

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

**INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: THE IMPACT OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 56**

by

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September 2001

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56? The U.S. government recognized the need for a more systemized method for managing the interagency response to complex contingency operations, after their experiences in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. In 1997, President Clinton signed PDD 56: *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. To determine the impact of this directive, this thesis uses a pre-PDD 56 and post-PDD 56 case study comparison methodology treating PDD 56 as the intervention. U.S. participation in Bosnia from 1995 until 1996 is the pre-PDD 56 case study, and U.S. participation in Kosovo from 1998 until 1999 is the post-PDD 56 case study. The Bosnia and Kosovo case studies are compared using six variables (type, depth, and timing of planning, decision process, funding, and monitoring and modification). Subsequent improvements to PDD 56 illustrate the positive impact that PDD 56 has had on improving U.S. government civil-military unity of effort in complex contingency operations.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In May 1997, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 56: *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. Its purpose was to institutionalize lessons from Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia to improve the U.S. government's interagency management of complex contingency operations – coordinating planning across multiple government agencies. Complex contingency operations are multi-dimensional, with diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, and military components, all of which rely on civil-military unity of effort to ensure a comprehensive response. The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56? Answering this question is important because of the continued proliferation of complex contingency operations. These operations will continue to be a challenge for the United States. It is also important because the tools developed for managing complex contingency operations may also be useful in managing other issues that span more than one agency in the U.S. government.

The impact of PDD 56 is determined through a pre-PDD 56 and post-PDD 56 case study comparison, treating PDD 56 as the intervention. U.S. operations in Bosnia in 1995 through 1996 provide the pre-PDD 56 case, and operations in Kosovo from 1998 through 1999 provide the post-PDD 56 case. Six variables are used to compare the two cases: type of planning, depth of planning, timing of planning, decision process, funding, and monitoring and modification. Additionally, modifications to PDD 56 are used to illustrate the directive's continued impact. From this analysis it is determined that PDD 56 had a positive impact on the interagency response to complex contingency operations. The operation in Kosovo was planned in advance, across the interagency environment, using the process laid out in PDD 56. Decision-makers were able to make informed decisions based on systematic planning. Congress allocated adequate funding two months in advance, and the Kosovo Excom provided a day-to-day oversight of the operation as it unfolded in Kosovo. The planning document developed by the United States for the Kosovo mission was adopted by the international community to guide international preparations and mandates as well, making for a more integrated and faster response than had occurred four years earlier in Bosnia.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military's scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, North Africa, 1942¹

Complex contingency operations are defined as “multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security.”² Several examples of complex contingency operations stand out: United States military involvement in the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia from 1995 to the present; U.S. military provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in northern Iraq in 1991; and foreign humanitarian assistance operations in Africa and Bangladesh.³ Since the end of the Cold War the proliferation of complex contingency operations has made it more difficult for agencies in the United States Government to work together. Failure to coordinate civil-military efforts has been a common problem of U.S. operations, as noted in the after action reports or lessons learned reports that followed U.S. operations in Panama, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. A common feature of these complex contingency operations is multi-dimensional problems, including interrelated security, economic, humanitarian, and diplomatic issues. The requisite response to them also was multi-dimensional, placing a premium on civil-military unity of effort. For example, if a humanitarian crisis is caused by a security problem, then dealing with the humanitarian crisis without addressing the security problem, does little more than make the responders feel better, and frequently delays or extends the suffering

¹ *Beyond Jointness: The Civil-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies Symposium, 2-3 June 1999, iv.

² The White House, “White Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive – 56,” May 1997; available from http://www.pdd56.com/handbook_docs/appendix_A.htm; Internet; accessed 22 July 2000.

³ The White House, 1997. The definition of complex contingency operations does not include “domestic disaster relief or...relatively routine or small-scale operations, or...military operations conducted in defense of U.S. citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations and international armed conflict.”

of the victims.⁴ This chapter defines and describes the following: complex contingency operations, the interagency environment, wicked problems, Presidential Decision Directive 56, the research question, the research design, and the thesis structure.

A. COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Some of the tasks in complex contingency operations that require significant civil-military unity of effort include humanitarian relief, the cessation of hostilities and demobilization of former warring factions, resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, public security and administration of justice, war crimes and human rights, governance, open media, and economic reconstruction.⁵ In many of these tasks, military forces are the only ones that can provide the security necessary to carry out the civilian aspects of the operation. For instance, in Somalia, military forces provided security for food convoys. In Bosnia military forces monitored and verified compliance with the separation of forces and cantonment of weapons. In Kosovo the military provided security for refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their homes. In Haiti the military forces provided training for local police forces. In Bosnia military forces have aided in the apprehension of indicted war criminals. Some specialized military forces such as Civil Affairs personnel have been used in many of these operations to help set up basic government services, such as providing public administration, education, and health services. In Bosnia military forces were used to occupy a radio station tower to prevent its use by those who would disturb the implementation of the peace agreement. Lastly, specialized military forces such as the combat engineers are frequently deployed quickly at the beginning of an operation to help repair basic public services such as electricity and water. Civil-military collaboration is critical to accomplish these tasks successfully, quickly, and efficiently.

The 1994 U.S. operation in Haiti was a benchmark for drawing attention to the need for interagency cooperation, defined as “a process for coordinating executive branch decision making when issues involve multiple agencies of the government.”⁶ Although

⁴ Kimberly A. Maynard, *Healing Communities in Conflict: International Assistance in Complex Emergencies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), xi-xii.

⁵ *Beyond Jointness*, 3-6.

⁶ *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations*, 13 August 1998; available from http://www.pdd56.com/handbook_docs; Internet; accessed 29 May 2000.

generally upheld as an interagency cooperation success story, the complex contingency operation in Haiti in 1994 provides specific examples of problems stemming from the failure of interagency coordination. While Operation Uphold Democracy is generally upheld as a success story for the interagency community, it was far from perfect. Following are two examples from Haiti that show common problems that can arise in complex contingency operations. First, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) agreed to launch a jobs program and the Department of Justice and USAID agreed to create the Haitian Justice Department. When USAID was unable to secure funding for the programs they were passed off to the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces deployed in Haiti placing a larger burden on the military forces already deployed.⁷ The failure of one agency to fulfill its commitments adds pressure on others and can threaten the entire operation's success. Second, one of the greatest assets the military brings to complex contingency operations is the ability to airlift large amounts of equipment, supplies, and personnel anywhere in the world, yet in Haiti, USAID personnel could not get on military transports because they were not granted access into the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) movement planning system.⁸ Civilian agency personnel are frequently left to find transportation on commercial or contract airlines, which can be problematic when traveling into a crisis region where the public infrastructure may have been destroyed or heavily damaged. Interagency collaboration in the planning phases of a complex contingency operations helps to address these potential disconnections between agencies, so they are not left to the operators in field to fix once they have become significant problems.

B. THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

Because so many of the tasks in complex contingency operations are multi-dimensional, the interagency environment is complex. The National Security Council (NSC), Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DoD), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are traditional participants in the national security arena. The unique nature of complex contingency operations usually brings additional players to the

⁷ Bob Chadwick. *Civil Affairs Campaign Planning for Complex Contingency Operations: Getting It Right*, Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 12 Apr 1999, 9-10.

⁸ Chadwick, 24.

table from the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy and Treasury. With the vast array of agency capabilities, resources, and perspectives it is easy to understand why interagency collaboration is a challenge.

The interagency is not a place. It is a process involving human beings and complex organizations with different cultures, different outlooks on what's good for the national interest and the best policy to pursue—all driven by the compulsion to defend and expand turf. The process is political (therefore conflictual) because at stake is power—personal, institutional, or party. The 'power game' involves the push and pull of negotiation, the guarding of policy prerogatives, the hammering out of compromises, and the normal human and institutional propensity to resist change.⁹

With that understanding of the interagency process, one might question how it is ever possible for the participants to come to agreement on anything. James Steinberg, who as Deputy National Security Advisor from 1996 until 2000 chaired the Deputies Committee of the NSC, addresses that issue:

What I think we tried to do with the deputies committee, and I know they did it with principals, was to say, "Check your institutional hat at the door when you come to this meeting. If we have differences, we have differences. We'll pass it along. But at least sit here as a committee of the whole of people who all work for the same administration and not just for a building, and see whether we can't find common ground." In most cases, people found common solutions that they generally felt pretty good about. I don't think people felt that they agreed for the sake of agreeing. I think that they recognized that there were difficult tradeoffs. They were able to see it from the other person's perspective and understand why they were arguing for it.¹⁰

Nearly thirty U.S. Government agencies are currently operating in complex contingency operations overseas.¹¹ Descriptions of the most significant of these agencies, can be

⁹ Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process: Formed into the 21st Century," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), 113.

¹⁰ Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler, moderators, *The Clinton Administration National Security Council Oral History Roundtable*, 27 September 2000, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and The Brookings Institution, 23.

¹¹ David Tucker, "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" *Parameters*, Autumn 2000; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/00autumn/tucker.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 June 2001.

found in Appendix 1. The three biggest players in the complex contingency interagency environment are the NSC, DOS, and DoD.

The NSC is responsible for coordinating the interagency aspects of a complex contingency operation. A formal meeting of the Clinton NSC was rarely convened, instead most Cabinet-level deliberations occurred at Principals Committee (PC) meetings, without the presence of the President. Its main role was to formulate and discuss options. Below the Principals Committee was the Deputies Committee (DC), made up of under-secretary or deputy level administrators representing the principals in the NSC. The Deputies Committee was charged with day-to-day crisis management and preparing issues for the Principals Committee. The Deputies Committee could establish Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) staffed at the assistant secretary level.¹² Marcella explains, “Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are the heart and soul of the process. They may be ad hoc, standing, regional, or functional. They function at a number of levels, meet regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame policy responses, and build consensus across the government for unified action.”¹³ Standing NSC IWGs in the Clinton administration were organized around either geographic regions or functional areas, such as Asian Affairs, European Affairs, Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs, and International Economic Affairs.¹⁴ In recent times the Presidency has been more ‘operational’ than in the past, and the White House staff has been more involved in running the day-to-day operations of the government, than ever before. In this environment the NSC has emerged as a powerful organization that sometime appears in competition with the Departments of State and Defense.¹⁵

The Department of State is principally responsible for American foreign policy, and the Secretary of State is the senior member of the Cabinet. The State Department is also divided into regional and functional bureaus. Regional bureaus, which do not match

¹² Timothy D. Lynch, *A Suggested Decision-Making Guide for Use by Interagency Working Groups in Developing Policy Recommendations for Complex Contingency Crisis Operations*, Army War College, 25 April 1997, 8-9.

¹³ Marcella, 110.

¹⁴ Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., *The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 46.

¹⁵ Marcella, 109.

either the NSC regional bureaus or the Defense Department's unified geographic commands, are further divided to individual countries at the Desk Officer level. Functional bureaus have long been relegated to second-class status within the State Department, and their input into national security decision-making has been underrepresented.¹⁶ Despite the State Department's statutory responsibility for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, in the Clinton administration it seemed to lose its leadership role. The Department of State works closely with the various departments of the United Nations in a variety of operations and missions overseas, is responsible for police affairs abroad, and operates embassies around the world. These embassies are themselves interagency forums called country teams where the ambassador is responsible for "overseeing and coordinating all activities of the U.S. government within his geographic area of responsibility. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) are both previously independent agencies that have recently come under the direction of the State Department. USAID is heavily involved in complex contingency operations. The administrator of USAID is designated as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. He works through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) deploying Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) to deal with the immediate response. DARTs work under the direction of the ambassador. USAID also provides U.S. food donations through direct donations or through a variety of public and private agencies. USIA puts a public face on U.S. foreign policies to audiences abroad and tracks public opinion abroad. USIA provides public affairs officers to embassies, and maintains contact with Army psychological operations, although there is little coordination.¹⁷

The major players in the Department of Defense include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military departments and the combatant commands. The Secretary of Defense and the President are the National

¹⁶ Thomas W. Lippman, *Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 277.

¹⁷ Bruce Pirnie, *Civilians and Soldiers: Achieving Better Coordination* (RAND, 1998), 20-21; available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1026/MR1026.pdf/>; Internet; accessed 14 April 2000.

Command Authority (NCA), with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as their principal military advisor. The Joint Staff is responsible for the national military strategy. The Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) is responsible for peacetime planning and is the military's representative to the PDD 56 process. The military departments are led by civilian secretaries and through the military chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping, training and supplying forces, but do not have operational control over them. Unified commanders are either regional or functional, U.S. European Command or U.S. Transportation Command, for example. They have operational control over forces from all services in their regions of responsibility. Some unified commanders also control international military organizations, for example the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCEUR) is also the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and is responsible to both the U.S. NCA and NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC).¹⁸

A side-by-side comparison of the Departments of State and Defense illuminates many of the reasons why these agencies find it so difficult to work together. A recent article, "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus"¹⁹ captures the cultural differences of the two departments in a humorous way. Common to both departments is a strong sense of professionalism, dedication, and competence, but that is where the similarities end.

<u>Characteristics</u>	<u>Department of State</u>	<u>Department of Defense</u>
Organization	Decentralized	Hierarchical
Training Programs	On-the-Job	Structured and Formal
Doctrine	Little	Extensive
Future Perspective	Long Term	Short Term
Accountability	Less Accountable	Highly Accountable
Individual Culture	Independence	Discipline
Values	Individual Achievement	Teamwork
World View	Grey	Black and White
Focus	Flexibility	Details
Problem Solving	Informal and Creative	Precise and Predictable

Table 1. A State-Defense Comparison²⁰

¹⁸ Pirnie, 21-23.

¹⁹ "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security," available from <http://www.pdd56.com/print.cgi>; Internet; accessed 29 May 2000.

²⁰ Mike Harwood, "Field Implementation of Policy," available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pki/inter-agency/iwa/sld001.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 May 2001; "Defense is from Mars."

Blending each department's strengths and niche capabilities, a comprehensive operation can be mounted in response to a crisis. Nevertheless, the Defense-State partnership in complex contingency operations can be an "uncomfortable marriage of necessity."

C. WICKED PROBLEMS

"Wicked problems" have been around since 1973, when the term was first used to characterize new public policy problems that confounded old problem-solving techniques.²¹ Since then, the concept of wicked problems has been applied to both public policy making and strategic planning in the business world. Wicked problems have the following four characteristics:

- The problem is an evolving set of interlocking issues and constraints. Indeed, there is *no definitive statement of the problem*. You don't understand the problem until you have developed a solution.
- There are *many stakeholders*—people who care about or have something at stake in how the problem is resolved. This makes the problem solving process fundamentally social. Getting the right answer is not as important as having stakeholders accept whatever solution emerges.
- The *constraints on the solution, such as limited resources and political ramifications, change over time*. The constraints change, ultimately, because we live in a rapidly changing world. Operationally, they change because many are generated by the stakeholders, who come and go, change their minds, fail to communicate, or otherwise change the rules by which the problem must be solved.
- Since there is no definitive Problem, there is *no definitive Solution*. The problem-solving process ends when you run out of time, money, energy, or some other resource, not when some perfect solution emerges.²²

Complex contingency operations can be characterized as wicked problems. As shown in Table 2, complex contingency operations fit the four wicked problems characteristics as defined by Conklin and Weil.

²¹ Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences*, 1973: 155.

²² Emphasis added. E. Jeffrey Conklin and William Weil, *Wicked Problems: Naming the Pain in Organizations*; available from http://www.mmm.com/meetingnetwork/readingroom/gdss_wicked.html; Internet; accessed 22 August 2001.

Wicked Problems	Complex Contingency Operations
Evolving set of interlocking issues and constraints; no definitive statement of the problem	“Multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security” ²³
Many stakeholders	Interagency environment: NSC, DOS (USAID, USIA, OFDA), DoD (OSD, JCS, CINC), CIA, DOJ (FBI, DEA, INS, ICITAP), USDA, DOC, DOE, OPIC, etc... ²⁴
Constraints on the solution, such as limited resources and political ramifications, change over time	Agency budgets, political risks, changing situation in the field
No definitive solution; problem-solving process ends when you run out of time, money, etc...	Some situations last for years before resolved (Bosnia 1991-present), some are crisis response operations that last for a few months (Hurricane Mitch)

Table 2. Wicked Problems and Complex Contingency Operations

Because the problem cannot be defined and the constraints are constantly changing, traditional linear problem solving is insufficient. In fact, the idea of problem solving does not really apply here, because there are no definitive solutions. Interagency players can only hope to cope with complex contingency operations, not solve them. The process described by Presidential Decision Directive 56 is a collaborative, interagency approach to cope with the wicked problem of complex contingency operations.

D. PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 56

In response to the U.S. performances in complex contingency operations in Somalia in 1993, Haiti in 1994, and Bosnia in 1995-1996, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 56, *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations* in May 1997. The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), which had been in development for nearly two years, drew largely from the positive lessons of the U.S. intervention in Haiti. PDD 56’s purpose is to:

²³ The White House, 1997.

²⁴ When complex contingency operations are examined at the larger international level of analysis, they appear to be even more wicked, with vast numbers of stakeholders and the additional constraints that they bring with them; however, since this thesis is focused on the impact of PDD 56, the examination of complex contingency operations as wicked problems is limited to the USG interagency stakeholders.

Institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations. The PDD is designed to ensure that the lessons learned – including proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms – will be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis. The PDD’s intent is to establish these management practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies...engaged in complex contingency operations.²⁵

PDD 56 describes six mechanisms that, when used in concert, are designed to achieve U.S. Government (USG) unity of effort when responding to complex contingency operations. The six mechanisms are as follows:

- Executive Committee (Excom)
- Political-Military Implementation Plan (Pol-Mil Plan)
- Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal
- After-Action Review (AAR)
- Training
- Agency Review and Implementation²⁶

The Excom, pol-mil plan and interagency rehearsal describe a collaborative interagency process, while the AARs, training program, and agency reviews ensure that lessons noted become lessons learned and are incorporated into future operations.

The process of blending niche capabilities from various agencies together into a coherent interagency effort increases the efficiency of the government response by reducing redundancy and can help to prevent operators in the field from working at cross purposes. PDD 56 can also minimize tasks best suited for civilians from being put on the military simply because they are already there. Interagency coordination through this PDD 56 process can be the difference between success and failure in these difficult and complex operations.

E. RESEARCH QUESTION

The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56, *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*? Determining the impact of PDD 56 is important for several

²⁵ The White House, 1997.

²⁶ The White House, 1997.

reasons. First, complex contingency operations are likely to continue to be a challenge for the United States. Army Lieutenant General William G. Carter, III, former Chief of Staff for IFOR (the Implementation Force deployed to Bosnia in 1995) said as much at a 1999 conference at the National Defense University. “It is clear that the world of the next 15-20 years will be one of chronic crisis. The current increase in peace operations is, therefore, not an anomaly.”²⁷ While interventions in large-scale humanitarian crises, whether natural or man-made, rarely involve vital American interests, they do involve humanitarian interests, and our participation in such operations works to advance American values around the world. Supporting international peace and stability operations is one of the fundamental elements of our current national security strategy.²⁸

Second, if PDD 56 works at a strategic level then it may also apply at three different levels of analysis. First, PDD 56 is designed to coordinate USG interagency efforts at the strategic level. Such coordination is also required at the operational and tactical levels. This becomes somewhat more problematic because many of the agencies involved do not have clearly delineated separations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels like the military. Currently, interagency coordination at these levels is conducted at ad hoc Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC), which have met with varied results. Applying the PDD 56 tools, or something similar, in a more systematic function could make these ad hoc mechanisms more successful. Second, complex contingency operations always involve organizations beyond the U.S. Government. If the PDD 56 process works within the U.S. interagency environment, then it may also work within the larger international community, which includes, other nations, Non-Government Organizations such as CARE or Médecins Sans Frontieres, and Inter-Government Organizations such as the UN, NATO, or the International Committee of the Red Cross. Third, U.S. Government interagency coordination is a problem that transcends the context of complex contingency operations. Today, it is rare that an issue of any importance can be dealt with solely by a single government agency. Most are approached in an ad hoc and inefficient way. If the tools of PDD 56 are deemed useful

²⁷ *Beyond Jointness*, 1.

²⁸ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, Washington, D.C., December 2000, 3-5.

for dealing with complex contingency operations, then they might be successfully applied in other areas of government management. It is unlikely that the organization devised by the National Security Act of 1947 will be fundamentally changed in the near term. PDD 56 may help mitigate the difficulties of coping with many of these cross-departmental issues.

F. RESEARCH DESIGN

The impact of PDD 56 will be determined using pre and post case study comparison, treating PDD 56 as the intervention. The pre-PDD 56 case study examines the U.S. involvement in the peace accord implementation in Bosnia in 1995-1996, and the post-PDD 56 case study examines the U.S. involvement in Kosovo in 1998-1999. These cases were selected from a list of complex contingency operations that included Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Bosnia and Kosovo were selected because they were both complex contingency operations that stressed all dimensions of a response across many U.S. government agencies. They were operations in which the United States was reluctant to get involved due to potential political ramifications, and little progress was made until the United States was willing to act. In both cases the application of force through NATO bombing encouraged parties to agree to a peace agreement, which then was implemented through a complex international military and civilian organization. The cases occurred in the same region and over a relatively short period of time. Bosnia is the last complex contingency operation before PDD 56 was signed, and Kosovo was the first case in which PDD 56 was thoughtfully applied.

The following six variables will be used to compare the two cases:

1. Type of Planning – Was planning was functional and “stove-piped” or interagency and collaborative?
2. Depth of Planning – How far down into the organization did the planning reach?
3. Timing of Planning – Was planning advanced, while the crisis was developing, or “on-the-fly?”
4. Decision Process – Was the decision process a top-down process involving few people or was it bottom-up with more people tasked to lay out options for decision makers?

5. Funding – Was sufficient funding allocated before the operation began?
6. Monitoring and Modification – Who is responsible for day-to-day operations and oversight as well as adapting the plans to cope with changing conditions?

The comparison of these variables is the primary source for analyzing the impact of PDD 56. These variables will be further described in Chapter V. An examination of improvements that have been made to the PDD 56 process will also illuminate the continued impact of PDD 56 on the interagency ability to cope with complex contingency operations.

Research for this thesis has relied on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include PDD white papers, planning documents, speech transcripts, briefing transcripts, press releases, after action reports, oral history transcripts, training reports, policy briefs, the PDD 56 Handbook, and personal interviews. Secondary sources include articles from scholarly journals, books, studies, and student papers. PDD 56 has been a frequent topic of student papers at the various war colleges, because, to the military's delight, PDD 56 imparts a structure to what had previously been an ad hoc process.

G. THESIS STRUCTURE

Chapter II is the pre-PDD 56 case study of U.S. participation in Bosnia in 1995-1996. Chapter III is a more elaborate description of PDD 56. Chapter IV is the post-PDD 56 case study of U.S. participation in Kosovo in 1998-1999. Chapter V, the analysis, begins with a comparison of the variables in the two cases, and then reviews improvements that have been made to the PDD 56 process since it was implemented. Chapter VI concludes with an answer to the thesis question, as well as some recommendations for future research.

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II. BOSNIA CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

By the summer of 1995, brutal ethnic war had ravaged the former Yugoslavia for years. Cease-fires were repeatedly violated, agreements broken, and there was no end in sight. After campaigning on the Bosnian issue in 1992 Presidential election, the Clinton administration proved unable or unwilling to make any significant changes in U.S. policy for more than two years. Weaknesses in the NATO coalition drove a weak American policy. As one senior administration official said at the time,

We have been putting straws on the back of NATO solidarity over Bosnia for the last two years. We have been pushing them over and over to use military force, to the point where we have come to threaten the destruction of the transatlantic treaty. We have decided that we are not going to do that anymore. We are not going to make this a manhood test. We are not going to break NATO over this.²⁹

Once the administration came to the decision that NATO was more important than an end to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, American policy shifted to merely containing the conflict to Bosnia and preventing its spread to other Balkan states. By the beginning of 1995, it seemed as if everyone in the Clinton administration had decided that there was no solution to what Secretary of State Warren Christopher had characterized as the “problem from hell.”

This case study focuses on events that occurred from May 1995 until March 1996. The first section will describe those events and the USG interagency response. This section first describes the situation on the ground in Bosnia in the summer of 1995; second, the three plans presented to the President, one each from the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense; third, the development of an implementation plan; and lastly, some of the problems that were experienced on the ground in Bosnia. This chapter then concludes with some of the interagency lessons learned from this complex contingency operation.

²⁹ Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). Unless otherwise noted, the material for this case study is drawn from this source.

B. “THE PROBLEM FROM HELL”

The first few months of 1995 were quiet while a cease-fire remained in place. While the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) helped civilian humanitarian agencies deliver food and supplies throughout the region, the warring parties used the winter cease-fire to smuggle arms, train forces, and prepare for spring offensives. On May 7th renewed fighting broke out, with artillery shelling into Sarajevo – one of six UN declared “safe areas,” killing eleven. The UN failed to react to the violation, overruling a request from the UNPROFOR commander for NATO air strikes. On May 22nd the now emboldened Serb forces seized heavy weapons stored near Sarajevo – violating the twenty-kilometer heavy weapons exclusion zone that had been in place for more than a year. The UN gave the Serbs an ultimatum – return the weapons within forty-eight hours or face air strikes. The Serbs did nothing, and NATO destroyed two ammunition bunkers. The Serbs next shelled Tuzla, another UN safe area, this time killing seventy-one. NATO responded by attacking six ammunition bunkers. The Serbs escalated the conflict by taking nearly four hundred UN peacekeepers hostage. Here the role of the media took center stage as the television images of UN peacekeepers being held hostage was a deep embarrassment for both the UN and, in particular, Britain and France, “great powers” who had forces deployed as part of UNPROFOR. The UN Secretary-General called for a “fundamental review of UNPROFOR” and their withdrawal was seriously considered. The potential withdrawal of UNPROFOR threatened NATO unity. The United States was adamantly opposed to its withdrawal, partly because they had pledged some 25,000 U.S. troops as part of a NATO contingent to cover UNPROFOR’s safe withdrawal if it proved necessary. The United Nations had proved unable to alter the situation on the ground in any significant way, and although a considerable amount of work by NGOs was contributing to delivering food and setting up refugee camps, the United Nations forces were becoming a bargaining chip for the opposing forces.

While this controversy raged within NATO, members of Congress were pressing for lifting the arms embargo in Bosnia. This position, unpopular in Europe, would have likely led to an unrecoverable rift in the NATO alliance and leave the responsibility for Bosnia squarely on the shoulders of the United States, all but guaranteeing the

withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. forces to the region. On August 1st the Congress sent the President a bill calling for an end to the arms embargo in the event of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. While the bill fell short of the hard-liner position requiring the President to unilaterally lift the embargo, it sent a clear message from the Congress that the administration's current Bosnia policy was ineffective and something new was needed. While all of this was happening, the 1996 Presidential race began to loom large on the horizon. It became increasingly important to not let an American foreign policy failure in Bosnia become a campaign issue, but by the summer of 1995, Bosnia had effectively hijacked U.S. foreign policy. At one point, Anthony Lake, the President's National Security Advisor wrote to Clinton in a memo "that the administration's weak, muddle-through strategy in Bosnia was becoming a cancer on Clinton's entire foreign policy – spreading and eating away at its credibility.... I'm really worried that Bosnia will again come to be the definition of American foreign policy and obscure all the other things we've done."

C. A MORE STRATEGIC APPROACH

In June, President Clinton met with his senior advisors. Clinton, describing U.S. policy toward Bosnia said, "We've got no clear mission, no one's in control of events." Vice President Gore added, "It's the issue from hell. The Europeans are self-delusional.... The need for us to protect and preserve the alliance is driving our policy. [And] it is driving us into a brick wall with Congress." Clinton's obvious frustration gave Anthony Lake an opening. Lake and his Bosnia aides on the NSC staff had wanted to take a more strategic approach to Bosnia as opposed to the immediate crisis management that had plagued U.S. policy for more than two years. The key problem, as he saw it, was to get everyone to the table in order to end the fighting. First he had to get policy consensus with the U.S. government, and for this he needed Secretaries Christopher and Perry to agree on a forward-leaning and assertive posture. Next, he could get the allies onboard, and then finally the warring parties.

Lake began a series of NSC staff meetings on June 24th to develop a new Bosnia strategy. He described the purpose of the meeting to his staff as "a blue skies discussion on what longer-term strategy would be." He told his staff to "think from the end

backward.” The strategy that came from these meetings became known as the Endgame Strategy. Meanwhile, American Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright had made her position on Bosnia known through a one and a half page memo she wrote for the President entitled “Elements of a New Strategy” where she strongly advocated a new approach toward Bosnia. The State Department was working on its own policy review during June as well. Their policy was based on the idea that “the United States was standing on the edge of two waterfalls and the trick was to make sure that it went down the right one.”

In July, Anthony Lake told the President that he had been working on a new strategy for dealing with the Bosnian situation and gave the President a draft of his Endgame Strategy. Clinton liked it, and Lake told him that he was convening a meeting with the other principals to discuss long-term strategy and that he planned to present the Endgame Strategy to them. He suggested that the President drop by the meeting to emphasize his desire for a long-term solution. On July 17th Anthony Lake, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, Ambassador Albright, General Shalikashvili, and Sandy Berger, Lake’s deputy, met to discuss Bosnia. Lake presented his strategy plan to the group, and as he expected, Christopher, Perry, and Shalikashvili showed little interest in what they saw as yet another policy review. They were more interested in “immediate tactical considerations” continuing the reactive policy that had plagued the administration. At that point the President joined the meeting as Lake had arranged. Clinton told the group, “I don’t like where we are now. This policy is doing enormous damage to the United States and to our standing in the world. We look weak. It can only get worse down the road. The only time we’ve ever made any progress is when we geared up NATO to pose a real threat to the Serbs.” He then called on his advisors to come up with something new.

D. THREE OPTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT

For two weeks an interagency group at the deputies level met daily to prepare strategy options to present to the President. In early August Anthony Lake submitted four strategy papers to the President. The first paper presented was basically a rewrite of Ambassador Albright’s “Elements of a New Strategy” memo. Her paper gave supporting

rationale and strategic justification for much of Anthony Lake's Endgame strategy. She wrote that U.S. foreign policy credibility was inextricably linked to the future of Bosnia, therefore the United States must take the lead in the issue. The question was no longer if UNPROFOR was going to withdrawal, but only when. As long as U.S. troops were committed to being deployed to Bosnia, it should be on U.S. terms, not at the beck and call of allies. Lastly, she wrote that every time the U.S. and NATO seriously threatened the use of force, the Serbs gave in; therefore, any U.S. plan should be based on using military pressure to convince the Serbs to negotiate a peace settlement.

The second paper presented to the President was the first real strategy option, Lake's Endgame Strategy. The President had already seen this option and had liked it. Lake's plan called for the preservation of a viable Bosnian state along the 51/49 split first suggested in the Contact Group's plan. Lake felt a political settlement or balance of power on the ground was critical to getting a working agreement. In order to support this the United States should be willing and prepared to support the Bosnians if necessary to get the Serbs to negotiate. Lake was clear that U.S. support for the Bosnians should be based on their willingness to negotiate for a settlement. The United States would not help them settle their differences militarily. If a political settlement was unobtainable, then Lake's plan called for the U.S. asking for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Along with the UN withdrawal, the arms embargo should be lifted, multilaterally if possible, but unilaterally if necessary. The United States would provide arms and training for Bosnian forces, enforce no-fly zones including preemptive attacks on air defense systems, and conduct air strikes on defend "safe areas" for up to a year. The last part of Lake's plan would be for the United States to encourage a successor to UNPROFOR to be made of forces from moderate Muslim states.

The next strategy presented to the President was the Secretary Christopher's plan for renewed negotiation. This plan grew from the "waterfall memo" which posited that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR was the wrong waterfall to go down. State's plan emphasized the risk to US troops if they were deployed to cover UNPROFOR's withdrawal and proposed a summit with Serbian, Croat, and Bosnian presidents with the Contact Group. The purpose of this summit was so that the three presidents could

officially recognize each other and set the groundwork and principles for a future summit to negotiate a peace settlement. Secretary Christopher also wanted to offer sanctions relief to Milosovic in an effort to convince him to get the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table (this represented a significant shift in U.S. policy away from refusing to negotiate with Karadzic and Mladic, both indicted war criminals, but finally recognized that without the Bosnian Serbs agreement, peace could not be guaranteed). Lastly, in the event of UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the United States would lift the embargo and provide arms to the Bosnians and conduct any training outside of Bosnia. Secretary Christopher's plan was against U.S. air strikes of any kind, emphasizing the importance of not becoming directly militarily involved in fighting in Bosnia.

The final plan presented to the President was from the Department of Defense. Secretary Perry's plan called for the United States to accept the partition of Bosnia along the existing confrontation line, although some consolidation of the map might be allowed to make the border more easily defended. Under this plan Serb areas in Bosnia would remain autonomous from the central Bosnian government and in time could vote to join Serbia. This represented a major departure from U.S. policy that had been unwaveringly against partition, and would give the Serbs roughly seventy percent of the partition. The plan also called for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the establishment of a permanent cessation of hostilities. The plan called for the demilitarization of Sarajevo. The United States and Europe would then provide considerable economic assistance to support the smaller states that remain. See Table 3 for a comparison of the three strategies presented to the President.

Criteria	NSC Endgame	State Negotiation	Defense Partition
What is the US role?	Leader	Mediator	Financial Assistance
What kind of Bosnia does the plan settle for?	Viable Bosnia 51/49	Viable Bosnia TBD	Partitioned 30/70
How long will it take to implement?	About One Year	Long Term	Short Term
What is the level of US military involvement?	High	Medium	None
What is the level of risk to US credibility?	High	Medium	Low
Does it satisfy the President's desire for something new?	Yes	No	Yes

Table 3. Three Bosnia Strategy Options

On August 7th, the principals met with the President to discuss the four plans. He began the meeting by stating that muddling through was no longer an option. First, a “last-ditch” diplomatic effort with NATO resolve was in order. U.S. leadership was critical for a chance at success, but even with the United States taking a leading role, the effort might fail. Second, if this diplomatic effort does fail, the United States should ask for the immediate withdrawal of UNPROFOR, lift the embargo, and execute a post-UNPROFOR strategy. This post-UNPROFOR strategy is where the President felt that there were still some questions to be answered. Lake summarized the four plans for the group and the principals were each given a chance to offer their perspectives. As Albright and Lake’s plans were not exclusive, the President began the discussion by saying that he liked the gist of the Albright paper and the specifics of Lake’s strategy. Clinton said, “We’ve got to exhaust every alternative, roll every die, take risks.” He felt that if the situation were not resolved quickly, it would be “dropped in during the middle of the campaign.” The principals further discussed the details of how the diplomatic plan should be implemented and what should happen if it failed. The next evening the President reconvened the group and told them that he had chosen Lake’s Endgame Strategy. The group then worked through the talking points that Lake would present to the allies.

E. STRATEGY SELECTION

The plan that Lake briefed the allied leaders showed the best aspects of all four plans presented to the President in early August, but clearly the President preferred Anthony Lake’s Endgame Strategy. Here the risks were the greatest for the United States because by taking the lead in the effort they also would take full responsibility for failure. However, in the realities of the international system, and after the failure of the UN effort, and the inability of the allies of developing a plan that everyone agreed with, President Clinton decided to roll the dice. Lake’s plan, if successful, would also prevent Bosnia from becoming an issue in the upcoming Presidential election. Thus the timeline was an important consideration in deciding which plan would be implemented. Additionally, the manner in which Lake presented his plan to the President before the other members of the cabinet probably had a considerable affect on the President’s final decision.

When Lake met with the leaders of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, he made the same presentation to each. Each meeting began with emphasizing that this is what the President has already decided to do. He asked each of the allies for support, but wanted them to understand that the President would act with or without their help. The next part of Lake's presentation described the plan for a diplomatic solution:

- A comprehensive peace settlement based on the core principles of the Contact group plan, including a united Bosnia;
- Three-way recognition between Croatia, Bosnia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- Consideration of changes in the Contact Group map to take account of recent territorial changes and to ensure viable and defensible borders;
- A framework for the long-term constitutional arrangements of a united Bosnia, including the possible scope of the "parallel special relationship" of the two entities with Croatia and Serbia;
- Sanctions relief for Yugoslavia, with the suspension of sanctions once an agreement had been signed and complete lifting of sanctions once the agreement had been implemented;
- A plan to resolve the situation in eastern Slavonia, a part of Croatia bordering Serbia; and
- A comprehensive plan for regional economic integration, to be assisted through an international "mini-Marshall" plan.

The last part of Lake's presentation to the allies described the U.S. plan for dealing with a diplomatic failure and the withdrawal of UNPROFOR:

- Seek to end the arms embargo multilaterally, through a vote by the UN Security Council;
- Provide arms, training, and support to the Bosnians (whether the arms embargo was lifted or not) in order to assist in establishing a balance of power on the ground;
- Enforce the no-fly zone and conduct air strikes for a nine-month transition period in case the Bosnian Serbs attacked; and
- Encourage the presence of a multinational force to assist the Bosnians in defending their territory.

Lake anticipated resistance from each of the allied leaders, but generally the meetings were "a piece of cake." The allies were not necessarily pleased with all aspects

of the American plan, but were nonetheless glad that someone was willing to take the lead. In typical American fashion when Lake was “asked along the way how he was going to get the allies on board, Lake had said that the United States was the ‘big dog’ that others followed. After each successful stop in a European capital, the lake team concluded that ‘the big dog had barked.’”

Once Lake had the allies on board, the next step was to conduct the U.S. diplomatic shuttle. Richard Holbrooke was chosen to lead the effort, in part because he “possessed the kind of ego, drive, aggressiveness, and bluster necessary to negotiate with intransigent parties such as those in Bosnia.” While Holbrooke and his team traveled throughout the Balkans, policymakers in Washington worked through the details of an acceptable peace agreement. Where the principals had worked through the plans for a new policy, the plans for implementation were left to the Deputies.

F. AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Good timing is everything. While the Deputies in Washington were working toward an implementation plan for the, yet to be achieved, peace settlement, the fundamental strategic landscape in Bosnia shifted. During the summer the Croatian forces had been mounting a successful offensive aimed at recovering territory in Croatia that had been held by Serbs since 1992. NATO bombing of Serb targets resumed on September 5th, and by September 9th the Croatian forces, fighting alongside Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian-Croat troops, had entered Bosnia. The military tide had turned, and the Serbs were on their heels. By September 13th, when Richard Holbrooke arrived in Belgrade, the Serbs were ready to talk. In Late August, Milosovic called the Bosnia Serb leadership to Belgrade and worked out an agreement by which Milosovic would be responsible for all Serbs during peace negotiations. This agreement, called the “Patriarch Paper” would bind Bosnian Serbs to any agreement that Milosovic might sign, effectively gaining their proxy for the upcoming diplomatic negotiations that would lead to the Dayton Agreement. These three factors, the Croat offensive, renewed NATO air strikes, and the Bosnian Serb acceptance of Milosovic’s role in the negotiations created a new environment where peace talks could proceed.

In October 1995, the Principals Committee established an Excom whose purpose was to support Ambassador Holbrooke's negotiations and write a political-military plan for the implementation of a peace agreement. But a peace agreement did not exist yet, and its formulation was difficult and not certain until the final day of the talks at Dayton. Due to the difficult nature of the negotiations, Ambassador Holbrooke did not work with the Excom, but only dealt with the Principals Committee, and therefore the Excom proved ineffective.³⁰ While Holbrooke was getting the parties working toward an agreement, the Deputies in Washington began working on the implementation plan. The Deputies Committee consisted of Sandy Berger, Deputy National Security Advisor and chairman of the committee, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, Policy Planning Chief James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocoobe, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Owens, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet, Vice Admiral Dennis Blair, representatives of the Office of the Vice President, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Treasury Department, Agency for International Development, and the Office of Management and Budget. Their meetings addressed three key issues: the mandate and mission of the Implementation Force (IFOR), the exit strategy and deadline, and the civilian implementation effort.

1. IFOR Mandate

The mandate developed for IFOR was to help enforce an agreed upon peace settlement, but should that fail, IFOR would help the Bosnians. The key parts of the mandate include a unified NATO command with no U.N. involvement, clear and robust rules of engagement, and the mission would be focused on the military aspects of the peace agreement – marking boundaries, maintaining the separation of forces, and cessation of hostilities. The NATO plan developed in Brussels and approved by North Atlantic Council in October, reflected these key issues the Deputies agreed upon in Washington. By the end of October there were two, seemingly irreconcilable, positions on the breadth of the IFOR mandate. The minimalists, led by Anthony Lake, felt the

³⁰ *Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Directive 56: A Plan of Action for the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1999, 8-9.

military's mandate should be narrow, limited to the specifically military aspects of the agreement. The maximalists, led by Richard Holbrooke, pushed for a broad mandate that would assign to the military such tasks as providing security during elections, arresting war criminals, protecting refugees returning to their homes, and responding to human rights violations. This fundamental disagreement came to a head just before the negotiations in Dayton began. General Shalikashvili eventually devised the middle ground mandate that could be accepted by both the minimalists and maximalists. IFOR would be give the authority to assist in the civilian aspects of the implementation, but would only be required to carry out the military aspects. This gave the commander of the force on the ground broad latitude to take on civil missions when the resources are available.

2. Exit Strategy

The overarching question in Washington was how long U.S. forces would be on the ground in Bosnia. Both political limitations and military realities led the Deputies Committee to agree to a one-year operation. The timeline agreed to in the Dayton Accords called for all military aspects of the agreement to be fulfilled in 120 days. The basic goal of U.S. policy was to achieve a balance of power in Bosnia and that would then secure peace and stability. At worst case, the administration felt that within a year they could build up Bosnian forces to even the military balance. Lastly, it was believed that a balance of power and a year without fighting would create a momentum for peace that would last after the withdrawal of NATO forces. This deadline never took into account the wider goals of the Dayton Accords but it kept Bosnia from becoming a major issue in the 1996 U.S. Presidential election.

3. Civilian Implementation

The last part of the planning effort in Washington was the civilian implementation effort. Once it became clear that an American would not be appointed as the High Representative (HiRep), the individual responsible for the civilian implementation, the effort in Washington focused on undermining the power of the office of the HiRep. Pauline Neville-Jones, the British negotiator at Dayton, said, "The U.S. negotiating tactic seemed to be to concede to this office [HiRep] as little authority as possible, either over the agencies engaged in civilian implementation or in relation to the military

commander.” She described the HiRep as “not fully answerable to any body of uncontested international authority and operates in uncomfortable and unconvincing limbo.” The HiRep was appointed by and overseen by the unwieldy Peace Implementation Council (PIC), consisting of representatives from the G7 plus Russia. The civilian implementation organization can be seen in Figure 1. This arrangement proved to create a stark separation between the clear and straightforward NATO command arrangements of the IFOR and the civilian implementation effort.




Figure 1. Civilian Implementation Organization³¹

4. The Dayton Accords

The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), more widely known as the Dayton Accords, was initiated on November 21, and formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Under the agreement the parties agreed to the following: respect each other’s sovereignty, settle disputes peaceably, respect human rights and the rights of

³¹ Daalder, 158.

refugees and displaced persons, and cooperate with all entities implementing the eleven annexes of the peace operations.³²

Annex 1-A is the military annex of the agreement and includes a cease-fire, withdrawal of forces, and cantonment of heavy weapons. IFOR was deployed to monitor compliance with Annex 1-A only and was authorized to use force, if necessary. Information on mines, military personnel, and weapons was to be reported to the IFOR commander through the Joint Military Commission. Lastly, a transfer of military personnel and civilians was to be carried out under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).³³ Annex 1-B focuses on regional stability, and called for negotiations between the parties to be conducted under the guidance of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for the purpose of developing confidence-building measures. Annex 1-B also directed the OSCE to organize a regional military balance by managing negotiations to limit military forces and equipment.³⁴

Annex 2 set an Inter-Entity Boundary Line and accounted for the future status of Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Brcko. Annex 3 addresses the issue of elections and requested OSCE supervise the preparation and conduct of free and fair elections. Annex 4 set forth a new constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constitution accounted for human rights, free movement of people, goods, capital, and services. It describes the structure of the presidency, legislature, judiciary, central bank, and monetary system. Annex 5 describes a system of binding arbitration for disputes between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic – the two entities created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 6 guarantees human rights and established a Commission on Human Rights. OSCE and UN human rights agencies were granted full access to monitor human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 7 established a Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees to ensure their safe return to their homes and compensation for lost property. In Annex 7 the parties agreed to help the ICRC find all missing persons. Annex 8

³² Larry Wentz, *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, (Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 1997), 467-468.

³³ Wentz, 468-469.

³⁴ Wentz, 469.

established a Commission to Preserve National Monuments. Annex 9 established a Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation to operate and maintain roads, railways, and port facilities and a Commission on Public Corporations to establish other public utilities and postal service. Annex 10 requested a High Representative (HiRep) to coordinate all the civilian aspects of the peace agreement including humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction, human rights, and elections. The HiRep has no authority over IFOR or the military aspects of the agreement. Lastly, Annex 11 requested the UN establish an International Police Task Force (IPTF) to train and monitor law enforcement personnel.³⁵

G. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

IFOR deployed on December 29, 1995. From November 1995 until February 1996, the Excom proposed several plans for the civilian implementation, but the Principals Committee did not approve any of them. This inability to develop a plan reflected a fracture in the administration that went all the way to the cabinet. The main issue of contention continued to be how far IFOR would go to support the civilian implementation. This policy debate which, was not resolved for more than two years after the deployment of IFOR, made any interagency effort fractured. Due to these disagreements at the top, the Excom was wholly ineffective.³⁶

The policy debate that plagued the Bosnia operations came from the fundamental question, did the U.S. policy intend to end a war or build a peace? Anthony Lake in his minimalist view felt that

assigning too large a role to the international community for rebuilding war-torn societies would create “unreasonable expectation [on the part of the parties] that the hard work will be done for them not by them.” The role of the international community should be limited to providing “governments the breathing room they must have to tackle their own problems.”

Initially, the minimalists won the battle of expectations in Washington, but as the international military efforts met with success, the euphoria at ending a war has led to the realization that in order prevent its reoccurrence the focus must shift to building a peace.

³⁵ Wentz, 469-473.

³⁶ *Improving the Utility*, 8-9.

IFOR could help guarantee an end to the fighting, but it would take a successful civilian implementation effort to build a lasting peace. However,

There was no formal integrating structure established at any level, and no means by which the military and civilian implementation plans and activities were reconciled and coordinated. The integration that did occur was primarily at the operational level – in Bosnia itself – and occurred as a result of *ad hoc* arrangements between the commander of IFOR/SFOR and the High Representative.³⁷

In March 1996 the Deputies Committee, working from the draft plans developed by the Excom, began meeting weekly to address the key issues of the civilian implementation—police, elections, refugees, and economic reconstruction. Over several months a plan was developed which eventually helped get the civilian implementation on course. IFOR’s mission lasted only one year, as promised to the American people, but was replaced with the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) – basically a change in name only. By March 1997 it was still behind schedule and Ambassador Robert Gelbard led another planning effort to energize the process. This plan was approved up the American channels through the Deputies Committee, Principals Committee and the President, and was used as a roadmap for the following year.³⁸

At the end of SFOR’s initial 18-month commitment, two and a half years after the first IFOR troops entered Bosnia, President Clinton finally publicly declared what many had already guessed.

President Clinton announced that the United States would remain militarily engaged alongside its NATO allies for as long as it would take for peace to become self-sustaining. There would be no more deadlines, only clear benchmarks to measure progress in meeting the goal of a lasting peace in Bosnia. These benchmarks included a durable cease-fire, reconfiguring of police forces, effective judicial and election reform, free market reform, return of displaced persons, and cooperation with the war crimes tribunal.

³⁷ George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing the Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond*, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1998; available from <http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/joul/joul.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 June 2001.

³⁸ *Improving the Utility*, 8-9.

H. LESSONS FROM BOSNIA

Lessons from Bosnia

The Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review noted that the lack of a coherent planning process and the ad hoc arrangements were a “root cause” underlying many of the problems that occurred in the implementation and limited the unity of effort.³⁹ The stove-piped nature of the agreement and implementation organization should have sent warning signals that a successful conclusion to this complex contingency operation is likely to be elusive. Other lessons to be learned from the Bosnia operation include the following:

1. The NSC needs strengthening to perform its statutory role in developing strategy.
2. The interagency process needs strengthening: It breaks down too easily when agencies take conflicting positions or an agency carries its internal conflicts into the interagency process.
3. Planning is necessary: absent a plan, departmental concerns will dominate and these may drive policy in contradictory directions.
4. Keeping military separate from civilian implementation of the same agreement is counterproductive; insulating the military from failure does not constitute success.
5. Civilian-military coordination should occur at all levels.⁴⁰

The failure of interagency planning and coordination for Bosnia suggested the need for a formal doctrine, like PDD 56, mandating interagency coordination in complex contingency operations.

³⁹ Bosnia-Herzegovina *After Action Review Conference Report*, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 19-23 May 1996, 3-4.

⁴⁰ Pirnie, 78.

III. PDD 56: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON MANAGING COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Good organization doesn't guarantee success, but bad organization guarantees failure.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower⁴¹

A. INTRODUCTION

In May 1997, President Clinton signed PDD 56, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. Its intent was to capitalize on the positive lessons learned and avoid some of the problems that had plagued previous complex contingency operations. To fully understand how PDD 56 was developed, it is important to explore how the U.S. government responded to operations before Bosnia, in both Somalia and Haiti. The first half of this chapter describes the background to PDD 56, including lessons from operations in Somalia and Haiti, and a description of the pilot interagency training program. The second half of this chapter summarizes the PDD 56 mechanisms for interagency management of complex contingency operations.

B. BACKGROUND

1. Somalia

In late 1992 President George Bush decided that the United States would respond to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. From November 1992 until January 1993, the State Department chaired an interagency working group on Somalia. This group, the Somalia Task Force, monitored and managed the U.S. involvement in Somalia through the beginning of the operation. When it disbanded in January 1993, high-level interagency coordination and oversight ended, leaving no plan to integrate the efforts of the various agencies deployed to Somalia – either amongst themselves or within the larger international presence. Within months the UN Security Council expanded the mission objectives, and U.S. troops began offensive operations – a significant departure from security operations to protect food distribution.⁴²

⁴¹ John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft, "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process," in *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*, eds. Ashton B. Carter and John P. White (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 269.

⁴² *Improving the Utility*, 5.

After 18 U.S. Soldiers were killed in October 1993, the operation came under intense scrutiny. Ambassador Robert Oakley and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner requested an interagency organization to manage the U.S. operation in Somalia. On November 1st an Executive Committee was chartered by the Deputies Committee of the NSC “to act as a high-level interagency committee to coordinate Somalia policy and achieve personal (at the Assistant Secretary level) accountability for actions of the various agencies.” It was co-chaired by Dick Clarke from the NSC and James Dobbins from State.⁴³ It was the first Excom of the Clinton administration, but it was a case of too little, too late. The U.S. withdrew from Somalia in March 1994.

Many of the lessons from the American experience in Somalia point to issues that stem from the absence of interagency management in Washington. Lessons from Somalia include the following:

- Clear statement of a feasible mission, starting with the U.S. government’s own statement, is fundamental to success.
- Unity of command, starting with U.S. forces, is as important in complex contingency operations as it is in war.
- Military forces and relief agencies are highly disparate in culture, but they will collaborate willingly if provided liaison, preferably through a well-supported CMOC [Civil Military Operations Center].
- In the absence of reliable government, no clear dividing line exists between military operations and law enforcement.
- The credibility of newly established police forces may depend critically on military support in emergency situations.
- Developing new police forces demands long-term effort and should not be considered a quick exit strategy.⁴⁴

Many of these lessons would be learned again in future complex contingency operations, but the U.S. experience in Somalia positively affected the conduct of the next complex contingency operation that the U.S. chose to respond—Haiti.

2. Haiti

Haiti is generally upheld as an example of a successful complex contingency operation. PDD 56 codified the interagency process as it unfolded in Haiti. Operation

⁴³ *Improving the Utility*, 5.

⁴⁴ Pirnie, 63-64.

Uphold Democracy, which was executed in September 1994 and turned over to the United Nations in March 1995, was unique in several ways. First, it involved few groups outside the U.S. government. Canada and several Caribbean nations assisted in the operation, and the UN was involved from the beginning, but the preponderance of the resources were American and therefore decisions were made by Washington.⁴⁵ American planners were intent on a smooth transition of responsibility from the U.S. to the UN, so the UN was on the ground in Haiti from day one. Additionally, the U.S. did not want to get bogged down in a longer-term operation, so planners determined in advance objectives that would have to be achieved before the transition and focused on those. Haiti was unique in the amount of time available for advance planning. The Defense Department began planning for Haiti in October 1993, nearly a year before it was executed.⁴⁶

From January to March 1994, the Panama and Somalia after action reports were circulating around the Department of Defense. Recognizing the role poor interagency planning played in the American failure in Somalia, Secretary of Defense Perry directed the start of interagency planning.⁴⁷ However, interagency planning was difficult within the ongoing policy debate – diplomatic means was the preferred tool for restoring the democratically elected president of Haiti, but the NSC was pushing for the use of force. It was not until the President decided to consider the use of force in May that interagency coordination could begin. Still, due to security concerns the military planning remained isolated from civilian planning, despite the recognition that there were issues that needed to be coordinated. In June, the President was briefed on the military operation, which was estimated to last one week. President Clinton asked the assembled Principals Committee, “What happens in the second week?” No one could answer the question, and it was clear that a comprehensive plan had to be drafted. This plan became known as a political-military plan.⁴⁸ Interagency planning for Haiti was assigned to an Excom,

⁴⁵ Steven P. Bucci, *Complex Contingencies: Presidential Decision Directive 56: The Case of Kosovo and the Future*, National Foreign Affairs Training Center, 6.

⁴⁶ Stephen A. Clark, *Interagency Coordination: Strengthening the Link between Operational Art and the Desired End State*, Naval War College, 8 February 1999, 10.

⁴⁷ Stephen A. Clarke, 10-11.

⁴⁸ Bucci, 6.

which was staffed at the Assistant Secretary level, chaired by the NSC, and reported to the Deputies Committee. The Haiti Excom was chaired by Dick Clarke from the NSC, and Ambassador James Dobbins was the State Department's Special Haiti Coordinator, both of whom had been co-chairs of the Somalia Excom.

The chief planner at USACOM, Marine Major General Michael Byron had been forwarding a series of questions to the Defense Department's Haiti Task Force for months. He requested planning guidance for issues that were related to post-intervention civilian functions. These issues would affect the conduct of the military operation and had to be resolved. The DoD Haiti Task Force had compiled General Byron's questions into a matrix of issues organized by functional areas. This matrix provided the basis for the Excom's pol-mil plan. Dick Clarke, chairman of the Excom, assigned members to functional areas of the plan, not just as representatives of their own agency's plans. Each member was responsible for integrating actions across government agencies for their part of the plan. In August 1994, the first of two interagency rehearsals was held. In this rehearsal, each Excom member briefed their functional areas of the pol-mil plan. Gaps were revealed and the plan was revised. The second interagency rehearsal was briefed to the Deputies Committee.⁴⁹

While interagency coordination was taking place at the strategic level, the interagency effort did not translate to the operational level. The operational planning was kept compartmentalized for fear of security leaks. The military created an "OPLAN A" which was the plan for the forced entry into Haiti. The civilian planners created an "OPLAN B" which was the plan if the U.S. was invited into Haiti. The idea was that the United States would either execute plan B or they would execute plan A then plan B, depending on whether it would be a forced entry or not.⁵⁰ Consequently operational planning was parallel and not synchronized.⁵¹ The first interagency meeting at the operational level occurred one week before the operation was set to begin and it revealed significant coordination problems. "One senior player noted: 'We tried to do the interagency coordination on September 12, but it was a disaster.' There were too many

⁴⁹ *Improving the Utility*, 6-7.

⁵⁰ Michele Flournoy, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 11 June 2001.

⁵¹ Chadwick.

people for real candor. ‘People just recited what they were doing.’ A senior military officer expressed alarm, reportedly observing, ‘This is the kind of planning that gets people killed.’”⁵² With the strategic coordination not translating to the operational level, and the operational coordination not really starting until the week before the operation began, the real interagency coordination took place in Haiti at the tactical level, as the operation was unfolding. “In the end, as usual, the absence of detailed operational coordination and planning was in many respects offset on the ground by the drive and initiative of operators working in harm’s way.”⁵³

Despite the problems encountered in the U.S. operation in Haiti, it is largely considered a success within the framework that it accomplished the goals that the U.S. government set out to achieve.⁵⁴ But even the most successful operation has useful lessons that must be learned. An interagency after action review took place at the National Defense University’s Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT) on May 24, 1995. The AAR brought together senior civilian and military participants from the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice, USAID, Coast Guard, as well as analysts, academics, and a representative from a private voluntary organization. The AAR looked at four phases of the Haiti operation: “the planning phase, the military operation itself, the transition to civilian control, and the transfer to UN responsibility. In each phase, the participants assessed decision processes and activities taking place at the strategic, operational, and tactical planning level and within military, civilian, and nongovernmental organizations.”⁵⁵ Workshop participants agreed on several interagency political-military lessons learned.

- Interagency planning doctrine for complex emergencies is needed.
- Planning must compensate for organizational and operational differences between civilian and military organizations.

⁵² Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds., *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti ~ A Case Study* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996), 32-33.

⁵³ Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, “Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can’t Ignore,” *Parameters*, Winter 1998; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/98winter/moore.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2001.

⁵⁴ The goals of Haiti operation described by Hayes and Wheatly, were limited to the decapitation of the military dictatorship, the restoration of the elected President of Haiti, and the transition of the operation to UN control in six months.

⁵⁵ Hayes and Wheatley, 4-5.

- Agreement on interagency command and control arrangements is needed.
- Agreement is needed on operational concepts for OOTW.
- Interagency C2 war games can help to work out interagency differences, expose agencies to each other.⁵⁶

Most of these lessons formed the basis for PDD 56, which is a doctrine for complex emergencies, compensates for organizational differences, accounts for strategic level oversight, and requires a training program of war games to help work out interagency differences and expose the agencies to each other.

3. A Pilot Training Program

Dick Clarke, Senior Director for Global Affairs at the NSC, convened an interagency meeting on September 15, 1995, and unveiled an interagency training program. Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements and Ambassador Thomas McNamara, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, along with leaders in the Joint Staff, USACOM, DoD, DoS, and DOJ, as well as leaders from several other agencies who had been involved in Somalia, Haiti, or both, came together to identify the most important lessons from these two complex contingency operations. Many of the same personnel had been involved in both Somalia and Haiti, and it was precisely this continuity that helped lessons transcend from one operation to the next.

The impetus for a training program came from a desire that their hard-earned expertise and lessons learned not be lost when personnel moved on to different responsibilities. Training would institutionalize the lessons learned from past operations to ensure that they would be applied in the next operation. The DoD was to be responsible for the development of this three phase pilot training program.⁵⁷ The first phase of the training program occurred in September and October 1995 where lessons learned were incorporated into a pol-mil plan template. The second phase of the exercise in November and December 1995 included the development of a pol-mil plan and rehearsal brief for an Excom. A third phase in February 1996 developed a pol-mil plan

⁵⁶ Hayes and Wheatley, 51.

⁵⁷ Improving the Utility, 2-3.

for a simulated operation in Eastern Zaire. Based on the participant consensus that the training was useful, an additional training session was scheduled for December 1996.⁵⁸

An important conclusion that came out of this pilot training program was that it would take more than training to get agencies to use the coordination and planning tools that had been useful in the Haiti operation. From this it was decided that a Presidential Decision Directive was needed to institutionalize these lessons learned. In February 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Michele Flournoy and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance Len Hawley, as well as their staffs began work on the document that would become PDD 56.⁵⁹

In December 1996, another interagency training session attended by action officers, office directors, and Deputy Assistant Secretaries further validated the training program that would be mandated in PDD 56. The participants formed an Excom, wrote a pol-mil plan, and conducted a rehearsal. Then in April 1997, while PDD 56 was in its final draft form, representatives from U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) attended an interagency training session at NDU. They wanted to know if the pol-mil plans being developed in the interagency training could be linked to their annual theater-level exercise called Tempo Brave. In 1997, Tempo Brave was a simulation of the collapse of the government in Burma and the following humanitarian crisis. To see if it would work, PACOM planners and NDU contractors worked together to draft a 27-page pol-mil plan based on the template that was being developed by the NSC for PDD 56.

When Tempo Brave began in July, it was quickly determined that the pol-mil plan that had been developed would not work. It had provided detailed guidance at the strategic and operational level, and did not allow the flexibility that was critical for an operational commander.

Tempo Brave demonstrated that the implementation of PDD 56 required sufficient flexibility to be useful across the spectrum of complex

⁵⁸ Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameters*, Winter 1998; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98winter/harwood.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 May 2000.

⁵⁹ *Improving the Utility*, 3.

contingency operations, including unanticipated crises. Tempo Brave also demonstrated that the utility of a stand-alone political-military plan is limited when divorced from the dynamic oversight mechanism of the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee plays a critical role in adapting the plan as a complex contingency operation unfolds. Finally, Tempo Brave demonstrated that PDD 56 political-military plans must remain at the strategic level to be useful at the operational level.... A truly strategic plan could have remained useful as a framework for operational planning for crisis action.⁶⁰

These were valuable lessons and Tempo Brave showed that with some improvements, the interagency training in Washington could be linked to CINC exercises around the world.

C. PDD 56 OVERVIEW

The purpose of PDD 56 is to “achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies.” To accomplish this aim, PDD 56 describes six mechanisms that when used in concert help to:

- Identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government agencies in a U.S. Government response;
- Develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction;
- Accelerate planning implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation; intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on;
- Integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level; and
- Rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions.⁶¹

PDD 56 goals for the interagency process are broad and include: “gaining a complete situation assessment; formulating integrated United States Government (USG) policy guidance; making agency planning activities transparent to other agencies; increasing individual accountability for implementation of assigned agency responsibilities; and anticipating and keeping pace with events during operations.” The six PDD 56 mechanisms are as follows: an Executive Committee, a Political-Military Implementation Plan, and Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal, an After Action Review,

⁶⁰ *Improving the Utility*, 10-11.

⁶¹ The White House, 1997.

an Interagency Training Program, and Agency Review and Implementation. While the use of the tools cannot guarantee a successful complex contingency operation, not using the tools could lead to a disjointed American effort that all but ensures failure of the mission.⁶²

1. Executive Committee

PDD 56 describes an NSC centered model for interagency management. Once it is determined that the United States will respond to a complex contingency, the Deputies Committee of the NSC establishes an Executive Committee, comprised of representatives of various USG agencies at the assistant secretary level, including agencies not normally part of the national security organization.⁶³ This Excom is “the principle coordinating mechanism of interagency activities.” According to the Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations, the Excom’s purpose is to:

- Provide unified policy guidance for agency planners of the operation
- Develop a USG pol-mil plan for the operation
- Integrate mission area plans within the overall USG pol-mil plan
- Monitor the operation
- Revise policy guidance, as needed
- Update the pol-mil plan as necessary
- Implement Deputies and Principals policy decisions
- Oversee an after-action review at the conclusion of each operation
- Disseminate lessons learned and improvements in interagency planning

The Excom is designed so that the assistant secretary representatives are held personally accountable for their assigned part of the operation. Excom members are not assigned to oversee their own agency efforts. They are assigned functional areas that span agencies, such as refugees, elections, or demobilization, to develop a plan and coordinate. The chairman of the Excom must also designate an agency to lead a legal and fiscal advisory sub-group to ensure that the tasks assigned to specific agencies are within the current legal and fiscal constraints of the agencies. “The Excom approach has

⁶² *Handbook for Interagency Management.*

⁶³ The Deputies Committee may also be augmented by agency representatives not normally part of the process.

proved useful in clarifying agency responsibilities, strengthening agency accountability, ensuring interagency coordination, and developing policy options for consideration by senior policy makers.”⁶⁴

2. Political-Military Implementation Plan

Development of the pol-mil plan is the “centerpiece of the integrated planning process.” Representatives from the appropriate agencies working together to write the pol-mil plan:

- Helps build interagency consensus on the key elements of the overall operation
- Assists in synchronizing individual agency efforts
- Enhances the transparency of planning among different agencies
- Helps ensure that all key issues are raised during planning⁶⁵

According to the PDD 56 White Paper, the pol-mil plan centralizes planning, allowing decentralized execution during the operation. PDD 56 describes eleven illustrative components to the pol-mil plan. While each plan must be developed to fit the specific details of a particular operation the following components should be included in all pol-mil plans:

- Situation Assessment. A comprehensive assessment of the situation to clarify essential information that, in the aggregate, provides a multi-dimensional picture of the crisis.
- U.S. interests. A statement of U.S. interests at stake in the crisis and the requirement to secure those interests.
- Mission Statement. A clear statement of the USG’s strategic purpose for the operation and the pol-mil mission.
- Objectives. The key civil-military objectives to be accomplished during the operation.
- Desired Pol-Mil End State. The conditions the operation is intended to create before the operation transitions to a follow-on operation and/or terminates.
- Concept of the Operations. A conceptual description of how the various instruments of USG policy will be integrated to get the job done throughout all phases of the operation.

⁶⁴ The White House, 1997.

⁶⁵ *Handbook for Interagency Management*.

- Lead Agency Responsibilities. An assignment of responsibilities for participating agencies.
- Transition/Exit Strategy. A strategy that is linked to the realization of the end state described above, requiring the integrated efforts of diplomats, military leaders, and relief officials of the USG and the international community.
- Organizational Concept. A schematic of the various organizational structures of the operation, in Washington and in theater, including a description of the chain of authority and associated reporting channels.
- Preparatory Tasks. A layout of specific tasks to be undertaken before the operation begins (congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, media coordination, etc.).
- Functional or Mission Area Tasks/Agency Plans. Key operational and support plans written by USG agencies that pertain to critical parts of the operation (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social reconciliation, public information, etc.).⁶⁶

PDD 56 specifically requires the pol-mil plan to include “demonstrable milestones and measures of success.” It must include planning for the transition from a complex contingency operation to a follow-on operation. Lastly, PDD 56 requires the plan to be updated as necessary to reflect any changes in the situation or the mission.⁶⁷ A detailed “Generic Pol-Mil Plan” can be found in Appendix B. It is constantly updated and used as a guide for the development of pol-mil plans in both training exercises and actual operations.

3. Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal

Once the pol-mil plan is drafted, PDD 56 calls for an interagency rehearsal. This takes the form of a brief to the Deputies Committee. First the intelligence representative gives an update of the situation, and then the NSC staff provides the context for the follow on briefs of the functional areas of the plan, describing the mission, objectives, end state, and concept of operations for the mission. Next, members of the Excom responsible for functional areas—program managers—brief their areas. This way problems or disconnects can be identified before the operation is executed. “By

⁶⁶ The White House, 1997.

⁶⁷ The White House, 1997.

simultaneously reviewing all elements of the plan, differences over mission objectives, agency responsibilities, the timing of operations and resource allocation can be identified and resolved early.” The mission area plans should answer the following questions:

- What is the overall purpose of the functional element plan?
- What is the current situation in the area of operations?
- What are the key entry conditions and assumptions for the mission area plan?
- What are the functional element plan’s purpose, mission, and operational objectives?
- How does the mission contribute to the overall USG pol-mil plan?
- What is the functional element plan’s concept of operation for accomplishing the mission?
- What are the timelines/milestones to accomplish the mission?
- How does the concept synchronize with the overall USG concept of operations?
- What are the organizational structure and chain of authority for operations?
- Who are the key players, from both the U.S. and others, and what are their roles?
- What mechanisms are planned to effect civil-military coordination?
- What difficulties, obstacles or resource shortfalls currently exist?
- What constitutes success on the ground?
- What are the unresolved issues pending decision?⁶⁸

Lastly, the synchronization matrix is used to determine if the functional areas are working in concert. The sync matrix has the functional elements along the x-axis and the time, or phases along the y-axis. The matrix is filled in to show how each part of the plan is conducted over time, and can be used as a guide to improve the integration of the functional plans.⁶⁹

The Deputies Committee uses three criteria to judge the pol-mil plan: effectiveness, integration, and executability? To judge the pol-mil plan’s effectiveness, they must assess whether the functional plans support the overall mission and will

⁶⁸ *Handbook for Interagency Management.*

⁶⁹ *Handbook for Interagency Management.*

achieve the objectives consistent with the established milestones. Integration is determined by assessing whether the agency efforts are complementary and synchronized within the overall concept of operations. Lastly, the Deputies Committee assesses whether or not the plan is executable within agency legal, resource, and financial restraints. The rehearsal is not intended to end the pol-mil planning process but instead to be part of an iterative process. If necessary, and time permitting, a second rehearsal may be held.⁷⁰

4. Interagency After-Action Review

Once the complex contingency operation is completed, the Executive committee is charged with conducted an AAR. For this process, the AAR is to be a guided discussion for the participants to identify for themselves what went right, what when wrong, and possible reasons why. This review should include “a review of interagency planning and coordination, (both in Washington and in the field), legal and budgetary difficulties encountered, problems in agency execution, as well as proposed solutions.” The purpose of the AAR is to capture the lessons from the participants and then use them to improve the process for future complex contingency operations.⁷¹ The AAR is briefed to the Deputies Committee, and should include both the strengths and the weaknesses encountered in the operation. It is not meant as a means to lay blame on any individual or agency. The AAR is only useful if the lessons are applied to future operations. The interagency training program gives an opportunity for the lessons from the AAR to be learned.

5. Interagency Training Program

PDD 56 mandates a training program to prepare officials to participate in managing complex contingency operations. PDD 56 identifies the National Defense University as the executive agent for this training program and requires that they hold an annual interagency exercise with the assistance of the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and the Army Peacekeeping Institute at the Army War College. Its aim is to educate officers at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level in the development of pol-mil plans. It also provides a forum for officers to meet their counterparts in different

⁷⁰ *Handbook for Interagency Management.*

⁷¹ The White House, 1997.

agencies and learn about the capabilities that the different agencies bring to the interagency forum. The training allows improvements to the PDD 56 process to be tested before they are used in actual crises. PDD 56 also calls on government educational institutions to incorporate the pol-mil planning process into their courses of study.⁷² A secondary benefit of the training program is that it expands the number of people who are familiar with the process. As more people are trained and become familiar with it, it is more likely that it will be used when a complex contingency operation occurs.

6. Agency Review and Implementation

Lastly, PDD 56 requires the agencies involved in complex contingency operations to review their “structure, legal authorities, budget levels, personnel system, training, and crisis management procedures” to ensure that they are applying the lessons learned in past complex contingency operations.⁷³

D. CONCLUSION

While PDD 56 made great strides in systemizing the USG interagency response to complex contingency operations, replacing the previously ineffective ad hoc organizations of the early 1990s, it took some time before the process caught on. PDD 56 mandated training sessions in December 1997, May 1998, and August 1998 helped to introduce the process to participants across the government. The first real test of PDD 56 would come in late 1998 through early 1999 with American involvement in Kosovo.

⁷² The White House, 1997.

⁷³ The White House, 1997.

IV. KOSOVO CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia continued in 1998 when violence erupted in Kosovo—a region in Serbia dominated by a large population of ethnic Albanians. From February 1998 until June 1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian security forces faced off in steadily increasing levels of violence. Before it was over NATO would conduct its first war, and the United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed to the region to enforce Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia. From the U.S. government perspective, the events in Kosovo led to the first implementation of PDD 56.

Interagency collaboration suffered from fits and starts during the Kosovo ordeal, but eventually the interagency process produced a comprehensive political-military plan that was adopted by both NATO and the UN, providing the basis for both the military and civilian implementation missions to Kosovo. This case study examines events from July 1998 until July 1999. The first section describes the Serbian summer offensive and the U.S. response; Ambassador’s Holbrooke’s October mission; the Racak massacre and Rambouillet; the bombing campaign’s unexpected consequences; the interagency planning for the peace in Kosovo; and concludes with some lessons learned from the operations in Kosovo.

B. THE SUMMER OFFENSIVE

In February 1998 the KLA began to challenge Serb security forces in a series of small-scale clashes. In July, the Serbs began a full-scale campaign against the KLA. This “offensive in Kosovo aimed at sealing the border with Albania, minimizing the flow of support to the KLA, eliminating the KLA leadership, and pacifying the Kosovar Albanian population. The scorched-earth campaign resulted in extensive destruction of Kosovar villages and the displacement of 400,000 Kosovars.”⁷⁴ In response to this renewed violence in the Balkans, on August 11, 1998 the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council directed seven senior managers from the NSC staff, OSD,

⁷⁴ *Improving the Utility*, 12.

DOS, CIA, and the Joint Staff “to develop a plan that would compel Slobodan Milosevic to cease his crackdown on the Kosovars.”⁷⁵ The group was never designated an Excom, and it was staffed at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level – one level lower than PDD 56 designates for an Excom. But this group largely acted as an interagency collaborative body tasked with developing a pol-mil plan. One member of the group had even helped to write PDD 56, so the Excom process was being used in practice, if not in name.⁷⁶

The Deputies Committee gave the group four weeks to develop their plan. In their first meeting they developed a table of contents for the plan and split up the work. Although, the plan did not follow the generic pol-mil plan format as laid out in PDD 56, all the subjects were covered. They started with purpose and intent, including policy questions the Deputies Committee would have to answer. The second section of the plan was a strategic analysis of the situation in Kosovo. The third section discussed the relation between force and diplomacy and addressed four key issues:

- Keep NATO united and engaged
- Keep the Russians out of the game
- Keep the issue out of the UN Security Council
- Ensure adequate maintenance of domestic support for any U.S. action⁷⁷

The fourth section covered advance preparations; fifth was potential reactions from Belgrade; sixth included Russia’s reactions; seventh was the reactions from the rest of the world; eighth reviewed humanitarian issues; ninth covered human rights; and lastly, the tenth section reviewed post-conflict requirements.⁷⁸ This plan became known as the pre-settlement plan.⁷⁹

When the group reconvened to review the plan in its entirety, it became evident that gaps existed, in particular, intelligence had not been integrated in the plan at all. After a three-hour session, the issues were resolved. On September 4th the Deputies Committee was briefed on the plan, which recommended bombing to get Milosevic to

⁷⁵ Bucci, 20.

⁷⁶ Bucci, 20.

⁷⁷ Bucci, 21.

⁷⁸ Bucci, 22.

⁷⁹ *Improving the Utility*, 12.

cease hostilities. Based on the anticipated consequences as laid out in the plan, the Deputies decided against the bombing option at that time. Despite deciding not to follow the interagency group's recommendation, the planning process was a success in that it facilitated an informed decision by the Deputies Committee. When the plan was briefed to the Principals Committee, a senior policy manager described the ensuing discussion "as the highest level (in regard to quality) discussion he had ever seen conducted in 30 plus years of high government service. If the pol-mil plan's purpose was to inform the decision makers, it clearly did its job here."⁸⁰ It was decided that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke would be sent on what became known as the "October Mission" to convince Milosevic to end his brutal operation in Kosovo.

C. THE OCTOBER MISSION

Holbrooke met with Milosevic for nine days and finally achieved an agreement that resolved what Ambassador Holbrooke characterized as "an emergency inside a crisis."⁸¹ In other words, Milosevic had agreed to end the military campaign in Kosovo – the *emergency* – but no resolution would be found on the underlying political issues that led to the conflict – the *crisis*. The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement had three major parts. First, Serb compliance would be monitored by a verification regime, which included over-flights and observers on the ground in Kosovo. Second, Christopher Hill was identified as an international mediator. Lastly, the Serbs agreed to a timetable to begin talks with the Kosovar Albanians. The October mission had some limitations according to Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon.

First, for all the focus on verification, the details of what was to be verified... were left vague. Second, although the verification system set up in Kosovo was able to monitor Serb compliance, it was incapable of enforcing it. Indeed, the vulnerability of unarmed monitors operating in an area teeming with Serb forces seriously undermined NATO's ability to threaten or use force in case of Serb noncompliance. Third, in ignoring the Albanian side of the equation, the agreement offered no effective way to prevent the Kosovar Albanians from attempting to exploit the opening

⁸⁰ Bucci, 22.

⁸¹ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 49.

created by the retreat of Serb forces.... In this way, the agreement may have contained within it the seeds of its own demise.⁸²

Now that an agreement had been reached, a plan had to be developed for what became known as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). In this case the planning was conducted at U.S. European Command, with the assistance of a senior manager from OSD, and representatives from State and the CIA. Since the KVM was to be carried out by the OSCE, the U.S. developed plan did not contain much detail, and was presented to both the OSCE and the UN as a “concept brief.”⁸³ This concept brief became the basis for the mission that was deployed to Kosovo.

At the same time that the KVM plan was being developed, State Department officials chaired an interagency planning team in developing a “post-settlement” implementation plan. Working from the Haiti experience, they integrated military and civil tasks to implement a peace agreement, which included tasks such as public security, elections, and reconstruction. This planning effort never had the backing of the agency leaders or any high-level interagency group, and finally shut down in January 1999.⁸⁴ No one knew what steps the United States or NATO were willing to take to create or enforce a peace agreement in November and December. The situation was still too uncertain.

D. RACAK MASSACRE AND RAMBOUILLET

Secretary of State Albright never believed that Milosevic would uphold his side of any agreement unless NATO proved that they were willing to use force. Albright thought the agreement was failing and wanted to target Milosevic with direct pressure. She had her spokesman James Rubin tell the press, “Milosevic has been at the center of every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade. He is not simply part of the problem; Milosevic is the problem.”⁸⁵ In December, the head of the KVM, Ambassador William Walker said that “both sides have been looking for trouble and they have found it. If the two sides are unwilling to live up to their agreements, 2,000, 3,000, or 4,000 unarmed verifiers cannot frustrate their attempts to go after each other.”⁸⁶ No one in

⁸² Daalder and O’Hanlon, 50.

⁸³ Bucci, 24.

⁸⁴ *Improving the Utility*, 12.

⁸⁵ Daalder and O’Hanlon, 69.

⁸⁶ Daalder and O’Hanlon, 61-62.

Washington, except Secretary Albright, was ready to give up on the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement yet.

On January 15, 1999, the Principals Committee met to discuss a thirteen-page Kosovo strategy paper known as October-plus. It proposed strengthening the KVM with more personnel, helicopters, and bodyguards; training an Albanian police force; and preparing for summer elections in Kosovo. The goal of the October-plus strategy was “to promote regional stability and protect our investment in Bosnia; prevent the resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and renewed humanitarian crisis; [and] preserve U.S. and NATO credibility.”⁸⁷ Albright came to the meeting prepared to offer other options.

She noted that the October agreement was about to fall apart.... Hill’s negotiation efforts were stymied by Serb obstructionism and Albanian fragmentation. The administration now faced a ‘decision point.’ It had three options: ‘stepping back, muddling through, or taking decisive steps.’ As violence escalated and a new humanitarian crisis loomed, stepping back was not a real option. As for muddling through, at best it might postpone the inevitable collapse of the October agreement; at worst it amounted to what one senior NATO official termed ‘a strategy of incrementally reinforcing failure.’ That left decisive steps. ...she emphasized that ‘Milosevic needed to realize that he faced a real potential for NATO action. If he did not get that message, he would not make any concessions.’”⁸⁸

The Principals opted for the October-plus option, or Albright’s muddling through option. After the meeting, she was quoted as saying, “We’re just gerbils running on a wheel.”⁸⁹ The PDD 56 process was not being used, and at this point the planning for Kosovo resembled the planning that had occurred in responding to Bosnia.

The Principals Committee would not be satisfied by their decision for long. Within hours after they adjourned from the January 15 meeting, the Racak massacre was discovered. Within hours, Jim Steinberg convened a meeting of the Deputies Committee with representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, and the CIA. State argued for immediate air strikes, and Defense asked what would be the objective. The group met for several days and made no decisions. Meanwhile, Secretary Albright

⁸⁷ Daalder and O’Hanlon, 70.

⁸⁸ Daalder and O’Hanlon, 70.

⁸⁹ Daalder and O’Hanlon, 71.

and her staff were working on a new strategy. Using input from Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Albright suggested the following strategy at a Principals Committee meeting on January 19.

Albright's strategy consisted of an ultimatum to the parties to accept an interim settlement by a date certain. If the parties accepted the deal, NATO would commit to its enforcement with troops on the ground. However, if Belgrade refused to endorse the plan, NATO's standing orders to its military commanders to commence a phased air campaign would be implemented. Albright was explicit about the strategy's key assumptions. First, since the allies would not deploy their troops on their own for fear of having to repeat the disaster of Bosnia, American troops would have to be part of any international force. Second, Milosevic would never accept the need to negotiate seriously, let alone accept an interim settlement, if there was no credible bombing threat. Third, further negotiations would lead nowhere; therefore, an interim deal had to be imposed through the threat and, if necessary, the use of NATO airpower.⁹⁰

On January 20th, President Clinton approved Secretary Albright's plan, which laid the foundation for the peace conference at Rambouillet. Once again, as he had done with Anthony Lake's Endgame Strategy in Bosnia, President Clinton chose an option presented by one of his principal advisors, instead of a plan developed in an interagency forum.

The Rambouillet Conference opened on February 6th, and was soon being called "Château Dayton."⁹¹ The proposed agreement resembled the format of the Dayton Accords. The agreement began with a brief framework agreement and was followed by a series of annexes, related to issues such as a constitution for Kosovo, elections, and military and civilian implementation.⁹² Timothy Garton Ash describes the talks:

First, while all Western participants entered the talks in the hope of reaching an agreement, the U.S., and specifically the State Department, had a much clearer fallback position than its European allies. This position was, as Albright herself subsequently put it, to achieve, "clarity." If the Kosovar Albanians signed, and the Serbs did not, then even the most hesitant European ally (and the Congress, and the White House) must

⁹⁰ Daalder and O'Hanlon, 71-72.

⁹¹ Timothy Garton Ash, "Kosovo: Was It Worth It?" *New York Review of Books*, 21 September 2000; available from <http://www.nybooks.com/nyrev/wwwarchdisplay.cgi?20000921050R>; Internet; accessed 28 April 2001.

⁹² Daalder and O'Hanlon, 78.

surely be convinced of the need to bomb Milosevic into accepting autonomy for Kosovo.

The talks continued through March 18th when the Kosovar Albanians were finally coerced into signing the agreement. When the Serbs refused, the conference was adjourned, and six days later, on March 24th, Operation Allied Force, the air war over Kosovo, began.

E. NATO'S FIRST WAR

The “pre-settlement plan” from September, which had recommended a bombing campaign, was taken off the shelf, and the Deputies Committee began day-to-day oversight of the operation as NATO entered its first war. “Excom duties were for all intents and purposes sucked upwards to the Deputies Committee. The entire issue became so high profile, that it became a nearly daily agenda for them. The added crush of time, and the full internationalization of the crisis... skewed the process away from any semblance of systemization.”⁹³ Everyone expected the air war to last two or three days. General Michael Short, the commander of the allied air forces said, “I can’t tell you how many times the instruction I got was, ‘Mike, you’re only going to be allowed to bomb two, maybe three nights. That’s all Washington can stand. That’s all some members of the alliance can stand. That’s why you’ve only got 90 targets. This’ll be over in three nights.’” NATO’s commander of southern forces, Admiral James Ellis agreed. “We called this one *absolutely* wrong.”⁹⁴

Another mistake that was made at the outset of the air campaign was to vastly underestimate the number of refugees that could be expected. NATO intelligence had expected 200,000 refugees. By the end of April there were 850,000 refugees and internally displaced persons.⁹⁵ Foreshadowing of the Operation Horseshoe, the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, can be found in a January conversation between Milosevic and General Wesley Clark. Milosevic told Clark, “You know, General Clark, that we know how to handle these Albanians, these murderers, these rapists, these killers-of-their-own-kind. We have taken care of them before. In Drenica, in 1946, we killed

⁹³ Bucci, 27.

⁹⁴ Ash.

⁹⁵ Ash.

them. We killed them all. Oh, it took several years, but we eventually killed them all.”⁹⁶ A repeat of 1946 seemed unrealistic in 1999, but the situation on the ground in Kosovo in March and April 1999 was not that different.

The air war was poorly prosecuted on several levels. There was no strategic clarity. The military means were poorly matched to the political aims. Leaders limited their options from the beginning by publicly declaring that there would be no ground troops. There was little coordination between the diplomatic and military campaigns. There was an open hostility between State and Defense. General Clark describes it as “a grudge match that went back to Bosnia.”⁹⁷ All this occurred under the immense pressure of maintaining a fragile 19-nation alliance. While the planning and conduct of the air war went so badly, the planning for peace, once it began, can be characterized as a success story.

F. PLANNING FOR PEACE

Once it became clear that the bombing campaign might last more than a few days, the Deputies Committee, in late March, tasked the Kosovo Excom to prepare a pol-mil plan for peace implementation after the bombing campaign ended.⁹⁸ In the first week of April, 30 experts and planners from 18 different agencies formed an interagency working group to develop the pol-mil plan. They quickly identified 14 mission areas—Governance, Military, Refugee Repatriation, Humanitarian Relief, Demining, Police, Elections, Democratization, Administration of Criminal Justice, Human Rights, War Crimes, International Public Information, Financial, and Reconstruction.⁹⁹ The group met at least twice weekly and brought together various position papers into a consolidated Mission Analysis. “A network of interlocking working groups sweated the details the USG could pin down as State awaited diplomatic action which would define

⁹⁶ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 151-152.

⁹⁷ Michael Ignatieff, “Chains of Command” *New York Review of Books* 19 July 2001, 17.

⁹⁸ Richard Roan, Erik Kjonnerod, and Robert Oakley, “Dealing with Complex Contingencies” *INSS Transition Papers*, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 21 December 2000, 4-6.

⁹⁹ Draft Staff Assessment, *Mission Analysis: International Provisional Administration (IPA) for Kosovo*, 6.

the ‘super-structure’ – lead organizations, an actual UN mandate – and, of course compliance with NATO’s conditions.”¹⁰⁰

By mid-May a final product called the Kosovo Mission Analysis was approved by the Deputies Committee. This document, which was not called a pol-mil plan so it would encounter less resistance in the international community, laid out the basic principles of the relationship between UNMIK and KFOR as it appeared in UNSCR 1244 – the UN mandate for UNMIK and KFOR.¹⁰¹ It also set the foundation for the four pillars of the civilian implementation effort: humanitarian support, governance support, institutional development, and reconstruction. Human rights were seen as a part of each of the four pillars, and the need to create an international police force was also acknowledged.¹⁰²

As the plan was being developed in Washington, members of the interagency group shared the planning concepts with planners at the UN and other international organizations including NATO and the OSCE. While the PDD 56 process was sporadically applied until March 1999, once it was fully invoked after the start of the air campaign to plan for the eventual peace, it was successful. “The interagency coordination and planning effort that produced the Kosovo Mission Analysis was a flexible and highly effective implementation of the coordination mechanisms and planning tools of PDD 56.”¹⁰³ PDD 56 was only partially implemented. The Kosovo Mission Analysis did not follow the format of the PDD 56 generic pol-mil plan, but included all the pertinent information. Critical to the success of the interagency effort was the oversight of the Deputies committee. Their participation ensured that the relevant agencies participated fully in the process and “ensured accountability and coordination by involved agencies during the implementation phase.”¹⁰⁴ In April the United States Congress passed a supplemental bill that supplied adequate funding for the peace implementation operation. The comprehensive Mission Analysis is also credited with helping the administration achieve financial support from the Congress.

¹⁰⁰ Newsom, United States State Department, “Background Press Brief on Kosovo IPA” 11 June 1999.

¹⁰¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is reprinted in Appendix C.

¹⁰² Newsom.

¹⁰³ Roan, Kjonnerod, and Oakley, 5.

¹⁰⁴ Roan, Kjonnerod, and Oakley, 6.

The overall mission of the International Provisional Administration (IPA) for Kosovo, as described in the Mission Analysis, was defined as follows: “The IPA will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.”¹⁰⁵ The specific missions were defined as follows:

- Promote the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-administration for Kosovo, taking account of the Rambouillet accords and relevant annexes of UNSCR 1244 (1999).
- Perform basic civilian administration functions where and as long as required.
- Organize and oversee development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections.
- Transfer, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities.
- Facilitate political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account Rambouillet accords.
- In a final stage, oversee the transfer from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement. Ensure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.
- Support, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, rapid and effective humanitarian and disaster relief aid.
- Support the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic recovery.
- Maintain civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.
- Protect and promote human rights.
- Cooperate and coordinate with ICTY.¹⁰⁶

The operational requirements for the IPA included “rapid and early deployment,” “maximum authority, flexibility, and political/legal legitimacy,” and a seamless interface

¹⁰⁵ Draft Staff Assessment, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Draft Staff Assessment, 1-2.

with KFOR.¹⁰⁷ On June 10th UNSCR 1244 was passed and on June 12th KFOR and UNMIK deployed into Kosovo.

G. LESSONS FROM KOSOVO

Eric Newsom credits the success of the operation to the PDD 56 process.

Before anyone was deployed in support of the post-bombing effort, we came to closure on an agreed strategy and plan. Great and contentious issues were argued and settled before, not after, mission start-up, providing those who implemented the plan with clarity of purpose and division of labor. I contend that the whole process was of great value, and a precedent for the future, even as subsequent events in Kosovo did not go according to plan. As the late president General Dwight Eisenhower once said, “A plan is worthless, but planning is everything.”

In the Report to Congress on Operation Allied Force, the interagency planning process was noted for coordinating the activities of different agencies, identifying issues for the consideration of the Deputies Committee, supporting international planning efforts, and developing measures of effectiveness for the operation. At the same time the interagency planning process was singled out for improvement. “Our experience in Operation Allied Force has shown that Presidential Decision Directive 56... had not yet been fully institutionalized throughout the interagency. As a result of this experience, the interagency has applied the lessons learned to further institutionalizing PDD 56.”¹⁰⁸ Specific recommendations in the report to Congress requested “routine participation of senior officials in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations,”¹⁰⁹ expansion of “the scope of policy actions considered during planning,”¹¹⁰ and improving the NATO pol-mil process.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Draft Staff Assessment, 2.

¹⁰⁸ Report to Congress, *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, 21 January 2000, 15-16.

¹⁰⁹ Report to Congress, 16.

¹¹⁰ Report to Congress, 126.

¹¹¹ Report to Congress, 127.

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V. ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*? The answer to that question will be determined in two ways. First, the two case studies presented in Chapter II and Chapter IV, pre-PDD 56 and post-PDD 56 cases will be compared using six variables. Second, since the PDD 56 process was designed to be continually improved, its impact will be evaluated by examining the improvements to the PDD 56 process that have been implemented.

B. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Six variables were chosen to compare the Bosnia and Kosovo case studies presented in this thesis. While there are seemingly limitless variables that could be used to compare the two extraordinarily complex operations, the following six have been chosen so as to measure the impact of the PDD 56 process:

1. Type of Planning
2. Depth of Planning
3. Timing of Planning
4. Decision Process
5. Funding
6. Monitoring and Modification

The first three variables – type, depth, and timing of planning – deal with the quality of planning in the complex contingency operations. PDD 56 lays out a process that is to be followed to achieve collaborative and comprehensive interagency planning. These three variables will reflect the impact that PDD 56 has had on planning. The fourth variable, the decision process, addresses a by-product of planning. While a plan provides guidance for the conduct of an operation, it also provides a systematic examination of various aspects of a problem. This can serve to inform decision-makers with details and consequences that were unknown or unaccounted for when the decision to act was first considered. This variable illustrates the idea that it is not necessarily the plan, but the process of planning that is so vital to success. An examination of this variable will show

the impact of the PDD 56 planning process on decision-making. The fifth variable, funding, addresses one example of the many problems that crop up in implementation. If details, such as funding, are not addressed prior to the implementation, they will surely become problems during the implementation. Funding is a problem that was specifically identified in PDD 56. This variable will show how addressing details in advance mitigates the problems that the implementation team will face in the field. The last variable, monitoring and modification, addresses one of the primary responsibilities of the Excom – the day-to-day oversight of the operation. That the organization is responsive to changing conditions is critical for the ultimate success of the operation. This variable will be used to determine if the PDD 56 process is more responsive to changing conditions.

1. Type of Planning

Planning was either functional (stove-piped) alone or both functional and interagency (collaborative). Functional planning within the various agencies is required, but problems arise when it is not done within a pol-mil plan's framework. In the absence of such an interagency framework, decisions are made to act, somewhere near the top, and it is left to the individual departments and agencies to make their plans, based on their own procedures, assumptions, and goals. Problems then occur when various agencies deploy to the region and attempt to carry out their individual plans, leaving operators to work out where efforts are overlapping or contradictory. Interagency planning from the beginning allows the agencies to develop common goals and assumptions and develop procedures to work together. In Bosnia the planning was primarily stove-piped. Military planning was conducted in secret, and short of calling Deputies Committee meetings, civilian agencies could not get any answers in what they were planning. Interagency planning in Bosnia was limited to resolving three policy questions, the IFOR mandate, the exit strategy, and the extent of American and NATO support to the civilian implementation. The organizational structure that was developed for Bosnia, intentionally compartmented the military and civilian parts of the operation.

In the Kosovo case, both stove-piped and interagency planning occurred, at several points during the crisis, culminating with an Excom that addressed fourteen

separate issues that crossed agency lines. Planning was conducted in an iterative fashion whereby interagency planning occurred to identify common objectives, then participants were assigned areas to develop plans, then the whole group reconvened to identify and resolve potential problems at the seams. The PDD 56 process facilitated this more effective type of planning.

2. Depth of Planning

The depth of planning variable examines how far down into the agencies the interagency planning occurred. In Bosnia, planning was compartmented below the Deputies Committee. In Kosovo, interagency planning occurred at the Deputies Committee, Excom, and several interagency working groups below the Excom. The deeper into the organization that the planning reached, the more one can capitalize on the expertise of operators in each of the agencies.

3. Timing of Planning

Planning can occur in advance of a crisis, as it is developing, and as the operators are deploying or “on-the-fly.” Advanced planning is the most deliberate and systematic approach where planners are given the opportunity to look at various options ahead of time, but it is also leaves planners dealing with the most uncertainty. Wildcards or unexpected events can make a plan developed in advance irrelevant, but the planning process creates a cadre of people who have already considered the problems from many angles and who are best prepared to deal with unfolding events. Planning that occurs while the crisis is developing usually occurs while events are rapidly changing, and the situation is at its most chaotic. There are still many options to choose from, but planners may find some of them cut-off as events develop on the ground. Planning that is conducted “on-the-fly” can be best characterized as making the best of a bad situation. By this point, there are usually very few options. The need to do things “on-the-fly” or make significant changes after the operation begins tend to reflect a lack of advanced planning.

In the case of Bosnia, the military and civilian commanders spent years trying to make something work well even in the absence of major changes in the situation. It became quickly clear that policy debates that were never resolved in Washington created

an organization incapable of achieving success. Since then, several groups have reexamined the organization and mission of the IFOR and civilian implementation force. In Kosovo, much of the planning was conducted in advance. The unexpectedly extended nature of the air campaign provided enough time for contentious issues to be settle ahead of time, and not left to those on the ground. This provided the operators a clarity of purpose and division of labor that everyone understood going into the operation.

4. Decision Process

Decision process options are top-down or bottom-up. Top-down decision-making allows a few number of people make decisions for everyone. This process is usually makes it easier to get to a decision in very complex operations, but rarely will it be the right decision because the issues extend beyond the understanding and knowledge of a small group of people. Top-down decision-making is best suited to simpler problems. Bottom-up decision-making includes as many stakeholders as possible, capitalizing on their expertise and knowledge. It is best suited to laying out options and examining the potential consequences of each choice. In Bosnia decision-making was top-down. Decisions were made at the Deputies Committee and higher with little input from below. In Kosovo, interagency groups laid out options and consequences to inform decision-makers, and at least in the beginning of the developing crisis in September 1998, a different decision was made because of the systematic examination of that option's consequences.

5. Funding

In Kosovo, Congress allocated funding two months in advance of the deployment of the operation. This early funding, difficult to achieve when the nature of how the events would unfold was uncertain, allowed the operation to be deployed quickly and without the delays that were seen in the deployment of aspects of all the previous complex contingency operations.

6. Monitoring and Modification

Monitoring and modification is a critical variable, because through this process the operation can adapt to changing conditions. In Bosnia, there was no organization in Washington responsible for oversight of the mission in Bosnia. This could possibly be attributed to the fact that the mission was international, and the civilian side was led by a

European. In Kosovo, an Excom continued to monitor the operation, managing the many American agencies and forces deployed to the region. Issues that were addressed by this group included details that were still unresolved after the initial deployment. Issues managed by this group included civilian policing and the administration of justice, demining, and humanitarian relief. Many of these problems will appear after the initial deployment of a complex contingency operations, and an Excom in Washington can help to manage the adaptation of the operation to include necessary responses.

C. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PDD 56 PROCESS

An important aspect of PDD 56 was that the process was designed to be continually improved. Recognizing the complexity of these problems and the fact that no single process could deal with every foreseeable problem, the drafters of PDD 56 included mechanisms for the interagency practitioners to improve the process. In fact, half of the six PDD 56 mechanisms deal with improving the process. After every operation an interagency after action review is to be chartered by the participants to address what worked, what did not, and how to fix the problems. The training program provides a way to education the participants in the PDD 56 process as well as the lessons of past operations and exercises. The training program is also a venue for testing out new ideas and improvements to the process. Lastly, the agency review and implementation is a way for each agency to individually address problems within their own structure and procedures that hamper the USG response to complex contingency operations. This section will examine two improvements to the interagency process that have been implemented as a result of lessons from the USG experience in actual and simulated complex contingency operations.

1. Annex V

A lesson that first appeared in the Haiti Operation Uphold Democracy, but that would be repeated in following exercises, was the disconnection between the strategic interagency and the operational interagency. In Haiti, strategic interagency planning occurred well in advance of the operation, while at the operational level it did not occur until days before the operation began. It became clear that guidance developed at the strategic level did not always filter down the agency stove-pipes to the operational level, leaving tactical operators in the field to deal with the consequences. Also discovered in

the May 1997 exercise Tempo Brave, the guidance developed at the strategic level does not always meet the needs of the operational commanders. Guidance from the Excom in Washington should be strategic, leaving flexibility for the operational commander to conduct his mission. Clearly more work needed to be done in the connection between strategists in Washington and operational planners. The creation of Annex V is a step in the right direction.

In October 1998, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an Interagency Coordination Annex (Annex V) be included in geographic CINC contingency plans. SOUTHCOM is the first CINC to be tasked to develop these annexes. Their purpose is to “integrate CINC plans with other instruments of national power in support of NCA objectives – a method of articulating what ‘the CINC needs if a plan is executed.’ It identifies, by phase and category (Diplomatic, Economic, Humanitarian, etc.), major missions and tasks for interagency coordination.”¹¹² Annex Vs go beyond complex contingency operations and let planners in Washington know the kinds of details the military commander needs to execute a contingency plan. These annexes are forwarded to the NSC to identify those that need further development at the interagency level. The NSC then designates an interagency group to write a contingency pol-mil plan to keep “on the shelf” to use in case the CINC plan is executed. This contingency pol-mil plan can be used as a starting point to an Excom if the PDD 56 process is initiated and would allow for a more rapid American response to an emerging crisis.¹¹³

In addition to Annex V, the strategic-operational link has been improved through the exercise program. Exercises like SOUTHCOM’s Blue Advance 2000 have been integrated into PDD 56 training at the National Defense University, providing more realistic training to both the strategic planners and the operational commanders. In the case of Blue Advance 2000, the interagency team wrote a pol-mil plan using operational inputs from SOUTHCOM, and the team continued to interact with the operational

¹¹² James R. Bartran, *PDD-56-1: Synchronizing Effects: Beyond the POL/MIL Plan*, Army War College, 10 April 2000, 7-8.

¹¹³ Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, “Posture Statement of General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 106th Congress, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 8 February 2000, Supporting the National Security Strategy,” available from <http://www.usis-australia.gov/hyper/2000/0208/epf208.htm>; Internet; accessed 7 May 2001.

commander as the exercise evolved, more realistically exercising the Excom's oversight responsibility.¹¹⁴

2. Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group

A problem in the PDD 56 process that was vividly highlight by the U.S. response to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, is the question of when to invoke PDD 56? The operation responding to the humanitarian disaster caused by Hurricane Mitch in Central America included the deployment of more than 5,000 civilian and military personnel, cost nearly a billion dollars, and involved various agencies of the USG. Joint Task Force Bravo, military personnel already stationed in Honduras conducted the initial U.S. response. At that point, General Charles Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, recommended that the PDD 56 process be applied to the operation. The President's National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, rejected the recommendation, feeling that the detailed PDD 56 planning process would get in the way of immediate needs on the ground in Central America. "General Wilhelm believes that the failure to immediately implement an effective interagency coordination and planning process in Washington caused delays in necessary relief activities, wasted resources and caused poor coordination in the field during the initial humanitarian response."¹¹⁵ The PDD 56 process can only work if it is applied. The Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group helps to address this problem.

To make an informed decision weighing the costs and benefits of the American response some level of advance planning must take place. However, as shown in the response to Hurricane Mitch, planning under PDD 56 does not begin until the decision to intervene is already made, and even then sometimes PDD 56 is not invoked. This conundrum reflects the tension between policy makers and planners. Policy makers are concerned that if planning takes place, usually worst-case planning, it will drive the policy decisions in a direction that may not fit with political realities. Planners are concerned that they will be unprepared if the policy makers make decisions without any advanced planning. Additionally, the quality of the decision is less, if all the options and potential consequences have not been explored. To deal with this dilemma, in December

¹¹⁴ Roan, Kjonnerod, and Oakley, 8.

¹¹⁵ *Improving the Utility*, 9.

1999, the National Security Advisor established the Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group (CPIWG), thus expanding the scope of PDD 56.¹¹⁶ The primary purpose of the CPIWG was to conduct advanced interagency planning for emerging hot spots around the globe. It also provided a forum to receive Annex Vs from the DoD and conduct interagency planning in support of the CINCs' standing war plans.¹¹⁷ The CPIWG was tasked to meet regularly to:

- Assess potential contingencies and make recommendations for the development of political-military plans to manage them.
- Oversee political-military plans contingency planning and provide reaction and comment to DoD regarding interagency involvement contained in CINC plans.
- Review and provide advice and recommendations to senior leaders on possible follow-on efforts.
- Provide policy guidance on the implementation of the interagency training and after-action review components of PDD 56¹¹⁸

The CPIWG was chaired by a representative from the NSC, and included representatives from the DoD, DOS, Treasury, DOJ, Transportation, Commerce, USDA, DOE, OMB, CIA, USAID, and the U.S. Mission to the UN.¹¹⁹

In its first real world test in late December 1999, the CPIWG recommended to the Deputies Committee that the PDD 56 process be applied to the emerging situation in Burundi. In December, Nelson Mandela was appointed as Special Mediator in Burundi. The CPIWG felt that the United States was unprepared to respond in support of a peace agreement. In January 2000 a Burundi Excom was formed. The Excom met in January and February and developed an assessment of the situation in Burundi and a pol-mil plan based on several possible outcomes of the peace process. The CPIWG is a mechanism that finally allows the USG interagency process to be proactive rather than reactive.¹²⁰

In February 2001, the newly elected Bush Administration published National Security Presidential Decision 1 (NSPD 1), which laid out the organization for the Bush

¹¹⁶ Roan, Kjonnerod, and Oakley, 9.

¹¹⁷ Bartran, 8.

¹¹⁸ Office of International Information Programs.

¹¹⁹ Bartran, 8.

¹²⁰ Roan, Kjonnerod, and Oakley, 6-7.

administration's NSC.¹²¹ In NSPD 1, President Bush rescinded all Clinton PDDs, specifically including PDD 56, and created 17 Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) to replace the Clinton IWGs. In April 2001, four additional PCCs were created, including a Contingency Planning PCC (CPPCC). The Bush administration's CPPCC first met in May 2001 and assumed identical responsibilities of the Clinton administration's CPIWG.¹²² The fact that this organization—CPIWG/CPPCC—was resurrected provides a further demonstration of its usefulness. The primary product of the CPPCC is contingency plans, which are classified, since they have not been executed. While the exact number of these plans is unknown at the unclassified level, they are another concrete example of the impact of PDD 56.

¹²¹ The Bush administration NSPDs serve the same purpose as the Clinton PDDs.

¹²² "Additional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs) Established," *Interagency News*; available from http://www.theinteragency.org/test/public/what_we_do/newsletter/V1-12/newsletter2.htm; Internet; accessed 6 July 2001.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Unlike Presidential administrations, problems rarely have terminal dates.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower¹²³

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

The central question of this thesis is: What was the impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*?

PDD 56 has improved civil-military relations in the response to complex contingency operations and has created a civil-military unity of effort that was unheard of in the early 1990s. The operation in Kosovo is a success story of that effort. Difficult multi-dimensional problems were resolved ahead of time, and an organization, the Kosovo Excom, was in place to be able to effectively deal with additional problems as they appeared. This improvement was a result of both following the process described by PDD 56, but also through the training program that prepared participants for implementing and improving the process.

The PDD 56 process has several limitations. It is only effective when policy issues can be sufficiently resolved prior to planning. The process of developing the pol-mil plan should help to identify those issues that are unresolved. Also, the conduct of military operations leading to a complex contingency operation, such as a peace implementation, can drastically alter the conditions within which the peace implementation must take place. Combat operations should be considered as a phase in the complex contingency operation. PDD 56 only applies to the strategic level of planning and oversight. Systematic interagency coordination is equally important at the operational and tactical levels. Lastly, PDD 56 only includes the U.S. government in operations that are rarely unilateral. One of the critical aspects of coping with wicked problems is to include all the stakeholders. PDD 56 leaves out many stakeholders

¹²³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "State of the Union Address, 12 Jan 1961," in *Simpson's Contemporary Quotations*, compiled by James B. Simpson, 1998; available from <http://www.bartleby.com/63/95/95.html>; Internet; accessed 28 August 2001.

including, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, warring parties, and victims.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Since PDD 56 has proven to have a positive impact on the interagency management of complex contingency operations, it should be resurrected in the current administration, and consideration should be given to widening the scope of the document to include interagency issues beyond complex contingency operations. Managing the proliferation of issues that span agency responsibilities—including the newly created Homeland Security Agency, which has been charged with coordinating 40 different USG agencies that are each responsible for some aspect of homeland defense¹²⁴—would benefit from a systematic approach for the management of interagency issues, to include future complex contingency operations. It took several years for the United States to learn to deal with complex contingency operations, a significant shift from the Cold War national security posture. We cannot afford to take as long to relearn the same lessons today.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH

The primary areas for future research deal with applying the PDD 56 process to two new levels of analysis, first horizontally, then vertically. First, since PDD 56 has had a positive impact on the USG interagency's ability to manage a complex contingency operation, a future study should examine a similar approach for the larger international management of complex contingency operations, or a horizontal expansion of the scope of a PDD 56-like process. Additional challenges that exist at the international level include much greater number of stakeholders with vastly different agendas, as well as the lack of a final authority to resolve disputes. Where in the USG agencies can turn to the President to decide issues, no such authority exists. It would be interesting to examine if this process could work in the absence of such authority.

The second approach that should be examined expands the scope of PDD 56 vertically. Already, some improvements have been made to connect the strategic PDD

¹²⁴ Elizabeth Becker, "Debating Whether New Agency Can Command, or Just Link Commanders," *The New York Times* 22 September 2001; available from <http://www.nytimes.com>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2001.

56 plan generation to the operational military commanders, and ad hoc Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) can be found in most complex contingency operations. This connection from the strategic to the operational to the tactical levels needs to be improved, as well as the interagency collaboration at the operational and tactical levels.

Lastly, since problems do tend to last beyond presidential administrations, interagency doctrine that spans presidential administrations should be considered. It is problematic that with every new administration, every presidential document is rescinded. Writing a PDD 56-like process into law seems, at first blush, to be the solution. I would submit that by putting it into law, the process would become frozen in time, and would not be able to be adapted as needed to deal with what will surely be rapidly changing situations. A middle ground needs to be found.

Presidential Decision Directive 56 was novel in that it created a process that could cope with very complex problems and then adapt itself to deal with emerging situations. The genius of PDD 56 lies in its focus on process and not product. It should continue to be relevant as long as the government must face issues that cross-departmental or agency lines, and all evidence points to more cross-agency issues in the future.

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APPENDIX A: THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

A. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council is a coordinating organization in the executive branch of the U.S. Government. The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council for the purpose of “the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies.”¹²⁵ The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, also known as the National Security Advisor, chairs all NSC meetings. He must fulfill the dual role of both advisor to the President and “honest broker” between the various departments who have a role in national security issues. He also oversees the permanent staff of the NSC. While it plays a large role in the management of American national security, the NSC staff has never numbered more than two hundred, making it much smaller than the any of the agencies and departments whose efforts it coordinates.

The statutory members of the NSC are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others whom the President sees fit to include. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the military advisor to the NSC. The Director of Central Intelligence is also a frequent participant.¹²⁶ As a new President comes into office, one of his initial actions is to establish the framework within which the NSC will operate. The basic form has largely remained the same over time, but the size of its staff and breadth of its power has tended to reflect the personality of the President.

On January 21, 1993, President Clinton signed PDD 2, which described how his National Security Council would be organized. A formal meeting of the Clinton NSC was rarely convened, instead most Cabinet-level deliberations occurred at Principals Committee (PC) meetings, without the presence of the President. Its main role was to formulate and discuss options. Below the Principals Committee was the Deputies Committee (DC), made up of under-secretary or deputy level administrators representing the principals in the NSC. The Deputies Committee was charged with day-to-day crisis management and preparing issues for the Principals Committee. The Deputies

¹²⁵ Patterson, 49.

¹²⁶ Pirnie, 19.

Committee could establish Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) staffed at the assistant secretary level.¹²⁷ “Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are the heart and soul of the process. They may be ad hoc, standing, regional, or functional. They function at a number of levels, meet regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame policy responses, and build consensus across the government for unified action.”¹²⁸ Standing NSC IWGs in the Clinton administration were organized around both geographic regions or functional areas, such as Asian Affairs, European Affairs, Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs, and International Economic Affairs.¹²⁹ In recent times the Presidency has been more ‘operational’ than in the past. The White House staff has been more involved in running the day-to-day operations of the government, than ever before. In this environment the NSC has emerged as a powerful organization that sometime appears in competition with the Departments of State and Defense.¹³⁰

B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State is principally responsible for American foreign policy, and the Secretary of State is the senior member of the Cabinet. The State Department is also divided into regional and functional bureaus. Regional bureaus, which do not match either the NSC regional bureaus or the Defense Department’s unified geographic commands, are further divided to individual countries at the Desk Officer level. Functional bureaus have long been relegated to second-class status within the State Department, and their input into national security decision-making has been underrepresented.¹³¹ Despite the State Department’s statutory responsibility for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, in the Clinton administration it seemed to lose its leadership role. Ambassador David Litt, Political Advisor to U.S. Special Operations Command, expressed this in a speech before the Secretary’s Open Forum in June 2000.

State is on the verge of assuming a merely subordinate role in complex contingency operations. During the last decade or so we have devolved

¹²⁷ Lynch, 8-9.

¹²⁸ Marcella, 110.

¹²⁹ Patterson, 46.

¹³⁰ Marcella, 109.

¹³¹ Lippman, 277.

into more of a tactical partner than a leader or strategic player in times of crisis. This despite the incontestable fact that State and the Foreign Service are the primary repositories of foreign affairs experience and institutional expertise for the U.S. government.¹³²

Ambassador Litt continues to say that the PDD 56 mandated interagency working group has helped State become a full player in the strategic development again, but this continued status is by no means guaranteed.

The Department of State works closely with the various departments of the United Nations in a variety of operations and missions overseas, is responsible for police affairs abroad, and operates embassies around the world. These embassies are themselves interagency forums called country teams where the ambassador is responsible for “overseeing and coordinating all activities of the U.S. government within his geographic area of responsibility. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) are both previously independent agencies that have recently come under the direction of the State Department. USAID is heavily involved in complex contingency operations. The administrator of USAID is designated as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. He works through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) deploying Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) to deal with the immediate response. DARTs work under the direction of the ambassador. USAID also provides U.S. food donations through direct donations or through a variety of public and private agencies. USIA puts a public face on U.S. foreign policies to audiences abroad and tracks public opinion abroad. USIA provides public affairs officers to embassies, and maintains contact with Army psychological operations, although there is little coordination.¹³³

C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The modern day Department of Defense (DoD) was established by the same National Security Act of 1947 that established the NSC. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military departments and the

¹³² David Litt, “Preparing for the Crisis After Next: Future Visioning in the State Department, the Interagency Process, and the Military,” *Secretary’s Open Forum*, 15 June 2000; available from http://www.state.gov/www/dept/openforum/proceedings/2000/000615_litt.html; Internet; accessed 23 April 2001.

¹³³ Pirnie, 20-21.

combatant commands make up the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense and the President are the National Command Authority (NCA), with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as their principal military advisor. The Joint Staff is responsible for the national military strategy. The Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) is responsible for peacetime planning and is the military's representative to the PDD 56 process. The military departments are led by civilian secretaries and through the military chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping, training and supplying forces, but do not have operational control over them. Unified commanders are either regional or functional, U.S. European Command or U.S. Transportation Command, for example. They have operational control over forces from all services in their regions of responsibility. Some unified commanders also control international military organizations, for example the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCEUR) is also the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and is responsible to both the U.S. NCA and NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC).¹³⁴

D. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Also established by the National Security Act of 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is led by the Director of Central Intelligence, who is also responsible for the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, and the military services intelligence agencies. The CIA supports the combatant commands through National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST).¹³⁵

E. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Department of Justice (DOJ) led by the Attorney General provides legal advice to the President. It includes several agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The Department of Justice plays a critical role in complex contingency operations through the International Criminal Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP). ICITAP is run by the Justice Department with guidance and funding from the State Department through USAID. The importance of training police and

¹³⁴ Pirnie, 21-23.

¹³⁵ Pirnie, 23.

justice officials in countries recovering from complex contingency operations has been overlooked or underfunded in nearly every operation the United States has been involved.¹³⁶ In addition to ICITAP, other lesser known DOJ programs, including, the FBI's overseas programs, and the United States Marshals Service's Special Operations Group add to the nation's capacity to respond to the diverse requirements of complex contingency operations.¹³⁷

F. OTHER AGENCIES

Many other agencies are involved in complex contingency operations on a smaller scale. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) manages food aid programs overseas. The Department of Commerce (DOC) participates, under the direction of the State Department, whenever trade is involved. The DOC monitors contracts issued through USAID and the World Bank, and works with USAID as a liaison between U.S. companies and overseas governments. The Department of Energy (DOE) would become involved in a complex contingency operation that involved nuclear energy or weapons. The Department of the Treasury, operating from U.S. embassies, assists foreign governments with debt management and fiscal policy and reviews projects and loans. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) encourages U.S. private investment in countries that otherwise would be a poor risk, by providing insurance against currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence. While this list is not exhaustive, it gives a pretty good picture of the complexities that have to be managed to provide a cohesive and comprehensive response.¹³⁸ Before PDD 56, interagency collaboration in complex contingency operations was largely ad hoc – a difficult proposition for such a varied group of organizations dealing with some of the most challenging problems. The results of this ad hoc approach proved to be less than successful.

¹³⁶ Pirnie, 24-25.

¹³⁷ David N. Thorson, *Jointness Writ Large? Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, National War College, 24 April 1998, 6.

¹³⁸ Pirnie, 23-26; Tucker.

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APPENDIX B: GENERIC POL-MIL PLAN

This appendix is a Generic Pol-Mil Plan for a Multilateral Complex Contingency Operation. The PDD 56 White Paper lists eleven components of a pol-mil plan. Two versions of a generic pol-mil plan can be found in Appendix B of the Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations. The generic pol-mil plan is updated periodically to reflect lessons from both training and real world operations. The version below was updated April 2, 2001.

INTRODUCTION

Executive Overview

This section introduces the reader to the complex emergency by providing a short summary of the crisis, international response efforts to date, U.S. equities at risk and our policy aims in responding to the emergency. It also summarizes the nature of the planned response and discusses the key policy issues that have emerged from the planning effort. Finally, the section outlines the Principals' or Deputies' guidelines to interagency planners for conducting the planning effort. Key introductory elements include:

- Purpose of the planning document
- Summary of the conflict
- Overview of international response efforts
- U.S. regional interests at stake and policy aims
- Nature of the planned response
- International coalition's civilian & military command, composition and structure
- Discussion of key policy issues/decisions
- Guidelines for interagency planning
- Principals guidance
- Planning scenario, assumptions and response parameters
- Probable dates for plan implementation

- Agency planning responsibilities

1.0 SITUATION ASSESSMENT

This section describes the interagency's assessment of the complex emergency. It identifies essential elements of information that, in the aggregate, constitute a comprehensive assessment of the situation. Its aim is to provide participating agencies with a clear picture of the operating environment. Key sub-paragraphs for the situation assessment include:

1.1 General Situation

Provide a big picture perspective of the conflict. Present a short history of the conflict—its origin, major factions, causes issues at stake, forces employed and relative power, scope of violence, activities of outside actors both friendly and hostile. Describe the factions involved, faction leaders-warlords, the leader's aims, and whether any of these aims would be negotiable. Identify regional hegemony, if any, and the nature of their participation. Outline U.S. equities at risk and the nature of the threat posed by each faction of the conflict. Discuss the extent and nature of current multilateral involvement in the crisis.

1.2 Ethnic Conflict Situation

Analyze the foundations for ethnic conflict. Discuss the host country's ethnic divisions—social differentiation based on ethnicity, intensity of internal cohesion within ethnic groups, degree of ethnic hatred and fear between ethnic groups, expected costs and consequences of ethnic defeat for each ethnic faction, nature and power of ethnic group leaders (hard-liner or moderate), and quality of the leadership within each ethnic group. Outline the relationship of ethnic groups to the State—which ethnic groups own the State bureaucracy, legitimacy of the government among ethnic groups, how State privileges are distributed, how resources within the State are controlled, and patterns of State discrimination and human rights abuses.

Discuss the territorial dimensions of the ethnic conflict—exclusive control of areas, access to economic resources, location and access of religious sites, etc. Identify outside sources of support for ethnic group operations. Discuss the stage of escalation or

de-escalation of the ethnic conflict—current stage of the fighting, how quickly can the fighting escalate, what are the escalatory dynamics, under what circumstances will the conflict escalate, and under what circumstances will the situation be amenable to mediation.

1.3 Political Conflict Situation

Assess the political roots of the conflict. Identify the factions to the conflict and their political aims. Discuss the nation's internal political situation, nature of the host government, key centers of power, ruling party, and opposing factions. Clarify the sources of internal political conflict (wealth, territory, resources, power, ethnic identity, religion, or ideology), intensity of grievances, level of political polarization and mobilization. Describe the nature of local government (e.g. clans, tribes, or community groups), status of democratization, level of corruption, and government responsiveness to recent political and social reform initiatives.

1.4 Military Conflict Situation

Describe the military dynamics of the conflict. Discuss the military, para-military, and militia forces operating in the region, size of forces, military balance. For each side of the conflict discuss the type of equipment and its capabilities, degree of military discipline and cohesion within each warring faction, operational military objectives of the factions. Overall, present the types of forces and tactics employed, scope of violence and destruction, degree of political control over military organizations, and extent of arms flows—sources, type and quantity of weapons supplied. Characterize the nature of the population's support for the military.

1.5 Weapons of Mass Destruction Situation

Discuss the types, numbers, and location of weapons of mass destruction. Assess current measures to safeguard their security. Describe recent and expected movements of WMD systems. Determine requirements for neutralizing WMD and their related platforms. Assess the potential for use of WMD during the operation and assess possible consequences of WMD use. Identify planning requirements (contamination, humanitarian toll, environmental impact, etc.) for consequent management operations.

1.6 Economic Conflict Situation

Discuss the economic underpinnings of the conflict. Explain how the factions, elite's and their armed groups use the conflict for economic gain or profit. For what economic gain does each faction wage the conflict? How are economic gains achieved by continued fighting? Clarify the spheres of economic control and influence of each faction.

For each armed faction, explain how the faction's military operations are sustained financially from outside sources—foreign assistance from patron states; donations from rich Diaspora's; international trade in gems, timber or other valuable natural resources, drug trafficking; etc. Also, explain how the faction's military operations are sustained by internal sources to amass economic rewards—pillaging and plundering civilian populations, extortion, protection money, hostage taking, banditry, trading with the enemy, organized corruption, theft and black-markets, labor exploitation, manipulating contracts, stealing relief supplies, etc. Discuss the economics of a soldier's pay, arms sales, equipment purchases, and operations costs.

In bringing the conflict to an end, discuss the compelling economic agendas that are at play for each warring faction/warlord. How can these economic rewards for continued fighting be controlled or reduced—such as through economic sanctions, through denial of access to natural resources, through alternative markets, or through criminal apprehension and prosecution. How could the rewards for peace and stability, if any exist, be put into play in the near term? How could a peace process accommodate the interests of the rebel leadership? If demobilization is being considered as part of the peace process, what realistic economic incentives, given the local economy, could be considered for ex-soldiers to offset the economic benefits of continued fighting? What threats of punishment could be put into place by the government to deter further conflict for economic benefit? Also, explain how the intervention force, civilian relief effort, and other civilian activities could adversely change the local economy.

1.7 Humanitarian Situation

Describe recent population movements, location and numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Discuss the level and nature of humanitarian suffering. Assess the threats of further ethnic violence. Explain the distribution of the suffering by region, by class, or by groups. Identify relief requirements for water, food, sanitation, shelter, medical services, heating supplies, household kits, farm tools, or other humanitarian needs. Assess the potential for outbreaks of disease. Identify the most threatening diseases and the capacity to treat them. Assess stockpiles of urgently needed relief supplies in the region and the capability to get them to affected populations. Discuss current and projected activities of the international relief community in the region. Determine the level of coordination among relief groups. Outline support provided by neighboring states to the operation. Specify transportation requirements for emergency relief efforts. Outline any religious or ethnic restrictions or requirements that could affect relief operations.

1.8 Landmine Situation

Determine the extent and nature of the landmine problem in the country. Locate mined areas in the vicinity of key installations and cities. Assess whether mine awareness training is needed. Determine current level of demining capacity. Suggest mine clearance priorities.

1.9 Human Rights Abuses/Atrocities/War Crimes Situation

Assess the scale of atrocities and identify the victims. Identify the scale of ethnic violence and possible genocide. Describe the nature of gross and systematic human rights abuses and possible war crimes. Determine the likely perpetrators. Name the officials who are likely responsible for gross and systematic human rights abuses. Determine who is compiling atrocity reports and describe the system for victims and witnesses to make such reports. Determine what refugee populations are likely victims and potentially have evidence of atrocities. Locate possible sites and outline how data collection and maintenance is being accomplished. Assess requirements for forensic teams and equipment. Assess protection requirements. Assess the impact of “hate radio”

broadcasts and other activities to harm minority populations. Determine the need for witness protection programs. Clarify what measures, if any, have been taken by the international community to bring the perpetrators to justice.

1.10 Public Security/Law and Order Situation

Assess the level of crime, banditry and lawlessness within the country. Assess the threat of bandits and criminal gangs against international operations. Discuss the types of host country police forces, amount of police corruption, degree of enforcement of law and order, the nature, scope and acceptability of police violence, and degree of host country political control of police forces. Discuss the cultural aspects of the host country legal system, amount of legal corruption, effectiveness of courts and administration of justice mechanisms, the quality of the penal system, and nature of police human rights practices and treatment of citizens.

1.11 Local Civil Administration Situation

Determine the nature and scale of civil administration in the country. Determine the number of employees and annual expenditures for the following areas of public administration: emergency services, electrical power, oil and gas; transportation, communications, water and waste treatment, trash disposal, law enforcement & justice, education; health care, housing, human services, employment services, consumer affairs, business activities, agricultural activities, natural resource management, export and trade services, banking and financial services, postal services, and environmental management. Assess critical civil administration needs and the host nation's capacity to meet these requirements. Determine requirements for providing advice and assistance to the local civilian administration.

1.12 Media, Public Information & Communications Situation

Describe the existing public communications assets within the host country—television, radio, newspapers, etc. Determine whom—which faction—controls each of the public information systems. Define the ownership/political orientation of local media and the content of its broadcasts or publication. Judge the impact of on-going media efforts by friendly nations or organizations. Assess the impact of “hate radio” broadcasts.

Identify cultural or religious institutions and practices that could be leveraged to facilitate popular support to the mission—focus on structures of authority in ethnic groups and related institutions. Identify key opinion leaders and their willingness to support operations. Identify broad-based groups of residents at the village, community, and regional level that should be consulted concerning proposed activities. Identify storylines and key points that have impact on the population regarding the operation.

1.13 Infrastructure and Physical Environment

Describe the potential effects of climate and terrain on the operation. Discuss the impact of the conflict/natural disaster on the country's physical environment. Assess the condition of power generation and transmission systems. Outline the condition of the country's available infrastructure such as railway systems, airports, roads, bridges, communications, utilities, etc. For each port (sea, air, rail, and river), determine the size and type of vessels (including containerized cargo) to be received and the port's capacity for storage and its related support systems. Specify requirements for additional assets or facilities to conduct anticipated operations.

1.14 Foundations of Economic Activity

Discuss the several basic financial issues associated with local commerce: viability of currency, monetary and exchange rate policy, banking, payments and settlements system, public finance capacity, revenue generation, trade regime and export sectors, legal framework regarding commercial, property, and privatization, and other factors of economic activity. Assess the threat of corruption to establishing and maintaining legitimate economic activity. Discuss the state of the economy, unemployment, distribution of wealth, types of natural resources, principal agricultural commodities, level and nature of production and trade, effect of sanctions (if appropriate). Discuss the availability of electrical power, quality of the workforce, level of international investment, degree of financial market activity, degree of privatization. Assess support of government bureaucracy to private businesses, effectiveness of the government's domestic business law and judicial system, extent of government graft and corruption in licensing, and quality and effectiveness of government economic policy.

1.15 Socio-Cultural Issues

Explain key issues with respect to the country's culture, traditions, and social institutions that bear on the success of the operation. Highlight religious prohibitions or ethnic dietary restrictions that could affect humanitarian assistance operations or human rights monitoring. Identify available coping mechanisms used by the population to cope with the crisis situation—extended family, armed militia groups, tribal support & security, hoarding, corrupt or abusive practices, migration, etc. Identify cultural institutions and practices that could be leveraged to facilitate popular support to the mission—focus on structures of authority in ethnic groups and related institutions. Identify key opinion leaders and their willingness to support operations. Identify broad-based groups of residents at the village, community, and regional level that should be consulted concerning proposed activities.

1.16 Support of the Host Government

Discuss the level of cooperation by the host government with anticipated operations. Specify the host government's intent in supporting the operation. Outline what is needed to achieve and maintain host government support. Assess the level of planning and operational capability to deal with both the military and civilian aspects of the operation. Verify that we have negotiated a SOFA for the force. Assess the host government's administrative capacity to provide support to the operation. Assess what it would take to gain host nation support and cooperation.

1.17 Support of Neighboring States

Describe neighboring state involvement with the host country. Assess each one's willingness to help with ensuring the success of the operation. Determine if they are actively committed to reinforcing the mission including its specified tasks that could include arms control, refugee return, demobilization, elections, sanctions, basing rights, logistic support, control of hate radio broadcasts, etc. Verify which neighboring states will (and those that will not) take constructive measures to support the operation.

1.18 Support of Regional and International Organizations

Outline the key regional actors, major powers, international actors, and other participants and their interests. Identify regional alignments with the factions, if any. Assess the unity of purpose among regional states regarding the operation, and consensus within the Security Council.

Outline the extent of the current international presence in country. List what UN peacekeeping forces, relief operations, or other NGO/PVO activities are operating in the host country and in the region. Discuss the activities of private international business interests in the area and how those business interests affect the key players in the conflict.

1.19 Situation on International or Regional Sanctions

Discuss the scope and extent of international or regional sanctions that have been imposed on one or more of the parties to the conflict. Assess the impact of the sanctions on the target. Determine whether the sanctions would affect the performance of the international mission during the anticipated duration of the mission. If the sanctions impair the performance of the mission, clarify what provisions in the UN mandate should be made to avoid problems with sanctions enforcement.

1.20 Suitability of the Framework for Peace Agreement/Settlement

Assess the political framework/agreement that governs the mission, if one exists. This framework for peace will normally result in a UN Security Council resolution that governs the operation. Such a framework/agreement/settlement provides the context in which international mission will operate.

Assess the scope of activities in the settlement. A “signed settlement” is defined here as an agreement that attempts to address the war aims of the parties. Settlements that only include terms for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, or amnesty of combatants are not considered comprehensive “signed settlements” since they do not attempt to deal with difficult political issues such as governance, ethnic minority rights or self-determination. Ceasefire agreements are better described as temporary measures to halt the fighting.

Assess the settlement's objectives. To be fully comprehensive, the "signed settlement" must address four key issues: 1) the cessation of hostilities in a way that reduces the threat of surprise attack by one party; 2) an acceptable plan to integrate previously warring factions into one state; 3) provisions to build an interim system government capable of accommodating the interests of the parties; and 4) the creation of a new non-partisan national military force.

Assess the settlement's provisions to support third party implementation. From the perspective of the implementation force, the key factors within an agreement include: 1) incentives to ensure compliance by the parties; 2) mechanisms to resolve disputes; 3) procedures for peaceful change; 4) appropriate authority of the UN SRSG or the force commander to take action to interpret and facilitate implementation.

Assess also whether the provisions of the "signed settlement" reflect (or at least do not go against) the history, traditions, culture, and values of the peoples involved.

1.21 Consent and Commitment of the Parties

Assess the ripeness of the conflict for resolution. Identify the parties to the conflict and the degree of consent for supporting the operations of the international force and related civilian activities. If entering into negotiations, assess the presence of critical conditions to support success of this activity: long vice short duration of the fighting, high vice low battle deaths, political vice territorial goals, and presence of religious cleavage among factions.

If transitioning from negotiations to signing, assess the presence of critical conditions to support success: credible third party guarantees, power sharing agreements, military stalemate, political vice territorial goals, and effectiveness of mediation efforts.

If transitioning from signing to full implementation of the agreement, assess the presence of critical conditions to support successful implementation: credibility of the peacekeeping force to verify security in DDR, and the scope of power-sharing arrangements (post-election government of national unity) that reduce political vulnerability of the faction leaders.

1.22 Diagnosis of Spoilers to the Peace Process

Name the likely spoilers to the peace process. Assess the perspectives of each of the “warlords” or potential spoilers involved in the conflict to identify how they will likely support (or hinder) implementation of key elements of the settlement. For each spoiler: determine if the spoiler is inside or outside the peace process; if the spoiler’s type is limited, greedy, or total all or nothing; and if the spoiler’s source of power is controlled at the top or originates from the group’s population. Characterize each spoiler: What demands will the spoiler make? What are his intentions? What leverage exists to shape the actions of the spoiler? Explain why the commitment of any one spoiler may be problematic. Assess whether our policy options to deter one spoiler will empower other spoilers.

1.23 Possible Expansion or Escalation of the Conflict

Outline several “what if scenarios”, however unlikely, which could occur in a way that would substantially expand the scope of the conflict or escalate the nature of the fighting and violence. The “what is scenarios” may call for dramatically increased ethnic cleansing; splintering of a warring faction; expanded participation in the conflict by a neighboring state or a regional power; escalation of the conflict to include chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons; long-term loss of a strategic ally; a major environmental disaster; massive civilian rejection of U.S. actions; increased terrorism against key U.S. personnel or facilities; or expansion of the conflict into the “unrestricted warfare” domain of non-military warfare. These scenarios may include ploys and adverse actions by the host nation, warring factions, neighboring states, a regional power, or a major power.

1.24 Summary of the Initial Situation—Immediate Entry Conditions

- The Parties and their Aims – the key parties to the conflict and their political aims
- State of Fighting – status of the fighting and immediate threats to deploying forces
- Agreement (Cease-fire) Compliance – degree of compliance by the parties to a cease-fire
- Spoiler Threats/Countermeasures – likely actions by the spoilers to hinder initial deployments

- Threats to Forces/Force Protection – threats and risks to deploying forces
- Humanitarian Needs – size and locations of affected population and immediate relief needs
- Atrocities and War Crimes – size and locations of war crimes sites and victims
- Evacuation of Americans – number and needs of American evacuees
- Condition of Key Bases – condition of power, transportation, and communications
- Deployment Enablers – status of overflight, basing and bed down for deploying forces
- Diplomatic Contacts – extent of diplomatic contact with key leaders
- Public Awareness and Support—degree of indigenous public support for the operation
- Host Nation Support – extent of support for the operation and provision of capabilities
- Regional Support – support by neighboring states and key regional powers

2.0 U.S. INTERESTS, STRATEGIC PURPOSE, MISSION AND END STATE

This section states the U.S. interests at stake, the overall USG strategic purpose in conducting the operation, and the pol-mil mission statement. Since these constitute the foundation of the pol-mil plan, all parts of the plan must be consistent with this section and be judged against it. Paragraphs 2.1 through w.6 are intrinsically linked and must be tightly defined. There should be a top-to-bottom rationale that ties interests, purposes, mission, objectives, and end state. Our approach calls for continuity among these paragraphs. The NSC should obtain interagency consensus, and at times resolve disagreements, on these issues as the planning process proceeds.

2.1 U.S. Interests at Stake

State the U.S. interests at stake (or promising U.S. opportunities & equities at risk) as a consequence of the crisis: undermine regional stability & development progress; weaken Alliance collaboration; reverse major power cooperation on security matters; threaten U.S. citizens and facilities in the region, jeopardize progress in democratization; empower corrupt/criminal governments; displace whole populations; incite fanaticism and export terrorism; divert scarce resources and diminish economic

growth; deny access to markets and trade; promote illegal weapons sales and mercenary operations; perpetrate human rights abuses and atrocities; and deny advancement of American values.

2.2 U.S. Strategic Purpose

Identify the U.S. strategic purpose or intent of the anticipated operation—what we hope to accomplish in conducting the operation. The USG’s purpose may include any of the following:

- Deter aggression
- Contain the spread of conflict
- Avert or mitigate a humanitarian disaster
- Deter violence and stop human rights atrocities
- Assist a government in establishing civil order and justice
- Maintain a cease fire or truce
- Implement a “comprehensive peace settlement”
- Establish a UN Transitional Administration
- Restore democratic government

2.3 Mission Statement

Present a clear and concise statement of what type of operation the USG will seek to accomplish and by whom. The mission statement should include:

- Who is conducting the operation (U.S., UN, NATO, OSCE, or an Ad hoc Coalition, etc.)
- What type of operation will be conducted (Enforcement, Relief Operation, Peace Implementation Mission, Preventative Deployment, Deterrence, Cease-fire Implementation, Post-Conflict Peace-building, etc.)
- When and under what conditions is the mission expected to occur and what is the expected duration
- What shape, size and composition of the follow-on mission, if any

2.4 Pol-Mil Objectives and Specified Tasks

List the key objectives to be accomplished by the mission/intervention—these objectives are usually outlined in the Security Council mandate, if one is adopted. Then, list the specified tasks that the mission—both civilian and military components—is

expected to accomplish over the duration of the operation. If necessary, state what tasks the operation will NOT undertake.

2.5 Desired Political-Military End State

Defines a realistic, durable and desirable political arrangement (i.e., power-sharing) that is acceptable by the parties and one that mitigates further conflict over the next five years, at least. This is the most decisive component of any settlement. This political framework is the “desired end state”—a preferred political-military arrangement that the parties agree (or are pressured) to implement—a political bargain that brings about an acceptable power-sharing arrangement coupled with a stable military balance. An end state that only addresses military security matters (e.g., such as terms for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, or amnesty of combatants) does not resolve the underlying political conflict and therefore, would not mitigate further fighting among the factions. A “cease-fire” is merely a temporary halt in the fighting—not a stable and lasting political accommodation. A ceasefire agreement is not a “comprehensive signed settlement” since it does not attempt to deal with difficult political issues such as governance, ethnic minority rights or self-determination. Such “ceasefire agreements” are better described as temporary measure to halt the fighting.

To be successful, a signed “comprehensive settlement” must address four critical elements that constitute a desired end state. These are: 1) the cessation of hostilities in a way that reduces the threat of surprise attack by one party; 2) an acceptable plan to integrate previously warring factions into one governing state; 3) provisions to build an interim system government capable of accommodating the interests of the parties; and 4) the creation of a new non-partisan national military and police force. These four elements of a durable and stable political-military end state dominate all other end state conditions, and early attention should be placed on determining what the parties will accept for these arrangements.

In failed states or divided societies, the central task is to figure out an acceptable political-military framework that the parties can agree to and support—one that will

encourage power sharing and military stability in a way that mitigates conflict among ethnic groups/warring factions for several years.

A “comprehensive settlement” should establish new political and military mechanisms and practices that give incentives to the warring factions to mediate their differences rather than resorting to fighting to resolve political confrontations. The settlement’s military arrangements (cessation of hostilities, confidence-building arrangements, arms control regime, demobilization, military balance, etc.) should support military stability and give security to all parties to the conflict. Security guarantees will require outside intervention by a credible peacekeeping force along with a long-term effort to reorganize the country’s indigenous military and police forces. The “comprehensive settlement” should include provisions that give incentives, rewards, or penalties to the political leaders to moderate divisive ethnic themes and to persuade their group members to support moderation, bargaining, and reciprocity among ethnic groups rather than military conflict.

2.6 Measures of Effort and Measures of Progress

This section outlines the metrics that will be used to measure performance and effectiveness of the mission itself (without prejudice to the efforts to achieve the desired political-military end state as described above).

First, the section should outline significant measures that describe the level of effort completed by the operation: number of troops deployed, number of police stations under control, number of disarmament camps open for operations. Obviously, these metrics define inputs, or the level of effort put forth by the mission, but they are useful in clarifying how much effort is being put forth in a specific mission area.

Next, this section should specify the metrics to be used to measure progress—describe the trends and interim goals that the mission will need to accomplish before the operation transitions to a follow-on mission (e.g., perhaps one led by the UN or an OSCE monitoring missions). The nature of these goals can be both objective (e.g., number of weapons turned in by combatants) and subjective (e.g., public opinion survey data indicating strong support for local elections). Depending on the mandate, the scope of

these goals will likely involve several areas—for example, the mandate could include such specific tasks for the mission to produce: gain territorial access, provide military security, reform the civilian policy, build civil order and justice, conduct humanitarian relief, resettle refugees, disarm and demobilize combatants, among others.

These metrics used to measure these interim goals should integrate military and civilian dimensions of the operation in a manner that describes successful mission progress for a major stage (e.g. Phase III) of the operation. In addition, these interim goals should be clear and realistic—for example: “Establish a suitable security environment that permits relief operations to be conducted by XXX in province YYY.”

These interim goals should be described as specifically as possible. Note that one should be clear as to whether one desires a change in conditions on the ground (e.g. newly elected officials gain control in all provinces) or simply the completion of a task or goal (e.g. complete elections in all the provinces). Either may be appropriate, depending on how ambitious we want to be in establishing the interim conditions or goals for the operation, while recognizing the limits on availability of political and financial support for the operation.

2.7 Transition/Exit Strategy

Describe the transition/exit strategy that is linked to the realization of the conditions or achievement of our goals leading to the desired end state described above. Obviously, this transition or “hand-off” strategy is multi-dimensional in character, focusing on such tasks needed to be completed for a hand-off of responsibilities to a follow-on international entity such as the UN or to the Host Nation. A transition/exit strategy requires the integrated efforts of both civilian and military officials within the USG and the international community.

Management of a transition/exit strategy is an interagency effort. It should be coordinated by an interagency working group, which would advise the Deputies Committee on the status of transition strategy planning and coordination within the USG and at the UN. The interagency working group would be composed of appropriate USG

officials having political, humanitarian, military, regional, and UN expertise regarding operations in the region.

3.0 CONCEPT OF OPERATION, ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING

This section describes conceptually how the mission will be accomplished—how the various components of USG policy (political, military, humanitarian, etc.) will be integrated to get the job done. Structurally, the concept of operations is a time-phased description of how the complex contingency operation will unfold. For each phase of the operation, task priorities are identified by functional components of the operation. In this way, various agencies and non-government organizations can understand how their priorities merge with those of other agencies to accomplish the mission.

3.1 Strategy for Successful Achievement of Political-Military Objectives

Present the overall strategy for successfully achieving our political-military objectives—advancing the goals of the international community while undermining any opposition to the mission. This overall strategy should include diplomatic, political, military and economic efforts within the region to contain the spread of the conflict and reduce the capacity of the opposition to resist efforts by the international community. The strategy may include several elements which are synchronized to decisively concentrate power relying on specific tool such as regional diplomatic efforts, military operations, sanctions on arms, diamond, drugs and other illicit operations, political pressure on patrons, isolation of key players, adverse media attention, and war crimes prosecution. The range of options is limited by the political will of regional states.

3.2 Strategy for Linking Force and Diplomacy

Present the strategy that explains how force and diplomacy will be linked in a timely fashion to advance our policy aims. State how our military and diplomatic means are to be integrated to successfully conduct the operation (or implement a settlement). Elements of this strategy should include building consensus among our allies for military action, making the legal and moral case for collective action to both the domestic and international audience, gaining the necessary agreements and resolutions for authorizing

use of force, conducting diplomatic communications to regional powers and organizations, and characterizing the possible outcomes of U.S. intervention.

3.3 Strategy for Building an International Coalition

Present the strategy for establishing an effective international coalition for getting the mission accomplished over the next 1-2 years of the mission. Address the political foundations and the structural elements of the coalition leadership, composition and structure. Identify potential weaknesses of coalition solidarity and how the coalition leaders will guard against any fragmentation of the coalition.

3.4 Pol-Mil Concept of Operations

Mission accomplishment calls for the timely integration of several functional dimensions of activity: diplomatic engagement, military security, humanitarian relief, political transition, and economic restoration, among others. The pol-mil concept of operations for the mission typically has several phases, each of which will require priority efforts within many of the functional dimensions as noted below:

- Phase I (Interagency Assessment and Preparation): The initial phase calls for a comprehensive interagency assessment, including deployment of assessment teams to gather information from all sources on the situation. Key agencies prepare appropriate organizations and forces for deployment to the crisis area. Critical functional task priorities for Phase I are stated by mission area (see listing of mission areas in para 5.0):
 - Diplomatic Engagement Priorities:
 - Military Security and Regional Stability Priorities:
 - WMD Control/Consequence Management Priorities:
 - Humanitarian Assistance Priorities:
 - Internal Political Transition Priorities:
 - Civil Law and Order/Public Security Priorities:
 - Infrastructure Restoration Priorities:
 - Economic Restoration and Transformation Priorities:
 - Human Rights Abuses/Atrocities/War Crimes Priorities:
 - Public Diplomacy and Education Priorities:
 - National Reconciliation Priorities:

- Phase II (Rehearsal, Movement, Civilian and Military Activity Build-up): This phase calls for multi-agency planning and rehearsals, strategic movement of assets, forces and civilian activities, and the establishment of local security, communications, airheads, logistic bases, and transportation systems in-country and/or in neighboring states. Critical task priorities for Phase II should be stated as was done in Phase I above.
- Phase III (Initial Entry Operations – NEO/Initial Entry/Emergency Relief): This phase may be executed nearly simultaneously with Phase II above, depending on the mission. Include critical task priorities for Phase III as noted in Phase I above.
- Phase IV (Stability, Political Transition, and Restoration Operations): This phase constitutes the longest part of the operation, requiring unity of effort among civilian and military organizations. Include critical task priorities for Phase IV as noted in Phase I above.
- Phase V (Post-conflict Peace-building, Transition & Military Force Drawdown): This phase calls for the continued evolution of the mission’s priorities toward civilian implementation, transition and hand-off of security responsibilities to a follow-on force or the host government, and then the drawdown of military forces. The hand-off of security responsibilities is event driven, based on exit criteria for military forces. Civilian operations continue to function and flourish. Include critical tasks priorities for Phase V.
- Phase VI (End State Sustainment): This final phase calls for sustaining the end state via activities consistent with long-term U.S. policy in the region. Include critical task priorities for Phase VI as noted in Phase I above.

3.5 Opposition Countermoves/Contingency Response Options

Outline the possible negative responses or countermoves that could be employed by key opposition players, adversaries, or spoilers that would thwart the opposition. For each possible response present a menu of options that we could use to either deter, preempt, or deal with these negative actions by the key player(s) involved.

3.6 External Variables, Random Events and Wildcards

Outline the important variables, random events and wildcards that could occur that would potentially thwart achievement of policy aims for the operation. External variables include a description of likely negative reactions by neighboring states or influential regional powers, negative reaction by some UNSC members or other major powers. Wildcards include random events or designated activities in the region or

elsewhere that could undermine our ability to achieve success. For each external variable and wildcard scenario outline a hedging strategy that we could use to counter such activity.

3.7 Mission Organization in Theater (UN or NATO, OSCE, Coalition MNF, etc. as appropriate)

Portray the international organizational structure for various components in theater.

3.7.1 Command, Control and Coordination Plan (among all components)

- UN Core Group/Friends Group/Peace Implementation Council
- SRSG
- Force Commander
- CIVPOL Coordinator
- Civil Affairs Office
- Other key offices, including UNHCR

3.7.2 Military Organization in Theater

3.7.3 Civilian Police Organization in Theater

3.7.4 Humanitarian Relief Organization in Theater

3.7.5 Economic Development Organization in Theater

3.7.6 Information/Public Affairs Organization in Theater

3.8 U.S. Organizational Concept

Portray the U.S. organization for various components in Washington, D.C., and in theater.

3.8.1 Washington Interagency Policy Elements

- Executive Committee (ExComm)
- Interagency Working Group (IWG)

3.8.2 U.S. Organization in Theater

- Senior Steering Group

- US Ambassador and the Embassy Staff
- CJTF Command and Staff
- Coordinating Staff – CMOC

3.9 Chain of Authority

Describe the chain of authority and associated reporting channels for the operation.

3.9.1 U.S. Chain of Authority

3.9.2 UN (or NATO, OSCE, Coalition MNF, etc.) Chain of Authority

3.9.3 Authorities of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General

3.10 Strategy for Financing the Mission

Describe how the mission will be funded over the long run. In multidimensional peacekeeping operations, successful implementation will usually require millions of dollars in the first two years. This section outlines the financial strategy to meet this substantial funding requirement. The section clarifies the myriad of financial needs and associated funding mechanisms to pay for implementation during the first two years. A UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission will be mandated to accomplish several military and civilian tasks (see Section 2.4 above) that will entail undertaking many humanitarian, governance, institution-building, security, development and human rights activities. Most of these activities will cost a substantial amount, especially in the first two years.

Since considerable funding is needed to support a myriad of tasks, a credible financial strategy seeks to tap into all potential sources of funds. These funding sources include UN peacekeeping assessments, voluntary financial contributions from Member States, program funds from UN specialized agencies and international organizations, in-kind support provided by NGOs, and revenue generation by the Host Country's public administration. Obviously, the UN or the World Bank will have to establish a Trust Fund to collect donor contributions, and the UN mission will have to administer funds in a

legally sufficient, transparent, and effective manner to ensure continued support by Member States. Note that measures must be taken to ensure that corruption and bribery from within the Host Nation does not imperil effective and legal use of these funds by the international community.

Major Funding Components

- The UN mission: Funds are needed to pay for the UN missions civilian staff, the international civilian police, and UN peacekeeping force. This component will be funded by UN assessed contributions. While these UN assessments can pay for UN mission's internal activities, these funds cannot be used to pay for "nation-building" and other non-peacekeeping type activities that the UN mission will supervise—these funds must come from other sources such as voluntary contributions.
- Humanitarian Operations: Funds are needed to pay for humanitarian relief operations and restoration of basic services. Activities in this area are funded by normal humanitarian assistance program funds of relief organizations such as UNHCR, WFP and ICRC as well as voluntary contributions and in-kind relief provided by NGOs.
- Military Disarmament, Demobilization and Transformation: Funds are needed to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as the transformation of existing military organizations of the parties. A trust fund would need to be established and supported by bilateral voluntary contributions, perhaps led by nations interested in supporting and organizing the new country's long term security.
- Human Rights Investigations and War Crimes Tribunal: Funds could be needed to support investigations of atrocities and war crimes by a Security Council-mandated War Crimes Tribunal. These activities are normally funded by assessed contributions. In addition, in the past tribunal activities have been complimented by human rights investigations that have been supported by voluntary contributions of interested nations.
- Civil Administration: Funds may be needed to pay for the day-to-day operations and salaries of several thousand persons of the Host Country's civil administration. This workforce includes firemen, police, teachers, hospital workers, civil servants and so forth. This requirement will be funded, at least initially, by bilateral voluntary contributions from interested nations. In the long run, self-

generating revenues, such as customs, sales taxes, fees, and so forth, are the primary source of funding for civil administration.

- Institution-building (Police, Justice, other): Funds are needed to invest in the establishment of institutions such as local police forces, a justice system, penal system, public information and free media, democratization, and branches of government. Funds are also needed to pay for elections at the local and province level. A collection of funding sources will be needed including a UN Trust Fund supported by bilateral voluntary contributions; bilateral nation-building development programs; and UN specialized agency programs to support institution-building efforts.
- Elections & Democratization Processes: Funds are likely needed to pay for the conduct of democratic elections and related processes and activities. This requirement is normally funded by bilateral voluntary contributions from interested States and NGOs.
- Reconstruction/Development: Funds are needed to invest in the reconstruction and development. This effort will be funded through a UN or World Bank Trust Fund supported by World Bank, a regional Development Bank and bilateral voluntary contributions. Also, bilateral development programs, some already working in the territory, will continue to sponsor in-country projects.

Since these requirements are to be funded from multiple sources, the SYG/SRSG should prepare a donor strategy and implementation plan, in collaboration with the World Bank, to organize donor campaigns and, where appropriate, target potential donors to take the lead in supporting key activities, particularly in the areas of civil administration, institution-building and reconstruction.

The UN mission will have to take the lead in establishing a financial management capability and a budget for supporting the operations of the Host Country's civil administration. The UN or the World Bank will also need to establish and appropriate Trust Fund or other mechanism to encourage donors to provide funding as soon as it is needed.

3.11 Lead Agency Responsibilities

Define the areas of responsibility to different USG agencies and international organizations based on the concept operations. These responsibilities are determine

through interagency discussions. In some cases, clarify assigned tasks or functions that fall outside an agency's normal area of responsibility.

3.11.1 State Department (P, Region Bureau and Functional Offices (R, IO, PM, PRM, INL, DRL, S-WCT, EB, L, S/RPP, etc.)

3.11.2 USUN

3.11.3 Defense (Regional Office and Functional Offices)

3.11.4 Joint Staff

3.11.5 USAID

3.11.6 Justice

3.11.7 Treasury

3.11.8 Transportation

3.11.9 CIA

3.11.10 OMB

4.0 PREPARATORY TASKS

This section lays out specific preparatory tasks to be undertaken by the interagency before the operation begins—these include such tasks as advance diplomatic consultations, troop recruitment, verification of legal authorities, funding for the operation, congressional consultations, and U.S. media relations. For each task noted below, there should be a discussion of the facts bearing on successful accomplishment of the task, requirements for action, agency responsibilities, and milestones for implementation. Each sub-section below (4.1, 4.2, etc.) is usually drafted by one agency and coordinated with all other interested agencies.

4.1 Advance Diplomatic Consultations (State lead with USUN, OSD)

Outline our strategy for UN consultations, consultations with key regional powers, major powers, and the host government, consultations with regional organizations and supporting international organizations (OSCE, UNHCR, etc.)

4.2 Advance Intelligence Support Preparations (Intelligence Community lead)

Describe how the IC will provide intel reports on the crisis and early warning of flashpoints to interagency policy-makers. If appropriate, outline requirements for and make arrangements to have damage assessments developed and provided to the interagency. Discuss guidelines for sharing of information with coalition partners, other participants from the international community, or regional organizations in the operation.

4.3 Force Generation and Troop Recruitment (State lead with OSD, Joint Staff and USUN)

Determine the coalition force structure and identify force requirements. Identify potential troop contributors and plan for soliciting participation. Clarify progress in on-going recruitment efforts.

4.4 Advance Coalition Arrangements and Leadership (State lead with OSD, Joint Staff and USUN)

Determine the organization and lead nation for the coalition. Prepare a charter for the Steering Group to provide policy control over coalition operations. Make provisions for both military and civil command and control. Establish coalition-planning staffs for military and civilian activities.

4.5 Strategic Deployment and Logistics Arrangements (State lead with OSD and Joint Staff)

Determine the coalition's requirements for overflight rights, basing, and bed down. This will require the establishment of an IWG (NSC, State-P, State-PM, OSD-ISA, Joint Staff, DATTs, and the CINC) led by State-PM to coordinate making arrangements through political-military channels.

4.6 Funding Requirements and Sources (OMB lead with State, OSD and AID)

Discuss the estimated USG cost of the operation, potential USG sources and adequacy of funding, interagency burden sharing—which USG agencies will pay for what, relevant funding authorities, and Congressional actions required for the expenditure of USG funds.

4.7 Financial Donors (State lead with AID and Treasury)

Determine overall financial requirements and identify potential donors. Establish a fund to receive contributions. Prepare appeals in consultation with relevant parties. Organize donor conferences. Collaborate with UN agencies, international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.), develop banks, NGOs and bilateral donors.

4.8 NEO Planning and Precautionary Arrangements (State lead with NSC, OSD and Joint Staff)

Outline measures to evacuate non-combatant personnel and protect U.S. personnel and facilities.

4.9 Legal Authority for Operations (NSC lead with all agencies)

Specify the overall authority for conducting the operation, the key provisions of the mandate, requirements of the peace accord, if appropriate, the U.S. legal authority for providing support to the operation, and the status of SOFA arrangements.

4.10 Advance Congressional Consultations (NSC lead with all agencies)

Outline the strategy for gaining Congressional support for operation, the requirements for consultation/reporting to Congress, plan for dealing with key Members.

4.11 Advance U.S. Public Relations and Media Affairs (NSC lead with State, OSD, Joint Staff and USUN)

Describe the overall strategy for telling the story, the rules of road for media once operations begin, key themes and critical events, and key media outlets/people.

4.12 Advance International Public Diplomacy (State lead with NSC, OSD, Joint Staff, USUN and AID)

Describe the overall strategy for conducting the public information campaign abroad. Efforts will be coordinated by the International Public Information (IPI) working group.

4.13 Interagency Rehearsal of Anticipated Operations (NSC lead with all agencies)

Outline the plan for conducting the Deputies interagency rehearsal of the operation.

4.14 Activities for Final Countdown and Onset of Operations (NSC lead with all agencies)

Outline the timeline and activities (for use in a “Playbook”) to be completed during final countdown and onset of operations. These may include legal notification, warning messages, evacuation of personnel, POTUS activities, final diplomatic notifications, final coalition activities, congressional briefings domestic public affairs and press operations, and international public information releases.

4.15 Interagency Crisis Management Activities and Processes (NSC lead with all agencies)

Discuss how the interagency will manage the crisis on a day-to-day basis. Discussion should include the establishment of “watch teams,” distribution of daily intel or diplomatic reports, timing of daily SVTS, and the schedule of Deputies or EXCOMM meetings, and interagency communications during the crisis.

4.16 Hedging Strategies for Possible “What If” Scenarios (NSC lead with the NIC, State and OSD)

Determine hedging strategies for the important “what if” scenarios. These scenarios may include ploys and adverse actions by the Host Nation, warring factions,

neighboring states, a regional power, or a major power. If these scenarios are large in number or are complex in nature, consider adding an additional section to the Pol-Mil Plan that addresses these “what ifs” and outline the hedging strategies and countermoves available to deal with them.

4.X Other preparatory task may be added as appropriate

5.0 MAJOR MISSION AREA TASKS

This section provides an inventory of the major mission area tasks that could be undertaken as part of the complex contingency operation. Although the content of this section may vary significantly from one operation to another, there are many common mission area tasks that are undertaken in most operations. Others are consciously dismissed as not relevant to a specific situation.

In writing a pol-mil plan, each mission area (e.g. 5.1. Diplomatic Engagement, etc.) will usually be tasked by the NSC to a specific lead agency for planning and preparation in coordination with other interested agencies. Note in the inventory that the usual agencies designed as lead are listed.

Mission area tasks for a complex contingency operation are designed to address immediate problems that, left unresolved, could lead to the return of fighting. As such, the mission area tasks listed herein are distinct from normal, long-term developmental tasks.

Note also that the overriding criterion for the establishment of task priorities is political-military, consistent with USG strategic purpose and mission as outlined in paragraph 2.0 above. This criterion offers a useful way of deciding whether, for example, an admirable humanitarian project fits in with the USG purpose and mission of the operation.

Since the set of mission area tasks undertaken for any given situation will vary from operation to operation, this inventory presents a list of tasks that may be undertaken—not all tasks will be applicable to every complex contingency operation. Other important aspects of this inventory are highlighted below:

- The selection of mission area tasks undertaken for a particular operation will have to account for the USG strategic purpose and mission, cooperation of the host government and the parties involved, and the resources available.
- This inventory of mission area tasks is illustrative rather than prescriptive. The inventory only identifies tasks that are usually undertaken as part of a complex contingency operation. Accordingly, the inventory can be used as a menu of potential tasks, based on lessons learned, to spur agency planners to consider the range of likely tasks appropriate for a given operation.
- Effort has been made to list tasks within each mission area in some chronological sequence of execution, however, this sequence should not be interpreted rigidly.
- The inventory does not specify which entities within the USG, the United Nations, NATO, OSCE, or OAU, ASEAN, or other organizations will undertake the task. This needs to be developed as part of the overall pol-mil strategy.

In writing this portion of the Pol-Mil Plan, agencies should prepare a brief, executive-level overview that is one or two paragraphs in length following the general outline below:

Mission Area Task (Lead and Supporting Agencies)

- Current situation/operating environment
- Operational requirement, task objectives and priorities of effort
- Concept of operations and key milestones for successful task completion
- Authorities/mandates/policy statements that may apply to task execution
- Supporting agencies involved, their roles/responsibilities
- Local institutional involved and nature of their participation/contribution
- Other international organizations involved and their level of effort
- Key financial, personal, asset, administrative, and logistical considerations
- Unresolved issues, risks, anticipated challenges/difficulties

Note that each task listed below under the various major mission areas does not identify the entity that will organize and implement the action, but rather only identifies the task using an action verb. The agency planner must assess the situation and make a determination of the entity which is best able to perform the task, such as the USG, the UN, an NGO, the host nation, or a regional organization, among others.

5.1 Diplomatic Engagement Tasks (State, USUN, OSD, Treasury)

- Consult with the host nation
- Consult with regional powers and neighboring states
- Collaborate with the UN and regional organizations (OAU, OAS, OSCE, ASEAN, etc.)
- Consult with supporting international organizations (UNHCR, Red Cross)
- Establish a “Friends Group” or a “Peace Implementation Council”
- Appoint a Special Envoy
- Conduct negotiations between the parties of the conflict
- Support mediation efforts/negotiations with the parties
- Develop a strategy for dealing with strongmen or de facto warlords
- Formulate UNSC resolutions for collective action
- Collaborate with troop contributing nations
- Impose or lift sanctions/arms embargo
- Maintain compliance with the peace accord milestones and conditions
- Gain diplomatic recognition of a government

5.2 Military Security and Regional Stability Tasks (OSD, Joint Staff, State, AID, CIA)

- Deter hostilities and armed attacks
- Assess, train and equip coalition forces
- Conduct military operations to accomplish the mandate
- Provide intelligence support to the operation
- Establish a military observer or a peacekeeping mission
- Implement a weapons control regime
- Disarm, demobilize, or reduce military units
- Demilitarize a zone or region
- Re-integrate ex-combatants
- Conduct constabulary operations
- Implement confidence-building and security measures
- Professionalize/restructure military forces
- Establish mil-to-mil programs

- Coordinate NATO support to the operation
- Provide security assistance to the host nation
- Conduct transition planning, hand-off, and military drawdown
- Develop U.S. position on compensation/payments for collateral damage
- Establish a foundation for post-conflict regional stability

5.3 WMD Control/Consequence Management (OSD, Joint Staff, State, DSWA)

- Prevent the sale, transfer, or migration of WMD systems and technical knowledge
- Control/neutralize/remove WMD threat and capabilities
- Safeguard/secure/dismantle WMD research personnel, records, facilities, etc.
- Conduct consequence management contingencies

5.4 Humanitarian Assistance Tasks (State, AID, OFDA, OSD)

Humanitarian Relief

- Pre-position humanitarian relief stocks
- Provide emergency humanitarian relief—water, food, shelter, medical supplies
- Organize humanitarian assistance zones or relief areas
- Coordinate non-government and private organization activities
- Restore damaged potable water sources
- Repair sanitary latrine and capabilities for sewage disposal
- Assist in restoring local health delivery services
- Rehabilitate damaged food production capacities
- Provide special assistance to vulnerable groups
- Provide basic training and education in preventative measures

Refugees

- Avoid generation of population movements from home towns
- Repatriate or resettle refugees and displaced persons
- Provide housing and public services for returning people

- Organize food-for-work efforts (demining, road repair, security, etc.)

Demining Operations

- Assess the landmine clearance problem
- Solicit financial support for landmine operations
- Create a landmine clearance authority and conduct operations
- Organize mine awareness training

5.5 Internal Political Transition Tasks (State)

- Conceptualize a workable political framework for the peace process
- Encourage adoption of effective power-sharing arrangements
- Release and assist political prisoners
- Create confidence-building measures among warring factions
- Foster the establishment of an effective interim or transition government
- Develop staffing and funding for the interim of transition government
- Create consensus-building mechanisms—national commissions, etc.
- Assist in restoring the government’s administrative apparatus
- Develop a political action plan for collaboration on functions for civil administration
- Assist in the conduct of nation-wide free and fair elections
- Assist in informing and educating newly-elected political leaders
- Offer advisory assistance to government officials
- Monitor and report on corruption by government officials
- Transfer control of administrative functions from UN to host nation officials

5.6 Civil Law and Order/Public Security Tasks (State, Justice)

- Reform or disband existing police forces
- Establish a new police force
- Provide equipment and conduct police training for police forces
- Establish a CIVPOL monitor activity
- Recruit qualified civilian police monitors
- Provide advisors to police and criminal justice organizations

- Support the establishment of local police operations
- Provide capabilities to deal with civil disturbances
- Rebuild the criminal justice system
- Assist in establishing a humane prison system
- Assist in establishing a legitimate legal system
- Eradicate police corruption
- Support judicial reform and local dispute resolution
- Combat organized international crime activity and corruption
- Safeguard government institutions and key leaders

5.7 Infrastructure Restoration Tasks (State, AID)

- Reconstitute energy supplies and restore basic services
- Rehabilitate agricultural capacity
- Restore facilities for power generation and transmission; fuse power grids
- Repair transportation facilities and systems
- Restore communications systems
- Advise on planning for mineral and industrial production revitalization
- Advise on natural resource management
- Monitor environmental damage controls

5.8 Economic Restoration/Transformation Tasks (State, AID, Treasury)

- Restore opportunities for employment and private home ownership
- Provide job training and employment for discharged military personnel
- Assist in economic integration and cooperation
- Streamline government administration and licensing
- Eliminate corruption
- Initiate privatization under market economy
- Monitor natural resource management
- Mobilize domestic and foreign investment capital

5.9 Public Diplomacy and Education Tasks (State, OSD, Joint Staff)

- Conduct public diplomacy (e.g. PSYOPS) operations
- Conduct public opinion research

- Assist in establishing open broadcast networks
- Discourage “hate radio” broadcasts
- Promote understanding of civic values, rule of law, and citizen responsibilities
- Provide unbiased historical information on the conflict
- Sponsor journalist training and professional standards
- Conduct public education and media training programs

5.10 Human Rights Abuses/Atrocities/War Crimes Tasks (State, Justice)

- Engage the UN Human Rights Commission
- Establish a Commission of Inquiry
- Establish a clearing house for information and evidence
- Constitute an office in the mission to address war crimes issues
- Train military mission personnel on war crimes investigation support
- Gain access to refugee camps and conduct interviews
- Set up an atrocity reporting system and compile atrocity reports
- Locate and protect possible sites of atrocities
- Maintain data on sites—digital pictures, maps, witness reports, etc.
- Deploy forensic teams with equipment to conduct investigations
- Provide protection to the sites, witnesses, and investigation personnel
- Develop an effective witness protection program
- Seek removal of possible abusive police and law enforcement officials
- Consult on appointing a UN Special Reporter to advise on human rights matters

5.11 National Reconciliation Tasks (State, AID)

- Assist in establishing a truth commission or international tribunal
- Deployment a human rights monitoring mission
- Provide human rights training to military, police and judicial officials
- Monitor human rights practices and promote human rights standards
- Seek legislation for amnesty of ex-combatants
- Search for evidence of missing persons
- Strengthen mechanisms to ensure government accountability

- Establish civil affairs operations in local areas
- Assist in capacity-building for social institutions
- Arrange for travel and reunion of families

5.X Other mission areas may be added as appropriate

6.0 AGENCY PLANS

This section outlines important agency plans that are to be written by USG or UN agencies that pertain to critical parts of the operation. For each critical task of the operation noted in section 5 above, the ExComm will task USG agencies to write an agency operational or support plan for implementation (note below some of the common operational and support plans required for a complex contingency). The ExComm determines, in consultation with NSC staff, which agency plans will be written for the complex contingency operation.

The format for these plans should follow a standard pattern for consistency and common understanding. Agency plans should at least discuss:

- Purpose of the plan
- Background on how the plan supports the overall operation
- Planning assumptions
- Current operating environment and situation on the ground
- Operational mission and objectives
- Desired operational end state and measures of success
- Concept of operations—how the activity will unfold and timelines
- Organizational framework for the activity and its chain of command
- Lead agency and other supporting agencies involved and their roles/responsibilities
- Local institutions involved and their roles/responsibilities
- Other international actors/organizations involved
- Financial, personnel, asset management, administrative, and logistical instructions
- Other specific coordinating instructions
- Unresolved issues, risks and anticipated challenges/difficulties

The interagency policy-level steering group (e.g., usually the ExComm) will review each of these plans to identify areas of interdependence between agencies (e.g., AID cannot do x until DoD does y), areas of disagreement (e.g., two agencies each think the other should pay for x), and the degree of consistency between agency plans and the overall pol-mil plan. The ExComm review will normally take place off-site at NDU or Carlisle and will include Director-level participation or higher.

In addition, the Deputies Committee will conduct an interagency rehearsal to review the Pol-Mil plan and supporting agency plans prior to commencement of operations.

Depending on mission requirements, here are some common major mission areas that will require an agency plan for a complex contingency operation:

6.1 Plan for Recruiting the International Coalition (State)

6.2 Plan for Military Operations (Joint Staff)

6.3 Plan for Humanitarian Relief Operations (AID)

6.4 Plan for Civilian Police Equip and Train (State, Justice)

6.5 Plan for Demobilization of Forces (AID-OTI)

6.6 Plan for Restoration of Basic Services (AID)

6.7 Plan for Refugee Return (State)

6.8 Plan for Apprehension and Prosecution of War Criminals (State, Justice)

6.9 Plan for Public Diplomacy (State)

6.10 Plan for Election Support & Democratization Activities (State)

APPENDICES

A – Regional Map

Provide a regional map of the area of operations. Overprinted maps with key information, such as the location of refugee camps, areas of military control by the factions, or economic spheres of influence, should also be included in this appendix.

B – Intelligence Assessment

Provide the fully classified version of the intelligence assessment for the mission.

C – Mission Organization and Footprint

In graphic form, define the civilian and military organization of the mission. Also, using a map picture, depict the geographic footprint of the mission on the ground.

D – Troop Contributors and International Participants

Summarize the list of contributors, participants and supporters of the mission. This list should be available for use in both diplomatic and public information activities.

E – Phases of Military Operations

As provided by the Pentagon, outline the phases of the military operation.

F – Summary of Key Decisions

In graphic form, provide on a timeline the key policy decisions that the Principals or Deputies will likely have to address as the operation unfolds over the next six-nine months.

G – Pol-Mil Strategic Timeline for Start-up

On a matrix, outline the timeline of key strategic events for mission start-up. Key pol-mil aspects usually include regional diplomatic activities, Security Council decisions, military coalition build-up, deployments of military and relief activities, and public information efforts.

H – Pol-Mil Operational Synchronization Matrix

On a matrix, outline the timeline of key operational events for mission progress over the next six months. Key pol-mil aspects usually include political, military, relief, and return efforts as a minimum.

I – Playbook for Final Countdown

On a short timeline covering the last few days and hours leading up to and following H-Hour, outline the key activities (as outlined in Section 4 above) within the USG to be taken at the outset by the White House and other agencies to ensure coordinated implementation of mission.

APPENDIX C: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, 10 JUNE 1999¹³⁹

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S.1999.516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to

¹³⁹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, 265-267 and 274-278.

9 of the paper presented to Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and *acting* for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. *Welcomes* the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and *demands* the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

3. *Demands* in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. *Confirms* that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. *Decides* on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as

required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals in a mutually supportive manner;

7. *Authorizes* Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfill its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

8. *Affirms* the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and *demands* that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. *Decides* that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. *Decides* that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. *Emphasizes* the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. *Encourages* all Member States and international organization to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and *emphasizes* in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. *Demands* full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

15. *Demands* that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. *Decides* that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related *matériel* for the use of the international civil and security presences;

17. *Welcomes* the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. *Demands* that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. *Decides* that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I. Statement by the Chairman on the Conclusion of the Meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre, 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;

- Establishing of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

Annex 2. Proposal Presented by Martii Ahtisaari and Victor Chernomyrdin to President Slobodan Milosevic, 2 June 1999, as Approved by the Yugoslav Parliament

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis;

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal like for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
 - Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
 - Marking/clearing minefields;

- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
 - Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
 8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
 9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
 10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below. A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslavia/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

FOOTNOTE. Other required elements: a rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours; return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands).

Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals. The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.

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