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THESIS

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES AT
THE STATE GOVERNMENT LEVEL**

by

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June 2004

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**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL
APPROACHES AT THE STATE GOVERNMENT LEVEL**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

State governments have been recognized as the fusion point for a significant portion of policy, operational, and implementation activities for homeland security. Additionally, the most critical decisions for allocating resources and prioritizing efforts have been delegated to states. The federal government has required this role of states and has asked them to organize task forces to deal with these challenges but has provided little guidance about how states might establish, administer, and ensure effectiveness of these structures. States have begun to establish decision-making bodies independently, inconsistently, and with few measurements to evaluate effectiveness.

This thesis provides a roadmap to success for individual state organizational approaches for Homeland Security. The recommendations are based upon an analysis of directives, expectations, national strategies, existing approaches and a case study of one state's efforts. The call for organizing for the war on terror is acknowledged, accepted, and for the most part, vigorously answered. But *how* the nation's states organize and to *what* ends their resources are applied will determine national and even international victory in this war. This project provides a model charter, recommended outcomes and outputs for a state structure, and several policy considerations for the State of Washington's Homeland Security infrastructure.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the President has called upon all Governors to create a new government organization in each state¹, a State Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF). The national strategies have also re-ordered the priority of the nation from a focus on the response and recovery to acts of terrorism to one of prevention and deterrence of new attacks. This redirection combined with the need for broader stakeholder participation, (e.g. industry, media, international border interests, and citizens themselves), dictates that states must evaluate and potentially adjust their approaches as well. A significant challenge is that, as in all other government programs, the expectations of all the stakeholders far outweigh any reasonable availability of resources. Additionally, there is no clear information or examination concerning what metrics or characteristics would determine a successful HSTF from one that is not.

Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the State of Washington has been recognized as dealing effectively and progressively with Homeland Security issues. However, there are always opportunities for improvement, refinement and reflection based upon analytical research and sound recommendations. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to provide information that will improve Washington State's approach to Homeland Security and the protection of its citizens.

This thesis gathers and analyzes federal mandates and expectations, state official opinions, and existing approaches for state Homeland Security infrastructures. From this analysis, it offers a model charter for a state HSTF, recommended outcomes and outputs for a state infrastructure to pursue achievement of the national objectives, and then tests these proposals against the State of Washington's current Homeland Security infrastructure in a case study. The project provides specific recommendations that would enhance the already sophisticated approach executed by the leaders, partners and stakeholders of the Evergreen State.

¹ U.S. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, 14.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. DISCUSSION

State governments have been recognized as the primary fusion point for a significant portion of policy, operational, and implementation activities for homeland security. Additionally, the most critical decisions for resource allocation and effort prioritization have been delegated to state governments for all efforts within their jurisdictional boundaries. The federal government has required this role of states and has asked them to organize task forces to deal with these challenges but has provided little guidance on how states might establish, administer, and ensure effectiveness of these structures. States have begun to establish decision-making bodies independently, inconsistently, and with few measurements to evaluate effectiveness².

This first chapter will discuss the background of the challenges of establishing state HSTFs and the issues surrounding the mandates, both explicit and implicit, of the federal government as well as the considerations of individual state prerogatives and desires. The chapter will also summarize the findings and provide recommendations for a model charter that includes a proposed mission, scope, objectives, outcomes and outputs for state Homeland Security infrastructures.

Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the State of Washington has been recognized as dealing effectively and progressively with Homeland Security issues. But there are always opportunities for improvement, refinement and reflection based upon analytical research and sound recommendations. The ultimate goal of this paper is to provide information that will improve the State of Washington's approach to Homeland Security and the protection of its citizens.

The demand for each state to have some form of coordinating body for homeland security issues may be the panacea to our collective struggles with this new threat, or it may just be an un-resourced, administration-specific initiative that will lack longevity and state enthusiasm. The requirements for state and local governments to participate in a national security emergency, to an extent not seen since the mid-decades of the 20th

² These assertions are fully developed, discussed and supported throughout the content of this thesis.

century, has prompted a heated and passionate debate about responsibility and funding³. That debate is destined to continue through the early years of the new millennia. The greatest dangers and most imminent threats to the domestic population seem to be well defined at the strategic policy level. However, the issues surrounding the division and assignment of new tasks amongst all the partners at the federal, state, local, tribal and private levels is always hotly debated in any homeland security policy, or operational, discussion. After a decade that included several devastating terrorist attacks within the continental United States as well as hundreds of domestically initiated events, the requirements for roles outside the federal family cannot be denied. But what are these roles and what specifically does the federal government expect of state governments? How should states be approaching this challenge, regardless of federal direction?

This project will investigate and analyze the requirements, both implied and explicit, of state Homeland Security infrastructures; examine how a sample of states have already organized to address these requirements; provide recommendations to both improve current state structures and to provide a template of desirable characteristics for all state governments as they organize to confront this challenge. The conclusions will be tested against the current homeland security infrastructure of Washington State in a case study and will provide specific recommendations for improvements.

In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the President has called upon all Governors to create a new government organization in each state⁴. The request to create State Homeland Security Task Forces has been done with little consideration of required resources, specific guidance, expectations, or definition. Additionally, there is no clear information or investigation concerning what characteristics would determine a successful HSTF from one that is not.

More specifically, the National Strategy for Homeland Security calls upon state governments to manage the interface and inter-jurisdictional relationships of all the agencies, as well as the private sector, which have a role in homeland security. While

³ The debate concerning the distribution of responsibilities and funding methodologies, especially between state and city governments, is well documented in newspaper articles, weekly periodicals, and congressional testimonies.

⁴ Ibid., National Strategy for Homeland Security.

nearly every state government had established some form of homeland security coordinating body, or at least a basic anti-terrorism program, both before and after the attacks of 2001, there was little consistency in the intent, chartering, and membership of these organizations⁵. Additionally, these organizations could not have predicted the advent of the Department of Homeland Security, Northern Command, and all the other directions and intents stemming from administration, congressional, and independent government actions at the federal, state, and local levels.

The national strategies have also appropriately re-ordered the priority of the nation from a focus on the response and recovery to acts of terrorism to one of prevention and deterrence of new attacks. This redirection combined with the need for broader stakeholder participation (e.g. industry, media, international border interests, and citizens themselves), dictates that states must evaluate, and where necessary, adjust their approaches as well. A significant challenge is that, as in all other government programs, the expectations of all the stakeholders far outweigh any reasonable availability of resources. A deeper, objective analysis of the requirements is a necessary first step before the implementation of systems and the commitment of resources based only upon emotional, subjective reactions to the escalating national crisis of terrorism.

B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The multi-governmental battlefield for terrorism is broader and more complex than any other issue that has faced this nation since the civil war. The involvement and commitment of states, local jurisdictions and the private sector is critical to the success in this battle, and the leadership of state governments is not only required explicitly and implicitly, it is the only level in which the broadest interaction and facilitation of all partners can be effected. Therefore, the organizational infrastructure in which states deliberate, prioritize and execute policies and procedures to combat terrorism is essential to the nation's success.

⁵ This assertion is based upon the author's personal experience and involvement with the National Emergency Management Association whose members are the directors of emergency management for the nation's state and territorial governments. Federal funding prior to September 11, 2001 focused upon state distribution of funds for planning while additional programs for large urban areas were also in place. These programs combined with a general recognition of terrorism as one hazard a state must acknowledge in their comprehensive planning efforts required, both implicitly and explicitly, that, as a minimum, some type of programmatic organization must be in place.

Based upon an analysis of federal documents, state practices, a case study, as well as interviews with officials at all levels of government, the proposal is that the following charter be a model and an evaluation tool from which states might accomplish the goals of state homeland security through a state Homeland Security Task Force.

1. Mission

To improve statewide terrorism prevention, preparedness, response and recovery readiness by providing a single statewide policy coordination group for all homeland security issues, initiatives, and strategies. To provide program oversight of homeland security roles among and between federal, state, local, tribal, private and volunteer entities.

2. Scope

The Task Force will provide homeland security policy recommendations to the Governor and/or his/her appointed homeland security advisor. The Task Force will address and consider the full spectrum of homeland security activities to include: 1) the prevention of future attacks, 2) the protection of critical assets and infrastructure, 3) the preparedness of all emergency disciplines, businesses, and the general public, 4) response and recovery capabilities, and 5) all legal and legislative issues that enhance the state's security. Additionally, the Task Force must include policy input or executive representation of all levels of government, all prevention and response disciplines, the private sector for their preparedness, response and recovery, the private sector for critical infrastructure protection, statewide and/or regional anti-terrorism workgroups, legal advisors and volunteer agencies. The Task Force may appoint, or include existing, sub-committees or workgroups to ensure inclusion of these representatives and to accomplish specific tactical or programmatic activities. The size of the Task Force itself must balance between the needs for broad-based participation and organizational effectiveness.

3. Objectives

While these may evolve as the fiscal, executive and tactical environment fluctuates, certain baseline objectives must be met: 1) facilitate activities, policies and programs that will prevent terrorist attacks, 2) develop and implement, (or oversee implementation of,) a comprehensive statewide homeland security strategy that will guide and prioritize policy actions, resource decisions, and operational guidance for all

entities for the full spectrum of homeland security activities, from prevention through prosecution, 3) provide effective collaboration, communications and coordination between all entities as well as the general public, 4) effectively, expediently and efficiently allocate, and advocate for, sufficient resources in accordance with the statewide strategy, 5) ensure accountability of all homeland security strategic actions and monitor the effectiveness of all programmatic activities, and 6) monitor and coordinate with homeland security efforts of regional, national, international and federal entities.

4. Outcomes and Outputs

By utilizing the three national Homeland Security priority objectives, numerous outcomes and outputs can be defined for achievement and measurement by state HSTFs. For example, to achieve the prevention of terrorist attacks objectives, outcomes for a state HSTF could be described as the: 1) increased ability to identify indications of an existing or future threat, 2) increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they are identified, 3) reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and other potential targets, and 4) increased appropriateness of protection and/or other threat response activities. Additionally, outputs could be established that promote the successful (or progress towards) achievement of each outcome. For example, outputs for the first outcome above could be the: 1) development of a strategy and commensurate business plans that describe how collaboration amongst all entities that participate in threat identification processes can be assured, 2) creation and implementation of a system to collect, screen and store relevant information with investigative value, and 3) development of a training system that provides adequate basic level threat awareness education to all public service entities, the private sector, and the general public as appropriate. In total, this paper recommends eleven outcomes for the achievement of the three national priorities and thirteen outputs to forward progress for successful attainment of the prevention outcomes for state HSTFs.

As these suggested charter, outcome, and output characteristics for a state HSTF are vetted and adjusted per state desires and based upon the requirements, expectations, and needs from all customers and stakeholders; several subsequent activities can follow: 1) currently established approaches can be measured for their effectiveness in terms of these characteristics, 2) advice can be provided to executive officials for either change or

establishment of such structures, and 3) cost-benefit decisions for the investment in such organizations can attempt to be made more in an environment of objective, strategic intentions versus one of only near-term expediency based upon emotional, political reactions to the threat.

This thesis used a case study of the State of Washington to evaluate its infrastructure approach against the above model charter's characteristics and the proposed outcomes and outputs. While the state has already achieved a high level of Homeland Security performance, there were several recommendations offered as a result of this assessment to strengthen its approach even further: 1) assign a Lead State Agency, 2) seek a specific legislative mandate and appropriation, 3) continue their "system of systems" approach⁶, but strengthen direction and control delineations, 4) enhance the focus of the infrastructure, and 5) redirect or enhance Governor's Domestic Security Executive Group⁷ towards more strategic engagement.

C. THESIS METHODOLOGY

The first chapter of this thesis will discuss the background of the challenges of establishing state HSTFs and the issues surrounding the mandates, both explicit and implicit, of the federal government and the considerations of individual state prerogatives and desires. The chapter will also summarize the findings and provide recommendations for a model charter that includes a proposed mission, scope, objectives, outcomes and outputs for state Homeland Security infrastructures.

In the second chapter, a content analysis of federal requirements and expectations will be conducted. This will include analysis of federal documents, strategies, and directives as well as opinions from federal Homeland Security officials. The chapter will propose themes, composition, tasks, and potential outcomes as

⁶ Beginning in December of 2003, the State of Washington's Homeland Security Advisor and his senior staff began to describe the intersection and coordination of multiple groups and committees addressing Homeland Security issues under his direction as operating in a "system of systems" structure as opposed to a hierarchical organizational method.

⁷ This group was established in the weeks immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks. It is chaired by the Adjutant General who is the Governor's assigned Homeland Security Advisor, Other members comprising this group include the Governor's Chief of Staff, his Communications Director, senior policy and budget advisors, the Director of the Emergency Management Division, the Secretaries of Health and Transportation agencies, and the Directors of Ecology, Information Services, Agriculture, State Patrol, and the Office of Financial Management. This group has met, and continues to meet, nearly weekly since the September 11th attacks to coordinate and provide policy guidance.

expressed by federal documents and individuals and discuss the potential implications and challenges of Presidential Directives. The chapter will refine these federal expectations with input from state leaders and an analysis of current state approaches. Finally, this chapter will propose a Model Charter that a state might use, or use for guidance to adapt their existing model to for their individual state's particular needs and operating environment.

Chapter III will provide recommendations for effective outcomes and outputs of a state Homeland Security infrastructure. By using the three national Homeland Security priority objectives, this chapter will describe outcomes for each of these national objectives and outputs for the prevention of terrorist attacks outcomes. The focus of these outcomes and outputs will be on what the state's HSTF, or otherwise named infrastructure, might be able to use to guide efforts and organizational construct.

Chapter IV will utilize the conclusions, tools and recommendations from the previous chapters and apply them against the author's home jurisdiction, the State of Washington. From this analysis, an evaluation or assessment of Washington State's current organizational infrastructure will be made and recommendations offered. The state's current structure will be briefly described and then compared to the elements of the Model Charter and the outcomes and outputs established in Chapter III.

Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be presented in the last chapter. This effort will provide information and recommendations for all states and territories in the nation as well as the federal government as it continues to strive for a collaborative, coordinated, and conscious *national* approach to securing our homeland.

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II. REQUIREMENTS AND EXPECTATIONS

A. FEDERAL EXPECTATIONS

It is the expressed policy and intent of Congress, however, that the responsibility for civil defense should be vested primarily in the States and their political subdivisions.

President Harry S. Truman, January 12, 1951; statement upon signing the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950⁸

State and local levels of governments have primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the emergency services that would respond in the event of a terrorist attack.

National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002

1. Introduction

Before being able to discuss the call for a Homeland Security Task Force in every state and territory, the overall federal expectations of state actions in this new environment should be acknowledged. Once this is accomplished, state opinions and current state constructs could be introduced to offer model or suggested mission, scope and objective language for a state Homeland Security infrastructure. This chapter will show that the federal expectations combined with state level opinion, desires and current practices can produce a model charter for state infrastructures that can be further refined based upon individual state needs and environments.

2. Specific Language and Suggestions

The specific language of the call for state HSTFs, supported by interviews of senior federal officials, help narrow and clarify the federal government's desired characteristics for these task forces. The National Strategy for Homeland Security states that:

Because of our federalist traditions and our large number of local governments, the federal government must look to state governments to facilitate close coordination and cooperation among all levels of

⁸ John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *Statement by the President Upon Signing the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950; January 12, 1951*. Source *The American Presidency Project*, Accessed at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/pppus.php?admin=033&year=1951&id=10>, accessed March 23, 2004.

government—federal, state, and local. Therefore, the president calls on each governor to establish a single Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF) for the state, to serve as his or her primary coordinating body with the federal government. This would realign the existing Anti-Terrorism Task Forces, established after September 11th in 93 federal judicial districts nationwide, to serve as the law enforcement component of the broader HSTFs. The HSTFs would provide a collaborative, cost-effective structure for effectively communicating to all organizations and citizens. They would help streamline and coordinate all federal, regional, and local programs. They would also fit neatly into the regional emergency response network that the Department of Homeland Security would inherit from FEMA.⁹

It is possible to summarize the key characteristics of the HSTFs as: they are encouraged to 1) coordinate all government levels, 2) coordinate all program activities, 3) establish a single coordinating body between the state and federal government, 4) utilize the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces as the law enforcement component of the HSTF, 5) build regional capacities and 6) communicate to organizations and citizens.

The Strategy does not specify or even allude to what the composition of these task forces might be, what level of authority should be granted to them, what level of official should chair it, whether they should be strategic or tactical bodies, how they might be administratively and legally established, or how existing agencies assigned Homeland Security responsibilities might be engaged or affected. Several senior Federal homeland security officials stated during interviews¹⁰ that the federal government did not want to be prescriptive in these areas. They said that the Governors should have the flexibility to design these entities as they deem necessary, based upon political, geographical, cultural, statutory, operational, and any other number of critical *state* factors. These officials also encouraged states not to wait for more federal guidance for the establishment of the HSTFs, that it is more than likely, primarily due to the desire not to be prescriptive, that individual state's initiatives will be the first models and templates available for advice.

While officials stressed that there is no mandate for specific characteristics or metrics for success, they could offer their opinions on what themes might make an effective state HSTF:

⁹ U.S. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, 14.

¹⁰ These interviews were conducted during the time period January 30, 2003 – February 12, 2003. The respondents asked to remain anonymous.

- Multi-discipline (e.g. representatives from fire, law enforcement, military, public health, emergency management, environmental, etc.)
- Multi-jurisdictional (e.g. federal, state, local and tribal levels of government participation.)
- Private sector and/or critical infrastructure owner-operator involvement.
- No national “one size fits all” mentality.
- Representation from existing regional homeland security specific, or related, efforts.
- Representation from Information Sharing and Analysis Centers’ (ISAC) sectors.
- While not necessarily the central state Homeland Security authority, the HSTF would be the central body for all coordination.
- Would provide accountability and monitoring activities for all Homeland Security efforts.

Another senior Federal homeland security official confirmed these themes, and suggested that the HSTFs would provide the fusion point between policy and operations. He also offered his views regarding how possibly to measure a successful HSTF:

- Prevention of terrorist attacks.
- Production of a collaborative resource allocation strategy.
- Effective and expedient allocation and expenditure of funds in accordance with the strategy.

The official also offered specific successful metrics, primarily the “expediency of money to purpose” and a reference to the state’s role in prevention that is generally absent from all other strategies and guidelines.

3. National Strategies

While the National Security Strategy of September 2002 makes a brief note of the role of all levels of government in the homeland security arena¹¹, it is clearly the National Strategy for Homeland Security that specifies the actions desired of states. In addition to the call for a State Homeland Security Task Force, the Strategy looks to state and local governments for a variety of initiatives and involvement from specific legal and

⁶ National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, 6.

administrative actions, such as state drivers' licensing standards, to general cooperative measures such as collaboration and partnership with the private sector. An extraction of the various suggestions for state and local government follows¹²:

- Establish a Homeland Security Task Force.
- Develop a state strategy complementary to the National Strategy utilizing critical mission areas.
- Implement the Homeland Security Advisory System.
- Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure requiring protection or defense.
- Maximize grant opportunities.
- Develop mutual aid implementation strategies.
- Develop plans and deploy an Incident Management System.
- Develop and deploy a statewide interoperability emergency communications plan.
- Develop a plan for receipt and distribution of medicines from national pharmaceutical stockpiles.
- Develop, plan, and exercise for annual Weapons of Mass Destruction preparedness certification.
- Develop first responder training and evaluation standards.
- Review and develop state law changes.
- Make interoperable acquisition decisions.
- Develop strategies and plan to host pilot programs and demonstrations.
- Develop and deploy a secure state intranet for Homeland Security.
- Develop deployment plan for tactical wireless infrastructure for first responders.

All of these activities could be considered for inclusion in a state's Homeland Security program with the potential assignment of the HSTF as one entity to participate in their prioritization, implementation and management. However, except for a few short references, national strategies fail to clarify state and local roles in the nation's first priority for Homeland Security: to prevent attacks from occurring in the first place. The levels of detail for non-federal roles in response and recovery from attacks are exhaustive and even the state/local roles for protection are emphasized, but there is no similar

¹² Extraction conducted by Joseph Huden, Special Assistant to The Adjutant General, Washington State Military Department, September 2002.

analysis and strategy for their participation in the interdiction of this enemy within domestic jurisdictions. Even the recently released National Strategy for Combating Terrorism makes only passing references to the needed efforts of state and local governments which requires “a coordinated and focused effort from our entire society – the federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, and the American people.”¹³ Strategic guidance and direction for other than federal and international roles in the prevention goal continue to be vague.

4. Design of a State Homeland Security Task Force – Federal Components

By analyzing the federal homeland security expectations and outcomes for states based upon legislative, strategic and implementation documents, the tasks and priorities of state HSTFs might begin to be established. Table 1 represents the beginning of a measurement matrix for building and grading state HSTFs. As desired characteristics from other stakeholders are gathered, the matrix can be further refined into an effective guideline and measurement tool. Table 1 organizes the essential elements of federal expectations into four categories; themes, composition, tasks, and potential desired outcomes.

a. Themes

Provide for the coordination of government entities both vertically and horizontally, conduct and ensure policy coordination, conduct and ensure program coordination, provide a central point of contact, include a law enforcement interface, account for and consider regional effects and interactions, and provide for private sector involvement.

b. Composition

A state HSTF should include state agencies with multi-disciplinary representation. These include, for example, public health, safety, emergency response, legal, law enforcement, etc.; federal agencies – also multi-disciplinary; local and tribal government representatives, state and local executive as well as discipline representation (also includes large metropolitan representation); Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (in its entirety or liaison); Joint Terrorism Task Force liaison; interstate regional partners;

¹³ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, 25.

private industry leaders who represent the economic infrastructure; private industry leaders who represent and/or own critical infrastructure; and the state homeland security leader.

c. Tasks

It should develop and implement the state’s Homeland Security strategy; implement the Homeland Security Advisory System; identify and prioritize critical infrastructure; develop mutual aid, interoperability, communications and incident management strategies; develop legal strategies; oversee planning, training, exercising and equipping strategies and standards; coordinate all internal and external Homeland Security programs (e.g. the Strategic National Stockpiles and BioWatch); and provide a central coordinating body.

d. Potential Outcomes

The state HSTF should strive for the prevention of terrorist attacks; the effective and expedient allocations of resources; a collaborative, cost effective organizational environment; an effective communications structure that reaches into all organizations and the general public; and effective accountability and monitoring of all statewide Homeland Security activities. These are “potential” outcomes based upon an analysis of federal expectations, Chapter III further analyzes this area and ultimately proposes the outcomes and outputs recommended by this thesis.

Table 1. Federal Expectations of a State HSTF

THEMES	COMPOSITION	TASKS	POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
Government Coordination (Vertical)	State Agencies – Multi-disciplinary (e.g. public health, safety, emergency response, legal, law enforcement, etc)	Develop and Implement State HS Strategy	Prevention of terrorist attacks
Government Coordination (Horizontal)	Federal Agencies - Multi-disciplinary (e.g. public health, safety, emergency response, legal, law enforcement, etc)	Implement the Homeland Security Advisory System	Effective and expedient resource allocations
Policy Coordination	Local and tribal governments, executive/discipline representation (include large metropolitan representation)	Identify/Prioritize Critical Infrastructure	Collaborative, cost effective organizational environment
Program Coordination	Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (in entirety or liaison)	Develop mutual aid, interoperability, communications and incident management strategies	Effective communications to all organizations and public
Central Point of Contact	Joint Terrorism Task Force Liaison	Develop legal strategies	Effective accountability and monitoring of all statewide HS activities

THEMES	COMPOSITION	TASKS	POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
Law Enforcement Interface	Regional Partners	Develop resource strategies	
Regional Effects	Private Industry – Economic Infrastructure	Oversee planning, training, exercising and equipping strategies/standards	
Private Sector Involvement	Private Industry – Critical Infrastructure	Coordinate all internal and external HS programs (e.g. Strategic National Stockpiles)	
	State Homeland Security Leader	Provide a central coordinating body	

5. Homeland Security Presidential Directives

Another critical component for the expectations of state and local governments can be derived from the language of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). At the time of this writing, there are nine HSPDs which in the statement of HSPD-1 are intended to “record and communicate presidential decisions about the homeland security policies of the United States.”¹⁴ The impact of these directives on the execution of state and local activities cannot be discounted or ignored.

The purpose of HSPD-5, Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents¹⁵ is to establish a single system for the management of all domestic emergencies, whether they are terrorist, natural or accidental in nature. The directive recognizes the current response levels in which state and local assets and resources are applied first and then the federal government supplements their efforts, but the directive also places implicit mandates on state and local governments to adopt a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to be developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security. *Explicitly*, it states that by federal fiscal year 2005 “Federal departments and agencies shall make adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for providing Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities.”¹⁶ Obviously, state HSTFs will

¹⁴ George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States. Directive on Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council; Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 1. The White House. October 29, 2001.

¹⁵ George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States. Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents; Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 5. The White House. February 28, 2003.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Section (20).

have to consider the implications of adopting NIMS as well as acknowledging that failure to do so essentially negate all fiscal assistance from the federal government for Homeland Security.

HSPD-8, Directive on National Preparedness¹⁷ calls for the establishment of a national all-hazards preparedness goal. Once this goal is established, measurable readiness priorities will be developed that “appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources required preventing, responding to, and recovering from them. It will also include readiness metrics and elements that support the national preparedness goal...”¹⁸ As states organize, reorganize and/or establish state infrastructures to address Homeland Security issues, they will have to incorporate a mechanism for achieving and evaluating against these metrics as well. Unfortunately, the goal itself is not due to be submitted by the Secretary until it is submitted in the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 2006 budget. Therefore, metrics that would be valuable for current consideration at the state and local level are not available. This HSPD also states that a pre-requisite for receiving Federal preparedness assistance is conditional upon the “adoption of approved statewide strategies”¹⁹ by September 30, 2005. Assessment and evaluation methods will also be established and provided to the president in an annual report. An interesting dichotomy is that while the directive calls for consultation with state and local governments as it is executed, the last section states that “This directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”²⁰ So how seriously should state and local government consider these Presidential

¹⁷ George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States. Directive on National Preparedness: Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 8. The White House. December 17, 2003.

¹⁸ Ibid., Section (6).

¹⁹ Ibid., Section (9).

²⁰ Ibid., Section (27).

Directives? On the one hand, failure to comply at the state and local level could put their federal funding receipts in jeopardy, and yet it is clearly stated above that these directives only apply to federal executive agencies.

The final implications of these HSPDs are yet to be determined as the deadline for development; implementation and definition of the details are still in the future. However, as states organize and institute their objectives, goals and priorities for statewide initiatives and their infrastructures, these future requirements must be acknowledged. Otherwise, both federal fund availability and some level of national consistency in approaches and programs could be lost.

B. REFINING EXPECTATIONS

[Success of an HSTF is measured] by the clarity of the vision, the depth of the collaborative partnerships, the wide range of support, the capability of [the] equipment, the quality of work generated from the subcommittees and the overall success of Homeland Security statewide.

Scott Behunin, Director of
Emergency Services and Homeland
Security, State of Utah; March 2003

1. Introduction

Section A proposed significant work, activities and expectations of states in answer to the federal requirements. While interviews with federal officials give the impression that states are free to structure at their discretion, correspondence from the Secretary of Homeland Security to Governors clearly encourages Governors to follow a federal desire, for example, designating the states' homeland security advisor for FFY 03 grant administration.²¹ Nevertheless, even within this environment, states retain the freedom to design internal infrastructures, as they deem appropriate. The question at this point is how identify the most important aspects of a state HSTF.

2. Other Stakeholder Input

In interviews with and surveys of other-than-federal players²², the overall direction of the federal requirements is consistent with the direction others feel is

²¹ Ridge, Tom. Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. *Grant Award Letter to Governors Dated March 6, 2003*.

²² Surveys and interviews of seven state homeland security advisors and/or emergency management directors were conducted in February 2003. These seven directors were a sample of small, medium and large states from western, central, and eastern areas of the U.S.

necessary to accomplish both strategic and programmatic tasks. Of course, the opinions of individual state representatives were not the same in every aspect, but still certain themes evolved that strengthened, clarified or added to the opinions of the federal analysis. Additionally, many states have already established either a “Task Force” or “Security Council” that address many of the components of the federal characteristics. When the seven senior state officials²³ who have responsibilities to direct the statewide components of emergency management and/or homeland security were interviewed, it was obvious that the concept of some type of coordination group was supported, if not already in place. Five thematic areas comprise the synthesis of these comments:

a. Advisory

The nature of this body should primarily be advisory to either the Homeland Security leader of the state or the Governor. While it may obviously have powerful positions in all aspects of homeland security issues, the HSTF by itself is not a final decision maker. The Governor or his/her single designee is the final authority. Several existing organizations have the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, or the Homeland Security Advisor as the chair of their existing task force or council.

b. Strategic and Policy Nature

The overall opinion was that this is not an operational or tactical entity. The HSTF exists to oversee strategic planning, comprehensive efforts, policy development, and set overall direction for homeland security within a state. It also will monitor the national and federal efforts as well as have some level of oversight of the operational groups that are developing tactical programs.

c. Multi-Discipline, Multi-Jurisdictional

While general agreement over this aspect exists, no specific theme of who, how many, or at what level of authority should the members be who comprise this force. Arguments both for widespread participation and narrow, state agency-only representation were made effectively, but even in the narrow arguments, it was stated that the HSTF must coordinate with the full spectrum of partners through other structures or methods. This appears to be the most flexible area for state-centric design based upon individual state dynamics.

²³ Ibid.

d. Prevention Aspects

This aspect of homeland security was clearly sounded in state and local input. Although federal guidance for states in this area is vague, it is apparent that a state HSTF must include a component, interface or function related the prevention process.

e. Strategic- and Programmatic-Based Metrics

Plan development, strategic outcomes, exercise results, terrorism acts prevented, and quality and capability improvements were all metrics offered by this constituency. There was general consensus that measurements are important, but that they should certainly be *strategic* progress and enhancement grades, and not “widget counting.”

There was no resistance at any level of input for the existence of a state Homeland Security Task Force or some other coordinating group(s) by another name. In fact, most state representatives voiced the opinion that they were already accomplishing what they viewed as necessary in their minds for the basic premise of the President’s call for a state HSTF. However, it is just as obvious that, for the most part, that the establishment of these organizations occurred well before the strategy’s publication and/or without the advantage of a clear vision that one might expect from that same strategy.

In a discussion with a group of experts from military and emergency disciplines²⁴, characteristics were also proposed that are necessary for the outcomes of a state HSTF: that it develops strategies and plans; coordinates all programs; possesses considerable authority, autonomy, accountability; and must coordinate all levels of activity. A National Emergency Management Association and Council of State Governments survey²⁵ of all states in May of 2002 revealed that while every state had organized “somehow” to address the function of homeland security; the characteristics, purposes and authorities of each was very diverse and generally answered the call to *organize* but not necessarily to address a consistent national purpose or outcome. The

²⁴ The discussion was conducted on January 10, 2003 and included representatives of local fire, state and local emergency management /homeland security, national guard, Coast Guard, Navy, state public safety agency, and state public health.

²⁵ State Organizational Structure for Homeland Security: A National Survey. National Emergency Management Association and the Council of State Governments. May 2002.

President's call for establishing state HSTFs occurred two months after this survey was complete and obviously many more months, if not years, after many states had already established some form of homeland security organization.

The National Governors Association also recommended that each state, by direction of their Governors, establish a homeland security structure and listed over 100 specific tasks and checklist-type activities that Governor's should address²⁶. The guidance is very comprehensive as it includes everything from interoperable communications challenges to agro and cyber terrorism, but it does not describe what a state homeland security structure might look like or be asked to specifically accomplish, (other than, ideally, everything in the guide.) This guidance along with the federal expectations as stated in Section 1 can clearly be handed to a state HSTF as comprehensive data to analyze, prioritize, and address in either strategic or tactical planning efforts.

3. Analysis of Existing State Approaches

Every state has established a methodology for organizing for Homeland Security. While many states had established an approach prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is clear that every state has evolved to some extent in order to address the myriad of challenges, directives, and other issues of the new environment of the post-9/11 world. Just the requirement alone that each Governor should appoint a single point-of-contact, (the State Homeland Security Advisor and/or State Administrative Agent,) to interact with the federal government has spawned the creation of new positions, offices, and agency missions. Although the variety of individual state organizational methods is extensive, certain themes exist in their formation authorities, executive directives, compositions, and missions.²⁷

²⁶ Governors Guide to Emergency Management; Volume 2: Homeland Security. National Governors Association, Center for Best Practices. Copyright 2002.

²⁷ State Homeland Security Organizational Structures. National Governors Association, Center for Best Practices. December 2003. Available at <http://www.nga.org/cda/files/HOMESSECSTRUCTURES.PDF>, accessed March 20, 2004. Additional information regarding each state's current approach and structures was obtained via a review of each state's homeland security information posted on their individual web sites, when available, from March 18-20, 2004. An unrelated observation during this review revealed that information on Homeland Security efforts available on each state's website varied substantially from little to no information to nearly complete posting of all activities in extensive detail and openness.

a. *Formation Authorities*

The authority which each of the state's formed their organizational structure or Homeland Security Official appointment varied across the nation. Some were simple memorandum appointments of the additional duty to an existing state official such as the state's Adjutant General, emergency management agency director or public safety commissioner. A few structures were authorized solely by a state agency director under his/her own authority. However, most were formed under the authority and mandate of legislative rule or act, or under the authority of a Governor's Executive Order. A significant issue in the differences of formation authority is the variety of the long-term existence ability of the organizational structures. Those created under legislative rule or act will traditionally survive longer with only incremental charter changes, while those created or authorized by Governors or executive agency officials may suffer substantial, frequent redirection or even termination as incumbents change office. On the other hand, if the legislative mandate was initially flawed, then these structures will have less flexibility to change and adjust than those under executive, individual directive.

b. *Executive Direction Language*

Regardless of the formation authority, all of these organizational appointments and/or structures were given some type of strategic direction or expectation when they were ordered to be created. Some were created to address an existing and specific need, such as to better enable the sharing of information and the creation of a strategy. Others were asked to only provide recommendations for other executive actions while more still were asked to provide the coordination point for all activities and entities involved, or required for, homeland security actions. Another divergence among the states is the level of tasks they were asked to perform. Some were directed to provide policy or strategic advice while others were asked to develop specific operational plans for the response to acts of terrorism. A prevalent task was the requirement to advise and/or decide on the distribution of funding and resources related to Homeland Security.

c. *Composition*

The greatest variety of divergence amongst states exists in this area and can further be analyzed in three distinct relationship definitions: lead agency designation; primary representation inclusion; and command, control and coordination interaction.

For the most part, the designation of the state's Homeland Security Advisor is consistent with the designation of the required State Administrative Agent in each state. From this, the lead governmental agency is most often assigned to the agency under these designees' authority. In many cases, an existing state military department, emergency management agency and/or public safety agency lead the efforts for homeland security activities consistent with their director's designation as the Homeland Security Advisor. However, there are exceptions as some states established separate agencies or executive offices to address Homeland Security issues but the lead action agencies are not under their direct authority. Generally, the explicit, (and sometimes implicit,) designation of the lead state agency follows the designation of the grant administration authority but not always. Additionally, in a few cases of an already established authoritative policy-making council or task force, no clear lead state agency exists because the council makes the determination of task assignment among numerous agencies.

The representation outside lead agencies in advice and/or policy-making groups is also varied across the nation. As a minimum, most states have established or built upon existing multi-agency coordination groups to conduct collaborative decision-making. However, while some have only a few state agency directors represented on these councils, others have comparatively large or even multiple, groups of individuals who play a part in the advisory or decision-making processes for state Homeland Security. At various levels of these state organizational constructs, tactical first responder discipline representatives, elected officials at both the state and local level, agency directors, agency staff, business leaders, trade and discipline association representation, tribal members, utility providers, and even individual citizen appointments can be found. There is little correlation between the type of composition and the level of authority given to the varying structures. A large state Homeland Security infrastructure may be advisory *or* policy-making, while in another state, a smaller, limited representational group may have differing levels of authority all occurring at the same time depending on the magnitude of the issue to be addressed.

This leads to the third area of analysis regarding the composition of existing state structures. The lines of authority, coordination, and communication are as varied as the number of states in the union. Due to the two aforementioned elements, the myriad of combinations of interactions amongst all the players prevents a conclusion of any consistent theme. This statement begs the question of whether there should be a national consistency in this element, which further leads to the question of whether composition and the correlating lines of communication and authority should be a significant metric for success. The clearest consistency is that all of these infrastructures are ultimately under the direction and responsibility of the state's Governor and his/her constitutional responsibilities for statewide public health and safety. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that a lack of national uniformity in this area is immaterial as long as state and national goals and objectives are being met.

d. Missions

Contrary to the above mentioned lack of consistency, the missions of these state organizational infrastructures are very similar. Whether the prevalence of power and authority exists within a person, a single agency, or a multi-party council, the overall missions of each state in regards to Homeland Security structures can be easily generalized. They are charged to “protect”, “coordinate”, “advise”, “recommend”, “develop”, “promote”, “lead”, “enhance”, and “implement”. The object of these mission action verbs is for the most part to “prevent”, “prepare for”, “respond to”, “recover from”, “investigate” and “secure from” acts of terrorism. No two mission statements are alike, (though some come fairly close,) but the intent and *raison d'être* of all the state's infrastructures are similar.

C. THE STATE HOMELAND SECURITY TASK FORCE – POTENTIAL CHARTER

By combining federal expectations, state practices and other stakeholder input, the model structure, mission, and outcomes of a state HSTF can be designed and potentially measured against. A proposed charter or executive directive for an HSTF is one way to specify the baseline responsibilities that can be either an initiating device or a scorecard for existing infrastructures.

1. Mission

The mission is to improve statewide terrorism prevention, preparedness, response and recovery readiness by providing a single statewide policy coordination group for all homeland security issues, initiatives, and strategies. It also provides program oversight of homeland security roles among and between federal, state, local, tribal, private and volunteer entities.

2. Scope

The Task Force will provide homeland security policy recommendations to the Governor and/or his/her appointed homeland security advisor. The Task Force will address and consider the full spectrum of homeland security activities to include:

- The prevention of future attacks.
- The protection of critical assets and infrastructure.
- The preparedness of all emergency disciplines, businesses, and the general public.
- Response and recovery capabilities.
- All legal and legislative issues that enhance the state's security.

The Task Force must include input or representation (at the policy level) of all levels of government, all prevention and response disciplines, the private sector for preparedness, the private sector for critical infrastructure protection, statewide and/or regional anti-terrorism workgroups, legal advisors and volunteer agencies. The Task Force may appoint, or include, existing sub-committees or workgroups to ensure inclusion of these representatives and to accomplish specific tactical or programmatic activities. The size of the Task Force must balance the needs of broad-based participation and organizational effectiveness.

3. Objectives

While these may evolve as the fiscal, executive and tactical environment fluctuates, it is necessary to meet certain baseline goals.

- Prevent terrorist attacks.
- Develop and implement, (or oversee implementation of,) a comprehensive statewide homeland security strategy that will guide and prioritize policy actions, resource decisions, and operational guidance for all entities for the full spectrum of homeland security activities, from prevention through prosecution.

- Provide effective collaboration, communications and coordination between all entities as well as the general public.
- Effectively, expediently and efficiently allocate, and advocate for, sufficient resources in accordance with the statewide strategy.
- Provide accountability of the effectiveness of all homeland security strategic actions and monitor the effectiveness of all programmatic activities.
- Monitor and coordinate with homeland security efforts of regional, national, international and federal entities.

The various, specific operational duties mentioned throughout national strategies, grant guidelines, anecdotal analysis and general conversation may be important, or not. It is presumptuous to dictate such tasks as mutual aid agreements, interoperability strategies, secure intranets, standardized drivers' licenses, etc. unless these initiatives had been identified as gaps and priorities of individual statewide efforts. These products are the potential outcomes and/or outputs of a risk assessment driven strategy that is coordinated and recommended by a state collaborative group, not part of the some "cookie cutter" default strategy. Additionally, a state HSTF would not be accomplishing these tasks within its purview or mission and would only provide the oversight and policy recommendations that such activities must be accomplished. Operational and programmatic workgroups, committees and focus groups may report organizationally to the HSTF, but this is not an absolute as long as their activities are coordinated in the "big picture" by the HSTF.

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III. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY STRUCTURES – OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS

Homeland security strategies – whether developed by individuals, governments, or the private sector – are a beginning. But general strategies must be turned into specific roadmaps to direct local, State, Federal, and private sector actions. Turning vision into reality will require sustained commitment of human and financial capital over the long term. It will require disciplined and consistent approaches balanced against mid-course adjustments when necessitated by real versus perceived shortcomings.

James S. Gilmore III, Chairman of the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
(a.k.a. The Gilmore Commission)²⁸

A. INTRODUCTION

The President's appeal for Governors to establish a Homeland Security Task Force, or some type of collaborative group, initially appears to be an unfunded mandate or simply a pass of federal responsibilities to state and local governments to deal with a national security threat. After analysis and further design, however, an institution at the state level that can provide coordination, collaboration, and communications to all entities across the full spectrum of homeland security challenges will increase strategic and operational effectiveness for the nation. The administration and Congress took this concept to heart as they ordered both the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. States are different than the federal government, however, and complete realignment of existing state government organizations may not be possible, wise, or even constitutionally legal in many states. However, there is also much flexibility in state constructs that certainly allows for the establishment of an HSTF to accomplish the mission and objectives as defined in this thesis. This chapter will use the conclusions from Chapter II's analysis of federal requirements, state official preferences and current state approaches. This chapter will suggest outcomes and outputs of a state's organization for homeland security

²⁸ James S. Gilmore et al. Volume V. Forging America's New Normalcy. From the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Report prepared and edited by the Rand Corporation. Arlington, VA. December 15, 2003. 1.

infrastructure. Combined with the model mission, scope, and composition of an effective state infrastructure, states can adjust and measure their ability to provide program oversight of homeland security roles among and between federal, state, local, tribal, private and volunteer entities.

The expectations of federal documents tend to *imply* outputs, outcomes and sometimes even performance measures but not stated as such. An outcome is an interaction of an output with the external environment and as the previous chapter's analysis illuminates, a clear definition does not yet exist for the expected outcomes of state homeland security organizations.

B. OBJECTIVES TO OUTCOMES

What are outcomes? Harry P. Hatry defines them, as “events, occurrences or changes in conditions, behavior, or attitudes that indicate progress toward achievement of the mission and objectives of the program. Thus outcomes are linked to the program’s (and its agency’s) overall mission – *its reason for existing*, [emphasis added].”²⁹ When the establishments of state HSTFs are considered, the first step in their development should be the establishment of measurable outcomes for that particular organization. For what reasons would, or do, these organizations exist? The General Accounting Office in April of 2002 testified to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs that two key ingredients were missing from current strategic efforts towards combating terrorism: the lack of measurable outcomes and the lack of the identification of appropriate roles for state and local governments.³⁰ This testimony occurred prior to the publication of the National Strategy for Homeland Security in June 2002 and its impact on the authors of the strategy is unknown.

²⁹ Harry P. Hatry, “*What Type of Performance Information Should be Tracked?*,” Quicker, Better, Cheaper? Managing Performance in American Government, ed. Dall W. Forsythe, New York: Rockefeller Institute Press, 2001. 21.

³⁰ David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States. In testimony to the Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability in Achieving National Goals. U.S. General Accounting Office. Expected release on April 22, 2002. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02627t.pdf>, 7, accessed February 19, 2004.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security clearly establishes three objectives:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
- Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism; and
- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.

It further states, "that the order of these objectives deliberately sets priorities for America's efforts to secure the homeland."³¹ However, these are not the outcomes.³² These are the objectives in which direction the nation must act towards based upon the achievement of measurable outcomes. Thus, it is possible to state that the outcomes, both intermediate and end, are the environmentally influenced events, occurrences or changes in conditions, behavior, or attitudes that lead to the final objectives as stated previously.

Since the objectives stated earlier are intended to be national, not federal, in their application, it would be reasonable to assume that these objectives would also be considered as priorities of state government efforts as well, and therefore, the state HSTFs would also be aiming towards them. What would reasonable and potentially measurable outcomes that an HSTF would be responsible for look like? Without immediately addressing the differences between the intermediate and end designations, it might be possible to postulate potential outcomes for each of the three national objectives for homeland security.

1. Prevent Terrorist Attacks within the United States

The large significance of external factors which influence whether a terrorist attack occurs or not makes the chore of measuring the effectiveness of any government action difficult to accomplish. Did the attack not occur because of all the effort and resources dedicated to the building of intelligence sharing systems? Or did the terrorist organization decide not to attack because of its own financial challenges? Regardless of whether a state HSTF is established for primarily operational or policy activities, if one is established that follows the essentials identified in Table 1, it could influence, direct, or

³¹ Ibid., National Strategy for Homeland Security. 3.

³² While one could argue that the prevention of future attacks is an outcome or goal for the achievement of homeland security rather than an objective, it could also be considered as an objective equal to the achievement of other *national* security objectives along with the prevention of other threats to national security such as nation-state conflicts and economic warfare. It begs the question of whether homeland security is a supporting element to the achievement of national security or vice versa. Regardless, even if the prevention of terrorist attacks is an outcome or goal rather than an objective, it still needs intermediate outcomes to be defined in order to eventually establish and focus efforts/outputs.

even enact the essential components of prevention. Unfortunately, these are not yet established in agreeable doctrine either. One method of looking at the elements of prevention is by looking at the flow of outcomes needed for prevention. Figure 1 depicts a potential methodology.

It is possible to rephrase the four major elements depicted below into relatively measurable outcomes for a state government level effort:

- Increased ability to identify indications of an existing or future threat.
- Increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they are identified.
- Reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and other potential targets.
- Increased appropriateness of protection and/or other threat response activities.

It is reasonable to argue that the 13 Critical Infrastructure Sectors³³ designated in national strategies and Presidential directives are more appropriately addressed in the second national objective, “reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism.” However, in this proposed approach, they can be more logically related to prevention and protection efforts, although the gray area is recognized.




Figure 1. Components of Prevention³⁴

³³ Ibid., 30.

³⁴ This diagram was drafted during a workshop of subject matters experts at the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security on January 28-29, 2004. The principle author is Bruce Lawlor, first Chief of Staff for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. I modified it slightly from its original draft version.

2. Reduce America's Vulnerability to Terrorism

“Our free society is inherently vulnerable,” states the National Strategy for Homeland Security.³⁵ A state might either reword this objective to be state-specific or accept the phrase as stated with the recognition of the critical role that states play in overall national homeland security efforts. Regardless, the attempt at reducing the vulnerabilities is more than just “inherent”; they are incredibly numerous. In an attempt to categorize the vulnerabilities, a state HSTF following the basic tenets of Table 1, might state them in these terms consistent with the national strategy³⁶: people, democracy, liberties, security, economy, and culture. If accepted as the very high-level vulnerabilities the nation is trying to reduce the weaknesses within, then it is feasible to express high-level outcomes for each:

- Reduction of the mental and physical vulnerabilities of the general public to acts of terrorism.
- Uninterrupted preservation of the tenets of the U.S. and individual state constitutions.
- Reduced negative impacts to the baseline security of the state and nation from both external and internal actors.
- Increased resistance to the negative influence of terrorism on the natural performance of state, national and regional economic processes.
- Reduced negative influence of terrorism on essential cultural aspects of American society.

These are indeed lofty outcomes in which valuable measurement tools will be difficult to develop, but it is not impossible. For example, in the first outcome, psychologists and sociologists could develop tools to somehow gauge the “robustness” of the American public through case studies, surveys and other analytical tools of their trade and track the trends and changes over time. Constitutional scholars could research and analyze trends in any changes to the application of constitutional provisions influenced by terrorism, and economists could analyze the micro- and macro-performance indicators of the economy to see if they are impacted by terrorism or our responses to the threat.

³⁵ Ibid. 7.

³⁶ Ibid. 7 and 8.

3. Minimize the Damage and Recover from Attacks That Do Occur

This objective really contains two separate action statements: minimize and recover. These objectives are closer to measurable outcome statements than the two of a higher priority, but nevertheless, deserve better outcome descriptions:

- Limited and minimized damage to people, property, the economy and the environment that might occur because of terrorist attacks.
- Expedient recovery process in the event of a terrorist attack in which all basic life activities and infrastructures are returned to a normal, near normal, or a better than normal state rapidly.

In summary, these eleven outcomes begin to put more concrete context into the three national priority objectives. Analytical tools can be established for all of these even though they are fairly high-level, but not unachievable, outcomes that are appropriate for national and state government efforts. The requirements and expectations concluded in Chapter II seemed at first blush to contain many outcomes we might expect from a state HSTF, but they more accurately run the gamut of all the things possibly desired to happen at the administrative, tactical, operational and strategic levels. These eleven outcomes will help to begin to create a better taxonomy into which the expectations might appropriately fit. The next step in this discussion is to develop outputs and/or intermediate outcomes that would help a state focus its efforts and resources to achieve these potential end outcomes and from there, positively influence the achievement of the strategic objectives.

C. SELECT OUTCOMES TO OUTPUTS – PREVENTION OF ATTACKS

How can you measure how many shipwrecks a lighthouse prevents?

Dr. William Pelfry
Monterey, California
January 2004

Mr. Hatry proffers that one person may view a particular action as an output while another may consider it a type of outcome.³⁷ In accepting this idea, 1) the role of states is critical in advancing the national homeland security objectives, 2) that Section B has outlined potential outcomes for the achievement of these objectives, and 3) that state

³⁷ Ibid., Harry P. Hatry. 17.

homeland security organizations will be looked upon to focus statewide efforts towards these outcomes. Then outputs, (products or services delivered,) can be proposed which will interact with the environment to hopefully advance the attainment of the outcomes.

The number one priority of national and state efforts must be to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring in the first place. Achievement of this objective, for the most part, makes all other activities moot.³⁸ For the scope of this paper, this section will describe potential outputs for the achievement of the outcomes just related to the objective of the prevention of terrorist attacks upon a state. The outcomes for prevention described in Sub-section B.1 will be utilized to organize the proposed outputs.

In June 2003, the Office for Domestic Preparedness published guidelines for state and local governments for the prevention of terrorist attacks.³⁹ It lists and categorizes over 130 individual activities or tasks, most of which could be considered outputs although they run the gamut from administrative to strategic efforts. Chapter II's analysis of federal requirements, state official preferences and current state approaches also provide some outputs that might be useful in achieving the outcomes of prevention. Clearly the list of outputs for the prevention of terrorism could draw from thousands of potential courses of action. In the context of this thesis, it is important to relate outputs specifically related to the possible vision of a state HSTF.

- 1. Outcome 1: Increased Ability to Identify Indications of an Existing or Future Threat**
 - Development of a strategy and commensurate business plans that describe how to assure the collaboration amongst all entities that participate in threat identification processes.
 - Creation and implementation of a system to collect, screen and store relevant information with investigative value.⁴⁰
 - Development of a training system that provides adequate basic level threat awareness education to all public service entities, the private sector, and the general public as appropriate.

³⁸ It is acknowledged that increased ability to minimize, damage and respond and recover from terrorist attacks can also be thought to implicitly increase prevention.

³⁹ Office for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Prevention Guidelines for Homeland Security. The Office of Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security June 2003: Prevention and Deterrence.* Washington D.C. June 2003.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 19.

2. Outcome 2: Increased Ability to Evaluate the Potential of Threats As They Are Identified

- Adopt or develop an appropriate analytical model to assess threat indications.
- Ensure collaboration and integration of assessment and evaluation processes from traditional as well as non-traditional investigative entities, (e.g. health and agricultural agencies.)
- Create and/or assign a lead organization to oversee and coordinate a system of threat identification and assessment processes.
- Through policy, legislative and/or executive action, identify and develop strategies to overcome barriers to the appropriate sharing of information and intelligence products.

3. Outcome 3: Reduced Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructures and Other Potential Targets

- Assign or create a lead entity to oversee the effort to identify, assess vulnerabilities of, analyze consequences, and recommend protective strategies and priorities of critical infrastructures and potential targets of terrorists.
- Develop and oversee strategies and action plans that maximize the collaboration and coordination of the owners of potential targets and the state effort to reduce their vulnerabilities.
- Provide a leadership point to assure the coordination between private, local, state, and federal critical infrastructure protection efforts.

4. Outcome 4: Increased Appropriateness of Protection and/or Other Threat Response Activities

- Establish and oversee a process that ensures the interconnection of the first three outcomes that will result in recommendations for protection decisions and threat response measures.
- Develop a risk management or cost benefit tool that will guide appropriate protection and response action decisions.
- Develop a model that delineates responsibilities for varying degrees of decision-making amongst and between levels of government and the private sector.

These outputs should be the responsibility of a state HSTF. This organization, with the proper delegation or access to authority, can easily track and focus upon these outputs and develop the resources and define the inputs needed for their accomplishment.

Following this process will lead ultimately to the accomplishment of the outcomes and thereby a strong effort towards the accomplishment of the priority objective, preventing terrorist attacks.

The establishment of effective performance measures representative of the outputs and outcomes for these state homeland security organizations is critical. However, the establishment of measurements first requires an investigation of the expectations of the task forces, an analysis of the expected outcomes of the task forces and the commiserate outputs required to positively influence the desired outcomes to further homeland security overall.

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IV. CASE STUDY: STATE OF WASHINGTON HOMELAND SECURITY - ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. INTRODUCTION

How would the author's state stack up against the model charter and themes, characteristics, outcomes and outputs as described in this thesis? The state of Washington possesses a significant share of the national risk and must address all the activities any state would in terms of the protection of its citizens, its critical infrastructures, and national assets. An evaluation within the confines of the HSTF topic would not necessarily determine the state's overall efforts and success in addressing homeland security, but it could illuminate whether or not Washington State is answering the National Strategy's plea for a single structure.

B. CURRENT HOMELAND SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

Washington State has several components in its homeland security infrastructure. The four primary groups are the Committee on Homeland Security, the Emergency Management Council, the Governor's Domestic Security Executive Group, and the Department of Health's two primary advisory groups:

The Committee on Homeland Security is a Governor directed organization which was formed in November 1999 to provide recommendations for the prevention of, preparation for, response to, and recovery from criminal acts of terrorism. The composition is multi-jurisdictional and multi-discipline and with the inclusion of its sub-committees, has over 170 members. This group meets monthly, sub-committees more often, and its primary focus has been to address programmatic and operational issues to include administrative recommendations for the distribution of federal grants. The state's Emergency Management Council first sees the Committee's recommendations for concurrence before going to the appropriate final authority for execution.

The Emergency Management Council is a 17 member statutorily established body tasked with assessing statewide emergency preparedness and providing recommendations to the Governor and the Director of Emergency Management, the state's Adjutant General by statute, on all aspects of emergency preparedness. It has three standing sub-

committees: the Committee on Homeland Security, the Seismic Safety Committee, and the State Emergency Response Commission required by federal law to address and coordinate hazardous material response issues.

The Domestic Security Executive Group was established in the days following the September 11th attacks. This small “terrorism cabinet” meets weekly to coordinate state agency activities, policy and initiatives on behalf of the Governor. It is chaired by the Governor’s Homeland Security Point of Contact, the Adjutant General, and consists of the state directors/secretaries of emergency management, health, agriculture, state patrol, ecology, information services, transportation, and a representative of the Attorney General’s Office. It also includes the Governor’s Chief of Staff, Director of the Office of Financial Management, Communications Director, and other senior policy and budget staff.

The Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Advisory Committee and the *Hospital Emergency Preparedness and Response Advisory Committee* were established under the auspices of the health and hospital supplemental fiscal awards in 2002. They include multiple representatives from all aspects of the health and medical community as well as the emergency response communities. They report to the state’s Secretary of Health.

Federal entities such as the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council and the Joint Terrorism Task Force are valuable components of the state’s overall infrastructure, but only loosely tied to state specific efforts through either the state patrol or the Adjutant General himself.

Numerous other workgroups or existing commissions, councils and committees exist that have a stake in homeland security programs and policies but are generally driven by larger missions. These organizations are generally affiliated with a state agency or a larger commission or workgroup. All of these interacting agencies, groups, and councils can be depicted in a hierarchical manner with lines of command, control and/or coordination. However, recent presentations by Washington State officials have strived to portray that the state’s Homeland Security infrastructure performs in more of a *system of systems* approach in which these groups intersect and collaborate when necessary. The

combination of these systems' interactions follow directions from the Governor as well as provide him advice on the one hand, while at the same time provide influence and input to national and federal entities such as the National Governor's Association, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the White House and others.

C. WASHINGTON STATE'S INFRASTRUCTURE IN REGARDS TO THE MODEL CHARTER

Discussions in Washington State periodically occur concerning the establishment of an HSTF in Washington State and involve options ranging from the creation of a new organization to the assignment of activities to an existing one. However, does the state already meet the desired characteristics of an HSTF? This section will compare the state's current characteristic against the model charter proposed in Chapter II.

1. Mission

The mission is to improve statewide terrorism prevention, preparedness, response and recovery readiness by providing a single statewide policy coordination group for all homeland security issues, initiatives, and strategies. It also is to provide program oversight of homeland security roles among and between federal, state, local, tribal, private and volunteer entities.

While the state is accomplishing many activities that improve statewide terrorism prevention, preparedness and response readiness, the many efforts from all levels of government and the private sector can claim only one real single point of contact for the state and that is the Adjutant General in his position as the Homeland Security Point of Contact (HS POC.) Even then, this individual is not able to collaborate and coordinate with every entity routinely. He relies upon the eventual filter of information and recommendations to him through an existing agency or homeland security group. Often, especially for private sector activities and needs, only the issues and initiatives that have come to a critical juncture or point of failure make it to top levels of discussion. No existing group in the Washington infrastructure can claim to be the "one" point of contact for all issues. Additionally, program oversight is often split among a few state agencies and, in some cases; there is no central oversight, e.g. port security and critical infrastructure protection.

2. Scope

The Task Force will provide homeland security policy recommendations to the Governor and/or his/her appointed homeland security advisor. The Task Force will address and consider the full spectrum of homeland security activities to include:

- The prevention of future attacks.
- The protection of critical assets and infrastructure.
- The preparedness of all emergency disciplines, businesses, and the general public.
- Response and recovery capabilities.
- All legal and legislative issues that enhance the state's security.

The Task Force must include input or representation from the policy level of all levels of government, all prevention and response disciplines, the private sector for preparedness, the private sector for critical infrastructure protection, statewide and/or regional anti-terrorism workgroups, legal advisors and volunteer agencies. The Task Force may appoint, or include, existing sub-committees or workgroups to ensure inclusion of these representatives and to accomplish specific tactical or programmatic activities. The size of the Task Force must balance the needs of broad-based participation and organizational effectiveness.

a. Scope, Part 1

Recommendations are routed to the Governor and his HS POC as needed but the entire spectrum of homeland security issues from prevention to prosecution is not comprehensively addressed by any single entity. No single body oversees the five elements within the scope of an HSTF, with the possible exception of the Domestic Security Executive Group. This group, however, only addresses urgent and near term policy issues and challenges, and seldom engages in long term strategic problem solving and goal setting. The tasking of these functions more often rests with individual agencies and/or other committees on an individual element level.

b. Scope, Part 2

There is no doubt that through one of the four primary organizations of the infrastructure or through one of the legs of the network, that just about every stakeholder is somehow involved. However, not a single organization exists that includes all the policy level representatives from all the desired entities. For example, while the mayors

and county commissioners are represented on the Emergency Management Council, the state Attorney General and Secretary of Transportation are not. While a sub-committee of the Committee on Terrorism has significant private sector involvement at the tactical level, there is no location for the collaboration of public-private policy for the protection of critical infrastructure.

c. Objectives

While these may evolve as the fiscal, executive and tactical environment fluctuates, it is necessary to meet certain baseline goals.

- Prevent terrorist attacks.
- Develop and implement, or oversee implementation of, a comprehensive statewide homeland security strategy that will guide and prioritize policy actions, resource decisions, and operational guidance for all entities for the full spectrum of homeland security activities, from prevention through prosecution.
- Provide effective collaboration, communications and coordination between all entities as well as the general public.
- Effectively, expeditiously and efficiently allocate, and advocate for, sufficient resources in accordance with the statewide strategy.
- Provide accountability of the effectiveness of all homeland security strategic actions and monitor the effectiveness of all programmatic activities.
- Monitor and coordinate with homeland security efforts of regional, national, international and federal entities.

3. Objectives

Effective administration and accountability for the programmatic outcomes of several grants and initiatives is being achieved and the recently published statewide strategic plan will help set measurements. The Federal metric of the effectiveness of “moving money out the door” is being achieved but it is done within a realm of operational success, not necessarily strategic success. Some of this challenge should fall upon the congressional and federal agency shoulders as their grants only ask for and focus upon programmatic progress. Washington State’s multi-level approach to developing resource and funding recommendations and the consequent decision-making are very effective. There is hardly an interest or stakeholder that does not have an opportunity to voice their opinion or become part of the objective risk/need based

process. Federal efforts are monitored well within the infrastructure of Washington State and local efforts are also well reported and tracked. “Partnership” does not seem to be an issue, but to what strategic end must it be established?

D. WASHINGTON STATE’S INFRASTRUCTURE IN REGARDS TO OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS

Washington State has just completed and published the Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan which “provides the frameworks through which we will strengthen our ability to defend against, deter, dissuade, and ultimately respond to and recover from terrorist acts in the State of Washington.”⁴¹ The plan delineates the strategic objectives, priorities, goals, objectives and implementation strategies for the state’s efforts to address terrorism and homeland security. By comparing Chapter III’s recommended objectives, outcomes and outputs against the state’s intended efforts, it is possible to evaluate the state’s direction.

1. Strategic Objectives

The state’s strategic objectives clearly reflect the intent of the national objectives but also narrow them for the state’s approach:

- Reduce Washington’s vulnerability to terrorism. Defend against, deter, dissuade and prevent terrorist attacks from occurring within Washington State.
- Prepare citizens, government, tribal nations and businesses at all levels to effectively respond in the event of a terrorist attack.
- Minimize the damage and effectively respond to and recover from attacks that do occur.

2. Outcomes

Chapter III establishes eleven separate outcomes that are divided among the three national objectives. It is important to remember that these are outcomes for the state’s Homeland Security infrastructure not necessarily its overall statewide efforts.

⁴¹ Major General Timothy J. Lowenberg, The Adjutant General, Director, Washington Military Department. Washington Homeland Security Advisor Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan. January 2004. Preface page.

Washington State has begun efforts that appear to address the outcomes for the prevention of future attacks. The state's strategic plan clearly outlines goals and objectives that speak to each of the four outcomes for this objective.⁴² Since all these outcomes cannot be accomplished solely by any one agency or entity, the necessity of a collaborative and coordinated, multi-player infrastructure is essential. The state is well suited for the achievement of these outcomes as long as the state's system of systems integration approach do not diffuse or degrade the implementation strategies and task assignments.

The achievement of the outcomes for the vulnerability reduction objective is also dependent on multiple players. However, in this case, those players need to come from legal, sociological, economic, psychological and other fields that are not predominant players in the current state construct. While some of the players come from the state's Attorney General's Office, the business community and federal border agencies, the overall construct for achieving the proposed outcomes for this objective is inadequate.

In contrast to the aforementioned assessment, the state's infrastructure approach is well suited to accomplish the two outcomes for minimizing damage and recovering from effects of terrorist attacks. This may be because the outcomes are not new to the traditional state and federal approaches to comprehensive emergency management in which coordination, collaboration, which has always been a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional approach and has existed in doctrine, plans, and practice for decades. These elements practically require the non-hierarchical systems approach of Washington State to be most effective.

3. Outputs for Prevention

Chapter III proposes 13 outputs for the four outcomes for a state Homeland Security infrastructure to produce in order to advance the prevention objective. In order to be realized, these outputs also require multiple players interacting effectively but they also demand, and in some cases explicitly state, that someone or some agency has to be put in charge. Some of these outputs are very similar to the objectives as stated in the state's strategic plan and the state has begun to assign responsibility as well as track

⁴² Washington Military Department. Washington Homeland Security Advisor Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan. January 2004. 25-26.

progress through the use of a balanced scorecard approach. The state's current Homeland Security structure enables the production of these outputs *as long as* it specifically identifies the outputs, assigns specific responsibility, provides resources, and tracks and measures progress.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

The construct of Washington State's infrastructure for Homeland Security has been most successful in its inclusiveness of many players, agencies and points of coordination. The recent development and publication of the state's statewide strategic plan will focus future efforts and activities and ideally guide, if not dictate, future expenditure decisions. The future requirements that Washington State has set upon itself to develop specific business and work plans for each of its objectives and implementation strategies clearly demonstrates the state's commitment to a conscious and monitored realization of the tenets of their strategic plan.

However, the trade-offs between a clear, operational command and control type structure for a more diffuse collaborative "system of systems" construct illustrates areas that can be improved. However, adjustments can be taken to address the concerns of the former *without* sacrificing the benefits of the latter. Based upon the results of the case study as well as the previous analyses in Chapters II through IV, it is possible to propose specific recommendations for the State of Washington.

1. "Overtly" Assign a Lead State Agency

While the Adjutant General is clearly the identified and recognized Homeland Security leader for the state, that distinction does not necessarily translate to his overall department and his Emergency Management Division (EMD.) It is mostly assumed that his immediate assistants and EMD are the central point of coordination and administration for Homeland Security, but the emphasis on the collaborative structure detracts from what may exist as the "one stop shop" for all Homeland Security activities in the state. The Military Department, or its EMD, should be clearly designated as the Lead State Agency and resourced to accomplish any additional efforts that would come from this assignment. The renaming of the department or EMD to include the Homeland Security nomenclature should also be considered as a possibility.

2. Seek a Specific Legislative Mandate and Appropriation

The benefits of establishing the infrastructure, leadership and strategic charter of the state Homeland Security in law or rule outweigh the loss of flexibility that a gubernatorial assignment offers. The “war on terrorism” is expected to last for many more years, if not decades, and state efforts need a firmer sense of permanency and consistency. Additionally, the specific efforts of the leading agencies and designated leader should not be constrained by federal funding uncertainty and the limitations of federal grant “allowable” activities. Appropriation of state funds should be enacted or else the ebbs and flows of Homeland Security efforts will be dictated by federal government resource ambiguity and not by the public safety needs of the state. It is also imperative to consider specific additional powers and authorities to the state’s Homeland Security leader to strengthen and clarify operational and administrative lines amongst organizations, levels of government and the private sector.

3. Continue “System of Systems” Approach, but Strengthen Direction and Control Delineations

The infrastructure that existed before the events of 2001 worked effectively for the scope of activities and requirements that the state addressed. However, the advent of the enormous grants, new interactions, new relationships and vocal politics following the attacks demand that a piece of the state’s infrastructure clearly establish and identify the direction, control and coordination relationships between agencies, councils, committees and boards. The current system is strong, but much of this strength is due to the positive associations and leadership skills of existing players. As these players change over time, especially upon the upcoming gubernatorial transition, new individuals will be introduced who will be expected to interact effectively but who will not have the benefit of historical relationships. A clearly defined operating environment, with strengthened direction and control components, is important to strengthen the current approach and is essential to the continuing success of the state’s efforts.

4. Enhance the Focus of the Infrastructure

Different pieces of the state’s Homeland Security infrastructure will oversee different elements of the statewide strategic plan. However, the overall infrastructure, in of itself, should also establish outcomes and outputs for success. Chapter III identified some recommendations for a state HSTF that could be considered, but the largest gap in

the State of Washington's approach is the focused consideration of the outcomes for the "reducing vulnerability" objective. This element should be emphasized for accomplishment by the state. It might be prudent to ask partners not currently engaged in this effort to participate and an organizational change may be necessary for its success.

5. Redirect or Enhance DSEG towards More Strategic Engagement

The Governor's key contact group for Homeland Security advice is his group of select cabinet members and key staff. This group possesses extraordinary experience, knowledge, skills and abilities that individually and collectively execute his direction very effectively. However, they have traditionally dealt with relatively short term policy issues and executive oversight of administrative issues. If a strategic, "over the horizon" focus were consciously engaged by this collective group, the added benefit to the overall safety and security of the state of Washington and its interests would be considerable.

Washington State has a very effective approach to addressing homeland security issues and protecting its citizens. However, there is always room for improvement and the key players in statewide Homeland Security have consistently demonstrated a desire for ever increasing levels of service delivery and effectiveness. Where feasible, the collaboration-emphasized approach should be enhanced with effective integration efforts that more clearly identify direction, control and coordination relationships. All the pieces, players and leaders for effective Homeland Security already exist and they are ready for the next level of sophistication.

V. CONCLUSIONS

As the nation continues to pursue the security of the homeland, it is clear that state and local governments must participate and organize for this endeavor. It is more important to prevent terrorist attacks through engagements overseas, but this *preference* should not detract from the importance and critical nature of preventing attacks here at home. Additionally, the misconception that prevention is solely a law enforcement activity primarily conducted by the federal government must also be corrected as state and local governments need to play a critical role in threat identification, threat evaluation, target assessment and the consequent protection and threat response measures necessary to deter, deny and defend against attacks. Significant portions of this prevention process are conducted by non-law enforcement entities such as the symptom surveillance activities conducted by hospital and health agencies, the monitoring and testing of food supplies by agricultural agencies, and the identification, assessment and prioritization of critical infrastructures compiled by a number of agencies as well as the private sector. This process will be wholly ineffective without a deliberative and organized management structure at the state government level. Add the complexity of integrating other components of state government responsibilities in the response and recovery phases, and it is clear that the creation of clearly identified organizational infrastructures, or Homeland Security Task Forces, is essential to local, statewide, regional and national success in the battle for our national security.

This thesis did not argue against the federal call for the creation of HSTFs or some otherwise named infrastructure, but it did suggest recommendations to fill a vacuum of uncertainty and unclear guidance in the construct, focus, and measurement standards of these important state structures. Based upon expectations, both implied and explicit, a model charter for a state Homeland Security infrastructure is recommended. This charter includes a scope of activities and focus areas as well as suggested objectives for the HSTF that support a clear mission statement: *to improve statewide terrorism prevention, preparedness, response and recovery readiness by providing a single statewide policy coordination group for all homeland security issues, initiatives, and strategies, and to provide program oversight of homeland security roles among and*

between federal, state, local, tribal, private and volunteer entities. During the analysis of existing state structures in Chapter II, it was clear that the missions of existing approaches at the state level were not significantly different from this recommended mission. However, the approaches, legal authorities, composition, and measurement techniques were clearly diverse across the nation and ranged in a manner that even exceeds the flexibility and self-determination that individual Governor's deserve as they organize for Homeland Security. "State's rights" are important but not to the point of damaging the collective *national* interests because of a lack of *some* commonality among state approaches. The similarity of state approaches should not be in a "cookie cutter" fashion where all states are identical in size, composition, and nomenclature, but the strategic goals, objectives and outcomes that each state is striving for should be consistent in order to effectively build a national, coordinated effort.

How Homeland Security efforts should be resourced and the commensurate levels of effort prioritized are a continuing, and often contentious, debate occurring at all levels of government and among all individual disciplines. Nonetheless, the application of resources is rarely decided through a deliberate approach that focuses upon the critical requirements to meet well defined outcomes and outputs. Billions of dollars continue to be distributed to federal, state and local governments based primarily upon political considerations as opposed to providing these means to meet the ends of a secure homeland. This thesis identifies outcomes that states should be focusing upon to advance the national priority objectives of preventing future attacks, reducing America's vulnerabilities and effectively minimizing damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. However, by themselves, outcomes do not provide complete guidance in strategic planning and budgeting for statewide Homeland Security. The effective application of resources is more controllable than the interaction of these applications with the external environment. Achieving the desired outcomes requires well defined and agreed upon outputs that when efficiently enacted, will drive individual and collective agency efforts closer to the achievement of desired goals. The prevention of terrorist attacks is pre-eminent in the process to achieving true Homeland Security. Therefore, the identification of state level outputs to meet the four outcomes for prevention is proposed in this work. Still, all these outputs and outcomes for prevention must be managed, directed, and

synthesized by a strong state infrastructure that has the ability to tie the myriad of individual actions together into a clear, systematic, collaborative and coordinated approach. Without this, the nation is subject to repeat the failures and re-exposes vulnerabilities to the fragmented and stove-piped efforts that resulted in two decades of sporadic, yet successful, terrorist attacks against U.S. interests at home and abroad.

Finally, the analysis of the State of Washington's approach to organizing for Homeland Security produced additional important lessons for all states. Washington State has an effective collaborative, coordinated and conscious organizational approach and one that is enhanced by exceptional leadership. The recent publication of the Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan and the strict adherence to its application will continue to improve the state's security as well as set an example for other strategic planning and application efforts. Nonetheless, the state should still consider additional policy level efforts that would create an even stronger and longer lasting organizational approach to state-level Homeland Security. Clearly identifying a lead state agency, seeking state legislative mandate and investment, strengthening command and control lines, and enhancing the focus of individual and collective sub-entities of the state's structure would accelerate the state's success for security by orders of magnitude. These recommendations would also ensure the continuation of comprehensive efforts through an infrastructure that would not be subject to inevitable changes in individual leadership positions and/or their dedication to this critical national effort.

This paper provides a roadmap to success for individual state approaches to organizing for Homeland Security. The recommendations are based upon an analysis of directives, their implications, national strategies, existing approaches and a case study of a successful state's efforts. The call for organizing for the war on terror is acknowledged, accepted, and for the most part, vigorously answered. But *how* the nation's states organize and to *what* ends their resources are applied will determine national and even international victory in this war. This is significantly more important than the simple reorganization of efforts under conditions of volatility, uncertainty, confusion and ambiguity.

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