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Emergency Response For Cyber Infrastructure Management

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
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
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
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

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Summary Report for

Emergency Response For Cyber Infrastructure Management

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Principal Investigators:

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1 Project Summary/Abstract

The objective of this research is to investigate architectural mechanisms to provide an emergency response capability for Cyber Infrastructure management through the use of distributed, highly secure, protected domains. Instead of creating a costly physically separate cyber domain, logical separation is used. This work developed an architecture and prototype demonstration in the context of an open source operating system.

2 Project Description

Introduction

Currently our national cyber infrastructure is vulnerable at both the node and router levels to attacks by adversaries ranging from untutored script-wielding novices to sophisticated threats from well-funded, well-organized groups and nation states. These attacks can result in the exposure of sensitive information, corruption of critical data, and the denial of system and network use by authorized entities. Although considerable effort has been devoted to the detection of attacks, little has been invested in infrastructure architectures that would permit a well-managed response to these attacks.

In a speech presented at the Microsoft Conference Center in Redmond, Washington on 4 June 2002, Richard Clarke, Special Advisor to the President for Cyber Space Security and Chairman, President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, called for research to create separate protected channels for the administration of critical components of the National Information Infrastructure. Such channels would permit the management of computers and networks even when the infrastructure was under attack and would permit the management components to allocate resources to services critical for local, state, and national response.

Current computer and network architectures do not provide separation of resource management services from those supporting run-time activities. Thus, through the corruption of payload and

runtime facilities, the ability to manage the information infrastructure or provide critical emergency functions can be sabotaged. Although a physically separate resource management / emergency response channel could be constructed, its cost would be prohibitive. Logical separation of management and runtime channels provides an alternative that can be implemented in the near term and can be integrated into existing and emerging network components.

Objective

The goal of this project is to develop an architectural mechanism to support separate protected communication and computation channels for *emergency response* that will automatically become available to local authorities during a time of crisis when the standard systems become unavailable because of natural disaster or human (terrorist?) activity. Use of this mechanism will allow resulting systems to operate in a fashion that is analogous to the emergency lighting system in a building. When the power goes out, enough lighting comes on to ensure that a safe exit of the building is possible. When standard communication and computer facilities are disrupted, then the emergency system should automatically become available for use to provide limited, temporary support to the local authorities so that they can continue to function.

The emergency-response capability we envision will be a managed subset of the national information infrastructure using the same physical components but logically separated as an independent out-of-band domain. Key network nodes, both processing and routing, will be emergency enabled by way of this multi-domain capability. Intrusion detection and other means will provide emergency response triggers for the transition of these nodes to a “safe” mode. Once in the safe mode, the protected nodes can process emergency and management functions without interference from other system and network activities, which will be temporarily halted. After the emergency situation is resolved, the non-critical activities can be re-enabled, perhaps gradually, to bring the system back to a normal state. For protected nodes, the logical separation of the protected domain will be their most critical and highly assured security function.

3 Approach

This project encompassed several interrelated tasks.

1. Analysis and design of domain architecture for infrastructure management
2. Implementation of extended attributes for domain management
3. Demonstration of domain separation to protect emergency response capabilities

The implementation task of the project is based on the OpenBSD code line. OpenBSD provides a stable development environment, and its emphasis on security and security auditing provide additional assurance, over and above that available through other commercial and open source operating systems, that trivial security errors such as buffer overflow do not occur. Many commercial entities rely upon open source platforms from the BSD family. This includes Yahoo, which runs 6000 BSD-based systems, and Hotmail, a Microsoft-owned email system.

Domain Architecture for Infrastructure Management

The protection domains provided at individual processing nodes is based on a *ring* architecture [Organick72]. In a generalized ring mechanism, the system binds subjects and objects to specific rings, and restricts accesses of subjects to objects based on their respective ring bindings. A *ring*

bracket mechanism extends rings to provide specific limitations based on the access mode (e.g., read, write, or execute). Thus, rings provide *protection domains* in which each object may be used.

In this task, a *software ring architecture* [Clark03] was developed to map specific elements of the general ring mechanism to the protection structures provided by OpenBSD [Watson01] (including our mandatory access control extensions), to provide a limited ring mechanism. This mechanism is of sufficient functionality to support emergency response domain separation, while allowing later extension to support a general ring bracket mechanism. The overall strategy is to leverage the assurances provided by the OpenBSD extended attribute and mandatory access control mechanisms, in support of global and persistent ring policy.

Extended Attributes For Domain Management

In this task, the extended-attribute label space provided by OpenBSD extended attributes was extended to define separate domains (rings) for critical and non-critical processing.

Demonstration

In this task, different security related programs were instrumented to take advantage of domain protection [Nguyen03]. A small-scale network environment was constructed to demonstrate the effectiveness of these mechanisms for protecting security-critical resources, processes and communication.

4 Results

Deliverables for Phase I of this work include:

1. Description of domain architecture for infrastructure management [Clark03]
2. Implementation of extended attributes for domain management
3. Demonstration and description [Nguyen03] of the use of domain management for protecting security-critical resources, processes and communication.

5 Future Work

Under this proposal, emergency protection domains have been designed and demonstrated for general-purpose processing (viz., end-system) nodes. Future work in support of emergency response for cyber infrastructure management, based on capabilities provided here, will be to control process scheduling based on domain attributes during emergencies, address the integration of intrusion detection and other network health-status triggers, the automated intercommunication of network status among protected nodes, and the domain protection of interior (e.g., router) nodes.

6 Value to the Objectives of the HS Program

This project has produced results that will directly increase capability of the US to defend and effectively respond to terrorist attacks against the national critical infrastructure. Specifically, using the techniques developed here, the information infrastructure can be better protected and

more resilient, and as a result, other infrastructures dependent on the information infrastructure can also be better protected. Thus, the national capacity to maintain emergency response capabilities in the face of cyber and other attacks is increased.

7 References

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