. But one of the things that worries me about our credibility is that—the first thing you said after in your oral testimony was the top priority is the war on terror, that is why winning in Iraq is so important, it is about the war on terror, and the President says that Iraq is the heart and soul of the war on terror.

But here is the point. There is no question in my mind—and I have been briefed privately as part of this committee and also there is no secret here—that terrorists are moving into Iraq. What is wrong with, I think, some of the statements I believe that you have made even here today is that the impression is that the terrorists were already in Iraq before we went in.

I want to say for the record, I want to put in—I ask unanimous consent—a page from a publication that is actually signed by George Bush right after 9–11, a month after, a list of the countries where al-Qaeda operated. This is, mind you, right after 9–11, and it lists 45 countries and Iraq is not in here.

Albania, Algeria, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Germany, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Senator BOXER. So we all know now that it is the Baathists who want back in power, it is the fundamentalists who want in power, and it is the terrorists who have moved in to fill a void. I just would hope that, instead of trying to rewrite history, we remember what history was in the words of our own President in this document, and in clear language al-Qaeda was not there.

Now they are moving into a void. We got rid of a heinous terrorist, which we are all happy he is gone or at least he is not in power, glad. And we now have what the terrorists hope to be a haven and because of the bravery of so many people is turning into a fight.

But I think it is just important not to be loose with the facts. I think it hurts us worldwide, if you read some of the comments being made about us worldwide from our friends who love us just saying that they do not know what they can trust and who they can believe.

For me, as someone who believed there were WMD there, which is why I voted for the Levin resolution to keep up the inspections, I never believed it was an imminent threat, I believed it was a long-term threat. I got the same briefings as everyone else. Some of us felt it was a long-term threat and we voted to continue inspections and keep our eye on Saddam and hopefully grab him and bring him before a tribunal for war crimes.

But the point is, that is past history. I think now what we hopefully have learned is that, since he was not an imminent threat,
we would have had more time to build a coalition. At this point my understanding is we have picked up more than 90 percent of the costs of the war itself. That is a huge burden on our people, and the deaths keep on flowing. So I think being very cautious with the facts are important.

I want to ask you a question. When you were here the last time you and I got into a give and take, as we normally do, and I asked you at that time—it was right after Iraq—if you felt we were going to find the WMD and you said absolutely we were going to find them. To give you your words back, you said on this date, and the date was April 29, 2003: “Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. Thank you. On the first question of WMD, they will be found. The presentation I made before the U.N. on the 5th of February was at the end of 4 straight days of living with the entire intelligence community, in going over every single thing we knew. Every day, every night leading up to the 5th of February, I was closeted with our very best experts, and what I presented on that day was information that was all-sourced and that had other backup to it and not just what you saw in the presentation. Everything we had there had backup and double sourcing and triple sourcing.”

Well, I want to know today if you could please tell us—you said you had three sources, your original source, your double, and your triple—who were these sources that were giving you this information which turned out to be incorrect?

Secretary Powell. It is not entirely clear that it is all incorrect.

Senator Boxer. Well, OK. Who were the sources that gave you the information?

Secretary Powell. The sources were the sources of the Central Intelligence Agency and I cannot name all of their sources, nor would I in an open session, Senator.

Senator Boxer. No, CIA is enough. That is one source.

Secretary Powell. That is the source. I mean, it is the Director of Central Intelligence who has the responsibility—

Senator Boxer. So what did you mean by “double sourcing” and “triple sourcing”?

Secretary Powell. I meant—well, let me give you one example, without blowing anything. On one of the items I presented to the U.N. on that day there were four different sources, human and non-human sources, that verified that particular item. And every item that I spoke of had one, two, three, or more sources saying that was the case.

Senator Boxer. Now I understand. Now I understand. I am sorry. What you said double source and triple source, when I looked at it I thought maybe there were others outside of our own CIA. So it was double and triple sourced within the Agency itself?

Secretary Powell. No. Double, triple sources from outside the agency that the agency relied upon to make the judgment.

Senator Boxer. Right, but all done through the CIA, rubric of the CIA?

Secretary Powell. Not just the CIA. Through all the intelligence agencies of government that play in this—CIA, my own INR Bureau—

Senator Boxer. I understand.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. DIA and all the others. And there is not always total agreement, and when there were differences of opinion we thrashed out those differences of opinion. And the Director of Central Intelligence, who is also the Director of the CIA, has to make a call as to what the preponderance of the evidence is.

Senator Boxer. Thank you. I am interrupting only because of time and now you answered my question, that the sources came in through the door.

Well, the New York Times recently quoted an Asian Foreign Minister, a friend of ours, as saying, quote: “The whole world was operating on the theory that Iraq had these weapons. One would not want to conclude that the U.S. was wrong in every respect, but clearly the U.S. now has to face the fact that as long as its actions are unilateral it will have a credibility problem around the world.” And this is a friend, and this is a gentle criticism in my opinion.

But I think it is really important when we talk now, because now we know, at least—I guess you are not agreeing with this, but most of us believe there will not be anything like the amounts of weapons that you predicted. Maybe they will find something, but not anything like, and I will not go through, that is in the record, what you predicted in front of the United Nations.

So I think we have to be careful then not to talk about al-Qaeda as if they were there before the war, because your own words said they were not.

I also was very interested on the trade promotion authority and I am a little troubled by this and I want to talk to you about it: “President Bush recognizes that the fastest, surest way to move from poverty to prosperity is through expanded and freer trade.” Now, I am assuming he means for other nations, because it is not working here. “America and the world benefit from free trade. For this reason, one of the first actions upon taking office in 2001 was to seek trade promotion authority allowing the President to negotiate market opening agreements with other countries. The President aims to continue vigorously the pursuit of his free trade agenda in order to lift developing countries out of poverty.”

I just hope you will take a message back and I just give it to you, that a free trade agenda without a fair trade agenda, without an agenda that talks about wage and labor standards, environmental standards, is working to push our wages down here, and it is hurting our people. So I hope while we pursue our foreign policy we will not forget what we do impacts our own people.

I think that the wording in your testimony here is very strong and is not particularly mindful of the fact that even today we had an increase in jobless claims. We have seen more jobs lost in the last 3 years than we have seen under any Presidency since Herbert Hoover. When I read this blatant free trade talk here, although I believe and I voted for half the trade agreements in front of me and voted against the other half, I think we need to be mindful of what we are doing for foreign policy reasons, how it impacts on working people in our own country, and I hope you could take that message back just from one Senator. I only speak for myself.

I thank you.

Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.

Following precedent, I would recognize now Senator Sarbanes. I note Senator Nelson has been here for a while, but this is a judgment call. I recognize Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. I will yield to Senator Nelson.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. For a senior Senator to yield to a junior Senator, I am honored. I am forever in your debt.

Senator BIDEN. I am surprised.

Senator SARBANES. I may bring it to your attention on some future occasion.

Senator NELSON. I am sure you will.

Mr. Secretary, I would reflect the comments that Senator Biden had said. I personally think that you and your Deputy are two of the finest appointments in this administration.

The world is full of problems and there is a problem only a few hundred miles from my State of Florida. Haiti is spiraling out of control. When I met with Assistant Secretary Noriega I got the distinct impression that the policy of this government is regime change, but in the mean time there could be enormous devastation of property and of life, of which the consequences to us could be people getting on these rickety boats, having an enormous economic impact on my State of Florida, not even to speak of the immigration headache for the United States.

In responding to my concern the Assistant Secretary indicated, well, we are going to work with the Bahamas and Jamaica to stop the exodus. You can see I am troubled. Can you bring some clarity on the policy of the administration?

Secretary POWELL. The policy of the administration is not regime change. President Aristide is the elected President of Haiti. I have more than a passing interest in this matter since I went down there 10 years ago in 1994 with former President Carter and your former colleague Senator Sam Nunn and talked the generals out of power so that our troops could come in and peacefully allow President Aristide to reassume control of the office of President.

I must say I have been disappointed in his efforts over the subsequent 10 years in building a functioning, stable democracy. But nevertheless he is the President. We have made it clear to the opposition, and Assistant Secretary Noriega had a long conversation with one of the opposition leaders yesterday, that we are standing behind the CARICOM proposal, which both sides are now examining and finding ways to move forward, to find a political solution to this current crisis, and not a political solution that says President Aristide is illegal and he has to go or he has to go, there is no political solution.

He is the President. We are only interested in a democratic solution, a constitutional solution, and we will continue to work to that end. Tomorrow we will be participating in a meeting here in Washington with my Canadian colleague, Foreign Minister Bill Graham, and with others who are coming in from CARICOM. The President met with CARICOM leaders in Monterey last year, with me in attendance, with CARICOM leaders and with President Aristide, and we told President Aristide that we had to find a democratic political solution to move forward.
The legislature on that very day had gone out of existence because of this impasse. We have been following very carefully the disturbances that have been taking place on the island. We are concerned about the demonstrations that will be taking place today. It is a difficult situation and I have spent a bit of time over the last 24 to 48 hours with my staff, as well as with intelligence officials, watching what may be going on on the north coast, because what we do not want to see is an exodus of Haitians heading anywhere. At the moment we do not see that.

We are hoping that the demonstrations will resolve themselves in a peaceful way today. I hope that is the case, and we hope that the CARICOM proposal will form the basis of a political solution moving forward. We will be discussing with the Canadians and with the CARICOM nations whether or not they are in a position to provide police support to the government in order to bring these disturbing situations under control.

Senator Nelson. Well, I would just offer as a Senator from the State with the greatest number of Haitian Americans, who are quite concerned about this, from the standpoint of our committee being concerned about the violence and the tumult that is spiraling out of control, I think it is almost akin to the Middle East. Unless the United States actually is a convener, a leader in trying to stop the violence and start bringing some kind of negotiated resolution, the place is going to be chaos.

That happened to us in the Middle East until you started getting more active over there, I might say at your urging, and it is going to happen here in Haiti if we keep a hands-off policy. So what I would urge is that you get in with all force trying to bring about, No. 1, stopping of the violence, and then No. 2 a reworking toward peaceful democracy.

Mr. Chairman, just in closing I would say what I have been saying as a broken record. I have spoken directly to Deputy Secretary Armitage. I have spoken to every Ambassador in the region of Syria about my recent meeting with President Assad. The one thing, despite all of the contentiousness of a disagreement that we had in the conversation about specifics, such as him harboring terrorists and so forth, the one little cause of note was after I asked him, why do you not seal the border to stop the jihadists going in and killing our American men and women in Iraq, and his response was: I cannot control the border; you cannot control your borders. Then he talked about a long history of smuggling across the border.

But then he said, and this is what is worth noting, that: “I want to talk to the American government about cooperating in closing that border.”

Now, when I reported this to Secretary Rumsfeld originally he was dismissive of that idea. Your Ambassadors in the region were not dismissive. Whether or not Assad is in fact sincere or not, in the judgment of this Senator it is worth exploring if it is in any way to help our men and women to be better protected by stopping jihadists coming across that Syrian border. I offer that to you.

Secretary Powell. Thank you. I will convey it to both our military authorities in the region as well as to our new Ambassador who has just arrived.
Senator Nelson. I have spoken to General Abizaid as well as General Jones, who debriefed me immediately after I came back from Syria. So they are well aware of this.

Secretary Powell. It is a very difficult piece of terrain, as you know, with thousands of years of experience of smuggling, all kinds of things going back and forth.

On Haiti, just back for a moment, sir, we are not indifferent or not engaged. The President met with President Aristide and with the CARICOM leaders in Monterey and gave encouragement and launched the latest CARICOM effort building on the bishops’ effort. The Ambassador down there is deeply engaged, Roger Noriega is engaged on a daily basis, I have been engaged on a daily basis, working with CARICOM leaders and with our Canadian colleagues.

We will see where we are tomorrow, and hopefully we might have some additional ideas that we can put into the mix after our meeting tomorrow.

Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

[The following letter was submitted for the record by Senator Nelson:]

UNITED STATES SENATE,

President GEORGE W. BUSH,
The White House,
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
The deteriorating conditions in Hispaniola are of great concern to the people of the state of Florida and must be immediately addressed by the U.S. government. The worsening violence, subversion of constitutional processes and absence of rule of law threaten the stability of the Caribbean region, and democracy itself. Urgent and sustained attention must be given by the administration.

Of utmost concern is the situation in Haiti, a country for which the United States has no discernible plan because our bilateral relations are adrift. Since the disputed parliamentary elections of May 2000, there has been a political stalemate which has ground the government to a halt, and has deprived the Haitian people of critical services. I had the privilege to join a Congressional delegation led by Sen. Mike DeWine in January 2003, and carry with me the images of the suffering population.

The Organization of American States (OAS), with U.S. facilitation, passed Resolutions 822 and 1959 calling for support from the international community, “to maintain its support for the OAS Special Mission and provide urgent additional funds,” for assistance. However, the United States has taken only meager steps to assist the people of Haiti. I appreciate the efforts of the administration to provide some assistance through nongovernment organizations and to advance economic ties between Haiti and the international financial institutions. But this is simply not enough.

First, we must stop the killings, gang activity and subversions of law in Haiti. The United States should rally the OAS Special Mission and OAS member nations to provide resources for a contingent of international civilian police to be deployed throughout the country. The U.S. should work specifically with France and Canada in an effort to stabilize the situation and, over the medium term, reorganize and restructure the Haitian National Police. When the Haitian people may live and assemble in peace, we may reasonably consider moving ahead with the necessary democratic election process, perhaps with the assistance of former President Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center. President Carter has had a positive impact previously intervening in Haiti.

Long-range planning should include increased U.S. assistance to Haiti from USAID, specifically to assist small business and industry development, microenterprises, and democracy building efforts. These efforts should also include action on S. 489, the Haiti Recovery and Opportunity Act, which would create tens of thou-
sands of new jobs in Haiti. Your administration has not taken a position on this legislation.

This situation in the Dominican Republic also is of great concern. Protests, demonstrations, and general strikes threaten law and order. The OAS is well-suited to assist with such problems there, and U.S. assistance should be commensurately bolstered for such efforts. Taking these steps now is far preferable than reaping the possible consequences we may face later, as elections approach in that country in May of this year.

Mr. President, we can, neither ill-afford to fail in our efforts to build democracy and the rule of law in our own hemisphere. I applauded, and agreed with, your Jan. 12, 2004 statement at the Summit of the Americas when you said, “The essential foundations of prosperity and progress remain democracy and the rule of law . . . At past summits, we resolved that democracy is the only legitimate form of government in this hemisphere, and that the peoples of the Americas have an obligation to promote it and defend it. Those governments in our hemisphere that have responded by supporting democracy can be proud. Our unity and support of democratic institutions, constitutional processes and basic liberties gives hope and strength to those struggling to preserve their God-given rights, whether in Venezuela, or Haiti, or Bolivia.”

It is now time to act, and I look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

BILL NELSON.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Let me do one housekeeping chore. The Chair wants to recognize the request of Senator Boxer that the chart that she introduced earlier be made a part of the record. It will be made a part of the record as a part of her testimony.

The Chair wants to acknowledge that Senator Nelson has brought to the attention of the committee in our oversight capacity that we should be very much interested in the questions on Haiti which he has raised. His colleague Senator Graham of Florida has also approached the committee. It was not possible for us, given the schedule of the committee’s hearings, to have an immediate hearing on Haiti. So I very much appreciate Senator Nelson’s raising these issues now. I appreciate your responses, and likewise I would hope that as you receive further news through the activities of our diplomacy, that you would convey that to our committee, because all of our members are deeply interested, as you can gather.

Secretary POWELL. I will, Mr. Chairman, and we have been in touch with both Senator Nelson and with Senator Graham on this matter. I have been through a boat situation in the past, Senator, and I can assure you we will do everything we can to not put ourselves in that situation again.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you before the committee. Last night I attended a concert at the Peabody Institute of the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. That is of course one of our Nation’s leading music conservatories. And they had the world premier of a symphony by David Gaines, who is a contemporary composer, entitled “The Lion of Panjshir.” It was in memory of Ahmed Shah Massoud.

It was a very moving performance, involving narration as well as the playing of the music and recounting the life of Massoud, who as we know, two terrorists came in disguised as journalists and blew themselves and him up. And of course, he had a very illus-
trious record in Afghanistan of both resisting the Soviets and then the Taliban.

I only mention that because it, of course, puts in front of us again and brings to mind the situation in Afghanistan. This committee actually, I think, and its leadership have consistently, and its members, have consistently tried to keep a focus on Afghanistan to make sure that we did not lose sight of its importance as a priority item. I think it is extremely important.

So I am concerned about these press reports that—well, just let me read one from the Knight-Ridder newspaper: “While attention is focused on Iraq, the United States and its international partners are struggling to overcome worsening violence, voter registration problems, and other difficulties that threaten to delay Afghanistan's first election since the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Taliban.”

A hearing actually was held, in which of course NATO—the problem is they cannot get security out across the countryside in order to do the registration to ensure the validity of the elections, which are scheduled to take place I think in less than 4 months from now.

NATO, of course, has authorized an expansion—I am quoting from the article—“of its force to the interior areas and is racing to accomplish the deployments in time to boost security for the June elections. But the alliance has been seriously hamstrung by a lack of contributions of troops and equipment, failing to obtain even enough helicopters for its operations in Kabul. Testifying with Taylor, Marine General James Jones, NATO’s top commander, conceded that coming up with enough troops and equipment for the expanded mission will test NATO’s ability to stage operations beyond its traditional boundaries.”

Now, some have raised the question about postponing the elections or delaying the elections. But apparently President Karzai and his allies are pressing still to have the early elections. His Finance Minister was quoted as saying: “We need elections in order to have legitimacy and a mandate for changes the country needs.”

How do you see this problem and what can we do, we being the United States in this particular instance, to help keep us on track and ensure the validity and the integrity of these elections? I guess, do we have some helicopters we can give General Jones, and all the other questions that flow out of these quotes that I have read from this article.

Secretary Powell. With respect to fleshing out the force, principally the NATO force that has gone in, there have been deficiencies. My new Dutch colleague was in town last week and confirmed that the Dutch would be providing Apache helicopters to assist in this effort. The new Secretary General of NATO was also in town and said that Afghanistan would be his first priority with respect to making sure that NATO can support this mission in the manner that it needs to be supported and fill any equipment deficiencies that are there and also see if we can get more of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in country and out into the field to start to bring the kind of security that we need.

Registration continues. It is our goal, as well as the goal of the U.N. and the goal of President Karzai, to have elections in June.
An open question is whether or not they will be ready to have elections both for the President and for legislature or they will only be able to handle the Presidential election.

There is a security problem, particularly in the southeast portion of the country. We are working on the United States task force there. It is trying to restore security, and we are also trying to encourage and get our Pakistani friends on the other side of the border to do more, and the Pakistanis have started to do more, to try to bring a sense of security that will permit the registration to continue and the elections to be held in June.

Senator SARBANES. This article says the problem is especially serious in southern and eastern regions bordering Pakistan, where the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies are staging a comeback. Do you think they are staging a comeback? What is your view of that?

Secretary POWELL. I think they are trying to stage a comeback. They have been active, and our forces are targeting them and going after them and our military commanders are confident that it will be an unsuccessful comeback. But it has created a higher level of instability in that part of the country than in other parts of the country.

Senator SARBANES. Well, let me stay with Afghanistan for the moment, because I think it is—I am very worried that we are sort of shifting our attention away from it. I mean, there is virtual unanimity in the country about the necessity to go into Afghanistan. I think that was clearly seen as a war of necessity. I think it was handled well by the administration and certainly in the early stages.

But I think some of us have a concern that attention has shifted away from us and that a situation that appeared to be on its way toward resolution is becoming difficult again. I think we are very fortunate there to have a leadership, a national leadership, selected through the loya jirga, which gives a legitimacy, at least for a period, although the elections are needed now to cement that, and which is also trying to move the nation on a good course in terms of the constitution now that they have evolved and so forth and so on.

Last year we provided just under $1.6 billion U.S. assistance to Afghanistan. Well, for the fiscal year 2004. The budget request for fiscal 2005 actually drops the figure to $1.2 billion. There is a line of thinking that I subscribe to that, first of all, this reconstruction is important to solidifying stability in the regime; and second, as you obtain some stability in the short to medium run you probably need, you need more resources rather than less, because then they are in a position to move ahead with the reconstruction which previously they were being thwarted from doing because of the unstable situation.

So in a way, at least for a time, it seems to me, even if we achieve stability, it really calls for more resources and not less. Therefore I am very concerned that the budget request that has come to us has about a 25 percent drop in the resources being committed for this purpose.

Would you respond to that.
Secretary Powell, I will verify all of the numbers. We have a total of $3.7 billion that we put in and now the $1.2 billion that is part of the FY 2005 budget request. It is a question of balance, Senator, with all the demands that we have on the assets that are made available to the Department for foreign operations.

[The following response was subsequently received:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The Honorable Paul Sarbanes,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Sarbanes:

On behalf of Secretary Powell, I would like to respond to your question about the FY 2005 budget request for Afghanistan that was raised during the February 12, 2004 congressional hearing.

In Afghanistan, we are committed to a successful end state, not an end date. For this reason, in FY 2004 we are providing approximately $2.2 billion in reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. This includes over $400 million in regular foreign operations appropriations, plus supplemental funding, DOD drawdown assistance, and other reprogrammings totaling almost $1.8 billion. This level of funding responds to the need to jump-start reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, particularly in advance of the 2004 elections and in the face of flagging donor interest. The enhanced assistance program represents the first step in a multi-year plan to accelerate reconstruction efforts, reduce long-term costs, and consolidate gains made to date.

We are confident, therefore, that our FY 2005 funding request for roughly $1.2 billion in assistance to Afghanistan—over $600 million above the budget request made in FY 2004—will be adequate to sustain the momentum that has already been achieved. Our plan is to continue to request funding at these levels for the next several years, with the goal of helping Afghanistan move more quickly down the road to stability, economic recovery, and self-sufficiency.

The bipartisan support shown by Congress for Afghan Reconstruction has been tremendous, and has engendered much goodwill among Afghans who see the U.S. commitment to their country as more than just rhetoric. Such continued support will ensure that Afghanistan never again plays host to the forces of violence, intolerance, and instability.

I hope that this information has been helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Paul V. Kelly,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

Secretary Powell. We have done a heck of a lot with the money that we have put in there. We finished the road. We have gotten a lot of hospitals built and schools built, a lot of things under way. So the reconstruction effort is going forward.

The needs of the country are so great, though, that it could take two, three, four, five times the amount that the international community has provided. But there is just a finite amount of money available from the international community.

I think everybody recognizes the need to do more. We are not in any way ignoring Afghanistan. The very fact that you heard from General Jones and others about the needs, the fact that the Secretary General of NATO when he was here last week listed that as his No. 1 priority to get done and get done well, the fact that NATO is there I think shows that we have worked hard to get the international community more involved. The fact that we were able to pull off a successful loya jirga blessing the constitution is evidence of what we are trying to do. We have a plan now to expand
out 1,000 miles of additional secondary roads off the main road in order to connect the country in part of our next year effort.

So we are fully engaged, but there are limits in the amount of financial resources available to us to deal with the needs of the Afghan people.

Senator Sarbanes. Well, I understand that and I think you are right to bring to our attention a number of positive accomplishments that have happened. But one of the problems, of course, is trying to get the other donor countries to come through with their pledges, and it seems to me it does not send a very good message if the U.S. is allowing its commitment to drop by 25 percent from this year to next year. I would hope the administration would be willing, working with the Congress, to find a way to up that commitment so there is no question about how important this priority is to us.

This is where al-Qaeda had taken over a state, in effect, in conjunction with the Taliban and had a safe haven, their training camps and everything else. They are not completely out of there yet, as we well know, and I think it behooves us to keep this first and foremost in our attention.

It is a matter on which you have developed unity, not only within the country but across the world, I think, for this effort and I would hope that the U.S. does not send some countersignal that impedes what needs to be done in Afghanistan.

Secretary Powell. We also benefited previously from supplemental funding in FY 2003 and FY 2004, and as we get into FY 2005 it may be something that would compete for supplemental funding in FY 2005.

Senator Sarbanes. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

The chair would observe that we had one round, 8 minutes. On average members took about 11 minutes, which was fine because additional questions were asked. But let me now just suggest maybe a shorter second round, in case members have supplemental questions, of 5 minutes each. If the Secretary can stay with us during that period we would appreciate it.

Let me begin by saying that the President in his speech at the National Defense University called for the IAEA Special Protocol very specifically, and he asked the Congress to pass this immediately. He looked in my direction, and I acknowledged that I heard him loud and clear. We have discussed this privately, but the President hopefully is advised that this committee is desperately attempting to fulfill his will. There have been—from some source in the administration that will remain nameless—questions and objections raised. I ask that you inform the President that we are eager. Perhaps he can inform the rest of his administration to work with us, because we really would like to move on with this rapidly.

Second, the umbrella agreement or, to state it another way, the liability provisions that the United States needs, that other countries need in the so-called 10 plus 10 over 10 program with Russia, has run into snags in the Duma. I know that Secretary Abraham and his shop in the Department of Energy are working very hard on this.
Specifically, it has delayed destruction—within the scope of a program to destroy 34 tons of plutonium on the part of the Russians and 34 tons of plutonium on our part. This is a great breakthrough for your diplomacy, to move the Russians on to the thought of destruction of plutonium as opposed to infinite storage or various other problematic options. These huge stores out there are at the heart of the proliferation difficulty.

Clearly, the world has to see that this is a place that we and the Russians ought to be moving. But we are not moving. In large part this is because these negotiations have not been successful. I do not want to cast judgment about this, but I would just say it is so important this not be dead in the water, and that we get on with these programs and as swiftly as possible.

Likewise, although we theoretically have the idea of the G–8 and their billion dollars a year supplementing Nunn-Lugar and so forth, in fact this is not moving very swiftly, given the lack of liability assurances they have.

All of this is important, because the public has the general impression, and the President certainly gave impetus to this yesterday, that a good number of these programs are moving. I have an impression they are not. So diligently we want to bird dog this.

Likewise, David Sanger—this is his view in the New York Times today—said, and I quote him: “One of the vaguer proposals the President called for boosting is the Nunn-Lugar program.” My colleague Sam Nunn, when asked for a quote by another paper, indicated that he saw no new resources. Indeed cooperative threat reduction specifically has less money requested in the budget than last year.

One reason given for this is that the Russians have not been as forthcoming as perhaps they could be with projects. Maybe so, maybe not. In any event, obviously Sam and I are interested in this. During his recent speech, the President nodded in my direction with that also, and I applauded the thought. I appreciate his mention of the program. Nevertheless I ask you, just as a part of this hearing, to take this back.

Finally, let me just say that I appreciate specifically your mention of the State Department and its budget. We have noted that additional jobs are going to go into the Afghanistan and into the Iraq situations, because the State Department will be assuming vastly new responsibilities, which you have recognized and which hopefully the Congress will recognize as well. I just want to highlight that this was not just a gratuitous addition, that you have specified the missions that have been preoccupying our committee today and trying to find able persons who are ready for those tasks. That is why we have some urgency, I would hope, in this committee, and in the other committees, to deal with the request favorably.

I thank you again for coming today.

Secretary Powell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I know that this committee is committed to the additional protocol, and I thank you for your support of that.

Nunn-Lugar, a tremendous program and I would like to enhance it with additional funds and have the flexibility to use it in other countries as well as in Russia. With respect to the additional peo-
ple we have requested, in previous years it was to fill out vacancies and to give it a little more flexibility. Now I have got to have those people. The mission in Iraq is going to be the largest mission we have in the world. It is going to be an unaccompanied mission, which means we not only have to get the people for it now, we have got to get the next tranche of people to go in when the first tranche goes out after 6 months or a year. So I share your encouragement that Congress act to give me those additional personnel resources.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for that testimony. I thank the President for the speech yesterday. It really was remarkable. I had the privilege of having former Secretary Schultz and Charlotte Schultz with me. The President was delighted that they could likewise imbibe in that experience, which we all enjoyed.

In my own conversations, as Senator Biden has been mentioning his, the President is very supportive of these programs. My point in raising the situation today is that down in the weeds sometimes the President’s enthusiasm is not followed through. So that is our job in this committee, and yours with others, that you can work to make certain that they are, and that the general themes are fleshed out.

Senator SARBANES. That is not to suggest that you are the weeds. The weeds are down below you, I think, as well, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Way down below.

Senator BIDEN. I think there is one weed above you, a big weed. His name is Cheney.

I am not nearly the diplomat that my colleague is. I do not think—and I mean this without any reservation. The single most important nonproliferation tool available to us is here now. It is Nunn-Lugar, Nunn-Lugar. It has not been funded fully. When it has been funded there have been roadblocks thrown up. My friend is being very diplomatic. I agree with him, the President’s enthusiasm—I have only been at one extensive meeting with the Senator and the President on this issue—his enthusiasm was real. But the enthusiasm of others in the room was not only not real, it was in opposition, in opposition.

This notion of fungible money is bizarre. You do not agree with that notion, but it is a bizarre concept, that if we go ahead and, assuming the roadblocks are out of the way, and provide moneys to buy U.S. contractors, to send U.S. contractors over to Russia to destroy stockpiles of weapons which are vulnerable to theft, vulnerable to sale, vulnerable to terror now, that somehow if we do that the argument is still made with some in the administration, including one person in the State Department, not you, that the Russians will not therefore spend the money they would have spent to destroy these weapons and they will go do something bad.

It is bizarre, but it is real, it exists. There are people in this administration—you are not one, I know that. I do not think you can solve this problem, quite frankly. I think the only way we can solve this problem is to keep harping on it. In my case, I am prepared to, unlike my friend, name names who have told me that, no, no, we cannot go forward this way because of these particular obstacles.

But I cannot imagine, I cannot imagine how we do not understand that there are facilities throughout just Russia that are so
unguarded. I mean, everybody talks about Russia. I know you know this. I apologize for doing this with you here because you are the last person who has to hear this from me. But the entire Russian military budget is somewhere around $10 billion, military budget, the entire budget. And we are talking about if we spend $200 million to build a facility near Shchuchye to take out a couple—how many are there, 19,000?

The CHAIRMAN. It is 1.9 million.

Senator Biden. OK, the 1.9 million missiles that are chemical-tipped, that somehow those dirty old Russians, man, they are going to take $200 million they would have spent and do something really bad with it to us. This is mindless. It is ideological idiocy.

You can tell I do not feel strongly about this. But it really is frustrating, and I believe, as Dick does, that the President supports this. But some of the questions the President asks startle me.

Senator Sarbanes. He supports—

Senator Biden. He supports Nunn-Lugar. He support Nunn-Lugar.

Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Nunn-Lugar, not the ideological idiocy.

Senator Biden. No, he supports Nunn-Lugar, but he is whipsawed by the ideological idiocy, in my view. But at any rate, I am getting myself in trouble here. But that is not unusual. That is not unusual.

But I cannot tell you how strongly I feel about this, and I do not think we fund this nearly enough. I would rather the President have said we are going to make the single priority in the next few months on nonproliferation dealing with liability, dealing with my own administration, and tripling the amount of money for Nunn-Lugar and expanding it, which they have resisted to do, expanding it beyond Russia, and that is a priority. We will get more done in that than this speech and 20 more like it. But at any rate, the speech is a good speech.

I hope you will continue to weigh in, which leads me to this next question. The President wants to stop new countries from accessing fissile material. There is a fissile material cutoff treaty that would help us do that. Now, for 8 years the United States has pursued the objective of the fissile material cutoff ban at the Conference on Disarmament. Such a treaty would establish a global verification ban on the production of highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium. In my view it is an essential supplement to the proposals the President outlined yesterday.

It seems to me this is a win-win proposition for the United States because we have more than enough fissile material ourselves while countries of concern continue to seek it. For over 2 years the administration has castigated, rightly, other countries for preventing negotiations from starting. Now there is a chance of success, however, the administration announced that our policy is under review.

Why is the United States advocating so strongly for a fissile material cutoff treaty, including during the initial years of this administration, only now to step back that the negotiations may finally start? Do you think this makes any sense? Is there something that happened that they did not know, that you did not know for the
first couple years, that you now have found out that requires us to step back?

Secretary Powell. We have supported the fissile material cutoff treaty and some questions have been raised about it. A review is under way and we will get the review dealt with rather promptly, I hope.

Senator Biden. Tell Mr. Bolton that is a good idea for him to go on vacation, because——

Secretary Powell. I beg your pardon?

Senator Biden. I know I should not do that. But this is Bolton. Bolton is the guy who thinks this is a bad idea, along with Mr. Feith and a few others.

Secretary Powell. Do not worry about Mr. Bolton. He works for me and we will work it out with respect to our position.

Senator Biden. My mother would say: No purgatory for you, straight to heaven. God bless you.

Can you provide us an update on the status of the review, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Powell. The review is ongoing. Some questions have been raised. We have been supportive of the treaty and I have to work out through the interagency process what the differences of view are and we will be back to you as quickly as I can.

[The following response was subsequently received:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The Honorable JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Biden:

I am writing on behalf of Secretary Powell in response to a question that you posed during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 12. You asked the Secretary about the status of the Administration’s review of U.S. policy toward a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Secretary Powell replied at that time that the review is proceeding and that some questions had been raised about an FMCT. He also noted that we have been supportive of the treaty and that he has to work out through the interagency process what the differences of view are. Finally, he promised to be back to you as quickly as possible.

We cannot at this time predict exactly when the review will be completed, or what the conclusions of the interagency review will be. We shall, however, communicate the conclusions of the review to the Committee at the earliest possible date.

I hope that you will find this information useful.

Sincerely,

PAUL V. KELLY,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

Senator Biden. I really hope you will, because I hope we can move forward with negotiations on the first part of the 2004 session. I think it would be—see, this is my problem, and I will cease with this. Sometimes I feel like I am preaching to the choir or talking to the wrong guy. But the President made a very good speech and some of the things he suggested, the basic premise that he laid down was absolutely accurate in my view. But I do not know how you negotiate, which would be required, this new regime the President is talking about at the same time we are appropriating money for purposes of providing a new nuclear weapon, while we are set-
ting out a policy for the first time I am aware of—that is not true—
setting out, articulating a policy that we contemplate the use of nu-
clear weapons against states that are non-nuclear states, and while
we have pulled back from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
I mean, the signals are so counterintuitive that we send to the
rest of the world, that I think it is going to be very difficult to nego-
tiate the regime the President has outlined in a very thoughtful
speech without some real change in our overall policy. I welcome
your comment on it. I am not asking you to comment on that. I am
expressing the degree of my frustration here.
Secretary POWELL. A few quick points to capture observations
made by you and Senator Lugar. Secretary Abraham is working
hard on the liability issue with the Russians. I raised it also when
I was in Moscow a few weeks ago.
Senator BIDEN. I believe that is true.
Secretary POWELL. With respect to Nunn-Lugar, I speak for my
Department. We are fully supportive and we have increased the
amount of money we are requesting in FY 2005 for these kinds of
disarmament purposes.
CTBT, we will maintain our test prohibition. There will be no
testing on our side. CTBT was not approved some years ago. We
have no plans to resubmit it, however, as you well know.
With respect to the use of weapons against non-nuclear states,
whatever contemplation may be given to this, it is my own personal
judgment that this would not be a sensible policy.
Senator BIDEN. Well, I know you think it is not sensible.
Secretary POWELL. And I will argue for that position, and our po-
sition has not changed.
So I am a solid supporter of Nunn-Lugar and similar efforts. Of
course money is fungible, but in this case we have ways of making
sure that this fungible money is serving our interests, not serving
the interests of the Russians alone, it is serving interests of ours
and serving the interests of world peace and stability by getting rid
of these kinds of weapons.
Senator BIDEN. I agree, but that is not the argument. I mean,
when I sat with the President to discuss this there were those—
again I will not say who—who were making the argument about
fungibility. There are Senators right here in this body who con-
tinue to make that argument, that this is fungible money, therefore
we should not be doing this. And there are those—I believe the
chairman has raised the possibility of amending Nunn-Lugar to
take out the language that was put in there by Senator Helms that
requires the President to—gives the President a waiver, which
other Presidents have exercised in the past, relating to whether or
not there can be a certification as to the absolute verifiability that
every agreement we have with the Russians is being kept to the
letter of the law.
As my mother might say in other circumstances, we should not
bite our nose off to spite our face. How it could be not in our inter-
est to get rid of almost 2 million chemical-tipped weapons is beyond
my comprehension.
By the way, the reach, search and development money I was re-
ferring to is for low-yield nuclear weapons, bunkerbuster weapons.
My only regret is that you are not Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

But anyway, I will conclude by one other point that my colleague and buddy Senator Boxer raised here, because I think she is onto something important. I suspect you know better than anyone in this administration how important, how our credibility is the coin of the realm when you go and interface with other Foreign Ministers and heads of state. I am sure you have heard a number of times what I was introduced to a couple of years ago by one of my staff members in a speech prepared for me, of the exchange that took place between former Secretary of State Acheson and Charles DeGaulle during the Cuban missile crisis.

I might add that I have not met a single world leader who does not hold you in personally high esteem. I mean that sincerely. The story goes that Kennedy sent former Secretary Acheson to inform DeGaulle of the urgency and the danger of the pending conflict over Cuba missile, the Cuban missile crisis with Russia, to seek the support of the French and DeGaulle in particular. At one point, after he made his case he said he was authorized—and I am paraphrasing—authorized by President Kennedy to show President DeGaulle the proof that we had of the assertions made by Acheson on Kennedy’s behalf, including satellite photos, et cetera.

DeGaulle said, so history records: There is no need to show me the proof. I know the President of the United States. I know he would never ask this of me were it not true.

I may be mistaken, but I doubt whether there is a single world leader who would say that today. Maybe they would not have said it for a Democratic President, but we are not there today.

It takes me to the point that my friend from California raised about these investigations. The President has set up a commission and the commission is to investigate the quality of the intelligence that was gathered in the prelude and workup to moving into Iraq, and that is worth doing and it is necessary to do. But I am of the view, Mr. Secretary, that an equally compelling issue that must be looked at is not only whether or not there were attempts, which I have no idea whether there were, attempts to intimidate the intelligence community to come up with different answers—and I am inclined to think that probably did not happen. But I am inclined to believe that, not out of motives that were anything other than totally patriotic and well intended, that a number of people in the administration portrayed the intelligence data in ways that did not contain any nuance and implied by the way it was stated that there was no real disagreement in the intelligence community.

I have had access to the intelligence data. I am no longer on the committee, but I have served on the committee longer than anyone in the U.S. Senate, over 10 years. And I did not find the representations made which were put in the record by administration officials to reflect much more than a judgment that they have made that, since the world has changed, we must lower the bar so much lower because the damage that could be done to us is so grave that we can take fewer and fewer chances.

So you have the Vice President of the United States saying on Meet the Press: “He reconstituted his nuclear capability.” I never
saw a shred of evidence to suggest that, not one shred of evidence to suggest that. I saw shreds of evidence suggesting he may be attempting to, he may have the capacity to, but not one shred of evidence to sustain that he has reconstituted his nuclear capability.

The judgment made about the nuclear—excuse me—about the aluminum tubes, whether they were for gas centrifuge or they were for artillery. The community was split on that. It was split, and I suspect if we go back and look a majority thought it was for artillery. But yet the way it was phrased by leading—not you and not your deputy, who sat before me and my colleagues when we asked about that—was to lead the American public to believe that there was some sort of unanimity among the intelligence community that this is what the purpose was.

It may be that is what the purpose was. The 40 percent or 50 percent of the community who thought it was for gas centrifuge may have been right. But it was not phrased or put forward to the Congress or the American people in terms of there is a question.

So I think unless this commission looks at the use of the intelligence, the use of the intelligence, as well as the quality of the intelligence, we will never be able to reestablish in the minds of other world leaders—there will not be in the near future in a Democratic or a Republican administration a Secretary of State who can go abroad and say: The President has sent me because we believe North Korea has A, B, C, D, and is about to do Y, or Iran is about to do. It is going to be a cold day in hell until we have a real discussion about this and a real investigation, before any of our friends say: You need not show me the proof, Mr. Secretary; I know the President would not say this were it not true.

So I hope there is a reconsideration of the scope of the inquiry of the commission set up by the President, not because I believe that any member of this administration deliberately tried to lie about or manipulate, but because I believe they believed that the threshold was so low, the chance that they were willing to take was so de minimis, the bar so lowered, that even if there was a 2 percent chance, a 5 percent chance, a 10 percent chance that he might have this capacity or distribute it, we could not take that chance.

I think that is totally consistent with the neoconservative notion, and I have great respect for them, the neoconservative notion about how this is a Hobbesian world and the rules have changed. But I think we better look at it, because if we do not I think our ability to reestablish our credibility will be very, very difficult to do.

I apologize for going over. You know me too well, Mr. Secretary. None, none, n-o-n-e, none of this is directed at you. I have great faith in you and I think you were as judicious as you possibly could be in your presentation. I do not think that is the case throughout the administration in the impression communicated to the American people.

So I have said my piece. I thank the chair and I appreciate you listening. I welcome a comment.

Secretary Powell. I just have to respond on one point, without belaboring the hearing. But the assertion that the President of the United States would not be received with credibility by a world leader, not one I think you said, and that simply is not the case, Senator. I was sitting here jotting. I do not want to go down a list
of names because I will probably leave somebody off who would like to be included. But when I think of all the meetings I have sat in with the President in recent months, before the war, after the war, and when I think of the world leaders who have supported him, they believe in the President, they believe in this country, they believe in the rightness of our cause and what we have done, and they have stepped forward to provide troops to support our efforts, whether it is from Japan or South Korea, or have provided other kinds of support in so many ways.

There are dozens of countries that have put their troops on the line because they support the United States, they think we have gone the right way, and they believe in the President of the United States.

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Boxer.

Senator Boxer. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

In 5 minutes I am going to try to make a couple of comments, ask you three quick questions, and hopefully this will be it for you, you can have lunch and relax.

First of all, Nunn-Lugar, count me in. It is everything my two esteemed colleagues said it is. I think we believe this across the board on this committee, at least I hope so.

Also with Senator Biden count me in on expanding the role of this commission to look at the use of the intelligence. It is not just to answer our questions here, but I think the American people's questions. So if you could pass that on for what it is worth.

Mr. Secretary, I think you have been far too kind to the intelligence community. I am just going to speak as a friend here. I thought to myself, what if I was given the role to go before the United Nations and be very specific about all kinds of, actually specific about how many tons and how many pounds and how many planes and how many mobile vans, et cetera, and then I found out that basically almost all of it was not true. I honestly think I would respond in a little bit of a different way than the President has. But that is what makes life interesting, because people are different.

And frankly, the way you have responded, I think you have been very kind. For example, we have the New York Times: “Agency alert about Iraqi not heeded, officials say.” This is February 6: “An Iraqi military defector identified as unreliable by the Defense Intelligence Agency provided some of the information that went into U.S. intelligence estimates that Iraq had stockpiles of biological weapons at the time of the American invasion. Because the warning went unheeded, the official said, the defector's claims that Iraq had built mobile research labs to produce biological weapons”—and I remember your showing those—“were mistakenly included in, among other findings, the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002 that concluded that Iraq had significant biological stockpiles.” It says: “Nevertheless, the defector was among four sources cited by Secretary Powell in his presentation to the U.N.”

So I ask unanimous consent to place this into the record.

The Chairman. It will be published in full.

[The New York Times article referred to follows:]
THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: INTELLIGENCE; AGENCY ALERT ABOUT IRAQI NOT HEEDED, OFFICIALS SAY
(By Douglas Jehl)

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6—An Iraqi military defector identified as unreliable by the Defense Intelligence Agency provided some of the information that went into United States intelligence estimates that Iraq had stockpiles of biological weapons at the time of the American invasion last March, senior government officials said Friday.

A classified “fabrication notification” about the defector, a former Iraqi major, was issued by the D.I.A. to other American intelligence agencies in May 2002, but it was then repeatedly overlooked, three senior intelligence officials said. Intelligence agencies use such notifications to alert other agencies to information they consider unreliable because its source is suspected of making up or embellishing information.

Because the warning went unheeded, the officials said, the defector’s claims that Iraq had built mobile research laboratories to produce biological weapons were mistakenly included in, among other findings, the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002, which concluded that Iraq most likely had significant biological stockpiles.

Intelligence officers from the D.I.A. interviewed the defector twice in early 2002 and circulated reports based on those debriefings. They concluded he had no firsthand information and might have been coached by the Iraqi National Congress, the officials said. That group, headed by Ahmad Chalabi, who had close ties to the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney, had introduced the defector to American intelligence, the officials said.

Nevertheless, because of what the officials described as a mistake, the defector was among four sources cited by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in his presentation to the United Nations Security Council last February as having provided “eyewitness accounts” about mobile biological weapons facilities in Iraq, the officials said. The defector had described mobile biological research laboratories, as distinct from the mobile biological production factories mounted on trailers that were described by other sources.

The intelligence about the mobile facilities was central to the prewar conclusion that Iraq was producing biological arms, senior intelligence officials have said. No such arms or production facilities have been found in Iraq since the war, and David A. Kay, the former chief weapons inspector, has said he believes that Iraq never produced large stockpiles of the weapons during the 1990’s.

Soon after the invasion, American troops in Iraq discovered suspicious trailers that were initially described by the Central Intelligence Agency as having been designed as factories for biological weapons. But most analysts have since concluded that they were used to make hydrogen for military weather balloons.

Dr. Kay reported in October that American inspectors had found “a network of laboratories and safe houses controlled by Iraqi intelligence and security services” that contained equipment for chemical and biological research. But American officials have not described any discovery of the mobile laboratories described by the Iraqi major.

In his speech at Georgetown University on Thursday, George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, provided the first hint that the prewar intelligence on Iraq had been tainted by evidence previously identified as unreliable.

Apparently alluding to the Iraqi military defector, Mr. Tenet said intelligence agencies had “recently discovered that relevant analysts in the community missed a notice that identified a source we had cited as providing information that, in some cases was unreliable, and in other cases was fabricated.” Mr. Tenet went on to say, “We have acknowledged this mistake.”

In interviews on Friday, intelligence officials described the episode as a significant embarrassment. They said the information provided by the defector had contributed significantly not only to the National Intelligence Estimate but to Mr. Powell’s presentation to the United Nations last Feb. 5.

“Either he was either making it up or he heard somebody else talking about it,” one intelligence official said of the information the defector had provided, “but he didn’t know what he was talking about.” The official said the notification circulated by the D.I.A. had advised other agencies “that the information that this guy provided was unreliable.”

In a related matter, the intelligence officials acknowledged that the United States still had not been able to interview two other people with access to senior Iraqi officials, and whose claims that Iraq possessed chemical and biological stockpiles were relayed to American officials in September 2002 by two foreign intelligence services.
Senator BOXER. Thank you.

It just seems to me that—I mean, I am sure that you make comments in private and I am encouraging you to get to the bottom of this——

Secretary POWELL. I am working on the bottom of that one.

Senator BOXER (continuing). Because you are—because it is important for our country and it is important for you and it is important for all of us who believed that there were WMD there.

I have a couple of questions. They are interesting, I think. Secretary Powell, there was a report in the Chicago Tribune stating that the U.S. military is planning a spring offensive designed to capture Osama bin Laden. “A U.S. military spokesman has been quoted as saying: ‘We have a variety of intelligence and we are sure we are going to capture Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar this year.’ The American commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barnow, told the BBC he expects bin Laden to be brought to justice by year’s end.”

This is good as far as I am concerned, if this comes true. Senator Grassley predicted this would happen before the election. So my question is—I do not know what briefings he has had, but that was an interesting comment.

My first question, then I will ask the other two so we get them out of the way: Do you share this optimism?

Secretary POWELL. I do not know the basis for the general’s assessment. When I was a general I tended not to give such assessments.

Senator BOXER. Then on Syria. Secretary Powell, you visited Syria, raised the issue of its ongoing support for terrorism, for which we are very grateful. As you know, with your changing your views on our bill, the Boxer-Santorum bill—it is hard for me to even put those two names together, given that we are never in agreement, but we were on this. With the help of Senators Lugar and Biden, we passed that bill and now you have at your disposal the ability to increase sanctions on Syria.

Why is this important? It looks to us that, while some of the terrorist offices were shut down for a few days, we believe that there has not any action been taken to close the headquarters of Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. There are also reports that Syrian aircraft that flew—this is very serious—humanitarian cargo to Iran following the earthquake returned to Damascus full of weapons for terrorist groups.

So my question to you is: Do you intend to begin implementation of the Syria Accountability Act some time in the near future?

Secretary POWELL. Yes, we are examining now what sections of the act we want to use.

Senator BOXER. Excellent.

Secretary POWELL. I agree with your assessment that Syria has not done what we demanded of it with respect to the closing permanently of those offices and getting those individuals out of Damascus. On the airplane story, I cannot confirm it or deny it.

Senator BOXER. Well, thank you for that.

The last question. Secretary Powell, last month Senators Landrieu, Mikulski and I sent a letter to Ambassador Bremer
about an Iraqi Governing Council ruling that essentially eliminates the rights of women under Iraqi family law and replaced it with sharia law. Now, Ambassador Bremer sent us a very strong letter saying that he totally disagreed with this, of course, and that he was going to do everything he could to ensure that in the interim constitution the rights of women will be protected. I have been visited by women from Iraq who are just absolutely terrified because even under Saddam, although their life in many ways was hell on wheels, and although they are very happy he is not there, they had more freedom than they may have now. This is frightening to them. So I do not know if you have taken a really hard look at this or whether you have discussed this with Ambassador Bremer, but are you confident that we will be able to use our influence to protect the rights of women when Iraq gets to control its own?

Secretary Powell. We are following this very carefully. Under Secretary of State Dobriansky wrote me a memo on all of these issues. We are conveying them to Ambassador Bremer to reinforce his efforts. We would not have succeeded in our mission if we found that after we set up a new government in Iraq women in any way are not allowed to participate fully in the society, with the same rights as anyone else in the society.

Senator Boxer. Thank you very much. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

Senator Voinovich, do you have further questions?

Senator Voinovich. Any time you want to wrap it up. I just have one short one.

The Chairman. As soon as you have concluded. We have a 5-minute round.

Senator Voinovich. If you have answered it—when we supported the President on his $87 billion request there was a lot of debate in the Senate about whether it ought to be a loan or a grant, and many of us thought it should be a grant because we felt that it would be difficult for you to sit down with other countries and talk about their waiving their loans, or the Paris Club and so forth. Could you tell us, where are we in terms of these other nations in terms of their debt with Iraq, and are any of them—are we getting any real help from other people in terms of rebuilding the infrastructure?

Secretary Powell. We are getting expressions of support. Former Secretary Baker visited a number of these countries in Europe and Asia and in the Middle East and Gulf region and came back with expressions of support for substantial reduction, words like that—not all countries used the same term—within the Paris Club and also bilateral considerations.

Now that he has finished his first round of visits, Secretary Snowe and I are working with Secretary Baker to put meaning to these words and get exact amounts worked out so that we can get the debt of the Iraqi people reduced as much as possible this summer.

Senator Voinovich. So the point is that Baker's visit stimulated conversations about it—

Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. But as yet none of them have waived any of the loans?
Secretary POWELL. Not converted into dollars yet, but that is the next step in the process. We think we are on track with the process.
Senator VOINOVICH. When do you think that will happen?
Secretary POWELL. We are hoping to get as much done by early summer as possible with respect to actual debt reduction.
Senator VOINOVICH. I hope they do better than their contributions to the stability back in southeast Europe.
Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Voinovich.
Thank you again, Secretary Powell, for being so forthcoming in answering our questions, and for listening to our additional concerns.
Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a pleasure, and I will pass on the compliment that I heard directed toward my Deputy Secretary Rich Armitage, which will make him even more insufferable to live with than he is now.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

**RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD**

**RESPONSES OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.**

**Question 1.** The Government of Pakistan claims that Dr. A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation activities were a rogue operation, conducted without the knowledge, consent, or involvement of senior officials in the government or military. Do you believe this to be the case?

**Answer.** As the White House has said, we value the assurances given by President Musharraf that the Government of Pakistan is not involved.

**Question 2.** In the fall of 2002, General Musharraf made a solemn promise to you: he vowed that Pakistan's nuclear facilities were completely under his control, and that there would be absolutely no proliferation in the future. Nearly one year later (according to public reports), U.S. intelligence tracked Dr. A.Q. Khan's network transporting five cargo containers of equipment for a nuclear centrifuge to Libya.

a. What does this incident, and other incidents of proliferation by Dr. A.Q. Khan subsequent to General Musharraf's 2002 pledge, indicate about the degree of control that Musharraf has over Pakistan's nuclear assets?

b. Do you believe that General Musharraf's current pledges to control nuclear proliferation are more credible than his 2002 pledge? If so, why?

**Answer.** As the President said in his February 11 speech at NDU, American and British intelligence identified, and German and Italian authorities intercepted, a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts manufactured at a Malaysian facility en route from the manufacturer to Libya via Dubai. The parts in question were neither produced in, nor shipped from, Pakistan; and we have no reason to believe that the Pakistani government was aware of this shipment.

President Musharraf has committed to work with the United States and international efforts to roll up the A.Q. Khan network and has pledged to take steps to ensure that Pakistan will not be a source for proliferation in the future. We are pleased with the action that President Musharraf has taken in response to his recognition of the danger presented by this network. Actions taken by the Government of Pakistan will be instrumental in rolling up the A.Q. Khan network.

President Musharraf has made clear his intention to protect Pakistan's sensitive nuclear facilities. We value his assurances that Pakistan's nuclear facilities and sensitive technologies will remain under the tight control of the National Command Authority.
Question 3. What is the total number of troops currently deployed in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan? How many of these troops are U.S. soldiers?

Answer. There are 581 soldiers assigned to the 11 U.S. and Coalition Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 405 of these soldiers are U.S.; the remainder are British and New Zealanders. These numbers do not include the German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz, which falls under the International Security Assistance Force, or any U.S. or Coalition soldiers providing support to PRTs, but not currently assigned and working as a member of a team. The number of military personnel supporting PRTs in Bagram and Kabul is around 100. We understand that there are 250 German military personnel on PRT Kunduz.

Question 4. The President’s budget request for assessed peacekeeping contributions falls from an anticipated $695 million to $650 million. This amount assumes reductions in the scope of missions in Kosovo, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the completion of missions in Sierra Leone and Timor Leste. But we know that these conflicts may not stabilize, and the requirements may not decrease. In addition, we know that conflict and instability is growing in several other areas—yet the request for peacekeeping does not appear to include a reserve for new peacekeeping operations.

How likely is it that we will see Security Council mandates for these new missions? How will we pay for them?

Answer. The Administration wants UN peacekeeping missions to end when they have achieved their objectives and for those currently on the ground to be as lean and effective as possible. In Sierra Leone and Timor Leste, we are working with the UN and interested nations to reduce the UN missions in those countries, and to end them as soon as possible.

In other countries, UN missions offer the hope of solidifying peace processes underway. We voted to establish a new UN peacekeeping mission in Cote d’Ivoire on February 27. The Administration has announced its intention to support the establishment of a peacekeeping mission in Haiti to replace the current multinational interim force, in which U.S. troops participate. We expect the UN peacekeeping Haiti mission will be created within the next two months. This month, the UN Secretary General recommended establishment of a new UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi. We are currently studying that recommendation. In addition, as we have reported in the past, we continue to monitor the situation in Sudan. If a comprehensive peace agreement is reached in Sudan, we expect to support establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission there to monitor the parties’ compliance with their commitments.

The Administration does not request contingency funds in the CIPA budget for possible new UN peacekeeping missions. Of necessity, the budget request for each year is put together long in advance of world events that may lead to a need for new UN peacekeeping missions. Events may occur rapidly which lead to new peacekeeping missions not anticipated in the President’s Budget Request. Liberia is an example. When Charles Taylor left Liberia (an event that was not predicted just months before) it created conditions for the U.S. to support UN peacekeeping in that country. We appreciate your appropriation of supplemental funds to pay for both peacekeeping and development needs in Liberia.

As to how we will pay for the new missions in Cote d’Ivoire and Haiti and possible missions in Sudan and Burundi, we recognize the problem. As the Secretary indicated in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, the CIPA account is under considerable stress. But, it is too early to be definitive on the specific approach we will take to address this problem and resolve it.

Question 5a. It’s going to take a long time to replace or renovate our facilities. In the meantime, what can we do to provide protection at overseas facilities that still do not meet these minimum security requirements?

Answer. During Secretary Powell’s tenure, the Department’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), working with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), has increased security through the following measures:

- Completing construction of 12 new secure facilities.
- Since March 2001, OBO capital construction projects have been completed or begun at 37 posts that will provide safer, more secure facilities for almost 11% of U.S. personnel overseas.
- OBO and DS continue to provide both interim and permanent security upgrades to the extent possible at existing facilities. Since 2001, security enhancements have been made to most U.S. diplomatic missions with $396 M (in OBO funds).
- These upgrades include major perimeter upgrade projects at 70 posts, construction of reinforced perimeter walls and compound screening facilities, emergency egress upgrades, installation of forced-entry/ballistic resistant doors and win-
dows, and other security upgrades at the majority of overseas posts. Shatter-resistant window film (SRWF) has been installed at all our overseas posts. Other funding has been used to acquire property that will increase setback at facilities.

- DS is upgrading technical security systems (such as closed circuit TV systems and intrusion detection systems) at 156 facilities. DS has installed 700 explosive detectors, added 200 new metal detectors and 490 x-ray machines at our posts. An aggressive surveillance detection program and well-trained local guards give us early warning of possible terrorist activity directed at our posts. Every post has an active Emergency Action Committee addressing near and long-term security issues. Our Regional Security Officers (RSOs) work closely with senior host country law enforcement and security officials to make sure threat information is shared quickly and thoroughly and to ensure the host country provides appropriate security for our posts and personnel. A Weapons of Mass Destruction First Responders program was developed and is operational at our posts overseas.

The FY 05 budget request includes $100 million for OBO to continue providing interim protection to our facilities until security-deficient office buildings can be replaced with New Embassy Compounds. This includes compound security upgrades, installation of forced entry/ballistic resistant doors and windows, maintenance of SRWF, minor security upgrades, and environmental security protection.

**Question 5b.** You stated that the total cost of constructing 150 new embassies is $17.5 billion over the next fourteen years. What proportion of this total will be funded through the cost-sharing program? Without cost-sharing, how much longer would it take to get the embassies built?

**Answer.** The Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) Program will generate $17.5 billion over 14 years (FY 05 through FY 18; contributions by State and other agencies will be phased in over 5 years beginning in FY 05). After the 5-year phase-in period, annual funding will be $1.4 billion, all from the CSCS Program.

The CSCS Program will ensure that all agencies with an overseas presence pay their fair share of urgent, security-driven capital projects. State has identified 150 embassies and consulates that do not meet minimum security standards and need to be replaced. Even assuming moderate growth in State's construction budget, without CSCS, it would take until 2030 (26 years) to fund the construction of these new embassies and consulates.

**Question 5c.** Have all relevant agencies, including the Department of Defense, agreed to contribute to the cost-sharing plan?

**Answer.** The Office of Management and Budget convened two meetings during the period that the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) Program was being developed. These meetings provided opportunities for all agencies with an overseas presence to offer suggestions for improvement in the proposed methodology for sharing the costs of meeting the objectives of secure, safe, and functional facilities overseas and to address the President’s Management Agenda of Rightsizing. In addition, both OMB and the State Department conducted numerous briefings and individual discussions with affected agencies. The CSCS Program was revised in several respects to take account of the concerns of other agencies.

Under the Administration’s CSCS Program, agencies with an overseas presence under the authority of the Chief of Mission (COM) will be required to pay their fair share of the program. Contributing agencies have participated and will continue to take part in the process for allocating cost shares. State conducted a comprehensive survey to identify the number and type of cost-sharing overseas positions at each post in Spring 2003; after this, agencies were given the opportunity to reduce their position count by abolishing unfilled positions, and certain types of positions were exempted, e.g., those in host government space. State will repeat the survey every 2 years, and in the future, adjustments will be made between surveys if an agency documents reductions in positions.

DOD participated in the process for allocating cost shares. DOD’s share is 11% of the total, whereas State’s is 66%.

- Only DOD positions under COM authority are counted for CSCS.
- Marine Security Guard positions are not counted.

In a January 7, 2004, letter to the Secretary from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, DOD expressed support for the Department’s efforts to improve embassy security, but noted its inability to contribute to the CSCS Program because of the FY 04 legislative prohibitions and lack of support from DOD oversight committees. The letter concluded that DOD would fully comply with the Administration’s position.
The Administration’s FY 05 budget includes a provision authorizing the Department to charge and collect CSCS costs, without offsets. It also includes a provision to repeal the DOD exclusions from cost sharing in the FY 04 Defense Authorization bill (Sec. 1007) and the FY 04 Defense Appropriations bill (Sec. 8137).

- Section 1007 of the FY 04 Defense Authorization Act provided that DOD’s appropriated funds may be transferred to State for the maintenance or construction of U.S. diplomatic facilities only if the amount charged by State is greater than the unreimbursed costs incurred by DOD during that year providing goods and services to State.
- Section 8137 of the FY 04 DOD Appropriations Act prohibits DOD from paying any fee charged by the State Department to construct new diplomatic facilities.

Question 6. As you may be aware, last November I introduced a resolution in support of the establishment of a Democracy Caucus at the United Nations. This is an idea that has gained a good deal of support over the past few years from a broad-based coalition, as well as endorsement from Secretary Albright and Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I also note that Assistant Secretary Holmes recently called the creation of a UN Democracy Caucus “an idea whose time has arrived”.

What is your view on the establishment of such a caucus? What efforts have we been making on this front? Are we encouraging other nations to take a leading role, as well?

Answer. The United States has strongly supported the Community of Democracies, which brings together over one hundred democratic nations to strengthen democratic principles around the world. And now we are building on the Community of Democracies to form a democracy caucus within the United Nations system. The caucus would be based on the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies (signed in June 2000), which calls for democracies to “collaborate on democracy-related issues in existing international and regional institutions.” The Community of Democracies reiterated this pledge in Seoul, Korea in 2002 when it charged the Convening Group with “encouraging the formation of coalitions and caucuses to support democracy.”

Such a grouping, united by its members’ shared ideals and democratic practices, will help the entire UN system live up to its founding principles. We envision a coalition of democratic countries consulting and cooperating in how they will vote in the UN, and uniting our voices to promote democratic ideals worldwide.

We do not envision a democracy caucus supplanting regional groups or coalitions such as the NAM or G-77; instead, it would provide democratic nations an alternate network with which to align its voting practices and support. Ultimately a democracy caucus would become an accepted UN bloc like other blocs. We want all countries to be able to freely associate themselves with the ideals of freedom that will carry their peoples to security, prosperity and peace in the 21st century.

Efforts

In June 2000, the United States, in cooperation with Poland, Chile, Mali and other democratic states, convened the first meeting of the Community of Democracies to “collaborate on democratic-related issues in existing international and regional institutions aimed at the promotion of democratic government.” More than one hundred countries participated, since some nations were included that at Seoul two years later would be moved to “observer” level, like Egypt.

A second such meeting took place in Seoul in November 2002, where participants reaffirmed the need to create a U.N. Caucus of Democratic States (or, Democracy Caucus). A third meeting of the CD is scheduled for Chile in 2005.

We are extremely excited about the emergence of the Democracy Caucus at the Sixtieth Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Geneva, Switzerland, March 15—April 23, 2004. At the high-level segment of this year’s CHR, Under Secretary Dobriansky spoke about the Democracy Caucus and the relevance of the Community of Democracies to the credibility and effectiveness of the CHR. Of the 53 member states of the current UN Commission on Human Rights, 32 are members of the Community of Democracies. This means that countries with shared democratic practices represent a clear majority of states on the Commission. Members of the Democracy Caucus are coordinating on a resolution proposed by Romania, Peru, and the United States on Consolidating Democracy. This is a wonderful first step toward reclaiming the only global body charged specifically with human rights from tyrannies seeking to hide behind its credibility.

The State Department has been hosting lunches in Washington and New York leading up to this year’s elections for CHR membership to urge democracies to recruit—and vote for—good candidates.
Furthermore, Ambassador Moley has hosted lunches in Geneva for the Permanent Representatives of regional groups on the relevance of the Community of Democracies to the Commission on Human Rights.

Under Secretary for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky and Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Kim Holmes have recently hosted four lunches in Washington, DC, with fifty-two democracies to discuss UN issues and reforms, hear attendees’ views, and promote dialogue among countries with shared democratic values.

The Department of State has also been engaging in public diplomacy efforts. Secretary Powell discussed the Community of Democracies in his Freedom House speech on March 11, 2003. Assistant Secretary Holmes addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and Under Secretary Dobriansky and others have held briefings in Washington, DC, in order to keep the NGO community informed on this issue.

Encouraging Other Nations

The United States has also been encouraging other nations to take the lead on this initiative. Chile has played a leading role as the host of the next Community of Democracies ministerial conference.

In New York since 2003, the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies, as well as individual missions, have held meetings and brainstorming sessions in support of the democracy caucus.

In April 2003, the Republic of Korea hosted a reception for Seoul participants of the Community of Democracies, which featured a strong speech by the Polish Permanent Representative.

The Polish Ambassador hosted lunches last September, in conjunction with the Permanent Representatives from the United States, the Republic of Korea, Chile, and Italy, to discuss the democracy caucus.

These steps by others give us hope that this will be much more than an American effort—it will be the joint effort of countries around the globe that share democratic principles, working together to bring the UN into ever closer alignment with its noble founding principles.

Response of Hon. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, to an Additional Question for the Record Submitted by Senator George V. Voinovich

Question 1. The President’s budget request includes a significant increase—nearly 30 percent—in funding for the Peace Corps. This is consistent with the goal of doubling the number of Peace Corps Volunteers by 2007. While the Peace Corps is a significant part of our presence aboard, it is essential that we do all that we can to provide for the safety of our Peace Corps Volunteers. As we work to increase the number of Peace Corps Volunteers, what is being done to ensure their highest possible level of safety while serving abroad? What recommendations would you make to enhance the security of Peace Corps Volunteers? How will this additional, funding be used to improve security for Peace Corps Volunteers? For instance, will any of these funds be spent on initiative to enhance the safety of housing for volunteers, or to improve means for volunteers to communicate with country directors or security officers in time of emergency?

Answer. The Department of State has no greater responsibility than the protection of Americans overseas. The Department’s “no double standard” requires the Department to share any threat information to both the official and non-official Americans community overseas.

Peace Corps Volunteers are not considered U.S. Government employees and are not under Chief of Mission authority while serving overseas. According to Department of State regulations “for all relevant purposes, volunteers are not considered U.S. Government employees. They are not official members of the mission and do not have diplomatic immunity.” The Peace Corps country directors and staff are considered official government employees. The Peace Corps has its own Safety and Security Officers who are assigned overseas with regional responsibility for different PC missions.

In country, Regional Security Officers provide in-country briefings to PCVS and coordinate with Regional Peace Corps Safety and Security Officers. In Washington, the first ever “Peace Corps Security Officer Course” was offered by the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) Training Division in 2003. In addition, DS personnel liaisons with Peace Corps at a headquarters level, ensuring cables and
investigative findings from RSOs are shared on all incidents involving Peace Corps Volunteers.

RESPONSES OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

**Question 1.** Is it your view that the Indonesian military has made significant progress in its reform efforts over the past two years? On what do you base your assessment? Will the Department link military assistance to our demand for cooperation and accountability in the investigation of the murder of American citizens in West Papua as required by the omnibus appropriations bill passed earlier this year?

Answer. The Indonesian military has made only limited progress in its reform efforts over the past two years. One visible sign of consolidated civilian control over the military will be the elimination, after the coming April 5 legislative elections, of positions in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) that were previously reserved for the military. This will accomplish a key measure sought by the civil society groups that led Indonesia’s reform movement after the fall of President Suharto in 1998.

There has been little progress on pursuing accountability for past human rights abuses, however. There also have been reports of human rights abuses occurring during the current state of emergency in Aceh. To the best of our knowledge, the scale of these abuses in the current state of emergency appears to be less than in past conflicts in both Aceh and East Timor. Reliable information from Aceh, however, has been sparse because the Indonesian Government has severely restricted access to the province.

The FBI team investigating the Papua attack reported after its last visit to Indonesia, in December, 2003, that cooperation by the Indonesian military had improved from an initially low level. The investigation remains ongoing—the FBI team will return to Indonesia on February 25 for a follow-on visit. The State Department continues to emphasize to senior Indonesian leaders that failure to resolve this matter will seriously affect our overall bilateral relationship. The State Department will of course fully comply with language in the omnibus appropriations bill that links military assistance to full cooperation and accountability from the Indonesian military in this investigation.

**Question 2.** One of Africa’s serious crises continues in Zimbabwe, and you, Secretary Powell, have spoken out admirably and honestly about that situation, in which a repressive regime appears to be willing to destroy the entire country, from judicial institutions to civil society to the economy, in what amounts to a fit of pique. When I think about budget priorities in Africa, I am always aware that eventually, we will need to provide meaningful reconstruction and recovery assistance to Zimbabwe, and I was proud to be one of the original sponsors of the Zimbabwe Democracy Act, which formalizes that commitment in law. But I continue to wonder, when will we get to that recovery stage? Can you talk a bit about the kind of engagement that you envision with South Africa, which of course has tremendous influence in Zimbabwe, aimed at moving this crisis toward resolution?

Answer. We fully share your concerns regarding Zimbabwe’s devastation at the hands of President Mugabe, and greatly value your engagement and contributions on this urgent problem. Our ultimate goal is a democratic, economically sound, stable, and peaceful Zimbabwe. Our immediate objective is commencement of constructive dialogue between the ruling ZANU-PF and opposition MDC parties that focuses on restoring the rule of law, leveling the political playing field, and laying the groundwork for free and internationally monitored elections that would yield a democratically legitimate government.

Though Zimbabweans themselves will decide the details leading to this outcome, the international community has an important role to play in helping to bring about conditions that will allow the Zimbabwean people to pursue their own solutions. U.S. sanctions and isolation of the Zimbabwean regime have brought useful but insufficient pressure to bear. African nations, and South Africa in particular, have the greatest capacity to press the Zimbabwean Government to reverse course.

Last July President Bush discussed the Zimbabwe crisis with President Mbeki in Pretoria and asked him to be the “point man” on Zimbabwe. This was a realistic acknowledgement that South Africa not only is best positioned to influence developments in Zimbabwe but is directly affected by a neighbor in political, economic and social crisis. In the months since, the United States has maintained its pressure and
sanctions on the Zimbabwean Government while giving President Mbeki an opportunity to pursue his strategies for addressing the crisis. President Mbeki has recently voiced his hope that dialogue between Mr. Mugabe’s regime and the opposition would commence soon. Unfortunately, we see no signs that serious and constructive negotiations are in sight. The crisis persists and President Mugabe’s abuse of his country for narrow political ends remains unchecked.

We are conferring very actively with South Africa, as well as with other African leaders and elements of civil society, on additional steps we might take to build consensus for greater African engagement and appropriate responses to continued intransigence on the part of Mr. Mugabe’s regime. Should the Zimbabwean Government continue to resist forthright pursuit of political solutions, we are prepared in the near future to broaden the range of individuals within the ruling elite, its supporters, and beneficiaries subject to our targeted financial and visa sanctions.

Although a political solution does not appear imminent, we share your views on the importance of planning for meaningful reconstruction and recovery assistance when conditions allow. In line with the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, we are developing strategies and identifying priorities to help support Zimbabwe’s eventual recovery.

Question 3. I noted with interest that the Department is proposing a new $7.5 million activity within the NADR account to combat terrorist financing. Will some of these resources be directed toward helping countries dependent on hawala networks to regulate those networks and make those systems more accountable and transparent?

Answer. Yes, our FY 2005 request for $7.5 million in NADR funds includes training and technical assistance programs to combat the abuse of alternative remittance systems (ARS) by terrorist financiers. Such programs will heighten awareness of possible abuse of ARS to launder funds or fund terrorism and encourage the formal regulation and supervision of alternative remittance systems in counterterrorism frontline states.

Question 4. What kind of diplomatic fall-out do you anticipate in the months ahead if indeed David Kay is correct and we are not going to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? What does this do to U.S. credibility around the world? Doesn’t damaged credibility on intelligence matters have the potential to undermine crucial cooperation in fighting terrorism?

Answer. Saddam’s regime clearly had the intent and the capacity to produce WMD, and Saddam had used WMD in the past, against other countries and against his own people. Iraq continued to have the technical infrastructure, labs, and dual-use facilities that lent themselves to the production of weapons of mass destruction. The assumption to make, based on what the intelligence community gave to us was that there were stockpiles present. To know that Saddam had the intent and capacity to produce WMD and not to act was no longer acceptable after September 11, 2001. Pre-war intelligence assessments reflected the best judgments of all of the intelligence agencies. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that if Iraq had gotten free of sanctions and the focus of the international community had dimmed with regard to its WMD programs, Iraq would have gone to the next level and produced stockpiles of these weapons. David Kay has even said that “at the end of the inspection process, we’ll paint a picture of Iraq that was far more dangerous than even we thought it was before the war.”

RESPONSES OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR NORM COLEMAN

Question 1. A big concern I consistently hear from my constituents involves the dire humanitarian needs of the Hmong who remain in Laos. Amnesty International has alleged that the Lao Government is using starvation as a weapon of war against these individuals. Can you tell me what specifically the U.S. and the international community are doing to bring humanitarian aid to the Hmong people in Laos?

Answer. We remain concerned about Laos’ poor human rights record, including the treatment of ethnic minorities. Our Embassy in Vientiane actively monitors the situation, investigating reports of abuses and pressing the Lao Government to adhere to international standards for the protection of human rights. We are aware of continued fighting between insurgent groups and government forces but are not aware of large-scale attacks against the Hmong people or any coordinated government policy of starvation. We have approached the Lao Government on numerous
occasions to urge that it resolve the humanitarian problem facing the Forest Hmong quickly and peacefully, preferably with the involvement of credible international organizations. We understand that the Lao Government has an amnesty program for groups to peacefully come out of the forest and resettle, but we lack details about this program and have requested additional information from the government. The GoL has been unresponsive to our requests thus far.

The USG does not provide specifically targeted assistance to Hmong in Laos, but does provide assistance through NGOs for humanitarian demining, developing economic alternatives to opium cultivation, and preventing HIV/AIDS and trafficking in persons. Overall, bilateral aid to Laos is minimal. In FY05, the State Department and AID plan to provide one million dollars in child survival and health funds (primarily HIV/AIDS related), to carry over one million dollars to continue funding an economic assistance/alternative development silk production and weaving program, and approximately 2.5 million dollars to support humanitarian demining. Through NGOs and UN agencies we will provide more than three million dollars in counternarcotics assistance (including alternative development, demand reduction and law enforcement training). Additional program funds may be used for regional programs designed to prevent trafficking in persons and other health-related assistance. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor plans to fund an IRI democracy-building project related to village elections this year.

**Question 2.** Like others, I have been watching with great concern the changing situation in Haiti. What specific actions is the U.S. doing to prevent loss of life in Haiti during this difficult time? Are there any good ways out of Haiti’s political crisis?

**Answer.** The best way out of Haiti’s political crisis is for all parties to agree to the settlement plan proposed by the Caribbean Community. Under the plan, President Aristide remains in office until his term expires but agrees to the formation of a new government under a new Prime Minister. This government would serve until elections were held in 2005. I am meeting on February 13 with Caribbean Community leaders, Canadian Foreign Minister William Graham, and OAS Secretary General Gaviria to discuss how we can best put the Caribbean Community plan into effect. President Aristide agreed to the plan on January 31 in Kingston; now our diplomatic efforts must concentrate on obtaining agreement of opposition and civil society elements.

The Administration is also very concerned about the attacks in the northern part of Haiti, and about the loss of life those attacks have caused.

President Aristide is deploying units of the Haitian National Police to restore order. Our assistance to the Haitian National Police is limited because of corruption and credible allegations of involvement in narcotics trafficking, but part of the Caribbean Community plan addresses police reform by requiring new leadership, a professionalization plan, and deployment of international police officers to assist in reform efforts. Agreement of all sides to the Caribbean Community plan, on which our efforts are now concentrated, depends in part on immediate Haitian Government implementation of some of these measures to build confidence in other political actors.

**Question 3.** The change of government that occurred in Bolivia last year was a source of great concern and sadness for the loss of life. I believe the stakes in Bolivia are very high. We must do what we can to support the current government, to help prevent Bolivia from becoming an undemocratic narco-state. I am concerned that our lack of support for Sanchez de Lozada, while not the cause of his downfall, nevertheless added to his woes. Can you please tell me what the U.S. is doing to support the Mesa government, specifically budget support?

**Answer.** We are working closely with President Mesa and his government to help them address Bolivia's daunting fiscal, socio-economic, and political challenges. In November, we allocated $8 million in ESF funds to provide the Bolivian Government with direct budget support. USAID dropped $16 million in counterpart funding requirements for FY 2004, freeing funds for the GOB to use elsewhere.

We are also working multilaterally to help the GOB meet its fiscal needs. On January 16 we co-hosted with Mexico the Bolivia Support Group meeting, which succeeded in increasing diplomatic support for the GOB. In mid-March, we will co-host a meeting of the Bolivia Support Group Steering Committee to follow up financial commitments made at the Support Group meeting and to identify new sources of direct budget support from bilateral donors and international financial institutions. In December 2003, we worked closely with Treasury to secure $96 million from IFIs to close the 2003 fiscal gap.
In addition to helping Bolivia meet its immediate budget needs, we are also working with President Mesa to support social, security and counter-narcotics programs. USAID has redirected $12 million in aid to Bolivia from long-term projects to fast-disbursing aid in conflict-prone areas. In December, State provided, approximately $4 million in FY 2004 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to the Bolivian government. INL has notified Congress of its intent to reprogram from Ecuador to Bolivia $1.5 million in ACL funds to bolster counter-narcotics efforts.

Question 4. One of our biggest challenges in Latin America is the current negative impression they tend to have of us. A poll last fall by the University of Miami and Zogby International found that only 12 percent of those questioned rated President Bush's performance on Latin America as positive. Ninety-eight percent of Brazilians gave the President negative marks. While the intensity of our image problem in Latin America pales in comparison to the situation in the Middle East, I am concerned that negative Latin perceptions of the United States could impede hemispheric cooperation. I believe this Administration is sincere in its goodwill toward Latin America, but somehow that message is being lost. Can you please tell me what activities we have done, and which we might consider, to improve U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America?

Answer. The Senator's concerns about public diplomacy and the image of the United States in Latin America are well taken, and we share them. It does appear, however, that the public view of the U.S. may not be as dire as the University of Miami/Zogby International polling reported.

Overall, we have seen a decline in favorable attitudes toward the U.S. in Latin America as a result of the opposition voiced by various publics to U.S. military action in Iraq, and more generally since late 2001, because of a dislike for the perceived "heavy-handedness" of U.S. policy. Nonetheless, opinion of the U.S. remained positive through last summer (on average, 60% were favorable—majorities in 11 of 17 countries polled in the 2003 Latinobarometer—Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia were the exceptions). Some have pointed to divergent values as a cause for anti-Americanism around the world, but this is most certainly not the case in the Western Hemisphere. Latin Americans believe people in the U.S. share many values with them—especially the premium both place on individual freedom and living under a democracy.

Within that context, however, we are determined to do more and to do what we are already doing better. Our missions in Latin America are increasing their innovative efforts to help our neighbors understand our policies. We are pumping almost $15 million each year into the Fulbright Program, with over 1000 scholars participating. About 450 of our posts' key interlocutors participated in the International Visitors program last year. Our ambassadors have been particularly active in speaking to their respective media. Positive stories about Iraq, for instance, are fed to the Public Affairs Sections of our embassies on a more than daily frequency. Under the direction of the Department's new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the embassies are looking to engage broader, younger audiences, to reach out beyond the elites with whom we've most often worked in the recent past.

I would be happy to provide the Senator with more details of our enormous Public Diplomacy efforts in the hemisphere (for instance, we have collated data regarding outreach by senior Administration officials to the hemisphere) or to have my senior staff in the Under Secretary's office and in the office of Western Hemisphere Affairs brief the Senator's staff.

Question 5. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal discusses the manipulation of human rights statistics by NGOs in Colombia. This information was based on a report from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota. Does this information suggest that congressionally-mandated human rights requirements for Colombia as part of our assistance program should be revisited?

Answer. The U.S. Embassy report mentioned in the Wall Street Journal article does not suggest that congressionally-mandated human rights requirements for Colombia should be revisited, but rather discusses the variance in human rights statistics produced by the Government of Colombia and Colombian NGOs. This report explains that many of these discrepancies can be attributed to differences in terminology and methodology used by different organizations, and do not reflect major differences concerning the underlying facts. While the aforementioned report and the 2003 Country Report on Human Rights for Colombia note that human rights indicators (i.e. numbers of murders, kidnappings, displaced, and other major human rights violations) showed significant improvements in 2003, both reports acknowledge that more remains to be done.
The Secretary takes the Colombia human rights certification process very seriously and will continue to review all evidence pertaining to the human rights conditions when deciding whether conditions found in Section 563(a) of P.L. 108-199 of the Consolidated Appropriation for the Fiscal Year 2004 have been met. As in the past, the Department will solicit input from available sources, including the Government of Colombia and NGOs. Further, the Secretary will continue to insist on full compliance with all human rights conditions prior to making his determination and certification.

Question 6. Is now the time for engagement with the Iranian regime? What sort of aid are we providing to independent Iranian-American media outlets that, with satellite technology, have the means and the desire to broadcast free media inside Iran?

Answer. The U.S. continues to have serious concerns regarding several aspects of Iranian behavior, including its support for terrorist groups opposed to the peace process; its repression of its citizens at home; its potential for negative interference in Iraq; and its continuing pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We continue to encourage the international community to recognize the threat posed by Iran’s state sponsorship of terror and its continuing pursuit of WMD. We have worked extensively to build support in the international community for tough inspections and investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency. We continue to press our allies to recognize the consistent efforts of the Iranian government to undermine peace in the Middle East. We have taken all appropriate opportunities to highlight Iranian human rights abuses. We maintain a rigorous sanctions regime in our efforts to encourage more cooperative behavior.

However, we distinguish between the Iranian Government and the people of Iran, who consistently have demonstrated their desire for a government based on democratic values and a fundamental respect for human rights. The 2003 Foreign Operations bill gave us special congressional approval to fund projects to support democracy in Iran through our already-existing Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) as well as to use funds assigned to the Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor to promote Human Rights in Iran.

As Deputy Secretary of State Armitage said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 29, 2003 we may consider specific MEPI projects on a case-to-case basis.

Currently, the Broadcasting Board of Governors run the Persian language VOA radio and TV programs, as well as Radio Farda. The State Department has also launched a Persian language Web site where we post key policy statements on Iran.

Question 7. As I stated in a letter to the President on March 27, 2003, I have great concerns about the lack of funds for broadcasting in Iraq and the State Department’s reluctance to release funds to the Iraqi National Congress for that purpose, as stipulated in P.L. 105-174. One consequence was a lack of understanding among Iraqis about the nature of the U.S. invasion. Today the vacuum left after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime has been filled by foreign media supported by Iran and other entities hostile to freedom and secularism. I am told that Iraqis continue to lack a credible media sector, and that the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) has serious credibility problems. What does the Administration plan to do to correct the lack of credibility of the IMN? What role do we anticipate the media will play in Iraq’s political future?

Answer. The State Department has supported the broadcasting operations of the Iraqi National Congress and Liberty TV. For the period from November 2002 to July 2003, for example, funding in excess of $4 million was authorized to the INC for broadcasting. Following the war, the Iraq Media Network faced daunting challenges in rebuilding Iraq’s TV and radio networks, training new media professionals and developing credible local programming. While security issues slowed initial progress, CPA has been successful in creating a new countrywide television network, Al-Iraqiya, which is now providing high quality programming and news to Iraqis. In February, Harris Corporation took over as the new DAN contractor as part of a long-term commitment to increase the level of professionalism and expertise of the operation. CPA has drafted plans to turn IMN into a public broadcasting operation by establishing the Iraqi Public Broadcasting Corporation (IPBC), which would be an institution independent of government or political influence.

Iraqis have access to other U.S. media outlets. Radio Sawa has been broadcasting into Iraq since well before the war, and is the number one radio station across Iraq. In April, pan-Arab al-Hurra satellite TV plans to open an Iraqi affiliate to broadcast international and local news and views to Iraqis.
Polling shows that Iraqis want to have a free and open media. This has translated into an explosion of local media with over two hundred local newspapers and periodicals published and avidly read. Local radio and television stations are flourishing in northern Iraq and are starting up in other regions of the country. To encourage the growth of independent and objective media, CPA, USAID and State have been carrying out training programs for Iraqi journalists and media professionals.

**Question 8a.** It has been my experience that faith based groups are one of our best assets in combating AIDS world wide. The Global AIDS bill was very explicit about the need to involve faith-based organizations. But I have been hearing quite a bit from faith-based organizations about their difficulties in accessing funding for AIDS work. Could you tell me how much of this assistance is currently being administered through faith based groups?

**Answer.** In launching the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, President Bush made clear that a wide array of partners will help us implement the Plan, including non-governmental organizations such as faith- and community-based groups, private corporations, and, in some circumstances, international organizations. Faith-based organizations have often been the first responders to the global AIDS pandemic and have a wealth of expertise and experience to offer in implementing the Emergency Plan.

The U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, has met with a number of faith-based organizations as he and his office have begun to implement the Emergency Plan.

As of last December 2003, the Administration had announced several initial central funding mechanisms to implement key topical areas of the Emergency Plan, pending the availability of funds. These areas included activities for orphans and vulnerable children, behavior change through abstinence and faithfulness, care and anti-retroviral therapy for HIV-infected persons, prevention through safe blood programs, and twinning and volunteer activities to build capacity and human resources. Additional proposal solicitation announcements are expected to be made throughout the year.

On February 23, 2004, the first $350 million in awards will be announced under the program areas noted above. Examples of faith-based partners that will receive awards include Catholic Relief Services, World Relief, Salvation Army, Habitat for Humanity, and Opportunity International.

**Question 8b.** The Global AIDS bill listed 14 countries to receive intense funding. While I fully support a targeted effort, AIDS is obviously not limited by geography. Can you tell me whether this targeting has led to decreases in AIDS funding for other countries coping with the AIDS crisis?

**Answer.** President Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is a 5-year, $15 billion initiative that virtually triples the U.S. commitment to international HIV/AIDS assistance.

The $9 billion under the Emergency Plan intended to boost prevention, treatment and care activities in 14 (soon to be 15) of the most affected countries in the world is additional to the base budgets of U.S. Government agencies, totaling $5 billion over five years, that will continue bilateral U.S. HIV/AIDS programs currently active in more than 100 countries around the world. The remaining $1 billion is an additional pledge by the United States to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

**Question 8c.** In November I had the opportunity to meet with the President of Congo, Joseph Kabila. Here’s a man who has made some really historic choices, who has put his country on the path to reconciliation, whose country has so many needs it’s difficult to even begin to list them. President Kabila’s one request of me was for more assistance for Congo in our Global AIDS efforts. Congo had a stable AIDS infection rate for many years, at 5 percent. But there are disturbing signs that this rate has increased, particularly in the eastern part of that country, where AIDS rates may be as high as 22 percent, with 36 percent of pregnant women HIV-positive. Following that meeting, I wrote to the State Department, making the case for
funding, a list of the world released a list of some 63 countries that are technically eligible to compete for MCA deal of interest in. My question deals with eligibility. The MCC board of directors challenge Corporation. This is an issue that many of my constituents have taken a great epidemic in thinking regarding AIDS in India?

progress of the past 50 years. Can you shed some light on the State Department’s thinking about how to tackle AIDS in India before the disease undermines India’s values of democracy our two countries share, I believe it is in our interest to begin the next 6-12 months to reverse the trend. Given India and International Studies (CSIS) Task Force, India faces a strategic opportunity in Indians or more are likely to be infected by 2010. According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Task Force, India faces a strategic opportunity in the next 6-12 months to reverse the trend. Given India’s strategic location, and the values of democracy our two countries share, I believe it is in our interest to begin thinking about how to tackle AIDS in India before the disease undermines India’s progress of the past 50 years. Can you shed some light on the State Department’s thinking regarding AIDS in India?

Answer. The Administration shares your concern about the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in “next wave” countries such as India. As such, as noted above, the President’s Emergency Plan includes nearly $5 billion to support ongoing bilateral HIV/AIDS programs in approximately 100 countries worldwide—including in India.

India is a participating country in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Global AIDS Program; HHS allocated $2.3 million for HIV/AIDS programs in India in Fiscal Year 2002, and was expected to spend $3.6 million in Fiscal Year 2003. Also within HHS, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) provided $1 million in 2002 to HIV/AIDS biomedical and behavioral research projects in India in Fiscal Year 2002 through collaborations with both U.S.-based and Indian institutions. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $2.2 million to HIV/AIDS prevention and care activities in India in Fiscal Year 2002, and an estimated $13.5 million in Fiscal Year 2003. Additionally, both the U.S. Departments of Defense and Labor have HIV/AIDS programs underway in India. Numerous other donors, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; governments; the private sector; multilateral organizations; and foundations also fund HIV/AIDS programs in India in Fiscal Year 2002, and was expected to spend $3.6 million in Fiscal Year 2003. Also within HHS, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) provided $1 million on HIV/AIDS biomedical and behavioral research projects in India in Fiscal Year 2002 through collaborations with both U.S.-based and Indian institutions. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $2.2 million to HIV/AIDS prevention and care activities in India in Fiscal Year 2002, and an estimated $13.5 million in Fiscal Year 2003. Additionally, both the U.S. Departments of Defense and Labor have HIV/AIDS programs underway in India. Numerous other donors, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; governments; the private sector; multilateral organizations; and foundations also fund HIV/AIDS programs in India. For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has committed $200 million to fight HIV/AIDS in India.

Question 8d. I’ve also been considering the AIDS problem for India. Infection rates do not yet reach those we find in sub-Saharan Africa, but the sheer size of India means that there are already 4.5 million people who are living with HIV/AIDS in India. If HIV continues to spread at its current rate, an estimated 20 to 25 million Indians or more are likely to be infected by 2010. According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Task Force, India faces a strategic opportunity in the next 6-12 months to reverse the trend. Given India’s strategic location, and the values of democracy our two countries share, I believe it is in our interest to begin thinking about how to tackle AIDS in India before the disease undermines India’s progress of the past 50 years. Can you shed some light on the State Department’s thinking regarding AIDS in India?

Answer. The Administration shares your concern about the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in “next wave” countries such as India. As such, as noted above, the President’s Emergency Plan includes nearly $5 billion to support ongoing bilateral HIV/AIDS programs in approximately 100 countries worldwide—including in India.

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Question 9. I read with interest of the recent launching of the Millennium Challenge Corporation. This is an issue that many of my constituents have taken a great deal of interest in. My question deals with eligibility. The MCC board of directors released a list of some 63 countries that are technically eligible to compete for MCA funding, a list of the world’s poorest countries that are not prohibited by Congress from receiving assistance. Most of these countries, I understand, are not likely to be eligible for aid under the MCA because they will fall short of eligibility criteria related to governance, investing in people, and economic freedom.

I understand that USAID plans to develop a program specifically designed to help those countries that just miss MCA eligibility requirements. Has this program been initiated? Where will funding for these activities come from?

Answer. The Millennium Challenge Act (MCA) requires that the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Board wait a minimum of 90 days after announcing candidates before selecting eligible MCA countries. Selection can thus occur no soon-
er than May 6, 2004. The Board plans to meet as near as possible to that date so that selection can take place at the earliest date possible. Only after selection can countries that fall just short of qualifying for the MCA be identified and a program initiated to assist them.

In addition to its ongoing assistance programs in a broad range of developing countries, USAID will provide targeted assistance to countries that just miss qualifying for the MCA and demonstrate a commitment to policy reform. In those countries, USAID will support development through programs under the MCA rubric of ruling justly, investing in people and encouraging economic freedom, with particular attention to areas of weakness in qualifying for the MCA. The aim will be to promote economic growth and development and encourage policy improvements that will eventually enable the country to qualify for the MCA.

Funding for such programs could come from USAID and/or the Millennium Challenge Corporation. The Millennium Challenge Act authorizes the Board of the MCC to provide not more than 10% of appropriated assistance to countries for the purpose of assisting them to qualify for the MCA, but the Board has not yet addressed this issue. Both the MCC and USAID will encourage countries to take the needed steps to qualify for MCA funding and to create the conditions for lasting development progress.

Question 10a. I have a general concern regarding U.S. citizen services at our embassies. My staff tells me of general problems in having phone calls and faxes returned promptly. I know our consular officers are extremely busy, and I expect they would return more phone calls from my staff if they were not. My question, then, is whether we have enough consular staff to respond to the needs of U.S. citizens.

Answer. The State Department has sufficient consular staff to respond to the needs of U.S. citizens overseas. Since consular staff usually interacts with the public in the morning, most posts accept only emergency calls during this time, and generally establish hours for phone calls in the afternoon. Posts make every effort to respond to congressional inquiries within 72 hours as prescribed by Department of State regulation. Our experience has shown that email is the most efficient and reliable form of communication and encourage congressional staff to use this medium rather than fax. If your staff is experiencing difficulty with any particular posts, they should contact the Consular Officer assigned to the Department of State’s Congressional Liaison Office for assistance.

Question 10b. I would follow up with specific concerns about adoption cases. My office works with hundreds of families in the process of completing international adoptions. The parents tend to come to my office because they do not feel adequately helped by Embassy staff; they feel an undue emphasis has been placed on preventing illegal adoptions—which is a goal we all share—without adequate attention to facilitating legal adoptions. (A big exception to this issue, I might add, has been our very positive experience with the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala.) I am wondering if there are ways we can do more to help prospective parents, rather than simply focusing on stopping improper adoptions?

Answer. The Department of State’s highest priority is the welfare and protection of American citizens, including Americans adopting children internationally. In FY 2003, Americans adopted over 21,000 children from overseas. We believe intercountry adoption is an excellent means of providing a loving, permanent family placement for children who would otherwise not have one. To support this goal we provide a number of services for American prospective adoptive parents.

The Office of Children’s Issues in the Bureau of Consular Affairs was created in 1994 in recognition of the growing prominence of children’s issues in foreign policy. The Adoption Unit in that office is devoted to working with parents seeking to adopt children from overseas:

- Adoption officers are available to respond to general and specific inquiries from prospective adoptive parents;
- We maintain a Web site with over 100 information flyers on the adoption process in individual countries, as well as general information on the immigrant visa process, citizenship for adopted children, and safeguards for children and adoptive parents;
- While we cannot direct that a visa be issued, we can and do inquire of the U.S. consular section abroad regarding the status of a particular case.

We take every opportunity to discuss adoptions with foreign interlocutors, both overseas and in the U.S. In these discussions, we express our strong support for transparent, consistently applied adoption procedures that place the interests of children first. In this vein, while we are not equipped to locate children for parents...
to adopt, act as an agent for an adoptive family, or order that a foreign authority grant an adoption, we can and do monitor the procedures of foreign governments to ensure that they do not discriminate against U.S. citizens in the adoption process.

We provide training for our staff in the importance of facilitating intercountry adoptions for American adoptive parents as a reflection of U.S. Government policy. We include training on intercountry adoptions in the initial instruction provided to every consular officer before his or her first tour overseas. We include adoption visa service issues in the continuing training seminars provided to officers and Foreign Service National staff working in American Citizens Services and Immigrant Visa sections in embassies and consulates around the world. We discuss adoption policy and customer service values at regional conferences for post leadership and management. For example, in 2002, the Office of Children’s Issues organized a Consular Conference on International Adoptions for consular officers serving at U.S. embassies with significant adoption workloads or adoption related concerns highlighting the importance of managing the orphan visa system to assist American citizen adoptive parents to receive orphan visas as quickly as possible. We continue to seek opportunities for training.

Adoptive parents often seek assistance with the visa application process. The Department recognizes the special needs and considerations of adoptive parents and their children. As stated in the Foreign Affairs Manual (9 FAM 42.21 N11), it is the general policy of the Department that consular sections should provide expeditious assistance in handling orphan visa cases, and that orphan visa appointments should be given priority over other cases. As a result, most posts will give orphan visa applications the first available opening, often within a few days of the parents declaring themselves documentarily qualified.

Unfortunately, not all orphan visa cases can be expeditiously processed if there are constraints that preclude setting an appointment. The Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) regulations, for example, prohibit a consular officer from issuing an orphan immigrant visa unless the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has already approved the I-600A advanced processing application. U.S. immigration law requires an immigrant visa applicant to collect certain required documents, and under standard Department practice, an immigrant visa interview is not scheduled unless the applicant has gathered all the necessary documents. There may be other factors that preclude prompt appointment scheduling, including the necessity to resolve certain legal, procedural, or factual issues before holding an interview would be fruitful. Whenever possible in such cases, consular officers work with the adoptive parents or their agents to try and resolve the problems in a timely and transparent fashion.

The Department of State is committed to the twin goals of rapid processing of international adoptions and the safeguarding of an adoption system free of fraud and baby selling. We believe that international adoption practices and procedures will be ameliorated as countries accede to and implement the Hague Adoption Convention. In addition to legitimizing the principle that intercountry adoption is superior to institutionalization for orphans, the aim of the Convention is to ensure that such adoptions take place when they are in the child’s best interests and that the abduction of and trafficking in children and other abuses are prevented. The Department is committed to the Convention's principles and is working diligently to implement it for the United States. Once implemented, the Convention will be a valuable tool to help American citizens who seek to build their families through intercountry adoption.

Question 10c. Much has been written about the drop-off in student visas issued— as well as the drop in student visa applications. While I believe it is entirely appropriate to exercise vigilance in the student visa process to prevent the entry of those who wish to harm Americans, I am concerned that we are being a bit too strict in our procedures. There is also a timeliness issue here—some students are not receiving their visas until after classes have begun. Is this a staffing question? Do you need more resources from the Congress in order to fulfill these duties in a timely manner?

Answer. While there has been a decline in the number of student visa applications over the last two years, the refusal rate for this class of visa has increased only slightly during this period of time. Proportionally, the decline in student visa applications is less than the overall decline in applications for nonimmigrant visas generally.

Levels of student visa applications are affected by a number of factors, including worldwide economic trends and general reluctance to travel after 9/11. There was also a general belief that it was more difficult to obtain a visa to the United States. The standards under which consular officers adjudicate visas based on immigration
law and regulations have not changed, however. Consular officers continue to grant visas to persons who can demonstrate that they are bona fide nonimmigrants coming to the United States to study.

The elimination of the personal appearance waiver for students and the need to collect biometric information from visa applicants has obliged students from a number of countries who previously did not need to come to an Embassy or Consulate to apply for their visas in person. Embassies and Consulates have been encouraged to set up special expedited appointments for students and exchange visitors in order to facilitate their visa applications in a timely manner.

Most student visa cases are adjudicated by consular officers the same day as the visa interview and biometric collection. Only a small number, are submitted to Washington for interagency review. The clearing agencies generally give priority to student visa applications. Most of these cases are concluded in less than 30 calendar days. The Visa Office identifies cases that remain pending for the other clearing agencies to ensure that cases do not get overlooked.

Question 10d. Moreover, in some large countries such as Sweden, I am told of students having to travel long distances to the U.S. Embassy in the capital city to engage in a three-minute interview for a visa. Are these types of procedures really necessary for countries like Sweden where we have a visa waiver program in place?

Answer. Our focus is on the statutory requirement to issue visas with biometric identifiers. In order to collect biometrics at the time of the visa application, the applicants must appear in person. The visa interview requirement is designed to complement the biometric requirement.

Students of all nationalities require a visa. The Congress has authorized the visa waiver program only for tourists and business visitors coming to the United States for short periods of stay. We recognize that some individuals travel long distances to reach our consular offices overseas. Most of those offices have appointment systems in part to permit those who do need to travel the assurance that a consular officer will be available to provide the appropriate services.

RESPONSE OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question 1. Recently, the State Department publicly denounced the human rights record of the Government of Uzbekistan. It has come to my attention that several relatives of Americans have been wrongly imprisoned in Uzbekistan for personal political motives and been denied any visitation due process. In addition, Uzbekistan has arbitrarily put individuals on the Interpol red notice list based on what Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Jones has publicly characterized as political motives. What is the State Department doing to remedy these matters? At what point will the U.S. Government back up its expressed concern about human rights in Uzbekistan and other parts of central Asia with concrete steps?

Answer. The United States has been proactive in addressing human rights issues in Uzbekistan and Central Asia. We have a hard-hitting public and private dialogue with the Government of Uzbekistan which focuses on a wide range of issues, among those the need to respect human rights, institute democratic reforms, and safeguard religious freedoms.

In December, the State Department took the step of denying Uzbekistan certification for Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) money on human rights grounds. Secretary Powell did recommend to the President, and he agreed, to approve a national security waiver because the reduction of weapons of mass destruction is in our interests. Further, FY04 assistance to the central government of Uzbekistan is dependent on our certification that Uzbekistan is making progress on our Strategic Partnership Framework signed in 2002. This Framework commits Uzbekistan to take steps in developing civil society and respecting human rights, among others.

As part of our commitment to support the Government of Uzbekistan in making these reforms, we also engage in direct government-to-government human rights training and legal reform assistance, support to local human rights NGOs, and active collaboration with Uzbek human rights activists.

Nonetheless, the United States has made it clear to Uzbekistan that the continued development of our bilateral relationship is dependent on progress on all these fronts.

With regards to Red Notices, the fact that a Red Notice for an individual has been issued by Interpol at the request of a member country does not obligate the United
States to arrest that person. Indeed, under U.S. law, a Red Notice alone is insufficient to arrest a person for purposes of extradition.

Though not specified in the question, the reference to arrested relatives of American citizens is related to three relatives of the Maqsudi family, former owners of the ROZ Trading company. We have actively urged Uzbekistan to release the three. The Government of Uzbekistan has assured us that they are conducting the dispute against ROZ Trading in accordance with Uzbek law. They have also confirmed that they have provided the Maqsudi relatives with access to their lawyers.