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THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: A EUROPEAN TROJAN HORSE

BY

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The collective security of Europe has been evolving since WWII. Since then NATO, a U.S.-led coalition of Allied forces has provided for the collective defense of both the U.S. and Europe. During this time, eleven of the NATO member-nations, along with four additional non-NATO nations, have evolved into a separate collective, economic and political, entity – the European Union (EU). The European Union will enact an international agenda in favor of its member-nations. A capable military force is needed to empower a successful international agenda. To meet that need, the EU has initiated measures via its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to establish a Europe-only military force. The ESDP empowers the European Union and concurrently risks precipitating a break with the 50 year-old link that binds the U.S. and Europe – a break with NATO. NATO could possibly dissolve if NATO's European member-nations depart the alliance in favor of the EU. The dissolution of NATO could have national security consequences for the United States.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... III
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: A EUROPEAN TROJAN HORSE ..................... 1
NATO’S IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S................................................................. 1
THE EU AND THE ESDP -- THE BIG PICTURE ............................................. 2
EVOLUTION OF THE EU AND THE ESDP .................................................. 3
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ............................................... 6
THE DILEMMA OF AUTONOMY ................................................................. 7
Political Unity ................................................................................................. 7
Sovereignty ...................................................................................................... 8
Conflicts and Disagreements .......................................................................... 8
THE DILEMMA OF SECURITY ...................................................................... 10
Need For Military Force .................................................................................. 10
Use of Military Forces ..................................................................................... 10
THE DILEMMA OF DEFENSE SPENDING ................................................. 11
A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FUTURE ............................................... 13
ENDNOTES ........................................................................................................ 15
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 19
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: A EUROPEAN TROJAN HORSE

NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security.

—William Clinton

The collective security of Europe has been evolving since WWII. Since then NATO, a U.S.-led coalition of Allied forces has provided for the collective defense of both the U.S. and Europe. During this time, eleven of the NATO member-nations, along with four additional non-NATO nations, have evolved into a separate collective, economic and political, entity -- the European Union (EU). The European Union will enact an international agenda in favor of its member-nations. A capable military force is needed to empower a successful international agenda. To meet that need, the EU has initiated measures via its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to establish a Europe-only military force. The ESDP empowers the European Union and concurrently risks precipitating a break with the 50 year-old link that binds the U.S. and Europe -- a break with NATO. NATO could possibly dissolve if NATO's European member-nations depart the alliance in favor of the EU. The dissolution of NATO could have national security consequences for the United States.

This research paper will reveal the dilemmas brought about by ESDP and how those dilemmas are likely to lead to the dissolution of NATO. First, it establishes the importance of NATO to the U.S. Then it presents the big picture -- a synopsis of the EU's and ESDP's effect on NATO. Next, it will present the historical evolution of the European Union, its Common Foreign Security Policy, and the ESDP. Then it presents the ramifications of the EU, specifically the effect of the EU's autonomy, security, and defense spending. Together, autonomy, security, and defense spending, foster dilemmas that conflict with the viability of dependable NATO support to the EU. Without viable and dependable NATO military support to the EU, NATO's importance to the EU diminishes and thereby weakens the alliance. A weakened NATO alliance cannot be an effective linchpin of transatlantic security and could therefore dissolve from the international scene. Undeniably NATO is important to America. Because of that importance, this paper concludes with one unrefined recommendation for the future but one that hopefully stimulates debates on the future of NATO.

NATO'S IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S.

NATO serves as a direct link to U.S. involvement in European affairs -- NATO is an organization of nineteen nations with nineteen voices. The U.S., as a principal provider to
NATO, leads this formidable coalition whose primary purpose is to provide for the collective defense of its members. For the past fifty years the NATO allies have built a superb military organization that helped bring about the end of the Cold War. NATO has given Europe peace, stability, and prosperity. Today NATO seeks to help stabilize newly independent nations within NATO's sphere of influence.

Strategically and economically, Europe remains linked to the U.S., "The unity of vision and purpose shared by Europe and the United States provides enormous leverage as these partners act in concert to encourage peace and prosperity throughout the world." 

Strategically, Europe's location enhances U.S. power projection capabilities. General (Ret.) Klaus Naumann, German Army Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, cites Europe's strategic advantages for the U.S., "The United States as a global and maritime power needs free access to the coastlines on both sides of the Atlantic. The Europeans offer control of the European coastline through America's participation in NATO . . . vital sea lines of communication." Likewise, " . . . a European-American nexus can continue to serve as a launch pad for U.S. strategic deployments." The U.S. VII Corps deployment from Germany to Saudi, for Operation Desert Storm, verifies Europe's strategic relevance to the U.S. Further . "Enhanced American influence beyond the Europe of the EU is a third strategic benefit of a continued U.S. presence . . one of the better investments in stability and outreach."

Economically Europe is a powerhouse, " the [15] EU economies represent 29% of world GNP." Economically, Europe is very important to the U.S.: "U.S. trade with Europe, amounting to $250 billion annually, produces over three million domestic jobs." Further, "Companies from the EU form the largest investment block in 41 U.S. states. Fifty-six percent of U.S. foreign investment occurs in Europe. Europe buys 30 percent of U.S. exports." Additionally, " . . . Europe forms a gateway for the American economy to Eastern Europe, to Russia, and to the Central Asian countries ranging from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan." Europe, simply in terms of dollars, greatly influences the U.S.' quality of life.

U.S. interests are indeed tied to Europe. NATO, as the linchpin of transatlantic security, offers a proven medium for international cooperation. The U.S. needs Europe strategically and economically. Our link to Europe is critical; that link is NATO.

THE EU AND THE ESDP -- THE BIG PICTURE

Before delving any deeper into the belly of the Trojan horse titled ESDP, it is important to understand the big picture -- a synopsis. Once seen in its entirety, the thesis and the proof will be much easier to comprehend.
The EU is a controversial political union -- a union that is already enacting a unified international economic agenda. Once unified politically and supported by its new military force, the EU will be a much stronger international player. ESDP makes the new EU military force a reality.

President Clinton said, "NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security." However, Europe appears to be on a path separate from that of the U.S, a path that will diminish Europe's dependence on NATO. The impetus for taking this separate path is ESDP. The EU sees the benefit of ESDP as providing itself a military force; NATO sees the benefit of ESDP as a vehicle for increased burden-sharing by European NATO members.

ESDP is a policy that European proponents say will provide a stronger European military capability for NATO. However, ESDP may be to NATO what the Trojan Horse was to Troy -- the ESDP is a gift fraught with danger, delivered by Europeans, and accepted by NATO and the U.S. Within the Trojan horse lay Troy's destruction, within ESDP lie the very causes that could lead to NATO's dissolution. NATO, which has been seeking greater capability and burden sharing by European member-nations, accepts ESDP as the answer to improvement of Europe's military capabilities. However, ESDP poses dilemmas that may trigger actions that could lead to the eventual dissolution of NATO.

With NATO's military assistance, ESDP could quickly provide the EU a capable and ready European military force. Without NATO, EU forces will lose critical U.S. military support. Consequently, the EU member-nations would be forced to increase defense spending to replace the missing military capabilities, specifically to replace command and control systems, airlift, and satellite intelligence. Ironically, duplication of NATO (U.S.) capabilities is necessary if the EU is to have a capable military force responsive solely to EU and exclusive of NATO. This new financial burden may provide the impetus for European nations to diminish support of NATO in lieu of developing its own Europe-only military force. The latter appears to be the logical decision. The EU, must be capable of enforcing Euro-centric diplomacy with a military force responsive to its needs. The ESDP provides the EU with that military force however concurrently ESDP may lead to the dissolution of NATO.

**EVOLUTION OF THE EU AND THE ESDP**

The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has evolved as a result of European treaties and organizations established since the end of the Second World War. At the end of that war, Europe was in tatters, both Allies and Axis. Europe needed time to restore stability
and to rebuild its war torn nations. Of immediate concern was the encroaching threat from Communism. So to secure their democracies and rebuild their economies, European countries formed alliances and organizations for Euro-centric reasons.

First, at the end of WWII, came membership in the new United Nations providing a forum to resolve international issues. In 1948, five western European nations (allies in WWII) signed the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self Defense. This group was referred to as the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) or the Western Union. Then in 1949, the mission of collective defense passed from the Western Union to a new organization, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1954, West Germany and Italy joined the Brussels Treaty committing themselves to the collective defense of the 1948 Western Union – renamed the Western European Union (WEU).

The most significant treaty in the evolution of ESDP was the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This treaty was the start of the European Economic Community (EEC), the forefather of today's European Union. The Treaty of Rome, per Article 238, enabled the Community to conclude agreements with third countries; per article 228, the Community could conclude international treaties; it also provided the power to receive and establish diplomatic missions. These were actions that the EEC could undertake on behalf of its members.

In 1984 the WEU developed a "common European defence identity." This marked a new point in the ESDP's lineage -- the ability to defend itself using its own forces. In 1987, the WEU's Ministerial Council expanded its purview, "to provide an integrated Europe with a security and defence dimension." This WEU expansion of the original 1984 agreement was to specifically "strengthen the European pillar" of NATO and "to provide an integrated Europe with a security and defence dimension." The 1987 expansion emphasizes a European military capability, separate from NATO, for use by a not yet unified Europe. Today, the ESDP and its Europe-only military force are the fruits of that expansion.

The 1991 Maastricht Treaty was the second most significant evolutional phase of ESDP. The Maastricht Treaty gave birth to the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU would internationally represent its members, "the Heads of State and Government adopted a Treaty on Political Union and a Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union, which together form the Treaty on European Union." These three unions are prescribed in the terms of the CFSP. Furthermore, within the treaty, the WEU was acknowledged to eventually become the EU's operational arm, "the defence component of the European Union, ... implementing decisions and actions of the Union with defence
implications."\(^{20}\) Undeniably, the Maastricht Treaty cemented a new Europe-only direction: it introduced European unity -- the EU (Title I of the treaty) -- and gave the EU a charter -- the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V of the treaty).\(^{21}\) The CFSP’s purpose is:

To safeguard the common values, fundamentals, interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways. To preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."\(^{22}\)

Key to comprehending the CFSP is that the EU, through the CFSP, "asserts its [EU] identity on the international scene . . . including the development of a common defense policy."\(^{23}\) Therefore to assert EU diplomacy requires the EU to have a military capability. From this point in time, the evolution of ESDP began to snowball.

The EU would eventually absorb the WEU's 1987 development of a security and defense identity and become the EU's military coordinator making the WEU significant to ESDP's evolution. In 1992, the WEU identified the military missions it would undertake -- the Petersburg missions. In 1993 the WEU was authorized to establish a satellite center to obtain and analyze satellite data in support of WEU operations. In 1996 the WEU created the Situation Center and Military Delegates Committee to monitor crisis as well as WEU operations. The WEU never had standing Armies but could draw forces from its member-nations and units such as "the Eurocorps; the Multinational Division Central; the UK/NL Amphibious Force; Eurofor and Euromarfor; the Headquarters of the First German-Netherlands Corps; and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force."\(^{24}\) The implication of this unit-list is clear -- Europe-only forces. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam, a revision to the Maastricht treaty, the EU assimilated the WEU, "the WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union, providing the latter with access to an operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersburg missions."\(^{25}\) The Petersburg Missions are: "humanitarian and rescue operations; peacekeeping; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking."\(^{26}\) Peacemaking was the most controversial because it required combat operations. The EU's assimilation of the WEU gave the ESDP its military missions and thereby a requirement for military forces to conduct those missions.

NATO established a link to the WEU in 1996 when NATO foreign ministers proposed "that a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) be developed within the transatlantic framework."\(^{27}\) This had three objectives: to improve the efficiency and flexibility in the conduct of NATO peacekeeping missions; to improve cooperation with the WEU; to reflect the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). ESDI is important to because it provided, "a genuine
European military capability without duplicating command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO."\textsuperscript{28} NATO embraced a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) linking it to the work of the WEU. The U.S. supported ESDI with these three caveats listed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen, "Indivisibility: there can be no severance of the linkage between NATO and ESDI. It must be Improvement, and that means improvement in capabilities which we don't have today. And it must be Inclusive: all of the NATO nations, which are not part of the EU, must have access to the planning and preparations part of it or we are going to see some resistance to full cooperation between NATO and the ESDI."\textsuperscript{29} With NATO's support ESDI could flourish unimpeded and the EU, after assimilating the WEU, could then conceivably have a separable military force but one that was tied to NATO support. So ESDI was NATO's initiative to support a Europe-only military capability and linked NATO to the EU through the WEU.

In December of 1999, the EU established a Headline Goal for its new military force. The goal was to have sixty thousand soldiers deployable by 2003 and this force would constitute the EU's military. Also in December of 1999, the EU started speaking of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) instead of an Identity (ESDI). These terms have been used interchangeably by the U.S. Ambassador to NATO\textsuperscript{30} and in reports by the Center for Defense Information.\textsuperscript{31} However, ESDI is now a NATO term and ESDP is now an EU term. Regardless of which term you use, they both refer to a Europe-only military force but ESDP refers to a force separate from NATO.

**RAMIFICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The evolution of the EU and subsequently the ESDP has ramifications. Specifically these ramifications are autonomy, security, and defense spending. Similar to Troy's enemies lying within the belly of the Trojan horse so too within the EU/ESDP evolution lie the dangers to NATO. Simply put, the EU's autonomy, security provided by military forces, and limited defense spending foster dilemmas that may be the very causes that diminish the EU's reliance on NATO.

The ramifications of autonomy, security, and defense spending, foster many dilemmas. The dilemma fostered by EU autonomy is that the EU's international agenda may conflict with its non-EU NATO allies such as the U.S. The dilemma fostered by EU security is linked to autonomy. The EU will need military power to support its international agenda. That power can only come from the Europe-only military forces because NATO support to the EU may prove unreliable. Some non-EU NATO allies may not support the EU's international agenda and
consequently leave the EU unable to enact its international agenda. The dilemma of defense spending, because of dwindling European defense budgets, may cause the EU to seriously consider expanding its meager resources on developing its own forces in lieu of supporting NATO. All of these dilemmas weaken the EU-NATO link and that could lead to the possible dissolution of NATO.

THE DILEMMA OF AUTONOMY

It is feasible to believe that the EU is headed toward political integration and, possibly, political unification. Political integration is critical to autonomy if the EU is to be the voice of its member-nations. In return, the EU member-nations must forego some of their sovereignty for the EU to be capable of autonomy. Autonomy is important to the EU; the EU will require autonomy in its diplomacy and in the use of its military forces. As an international power, the EU will make decisions that the U.S. may not always support. In these situations, the EU's autonomy will be confronted by the viability of NATO support of the EU and vice versa. The EU is a union that brings a powerful synergy to the international arena but not without conflicts and disagreements.

Political Unity

Political integration is not a new concept in Europe. In 1997 Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt declared, "[The] European Union will have a political, economic, and financial weight to exert an influence on global affairs equal to that of the three superpowers. This perception is gaining ground among the leaders of the EU, and it provides an additional strategic motivation for European integration."32 France shares this view. Its pioneers of integration were Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet.33 Monnet (1888-1979), a French economist and public official, was a leading proponent of European unity after World War II.34 Schuman 1886-1963 was a Finance Minister, Premier, and Foreign Minister. His Schuman Plan led in 1952 to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first step in the creation of the European Union.35 Dr. Hay, executive director of the U.S. Foreign Policy Research Institute, notes that both France and Germany support integration but disagree on whether Europe will be the French version of a United Europe of States or the German version of a United States of Europe.36 Germany's Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has mentioned a "fully sovereign European federation to be completed within the next five years."37 Another tribute to political union was published in the European Foundation: "The greatest step toward a United States of Europe came with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, reinforced by the Amsterdam
treaty of 1997. The main provision of Maastricht, the Economic and Monetary Union ('EMU'), is a project described by President of the European Central Bank, Wim Dusenberg, as 'go[ing] hand in hand, with political integration and ultimately political union. EMU is, and was meant to be, a stepping stone on the way to a united Europe.'

Undoubtedly, Europe is on the road to unity -- slowly but surely.

**Sovereignty**

The tallest hurdle in debates of political unity appears to be the issue of sovereignty. Each EU member-nation would have to forego some degree of sovereignty to support EU decisions. Only through voting could member-nations influence EU decisions and voting is a very sensitive point of discussion amongst the member-nations -- the recent Nice summit addressed this very issue but not conclusively. However, it is likely that Europe will eventually unify in all matters as is evident in the voting that brought the European Union to life, the advent of the Euro, the birth of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the initiative of a Europe-only military force. Each of these developments has chipped away at the sovereignty of the individual member-nations. The Euro requires economic synchronization of the EU nations and is guided by a single agency, the European Central Bank, (ECB). ECB decisions represent the collective good, which at times may not bode well for some member-nations. Similarly, the EU's Europe-only military force -- the Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) -- must be developed, deployed, and used by a singular agency. The EURRF cannot effectively react to directions and commands from each member-nation. The EURRF requires a single command and control element to synchronize multi-national military operations. These operations must also have a singular but multi-national purpose. Logically the EURRF would be employed under the command of the EU. Again, as with the Euro, we see that EU member-nations are willing to forego some sovereignty for the collective good. The EURRF is in itself a sign, a marker of EU sovereignty; the London Daily Telegraph asserted, "The principal goal is to endow the 'fully sovereign' European federation with a defining characteristic of sovereignty." In other words, development of a military capability is a defining characteristic of sovereignty for the EU. We can only conclude then that political unity is on the EU's horizon.

**Conflicts and Disagreements**

The EU's political union is a foregone conclusion and will further empower the EU. Doing so, the EU will define its international agenda in support of its member-nations. The EU has already in place a rudimentary guide -- the CFSP. It is therefore conceivable that the EU, at
times, will make decisions that will conflict with those of its NATO allies. Indeed, the EU's autonomy may cause conflicts that separate it from its NATO allies and thereby diminish its dependence on NATO.

Conflicts and disagreements are the norm in the international arena as every nation exercises their elements of national power on behalf of their national interests. An autonomous EU could find itself at odds with the very nations that provide it with NATO support. If the EU is at odds with NATO allies then how can NATO allies supply forces in support of the EU? Two examples of disagreements are trade relations with Cuba and Iran; the E.U. has trade relations with both, and the U.S. does not. The EU probably would not obtain NATO (U.S.) support for EU operations on behalf of Cuba or Iran. Another example of disagreement is Turkey, a NATO ally that does not support EU use of NATO assets without Turkey's approval. Turkey is not EU; her Foreign Minister Ismail Cem said, "What the EU is trying to do is against logic, moral values and conscience, . . . it was out of the question for Turkey to accept it." Canada worries that, " . . . the new force, coupled with the possibly more isolationist administration of U.S. President-elect George W. Bush, could leave Ottawa stranded in a diminished NATO, with the EU conducting security consultations directly with the United States." Additional points of contention broaden the gap between the U.S. and Europe (NATO and the EU). Europeans are wary of the U.S.' National Missile Defense (NMD) an initiative strongly supported by President-elect Bush. NMD provides an umbrella for the U.S. but not for its allies. Must Europe develop its own NMD or go without one? If Europe must go its separate way from NATO, could Russian military support replace NATO capabilities? Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov recently announced Russia's support for separate European forces for European security and offered to cooperate with the EU in a crisis situation. Russia shares a continent with the EU, unlike the U.S. across the Atlantic Ocean. The U.S. and non-EU NATO members should not hastily dismiss the validity of this offer simply because Russia was once an enemy -- other former enemies in WWII are today joined in the EU. Further, the U.S. is attempting to reduce its share of the UN budget. The top candidate to make up U.S.' reduction is the EU, " . . . the EU economies represent 29% percent of world GNP . . . " Ambassador to the UN Jean-David Levitte of France, whose country (at the time of this writing) holds the EU presidency, has stated, "we will pay no more." Confronted with these disagreements will affect the EU's ability to enforce its will. Indeed the EU's autonomy, brought about by the evolution of its security needs, could possibly weaken its reliance on NATO.
THE DILEMMA OF SECURITY

The EU's political union mandates autonomy that in turn empowers its international agenda. Like a nation-state, the EU will employ the elements of national power in its own behalf. There are four elements of national power: political, economic, psychological (informational), and military forces. Military forces are best employed in concert with the other three elements. The EU needs a military force and has good reasons to use it.

Need For Military Force

Security and autonomy are directly linked and require military forces for enforcement. The EU, as any other nation, will act in support of its national interests employing its own elements of national power and thereby require military forces, "European Leaders have recognized that without military muscle to back up the EU's diplomacy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be ineffective."46 The U.S. Ambassador to NATO elucidated the linkage between international diplomacy and a military capability, "Diplomacy backed by force was the secret to Dick Holbrooke's success at the Dayton negotiations in 1995." In that analogy he denotes that effective diplomacy must be backed by military force.47

The EU comprehends the need for military power and has taken steps to make the Europe-only force a reality not just an Identity (ESDI) or a policy (ESDP). On 20 November 2000, in accordance with its Headline Goal, the EU member-nations pledged a pool of 100,000 (+) troops and offered 400 aircraft and 100 ships for the Europe-only military force [EURRF].48 Additionally, "At the 22 November [2000] 'pledging' conference for the rapid reaction force, the EU did manage to formalize its new EU Political-Security Committee, Military Committee and EU military staff..."49 By 2003, the EURRF is expected to be capable of conducting the Petersburg missions. The EU, like any other autonomous governing body, is very serious about having its own military capability.

Use of Military Forces

ESDP has brought to fruition the EU's military capability and subsequently fosters the dilemma of having an EURRF and simultaneously supporting NATO. Believing that the two forces or force structures, the EURRF and NATO, can coexist may not necessarily be true. Two significant issues defy coexistence of the EURRF and NATO: First, forces pledged for use in NATO operations would not be available for EURRF operations, and vice versa. Second, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that NATO should have the right of first refusal of missions before the EU acts on its own behalf. Obviously these two issues subordinate the EU's
autonomy to NATO making the EU's security and defense policies secondary to NATO. This is an untenable position for a governing body and may force the EU to decide between support of NATO or improve the EURRF's capabilities to replace NATO capabilities. Therefore the military force brought into existence by ESDP could very well be the instrument that diminishes EU reliance on, and support to NATO.

It's not known for certain but can be estimated that a fledgling EURRF will require the support of NATO's assets to operate: "Indeed, for the foreseeable future, the new force will not be able to operate without logistical, intelligence, and other support from NATO according to military analysts." But this is only a near-term reality. The on-going evolution of the EU and the subsequent need for autonomy and security may instigate the EU to improve EURRF capabilities. The EURRF, as currently designed by the Headline Goals, is meant to serve the EU in its present stages of development. But the EU is still not unified as envisioned in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, specifically political unity. Therefore momentum to improve EURRF capabilities may be as inevitable as the development of the EU's political unity.

THE DILEMMA OF DEFENSE SPENDING

Autonomy and security have very real costs. No government can escape the fiscal expenditures for military forces. Money spent does not necessarily equate to quality but regardless, all military forces require the expenditures of monies, as do military operations. EURRF operations will undoubtedly require additional outlay of defense monies by the EU as duplication of NATO military capabilities occur -- the duplication incurs costs. Concurrently, the U.S. has been asking European governments to increase their share of the burden for NATO operations. Why would European nations want to do both -- duplicate NATO capabilities and increase their share for NATO operations? It is likely that won't happen given that European spending on defense has been dropping since 1992. It may be at this point when the EU member-nations may be forced to decide whether to improve EURRF capabilities or spend to improve NATO capabilities. This is not a truly viable choice because NATO cannot always support EU autonomy. A NATO-supported EURRF is dependent upon U.S. will, specifically U.S. dollars, personnel, technology, and equipment to support the EU's international agenda. Will the U.S. provide this open-ended support indefinitely? The answer probably lies somewhere between "In most cases" and "No." Thus, the need for an EU force responsive only to the EU is undeniable. This means that the EURRF must duplicate some NATO capabilities to conduct EU missions without NATO support. Duplication incurs new costs for the EU and its member nations. So instead of European nations using their dwindling defense budgets to
improve military capabilities, IAW NATO requests, the Europeans use their dwindling funds to duplicate NATO capabilities. In the long run, duplicating now and improving military capabilities later would further reduce EU reliance on NATO. Therefore, ESDP and the realities of growing the military force it birthed could very well lead to the dissolution of NATO.

As strange as the following statement may seem it does indeed have merit -- Europe's current lower defense spending trends actually support a separation of EU from NATO. There is no doubt, Europe is spending less on defense, "Defence expenditure by NATO European countries has fallen by 22% in real terms since 1992, . . ."52 Likewise, "Countries with relatively large defence expenditures, mainly non-NATO EU countries, continue to cut their spending."53 These reductions would appear to strengthen EU ties to NATO because European nations, as they cut defence spending, must rely on NATO/U.S. for military support. The reality is not so simple. If European nations spend less on military operations then the U.S., through NATO, will have to shoulder the financial burden for operations in support of EU autonomy and security -- someone has to pay. This would be unacceptable to the U.S. During the U.S. elections many news agencies reiterated American sensitivity to the cost of maintaining a forward presence in Europe. Additionally, U.S. payment for the majority of costs for NATO operations in Kosovo, has stirred more furor over sharing of burdens and costs. On 5 December 2000, Secretary of Defense Cohen warned, " . . . if they [NATO allies] don't start spending more on their military and work out a new EU-NATO relationship, the alliance 'could become a relic of history.'"54 Undeniably, the U.S. will not always support the EU's international agenda and likewise the U.S. will not pay for the EU's autonomous military operations. Therefore the EU-NATO member-nations will have to decide where to spend their diminishing defense expenditures -- developing their own force in support of EU autonomy or increase spending in support of NATO. Logically, the former makes more sense -- spending by European nations in support of EU autonomy and security is truly in their self-interest. Finally, "Treating the EU too much like America's vassal may not be the best way to get it to spend more and do more in its own backyard -- the aim of all administrations for decades."55

The EU and its member nations will have to spend more money whether they stay with NATO or improve the EURRF. The EU must duplicate NATO capabilities if they are to conduct Europe-only operations in support of ESDP. It is illogical to believe that the EU can rely on U.S. pocketbooks being perpetually open, especially to missions that do not further U.S. interests.

A supporting argument, for the EU to forego NATO, is the fiscal efficiency gained by maintaining a single EU force proportionately supported by its many member-nations. Each EU member-nation already has a combat-ready standing Army, a military budget, and some form of
its own military-industrial complex. Fifteen nations, fifteen armies, fifteen budgets can not efficiently provide military support for a politically unified EU. A future cost savings for European nations will almost certainly be the consolidation of their military-industrial complex. Were this to occur, EU member-nations would attain financial and military synergies that would benefit each member-nation as well as the EU. Each EU member-nation could buy mass-produced equipment much cheaper from a sole EU provider. Research and development costs could be shared among the nations. Each nation would attain the same level of modernization. The EURRF would benefit the most because EURRF units equipped with common equipment can use the same type logistical support, can train along the same doctrinal lines, can share data, can readily communicate, which would fundamentally transform current multi-national armies into one huge military force with similar and powerful capabilities. Indeed, a consolidated EU military could be a formidable force with many capabilities and a cheaper alternative to NATO. NATO could not attain that kind of synergy simply because NATO is not a politically unified entity having the same national interests -- same values YES but not interests. The EURRF would serve as the stepping-stone to this force.

A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FUTURE

ESDP is indeed a Trojan horse -- within it lies a threat to NATO. Though dissolution of NATO was not the intent of our European allies, ESDP may make that outcome inevitable. Undeniably, the U.S. and the EU must maintain a linkage for strategic and economic reasons. This was true 50 years ago and will most certainly be true in the future. To ensure that linkage remains viable requires a dialogue acknowledging the changing future needs of all parties. Even more than dialogue, NATO, to remain viable must represent the changes and strengths of its many member-nations. Maintaining the status quo (current EU and NATO relationships) will weaken it, if not dissolve NATO altogether. Yet the U.S. needs to retain a link to Europe. Perhaps now is the time to evolve NATO into a new strategic relationship -- a relationship that capitalizes upon and acknowledges European strength. The U.S. and EU need a NATO for the 21st century. As General Naumann declared, "The United States needs a global partner who can act together with Washington as a global power."56

Historically, NATO has been a very successful alliance. The U.S. needs NATO to remain the linchpin of our transatlantic security. The key is to acknowledge the autonomy of the EU and likewise to make NATO a viable military force for both EU and NATO member-nations.

WORD COUNT = 5,781
ENDNOTES


4 Ibid, 42.

5 Ibid, 42, 43.


7 Clark.

8 Ibid.


11 Euro-centric is a term that represents the concept of Europe-only or for the primary benefit of European nations.


13 Ibid.


17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 332.

19 Ibid., 325.

20 Ibid., 332.


23 Ibid., 328.

24 Ibid., 336.

25 Ibid., 334.

26 Ibid., 333.


28 NATO, 75.


34 Monnet, Jean" The Concise Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, Third Edition Copyright © 1994, Columbia University Press. Licensed from Inso Corporation. All rights reserved.


36 Hay.


39 The EURRF is an acronym used only within this research paper and it represents the European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force. EURRF is the title devised by the author of this research paper solely for reasons of brevity and clarity. This acronym represents the current military force, of the European Union, as pledged by its member-nations on 20 – 22 November 2000.


41 Jeffrey Ulbrich, "NATO, EU Fail To Persuade Turkey," 15 December 2000; Brussels AP AP-NY-12-15-00 1525EST; Internet, AOL News; accessed 27 December 2000.


44 Lederer.

45 Ibid.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 38.


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27


