

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**FUTURE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE:
FOUNDATION FOR A MULTILATERAL SECURITY REGIME
IN ASIA?**

by

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June 2003

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2003	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Foundation for a Multilateral Security Regime in Asia?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR Keith W. Allen				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
<p>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</p> <p>The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was the foundation of the United States' bilateral alliance system during the Cold War. The alliance suffered severe strains in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War primarily due to the loss of its primary mission, containment of Soviet expansion.</p> <p>The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 breathed new life into the alliance. Japan quickly joined in the anti-terrorism coalition, providing logistical support to U.S. forces involved in the War on Terrorism. North Korea's October 2002 admission of a covert nuclear weapons program also changed the strategic dynamic for Japan, pushing it towards "normal" nation status.</p> <p>Multilateralism in Asia developed a life of its own during the 1990's. Numerous multilateral organizations were created to help resolve regional security issues. China is attempting to use multilateral security forums as a means to balance against U.S. regional power. Japan also proposed developing a new multilateral security regime in the Asia-Pacific.</p> <p>This thesis examines issues related to the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the possible emergence of a new multilateral security regime in the Asia-Pacific. The United States should enhance the U.S.-Japan Security and lead the way on developing a new multilateral security regime for the Asia-Pacific.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, Multilateral Security, U.S.-ROK Security Alliance, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Russia, United States, Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 134	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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MULTILATERAL SECURITY REGIME IN ASIA?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was the foundation of the United States' bilateral alliance system during the Cold War. The alliance suffered severe strains in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War primarily due to the loss of its primary mission, containment of Soviet expansion.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 breathed new life into the alliance. Japan quickly joined in the anti-terrorism coalition, providing logistical support to U.S. forces involved in the War on Terrorism. North Korea's October 2002 admission of a covert nuclear weapons program also changed the strategic dynamic for Japan, pushing it towards "normal" nation status.

Multilateralism in Asia developed a life of its own during the 1990's. Numerous multilateral organizations were created to help resolve regional security issues. China is attempting to use multilateral security forums as a means to balance against U.S. regional power. Japan also proposed developing a new multilateral security regime in the Asia-Pacific.

This thesis examines issues related to the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the possible emergence of a new multilateral security regime in the Asia-Pacific. The United States should enhance the U.S.-Japan Security and lead the way on developing a new multilateral security regime for the Asia-Pacific.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the U.S. Navy for giving me the opportunity to expand my horizons here at the Naval Postgraduate School. The chance to interact with an extremely talented faculty, students from other services, and students from other countries truly broadened my horizons and helped me develop my critical thinking skills.

I would like to especially thank Dr. Edward Olsen and Dr. Gaye Christoffersen for their wise counsel and enduring patience with me while I was researching and writing my thesis. I could not have completed this project without their assistance. I would also like to thank Dr. H. Lyman Miller for challenging my arguments during many hours of class time. Your critiques and probing questions allowed me to fully develop my thesis argument.

Special thanks also go to RADM Dave Gove, RADM Joe Walsh, and CAPT Sean Sullivan. RADM Gove convinced me to stay in the Navy and pursue my interests in foreign area studies. RADM Walsh and CAPT Sullivan assisted me in my dealings with BUPERS, ensuring that I was able to get orders to Naval Postgraduate School to study National Security Affairs.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for all their love and support. My parents always encouraged me that I could accomplish anything I put my mind to. Special thanks to my wife, Lee-Hannah, and my daughters, Rebecca and Audrey, for their understanding and support during the many long days and late nights while I attended NPS. You have my enduring love.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE EAST ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

I believe the U.S.-Japan alliance is the bedrock for peace and prosperity in the Pacific. Japan is a generous host to America's forward-deployed forces, providing an essential contribution to the stability of Asia. This enduring partnership benefits both our countries, but it also benefits the world. The peace of the world is now threatened by global terror. We have no better friend, and nobody provides such steadfast support than the Japanese government.¹

Combating terrorism around the world is currently the top priority of the United States. During recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly reiterated that regional stability remains the "long term and overarching goal" of the United States in the East Asia region. He also stated that "regional stability impacts directly on each of our five top goals for the region: promoting and deepening democracy; improving sustainable economic development; countering proliferation and weapons of mass destruction; countering international crime in the region; and promoting open markets."² To achieve these goals, the United States must work with bilateral and multilateral forums in the region.

The U.S.-Japan security alliance is arguably the United States' most important bilateral security relationship. Japan is an indispensable partner of the United States on a variety of international and economic issues and is a key investor in most Asian-Pacific nations.³ The security alliance supports the following U.S. interests:

1. Provides for the defense of Japan.
2. Deters North Korean aggression against South Korea. Provides logistical support to U.S. Forces in Korea.

¹ George W. Bush, "Statement from press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi," February 18, 2002. See <http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A1=ind0302c&L=wf-easia>

² James A. Kelly, "Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 26, 2003," See <http://lists.state.gov/SCRIPTS/WA-USIAINFO.EXE?A1=ind0303d&L=wf-easia>

³ James A. Kelly, "Statement before the House International Relations Committee, February 14, 2002." See http://www.house.gov/international_relations/107/kell0214.htm

3. Influences foreign policy decision-making in the People's Republic of China.
4. Deters renewed hostilities in the Taiwan Strait.
5. Provides a regional security guarantee.
6. Provides basing for U.S. Forces in Japan.
7. Prevents the rise of a regional power that could provide a global challenge to the United States.
8. Ensures the protection of U.S. economic interests in Asia.

This thesis will examine the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, determine the prospects for a multilateral security regime in Asia, and provide relevant U.S. policy options with respect to regional security in the East Asia-Pacific region.

B. BACKGROUND

The U.S.-Japan security alliance has gone through extreme strains during the last decade, mainly due to the loss of its Cold War primary mission after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This caused the alliance to reassess its core mission. This questioning of the mission -- coupled with the diplomatic and financial legacy of the Gulf War, a shift in U.S. strategic focus, Japan's economic recession, and a perceived lack of faith in the U.S. commitment to the alliance -- has challenged Japan's ability to continue support for the U.S.-Japan security alliance in its current form. Many Japanese have begun to question the need for such a large U.S. military footprint in Japan.

Japan is under increasing pressure from U.S. politicians to fulfill what many perceive to be its international obligation: contributing to the global security structure. Japanese politicians are constrained by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Japan does not recognize the right of collective self-defense that is granted to all nations under the United Nations' charter. This has been one of the major sticking points in the U.S.-Japan alliance and has created opposition to Japan's pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, the security alliance is a consultative relationship with no unifying apparatus for wartime decision-making⁴ (similar to NATO or the U.S.-

⁴ Paul S. Giarra, Interim Report from an Evolving Alliance (GIS Research Daily, June 20, 2000) pg 6.

ROK Joint Command). This further complicates the ability of the Japanese Self Defense Forces to be incorporated into a collective security arrangement with U.S. forces.

The Gulf War introduced a major point of contention in the U.S.-Japan alliance. While the United States built its worldwide coalition against Iraq, Japan struggled over how to provide military support in the face of the constitution's Article 9 provisions. Japan's political indecision led to widespread criticism throughout the United States. Under tremendous pressure from the U.S. Congress, Japan provided over \$13 billion dollars (one-sixth the total cost of the operation) in financial assistance. Yet, because it failed initially to send military forces, Japan was treated like a second-class player on the world stage. "So deep was the institutional memory, that, to this day, policymakers remind themselves that they must never again allow the country to be subjected to the charge of checkbook diplomacy."⁵

The Clinton administration shifted from the previous Bush administration's realist grand strategy of selective engagement to the more liberal policy of cooperative security. The Clinton administration placed a much heavier emphasis on the importance of international institutions, global interdependence, and human rights. The United States expanded its focus to include Eastern Europe and Africa. This policy shift was elucidated through U.S. military actions from 1993-1999 in Somalia (although the humanitarian mission first began under President Bush), Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. Many Japanese politicians viewed the shift in U.S. focus as a zero sum game for Japan in which the U.S.-Japan security alliance was losing importance to the United States. They felt this shift in U.S. policy further emphasized Japan's treatment as a second-class player.

Several additional factors challenging Japan's view of the U.S. commitment to the alliance included: Japanese perceptions that economic factors had the most influence on U.S. policy toward Japan; the rise of China and its corresponding increase in regional influence; the United States' failure to deter North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program following the 1994 Agreed Framework; and expectations of a U.S.

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⁵ Yukio Okamoto, "Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance" *The Washington Quarterly* Spring 2002, pg 63.

withdrawal following the end of the Cold War.⁶ The Clinton administration attempted to circumvent Japanese perceptions through the dispatch of Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr. to Tokyo in 1995. The Nye Initiative emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, including the U.S. commitment to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in Asia, and broadened the geographic scope of Japan's national defense.⁷

The decade-long Japanese recession (potentially a depression) and the fragility of its financial system also placed great strain on Tokyo's ability to fund the security alliance. Japan's Host Nation Support funds approximately three-quarters of total U.S. basing costs in Japan.⁸ Should major banks in Japan fail, Japan will most likely need to dramatically cut its Host Nation Support. The United States would have difficulty making up the difference in the current Department of Defense funding levels. This would force a fundamental realignment in the alliance.

The security alliance has also suffered from negative publicity and decreasing public support inside Japan. Noise from U.S. air operations in Japan resulted in numerous public protests and lawsuits. Several prominent crimes by U.S. service members, including the 1995 and 2001 rapes of Japanese citizens, have resulted in demands for a decrease in the number of U.S. service members in Okinawa and a reform of the Status of Forces Agreement. There has also been an intense struggle over the presence of U.S. bases in Okinawa. In 1995, the United States and Japan formed the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to look at ways to minimize the burden of U.S. Forces on the people of Okinawa.⁹

In 1996, SACO released its recommendations: (1) return Futenma Marine Corps Air Station within five to seven years; (2) reduce the total area used for American military training by 20 percent; (3) terminate live fire artillery practice over Prefectural Highway 104; (4) and the introduction of stringent noise-reduction procedures around U.S. military facilities.¹⁰ However, the most significant recommendation, the relocation

⁶Paul S. Giarra, Interim Report from an Evolving Alliance (GIS Research Daily, June 20, 2000) pg 7.

⁷ Ibid. pgs 13-14.

⁸ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, June 26, 2000.

⁹ State Department Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

¹⁰ Mike M. Mochizuki, "Toward a New Japan-U.S. Alliance" Japan Quarterly (Tokyo: Asahi

of Futenma Air Station, is still pending in United States and Japanese diplomatic and military channels. In 1999, the Japanese cabinet passed a policy requiring the Government of Okinawa to propose an alternate location for the Marine Air Station. In August 2000, the Japanese government formed a panel to make a recommendation. The government of Okinawa initially delayed action because it did not want to move the air station, it wanted to remove it from the island. In July 2002, the Okinawan and Japanese authorities finally agreed on a plan to move the air station to reclaimed land off Nago. The governments continue to battle because in February 2003, Okinawan authorities insisted use of the new facility by the U.S. military be limited to fifteen years, yet the central Japanese government and U.S. officials continue to resist any modification to the relocation agreement.¹¹

In September 1997, the United States and Japan issued a new set of Defense Planning Guidelines that took into consideration the political and strategic logic of the post-Cold War alliance, modified constraints on Japan's national defense roles in major regional crises, and invigorated Japan's defense acquisition strategy.¹² The modified Defense Guidelines were initially well received by both sides; however, the political climate quickly chilled due to fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis and problems resolving the Okinawan basing issue. President Clinton's 1998 overflight of Japan enroute to a summit with President Jiang Zemin in Beijing was perceived as the ultimate "slap in the face" by Japanese officials.¹³

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, Japan quickly joined in the counter-terrorism coalition, despite the political challenges its support presented. The Diet, led by Prime Minister Koizumi, quickly adopted the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law of 2001. This law permitted Japan to provide direct support to the U.S. efforts against terrorism. This support included fueling of U.S. ships directly from Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) ships, providing enroute transportation to U.S. forces, carrying relief supplies and providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and quickly Shimbun, Vol 43 No. 3 (July-September 1996).

¹¹ "Kawaguchi vows Okinawa effort" Japan Times Online February 3, 2003.

¹² The new principles for security cooperation were first announced in April 1996 in a joint declaration on security made by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto.

¹³ Yukio Okamoto, pg 61.

freezing Taliban and al-Qaeda linked financial accounts.¹⁴ This represented a significant departure from Japanese policy during the Gulf War during which support was limited to financial contributions and the dispatch of JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf (although they did not make it there before the war ended).

The next section will discuss possible U.S. policy options for the future. Recent academic literature is filled with arguments for varying approaches to the U.S.-Japan security alliance.¹⁵ This is a drastic change from the Cold War period. During the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was the foundation of U.S. military presence in Asia. The only option was the amount of money and forces to send to Japan, what technology to transfer, and how to combat attempted Soviet encroachment in the region.

C. POLICY OPTIONS

This thesis will examine four options with respect to the future of the U.S.-Japan security alliance: maintaining the status quo, U.S. withdrawal, Japanese unilateralism, and a reinvigorated alliance as the foundation of a multilateral security regime in Asia.

1. Option A: Maintaining the Status Quo

Under this scenario, Japan would continue to rely on the protective shield of the United States. In exchange, the United States would continue to use Japanese bases as the linchpin of its force structure in Asia. Japanese politicians will continue to cite Article 9 of the Constitution as the reason that Japan is unable to participate in a collective security regime with U.S. forces. Japanese military and diplomatic policy will remain beholden to

¹⁴ James A. Kelly, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee February 14, 2002.

¹⁵ Several examples are: Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, ed. The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1999); Mike M. Mochizuki, "Towards a New Japan-U.S. Alliance" Japan Quarterly (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, Volume 43, No. 3 (July-September 1996); and Akio Watanabe, "First Among Equals" The Washington Quarterly (Cambridge: CSIS/MIT, Summer 2001).

U.S. policy. Economically, Japan will continue to concentrate on the development and maintenance of market share for Japanese industry.

2. Option B: U.S. Withdrawal

Under this option, the United States would effectively end the security alliance. U.S. forces would be re-deployed back to the continental United States or elsewhere in the world. Japan would assume responsibility for its defense. Japan would then pursue its aims through diplomacy and bilateral or even multilateral alliances to protect its interests and maintain a balance-of-power in East Asia.

3. Option C: Japanese Unilateralism

This option is the doomsday scenario with respect to U.S. policy in East Asia. This option, while extremely unlikely, is a possibility in the event Japan's economy continues to degrade and Japanese ultra-nationalists return to power. Another possible catalyst for this option would be either a unified Korea and/or a rising China, unchallenged by the United States, tipping the regional balance of power against Japan to the point that Japan questions the United States' security guarantee. Under this scenario, Japan would withdraw from the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, reclassify the Japanese Defense Agency's (JDA) armed forces as a full-fledged military force, and commence a massive arms buildup, possibly including nuclear weapons. This would result in an unrestrained arms race in East Asia and severely challenge the United States' influence in the region.

4. Option D: Reinvigorated Alliance/Multilateral Security

Under this scenario, the U.S.-Japan Alliance would more closely resemble the U.S.-U.K. Alliance. Japan would amend Article 9 to permit the SDF to partake in "collective security" operations and would become a full strategic partner with the United

States in Asia. This would be fully in keeping with Japan's efforts to redefine its identity as a "normal" country that participates in international and regional military relationships.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance would continue to provide basing rights for the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the Fifth Air Force, and the Third Marine Expeditionary Force. These forces are crucial to the defense of the Korean Peninsula and provide the United States the ability to influence the East Asian security environment. While the United States would remain in Japan, it would decrease the military footprint on Okinawa. Some possible options are to transfer some Air Force and Marine Units from Okinawa to Guam, and to explore basing rights with Singapore and the Philippines.

One of the major topics of regional dissension, and the primary reason that multilateral security has not taken over in Asia, is uncertainty about exactly what form a multilateral security regime would take. There have been several different proposals over the last several years. Japan and the People's Republic of China promote the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a foundation. The United States advocates a coalition of the "like minded states." This would include Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and India. (Multilateral security will be discussed further in chapter 6).

This thesis will argue that in the next decade, the U.S.-Japan Alliance could serve as the foundation of a multilateral security regime in Asia that would include the United States, Japan, the PRC, South Korea, Australia, and the ASEAN states. Russia and India should be included in political forums and be invited to join the security regime in the future. Once a baseline multilateral security regime is established, the United States could in the future pursue its transition to a military alliance similar to NATO. This would allow the United States to acquire basing and visit rights with the member nations, and decrease its military footprint in Japan due to the reduced strategic threat in Asia.

D. ORGANIZATION

This thesis attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What were the issues leading to the perceived decline in the U.S.-Japan alliance?
2. What are the current challenges facing the alliance?
3. How do Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, and the ASEAN states view the alliance?
4. What are the prospects for a resurgent Japan?
5. What are the prospects for a multilateral security regime in East Asia?
6. What are U.S. policy options with respect to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance?

This thesis has eight chapters. Chapter I presents the thesis argument and introduces the current state of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Chapter II reviews the history of the security alliance, emphasizing its foundational principles and the causes of the strained relations in the 1990's. Chapter III analyzes Japanese views on defense and their origins. Chapter IV reviews the status of the alliance along with Japan's support for the U.S. War on Terrorism. Chapter V examines the regional security views of the United States, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Russia, and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Chapter VI reviews the positive and negative attributes of other multilateral forums, and attempts to provide a framework for a new multilateral security structure in Asia. Chapter VII provides U.S. policy-makers options with respect to the future of East Asian regional security. Chapter VIII concludes with findings, implications, and recommendations for U.S. policy.

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II. HISTORY OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

A. BACKGROUND

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance has its roots in the aftermath of World War II. The Pacific War devastated Japanese society. All of Japan's major cities except for Kyoto were destroyed by Allied bombings, with approximately 700,000 civilians killed. Japan's industrial capacity was crushed by the lack of strategic materials during the last year of the war and its agricultural production was down by one-third. The Japanese nation was on the verge of starvation when allied occupation forces entered the country on September 2, 1945. Additionally, there was great popular revulsion to the war and the leadership who had taken the country to its first defeat in modern history. Japan was a society that was ready for change – the Allied occupation forces took advantage and executed one of the most successful military occupations of the modern era.¹⁶

Policy for the occupation of Japan was governed by the Allied Far East Commission, which was established in Washington, D.C. in early 1946. The three primary objectives of the occupation were: demilitarization, democratization, and rehabilitation of society. “The American thinking was that demilitarization was only a temporary cure for Japan's militaristic ills but that a democratization of the government might produce a Japan that would be less likely to go to war in the future. The most important aspect of the democratization policy, however, was the adoption of a new constitution and its supporting legislation.” An Allied council for Japan, composed of the four major Allied powers, was established in Tokyo to advise the occupation forces on the execution of the policy.¹⁷ General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) and was responsible for overseeing the occupation. The large ego of General MacArthur, combined with the fact that United

¹⁶ Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese Today* (Tokyo: The Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1988) pgs 103-105.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* pg 106.

States troops made up the majority of the occupation forces, turned the occupation into essentially a U.S. operation.

General MacArthur dominated the Japanese occupation and reforms until 1947. General MacArthur's chain of command ran through the War Department, which made it extremely difficult for the State Department to maintain any semblance of control over the reforms. Additionally, the Truman Administration was initially committed to a Europe-first strategy; thus, General MacArthur was essentially left to his own devices.¹⁸ General MacArthur initially envisioned Japan as the Switzerland of Asia, demilitarized and peace loving. General MacArthur stated "the Japanese were thirsty for guidance and inspiration; it was his aim to bring to them both democracy and Christianity. They were now tasting freedom; they would never return to slavery." MacArthur believed a communist revolution was no threat to Japan.¹⁹ In the early stages of the occupation, the Allied forces made no provision for Japan's self-defense because it was believed once Japan was demilitarized and democratized, they would be safe from any outside aggression, including from the Soviet Union. Kennan also believed that once demilitarization and democratization were complete, U.S. forces could be removed from Japan in a quid pro quo with the Soviet Union, which would then remove its forces from the Korean peninsula.²⁰

MacArthur's desire for a "Switzerland of Asia" was a major factor behind the peace provision (article 9) of the newly amended Japanese constitution (essentially a ratification of the U.S. provided draft), which was adopted by the Japanese Diet on May 3, 1947. Article 9 states "aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim ...land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."²¹ Over the last fifty years, Article 9 has provided the political cover for Japan to rely on the American

¹⁸ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967) pg 369.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* pg 384.

²⁰ *Ibid.* pg 376.

²¹ Japanese Defense Agency home page: [http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index .htm](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.htm)

security umbrella for its protection, while concentrating its finances on economic development.

The State Department's planning staff, led by George Kennan, finally focused on Japan in the summer of 1947. Kennan recognized that Japan's recovery, as one of the great industrial complexes of the world, "was essential to the restoration of stability in East Asia. It was essential if any tolerable balance of power was to be established in the post-war world, that (Japan) be kept out of the Communist hands and that (its) great resources be utilized to the full extent for constructive purposes."²²

During the occupation of Japan, the United States assumed full responsibility for the security of Japan. "Together with our allies we were theoretically in a position to control both internal developments and external relationships of those areas."²³ George Kennan led a mission to Japan to act as the State Department's liaison with General MacArthur to establish a coherent strategy for Japan that would keep it firmly in the United States' sphere of influence for the near future. Kennan emphasized that Japan and the Philippine Islands were the cornerstones of Pacific security, and that the United States needed to ensure the security of these countries at all costs.²⁴

1. Developments During the 1950's

A shift in the United States' strategic equation in Asia was initiated by the start of the Cold War. "China was being 'lost' to communism, and Japan no longer appeared the unique threat to peace in East Asia but rather a base for democracy and American military power in that part of the world."²⁵ The start of the Korean War, and America's reliance on military forces based in Japan "converted everyone who had not yet been

²² George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967) pg 368.

²³ Ibid. pg 369.

²⁴ Ibid. pg 381.

²⁵ Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese Today (Tokyo: The Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1988) pg 110.

converted to the view that the American military presence in Japan was wholly essential to any future security of the area.”²⁶

In September 1951, the United States and Japan signed a bilateral security treaty in San Francisco. “The Truman-Acheson alliances (NATO, Japan, ANZUS) were specifically designed to achieve Kennan’s first stage of containment, the protection of non-communist centers of world industrial capacity.”²⁷ This security treaty stated that the United States would defend Japan in exchange for full access to Japanese bases. Additionally, the United States made several economic concessions to Japan to speed its economic recovery:²⁸

1. The United States interceded with Asian nations to cut Japan’s war reparations payments.
2. Washington provided access to the U.S. market and allowed Japan to develop sizeable market shares in several key industries.
3. The U.S. defensive umbrella has enabled Japan to limit its defense burden to 1% of GNP since 1976. This allowed Japan to focus its resources on economic growth.

The United States saw Japan’s economic development as the key to political stabilization, preventing extremist groups from challenging for power. In July 1954, Japan established its Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces (SDF). These forces were created specifically to provide Japan with a self-defense capability. The SDF are permitted to be used only for self-defense in the following circumstances:²⁹

1. There is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan.
2. There are no appropriate means to deal with this aggression other than resort to the right of self-defense.

²⁶ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967) pg 396.

²⁷ Terry L. Deibel, ed. *Containment: Concept and Policy* (Washington: NDU Press, 1986) pg 198.

²⁸ Daniel Okimoto, *The Japan-America Security Alliance* (Stanford: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Jan 1998) pg 3.

²⁹ Japanese Defense Agency home page: [http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index .htm](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.htm)

3. The use of armed strength is confined to the minimum necessary level.

2. Developments From 1960-1990

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was revised in 1960. The revision provided a definitive U.S. security guarantee for Japan. Prime Minister Kiishi pushed through the revision because he felt it paved the way for Japan to get a good deal, the U.S. security umbrella, for the next few years. This action was heavily criticized by conservatives, forcing Kiishi from office. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Prime Minister Ikeda put security issues in the background and concentrated on Japan's economic growth. In the late 1960's, Japan pursued a more forceful foreign policy due to its rising economic stature.

In the late 1960's, Japan's support for U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam drew criticism from students, the media, and large segments of the population. This resulted in almost daily protests throughout Japan. In 1969, the Nixon administration responded to the protests by announcing the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. This decision "healed a festering wound and demonstrated that the United States had no territorial ambitions in the Pacific, in stark contrast to the Soviet Union, which continued tenaciously to hold on to the Northern Territories."³⁰

Japanese foreign policy suffered a serious setback in the early 1970's due to the combined weight of the United States coming off the gold standard, the Arab Oil embargo, and the Nixon shocks. The Japanese yen was revalued against the dollar, making Japan's exports more costly. The oil embargo caused the Japanese to change their policies with respect to the Middle East. The Japanese took an "Arab tilt," and attempted to convince the Arabs the Japanese could provide many of the same economic benefits as the United States.

³⁰ Eri G. Hirano and William Piez, "Alliance for the 21st Century" The Final Report of the U.S.-Japan 21st Century Committee (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998). Pgs 47-48.

The largest setback was due to the Nixon shocks, which resulted from the U.S. rapprochement with the PRC. The United States did not keep Japan informed of its intentions; this left Japan holding the diplomatic bag when the United States and the PRC re-established relations. Japan began to realize it could not rely on the United States for diplomatic and economic protection. Japan started to think more about what a multi-polar world would look like.

In 1971, Japanese defense commentator Hideo Sekino first proposed the idea of Japan protecting its own sea lines of communications (SLOC). Sekino stated that a *guerre de course* was the most likely kind of future conflict in Asia, and it was up to Japan to protect its own SLOCs north of Indonesia. In 1977, the director general of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) stated that Japan was ready to exercise its right of self-defense within 1000 miles of Japan. In May 1981, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki informed President Ronald Reagan, during a summit meeting, that Japan was ready to assume responsibility for defending its SLOCs out to 1000 nautical miles. This policy was formally promulgated in the 1983 Japanese Defense White Paper.³¹

The Host Nation Support Program, by which Japan pays a portion of the yen-based expenses to maintain U.S. forces in Japan, was established in 1977, and the Defense Guidelines were established in 1978. The guidelines provided a framework for military commanders to plan for Japan's defense. Both of these programs were responses to increasing pressure from the U.S. Congress over Japan's "free ride" in defense. The United States was suffering from a severe recession in the late 1970's and U.S. Congressmen felt Japan needed to become more self-supporting, especially since it was enjoying increased economic prosperity.³²

The Cold War détente made the U.S.-Japan alliance more difficult to maintain. The U.S. legacy in Vietnam, coupled with the détente, seemed to weaken the U.S. commitment to East Asia. This was underscored when President Carter proposed withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea. This policy was reversed when President Reagan entered office. President Reagan reinvigorated the Cold War and expected Japan

³¹ Peter J. Wooley, Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox 1971-2000, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999) Pgs 29-30.

³² Eri G. Hirano and William Piez. Pg 48.

to assume a larger role.³³ Prime Minister Nakasone enjoyed a close relationship with President Reagan. As a result, the U.S.-Japan alliance flourished during most of the 1980's.

3. Developments Over the 1990's

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance has gone through extreme growing pains during the last decade. The growing pains have been principally a result of the loss of the former primary mission- coping with a Soviet adversary. This lack of mission coupled with the diplomatic and financial legacy of the Gulf War, an expansion in U.S. strategic focus, Japan's economic recession, and a lack of faith in the U.S. commitment to the alliance has challenged the country's ability to continue support for U.S. forces. Many Japanese have begun to question the need for such a large U.S. presence in Japan.

As of the late 1990's, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, a Japanese analyst observed:

Japan today faces a dramatically changed strategic environment. Globally, the bipolar structure of the Cold War has disappeared but no clear strategic structure has emerged to replace it. The United States is bent on reducing its global security burdens.³⁴

The 1991 Persian Gulf War fundamentally realigned Japanese perceptions of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The Japanese government was indecisive at a time when virtually every U.S. ally was joining the U.N.-sponsored coalition to remove Iraq's military forces from Kuwait. Japanese politicians felt captive to the constraints of Article 9 of Japan's constitution. Japan's vacillating led to increasing criticism from U.S. Congressmen. Japan eventually agreed to provide \$13 billion to help fund the cost of the war and dispatched six minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. The conflict, however, was over by the time the minesweepers reached the Middle East. This episode raised serious questions on both sides of the Pacific about Japan's ability to be an equal partner in the U.S.-Japan security alliance and a leader, on par with its economic might, in the

³³ Kazuya Sakamoto, "Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance" *Japan Quarterly* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, April-June 2001) pg 22-23.

³⁴ Yoshinobu Yamamoto, *Globalism, Regionalism, and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) pg 171.

international community. Since the Persian Gulf War, “Japan has been incrementally increasing its military reach, first through peacekeeping in 1992, and more recently through more regional-defense cooperation.”³⁵

The April 1996 Joint Declaration by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was an attempt by both governments to reaffirm the importance of the security alliance. It called on both countries to work “jointly and individually...to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.” The September 1997 revision to the Defense Guidelines emphasized Japan’s support for “situations in the areas surrounding Japan.” The guidance “permitted, following the enactment of domestic laws, ... support for U.S. forces in an emergency and authorized Japanese forces to engage in mine-sweeping and search activities in support of U.S. operations.”³⁶ In the view of Takakazu Kuriyama, former Japanese Ambassador to the United States, the reaffirmation quickly stagnated - neither government put a sustained effort into building on the agreements.³⁷

The low point of the U.S.-Japan security alliance was the period immediately following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. The U.S. and Japan publicly feuded over the causes of the crisis. The U.S. believed that Asia was suffering from ‘crony capitalism’ because they believed in the rationality of financial markets. Japan, on the other hand, argued “the crisis was the consequence of globalization gone amok, insisting there was nothing fundamentally wrong with Asia’s economies.”³⁸ The Japanese, and most Asian leaders, blamed the irrationality of capital markets for the crisis. The Asian leaders argued that in fact the IMF-mandated reforms (under U.S. direction) were another form of imperialism; the Western world was unwilling to allow the market to operate as designed. The countries should have defaulted on their loans, causing the western investors to suffer the consequences of their poor investments.³⁹

³⁵ David Lague, “New Rules on Defence” Far Eastern Economic Review Online, November 01, 2001.

³⁶ Eri G. Hirano and William Piez. Pg 48.

³⁷ Takakazu Kuriyama, “U.S.-Japan Relations After September 11,” Heritage Foundation Lecture Series, April 30, 2002.

³⁸ Christopher B. Johnstone “Strained Alliance: US-Japan Diplomacy in the Asian Financial Crisis” Survival (London, Summer 1999) pg. 130.

³⁹ Chalmers Johnson, “Economic Crisis in East Asia: the clash of capitalisms” Cambridge Journal of Economics Volume 22, 1998, pg 657.

The decade-long Japanese recession and the fragility of its financial system have also placed great strain on Japan's ability to fund the security alliance. Japan has "an essentially bankrupt financial system...it will require something like 15 to 20 percent of the Japanese GDP to be spent by the Japanese government to recapitalize the banking system."⁴⁰ If Japan fails to respond in a timely manner, major banks will fail. This would have a devastating effect on the world economy. The Japanese, who hold approximately \$600 billion of the U.S. national debt, would be forced to withdraw their funds from around the world. This would have a ripple effect on the world economy, resulting in high interest rates, and a potential worldwide recession.⁴¹ A loss of Japanese Host Nation support would force a fundamental realignment in the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

The bad relations between Japan and the United States are coldly articulated by a prominent scholar (and columnist) in a Japanese newspaper:

Japan has learned the hard way...that the United States regards an economically strong Japan as a rival but disregards the country when its economic power weakens...Washington, while disregarding Japan, keeps pressing it to take measures to prop up the economic side of the uni-polar world – especially through steps that continue to finance the U.S. current account deficit.⁴²

The dispute over economic policy had severe consequences for U.S.-Japan relations. "Washington's intense criticism aggravated latent Japanese insecurities about the strength of the U.S. commitment to the alliance."⁴³

"The real basis of the alliance always was the credibility of the American security guarantee to Japan...Several factors combined to undercut the credibility of this commitment."⁴⁴

1. Perceptions of U.S. policy to Japan being driven primarily by economic factors. "In a major shift over the last decade, United States' Japan policy was made largely by the Treasury Department. Japanese

⁴⁰ Fred Bergsten, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee November, 2001.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Christopher B. Johnstone, "Strained Alliance: US-Japan Diplomacy in the Asian Financial Crisis" *Survival* (London, Summer 1999). pg. 128.

⁴³ Ibid. pg. 131.

⁴⁴Paul S. Giarra, Interim Report from an Evolving Alliance (GIS Research Daily, June 20, 2000) pg 7.

leaders were put on notice that they need not call ‘until they get serious about economic reform’, and Japanese elder statesman were unable to get appointments with senior administration officials.”⁴⁵ The high point of this economic ‘snubbing’ came in 1998 when President Clinton attended a summit in China and flew over Japan without stopping for consultations.

2. The rise of China and the U.S. engagement of China. The United States’ pledge to China in the summer of 1998 to establish a ‘collaborative strategic partnership’ increased Japan’s suspicion of U.S. intentions with respect to its China policy.⁴⁶ Additionally, Japan is hesitant to be relied on by the U.S. as a ‘trump card’ in any potential conflict with China over Taiwan. Japan is more interested in self-sufficiency than in an operational military relationship with the United States.⁴⁷

3. U.S. failure to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program. The North Korean test of its Taepo Dong missile, which flew directly over Japan in August 1998, created a public outcry in Japan over inadequate warning from U.S. Forces.

The immediacy of North Korea’s missile threat to Japan provided a focus to Japanese planning that has been absent since the demise of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Japan now has the capabilities and political will to assert its interests that it lacked during the Cold War. Since the launch the Japanese have aggressively pursued advanced defense technologies to enhance Japan’s indigenous defense industrial base, and not always in ways that will enhance interoperability.⁴⁸

4. Expectations of a U.S. withdrawal. The end of the Cold War brought increasing emphasis on self-reliance throughout Asia. “Today there is much greater pride, more self-confidence, and a growing desire to

⁴⁵ Ibid. pg 7.

⁴⁶ Zalmay Khalilzad et al, The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001) pg 103.

⁴⁷ Paul S. Giarra, Interim Report from an Evolving Alliance (GIS Research Daily, June 20, 2000) pg 3.

⁴⁸ Zalmay Khalilzad et al, The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001) pg 107.

be more self-reliant and avoid the vulnerability that results from reliance on another country for security. The strong wave of nationalism in Asian states also supports the development of independent national capabilities.⁴⁹”

5. Perceived U.S. unilateralism.

America nowadays seems increasingly interested in defending its interests with its own power rather than working with other like-minded countries to build international orders based on agreed international rules and agreements. Many Americans have come to hold a Gulliver-like image of their country, whose ability to defend its interest is too much constrained by Lilliputians’ ropes of international agreements.⁵⁰

Examples of perceived unilateralism include the U.S. refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the recent U.S. steel tariffs.

These factors have led the Japanese to pursue a “hedge strategy” against competing U.S. interests. In September 1997, the United States and Japan issued a new set of security guidelines which considered the political-strategic logic of the post-Cold War alliance, modified constraints on Japan’s national defense roles in major regional crises, and invigorated Japan’s defense acquisition strategy. “The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are now authorized by law to execute an array of new roles and missions.”⁵¹ These new roles have inspired the Japanese to pursue greater regional influence; they no longer automatically rubber-stamp all U.S. strategy and policy goals.⁵² The modified Defense Guidelines were initially well received by both sides; however, the political climate quickly chilled amid the fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis and problems resolving the Okinawan basing issue.

⁴⁹ Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 1998) pg 631.

⁵⁰ AMB Takakuzu Kuriyama, “Japan-US Alliance Should be Redefined in the 21st Century” (Asahi Shimbun Online Plenary Session 2 From global war to global economy --An overview of U.S.-Japan bilateral relations, 1945-2001) October 2001.

⁵¹ Zalmay Khalilzad et al, The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001) pgs 102-104.

⁵² Ibid. pg 95.

Negative publicity has also challenged the security alliance during the 1990's. Noise from U.S. air operations has been a frequent thorn in the side of Japanese and U.S. military authorities. The noise resulted in numerous public protests and lawsuits. In 1993, the U.S. Navy moved its night-time carrier landing qualification training from Atsugi Naval Air Facility to Misawa Air Base in northern Japan, and finally to a Japanese Air Self-Defense Force facility in Iwo Jima, in an attempt to soften public criticism.⁵³

Okinawa has been the site of the largest protests against a U.S. military presence. U.S. military facilities occupy over 10 percent of Okinawa's land (this represents 75 percent of the total land area used by U.S. facilities in all of Japan). Futenma Air Station is the source of the most protests due to its location in the middle of Ginowan City.⁵⁴ Several air accidents have killed Okinawans and several prominent crimes by U.S. service members, including the 1995 and 2001 rapes of Japanese citizens, have inflamed the calls for decreasing the U.S. military burden on Japan and a reform of the Status of Forces Agreement to allow Japanese prosecution of any military member accused of a crime against a Japanese national. In 1995, the U.S. and Japan formed the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to look at ways to minimize the burden of U.S. Forces on the people of Okinawa.⁵⁵ SACO released its recommendations in 1996; however, the Japanese and Okinawan governments were unable to agree on a new location for Futenma until July 2002. The relocation of Futenma Air Station is once again in the news because the Okinawan government now insists that the U.S. forces only be permitted to utilize the replacement air facility in Nago for a period of fifteen years. U.S. and Japanese authorities are refusing to accept the new limitations.⁵⁶

During the Cold War, Japan was a solid "junior member" of the security alliance. Japan provided political support for containing communist expansion, provided key basing facilities for U.S. forces, provided critical financing in the form of Host Nation Support, and helped guard the entrances to critical sea lines of communications by

⁵³ Greg Tyler, "Navy to practice night landings at Atsugi, Iwo Jima; residents protest," Pacific Stars and Stripes, March 2, 2002. pg 1.

⁵⁴ Ted Osius, The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Why It Matters and How to Strengthen It (Westport: Praeger, 2002) pg. 55.

⁵⁵ State Department Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

⁵⁶ "Kawaguchi vows Okinawa effort" The Japan Times Online, February 3, 2003.

providing surveillance of Soviet activities out of Vladivostok, Sakhalin Island, and the Sea of Okhotsk. Japanese bases allowed the United States to maintain a strong military presence in East Asia and enabled the United States to meet its defense commitments to the Republic of Korea.⁵⁷ However, the end of the Cold War resulted in several cracks in the alliance. This was predominantly due to the loss of its primary mission. It took the United States and Japan a full decade before they developed a new common enemy - global terrorism. During this period, both sides questioned what to do with the alliance. Despite the period of trials, it appears the U.S.-Japan security alliance is back on stable footing, at least for the near future.

⁵⁷ Eri G. Hirano and William Piez. pg 49.

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III. JAPANESE VIEWS ON DEFENSE

The 2001 Armitage-Nye report stated:

Japan is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformations since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji restoration.⁵⁸

Japan's loss of stature on the world stage coupled with its continued economic problems has provided a breeding ground for renewed Japanese nationalism. Japan is striving to become a "normal nation" in order to gain the international respect and power it feels it deserves. The Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) are taking on added legitimacy due to their high-visibility roles over the last decade, including UN peacekeeping roles, counter-piracy operations, and support for the U.S. War on Terror. The Japanese are beginning to realize the only way to achieve this respect is to throw off the perception that Japanese security and diplomatic policy are beholden to the United States. This has led Japan to adopt a more aggressive diplomatic stance, sometimes at cross-purposes with the United States.

A. THE RISE OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM

Japan's decade-long recession is particularly worrisome. As many historians say: "Those who fail to study and understand history are doomed to repeat it." The long economic recession in Japan has caused an increasing number of Japanese citizens to have doubt and ambivalence toward market oriented reforms.⁵⁹ Economic malaise and hopelessness was one of the primary factors in the rise of Japanese nationalism in the late 1920's and early 1930's. "Sato Seizaburo has described the Japanese as being unconscious nationalists, suggesting nationalism could rise and become expressed if there

⁵⁸ Richard L. Armitage, et al., INSS Special Report, "The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership" see <<http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/SR.JAPAN.HTM>>, 11 October 2000, pg 2.

⁵⁹ Brad Glasserman, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, November 2001.

were something to trigger it.”⁶⁰ Without careful, not high-handed, support from the United States, Japanese nationalism could once again rise to the forefront.

There are already some alarming trends that point to the resurgence of nationalism in Japan:

- a. In 1999, the Diet officially recognized the Hinamaru rising sun flag and the Kimigayo, a song that celebrates the emperor’s reign, as official symbols of Japan.⁶¹
- b. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has made public statements evoking the spirit of ‘correct Japanese nationalism.’ “Explaining ‘correct nationalism’, Nakasone harks back to pre-war values, when Japanese people respected the cult of the Emperor, swore obedience to the national flag, and put duty to state before individual rights.”⁶²
- c. The April 1999 election of Shintaro Ishihara as Governor of Tokyo.⁶³ Ishihara is a well-known nationalist and author of the book “The Japan That Can Say No” in the late 1980’s. Ishihara has stated that the U.S. military shield around Japan is an illusion and that U.S. criticism of Japan is racially motivated. This has led to “real concern that Liberal Democratic Party members, who thought they had to hide their nationalism, now realize that such strong appeal works well and they will feel free to discuss hard-line policies openly.”⁶⁴
- d. In April 2001, history and social-studies textbooks, which downplay Japanese aggression in World War II and are tinged with nationalistic

⁶⁰ Christopher Hood, “The Election of Ishihara: A symbol of rising nationalism in Japan?” The Royal Institute of International Affairs Asia Programme, Briefing Paper No. 7, November 1999. Pg 5.

⁶¹ Peter McCutcheon, “Japanese Nationalism Re-emerges,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News Online, December 23, 1999. See <http://www.abc.net/news>

⁶² Robert Whyment, “Victorious Nakasone dreams of the heroic past” (London: Guardian Newspaper, July 8, 1996)

⁶³ For more details on Shintaro Ishihara see http://www.japan-zone.com/modern/ishihara_shintaro.shtml

⁶⁴ Shingo Ito, “Tokyo Governor revives ghost of Japan’s Nationalism” (Agence France Presse Online, April 13, 1999)

sentiments, passed screening by the Ministry of Education for use in junior-high and high schools throughout the country.⁶⁵

- e. Prime Minister Koizumi's August 2001 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan's war dead including General Hideki Tojo. The visit caused strong reactions from both China and South Korea.⁶⁶
- f. Japan's recent hard-line position at the International Whaling Commission, where Japan "derided delegates of anti-whaling nations as 'mimics for Greenpeace', called on Australia and New Zealand to leave the commission, and then rejected proposals for whale sanctuaries...This position has its roots in Japan's growing nationalism, long-running insecurity about food imports, and a fishing industry that has enormous political clout."⁶⁷
- g. Alarmed by China's rising power and anxious about U.S. security guarantees, several nationalist politicians have begun to consider a review of Japan's non-nuclear principles. Prime Minister Koizumi's top aide, Yasuo Fukuda, stated, "the principles are just like the constitution, but in the face of calls to amend the constitution, the amendment of the principles is also likely. This statement came less than a week after another senior official, Shinzo Abe, said publicly that Japan could legally possess nuclear weapons, so long as they were small."⁶⁸

The striking historical parallels between the above examples and the nationalistic mood of Japan in the 1930's require further explanation. Throughout the last century, Japanese leaders evoked the spirit of *bushido* (the way of the warrior) and Japanese nationalism to maintain public support of its policies.

⁶⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism" International Security Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02). Pg 156-157.

⁶⁶ George Gedda, "Japan Has Trouble Acknowledging the Past," The Associated Press Online, August 15, 2001.

⁶⁷ New York Times Wire Service, "Japan Defends Whaling," (The Monterey Herald, May 26, 2002), pg A8.

⁶⁸ New York Times Wire Service, "Japanese Reconsider Nuclear Taboo," (The Monterey Herald, June 9, 2002), pg A11.

Bushido was a “spiritual” guide for the conduct of the Japanese people and, more specifically, the military during World War II. It was used to instill a sense of honor-bound tradition and patriotic fervor in order to obtain the objective of making Japan a great power, equal to that of the west. Despite Japan’s defeat in World War II, bushido continues to mold the moral and religious qualities of the Japanese people.

Modern Japanese society keeps bushido alive, although in a more subtle form. “Bushido today is seen through the Japanese work ethic, commitment, honesty, and keen sense of motive and action.”⁶⁹ The Japanese have a strong sense of group awareness. They will sacrifice their own personal goals if they are counter to the group’s goals. In the aftermath of World War II, the government called upon the Japanese people to work together as a group to attain the national goal of rebuilding Japan into a world power. To achieve these ends, the Japanese accepted working endless hours at comparatively low wages, spending little time with their families, living in cramped housing, commuting long hours to work, and a low standard of living when compared with most Western economies. Through their joint sacrifices and the support of the United States, Japan was able to rebuild itself into the world power that it is today.

Following World War II, the U.S. Military Government realized that it needed a strong Japan to counter the spread of communism throughout Asia. The quickest way to rebuild Japanese industry was to allow cartel business relationships similar to those that existed before the war called *zaibatsu*. The Military Government sanctioned the cartels under a new name, *keiretsu*. The keiretsu formed around a large bank that allowed rapid establishment of financial links. Members of the keiretsu established alliances to exercise control over many levels of the manufacturing chain. The members of the keiretsu primarily did business with other members, giving preferential treatment based upon “loyalty and protection.”⁷⁰

“Loyalty to one’s company is akin to belonging to a family in Japan; it precludes changing employers on the basis of market opportunities or organizing against employers

⁶⁹ Kent Derricot, producer, “Makato” Kokoro: The Heart Within (Salt Lake City: Lorien Productions, 1993) part 5.

⁷⁰ Vera Simone, The Asian Pacific: Political and Economic Development in a Global Context (White Plains: Longman Publishers, 1995) pg 172.

to obtain higher salaries.⁷¹” The Japanese worker in large organizations identifies himself first by his company, then by his name. Achievements of the company defined their self-identity and success. Japanese employees usually work in a large room in full view of their co-workers and supervisors, and are required to attend a company “boot camp,” take vacations together, and socialize with each other after-hours to instill a sense of solidarity and comradeship with their fellow employees.

The structure of Japanese society itself exemplifies respect for the ideals of bushido. From early childhood, Japanese learn to be conscious of their position in society and to conform to group norms. “A nail that sticks out will be hammered down.” Japanese society is extremely dependent upon vertical relationships. The Japanese rank according to seniority, age, and sex. They are dependent upon the knowledge of their position in society as well as in groups in order to establish required actions. Their language and gestures depend heavily upon who is the senior member of a group; they sometimes communicate non-verbally and desire to avoid confrontation if possible.

The Japanese educational system emphasizes conformance to group standards and goals. Students learn to be group oriented and to remain in their place in the group. This leads to a dilemma in today’s modern society: “how to balance cultural, group and individual identity. Japan is a nation caught between the old and the new.”⁷²

Bushido values transfer to many parts of the world through the martial arts. Many members of Japanese society demonstrate the qualities of bushido through the pursuit of sports, martial arts, and other art forms. A majority of Japanese pursues sports and art as leisure activities. They often devote themselves to a particular activity for years to become a teacher or master in their field. “There is an underlying assumption that anyone could, with enough application, succeed in their chosen pursuit. The method of learning is often based largely on imitation and repetition...much of the movement is ritualized, a pupil strives to achieve perfection...perseverance and suffering are an integral part of the process.⁷³” These pursuits enable the participants to build spiritual strength, similar to

⁷¹ Ibid pg 173.

⁷² Kent Derricot, producer, “*Makoto*” *Kokoro: The Heart Within* (Salt Lake City: Lorien Productions, 1993) part 5.

⁷³ Joy Hendry, *Understanding Japanese Society* (London: Routledge, 1987) pg 157-158.

that of a samurai. The ideal goal is to reach a stage where the movements are so familiar that you can do them without thought, an ultimate goal of Zen Buddhism.

Many Japanese fanatically follow team sports, especially baseball. Japanese baseball is a true team sport; superstar individualism is generally frowned upon. Despite the intensity of the fans, baseball games are played within the rules and are very organized. Fans cheer only when their team is at bat. Each side has a head-cheerleader who leads the fans in rooting for their team. Players are not allowed to argue with the managers or the umpires; violations are severely punished.

Retained in Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the values of bushido survive. The SDF enjoys the second largest military budget in the world. Despite the Article 9 prohibition from pursuing offensive military operations, the SDF continually practices military operations and conducts major bilateral and multilateral exercises with the United States and other nations in order to maintain its skills. One of the current hot topics in Japan concerns the SDF supporting U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Many Japanese are still opposed to an offensive military and believe these operations violate the Japanese Constitution. Additionally, many Asian neighbors still fear a return to Japanese expansionist policies. However, a growing number of Japanese citizens feel the SDF support operations are necessary if Japan wants to become a "normal nation" and maintain its influence on the international stage.

The growing nationalist fervor of Japan is a response to the economic and political troubles that have plagued the nation during the last decade. This nationalism is not political; it is socio-cultural and is a response to their desire to remain an "impact player" on the world stage. Japan has managed to avoid the detrimental effects of nationalism that have plagued many parts of the post-Cold War world. Bushido, used by the Japanese to help prevent globalized homogenization, maintains their linkage with the past, through the imperial lineage - "a defense against rootlessness."⁷⁴

⁷⁴ W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995)

B. QUEST TO BE A “NORMAL NATION”

In the context of Japan, a “normal nation” is a country that is willing to use the SDF for missions other than defending the homeland. Some analysts argue that Japan has already achieved “normal nation” status. Japan pursues an active and frequently independent foreign policy. No longer does Japan automatically follow the U.S. foreign policy line. Some recent examples include Japan’s proposal for an Asia Monetary Fund in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, Japan’s refusal to join President Bush in calling for the ouster of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in June 2002, and the September 2002 summit between Prime Minister Koizumi and Kim Jong-Il.⁷⁵

As part of its drive to become a “normal nation,” public debate is under way in Japan over the future of Japanese Defense, including constitutional revision, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and transformation of the Japanese Defense Agency into a full ministry. Over the last decade, Japan put forward a number of initiatives to reform Japanese defense policies:⁷⁶

1. In 1992, Japan expanded its participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and began to take a leadership role in regional security issues.
2. In 1994, the special Advisory Committee on Defense Issues called for a defense policy based on three principles: multilateral security, enhanced indigenous defense, and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.
3. In 1995, the 1976 National Defense Program Outline was revised to increase the scope of Japanese defense requirements to include all areas around Japan that affect its security.
4. The 1996, Joint U.S.-Japan Security Declaration reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the maintenance of U.S.

⁷⁵ Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, *Strategic Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks* (Seattle, NBR Press, 2002)

⁷⁶ Stephen E. Duke, “Japan’s Constitution, Prospects for Change: Impact on U.S. Force Presence in Japan”, Master’s Thesis (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2001) pgs 10-12.

forces in Japan.

5. In 1997, the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation were revised, expanding Japan's contribution to regional contingency operations.
6. In 1998, Japan began research on Theater Missile Defense in response to the Taepo Dong missile overflight of Japan.
7. On 25 August 1999, Japan passed the Regional Contingency Security Law, which stated Japan's support for U.S. Forces in the event of a regional emergency.
8. In April 2000, Prime Minister Mori proposed permitting U.N. peacekeeping forces to carry small arms.

A rising Japanese nationalism and the spirit of Bushido, which always remains in the background, complicate this defense debate. These factors still cause fear in the minds of many Asian nations, remembering the contribution of nationalism to Japanese militarism on the eve of World War II.

C. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

The debate between advocates of a constitutional revision and preservation has been active in Japan since 1952. This debate has been a major point of contention between the various political parties. The Liberal Democratic Party has advocated revision to permit Japan to exercise the right of "collective security" (currently not recognized by Japan due to Article 9 restrictions) granted to all nations under the United Nations Charter. The Socialist Party has been the leading faction supporting preservation. The debate finally came to a head in January of 2000 when both chambers of the Diet appointed *Kempo Chosakai* (research commissions on the constitution). These commissions are deliberating whether to modify the constitution, and if so, how.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Atsushi Odawara, "The Dawn of the Constitutional Debate" Japan Quarterly (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, January-March 2000) pg 17.

Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is a strong advocate of revision. He stated, “The idea of collective security ought to be incorporated into the Constitution. Japan should be able to send troops overseas if it has to...the nation cannot otherwise expect to survive in the international community.”⁷⁸ Constitutional revision enjoyed broad public support immediately following the Gulf War in 1991 and again following the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. A March 2000 poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun shows that more than 60 percent of the public favors revision. Two-thirds of Diet members (90 percent of those under 50) want to revise the constitution.⁷⁹

The current North Korean crisis, in which Japan faces the threat of potential North Korean nuclear missiles, has placed added emphasis on constitutional reform. “Faced with the biggest threat to national security since World War II, many Japanese are shocked to find how unprepared they are.”⁸⁰ On May 7, 2003, the Mainichi Daily News reported that senior Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians had compiled a draft revision to the constitution that would result in fully arming Japan. The draft reportedly states “Japan should possess an army, navy, air force and other forces.” While this would be a breakthrough for Japan, their plan is facing fierce opposition from younger legislators and some high profile members of the LDP.⁸¹

D. PERMANENT SEAT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The idea of Security Council reform was first raised in the aftermath of the Cold War and Gulf War. Nonaligned countries called for drastic reform in an attempt to democratize the United Nations. They believed that by increasing the number of permanent member seats, the power of the “big 5” would be moderated. The “big 5” are only interested in expanding permanent membership to perhaps Japan and Germany, and

⁷⁸ Yasuhiro Nakasone, “Rethinking the Constitution: Making It a Japanese Document” Japan Quarterly (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, July-September 1997) pg 5.

⁷⁹ Ted Osius, The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Westport: Praeger, 2002) pg 67.

⁸⁰ Sebastian Moffett, “Japan Begins to Doubt Its Defense Capabilities” Online Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2003.

⁸¹ “LDP bigwigs seek to revise Constitution to beef up military” Mainichi Daily News Interactive, May 7, 2003.

that is mainly to reduce their financial burden. Japanese administrations have remained keenly interested in the idea of a permanent seat for Japan since 1992. In a 1994 speech, Foreign Minister Yohei Kono stated that Japan was ready to assume the responsibilities that are incumbent on a permanent member, however, one with peaceful intentions. Japan would not use force in violation of its constitution. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) public opinion poll conducted in early 1994 showed 53 percent of the population supported Japan becoming a permanent member.⁸²

Many U.N. members believe Japan deserves its permanent seat; Japan is the world's second largest economy and provides the second largest financial contribution to United Nations operations. Former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that he believes Japan's permanent seat could have a stabilizing effect on U.S. hegemony, and advance the cause of democratization.⁸³

The Japanese admire the United Nations. Japan generally pursues an internationalist ideology; they see the United Nations as a good model. "There is in Japan a certain type of thinking with regard to the United Nations that amounts almost to religious faith. As long as a diplomatic initiative is going forward under the auspices of the United Nations mistakes are impossible."⁸⁴

To Japanese the United Nations is the apex of the international community. Gaining a permanent seat on the Security Council is the quickest way for Japan to gain the respect and power they believe they deserve. The Japanese are beginning to realize that the only way to achieve a permanent seat is to become a "normal nation." As long as Japan's security and diplomatic policy are beholden to the United States, it is unlikely it will gain sufficient support from other nations to achieve its permanent seat.

⁸² Hiroshi Fujita, "UN Reform and Japan's Permanent Security Council Seat" *Japan Quarterly* (Tokyo: *Asahi Shimbun*, October-December 1995) pgs 437-439.

⁸³ *Ibid.* pg 439.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* pg 441.

E. TRANSFORMATION OF THE JDA INTO THE “JDM”

At the end of World War II, the Allied Occupation forces dissolved Japan’s Imperial Army and Navy. Article 9 of the new Japanese constitution renounced war and the right to possess combat forces. However, in 1954 the Self-Defense Forces Law was enacted in response to the security threat posed by the Cold War. This law provided the foundation of the modern SDF. Article 9 was interpreted to grant Japan the inherent right of self-defense and authorize the minimum forces needed to exercise that right. The law states that “ground, maritime, and air forces are to preserve the peace and independence of the nation and to maintain national security by conducting operations on land, at sea, and in the air to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression.”⁸⁵ To avoid the appearance of a militarist revival, Japan's leaders required firm constitutional guarantees to ensure civilian control over the SDF. The JDA was organizationally termed an “agency” rather than a “ministry,” further demonstrating the low importance placed on the JDA. The SDF were broken into an air (ASDF), ground (GSDF), and maritime (MSDF) arms, versus calling them an air force, army, and navy.⁸⁶

With an annual defense budget of \$50 billion, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have lots of modern equipment. Japan has the second largest defense budget in the world and the second largest contingent of naval forces in Asia, behind only the United States. Japan’s SDF have a culture of taking on new missions incrementally. They carefully plan and practice new missions before implementing them. Peter Wooley described this trait as following Japan’s cultural predilection for *kata*, or form. Wooley argues that the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has taken the lead in performing new roles because it is the “most cosmopolitan service yet is least in the public eye.”⁸⁷

The JMSDF has been slowly and quietly taking on new roles that would normally only be exercised by a fully capable navy. “The new missions the JMSDF took on were planned for and rehearsed, were consequently accepted by the public, and later receded

⁸⁵ FAS Intelligence Resource Program on the JDA located at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/japan/jda.htm>

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Peter J. Wooley, Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox 1971-2000 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999). Pg 25.

into the ordinary background of public affairs.”⁸⁸ Examples of this mission expansion include: overseas deployment, protection of sea lines of communication, the use of minesweepers, and open ocean escort and patrol duties.

In 1957, the JDA deployed its first ships overseas on training missions to Hawaii and Midway Island. Following successful completion of the overseas missions, Japan embarked on a destroyer-building program. The JMSDF eventually expanded training missions to Canada, Mexico, the Mediterranean Sea, and circumnavigation of South America. By 1970, the JMSDF included African ports on its training cruises. The JMSDF “sailed the proverbial seven seas, became acquainted with distant ports and foreign navies, learned the logistics of long-term deployments, and practiced the diplomatic formalities of entering foreign territorial waters.”⁸⁹

Defense of sea-lines of communication within 1000 miles of Japan was first elucidated in 1971. By 1977, the head of the JDA said the JMSDF was ready to assume the role. In 1980, the JMSDF began participating in the annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) training exercise with the United States, Canada, and Australia. In 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki informed President Reagan that Japan was ready to assume the new role, and the new mission was incorporated into the 1983 Defense White Paper.⁹⁰

The United States first requested JMSDF assistance in minesweeping in 1987-1988 during the Kuwaiti tanker escort missions. Even though Japan declined the request, the JMSDF began planning and practicing anti-mine missions. Despite the public view during the Persian Gulf War that the JMSDF deployment of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf was too little, too late, this represented the first time that the JMSDF had operated in potentially hostile waters. Once the minesweepers and their escort vessels were in the Persian Gulf, they provided logistical support to other allied vessels in foreign waters, another first.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Ibid. Pg 26.

⁸⁹ Ibid. Pg 28.

⁹⁰ Ibid. Pg 29.

⁹¹ Ibid. Pg 31.

The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) conducted planning and training for potential humanitarian supply missions to the Persian Gulf region, and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) conducted planning as part of the overall JDA support for the Persian Gulf War. This planning and training paid dividends in 1993 when Japan began participating in U.N. Peacekeeping missions.⁹²

In the early 1990's, the JMSDF began to practice escort duties in conjunction with RIMPAC and other U.S.N.-JMSDF exercise series. Additionally, in 1993 the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), Japan's version of the Coast Guard, provided escort service for the Japanese freighter Akatsuki Maru that was carrying reprocessed plutonium from Europe to Japan. "The JMSDF's addition of Aegis-equipped destroyers to its flotillas not only increased the competence of the JMSDF in anti-air and anti-submarine warfare but also enabled the force to operate outside the range of protective land-based aircraft"⁹³ while providing protection of Japan's SLOCs.

In 2001, the JDA was able to leverage all of the previous experience in support of allied forces during the War on Terrorism. The MSA provided anti-piracy patrols in the Straits of Malacca, the JMSDF provided logistics and escort services to U.S. and British naval assets in the Indian Ocean, and the JASDF provided transportation services for U.S. military forces to bases in Singapore and Diego Garcia, and provided humanitarian supplies to Pakistan.⁹⁴

Despite the rapidly expanding military capabilities of the JDA, the political transformations have not kept pace. The Japanese Diet has initiated discussions on the future of the JDA and whether to transform it into a full ministry; however, this transformation would likely not occur until after constitutional revision. While it will not happen overnight, Japan must complete this reorganization to become a "normal nation" and conduct security relations on an even par. Currently, the head of the JDA is not seen as the equivalent of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, so meetings between Japanese and U.S. Defense officials usually occur at the Assistant Secretary level. This only adds to Japan's view of "second class" treatment.

⁹² Ibid. Pg 32.

⁹³ Ibid. Pg 33.

⁹⁴ Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of Japan White Paper 2002 (Tokyo: JDA, 2002).

The Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) are taking on added legitimacy due to their high-visibility roles over the last decade, including UN peacekeeping roles, counter-piracy operations, and support for the U.S. War on Terror. Japan is striving to become a “normal nation” in order to gain the international respect and power it feels it deserves. The Japanese are beginning to realize the only way to achieve this respect is to throw off the perception that Japanese security and diplomatic policy are beholden to the United States. This has led Japan to adopt a more aggressive diplomatic stance, sometimes at cross-purposes with the United States.

The growing nationalist fervor of Japan is a response to the economic and political troubles that have plagued the nation during the last decade. This nationalism is not political; it is socio-cultural and is a response to their desire to remain an “impact player” on the world stage. So far, Japan has managed to avoid the detrimental effects of nationalism that have plagued many parts of the post-Cold War world. However, bushido remains in the background. Bushido is used by the Japanese to help prevent globalized homogenization, and maintains their linkage with the past, through the imperial lineage - “a defense against rootlessness.”⁹⁵ The United States must reinvigorate the security alliance, support Japanese economic reforms and efforts to achieve a ‘normal nation’ status, or risk the rise of a nationalistic Japanese nation, which could compete with the United States for influence and bring about a renewed arms race in East Asia.

⁹⁵ W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) pg 102.

IV. CURRENT STATUS OF THE SECURITY ALLIANCE

A. JAPAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE WAR ON TERROR

The change of U.S. administrations in 2001 was welcome in Japan. The Bush administration brought a return to the realist policies of the past. President Bush's administration is particularly concerned with balance of power –that is, making sure it does not shift against the United States; human rights, international law, and international institutions do not matter as much. As a result, the United States is re-emphasizing its relationship with Japan, to counter China's rising influence.⁹⁶

As Admiral Fargo stated in his confirmation hearing: “The foundation for stability in (Asia) has been our long-standing bilateral alliances, of which Japan is our most important. This relationship is the cornerstone for U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and security. Our forward presence in the region is demonstrative of our commitment to its security and our interests abroad.”⁹⁷

On 19 September 2001, just eight days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, Prime Minister Koizumi announced Japan's “Measures in Response to the Series of Terrorist Attacks in the United States.” The measures included improving protection afforded U.S. bases in Japan, providing intelligence to U.S. forces, providing humanitarian aid to India and Pakistan, and dispatching JMSDF and JASDF forces to support U.S. forces.⁹⁸ Japan thereby joined in the counter-terrorism coalition, despite the political challenges the decision presented. On October 1, 2001, in the first visible sign of Japan's support, JMSDF destroyers escorted the USS Kitty Hawk as it departed from Yokosuka en route to the Indian Ocean. On October 9, 2001, six JASDF C-130 transport

⁹⁶ Francine Keifer and Abraham McLaughlin, “Behind US Foreign Policy, a Focus on Politics of Power” Christian Science Monitor June 29, 2001. Pg 4.

⁹⁷ ADM Thomas Fargo, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 2002.

⁹⁸ Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan's Dual Hedge” Foreign Affairs Vol. 81 No. 5 (September/October 2002) Pgs 110, 113.

planes landed in Islamabad, Pakistan to provide humanitarian supplies to care for the expected influx of Afghani refugees.⁹⁹

The Diet, led by Prime Minister Koizumi, quickly adopted the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law on October 29, 2001 (for full text see Appendix 1). The law specifically references UN security resolution 1368, which stated that the terrorist attacks on the United States were a threat to international peace and security, as the basis for the law. This provided Japan political cover to skirt any question of whether the law violated Article 9 of its constitution.

The purpose of the Law is to specify the following measures in order to enable Japan to contribute actively and on its own initiative to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, thereby contributing to the achievement of the purposes of the Charter of the U.N.¹⁰⁰

This law permitted the Government of Japan to provide direct support to the U.S. efforts against terrorism. This support included fueling of U.S. ships directly from JMSDF ships, providing enroute transportation to U.S. forces, carrying relief supplies and providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and quickly freezing Taliban- and al-Qaeda- linked financial accounts.¹⁰¹ “The bill (opened) the way for the deployment of SDF personnel during active hostilities for the first time since the end of World War II.”¹⁰² The most controversial portion of the law was its area of implementation:

These measures shall be implemented in the following areas: (1) Japan’s territory; (2) the following areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being implemented: (a) The high seas, including the exclusive economic zone stipulated in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and airspace above; (b) Territory of foreign countries (implementation shall be limited to cases where consent from the territorial countries has been obtained.)¹⁰³

⁹⁹ David Lague, “New Rules of Defence” Far Eastern Economic Review Online November 1, 2001.

¹⁰⁰ Government of Japan, The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, dated October 29, 2001. Accessed at <<http://www.embjapan.org/pressreleases/102901.htm>>

¹⁰¹ James A. Kelly, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee February 14, 2002.

¹⁰² Asahi Shimbun, “Lower House passes SDF bill,” Asahi.com, October 29, 2001.

¹⁰³ Government of Japan, The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, dated October 29, 2001. Accessed at <<http://www.embjapan.org/pressreleases/102901.htm>>

The law basically gave a blank check to Prime Minister Koizumi to interpret the measures and area of implementation as he saw fit, with the stipulation that he put any measures implemented by the Self-Defense forces to the Diet for their approval within 20 days (or upon convening of the first Diet session thereafter).¹⁰⁴ The law also expanded the SDF's area of operation much further than the existing limit of 1000 nautical miles from Japan. The JMSDF and JASDF were now conducting operations in the Indian Ocean and South Asia. China and South Korea were extremely wary of the JDA's expanding missions, and Prime Minister Koizumi was forced to mount a diplomatic offensive to overcome their concerns.

The Diet also passed two other security related bills simultaneously with the Anti-Terrorism bill. One bill allowed SDF personnel to provide security for U.S. bases in Japan during times of emergency. The second bill revised the Maritime Safety Agency Law permitting the MSA to fire upon any unidentified vessels in Japanese waters that refuse to comply with MSA directives.¹⁰⁵

On November 16, 2001, the Diet passed the "Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law" (Basic Plan). The Basic Plan specified the measures that the SDF would carry out to implement the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. The initial plan was enacted for a period of six months¹⁰⁶ (although it has been renewed, and is currently effective until November 2003). The following are examples of the specific operations conducted under the Basic Plan:¹⁰⁷

1. On November 25, 2001 the destroyer JDS Sawagiri, supply vessel JDS Towada, and minesweeper tender JDS Uruga departed enroute to the Indian Ocean. JDS Towada commenced providing fuel to U.S.N. vessels

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ Yomiuri Shimbun, "Diet passes bills for SDF action," Daily Yomiuri Online, October 30, 2001.

¹⁰⁶ Government of Japan, Outline of the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, dated November 16, 2001. Accessed at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/policy/plan_o.html

¹⁰⁷ Japanese Defense Ministry, Defense of Japan White Paper 2002, accessed at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2002/0301.htm> on June 7, 2003.

on December 2, 2001 and Royal Navy vessels on January 29, 2002. JDS Sawagiri and JDS Towada returned to port on April 25, 2002.

2. On December 12, 2001, JDS Sawagiri and JDS Uruga delivered 200 tons of relief supplies to U.N. aid personnel in Karachi, Pakistan. JDS Uruga returned to port on December 31, 2001.
3. On February 12, 2002, destroyers JDS Haruna, and JDS Sawakaze, and the supply vessel JDS Tokiwa departed to take over the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.
4. On November 29, 2001, ASDF C-130 aircraft began transporting U.S. forces from Japan to Guam.

As of November 19 2002, the MSDF conducted 140 refuelings, totaling 62 million gallons and the JASDF conducted 112 transport missions.¹⁰⁸ Japan has received continuing praise from American diplomatic officials, including Ambassador Baker who recently stated, “the government of Japan is one of the United States’ staunchest allies in the struggle against terrorism.”¹⁰⁹

B. CURRENT ISSUES

“In the last couple of years, Japan’s pacifist world-view has been jolted, first by Pyongyang’s launch of a Taepo Dong missile over the main island in August 1998, then by the events of September 11, 2001, and most recently by North Korea’s admission that it had abducted Japanese citizens and its claim that it has nuclear weapons.”¹¹⁰ The

¹⁰⁸ Embassy of Japan, “SDF Anti-terrorism activities to be extended and expanded” December 4, 2002. Accessed at <http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/pressreleases/111902.htm>

¹⁰⁹ AMB Howard Baker, “Still Room for Diplomacy with North Korea,” U.S. Department of State List Service, February 10, 2003. Accessed at <http://lists.state.gov/archives/wf-easia.html>

¹¹⁰ Mark Magnier, “Japan Set to Clarify Defense Mandate,” Los Angeles Time Online, May 16, 2003.

global shock of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks also caused tremendous soul-searching in Japan. Prime Minister Koizumi's ambitious statement of September 19, 2001 was seen by some observers as "the first steps to Japan becoming what is often described by politicians and the military as a 'normal' country – a nation with the military muscle to match its economic weight along with the responsibility that goes with being a major power."¹¹¹

In late September 2001, several Japanese and American political heavyweights, who were attending a conference celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, made statements concerning the issue of Article 9, collective defense, and the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa called for ending Japan's self-imposed ban on the right of collective self-defense "in the interests of a more effective Japan-U.S. alliance and a greater ability to adapt to changing realities."¹¹² At the same conference, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara called for the end of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. He stated:

To apply the metaphor of a book to Japan's postwar history, we can call the years up to the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty the prologue, and the 50 years from its signing to the present the first chapter. It seems about time to start shaping the next chapter of our postwar history...Japan can take the initiative in proposing to the United States that the two countries annul the Japan-U.S. security treaty...We should change the treaty so that the Japanese people are in an equal partnership with the Americans in a way of which they can be proud.¹¹³

A poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun in October 2001 to gauge Japanese public opinion on defense issues had the following results:¹¹⁴

1. Forty-four percent of respondents supported SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities.

¹¹¹ David Lague, "New Rules of Defence," Far Eastern Economic Review Online, November 01, 2001.

¹¹² Yomiuri Shimbun, "Miyazawa: Japan should exercise right to collective self-defense," Daily Yomiuri Online. Accessed at <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/ties.speech.htm> on October 26, 2001.

¹¹³ Yomiuri Shimbun, "Japan must assert own identity vis-à-vis U.S." Daily Yomiuri Online. Accessed at <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/ties/ties026.htm> on October 26, 2001.

¹¹⁴ Yomiuri Shimbun, "Poll: 63% back antiterror efforts," Daily Yomiuri Online November 3, 2001.

2. Sixty-six percent of respondents said maintaining the Japan-U.S. security treaty would be in Japan's national interests.
3. Sixty-three percent of respondents favored Japan's support for the War on Terrorism; however, thirty-seven percent said it should be limited to financial assistance.
4. Fifty-three percent of respondents favored Japan exercising the right to collective self-defense.
5. Fifty-eight percent of respondents favored revising Japan's constitution.

The results of the above poll and the statements by Japanese politicians show that the Japanese population is becoming less pacifist. This trend partly reflects the rise of the post-World War II generation. More than 60 percent of the population was born after World War II. Additionally, this could partly be a reflection of the economic burdens of the younger generations. This generation is leading a resurgence in nationalism – by regaining stature on the international stage, the Japanese can forget their economic troubles at home.¹¹⁵ This trend is also reflected in the election of Prime Minister Koizumi, who ran on a nationalist platform that attracted the support of many younger Japanese citizens.

In April 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi submitted three emergency legislation bills to the Japanese Diet to further clarify governmental response in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The first, “Bill to Respond to an Armed Attack Situation,” provided a division of labor between local and national government. The second bill was designed to modify the “Self-Defense Forces Law” in order to clarify the permitted activities for the SDF during a time of emergency. This bill was designed to prevent another public relations disaster similar to the poor response to the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Following the earthquake, the SDF was extremely slow in providing disaster assistance due to misunderstandings related to the Self-Defence Forces Law. The third bill was a modification to the “Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan.” This bill was designed to strengthen the functions of the Security Council of

¹¹⁵ STRATFOR, “Japan Rising From Its Pacifism,” STRATFOR Regional Analysis, January 25, 2000 (story ID #102326)

Japan during a national emergency.¹¹⁶ In a sign of the struggle over the defense debate within the Japanese political leadership, the Diet failed to consider these bills before the end of its 2002 legislative session.

The current North Korean nuclear crisis was another tremendous shock to the Japanese. In his 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush labeled North Korea, Iran, and Iraq part of an “axis of evil” that promoted terrorism. On October 4, 2002, a visiting U.S. State Department delegation confronted North Korean officials with evidence that they were violating the 1994 Agreed Framework by operating a covert nuclear weapons program using enriched uranium. The North Koreans officials reportedly acknowledged the covert program, although the North Korean government later denied the charges.

On November 11, 2002, the United States, South Korea, and Japan froze oil shipments to North Korea in an attempt to pressure North Korea into terminating their nuclear program. North Korea responded by charging that the United States breached the Agreed Framework by failing to provide operational light water reactors, and by suspending oil shipments. In early December 2002, North Korea expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, removed the IAEA monitoring seals and cameras from its nuclear facilities, and prepared to restart its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. On January 10, 2003, the North Koreans announced their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. On February 18, 2002, the North Korean Army threatened to abandon the 1953 Korean War armistice if the United States continued to threaten North Korea. On February 24, and March 10, 2002 North Korea test fired anti-ship Silkworm missiles in the Sea of Japan.¹¹⁷

On February 25, 2002, Shigeru Ishiba, head of the JDA, responded to the North Korean missile launch by indicating it was time for Japan to develop its own missile defense system. He stated:

¹¹⁶ Honorable Fukushima Nukuga, “Japan’s Emergency Legislation and the War on Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation Lecture Series, lecture #749, June 10, 2002. The Honorable Fukushima Nukuga is a LDP member in the Japanese House of Representatives.

¹¹⁷ CNN Special Reports, “North Korea Nuclear Tension” CNN.com. Accessed at <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/nkorea> on June 10, 2003. This website provides a detailed history and analysis of the North Korean crisis.

Until the other side actually starts something we cannot exercise self-defense. It has been agreed that Japan is the shield and the U.S. is the arrow, but we have to discuss whether this is adequate or not. Henceforth, this will be discussed in parliament.¹¹⁸

The Japanese public is showing deep concern over the North Korean situation. Debates over constitutional reform, collective self-defense, and nuclear weapons are openly discussed in the Japanese media. Political commentators are debating whether Japan needs nuclear weapons to counter the North Korean threat. Shigeru Ishiba stated the SDF might be forced to attack in self-defense if the North Koreans threaten Japan with weapons. Gen Nakatani, former head of the JDA agreed with Ishiba's views, but stated that Japan does not currently have the ability to attack North Korea.¹¹⁹

On March 28, 2003, Japan launched two military spy satellites despite North Korea's threats of "disastrous consequence." The two spy satellites will give Japan the ability to independently monitor the North Korean situation and have "shutter control," in an attempt to make the Japanese less dependent on U.S. intelligence.¹²⁰ On April 13, 2003, in another sign that Japanese citizens are becoming more right wing in their views, Tokyo residents overwhelmingly re-elected Shintaro Ishihara as the governor of Tokyo.

On April 16, 2003, Shigeru Ishiba called for Japan to expand its antimissile defenses, possibly purchasing the latest Patriot missiles from the United States. He stated:

The peace constitution does not mean that the country has to be pacifist. Just to be on the receiving end of an attack is not what our Constitution had in mind. Just to wait for another country's attack and lose thousands and tens of thousands of people, that is not what the Constitution assumes.¹²¹

On May 29, 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi emphasized that while Japan needs to investigate stronger missile defenses, it must remain committed to the concept of Self-Defense Forces.

¹¹⁸ Richard Lloyd Parry and Robert Thomson, "Japan Seeks Parasol in Shade of U.S. Umbrella," [London Times Online](#), February 26, 2003.

¹¹⁹ Doug Struck, "Threat Erodes Japan's Pacifism," [Washingtonpost.com](#), February 15, 2003.

¹²⁰ James Brooke, "Japan Launching Spy Satellites Despite North Korean Threats," [nytimes.com](#), March 28, 2003.

¹²¹ James Brooke, "Japanese Official Seeks to Guard Against Korean Missiles," [nytimes.com](#), April 16, 2003.

On June 6, 2003, the Japanese Diet passed the three emergency legislation bills giving the government broadened powers during national emergencies.¹²² The emergency legislation bills give the prime minister specific emergency powers to coordinate actions between the central and local governments, clarify the rules and powers given to the JDA in response to emerging threats, strengthen the powers of Japan's National Security Council, and provide severe punishment for citizens who violate the emergency provisions. Prime Minister Koizumi remarked that passage of the bills was a milestone in Japanese security policy; these topics were previously considered political suicide. Final passage was due in large measure to the North Korean threat that changed "key Japanese ideas of peace and risk."¹²³

"Operation Iraqi Freedom," the U.S. campaign to oust Saddam Hussein from Iraq and liberate the Iraqi people, has presented the Japanese with another way to strengthen their global prestige. In early March 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Kawaguchi openly campaigned in support of the United States and British coalition's proposed U.N. Security Council resolution to give a final ultimatum, which could ultimately authorize the use of force, to Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq. The Japanese government lobbied the leaders of the "undecided" members (Chile, Mexico, Pakistan, Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea) in an attempt to gain their vote in support of the resolution. Despite Japanese public opposition, the Koizumi government was willing to risk its political capital, earning significant points with the Bush administration.¹²⁴ As former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stated:

Japan was faced with the choice of either attaching importance to the United Nations or attaching importance to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. We took note of the fact that the United Nations makes its decision based on a composite national interest of various countries, whereas the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has a direct bearing on Japan's fate. So, we attached priority to respecting the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and supported the United States.¹²⁵

¹²² Howard W. French, "Japan Adopts Laws Strengthening Military Powers," nytimes.com, June 7, 2003.

¹²³ Mark Magnier, "Japan Set to Clarify Defense Mandate," [Los Angeles Time Online](http://LosAngelesTimeOnline), May 16, 2003.

¹²⁴ STRATFOR, "Japan Redefines Role with Support of Iraq War," [STRATFOR Regional Analyses](http://STRATFORRegionalAnalyses), Story ID #211181, March 10, 2003.

¹²⁵ Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Iraq and North Korea – New Challenges to the U.S.-Japan Relationship,"

The Koizumi administration recognized that support of the U.S. and British position would offer several benefits to Japan's long-term security policy:¹²⁶

1. It would allow Japan to maintain a say in the Bush administration's dealings with North Korea.
2. Guaranteed the security of Japan's Middle Eastern oil supplies.
3. Redefines Japan's regional role from economic donor to strategic ally.

Japan's support for the War on Terror, the North Korean nuclear crisis, and "Operation Iraqi Freedom" present significant opportunities and challenges for the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. According to Shigeru Ishiba, "Japan is waking from a prolonged state of *heiwa boke*, or peace senility, induced by more than half a century of the United States taking on the role of Japan's ultimate protector."¹²⁷ A May 2003 Jiji news poll showed seventy percent of Japanese support strong relations with the United States, and sixty-six percent of Japanese support U.S. bases in Japan as a means to provide regional security.¹²⁸ While the current Koizumi administration is considered a strong member of Washington's "coalition of the willing," the United States must remain vigilant to prevent tipping the balance from a more active Japanese security consciousness to a full-fledged nationalistic defense revival in Japan. A militarily resurgent Japan could have disastrous consequences for U.S. security policy in Asia, resulting in a new race for regional domination.

Yomiuri-Japan Society Speaker Series, March 28, 2003.

¹²⁶ STRATFOR, "Japan Redefines Role with Support of Iraq War," STRATFOR Regional Analyses, Story ID #211181, March 10, 2003.

¹²⁷ James Brooke, "Japanese Official Seeks to Guard Against Korean Missiles," nytimes.com, April 16, 2003.

¹²⁸U.S. State Department, "Transcript: Wolfowitz Says U.S. Concerns over Proliferation are Global," June 3, 2003. Accessed at <http://lists.state.gov/archives/wf-easia.html>

V. U.S. AND REGIONAL SECURITY VIEWS

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 had a major effect on regional security views throughout East and Southeast Asia. President Bush in his 2002 “State of the Union” speech effectively declared war on terrorism and warned other countries they needed to choose sides – they were either “with us or with the terrorists.”¹²⁹ The United States developed closer strategic cooperation with Russia and the PRC, both former Cold War adversaries. The U.S.-Japan security alliance strengthened (as discussed in chapter IV), and U.S.-ASEAN relations improved as the United States assisted Indonesia and the Philippines in combating local terrorist organizations. Only on the Korean peninsula did strategic relations worsen. This was due in large part to North Korea’s admission of its nuclear weapons program coupled with the strategic drift in the U.S.-ROK security alliance.

The increasing concentration and yet differing rates of growth of national economic and military capabilities in Asia, the region’s demographic dominance, and its long-standing history of rivalries and grievances all suggest that the most significant challenges to peace and security in the coming century are likely to arise in Strategic Asia.¹³⁰

A. UNITED STATES

During the Cold War, U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific consisted of a “hub and spoke” arrangement of bilateral security alliances designed to contain communist expansion in Asia. This system of bilateral security alliances, while highly effective during the Cold War, underwent significant challenges (as discussed in Chapter III) due to the loss of primary mission coupled with the challenge to agree upon a new unifying mission.

The focus of U.S. foreign policy shifted several times during the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. President George H.W. Bush’s administration executed a foreign

¹²⁹ Richard Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, “Introduction,” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed, *Strategic Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks* (Seattle, NBR, 2002) Pg 3.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, Pg 4.

policy grounded in the realist strategy of selective engagement; the United States should act only to protect its vital national interests (SLOCs, access to oil, and regional stability). This policy was displayed during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-1991. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the United States led a coalition, under the banner of the United Nations, to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait and protect the Middle Eastern oil supply from domination by Saddam Hussein. President Bill Clinton's administration pursued a foreign policy grounded in cooperative security, protection of human rights, and the spread of liberal democracy around the world.¹³¹

President George W. Bush's administration initially pursued an Asian security policy designed to contain a "rising China" and enhance the existing security relationships throughout the region. The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 caused a wholesale reappraisal of its policies. The Bush administration determined to lead a "coalition of like-minded states" to battle the emerging threat of transnational terrorism. The Bush administration now needed the cooperation of previous strategic Asian competitors like India, China, and Russia.

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that the United States needed to shift its strategic focus from Europe to Asia due to the "volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers."¹³² The most direct sign of the change in U.S. security posture in Asia was the large increase in the number of military personnel engaged in the region. "Operation Enduring Freedom" brought U.S. forces to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. U.S. forces also deployed to the Philippines in January 2002 to assist the Philippine government in combating the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization.¹³³

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America states:

America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic

¹³¹ Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, "Neither a Realist nor a Liberal, W. Is a Liberator," The Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2003. Pg A14.

¹³² Department of Defense, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001) Pgs 4-5.

¹³³ Ibid, Pg 4.

technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.¹³⁴

The National Security Strategy is based on: (1) strengthening alliances with like-minded nations; (2) working bilaterally and multilaterally to solve regional issues; (3) preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction; (4) encouraging global economic growth and development; and (5) protecting the rights of humans around the world.¹³⁵

One aspect of the new National Security Strategy, often referred to as the Bush Doctrine, stirred significant negative press around the world: the concept of preemption. The strategy contends that international law recognizes that nations need not suffer an attack before they can defend themselves; an imminent danger of attack is sufficient to justify self-defense. This is similar to the concept of self-defense often invoked in police shootings. The officer must merely fear for his life in order to use deadly force against a suspect. The strategy emphasizes that imminent threat must be adapted to fit today's transnational terrorism. Today's terrorists covertly target non-combatants; therefore, friendly forces must act within the timeline of a terrorist's decision matrix. No longer does the United States always have time to conduct extensive discussions with our allies and adversaries before taking action. However, the strategy does state that the United States will gather intelligence to provide proof, and consult with allies when sufficient time is available.¹³⁶

During the first year of the Bush administration, U.S. foreign policy received international criticism for a perceived tendency toward unilateralism.

The administration's rejection of the Kyoto treaty to stem global warming and Bush's abrupt dismissal of South Korea's 'sunshine' policy toward North Korea set the impression that the administration was not interested in listening too closely to the concerns of its allies. The administration exacerbated tensions by refusing to join the International Criminal Court, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and announcing a

¹³⁴ White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, September 2002) Pg 1.

¹³⁵ Ibid. Pgs 1-2.

¹³⁶ Jay Tolson, "The New American Empire," U.S. News and World Report, January 13, 2003. Pg. 39.

doctrine of fighting preventative wars that surprised and concerned allies.¹³⁷

In February 2003, the criticism came to a head during the United Nations Security Council and NATO deliberations over the topic of regime change in Iraq. Many experts charge that the rejection of the United States and British resolution by Germany, France, and Russia was an attempt by these countries to punish the United States for its past unilateral policies, and balance against U.S. hegemony.

The Bush administration, however, has taken a decidedly multilateral view over the 2002-2003 North Korean nuclear crisis. Despite initial insistence from South Korea, Russia, China, and Japan that the United States needed to deal with North Korea bilaterally, the Bush administration maintains that a multilateral solution is the only way to solve the crisis peacefully. Following the May 2003 summits between President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, and President Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun, it appears that Asian leaders are moving towards a multilateral solution to the North Korean issues.¹³⁸

At the 2003 Shangri-La Dialogue, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated that U.S. defense policy with respect to Asia was based on three principles:¹³⁹

1. East Asia is an important region.
2. The future security and stability of Asia is key to U.S. security.
3. The United States remains committed to playing a role in East Asian security.

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz also stated the United States was conducting a baseline review of its military force structure in Asia. This review seeks to determine the best way to maintain U.S. commitments to Asia in the age of limited defense resources.

¹³⁷ Glenn Kessler, "Forceful Tactics Catch Up With U.S.," The Washington Post, February 16, 2003. Pg A26.

¹³⁸ Gordon Fairclough, "A Surprise in Korean Crisis: Consensus," The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2003. Pg A16.

¹³⁹ Paul Wolfowitz, "Remarks at the IISS Asian Security Conference," May 31, 2003. Accessed at <http://www.iiss.org/shangri-la-more.php?itemID=11>. The Shangri-La Dialogue was inaugurated in May 2002 and is sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The dialogue is the only forum in the Asia-Pacific region that brings together the region's defense ministers in a multilateral format for discussions on defense issues and regional defense co-operation.

The United States is determined to leverage the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to fashion a smaller, more agile force with the ability to respond to a wide variety of situations.¹⁴⁰

Also at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander U.S. Pacific Command, stated the principal threats to security in the Asia-Pacific in 2003 are transnational terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. To combat these threats the United States is emphasizing international cooperation to:¹⁴¹

1. Gain advanced situational awareness. With adequate cueing, terrorist forces can be destroyed before they execute an attack.
2. Develop responsive decision-making architecture. This requires national policies that permit cooperative threat engagement, legal frameworks that allow prosecution, and enhanced communications to support timely decision-making.

B. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

The end of the Cold War caused tremendous changes in China's security environment. The collapse of the Soviet Union decreased the threat of superpower conflict, however, regional wars became more likely.

China is more secure from major external military threats than at any time since the early nineteenth century. (Disintegration) of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the threat that had been the focus of Beijing's military preparations for the late 1960s on. Furthermore, two decades of reform have transformed China into a major participant in international trade and commerce and a leading diplomatic power in the world.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Paul Wolfowitz.

¹⁴¹ Admiral Thomas Fargo, "Remarks at the IISS Asia Security Conference," June 1, 2003. Accessed at <http://www.iiss.org/shangri-la-more.php?itemID=17>.

¹⁴² Paul H.B. Godwin, "Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-First Century," pg 171. From Samuel S. Kim, ed. China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

The core elements of China's strategic policies are rebuilding the economy and modernizing its armed forces in order to protect China's territorial integrity, providing peripheral security, and restoring her great power status. Taiwan reunification, the defeat of Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang Province, and the defeat of Tibetan insurgency are the dominant issues under territorial integrity. The foremost issues affecting Chinese peripheral security include: (1) defeat of Islamic terrorists in Central Asia; (2) a peaceful and nuclear-free Korean peninsula; (3) peaceful settlement of the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir; (4) resolution of the South China Sea territorial dispute with Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines.¹⁴³

Despite the growth in China's economic and military power over the last decade, China remains paranoid about U.S. "hegemonic" power. China perceives the United States as attempting to contain China through its bilateral alliance structure. China was extremely critical of the 1996 reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto. On the other hand, China supports the U.S. military presence in Japan to keep the "cork in the bottle" and prevent Japan's return to militarism.¹⁴⁴

The 1996 reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance caused Chinese leaders to search for a new way to balance against U.S. and Japanese regional power. As a result, in 1996, "China put forward the initiative that countries in the region jointly cultivate a new concept of security, which focuses on enhancing trust through dialogue and promoting security through cooperation."¹⁴⁵ China's first attempt at implementation of the "new security concept" came at the 1996 meeting of the Shanghai Five (to be discussed in Chapter VI) between China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.¹⁴⁶ In January 1997, Chinese officials used the term "mutual security to describe China's preferred approach to regional security cooperation, offering the

¹⁴³ Wu Xinbo, "U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations," September 2000. Accessed at http://www.brookings.org/fp/cnaps/papers/2000_wu.htm on January 16, 2001.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. Pgs 172-176.

¹⁴⁵ Government of the People's Republic of China, "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept," August 6, 2002. Accessed at <http://un.fmprc.gov/cn/eng/33462.html>

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

Shanghai Agreement as an example of this concept ...(which is) based on three overlapping principles of common, cooperative, and comprehensive security.”¹⁴⁷

In China’s 1998 Defense White Paper, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders adopted the concept and promoted “cooperation in confidence-building measures (CBMs), considering the establishment of mutual trust between nations as an effective way to maintain security.”¹⁴⁸ The 1998 White Paper also recommended that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) explore ways to promote CBMs. Governmental leaders also promoted the new security concept during foreign visits. In March 1999, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, President Jiang Zemin discussed the fundamentals behind the new security concept.¹⁴⁹ In July 2000, during a speech to the Indonesian Council of World Affairs, Vice President Hu Jintao recommended fostering:

a new security concept that embraces the principles of equality, dialogue, trust and cooperation, and a new security order should be established to ensure genuine mutual respect, mutual cooperation, consensus through consultation and peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than bullying, confrontation, and imposition of one’s own will upon others. Only in that way can countries coexist in amity and secure their development.¹⁵⁰

The evolution of the new security concept continued in China’s 2000 Defense White Paper, which emphasized the continuing threat posed by the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The White Paper also recommended that the ARF “continue to focus on confidence building measures and explore new security concepts and methods, and discuss the question of preventive diplomacy (PD).”¹⁵¹

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks convinced the Chinese government of the growing threat of asymmetric attacks; if the world’s only superpower was attacked in

¹⁴⁷ David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, (Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pgs 176-177.

¹⁴⁸ People’s Liberation Army, White Paper – China’s National Defense, July 27, 1998. Accessed at <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm> .

¹⁴⁹ David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, (Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pg 177.

¹⁵⁰ Carlyle A. Thayer, “China’s New Security Concept and ASEAN,” Pacific Forum CSIS Comparative Connections, 3rd Quarter 2000. Accessed at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/003Qchina_asean.html.

¹⁵¹ People’s Liberation Army, China’s National Defense in 2000, October 2000. Accessed at <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/index.htm> .

such a devastating manner, all countries were vulnerable. The Chinese government understood the threat of terrorism, recognized a globalized world required economic interdependence, and saw an opportunity to promote common ground between China and the United States.¹⁵² The Chinese government responded by intensifying the call for its new security concept to become the model for a new multilateral security regime in Asia. It conducted a comprehensive review of its security policies. China's Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan released "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept" at the July-August 2002 Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. The paper promoted "common security through mutually beneficial cooperation." It proposed a flexible security concept that could span the spectrum from a rigid multilateral security regime to a "forum-like multilateral security dialogue." The core of the policy includes:¹⁵³

1. Mutual trust: relationships should transcend differences in ideology and social systems. It emphasizes moving away from power politics.
2. Mutual benefit: all countries should strive for economic development and respect for each other's security interests.
3. Equality: all countries should be treated equally on the international stage.
4. Coordination: all countries should peacefully settle their disputes.

During his November 2002 report to the 16th National Congress of the CPC, President Jiang Zemin made the New Security Concept official policy of the People's Republic of China. The 2002 Defense White Paper stated:

China will unrelentingly put the new security concept into practice, oppose all kinds of hegemonism and power politics, and combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations. China will strive, together with other countries in the world, to create an international environment of long-term peace, stability and security.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² People's Daily, "China's Security Model Shapes Peace," June 30, 2002. Accessed at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/30/print20020630_98811.html

¹⁵³ Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept" dated August 6, 2002. Accessed at <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/33462.html> .

¹⁵⁴ People's Liberation Army, China's National Defense in 2002, December 2002. Accessed at <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm> .

Prior to the publishing of the New Security Concept, Chinese foreign and security policy were based upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.¹⁵⁵ These principles are:¹⁵⁶

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Non-interference in each other's affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence

The Five Principles were the mainstay of Chinese foreign policy for almost fifty years. China now exercises more of a realist foreign policy, acting to protect its vital national interests.¹⁵⁷

Economic security is also a matter of extreme concern for the Chinese government. With its entry into the World Trade Organization, China is economically connected with the rest of the world. China has increasing reliance on raw materials, capital investments, and technology upgrades. A shortage of raw materials, specifically oil, is the principal economic vulnerability that China may suffer. "Stabilizing the external petroleum supply sources and safeguarding the smooth operation of the supply line must be regarded as an important component of safeguarding state security."¹⁵⁸ China is attempting to secure an oil pipeline from Siberia to its Daqing oil fields in northeast China. China is currently in a bidding war with Japan in an attempt to secure a stable source of Russian oil.¹⁵⁹

The U.S. War on Terrorism presented China with a strategic dilemma; on the one hand, China needs a stable relationship with the United States to continue its economic

¹⁵⁵ The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were originally published in 1954 as a joint communiqué released by the People's Republic of China and the Government of India. Prime Minister Nehru and Zhou En-lai agreed that the Five Principles would govern relations between the two countries.

¹⁵⁶ Denny Roy, *China's Foreign Relations* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) Pg 40.

¹⁵⁷ James Kynge and Richard McGregor, "China Replaces its Five Principles with Foreign Policy Pragmatism," ft.com, February 24, 2003.

¹⁵⁸ Zhang Yunling, "Observing China's Security Environment," *Beijing Liaowang*, April 3, 2000. Accessed from FBIS (article CPP20000411000046) on February 11, 2001.

¹⁵⁹ Martin Fackler, "Japan Turns to Old Foe Russia For Oil, Finding a Rival in China," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 17, 2003. Pg A13.

modernization, but on the other hand, China is threatened by the increased U.S. military presence in Asia.¹⁶⁰ So far, the Chinese government has been able to have its cake and eat it too. It fully supported the United States in its War in Afghanistan and acted as a diplomatic mediator between the United States and North Korea during the April 2003 negotiations over the North Korean nuclear crisis. This support greatly increased bilateral relations with the United States.

China has also been able to balance U.S. power by emphasizing the importance of international institutions and multilateral solutions to regional and global problems. This has helped constrain American domination of the global system. China achieved this by not supporting the U.S.- sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution on regime change in Iraq, and by its increased engagement in other multilateral institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, and as a participant in the May 2003 Group of Eight Summit held in France.

China recognizes that it cannot challenge U.S. power for several decades. In the meantime, it hopes to become one of several major powers that co-exist with the lone superpower, the United States. It will attempt to achieve this policy by emphasizing multilateral forums for solving regional issues while periodically joining one of the United States' "coalitions of the like-minded," when it suits China's strategic interests.

C. REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

The Republic of Korea was formed in August 1948 under President Syngman Rhee. South Korea was a virtual protectorate of the United States following the division of the two Koreas at the conclusion of World War II. On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched a surprise attack, starting the Korean War. The Korean War developed into the first active fighting of the Cold War; the United States saw the defense of Korea as vital to its newly established policy of containment - preventing the spread of communism in Asia. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, essentially freezing the conflict at the

¹⁶⁰ H. Lyman Miller, "An Uneasy Alliance," *Hoover Digest*, Summer 2002. Accessed at <http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/023/lmiller.html>.

38th parallel. The armistice also established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea that remains the powder keg for Northeast Asian security. The Cold War was frozen in a state of suspended animation along the DMZ; even today, the two Koreas remain in a state of war.¹⁶¹

The Republic of Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States on October 1, 1953. This treaty was the foundational document for the U.S.-ROK Security Alliance. The treaty provides for the defense of South Korea, the basing of U.S. forces in Korea, and has a mutual defense clause, which distinguishes it from the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The United States has 37,000 troops based in South Korea, providing a deterrent force against any future North Korean attacks. South Korea became a virtual “client-state” of the United States. South Korea toed the U.S. line when it came to economic and security policies until the end of the Cold War in 1991.¹⁶²

The end of the Cold War coupled with the normalization of ties between South Korea and China in 1992 placed significant strains on the U.S.-ROK relationship. South Korea felt a historic kinship with the Chinese and saw the expanding Chinese economy as a tremendous opportunity for the future. U.S. trade relations were increasingly bitter due to the large trade deficits racked up by the United States in the early 1990’s. The 1997 Asian financial crisis also caused strains on the U.S.-ROK relationship. Many South Koreans blamed the United States for their monetary problems since the United States virtually dictated economic policy to South Korea.

In February 1998, Kim Dae-jung was elected President of South Korea. President Kim took a more independent policy track than his predecessors; announcing a new policy of engagement with North Korea. This policy, which was known as the Sunshine Policy, was intended to eliminate military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. The policy promoted bilateral talks and had three main principles:¹⁶³

1. No tolerance for armed provocation on the Korean peninsula.

¹⁶¹ Encyclopedia Britannica, “The Korean War,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Accessed at <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=47147&tocid=0&query=korean%20war&ct=> on May 25, 2002.

¹⁶² Nicholas N. Eberstadt, “Korea,” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. Strategic Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks (Seattle: NBR, 2002) Pg 131.

¹⁶³ Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 2001: The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia, (Seoul: KRIS, 2001) Pg. 36.

2. No unification through unilateral action or absorption.
3. Active promotion of reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas.

The Sunshine Policy became the foundation for Korean foreign policy during the Kim administration. South Korean security policy was revised because North Korea was no longer considered the primary threat. South Korean military spending was increasingly tied to force projection; the ROK military focused on procurement of “submarines, Aegis destroyers, amphibious transport vessels, naval helicopters, and air-refueling aircraft.”¹⁶⁴ South Korea hoped to achieve peaceful unification of the two Koreas, permitting the reunification of many families separated by the strife of the Korean War. The efforts of the Sunshine Policy culminated in a historic summit between President Kim and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Il from June 13-15, 2000.

The Clinton administration supported the Sunshine Policy through coordination of U.S. and South Korean diplomatic and economic efforts with respect to North Korea. The Clinton administration hoped to use the successful summit meeting as a stepping-stone to future talks between President Clinton and Chairman Kim Jong-il. Upon its inauguration in 2001, the Bush administration took a hard-line policy regarding North Korea. The United States now considered North Korea as a “rogue state” that needed to be contained. North Korea responded by breaking off talks with South Korea. This added to South Korean resentment toward the United States because South Koreans felt the Bush administration was attempting to undercut the Sunshine Policy.¹⁶⁵

There are reasons for this sacrosanctity of reunification in Korean society. Besides the ethnic homogeneity and cultural similarity between the two Koreas, many Koreans have close family members who have been on the other side of the DMZ since the war ended...For these and other South Koreans, the issue of famine in North Korea is not only a cause for honorable and humane concern, but a reason to worry about whether their parents, children or grandchildren have enough to survive.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Nicholas N. Eberstadt, “Korea,” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. Strategic Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks (Seattle: NBR, 2002) Pgs 161-162.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. Pg 38.

¹⁶⁶ Sangmee Bak, “Suddenly, Three’s a Crowd in South Korea,” The Washington Post, January 26, 2003. Pg B1.

In June 2002, the role of the U.S.-ROK security commitment became an increasing source of friction due to an unfortunate training accident in which two South Korean schoolchildren were run over and killed by a U.S. military vehicle. The U.S. soldiers were tried and acquitted in a U.S. military court. Anti-U.S. sentiment spread throughout all levels of Korean society. In the fall of 2002, protests were held on almost a daily basis calling for revision in the U.S. Status of Forces agreement, and a reduction/withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. South Koreans increasingly saw the United States as more of a threat than North Korea. The anti-U.S. sentiment played a major role in the December 2002 election of Roh Moo Hyun as the next president of South Korea. President Roh ran on a platform that was critical of “the subservient relationship of his country to the United States.”¹⁶⁷

Despite the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear crisis, “Mr. Roh is so firmly committed to engagement with North Korea that any coercive or military measures by Washington aimed at terminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs could end up destroying the 50-year old alliance.”¹⁶⁸ Before his inauguration, President Roh even suggested the Koreas should stand together against the United States, refusing to “kow-tow” to U.S. demands.¹⁶⁹

The South Korean policy toward resolving the nuclear crisis seemed to reverse course following the April summit between the United States, North Korea, and China. North Korea reportedly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons during the summit. This statement changed the peninsula security dynamic with all regional players now publicly voicing their opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program. Under the concerted pressure from Washington and the other regional powers, President Roh appears to now support the U.S. policy line.¹⁷⁰ This change of heart could also be the result of the May 2003 announcement of a U.S. military force posture review. President Roh was likely

¹⁶⁷ Doug Struck, “Resentment Toward U.S. Troops Is Boiling Over in South Korea,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2002. Pg A17.

¹⁶⁸ Howard W. French, “Reversals in U.S.-South Korea Links, and Some Jagged Fault Lines,” nytimes.com, February 11, 2003.

¹⁶⁹ Howard W. French, “U.S. Approach on North Korea Strains Alliances in Asia,” nytimes.com, February 24, 2003.

¹⁷⁰ Gordon Fairclough, “Seoul Demands North Korea Scrap Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal Online, April 28, 2003.

pressured during his May 2003 summit with President Bush to get in step with U.S. policy or suffer the consequences. South Korea relies on U.S. military personnel stationed at the DMZ to act as a tripwire. South Korea believes that as long as U.S. troops are stationed at the DMZ, the United States and North Korea will not initiate hostile action due to the tremendous loss-of-life that would result. Without the U.S. tripwire, Seoul is vulnerable to a surprise attack that could decimate the city in a matter of hours.¹⁷¹

Current South Korean security policy is adrift. The U.S.-ROK security alliance is suffering from an unclear primary mission, similar to the mid-90's struggle in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The United States and South Korea must agree on a common policy toward North Korea and work together to redefine the U.S.-ROK relationship to ensure it continues into the future.

D. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in 1948 under Kim Il-Sung. In 1949, Kim Il-Sung was appointed the first premier of the Korean Worker's Party, the de-facto head of the communist regime. He ruled North Korea with an iron fist until his death in 1994 by promoting himself as the "Great Leader" of the Korean people. Throughout the Cold War, Chairman Kim deftly switched camps between the Soviet Union and China depending on which relationship would provide the most benefit to North Korea. In 1966, President Kim announced that North Korea would follow a new independent party line. This policy stressed "complete equality, sovereignty, mutual respect, and noninterference among the communist worker's parties." The independent party line evolved into North Korea's *juche* (self-reliance) policy. The four principles of *juche* were:¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Howard W. French, "G.I.'s Will Gradually Leave Korea DMZ to Cut War Risk," nytimes.com, June 6, 2003.

¹⁷² Encyclopedia Britannica, "North Korea," [Encyclopedia Britannica Online](http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?query=north%20korea&ct=eb&eu=114856&tocid=214597#214597.toc). Accessed at <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?query=north%20korea&ct=eb&eu=114856&tocid=214597#214597.toc> on May 25, 2003.

1. Ideological autonomy.
2. Independence in politics
3. Economic self-sufficiency
4. Self-reliance in defense

In the late 1960's, North Korea began to emphasize the importance of the military. North Korea embarked on an ambitious military-building program to the detriment of its economy due to loss of economic aid from other communist block members. North Korea remained diplomatically isolated up until the end of the Cold War. North Korea maintained relations only with the Soviet Union and China. North Korea also pursued an anti-American foreign policy.¹⁷³

During the 1980s and 1990s, North Korea's policy toward South Korea alternated between provocation and peace overtures. In October 1980, Chairman Kim proposed the creation of a Korean republic with equal representation for both sides. Later in the decade, however, North Korea conducted several terrorist bombings against South Korean interests. In September 1989, North Korea announced a new policy line, building a "Great and Prosperous Nation." The policy objectives included: (1) a strong nation in politics and ideology; (2) a strong nation in the military; and (3) a strong nation in the economy.¹⁷⁴

In 1991, a series of talks were held between the respective Prime Ministers. This resulted in a joint declaration of "Nonaggression and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," however; these overtures were quickly overcome by North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty in 1993. Kim Il-Sung's death in July 1994 renewed hopes for peaceful resolution of the Korean issues.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 2001: The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia, (Seoul: KRIS, 2001) Pg. 273.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

On October 24, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the “Agreed Framework” which was designed to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program. The agreement had the following provisions:¹⁷⁶

1. North Korea would shut down its graphite-moderated reactors and submit to IAEA inspection in exchange for U.S.- provided light-water reactors by 2003. The United States agreed to provide 500,000 tons of heavy-oil as an alternative fuel source until the light-water reactors were operational.
2. The DPRK and the United States agreed to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
3. The DPRK and the United States would work for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
4. The DPRK would work to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Relations between the United States and North Korea improved during the remainder of the 1990’s due to the Clinton administration’s desire to support South Korea’s Sunshine Policy. Relations took a turn for the worse in 2001 when the Bush administration took a hard-line approach toward North Korea. The Bush administration considered North Korea a “rogue regime,” and President Bush announced that North Korea was a member of the “Axis of Evil” during his January 2002 State of the Union address.

In October 2002 representatives of North Korea, when challenged by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, admitted that North Korea was operating a covert uranium-based nuclear weapons program. The North Korean admission started a diplomatic standoff among the major nations of Northeast Asia over how to deal with North Korea. The United States declared that North Korea was in violation of the Agreed Framework and suspended oil shipments to North Korea. The North Koreans responded by expelling the IAEA inspectors, restarting their graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon, and withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty.

¹⁷⁶ Governments of the United States and North Korea, “Agreed Framework between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Accessed at <http://216.109.117.135/search/cache?p=Agreed+Framework&url=tdHfpajKP98J:www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf> on May 25, 2003.

The current North Korean nuclear crisis appears to be an attempt by Chairman Kim Jong-Il to force the United States to change its policy toward North Korea in order to ensure regime survival, and rebuild North Korea's devastated economy. North Korea hoped to leverage anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea, South Korea's desire to see the Sunshine Policy succeed, and U.S. preoccupation with the War on Terrorism and regime change in Iraq to achieve its strategic goals.¹⁷⁷ So far, the crisis appears to be working against North Korea as all the major regional actors have lined up alongside the United States in calling for North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons program.¹⁷⁸

E. RUSSIA

September 11, 2001 marked a historic shift in Russia's role in the world. President Putin accepted that Russia was no longer a superpower, and decided to shift Russia's strategic view toward Europe; no longer could Russia act as a dominant power in Asia. President Putin phoned President Bush within hours of the terrorist attacks and provided his unconditional support to the U.S.- led War on Terrorism.¹⁷⁹

Historically, Russia is only a dominant power in Asia when China is weak and the Russian government is able to devote sufficient resources to maintain a strategic presence in the region. Russia's strategic objectives are: (1) territorial security; (2) state prestige; and (3) welfare of the Russian people. The problem since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been how to balance these priorities.¹⁸⁰

In the early 1990's, Moscow tried to maintain its place in the bipolar order as a superpower opposing U.S. power around the globe. Even after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the former Soviet Republics, Russia continued to try to maintain its strategic struggle against the United States. By the mid-1990s, Russia's

¹⁷⁷ STRATFOR, "North Korea: Six-Sided Game Keeps Solution Distant," STRATFOR Regional Analyses, January 17, 2003, Story ID#209240.

¹⁷⁸ Gordon Fairclough, "A Surprise in Korean Crisis: Consensus," The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2003. Pg A16.

¹⁷⁹ William C. Wohlforth, "Russia," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. Strategic Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks (Seattle: NBR: 2002) Pg. 183-184.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. Pgs 188-189.

economy was a wreck and Russian leaders recognized they could no longer compete with the United States for strategic leadership. Russia began to emphasize the dangers of a unipolar world and the need to restore a multipolar balance of power; Moscow wanted to lead the international community against U.S. hegemony. Russian elites “believed that Moscow genuinely was on course to become the linchpin in a new Eurasian anti-hegemonic coalition that would reorder world politics and end America’s unipolar moment.”¹⁸¹

Russia maintained security ties with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (to be discussed more fully in chapter VI), continued to export arms around the world to gain hard currency, and focused on enhancing economic relationships. In March 2000, President Putin proposed returning two of the disputed Kuril Islands to Japan in an attempt to normalize Russo-Japanese relations and gain much-needed economic aid from Japan. The December 2001 visit of the Russian Defense Minister to Tokyo led to defense exchanges between the two countries. In July 2000, President Putin exchanged visits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in an effort to re-establish close ties between the countries. President Putin attempted to convince the North Koreans to abandon their missile program to neuter the U.S. argument for missile defense.¹⁸²

In the aftermath of September 11, President Putin and the Russian elites opted to take a demotion in Russia’s strategic prestige today in order to expedite its eventual return to power. President Putin recognized that his current focus needed to be on rejuvenating the Russian economy and building the political institutions necessary to sustain economic growth.

The more Russians recognized the extent of their country’s decline, the more importance they place on the modernization imperative and the more inclined they are incrementally to scale back their expectations for international status and to pare down their security agenda.¹⁸³

President Putin’s emphasis was now on gaining access to Western financial and trade organizations.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. Pgs 191-192.

¹⁸² Ibid 201-203.

¹⁸³ Ibid. Pgs 190-191.

In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, Russia offered the following support to the United States:¹⁸⁴

1. Exchange of intelligence on international terrorists.
2. The use of Russian airspace for humanitarian flights.
3. Encourage Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to host U.S. forces engaged in combating terrorism.
4. Cooperation in search-and-rescue missions
5. Military assistance to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

“Faced with an expansionary NATO to the west, an expansionary China to the east and increasingly militant Islam to the south, Russia’s room to maneuver has shrunk precipitously over the past decade.”¹⁸⁵ Russia’s Eastern Fleet is in shambles. Its ability to project power, with the exception of its few operational submarines, is almost non-existent. Russia’s population is declining while the populations in China and the neighboring former Soviet Republics are exploding. This has resulted in China encouraging immigration to the Russian Far East. Russia is increasingly losing control of its demographics.¹⁸⁶

President Putin’s acceptance of Washington’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, his support for U.S. military presence in Central Asia, and his support for NATO expansion all demonstrate the steps he is willing to take to support friendly relations with the United States. “Putin is seeking a geopolitical alliance with the West as a whole and seems willing to accept Russia’s junior status...he seeks to convince Russia and the West that they are on the same team on all issues of importance.”¹⁸⁷ Despite a split over supporting the U.S.- sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution on regime change in Iraq, U.S.-Russian relations appear to be back on track following the May 2003 summit between President Bush and President Putin.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. Pg 206.

¹⁸⁵ STRATFOR, “Redefined: Russia’s Path Post-Sept. 11,” STRATFOR Regional Analyses, Story ID#205741, August 14, 2002. Pg 2.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. Pg 3.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. Pg 4.

F. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

Southeast Asian security issues are of vital interest to U.S. Asian security policy. This is for several reasons:¹⁸⁸

1. Southeast Asia is the crossroads for trade flowing from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific basin. Security through the Straits of Malacca is crucial for the passage of strategic materials that are critical to the well being of Japan and many other U.S. allies.
2. Sea-Lines-of-Communication through the Straits of Malacca are vital to U.S. forces' ability to reach the Middle East in a timely manner.
3. Southeast Asia is the cultural and geographic crossroads of Asia. It is one of the few regions of the world where major Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim populations co-exist with each other.
4. Southeast Asia is a major trading partner for the United States. It is also important in the balance-of- power equation in Asia.

Many Asian analysts believe that Southeast Asia will be a major source of conflict during the twenty-first century. "The persistence of historical antagonisms, the absence or weakness of institutions, the weakness of the Southeast Asian "state", the existence of an incipient arms race and the potential for its further escalation, and the belief that war is still a cost-effective instrument of policy in Asia"¹⁸⁹ are the main reasons for this belief.

Following the example of an independent Indonesia in the 1950's, Southeast Asia has attempted to control its own destiny, free from superpower influence, in the realm of regional cooperation and security. In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed to counter: (1) a fear of communism; (2) mistrust of external powers; (3) the desire for a cooperative framework between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; (4) considerations of regime consolidation; and (5) the desire to concentrate

¹⁸⁸ Zalmay Khalilzad et al, The United States and Asia (Santa Monica: Rand Press, 2001) pg 163

¹⁸⁹ Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 1998) pg 5.

on economic development. “Although the formally articulated purpose of ASEAN was economic and socio-cultural cooperation, security was a key concern from its inception.”¹⁹⁰ ASEAN “developed slowly during its first decade, partly because of diverse economic interests, varied historical experience, and the initially fragile political ties among the five original members (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines).”¹⁹¹ The collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 prompted ASEAN to take its relationship to a new level. In 1976, the first ASEAN summit conference was held and a Declaration of ASEAN Concord was signed. This document promoted cooperative activities among the member nations. This document formed the major “constitutional base” for ASEAN cooperation.

In July 1998, the Foreign Minister of Singapore, S. Jayakumar, outlined the norms of ASEAN as:¹⁹²

1. Sovereign equality and decisions by consultations and consensus.
2. Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
3. Avoidance of the use of force to change established governments or an internationally recognized political order.
4. Open economies
5. Making ASEAN the cornerstone of its member’s foreign policies.

ASEAN’s relations since its creation in 1967 have generally been on a bilateral basis. Early cooperation revolved mainly focused on intelligence sharing and border cooperation. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the cooperation expanded into mutual training, joint exercises, and defense industrial cooperation.¹⁹³ Despite these ties, military relations have remained on a bilateral, versus multilateral, level. This is primarily due to a lack of

¹⁹⁰ Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 1998) pg 107.

¹⁹¹ State Department Background Notes on ASEAN, March 1992.

¹⁹² Amitav Acharya Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001) pg. 121

¹⁹³ Amitav Acharya Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001) pg 146-147.

vision concerning the need for a collective military pact. Three reasons explain why ASEAN has never seriously considered collective defense: ¹⁹⁴

- a. ASEAN states continue to see threat-oriented cooperation as unduly provocative to potential adversaries.
- b. Such cooperation is seen as futile due to the weak self-defense capabilities of member nations.
- c. Standardization and interoperability of military equipment is limited.

Additionally, several of the countries believe an ASEAN military force could be created overnight, if necessary. This could not be further from the truth, as evidenced by the non-existent ASEAN response to the East Timor crisis in 1999.

The end of the Cold War brought increasing emphasis on self-reliance throughout Southeast Asia.

Today there is much greater pride, more self-confidence, and a growing desire to be more self-reliant and avoid the vulnerability that results from reliance on another country for security. The strong wave of nationalism in Asian states also supports the development of independent national capabilities.¹⁹⁵

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN's security apparatus, was formed in July 1994. ARF is composed of ASEAN and all other major regional and international players in Southeast Asia. The ARF was designed as a forum to discuss security issues at the regional level while keeping the great powers involved. The ARF focuses on the use of confidence building measures (CBMs) to build mutual trust between member countries and develop "norms" for interaction.¹⁹⁶

In 1997, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand successfully negotiated a peaceful solution to a potential civil war in Cambodia. Due to ARF's intervention, elections were held, with the results accepted by both sides. The Asian financial crisis in

¹⁹⁴ Amitav Acharya Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001) pg. 151.

¹⁹⁵ Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 1998) pg 631.

¹⁹⁶ Barry Desker, The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum (CSIS PacNet Newsletter #36, 9/7/2001).

the fall of 1997 marked the beginning of a five-year free fall for ASEAN. Essentially, ASEAN was helpless to do anything to avert the financial crisis, and the resulting lack of confidence among members showed. This lack of confidence was partly the reason for ASEAN's poor showing in the East Timor crisis of 1999. A United Nations force led by Australia eventually restored peace to the island.¹⁹⁷

The events of September 11 also shook the strategic landscape of Southeast Asia. It was recognized that Southeast Asia was home to several Islamist terrorist organizations including Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and Jemaah Islamiyah (responsible for the October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali), in the Philippines and Indonesia. At the August 2002 meeting of the ARF, the group of ministers pledged to fight international terrorism. This was seen as a "watershed for the institution" – a shift in focus and role. The ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing states that member nations will adopt U.N. identified measures to combat terrorist financing including: freezing assets, sharing financial data, providing technical assistance to cognizant authorities, and compliance reporting. This represents the first time that ARF members have agreed to concrete actions as opposed to just CBMs.¹⁹⁸

The significant strategic issues for ARF member countries are: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, SLOC protection, anti-piracy, and counter-narcotics.¹⁹⁹ Other issues of concern include the changing U.S. force structure in Asia, U.S.-China relations, Japan's regional security role, and its development as a "normal" country.²⁰⁰ "This shift toward transnational threats requires a broad-based approach to security, a formulation that takes us closer to the notions of 'comprehensive national security' that China has championed." This, however, leads to strong voices of opposition from ASEAN countries that strongly cherish their national sovereignty and are afraid of foreign intervention to combat terrorist forces. The next several years will be a critical

¹⁹⁷ Domingo L. Siazon, Jr. "ASEAN is on the right track with ARF," The Japan Times Online, August 3, 2002.

¹⁹⁸ Brad Glosserman, "Forum Breaks New Ground," The Japan Times Online, August 20, 2002.

¹⁹⁹ Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam and Mr. George Fernandes, "Statements from the Second IISS Asia Security Conference," June 1, 2002. Accessed at <http://www.iiss.org/shangri-la.php>

²⁰⁰ Jusuf Wanandi, "Statement from the Second IISS Asia Security Conference," May 31, 2002. Accessed at <http://www.iiss.org/shangri-la.php>

period in the development of the ARF. Possible options include collapse or development into a more mature security regime

With the exception of on the Korean peninsula, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 provided a strategic nexus between the major actors in the Asia-Pacific. The recognition that transnational terrorism is a common threat has provided renewed emphasis on the importance of international cooperation to win the War on Terrorism. The challenge ahead for the Asia-Pacific region is to build on the heightened security awareness to develop a broad-based multilateral security forum that can ensure the peace and stability of the region well into the future. This topic will be explored further in Chapter VI.

VI. PROSPECTS FOR MULTILATERAL SECURITY IN ASIA

A. BACKGROUND

Multilateralism refers to a system of coordinating relations between three or more states in accordance with certain principles of conduct. In the twentieth century, the increased interdependence of states in economic, political, and military matters coupled with rapid industrial, scientific, and technological developments led directly to the growth of multi-purpose, universal organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations.²⁰¹

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateralism has been on the rise throughout the Asia-Pacific. The shift of the security order from bipolarity, between the United States and the Soviet Union, to unipolarity, with the United States as the lone superpower, challenged Asian countries to find other venues to ensure their security interests are considered. “Multilateralism is the foundation upon which other aspects of the post-Cold War regulative settlement have been constructed.”²⁰²

According to Ian Clark, regulative peace can occur through two different forms of multilateralism. The first form is “hegemonic.” Under hegemonic multilateralism, the multilateral regime dictates the limits of state power except for that of the hegemon. With its emergence as the lone superpower, the United States had the ability to dictate the terms of multilateralism to the rest of the world.²⁰³ The United States has clearly exercised hegemonic multilateralism from the end of the Cold War up until the start of the War on Terrorism. This was elucidated by the use of the United Nations and NATO during the 1991 Gulf War, the Bosnia peacekeeping mission, and the Kosovo conflict. In each case, the United States used its pre-eminent position to dictate the security agenda to the rest of the world.

²⁰¹ Graham Evans, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, (London: Penguin Books, 1998) Pg 340.

²⁰² Ian Clark, The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace (New York: Oxford University, 2001) Pg 168.

²⁰³ Ibid. Pgs 175-176.

The second form of multilateralism is “constitutional.” In this version, “there are incentives for the leading state to agree to limit its power – to insert itself into a constitutional order – in exchange for the acquiescence and compliant participation of secondary states in the postwar order.”²⁰⁴ Constitutional multilateralism obviously is preferred by the weaker states because it allows them to maintain a say in the security order. This form of multilateralism has been pursued by Asian-Pacific nations throughout the 1990’s and early twentieth century in an attempt to contain U.S. power.

B. JAPANESE VIEWS

Japan first proposed a multilateral arrangement in the 1960s; Japan proposed multilateral economic relations with Southeast Asia. This proposal was, however, soundly rejected. Japan was also an early supporter of the concept of ASEAN; Japan saw ASEAN as a way to stabilize Southeast Asia in the wake of the Vietnam War.²⁰⁵

The strains in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and Japan’s accompanying attempt to regain its international prestige, have led to challenges for leadership in Southeast Asia. Japan is extremely dependent on strategic resources and overall trade from Southeast Asia. This fact, coupled with its economic malaise over the last decade, has led to renewed calls for Japan to reach out and become the leader of a new multilateral security framework in Southeast Asia. Japan is essentially pursuing a hedge-strategy against a decline in U.S. strategic interests in Asia.²⁰⁶

In July 1991, following Japan’s international humiliation from its perceived “check-book diplomacy,” Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed that the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) include a new multilateral security dialogue. This proposal was a bold-step in Japanese security policy; it was the first time Japan proposed a security initiative without the backing of the United States. Despite the

²⁰⁴ Ibid. Pg 177.

²⁰⁵ Nobuo Okawara and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japan and Asia-Pacific security: regionalization, entrenched bilateralism and incipient multilateralism,” *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2001. Pg 176.

²⁰⁶ Amitav Acharya *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 2001) Pg 208.

PMC's rejection of the proposal, the Nakayama Initiative set the diplomatic wheels in motion, eventually resulting in the 1994 creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). By the end of 1990s, Japan proposed that the ARF move from CBMs to Preventive diplomacy.²⁰⁷

“Japan places heavy emphasis on using multilateral diplomacy and international trade and investment to increase its influence and build a more stable regional order.”²⁰⁸ This policy was elucidated in Japan's goals for the twenty-first century, sponsored by Prime Minister Obuchi in January 2000. This report listed the four pillars of a “multi-layered security framework” for Japanese security as:²⁰⁹

1. U.S. security alliance.
2. Efforts to build trust through diplomacy and multilateral institutions
3. Economic security
4. Human security

Japan, due to its economic malaise, has increasingly pursued the ASEAN+3 initiative as a means to economic recovery and renewed growth throughout Asia.

ASEAN presently has no core. But if Japan and China enter the mix and powerfully advance a cooperative framework, the possibility for further large-scale Asian growth exists...If Japan does not exercise joint leadership in Asia with China, Japan will be left behind.²¹⁰

Several Japanese politicians fear that the United States is attempting to use its dominant advantage over the world economy to turn NAFTA and APEC into “twin bases for Pax Americana.” In response, they have called for ASEAN+3 to become the “Asian Economic Community” (AEC). They believe the AEC could assume leadership of APEC to prevent U.S. domination of world trade.²¹¹ These calls for regional economic cooperation with Japanese and Chinese leadership are achieving popular appeal

²⁰⁷ Ibid. Pg 177.

²⁰⁸ Aaron L. Friedberg, ed., Strategic Asia 2001-2002 (The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001) Pg. 8.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. Pg 81.

²¹⁰ Ibid. Pg 107.

²¹¹ Ibid.

throughout Southeast Asia. Japanese leadership of APEC would be fully in keeping with their “dual hedge” strategy by which Japan allows the United States to lead in the security arena while pursuing a more independent economic agenda.

C. CHINESE VIEWS

In the early 1990s, China viewed multilateral forums with suspicion. China was still suffering from the adverse international press and sanctions imposed following the 1999 Tiananmen Square standoff. The Chinese believed that international forums were just another way to attack China’s policies and oppose China’s return to “great power” status. ASEAN’s 1995 stand against China’s South China Sea policy was one of the turning points in China’s view of multilateralism. China recognized the only way to defend herself was by becoming a participating member of the forums.²¹²

“China prefers a multilateral approach that is oriented toward discussion without commitment. It prescribes a non-binding approach in which all participants have the opportunity to air views, but absent consensus, does not bind the participants to a specific course of action.”²¹³

China’s July 1998 Defense White Paper outlined Japan’s vision for a post-Cold War security order. The strategy included:²¹⁴

1. the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
2. Free-trade
3. the promotion of mutual trust and understanding through CBMs
4. development of strategic partnerships.

Since the mid-1990s, China has increased its participation in multilateral forums. China sees the forums as its only viable method to counter U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. China believes the U.S. bilateral alliance system is designed to contain China. It

²¹² David Finkelstein and Michael McDevitt, “Competition and Consensus: China’s “New Concept of Security” and the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” PacNet CSIS Newsletter, No. 1, January 8, 1999. Pg 3.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid. Pg 2.

continues to stress that U.S. hegemony and power politics are the biggest threat to regional peace and stability. China is “attempting to present a more benign and less threatening face in East Asia...it wants to be seen as a responsible Asian power.”²¹⁵

In the last several years, China has dramatically increased its military ties with neighboring countries. These increased ties include high-level military contacts, ship exchange visits, and cooperation in military education and training. China has also been a major participant in several multilateral forums including, APEC, ARF, CSCAP, and NEACD (discussed later in this chapter). China continues CBMs with the ARF and has discussed the use of preventive diplomacy.²¹⁶ Additionally, China now participates in U.N. peacekeeping missions and was an observer in the 2002 Cobra Gold exercise.²¹⁷

D. U.S. VIEWS

The United States, in the early 1990s, was leery of multilateralism. It preferred bilateral approaches to regional security issues. The United States had bad memories of its previous experiences with multilateral security institutions in Southeast Asia (SEATO) and Central Asia (CENTO). Additionally, during the Cold War, the Kremlin attempted to introduce multilateral security mechanisms into Asia in an attempt to weaken U.S. influence. In 1993 at his confirmation hearing, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord stated that “enhancement of multilateral security dialogue” was one of President Clinton’s top Asian policy goals. In addition, in 1993, President Clinton called for the creation of “a new Pacific community, built on shared strength, shared prosperity, and a shared commitment to democratic values.” The four stated priorities for this new community were:²¹⁸

²¹⁵ Ibid. Pg 4.

²¹⁶ Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s International Security Cooperation.” Accessed at <http://www.chinese-embassy.no/eng/11830.html> on September 6, 2001.

²¹⁷ Cobra Gold is a trilateral security exercise that occurs between the United States military, Thailand’s military forces, and Singapore’s military forces. Cobra Gold 2002 had a anti-terrorism component and included observers from 14 nations including China. See Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia,” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. *Strategic Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks* (Seattle: NBR, 2002) Pg 333.

²¹⁸ Ralph Cossa, et al. “Security Multilateralism in Asia: Views from the United States and Japan,” *Columbia International Affairs Online*, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper 51, June

1. Continued U.S. military presence/commitment
2. Stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
3. Support for democracy and societies that are more open.
4. The promotion of new multilateral regional dialogues on the full range of common security challenges.

President Clinton's administration became actively involved in multilateral forums including ARF, KEDO, the Four-Party Talks, CSCAP, and NEACD (all to be discussed in more detail later). Despite this newfound commitment to multilateralism, U.S. officials stressed that they were only a supplement to existing bilateral relationships. Despite the talk, the Clinton administration was not fully onboard the multilateral wave that was rolling through Asia.²¹⁹

In 2001, the Bush administration entered office and conducted a wholesale review of U.S. security policy. The administration initially took a much more hard-line view towards China and North Korea. The change in U.S. policy initially had a negative impact on multilateral security forums throughout Asia; many of the forums were suspended. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. policy became supportive of multilateral cooperation. The War on Terrorism required multilateral cooperation to achieve U.S. objectives. The new multilateral approach was elucidated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (discussed in Chapter V), the U.S. attempt to gain United Nations backing for regime change in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's "coalitions of the willing," and U.S. insistence on developing a multilateral solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis.

At the 2003 Shangri-La Dialogue, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated:

We can build on established relationships to maintain an active security posture in Asia and to encourage broader multilateral cooperation. Although multilateral mechanisms of cooperation in Asia are relatively

1999. Pg 5. Accessed at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/akf01/akf01.html>

²¹⁹ Ibid. Pg 6.

new, they hold important promise for enabling countries of the region to resolve problems peacefully.²²⁰

The Bush administration appears to have recognized that multilateralism is necessary to ensure the future security of the Asia-Pacific region.

E. MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN ASIA

Emerging multilateral security mechanisms in Asia can be important vehicles for promoting long-term peace and stability. Institutionalized multilateral forums can be most valuable if they serve as confidence-building measures aimed at avoiding, rather than reacting to, crises or aggression.²²¹

This section will discuss the background and issues involved in several Asian multilateral forums.

1. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The end of the Cold War brought renewed interest in the strategy of cooperative security. This idea has been pushed by ASEAN states and Japan. This is driven by several factors:²²²

- a. The growing connectivity between Northeast and Southeast Asia in the globalized world.
- b. Concern over the fluidity of the regional security environment.
- c. A desire to constrain and engage the major powers, especially China.

²²⁰ Paul Wolfowitz, "Remarks at the IISS Asian Security Conference," May 31, 2003. Accessed at <http://www.iiss.org/shangri-la-more.php?itemID=11>.

²²¹ Ralph Cossa, et al. "Security Multilateralism in Asia: Views from the United States and Japan," Columbia International Affairs Online, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper 51, June 1999. Pg 15. Accessed at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/akf01/akf01.html>

²²² Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 1998) Pg. 636.

- d. A desire to take the lead and command their own destiny in developing a new regional security architecture.

The response to these concerns was the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1994. The ARF is composed of ASEAN and all other major regional and international players in Southeast Asia.

Implicit in its conceptualization was the recognition that regional issues required the engagement of the great powers in regional affairs. The ARF focused on building mutual trust and sought to develop norms through confidence building measures.²²³

The major problem with the ARF from the United States' viewpoint is its slow, methodical development of security cooperation. ARF relies on consensus and emphasizes the importance of "the process" over "the product."²²⁴ Western members of the ARF charge that it is too slow and amounts to nothing more than a 'talk shop'. Unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN (and the ARF), have

drifted toward impotence. Its rapid expansion from six market-oriented countries to ten members—including pariah socialist nations like Burma and Laos—diluted internal cohesion, and the reluctance of the U.S., Japan, and the E.U. to share a table has weakened ASEAN's utility as a multilateral forum.²²⁵

ASEAN also faces several security challenges, both external and internal. The internal burdens are membership expansion, which brings new challenges of managing underdeveloped nations, and new sources of conflict over economic and border migration issues. The external burden comes primarily from its 'leadership' role in the ARF, and the loss of prestige that would occur if the ARF were to fail.²²⁶

The 1997 Asian financial crisis and the associated political upheaval in Indonesia

²²³ Barry Desker, The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum (CSIS PacNet Newsletter #36, 9/7/2001).

²²⁴ Amitav Acharya Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001) Pg. 201.

²²⁵ Dana R. Dillon, Priorities for Southeast Asian Policy (The Heritage Foundation No. 746, 5/10/2001)

²²⁶ Amitav Acharya Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001) Pg. 205.

knocked out the underpinnings of the Southeast Asian security system and brought dynamic changes in the region's security environment. The economic crisis seriously weakened the cohesion and regional security role of ASEAN, put a severe strain on defense budgets throughout the region, and increased political volatility and ethnic and religious tensions in a number of Southeast Asian states.²²⁷

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 gave the ARF an opportunity to reinvent itself. Immediately following the attacks, ASEAN members were leery of increased U.S. military presence in the region. They feared that local terrorist groups might instigate U.S. intervention in their countries as part of President Bush's campaign to "weed out terrorism wherever it exists." However, at the July 2002 meeting, the ARF issued a "Statement on Measures against Terrorist Financing" in response to a U.S. request for support in combating terrorism. The ARF statement specified actions that ARF members would take to combat terrorism. Both ASEAN and ARF have made strong formal statements to cooperate in the War on Terrorism. "If these new pledges are implemented, both regional organizations could make significant progress toward enhancing regional security and validating their relevance in a new international context."²²⁸

2. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

APEC was established in 1989. It emphasizes the development of economic growth, trade, and investment throughout the region. There are currently twenty-one member countries, encompassing most countries that border the Pacific Ocean.

The annual APEC gathering of economic leaders has become the single most important institution in the Asia Pacific region. It brings top level attention to APEC's vision of free trade and investment as well as

²²⁷ Zalmay Khalilzad et al, The United States and Asia (Santa Monica: Rand Press, 2001) Pg. 164-165.

²²⁸ Sheldon W. Simon, "Southeast Asia," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. Strategic Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks (Seattle: NBR, 2002) Pg 336.

providing a forum for Leaders to meet on a regular basis both as a group and bilaterally to discuss current issues and resolve disputes.²²⁹

APEC provides several important functions:²³⁰

- a. Promotes trade and investment liberalization
- b. Plays a complementary role to the International Monetary Fund.
- c. Promotes increased transparency, openness, and predictability based on the rule of law.
- d. Serves a crucial role in advancing long-term projects and initiatives to reform members' economies and implement changes necessary to sustain economic recovery.
- e. Promotes discussion among leaders and ensures that economic growth translates into real social progress.
- f. Allows for public-private collaboration such as developing e-commerce.

The most significant early benefit of APEC was China's participation at a time when China was not a member of the World Trade Organization or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. APEC provided member countries a forum to interact with Chinese officials to resolve economic issues and ensure maximum two-way trade with the rapidly growing Chinese market. Chinese officials viewed APEC as a diplomatic vehicle, a venue for geo-political dialogue, and as a means to integrate into the world trade system.²³¹

²²⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Why APEC Matters to Americans." Accessed at <http://www.apec.org> on June 9, 2003.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Sheng Bin, "Regionalism: Challenge for China's APEC Policy in the 21st Century," China and the World Economy, Number 6, 2001. Pgs 46-48.

3. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

KEDO was established on March 15, 1995 by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. It was developed to help implement the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea. KEDO's membership has expanded to include: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, the European Atomic Energy Community, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Uzbekistan. KEDO was responsible for arranging heavy oil fuel deliveries to North Korea and overseeing the construction of two light water reactors. Until October 2002, KEDO was hailed as an example of how a cooperative international effort can help resolve regional security issues. KEDO also utilizes a multinational staff to carry out its policies.²³² KEDO's effectiveness is, however, being questioned in the aftermath of the North Korean admission of a covert nuclear weapons program in October 2002.

4. Four-Party Talks

The Four-Party Talks were first proposed by President Bill Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young-Sam during their April 1996 summit meeting on Cheju Island, South Korea. North Korea demanded a direct peace dialogue with the United States. The Four-Party Talks were meant as a "carrot" to North Korea while maintaining a multilateral approach to solving Korean "peace-related issues."²³³

In 1997, the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and China agreed to enter into formal talks. The first summit was held in December 1997 in Geneva, Switzerland. The first meeting was largely a media event with no real substantive talks. During the second meeting in March 1998, all parties agreed to discuss CBMs between North and South Korea, however, the talks broke-down over North Korea's insistence that U.S. troop withdrawals be a subject of discussion. The Four-Party Talks were last held in

²³² KEDO, "Our History." Accessed at http://www.kedo.org/au_history.asp on June 9, 2003.

²³³ Ralph Cossa, et al. "Security Multilateralism in Asia: Views from the United States and Japan," Columbia International Affairs Online, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper 51, June 1999, Pg 8. Accessed at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/akf01/akf01.html>

August 1999. This forum failed because Pyongyang attended only because of U.S. “inducements and pressure” and was most likely not interested in serious negotiation. The talks are not likely to resume due to the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis.²³⁴

5. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)

CSCAP, founded in June 1993, is a track-two dialogue linking Asian security institutes with “off-duty” governmental officials. It has been one of the most promising track-two mechanisms within the Asia-Pacific. CSCAP currently has members from twenty different organizations covering four continents. CSCAP member committees are broken up into five different working groups that address issues of concern to the ARF:²³⁵

- a. Maritime Cooperation
- b. Enhancement of Security Cooperation in the North Pacific and Northeast Asia
- c. Confidence and Security Building Measures
- d. Cooperative and Comprehensive Security
- e. Transnational Crime

CSCAP is one of the few multilateral organizations that has representatives from North Korea. Recent issues that CSCAP has studied on behalf of the ARF are CBMs, the role of preventive diplomacy, the law of the sea, and guidelines for regional maritime cooperation. The major advantage of CSCAP is that “track two participants, not being bound by current government positions, have the license to pursue more innovative and forward-leaning approaches and solutions.”²³⁶ Reports of the various working

²³⁴ David G. Brown, “Reconsidering Four Party Talks In Korea,” PacNet CSIS Newsletter, January 11, 2002.

²³⁵ CSCAP Website. Accessed at <http://www.cscap.org/about.htm> on June 9, 2003.

²³⁶ Ralph Cossa, et al. “Security Multilateralism in Asia: Views from the United States and Japan,” Columbia International Affairs Online, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper 51, June 1999, Pg 8. Accessed at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/akf01/akf01.html>

committees can then be transmitted to the full ARF for study and possible implementation.

6. Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)

The NEACD, another track-two level forum, was established in October 1993 by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The NEACD was designed to bring together two private and two governmental officials from each of the six major powers in Northeast Asia: the United States, China, Russia, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. The NEACD discusses political, security, and economic issues of concern to all member countries. The NEACD was designed to take a more regionally focused look at issues of concern in Northeast Asia in an attempt to build confidence and dialogue between participants. The major drawback of the NEACD has been the lack of participation by North Korea. North Korea has refused to participate until "all bilateral relationships are in balance." The NEACD last met in October 2002 in Moscow.²³⁷

7. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The SCO, formerly known as the "Shanghai Five," was established in 1996 and was composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The Shanghai Five originally established CBMs between member countries involving border defense, and promotion of regional stability. It also discussed how to combat Islamic terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. In May 2001, Uzbekistan was invited to attend and the name was changed to the SCO. The last summit meeting, which established a joint regional anti-terrorism agency, was held in May 2003 in Moscow.²³⁸ The SCO shows China's increasing belief in the role of multilateralism.

²³⁷ Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, "Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue." Accessed at < http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/ > on June 12, 2003. Additional information is also available at <http://www.wiredforpeace.org/>.

²³⁸ People's Daily, "SCO – Model for Multilateral, Regional Cooperation," May 29, 2003. Accessed at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/29/print20030529_117365.html

8. Shangri-La Dialogue

The Shangri-La Dialogue was initiated by the London Institute of International Security Studies in May 2002. It is a multilateral forum attended by Asia-Pacific Defense Ministers. The ministers discuss security issues of interest to the Asia-Pacific region. “This unofficial defense summit allowed defense officials to meet privately and in confidence, bilaterally and multilaterally, without the obligation to produce a formal statement or communiqué.”²³⁹ The most recent dialogue, held in Singapore from May 30-June 1, 2003, was attended by senior defense ministers from eighteen nations.²⁴⁰

F. CONCLUSION

It is no longer a question of if, but when a stronger multilateral security regime will form in Asia. The challenge for the United States is to determine whether it will lead, or get out of the way. The United States must take the lead in developing a new, stronger, multilateral security organization, or risk losing its regional influence. One possible format could be similar to the one proposed by Gen Nakatani, the former head of the Japanese Defense Agency, at the 2002 IISS Asian Security Summit in Singapore. Some recommended areas for reform include:²⁴¹

1. Ability of participating states to engage in a frank and constructive exchange of views
2. Move from just an exchange of views to problem-solving
3. Establish an institutional framework for the implementation of preventive diplomacy
4. Establishment of a Secretariat

²³⁹ Ralph Cossa, “Asian Multilateralism,” *The Japan Times Online*, July 30, 2002. Pg 1.

²⁴⁰ For more information, see the IISS website at <http://www.iiss.org/shangri-la.php?PHPSESSID=e3cd74549882992961dd8d51f7187624>

²⁴¹ Barry Desker, “The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” *CSIS PacNet Newsletter* No. 36, September 7, 2001.

5. Removal of the ability for one nation to veto any proposal.
6. Inclusion of defense officials in the dialogue

The United States must continue to quietly support the economic reforms necessary to bring Japan to a place of prominence on the international arena and treat any new multilateral organization in Asia as an equal player on the world stage, avoiding the past tendency to act unilaterally without prior consultations with its major allies.

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VII. FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE

This chapter will address four possible scenarios for the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: maintaining the status quo, United States withdrawal, Japanese unilateralism, and a reinvigorated alliance combined with the formation of a multilateral security regime in Asia.

A. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

Under this scenario, Japan would continue to pursue its “hedge strategy,” rely on the protective shield of the United States for defense, yet pursue a more independent economic policy. The United States would continue to rely on its “hub and spoke” series of bilateral security treaties to protect its vital interests in Asia. Japan would remain the central hub for U.S. force structure in Asia. Japanese politicians will continue to hide behind Article 9 of the Constitution and subvert its security policy to the United States. Economically, Japan will continue to try to maintain its status as the world’s second largest economy. This independent economic policy will continue to cause periodic trade disputes between Japan and the United States. To make this policy work, the United States must re-establish “the general belief that the United States will remain engaged and that nations that depend on it will not be left in the lurch.”²⁴²

The Bush administration’s increased emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance, if continued, can pay dividends in other areas of foreign policy. Some potential future advantages of a strengthened alliance include:²⁴³

1. Causes China to have second thoughts about forcible reunification with Taiwan.

²⁴² Zalmay Khalilzad et al, The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001) pg 44.

²⁴³ Yukio Okamoto, “Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance” The Washington Quarterly Spring 2002, pg 71.

2. Acts as the Damoclean sword hanging over the DPRK if it should invade South Korea.
3. Provides for safety on the high seas in the Asia-Pacific region.
4. Provides a conduit for Russian communication concerning the Far East.
5. Provides a potential intermediary between the United States and the Muslim world because of Japan's close relationships with Arab governments
6. Promotes security throughout Southeast Asia via financial support.

This scenario is increasingly unlikely because of:

1. Waning Japanese popular support for the large U.S. footprint in Japan.
2. Japan's economic malaise makes funding U.S. forces through Host Nation Support increasingly difficult.
3. Japan's increasing sense of nationalism and its desire to provide for its own defense as a backstop against U.S. inaction.
4. Increased attempts to rebuild Japan's reputation on the International stage. This has caused U.S. and Japanese policy to diverge in the last several years. Examples include Japan's decision to promote the Kyoto Protocol, the establishment of a Japanese-led Asian Monetary Fund, and Japan's proposal for a new multilateral security regime in Asia.
5. U.S. fiscal problems will make carrying the defensive burden for Japan increasingly difficult.
6. The current U.S. force structure review will likely require Japan to assume a greater share of its defense burden.

B. UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL

Under this scenario, proposed by Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute, the United States would phase out its military presence in East Asia, suspend its defense guarantees, and transfer responsibility for dealing with local security problems to its Cold War allies

(Japan, and South Korea).²⁴⁴ The United States would maintain a strong military presence in Guam and Hawaii that would enable it to intervene in Asian crises, if necessary, as a “balancer of last resort.” The United States would only intervene to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon that could challenge the security order of the Asia-Pacific. This policy would prevent the United States from becoming entangled in regional crises that do not threaten U.S. vital interests. A new regional security regime centered on Japan, Australia, and South Korea should be developed to fill the power-vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal.

The current North Korean nuclear crisis and the global war on terrorism make this option extremely unlikely.

C. JAPANESE UNILATERALISM

Under a unilateral strategy, Japan would end its alliance with the United States. It would then pursue an independent security policy using bilateral diplomacy and bilateral or even multilateral alliances to protect its interests and maintain a balance-of-power in East Asia. While this scenario is extremely unlikely, two potential ways this policy could emerge are:²⁴⁵

1. The rise of a xenophobic and nationalist leadership resulting from continued economic stagnation. This would be similar to the scenario of the late 1920's and early 1930's.
2. Over-reliance on a mercantile Asia-first strategy could economically isolate Japan causing it to pursue unilateral policies to ensure its survival.

²⁴⁴ Doug Bandow, “Old Wine in New Bottles: The Pentagon’s East Asia Security Strategy Report,” *Cato Institute Policy Analysis*, No 344, May 18, 1999.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.* pg 91.

D. REINVIGORATED ALLIANCE/MULTILATERAL SECURITY

“Japan needs to strike a politically sustainable balance between its bilateral priorities vis-à-vis the United States and its regional interests.”²⁴⁶ Under this scenario, “Japan would maintain strong defense ties with the U.S., but also seek to expand its influence in Asia by charting a security policy that might, at times, be at cross-purposes with Washington.”²⁴⁷ Japan’s constitution would be amended to acknowledge its ability to participate in “collective security” operations and redefine the Self-Defence Forces as a full-fledged military. Japan would then be free to assume a more active security role around the world. The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance would resemble the U.S.-U.K. Alliance, transforming it into a global alliance; the United States could utilize the Japanese military as a force multiplier in the Asia-Pacific. With its more active security policy, Japan would also be more likely to achieve its desired permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Japan would continue to provide basing rights for U.S. Seventh Fleet, Fifth Air Force, and the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), although the U.S. footprint in Okinawa could be reduced. This would be fully in keeping with the U.S. military transformation. U.S. lift capability, coupled with a lighter, more agile force will decrease the number of troops required in Okinawa.

The United States must also seize the opportunity to promote a new multilateral security regime in Asia. As shown in chapter VI, multilateralism is running rampant in Asia. Transnational terrorism is the common threat of the 21st century that can be used as the unifying basis for a new security regime. The United States needs to lead the way to ensure that it has a say in the structure of the organization. The new security regime must follow the constitutional model vice the hegemonic model to gain the support of as many Asia-Pacific nations as possible. The Chinese would support a new security regime as long as it maintained a rough balance of power, was not designed to contain China, and

²⁴⁶ Yoshinobu Yamamoto, ed. *Globalism, Regionalism, and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) pg 179.

²⁴⁷ Chester Dawson, “Flying the Flag” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (August 12, 1999) pg 19.

provided China with credible deterrence against external threats.²⁴⁸ If the United States should fail to lead, Japan and China are ready to lead the way, probably to the detriment of U.S. interests in Asia.

²⁴⁸ Wu Xinbo, "U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations," September 2000. Accessed from http://brookings.org/fp/cnaps/papers/2000_wu.htm

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VIII. CONCLUSION

Policy option D is the best course for future U.S. policy. Multilateralism is taking on a life of its own in post-Cold War Asia. This does not mean that it will replace the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the foundation of U.S. security policy in Asia. Rather, it indicates the alliance must assume a new role in Asian security.²⁴⁹

The end of the Cold War brought renewed interest in the formation of a multilateral security regime in Asia. One of the first by-products of this phenomenon was the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1994. The ARF is composed of ASEAN and all other major regional and international players in Asia. Western members of the ARF charge that it is too slow and amounts to nothing more than a “talk shop.” Recognizing the weaknesses of the ARF, on June 2, 2002, Gen Nakatani, the former head of the Japanese Defense Agency, proposed the formation of a new, stronger, multilateral security organization at the IISS Asian Security Summit in Singapore.

Japan, due to its economic malaise, has increasingly pursued the ASEAN+3 initiative as a means to economic recovery and renewed growth throughout Asia. In response to NAFTA and the E.U., several prominent Japanese politicians have called for ASEAN+3 to become the “Asian Economic Community.” Additionally, ASEAN+3 nations are moving toward the establishment of an Asian Free Trade Area and recently established the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to compete with the International Monetary Fund.

Japan is undergoing a renewed nationalist fervor in response to the economic and political troubles that have plagued the nation during the last decade. This nationalism is a response to its desire to remain an “impact player” on the world stage. So far, Japan has managed to avoid the detrimental effects of nationalism that have plagued many parts of the post-Cold War world. The United States must continue quietly to support Japan’s economic reforms and attempts to become a ‘normal’ nation, allowing it to assume a place of prominence on the international stage.

²⁴⁹ Anne M. Dixon, “Can Eagles and Cranes Flock Together” in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, ed. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) pg 163.

Some steps the United States can take to ensure the transition to a new, stronger multilateral security regime include:

1. Continue to encourage Japan's transition to "normal" nation status. The United States should encourage Japan to increase its participation in international peacekeeping, humanitarian, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts (such as its proposed participation in the reconstruction of Iraq). Further efforts in these areas will help to overcome any lingering suspicions of Japan's motives.
2. Build on the renewed spirit of international cooperation displayed at the 2002 ARF PMC meetings²⁵⁰ and the 2003 Shangri-La Dialogue²⁵¹ to call for the study and development of a new, stronger multilateral security regime for the Asia-Pacific. The United States should recommend that CSCAP study the proposal and make recommendations for implementation.
3. Encourage the continued study of cooperative security mechanisms by Asian security experts. One idea already studied at an ARF track two dialogue in 2002 was the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).²⁵² OSCE, often described as the "regional United Nations" of Europe, requires consensus among its members to take significant actions.

To date, its security functions principally have been in areas such as norm setting, conflict prevention, early warning, political consultations and mediation, monitoring and fact-finding missions, protecting minority rights, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and arms control and confidence and security-building measures.²⁵³

²⁵⁰ See http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arf9_chairman.html for further details.

²⁵¹ See <http://www.iiss.org/shangri-la.php?PHPSESSID=c35f5d9615ce61e282d2daedf24d7fcd> for further details.

²⁵² See <http://www.osce-arf.de/> for further details.

²⁵³ David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998) pg 176.

The ideas of OSCE could be tailored to the Asia-Pacific, and could help transition ARF from CBMs, into preventive diplomacy (PD), conflict mediation/resolution.

4. Recommend the establishment of a “Standing Naval Forces Asia-Pacific” (STANAVFORAP). This would be similar to NATO’s “Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean” (STANAVFORMED)²⁵⁴ While not exercising the mutual defense aspects of the NATO alliance, STANAVFORAP could be used as a CBM and PD tool by the new multilateral security regime.
5. Continue to encourage countries to join the COBRA GOLD and RIMPAC exercise series (discussed earlier). These exercises also help to build trust and relationships among the armed forces of the Asia-Pacific.

The recommendations discussed above would be fully in keeping with the current policies of the Bush administration. The new, multilateral security regime could be used by the United States as a force multiplier, and as a source for rapidly building a “coalition of the like-minded.” The new security organization also fits with the United States’ current “force structure review.” Once the organization is established, the United States could negotiate “mutual ship visits” and temporary basing rights, allowing the United States to increase its force mobility, and decrease the number of troops permanently stationed in the Asia-Pacific. The recommended policies would also work for any future U.S. administration.

The challenge ahead for the United States is to recognize the potential for a multilateral security regime in Asia, and foster its development. Through this cooperative policy, the United States will ensure it has a say in the multilateral regime. The United States must strengthen the current security alliance with Japan and treat any new multilateral organization in Asia as an equal player on the world stage, avoiding the past tendency to act unilaterally without prior consultations with its major allies. As long as the United States treats Japan with an appropriate level of international respect, the U.S.-Japan security alliance should continue for the near future.

²⁵⁴ For more information on STANAVFORMED see <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/STANAVFORMED.htm>.

In the next 5-10 years, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the ARF could serve as the foundation of a multilateral security regime in Asia that would include Japan, the United States, South Korea, the PRC, Australia, and the ASEAN states. Russia and India should be included in political forums and be invited to join the security regime in the future. Once a multilateral security regime is established, the United States should pursue basing and visit rights with other member nations to reduce the impact on Japan. The reduced strategic threat in Asia would no longer require the United States to have the large Asian presence that it currently possesses.

APPENDIX I: THE ANTI-TERRORISM SPECIAL MEASURES BILL

October 2001²⁵⁵

ARTICLE 1: TITLE

The Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on the Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations

ARTICLE 2: PURPOSES

- (1) Recalling that UN Security Council resolution 1368 regards the terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in the United States (hereinafter referred to as "the terrorist attacks") as a threat to international peace and security,
- (2) And also noting that the UN Security Council resolutions 1267, 1269, 1333 and other relevant resolutions condemn acts of international terrorism, and call on all States to take appropriate measures for the prevention of such acts,

The purposes of the Law is to specify the following measures in order to enable Japan to contribute actively and on its own initiatives to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan.

- a. The measures Japan implements in support of the activities of the armed forces of the United States and other countries (hereinafter

²⁵⁵ Government of Japan, The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, dated October 29, 2001. Accessed at <http://www.embjapan.org/pressreleases/102901.htm>

referred to as "Foreign Forces") which aim to eradicate the threat of the terrorist attacks, thereby contributing to the achievement of the purposes of the Charter of the UN

- b. The measures Japan implements with the humanitarian spirit based on relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council of the UN or requests made by the UN, organizations established by the General Assembly of the UN, the Specialized Agencies of the UN, or International Organization for Migration (hereinafter referred to "the UN and Others")

ARTICLE 3: BASIC PRINCIPLES

- (1) The Government of Japan (GOJ) shall implement Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities, Assistance to Affected People and other necessary measures (hereinafter referred to as "Response Measures") in an appropriate and swift manner, thereby contributing actively and on its own initiatives to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, and ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan.
- (2) These measures must not constitute the threat or use of force.
- (3) These measures shall be implemented in the following areas:
 - a. Japan's territory
 - b. Following areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.
 - (1) The high seas, including the exclusive economic zone stipulated in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and airspace above
 - (2) Territory of foreign countries (Implementation shall

be limited to cases where consent from the territorial countries has been obtained.)

- (4) The Prime Minister shall, representing the Cabinet, supervise and control government agencies based on the basic plan stipulated in Article 5.
- (5) Heads of relevant government agencies will cooperate with each other to implement these measures.

ARTICLE 4: MEASURES TO BE TAKEN

(1) Cooperation and Support Activities

- a. Cooperation and Support activities are the provision of materials and services, convenience and other measures implemented by Japan in support of Foreign Forces.
- b. Relevant government agencies, including the Self-Defense Forces, shall implement these activities.
- c. The contents of materials and services that the Self-Defense Forces provide are supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, and base support. Nonetheless, the Self-Defense Forces shall not undertake the supply of weapons and munitions, the supply of fuel to or maintenance on aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties, and the land transportation of weapons and munitions in foreign territories.

(2) Search and Rescue Activities

- a. Search and Rescue Activities are the activities implemented by Japan to search and rescue combatants in distress due to combat in the case of the activities of the Foreign Forces. (Search and Rescue Activities include the transportation of the rescued as

well.)

- b. Self-Defense Forces shall implement these activities.
- c. The contents of materials and services that the Self-Defense Forces provide in implementing Search and Rescue Activities are supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, billeting and decontamination. Nonetheless, the Self-Defense Forces shall not undertake the supply of weapons and munitions, the supply of fuel to or maintenance on aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties, and the land transportation of weapons and munitions in foreign territories.

(3) Assistance to Affected People

- a. Assistance to Affected People is transportation of necessities including food, clothing and medicines, medical services and other humanitarian activities implemented by Japan, with regard to the terrorist attacks, based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the UN or on requests by the UN and Others.
- b. Relevant government agencies including the Self-Defense Forces shall implement these activities.

(4) Other Necessary Measures

- a. An example is transportation of foreign nationals while providing transportation to Japanese nationals abroad with aircraft of the Self-Defense Forces.
- b. Relevant government agencies including the Self-Defense Forces shall implement these activities.

ARTICLE 5: BASIC PLAN

(1) The Prime Minister, when he deems necessary the implementation of any of the following Response Measures, shall propose to make a Cabinet Decision on such implementation and on a draft of basic plan with regards to their implementation (herein after referred to as "Basic Plan"):

- a. The provision of materials and services by the Self-Defense Force as Cooperation and Support Activities
- b. Other measures implemented by relevant government agencies as Cooperation and Support Activities that require involvement of the Cabinet for their coherent and effective implementation
- c. Search and Rescue Activities
- d. Assistance to Affected People by the Self-Defense Forces
- e. Other measures implemented by relevant government agencies as Assistance to Affected People that require involvement of the Cabinet for their coherent and effective implementation

(2) Matters to be specified in the Basic Plan include the following:

- a. Basic points with regards to the Response Measures
- b. Kinds and details of the activities stipulated in (1) to (3) of Section 4 above
- c. Sphere of areas to implement the activities stipulated in (1) to (3) of Section 4 above and designation of such areas
- d. Size, organization and equipment of the units of the Self Defense Forces which implement the activities stipulated in (1) to (3) of Section 4 above in foreign territories, and the time period of the dispatch of the units

- (3) (1) above is applied to a change of the Basic Plan.
- (4) When Response Measures are implemented in foreign territories, the GOJ shall consult with the territorial countries in order to specify the implementation areas.

ARTICLE 6: THE DIET APPROVAL

- (1) The Prime Minister shall put Cooperation Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected People implemented by the Self- Defense Forces specified in the Basic Plan, within twenty days after their initiation, on the agenda in the Diet for its approval. When the Diet is in recess or when the House of Representatives is dissolved, however, the Prime Minister shall promptly seek for its approval upon convening of the first Diet session thereafter.
- (2) If the Diet disapproves, Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected People must be promptly terminated.

ARTICLE 7: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSE MEASURES BY THE RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

- (1) In accordance with the Basic Plan, the Minister of State for Defense will decide guidelines with regards to the provision of services as Cooperation and Support Activities, to Search and Rescue Activities, and to Assistance to Affected People, and, with the Prime Minister's approval, order the Self Defense Forces to implement them.
- (2) The Minister of State for Defense will designate specific implementation areas in the guidelines.

- (3) In case all or a part of implementation areas no longer meet the criteria stipulated in this law or the Basic Plan, the Minister of State for Defense must promptly alter the area designation or order the cessation of the activities implemented in the areas.
- (4) The commander of the unit of the Self-Defense Forces in charge of the activities stipulated in a, b and d of Section 5 (1) above, which are implemented in the high seas and airspace above or in foreign territories, or the person designated by him, in case combat takes place or is expected to take place near the area where the activities are implemented, will wait for the steps stipulated in (3) above, while, for example, temporarily suspending the activities or evacuating in order to avoid the danger caused by the combat.
- (5) In addition to (1) to (4) above, the Minister of State for Defense and the Heads of other relevant government agencies shall implement Cooperation and Support Activities, Assistance to Affected People and other Response Measures in accordance with relevant laws and the basic plan.

ARTICLE 8: LENDING WITHOUT CHARGE AND TRANSFER OF MATERIALS

The Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers or those entrusted by them shall be authorized, to the extent that will not affect their duties, to lend without charge or transfer materials (excluding weapons and ammunitions) under their supervision to Foreign Forces or the UN and Others, in cases where there is a request of them for such lending or transfer of materials to be used in their activities, when deemed necessary for the smooth implementation of such activities.

ARTICLE 9: REPORT TO THE DIET

The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet without delay, (1) the content of the Basic Plan when a decision or change on it is made, (2) the consequence of the implementation of the Response Measures specified in the basic plan.

ARTICLE 10: USE OF WEAPONS

- (1) Members of the Self-Defense Forces in charge of Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected people, may proportionately use weapons when an unavoidable and reasonable cause exists for use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other members of the Self Defense Forces who are with them on the scene, or those who are with them on the scene and have come under their control while conducting their duties.
- (2) The use of weapons stipulated in (1) above, when a senior officer is present at the scene, shall be conducted only under the order of the senior officer, except for cases where offense or danger to lives and bodies are too imminent to wait for such order.
- (3) A senior officer present on the scene, in the case as mentioned in (1) above, must give necessary orders with a view to preventing the danger to the lives and bodies and also to preventing disorder by uncontrolled use of weapons, and to ensuring that the use of weapons is done, in accordance with (1) above and (4) below, in an appropriate manner and within the limit necessary to achieve the purpose.
- (4) The use of weapons stipulated in (1) above shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (act of necessity) of the Penal Code.

Note: Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Use of Weapons for Protection of Weapons) is applied.

ARTICLE 11: OTHERS (PERTAINING TO ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS)

- (1) This Law shall come into effect from the day of promulgation.
- (2) The Self-Defense Forces Law shall be amended so that the Self-Defense Forces are authorized to implement Cooperation and Support Activities and other activities, to the extent that will not affect their duties.
- (3) This Law shall, in principle, expire upon the passage of two years after its entry into force. If deemed necessary, however, the effect of the law can be extended by not more than two years as set forth by a separate law. (The same applies to further extension of the Law.)

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