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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Title:** Preparation of the US Navy Intelligence Officer

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**Thesis Question:** Is today's senior US Navy Intelligence Officer--mostly trained and experienced in Cold War-era threats--fully prepared to support current and future intelligence requirements of the commander who is increasingly tasked to support emerging and non-traditional military missions?

**Discussion:** The history of US Navy Intelligence reflects trends in education and training activity that parallels periods of national crises and peace. During extended periods of peace, Navy Intelligence Officer education and training has withered because of mission-poor environments, underfunding, and a lack of doctrine. The Navy Intelligence community of the mid-1990s--absent a Cold War focus--is again challenged by enigmatic missions and restrained by declining Defense budgets. In 1994, the Navy promulgated its first intelligence doctrine, which is the cornerstone for intelligence education and training. Many of today's senior Navy Intelligence Officers are enjoying rewarding careers. However, some Navy Intelligence Officers lack contemporary preparation; these officers are challenged to fully support intelligence requirements. Sustained quality intelligence support demands sustained quality

officer education, training and experience regardless of mission and budget peculiarities.

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### **CHAPTER 1**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The focus of this paper is on the preparation of the afloat senior US Navy Intelligence Officer (NIO) to support the commander--the crucible of senior NIO performance. The senior NIO is a key member of the deployed warfighting team--the afloat staff. On the shoulders of the senior NIO lies a great burden of responsibility, that of advising the commander on critical intelligence issues in a manner which ensures friendly forces can fight and win. When applied effectively, intelligence focuses the commander's effort for decisive action, be it in peace or war. A poorly prepared senior NIO degrades the effectiveness of the commander and the afloat staff and, therefore, jeopardizes the commander's desired mission end state.

This paper will explore the following thesis: Some senior NIOs--Lieutenant Commanders, Commanders, and Captains--either selected for or serving in afloat staff billets, are not being adequately prepared in terms of quality for the Navy's current and future needs; these NIOs lack the specific education, intelligence training, and technical skills necessary to support the full spectrum of emerging and non-traditional naval missions.<sup>(1)</sup> This thesis assumes that some senior NIOs have not attended formal education since undergraduate schooling and have not undergone competitive institutional training since basic intelligence school, or they merely updated their intelligence skills on an arbitrary basis.

I will investigate the above thesis in the following manner: In Chapter 2, Navy Intelligence community history will be examined, focusing primarily on historical trends in education and training from the mid-20th century to 1995; in Chapter 3, Naval Intelligence Doctrine will be assessed, focusing primarily on key intelligence support principles that education and training institutions must support; in Chapter 4, NIO preparatory processes will be reviewed, focusing primarily on the scope of current naval intelligence education and training curricula taught at major institutions; in Chapter 5, NIO management processes will be evaluated, focusing primarily on the roles of Navy Intelligence community managers in filling staff billets; and, in Chapter 6, the results of surveys on senior NIO effectiveness will be summarized, and the careers of selected senior NIOs will be analyzed. My conclusions and recommendations are provided in Chapter 7.

Integral to the success of Navy Intelligence is the capacity of its officers to execute competently the military intelligence artform.<sup>(2)</sup> Geopolitical upheavals, socioeconomic crisis, and burgeoning technological innovation--the challenges of the Information Age--demand that NIOs achieve comprehensive and specialized qualifications. Exacting preparation of the NIO's professional qualifications, in the form of education, training, and experience, is essential for a satisfying and rewarding career. But even more so, as Naval Intelligence doctrine recognizes, exacting preparation is key to the successful performance of the officer's duties in the Navy's cornerstone intelligence missions, those of providing objective, timely, and quality intelligence support to operating forces, and assisting the

component and joint forces commanders in planning and executing both combat and non-combat operations.<sup>(3)</sup>

If the afloat senior NIO is to participate successfully in current and future intelligence support challenges, the NIO's qualifications must be updated continuously. An NIO's credibility within the national intelligence community and the Navy is critical; therefore, it can be argued firmly that the NIO's accumulation of knowledge and development of skills must never cease. Formal instruction for the career NIO should include rigorous basic, intermediate, and advanced schooling; informal instruction should include non-institutional methods--such as on-the-job training, continuing education seminars with academics, business executives, and foreign-area experts, as well as directed professional reading and writing--both ashore and afloat. Training underpins broad professional experience which includes participation in naval, joint, and multinational operations. Support to multinational operations requires a very broad exposure to global issues and events. Professional human experiences should be broadened by the NIO at every opportunity through foreign-area and afloat assignment, foreign language training and proficiency, personal foreign travel, and cultural association.<sup>(4)</sup>

As professionals, senior NIOs must train the way the US military fights. To be effective during real-world combat operations, the NIO must be integrated into the primary elements of battle staff operations<sup>(5)</sup>--training, mission planning, and task execution--and battle staff logistics:<sup>(6)</sup> the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operations in the execution of a military strategy and operations. Through such exposure, the NIO will gain a deeper understanding of friendly force capabilities and limitations, and by combining this knowledge with what is known about the adversary, he is better able to advise the commander.<sup>(7)</sup>

## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORICAL TRENDS IN EDUCATION AND TRAINING

**You can never really become an Intelligence Officer of the inspired class unless you happen to be born with that delicate touch which produces a reasonable and measurable evaluation without full knowledge of all the facts; but there are characteristics which you can develop even if they do not come as part of your standard equipment at birth. The first is an attitude of constant suspicion--an unwillingness to take anything for granted; the second is a form of scientific mindedness--the ability to approach all things with a sense of analytical inquiry; and finally, perhaps more important than anything else, a restraint which enables one to remain silent.**

**General Walter B. Smith, USA**

**Army War College, 19 February 1952**

A study of past Navy Intelligence Officer (NIO) education and training programs reveals that they neither met the sustainment needs of the NIO careerist nor fully prepared the NIO careerist to support the

demands of the warfighting commander. Navy Intelligence education and training have been inconsistent and cyclic, paralleling the rise and fall of threats to the US and its interests. Some education and training requirements were of short duration while others were maintained for decades by unwavering national priorities. Much of the preparation of the NIO involved training as opposed to education. Moreover, most intelligence training was at a basic level, which led to highly perishable intelligence skills.

US Navy Intelligence, with all of its components, has its roots in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).<sup>(8)</sup> Established in 1882, the ONI is the oldest continuously operating US intelligence service. Key to the Navy Intelligence community's century of success has been a hard-working ability of the Navy's senior officer and civilian administrators. Over time, they have demonstrated the ability to: focus on key national and military support missions; articulate intelligence doctrine; manage system acquisitions; recruit and retain quality people; achieve high standards of production; and provide tradecraft education, training, and experience for the NIO.

Since its establishment, the Navy Intelligence community--guided by the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI)--has enjoyed the good fortune of inspired and competent leadership. Throughout the history of the organization, NIOs at all levels have managed various intelligence requirements in support of national and military security strategies.<sup>(9)</sup> Their accomplishments, good and bad, were the result of education and training processes--intelligence preparation--and the practical application of knowledge and skills.

**Trends.** In the early years of Navy Intelligence and up to World War II, education and training in intelligence procedures was gained largely through experience and self-study, and rarely through institutional instruction. Navy officers with a proficiency in a foreign language, those who had foreign travel or who had intelligence-like experience, had their names kept on file at the former Bureau of the Navy as candidates for assignment to billets at ONI and at Navy attache posts overseas. Once posted to an overseas billet, a NIO's local area training continued.<sup>(10)</sup>

Until the opening months of World War II, Navy Intelligence, still an artform of limited and unproven value, struggled to overcome low funding and bureaucratic inertia. Languishing in the backwaters of Navy operations, Navy Intelligence--a non-battle tested resource--remained a little appreciated element of the Navy warfighting team. Some inroads to respectability were made at overseas diplomatic missions in support of the Navy's human intelligence (HUMINT) interests but, overall, the value of Navy Intelligence to the "battleship" Navy was seen as questionable. However, by 1941, rapidly moving events in Europe and Asia were just too much for even a cumbersome Navy bureaucracy to continue to sidestep. On 2 May 1941, a three-week indoctrination course was established to prepare Navy officers for foreign and domestic intelligence duties.<sup>(11)</sup> Then, on 12 September 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) authorized the creation of the Navy's first photo interpretation (PI) school.<sup>(12)</sup>

As America's role in World War II unfolded, training for military intelligence work finally achieved recognition as an essential preliminary step toward providing effective tactical intelligence support to naval planning and operations.<sup>(13)</sup> In April 1942, the Naval Air Combat Intelligence Officers School (NACIOS) was established as the need for air combat intelligence officers was recognized;<sup>(14)</sup> Navy and

Marine Corps Intelligence Officers were badly needed to brief pilots and debrief missions, and to ensure the flow of intelligence from combat reports to the commanders. Then, on 1 February 1943, in response to a growing need for NIO support to senior government diplomatic and military staffs, an 8-10 week school--built on the NACIOS concept--was established for advanced intelligence training.<sup>(15)</sup>

By 1944, Navy Intelligence was accepted as a critical component of successful naval planning and operations. Instruction in the intelligence artform became more professional. Training courses were more flexible and subjects were tailored to naval warfighter requirements. Continuous intelligence training was made available. NIOs returning from overseas assignments were offered a two-week refresher course at the Advanced Naval Intelligence School (ANIS) en route to their next assignment.<sup>(16)</sup>

With the detonation of the atomic bomb in 1945, the world saw the beginnings of the Cold War (1945-1990) and the manifestations of the Information Age (1945-present). The simultaneous genesis of the Cold War and information processing technology created new and complex paradigms and a calling for specialized skills in military intelligence organizations. Moreover, the need to comprehend complex political and strategic military concepts, and to process vast quantities of information, legitimized a long-term need for a new breed of well-educated and highly trained military intelligence professionals to support accurate intelligence analysis and timely intelligence production.

The value of Navy Intelligence as an integral element of fleet operations was underscored by the success of US maritime forces throughout World War II. Moreover, Navy Intelligence had become a necessity for the successful commander, having earned its rightful place alongside the combat specialists during key planning and decision-making processes. Concurring on the necessity for Navy Intelligence education and training, on 9 October 1945, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King praised the outstanding contributions of Navy Intelligence and declared it "**a prime essential for modern warfare.**" King further remarked, "**The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations desires that a continuing program of specialized instruction in intelligence and the appreciation of good intelligence be undertaken without delay.**"<sup>(17)</sup> Almost immediately, comprehensive intelligence education programs were formulated and institutionalized at the former Naval Academy Postgraduate School and the Naval War College. Intensive instruction in Navy Intelligence in relation to command and staff requirements was provided in the junior- and senior-level Naval War College courses.<sup>(18)</sup> From late 1945 onward, Navy Intelligence became recognized as a vital and permanent part of active naval forces structure. By March 1946, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal authorized the establishment of the Navy Intelligence School (NIS) at Anacostia, DC.<sup>(19)</sup> After completing a challenging program, graduates were offered an opportunity to apply for status as Special Duty Intelligence (SDI) Officers and to serve continuously thereafter in intelligence billets.<sup>(20)</sup> Navy Intelligence had, at last, become a dedicated profession.

Nevertheless, highlighting the cyclic effects of US military demobilization after a war and its negative impact on both national and military intelligence infrastructures, the US--including the Navy--was caught flatfooted at the start of the Korean War in June 1950. The Navy's primary combat intelligence training facility, the NACIOS, had been closed and, incredibly, no experienced air combat intelligence officers

remained on active duty. Tactical combat intelligence had slipped as a fleet priority during demobilization, with the intelligence duties among the fleet's air wing and squadron officers being handled as a collateral duty. The Navy was quickly forced to organize an Air Intelligence Section at NIS for the purpose of resurrecting an Air Combat Intelligence program.<sup>(21)</sup> Also, Commanders of Naval Air Forces in both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets established courses to augment NIS basic air and photo intelligence training with operational theater indoctrination.<sup>(22)</sup>

From the late 1950s through the early 1960s--a period of global tension, but no large-scale US combat activity--most Navy Intelligence programs were reorganized and enhanced under the NIS.<sup>(23)</sup> Navy Intelligence education and training activities focused on communist threats as the US moved through some of the darkest Cold War periods.

From the mid- to late-1960s, mobilization requirements--this time for the Vietnam War--again increased the demands for NIOs trained in tactical and operational-level combat intelligence support. The Navy subsequently joined with the US Air Force and established a basic six-month intelligence education and training program at the Armed Forces Air Intelligence Training Center (AFAITC), Denver, CO.<sup>(24)</sup> AFAITC served the ONI's basic intelligence education and training needs, producing 100-150 new NIOs for the fleet annually.

By 1972, in a mature Cold War environment, the Navy's first graduate-level intelligence education program was established at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) at Monterey, CA.<sup>(25)</sup> This program anchored intelligence as a naval warfighter sub-specialty and also fulfilled the technical education needs of top flight NIOs.

Then, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Navy and Marine Corps consolidated officer and enlisted intelligence education and training; this same year, the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) was established at Dam Neck, VA. Currently, NMITC provides initial accession and lateral transfer naval officers with joint basic intelligence education and training.<sup>(26)</sup>

And finally, since 1994, Navy Intelligence education and training have been guided by established doctrine. Long missing from the NIO preparation processes, doctrine should provide long-term stability and focus for Navy Intelligence education and training. However, since the end of the Cold War, with Defense budgets again in decline, Navy Intelligence may once again be entering a cycle where the NIO is unable to satisfy intelligence preparation and sustainment needs. The importance of doctrine in the preparation of the NIO is discussed fully in Chapter 4.

The above historical examples of education and training trends prove that past NIO preparation was inconsistent and basic, and that it did not meet the professional sustainment needs of the NIO. Moreover, inconsistent and basic NIO preparation led to perishable intelligence skills and poor readiness. From the beginning of World War II, through the Vietnam War era, training opportunities fluctuated, often coming to a complete standstill during periods of military demobilization; it was often defense outlays which

drove the process, not real needs for future warfighting requirements.

## CHAPTER 3

### EDUCATION AND TRAINING TODAY

The Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) has said, "**There are now just three kinds of naval intelligence personnel: those afloat serving with the Fleet, those in joint billets, or those preparing for one or the other.**"<sup>(27)</sup> This chapter will focus on the latter--preparation of the Navy Intelligence Officer (NIO) for current and future intelligence missions. This chapter will also provide a critical appraisal of the NIO preparation processes and prove that the end product often falls short of the intended target.

It is essential that Navy Intelligence education and training programs be ready at all times to produce highly competent and informed NIOs. Declining Defense resources require ever more critical thinking, riskier long-range planning, tougher systems acquisitions decisions, and greater flexibility in Navy Intelligence education and training curriculum development. Unfortunately, there is no room for downrange error in any of these processes.

Moreover, the telecommunications technology explosion threatens constantly to leave Navy Intelligence in a "state-of-decline" vice "state-of-the-art" situation. The life cycle of information technology is increasingly shortened. Information technology is also getting cheaper. Rapid and less costly technological advances, coupled with increased technology availability, play into the hands of those who threaten US national security and international stability. The pressure on Navy Intelligence to maintain its technological and human resources competitiveness is increasing.

Finally, new and expanded missions represent a real opportunity for Navy Intelligence to grow beyond Cold War-era tasks and to address a wider range of national concerns and interests. This challenge of new missions is welcomed by many NIOs. Notwithstanding the change of focus, exacting preparation of the NIO for any potential mission remains critical, lest the mission be poorly accomplished.

The tasks and missions of the US military intelligence community are broadly stated in the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy (NMS) publications.<sup>(28)</sup> Prepared annually for Congress, these documents outline key Executive Branch and Department of Defense national security goals and interests. Moreover, these documents provide a linkage between the security goals and interests of the President and the Chairman and the tasks and missions of the Department of the Navy and Navy Intelligence. Identified therein, in support of two key national objectives--enhancing security and promoting stability--the traditional Navy Intelligence missions which have withstood the test of time include:

a - support to national deterrence and national intelligence objectives;

b - support to expeditionary warfare, sea control, special operations, strike warfare, and anti-submarine warfare;

c - support to the acquisition process.

Since the demise of Soviet state-sponsored communism, fewer Defense resources are committed to the support of Cold War-era tasks. This created an opportunity for Navy Intelligence to undertake emerging and non-traditional missions, as outlined in the NSS and NMS:

a - combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction;

b - supporting sanctions and embargo enforcement;

c - identifying alien smuggling operations;

d - assisting international counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and anti-piracy efforts;

e - assisting fisheries protection and environmental monitoring;

f - assisting humanitarian relief operations;

g - supporting United Nations (UN) coalition warfare;

h - information warfare.

Doctrine supporting the military intelligence and missions described above is promulgated in Joint Publication 2-0 and Naval Doctrine Publication 2.

With the shift in national and service priorities away from Soviet-era objectives and roles, and toward global, multi-service, multi-nation cooperation and engagement, jointness has become the most appropriate term to describe the collectivization process of the four US military services' and the Coast Guard's efforts and strategies. Jointness ensures that each of the services and the Coast Guard will survive--intact--with a viable, shared mission well into the 21st century.

Navy Intelligence, too, has embraced the collectivization process; it has fully adjusted to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, by reinventing, reorganizing, and reshaping itself, and it continues to adjust to the realities of a changing world: declining Defense resources, the telecommunications technology explosion, and emerging and non-traditional missions. However, there are dangers associated with the adjustment to jointness and to a rapidly changing world.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on primary NIO education and training programs at the Navy and

Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), and the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific (FITCPAC). This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the Navy and Marine Corps War Colleges, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Defense Language Institute (DLI) foreign language training, and the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC). Specialized tactical intelligence training taught at Navy warfare centers, such as the Expeditionary Warfare Training Center and cepts that help the NIO develop a clearer understanding of national interests ad goals and, consequently, help the NIO accomplish emerging and non-traditional missions.

**NMITC.** The mission of NMITC is to provide quality education and training to Navy, Marine Corps, and other personnel in basic and advanced intelligence methodologies and applications in support of national interests.<sup>(29)</sup> NMITC further provides Atlantic Fleet operating forces with theater unique training.<sup>(30)</sup>

In 1995, NMITC offered over 55 intelligence education and training courses to Defense personnel. Curricula analysis revealed that 17 courses (31 percent), ranging from 5 to 151 training days in length, provided key basic through advanced intelligence training to active duty Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officers. Appendix A provides an overview of the 17 intelligence officer training courses.<sup>(31)</sup>

Instruction for the 17 courses was organized into the following general category areas: Operational Intelligence, Marine Corps Amphibious Operations Intelligence, Automated Intelligence Systems, Counterintelligence, and Counterdrugs and Counterterrorism. Analysis further revealed that 11 of 17 courses (64 percent) included training in naval warfare issues, such as direct combat support and weapons analysis; 15 of 17 courses (88 percent) included training in automated intelligence processing systems; and, 11 of 17 courses (64 percent) included some training associated with intelligence support to emerging and non-traditional naval intelligence missions, such as peacekeeping, information warfare, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation. Except for automated intelligence processing systems courses, most training courses covered at least two of three training areas: warfare, processing systems, or emerging and non-traditional naval missions. The preponderance of NMITC's officer training efforts, except for entry-level courses, are designed to hone the intelligence officer's skills at operating automated intelligence systems in the production of military intelligence.

To bring the NMITC training issue into sharper focus, the primary intelligence officer courses that touch on emerging and non-traditional naval missions are the 31-week Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC), the 14-week Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Officer Course (MAGTF IOC), and the 10-day Naval Intelligence Mid-Career Course (NIMCC).

In the NIOBC, emerging and non-traditional naval mission concepts are not well represented. Navy students are taught mostly basic Navy Intelligence skills. In the sixth week, there is a 10-day block of basic instruction on current geopolitical (GEOPOL) issues. However, students spend most of the 10-day period researching and presenting foreign area briefings to their colleagues.

In the MAGTF IOC, Marine Corps officers are taught basic combmbatant Evacuation Operations (NEO),

and special operations. Emerging and non-traditional naval mission concepts are well represented.

In the NIMCC, students submit a five-page essay on the subject of their choice and participate in short seminar discussions. Guest speakers touch on a wide range of national and military intelligence issues, including Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) requirements, and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Emerging and non-traditional naval mission concepts are well represented.

**Interviews.** During NMITC on-site interviews, spokespersons provided detailed information on the training center and its instructional activities for naval officers.<sup>(32)</sup> Central to these discussions were four topics: (1) fleet feedback on the effectiveness of NIOs, (2) current Navy Intelligence community focus, (3) NMITC training, and (4) internal reviews. The following summarizes NMITC interview findings.

**Fleet Feedback:** Navy warfighter feedback is subjective and unreliable. Therefore, the Navy Intelligence training community chooses to address its own problems and correct shortfalls. Self-help is the way to go.

**Community Focus:** There is plenty of money available for current and future automated intelligence processing systems training. NIO's concerns about emerging and non-traditional missions receive lip service at the ONI--but concerns are not backed up with training dollars.

**NMITC Training:** NMITC's training programs are closely monitored by the ONI and coordinated with the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET); NMITC's training programs have never been the subject of an Inspector General (IG) review and no outside auditing agency, such as the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), has conducted a study of NMITC for the purpose of determining training program effectiveness; direct combat support training lags behind battlespace realities; analytical training is not a priority. NMITC officer instructors are top quality people. However, not all instructors have experienced an operational tour or a joint tour. NMITC provides an Intelligence Chair for a senior faculty representative; and, NMITC has begun periodic Cryptologic and Intelligence Training Requirements Review (CRITRR) processes.<sup>(33)</sup> My follow-up questions on the CRITRR processes elicited considerable discussion (see below).

**Internal Reviews.** The purpose of the CRITRR is to provide a systematic review process to ensure that cryptologic and intelligence training is reviewed by Navy and Marine Corps command representatives on a continuing basis. Central to the CRITRR process is participation by fleet representatives, in concert with school staff, to facilitate review of existing curricula and focus on needed improvements. Each CRITRR is preceded by a fleet data call which requests point paper inputs to identify training concerns and shortfalls in specific areas. Typically, a data call produces recommendations to update systems training and direct combat support training, clarify existing techniques and procedures, or improve administrative procedures.<sup>(34)</sup>

At the 5-9 June 1995 CRITRR conference, five core NIO training courses were reviewed by Navy

Intelligence and CNET representatives.<sup>(35)</sup> CRITRR findings and recommendations were then forwarded to the ONI for evaluation.<sup>(36)</sup> I extracted the following essential elements of information on the effectiveness of NMITC's officer training programs from the CRITRR pre-conference report:

- (1) Training Directorate officer instructor billet manning is at 96.7 per cent, with 30 of 31 slots filled;
- (2) Core courses are manned at 88.8 percent, with 8 of 9 officer instructor slots filled;
- (3) Basic Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officer student training throughput and iterations for academic year (AY) 1993: 99 and 5; for AY 1994: 91 and 5; projected for AY 1995: 74 and 4; projected for AY 1996: 124 and 6;
- (4) Projected accessions for AY 1995: 22 new Navy Ensigns, 21 prior service Ensigns, 20 lateral transfer officers, 7 new Marine Corps Second Lieutenants, and 4 officers from unidentified accession sources;
- (5) Commissioning sources for AY 1995: 31 from Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps; 14 from the US Naval Academy; 4 from the Naval Aviation Officer Candidate School and the Naval Officer Candidate School; and 25 from the Navy's enlisted commissioning program;
- (6) Student destinations for AY 1995: 20 to Navy and Marine Corps air squadrons; 5 to Navy ships; 9 to air wing staffs; and 4 to unidentified commands.<sup>(37)</sup>

**Analysis.** From the combined NMITC data I determined the following:

- (1) NMITC does an excellent job of teaching basic intelligence skills to naval officers. However, NMITC does a poor job of educating NIOs on emerging and non-traditional naval missions; Marine Corps officers fare somewhat better in their courses;
- (2) Dialogue between NMITC and the Navy warfighting communities is poor;
- (3) Training dollar priorities are focused on systems training vice analytical and emerging missions training;
- (4) Navy Intelligence internal review processes are vigorous; the CRITRR processes are significant because, if wisely managed, they have the potential to be dynamic forces for program reinforcement and change; however, a review by an external source should be conducted to augment the CRITRR and provide greater objectivity.
- (5) The broad spectrum of officer commissioning sources, and the experiences of prior-service and lateral transfer students, enrich the learning environment; moreover, naval intelligence community diversity is enhanced after student graduation;

(6) Most intelligence officer graduates--both men and women--transfer directly to operational or deployable tactical units to gain their first on-the-job experiences.

**FITCPAC.** Using the most current curriculum and latest technology, FITCPAC training builds on NMITC's basic programs and trains Pacific Fleet operating forces in the advanced application of tactical intelligence. FITCPAC also serves as a focal point for theater intelligence support, providing connectivity and access to information, systems, and resources.<sup>(38)</sup>

In 1995, FITCPAC offered over 19 intelligence education and training courses to Defense personnel. Curricula analysis revealed that six courses, ranging from 5-13 training days in length, provided introductory and advanced training to active duty Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officers. Instruction was organized into the following category areas: Operational Intelligence, Marine Corps Amphibious Operations Intelligence, Automated Intelligence Systems, and Cryptologic Training. Further analysis revealed that 4 of 6 courses (66 percent) included training in naval warfare issues, such as direct combat support and weapons analysis; 6 of 6 courses (100 percent) included training in automated intelligence processing systems; and 4 of 6 courses (66 percent) included some training associated with emerging and non-traditional naval intelligence missions, such as information warfare, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation. Except for automated intelligence processing systems courses, most training courses covered at least 2 of 3 training areas: warfare, processing systems, or emerging and non-traditional naval missions.<sup>(39)</sup> Appendix B provides an overview of the six FITCPAC officer training courses.

**Interview.** FITCPAC, as the ONI-designated executive agent, is in the process of developing a 10-day advanced training course, the Naval Intelligence Professionals Advanced Course (NIPAC), to fill a perceived training gap for senior Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officers. In an interview with the Commander, FITCPAC, it was reported that the focus of NIPAC will be on the "**management of intelligence afloat and preparing officers for a return to sea duty in any theater of operations.**"<sup>(40)</sup> Currently in the concept phase, the course may include instruction in naval doctrine, afloat staff coordination, Navy and Marine Corps combat organizations, intelligence officer roles, leadership, joint operations, maritime and expeditionary warfare, warfighter intelligence support, allied partnerships, law of the sea, media relations, military intelligence systems architecture, operational intelligence (OPINTEL), emerging missions, national intelligence and diplomatic agencies, and fleet lessons learned. The ONI approved the NIPAC concept on 31 July 1995.<sup>(41)</sup> The course will be developed around three cornerstone strategies: national policy, joint warfare, and naval warfare. Following DNI final approval, the course could be ready for its first class at NMITC in late 1996.

**Analysis.** From the FITCPAC data I determined the following:

(1) FITCPAC provides excellent, but limited, waterfront training opportunities for Pacific Fleet Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officers located near San Diego, CA; training is satisfactory in meeting tactical intelligence processing and production requirements.

(2) Due to the very short duration of courses, FITCPAC is assessed as doing a poor job of educating Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officers on emerging and non-traditional naval missions.

(3) Most FITCPAC training is refresher-type training; officer training program growth is unlikely.

(4) When finally approved, the NIPAC course under development at FITCPAC will be taught at NMITC, possibly augmenting or replacing the NIMCC course. The NIPAC course could begin to fill a critical gap in Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officer advanced training. However, I remain skeptical that long-term, effective learning can be accomplished with two weeks of seminar-style instruction. The proposed NIPAC training concept is far too hasty and it will not get the job done.

**Service Colleges, War Colleges, and Graduate Programs.** NIOs get some extra professional intelligence education and training at the service colleges, but not much. However, those NIOs sent to the NPS and the JMIC fair much better. In AY 1995, the Navy Intelligence Community Manager sent 22 senior NIOs (Lieutenant Commanders, Commanders, and Captains) to the service colleges: 15 to service Command and Staff Colleges; 7 to service War Colleges.<sup>(42)</sup> The Navy Intelligence Community Manager sent 12 junior NIOs (Ensigns, Lieutenants junior grade, and Lieutenants) to Defense graduate-level schools: 10 officers went to the NPS,<sup>(43)</sup> the Navy's premier technical education institution, and two officers went to the JMIC.<sup>(44)</sup>

At the service Command and Staff Colleges, senior NIOs received brief exposure to military intelligence concepts: primarily in Theory, Operational Level of War, and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) curricula. Practical application of limited intelligence concepts was conducted in training exercises with a focus on staff coordination. Through MOOTW curricula, students received excellent opportunities to learn about emerging and non-traditional naval missions. At the service War Colleges, senior NIOs received limited exposure to intelligence concepts: primarily through the study of applied strategic intelligence and decisionmaking processes. At Command and Staff Colleges and War Colleges, intelligence artform education and training is inadequate, and emerging naval intelligence missions are examined peripherally.<sup>(45)</sup>

Junior NIOs attending NPS were enrolled in one of three high quality intelligence education programs: Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Operational Intelligence, and Regional Studies. Five NIOs were enrolled in the Regional Studies program and were required to enroll in additional foreign language studies at the DLI at the conclusion of their Master's degree program. In AY 1995, NIOs at DLI learned Korean, Farsi, Gulf Arabic, German, and Mandarin Chinese. In AY 1994, NIOs learned Arabic, Portuguese, French, and Japanese.<sup>(46)</sup>

The five NIOs enrolled in the rigorous 18-24 month NPS Regional Studies program will experience an outstanding opportunity to become foreign area experts, learn about emerging and non-traditional naval missions, and develop sophisticated analytical skills. Their Regional Studies education is greatly complemented by a foreign language proficiency.

The JMIC awards a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree to qualified Defense personnel. In this regard, the JMIC offers an outstanding joint military educational opportunity to junior NIOs. However, due to competing personnel needs, the Navy Intelligence community was able to fill only two JMIC student quotas for AY 1995.<sup>(47)</sup> Recently, the DNI has directed increased matriculation into Navy-funded graduate-level programs despite continued imbalances between available NIOs and operational billets. For AY 1996, NIOs attending NPS will increase from 10 to 13 students; NIOs attending JMIC will increase from 2 to 3 students.<sup>(48)</sup>

**Analysis.** From the above data I determined the following:

(1) Achievement of high quality NPS and JMIC advanced degrees is an outstanding accomplishment; however, the opportunity is limited to too few junior NIOs;

(2) The DNI's recent initiatives to increase NIO graduate-level throughput at premier military institutions will produce additional Master's degree graduates; this is a big step in the right direction--an increase in emphasis on long-term education vice perishable short-term training; however, this effort does not address the shortfall in professional education at the senior officer level.

(3) The 15 NIOs who graduate from the service colleges at the conclusion of AY 1995 have an opportunity to gain quality graduate-level educations in general military studies and fulfill major Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements simultaneously. Because of the colleges' focus on service and joint staff support, these NIOs will be well prepared to provide immediate help at the senior staff level for component and joint force commanders.

**Summary.** The Navy Intelligence community continues to pay a top price--in terms of people, time, and dollars--to prepare its officers for a world increasingly dominated by complex challenges. Success in education and training is being achieved at all levels; but, there is still a long way to go and much hard work to be done.

The CRITRR process is the best near-term hope for highlighting and solving key Navy Intelligence community issues and problems. Furthermore, the CRITRR is a valuable ONI management tool that can assist community managers in determining if a training program is in step with national- and service-level missions and tasks, or if it is appropriate doctrinally. The CRITRR will help maneuver the Navy Intelligence community through difficult challenges and on into the 21st century.

Despite steady Navy Intelligence education and, graduate-level professional education. These officers are in danger of being left behind, professionally, as the Navy moves swiftly into the future. Most intelligence education and training remains short in duration, leading to highly perishable skills. Many NIOs are at risk professionally, armed only with basic intelligence education and training skills, as Navy Intelligence maneuvers to address emerging and non-traditional mission support requirements.

The above analysis permits the following overall conclusions on current NIO education and training:

- (1) Navy Intelligence education and training centers are satisfactorily training NIOs to meet the support requirements for traditional missions--a, b, & c--as outlined earlier in this chapter.
- (2) Navy Intelligence education and training centers are satisfactorily training NIOs to meet the support requirements for emerging and non-traditional missions--a, d, and h.
- (3) Navy Intelligence education and training centers marginalize emerging and non-traditional missions--b, c, e, f, and g.
- (4) Navy Intelligence education and training for emerging and non-traditional missions is best accomplished by NPS and JMIC;
- (5) fleet waterfront training is crisis-driven;
- (6) education and training availability is cyclic;
- (7) education and training is expensive;
- (8) some instructors are not fully qualified;
- (9) training is basic- to basic-plus, not deluxe;
- (10) advanced education and training opportunities, in particular the high quality programs at NPS and JMIC, are not available to all NIOs;
- (11) basic intelligence education and training priorities change very slowly;
- (12) a vigorous internal review process, the CRITRR, is available to identify and offer solutions to the above education and training shortfalls.

Despite its conspicuous problems, Navy Intelligence education and training has come very far since the 1940s. Appendix C provides a side-by-side comparison of NMITC's current 31-week Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC)<sup>(49)</sup> and the 1945-era 10-week Basic Naval Intelligence Officer Training Course formerly taught at the Advanced Naval Intelligence School (ANIS).<sup>(50)</sup> The greatest differences in the current NMITC and FITCPAC programs, when compared to the vintage ANIS program, is the significantly increased instruction necessary to educate and train today's Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officers for complex warfare systems, automated data processing systems, briefing techniques, and for direct mission support. The greatest similarities between present and former training programs is the continued focus on tactical-level warfare. Currently, no curriculum at NMITC or FITCPAC is devoted to general warfare theories or to the concepts of the strategic and operational levels of war--theories and concepts which can be considered as cornerstones to a solid Navy Intelligence

education and training program.

## CHAPTER 4

### NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE

**He ... said unto them in his doctrine, hearken.**

**Mark IV, 2.**

Naval intelligence doctrine describes the ways naval intelligence supports military planning for routine peacetime operations, operations other than war, and combat.<sup>(51)</sup> Unless the Navy Intelligence Officer (NIO) understands Naval intelligence doctrine clearly, he will find himself unable to think, plan, and lead effectively or even understand supporting operations, whether Navy, joint, or multinational.<sup>(52)</sup> Moreover, without a basic understanding of Naval intelligence doctrine, the NIO will be unable to contribute effectively to the overall intelligence support effort. And, finally, even when doctrine is in place, if it is not fully supported by leadership, then it is not of much use to anyone.

This chapter will examine whether or not Navy Intelligence supports doctrine and adheres to it for NIO education and training. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, my analysis of past education and training trends and practices calls into question the degree to which Navy Intelligence has understood and applied doctrinal principles to the professional development of NIOs. Only recently has Navy Intelligence developed methodologies--starting with the Cryptologic and Intelligence Training Requirements Review (CRITRR) processes--to assess the effectiveness of its education and training programs to support naval warfighter requirements and meet doctrinal objectives.

Describing the aim of US military doctrine broadly, its purpose is to provide an overarching philosophy that governs the activity and performance of the US Armed Forces. Doctrine also provides guidance for the exercise of authority in the conduct of operations, training, and the preparation of appropriate plans. US military doctrine provides considerable leeway in the organization of forces and execution of the missions in a manner most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.<sup>(53)</sup>

Official doctrine is somewhat new for the Navy Intelligence community. One hundred and twelve years after the establishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882, the Navy published its first official intelligence doctrine, Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP 2), on 1 October 1994. However, this is not to say that Navy Intelligence functioned for 112 years without enduring professional themes and principles available to guide its development and application. Quite the opposite is true. Throughout this period, an extensive Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) series served as guidepost precepts for the arts and sciences of Navy maritime warfare. The NWP series was, in effect, naval doctrine even though it was not labeled as such.

On the whole, the NWP series represented the independent character of the Navy--the way it went about its daily business: informal, traditional, and scattered around the globe. Furthermore, the NWP series was an extremely complex and serious effort that captured how the Navy thought about warfare, and how it might perform in combat. The NWP 12 series of publications described the distinctive characteristics, capabilities, and missions of Navy Intelligence. These publications provided the framework for Navy Intelligence tasks which lead to the development and employment of an extensive inventory of intelligence support concepts and tools specifically designed and tailored to support the warfighting commander at sea.<sup>(54)</sup> Included in this inventory of principles was the requirement to prepare the NIO to support naval warfighting.

Despite the above assessment of the NWP 12 series, it is also my judgment based on analysis of past Navy Intelligence education and training activities--that Naval intelligence doctrine per se was misunderstood or, more likely, ignored as an expedient to the processes of serving Fleet Commanders in a "steady as she goes" direct support role. One ought to keep in mind the primary goal of US national security from 1945 to 1990: to contain the spread of communism. It is easy to understand how stacks of boring Navy doctrine could be set aside in such an environment. The problem of communist containment was complex, but the US military's focus was singular. The US Navy en masse was mostly focused on that one threat. Under those mostly unchanging circumstances, the Navy could afford to let dust settle on its doctrinal principles.

During the Cold War, the primary focus of Navy Intelligence was support to the nation's Maritime Strategy: checkmating Soviet ambitions.<sup>(55)</sup> Navy Intelligence combated superpower maritime nuclear threats, analyzed regional maritime security challenges, and provided direct tactical and operational intelligence support to deployed Navy forces. As an enabler, Navy Intelligence provided the vital intelligence that ensured the commander was well advised and could fight and win all battles and campaigns. The preponderance of specialized institutional education and training received by the NIO during the Cold War reflected the nature of the threat to the nation and the mission of the Navy: containing superpower aggression while keeping vital maritime lines of communication open.

Slowly, after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and the consequent stripping of the Navy's independence and consolidation of service power in the hands of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, changes in the roles and missions of the Navy began to occur. This process was accelerated through necessity by the Bush and Clinton Administrations as the Soviet threat faded, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) validated base force cuts, and fiscal restraints at home demanded a leaner and more efficient military. When Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, the Navy Intelligence community had barely started to think joint. By the time the Gulf War ended, in early 1991, the Navy's Maritime Strategy had been recast with a bright purple glint.<sup>(56)</sup> From that point onward, the Navy was forced to come to grips with its long-standing inattention to doctrine.

NDP 2 is not dogma--a set of rigidly imposed teachings to be followed blindly. Rather, it is an assemblage of important principles and goals--a framework of easily understood ideas and desired end

states--that can be used by the NIO to shape the mission. NDP 2 describes a way of thinking, a philosophy. It is specifically designed to provide the NIO a freedom of judgment and individual initiative needed to accomplish the mission under a variety of circumstances. For this reason, NDP 2 does not provide answers to "how to?" questions. There are no outlines for procedures found in its pages. This would also explain how doctrine might have been ignored in the past. If the purpose of doctrine was misunderstood, that is, if NIOs expected it to answer procedural questions, which it could not, then it would be cast aside.

NDP 2 articulates Navy and Marine Corps intelligence doctrine and provides the foundation for the development of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)--including education, training, and readiness--that naval intelligence uses throughout the spectrum of peace, war, and operations other than war.<sup>(57)</sup> The doctrine reflects all the themes of jointness, deployability, and flexibility necessary for success throughout the battlespace. Looking to the future, NDP 2 is shaping naval intelligence organizations, training curricula, new sensors, processors and communications, and personnel structures for optimizing joint and combined operations. NDP 2 frames the essence of naval intelligence officer training and readiness as follows:

**To remain ahead of the challenges associated with geopolitical upheavals, socioeconomic crises, and rapid technological innovation, naval intelligence personnel must receive comprehensive and specialized training. Intelligence training should be updated continuously, reflecting tomorrow's challenges. Basic, intermediate, and advanced training...should include non- institutional methods--such as on-the-job training--and should develop well-rounded, career-oriented professionals who will have credibility within the intelligence and cryptologic communities, the Naval Service, and external agencies and organizations. Training underpins broad professional experience. Personnel rotation policies and deployment cycles must enable intelligence personnel to maintain career paths that provide them experience in naval, joint, and multinational operations. Of particular concern is adequate foreign-area and language expertise. Operations in littoral regions of the world create unprecedented specialized language requirements, thus adequate language training should be made available. Foreign language proficiency, especially in languages not commonly studied, must be emphasized continually in training programs.**<sup>(58)</sup>

Moreover, NDP 2 captures all the enduring principles found in Joint Doctrine Publication 2-0, including the education and training of intelligence personnel, and applies them directly to naval operations.<sup>(59)</sup>

Keeping pace with rapid technological changes and emerging opportunities is key to the future of Navy Intelligence. Naval intelligence doctrinal developments include publication of NDP 2-01 by the Naval Doctrine Command, sometime in early 1996. NDP 2-01 will assist the Navy and Marine Corps in developing and teaching specific naval intelligence skills compatible with joint warfighting architectures, regardless of geographic Area of Responsibility (AOR) or Unified Command subordination. Additional developments include continual updates to existing joint doctrine and assisting in the development of new joint TTPs for: Intelligence Support to Targeting and National Support to Joint Operations.<sup>(60)</sup>

Based on my assessment of current and combined Navy Intelligence and Naval Doctrine Command efforts to develop, update, and promote cohesive doctrinal concepts, I conclude that intelligence doctrine is not being ignored by senior NIOs. Navy Intelligence leadership believes firmly in the value of good doctrine and supports it solidly. Leadership further supports efforts to inculcate all ranks with the fundamental intelligence principles spelled out in NDP 2. This effort is being accomplished formally and informally at learning institutions and at the command level. Proof of the effect of intelligence doctrine on leadership lies in the leadership's efforts to bring intelligence education and training up to speed to meet new mission challenges. This last effort is being addressed through the CRITRR process, as discussed in Chapter 3.

**Summary.** Tremendous efforts are underway to standardize naval doctrine so that it strengthens the professional aspects of the naval intelligence specialist but does not diminish the freedom of judgment and individual initiative. NDP 2 should be read fully and digested by all NIOs, as it represents the first of several new keystone and capstone doctrinal naval publications--consistent in content and compatible in form--that will constitute basic tools and standards for NIOs as they perform increasingly in joint service and multinational environments.

Navy Intelligence is getting its act together doctrinally. NDP 2 is in place and more doctrine is on the way. Moreover, doctrine is supported by leadership. The CRITRR--a continuous effort to address doctrinal education and training standards and principles--is proof that Naval intelligence doctrine is working.

## CHAPTER 5

### NAVY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT

The Navy Intelligence community Senior Assignment Manager, or Senior Detailer, plays a key part in facilitating senior Navy Intelligence Officer (NIO) career development processes. In this regard, the NIO detailing process is well managed and inherently fair, despite uncertain funding. Solid performance on the part of the NIO in tough duty assignments is critical to the NIO-Senior Detailer interface. This relationship affects promotion processes, duty assignments, and the development of education and training opportunities. The Director for Naval Intelligence (DNI) assists the Senior Assignment Manager and provides experienced oversight to the NIO detailing process. While the Senior Assignment Manager and the DNI play key parts, the burden of accountability in determining challenging and rewarding opportunities for career development processes falls mostly on the NIO's shoulders: The most outstanding career management processes cannot overcome poor NIO performance.

The essence of this chapter is based on an interview between the Senior Assignment Manager and the author, and an analysis of interview findings.<sup>(61)</sup> Interview questions are provided at Appendix D. In this chapter, I will examine the NIO management process, focusing on the supportive roles the Senior Assignment Manager and DNI play in filling various billets with qualified senior NIOs, and determine if these processes meet the needs of the Navy and the NIO. Each subtitle is followed by a brief analysis

which integrates key findings into this paper's thesis.

**The Role of the Senior Assignment Manager in Facilitating Senior NIO Career Development.** The role of the Senior Assignment Manager is to represent the individual senior NIO. The mission of the Senior Assignment Manager demands the best in judgment, negotiating skill, and timing to simultaneously satisfy the needs of the Navy and the individual officer. It is the duty of the Senior Assignment Manager to meet current NIO personnel requirements, in terms of both quality and quantity, and to ensure that the career needs and personal interests of each officer are served fairly. Moreover, individual officers must also be provided with a meaningful professional career development path designed to encourage retention and advancement. The mission of the Senior Assignment Manager can be summed up this way: to assign the most qualified NIOs to meet the needs of the Navy; to assign NIOs to billets which develop their professional expertise and which allows them to acquire the leadership, technical, and managerial skills necessary to achieve the mission of the Navy; and, to assign officers fairly to ensure continued professional motivation and dedication to the Navy.<sup>(62)</sup>

**Analysis.** Vital to the job-filling mission of the Senior Assignment Manager is the requirement to manage. This effort is being done well, within numerous bureaucratic limitations.

A measure of effectiveness for the Senior Assignment Manager is managing selection of the most qualified and available senior NIO for a certain duty billet. Qualification and availability factors are objectively interpreted by managers involved in the process. At the senior officer level, most NIOs have developed sufficient leadership, technical, and managerial skills to qualify for just about any Navy Intelligence billet. However, NIOs serving in joint billets, now 41 percent of the Navy Intelligence community, are not available for immediate reassignment anywhere. Likewise, officers serving in sea billets are usually not available for immediate reassignment ashore. Therefore, job qualification and officer availability are not driven by seemingly arbitrary factors. Opportunities for professional development are continually balanced against rules, obligations, and priority needs.

**Processes for Senior NIO Assignment to an Afloat Billet.** Senior NIOs performing duties in afloat billets are the most valued forward-deployed resources of the Navy Intelligence community. Each senior NIO assigned to an afloat billet represents a synergistically rigorous preparation: at least 10-20 years of professional education and training, arduous sea duty, and varied personal military experience. Prior to senior-level sea duty assignment, an NIO must have demonstrated consistent and outstanding professional ability and expertise in the performance of all duties.

Because of the importance of each NIO in an afloat billet relative to a theater of military operations, and an NIO's potential ability to impact directly--with great consequence, both positively and negatively--on intelligence support to the commander, the Senior Assignment Manager reviews qualified ofnd names are matched up with sea duty billets, the tentative NIO and billetassignment list is formally proposed and discussed in detail with the DNI, who, in his capacity as true senior assignment manager, reviews NIO records and provides final approval of qualified senior NIOs for assignment to specific sea duty billets.

The DNI's involvement in the senior NIO detailing process does not require firsthand or personal knowledge of the prospect. The prospect's Fitness Report, as a rule, is sufficient for the DNI to form an impression of an officer's capacity for excellence.<sup>(63)</sup> Because of the historically close working relationship between the Navy Intelligence and naval warfighting communities, the importance of the DNI's participation in senior NIO assignment processes cannot be overstated.

**Analysis.** The level of DNI participation with the Senior Assignment Manager in determining senior NIO afloat assignments is not appreciated fully by NIOs; the DNI's participation is vital and necessary. As community liaison officer, the DNI provides a direct link between the Navy Intelligence community and the Commanders in determining afloat billet requirements. Moreover, acting as an umpire, the DNI judges performance history, determines potential for excellence at sea, evaluates a prospective officer's education and training, weighs personality issues, and balances competing community needs. The DNI's final approval on a senior NIO's assignment to an afloat billet ensures the integrity of the Navy Intelligence community at sea is preserved and that commander confidence in Navy Intelligence is sustained. Oversight by the DNI is required to ensure that top-quality officers are placed in challenging afloat billets.

It is important to recall my previous remarks in this respect, on an NIO's ability to impact directly--with great consequence, both positively and negatively--on intelligence support to the commander. The DNI is cognizant of sea duty's demands on deployed officers. The combined efforts of the DNI and the Senior Assignment Manager are appropriate for determining an officer's potential for success at sea.

**Processes for Senior NIO Assignment to a Joint Billet.** For Unified Command assignment, or joint duty, the DNI acts in the capacity of community coordinator and arbitrator as opposed to final approving authority. The Unified Command's Director of Intelligence (J2), coordinating with his Commander in Chief (CinC), wields final approval authority over senior Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officer nominations to fill for afloat billets, a senior NIO nominated by the DNI to a joint duty billet is often required to be a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO).<sup>(64)</sup>

**Analysis.** The NIO assignment process is adequate and meets the needs of the service and Joint Forces Commanders (JFCs). However, this process works to the detriment of Navy Intelligence. Due to the enhanced authority of the Unified Commanders, because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the ability of the DNI to manage NIOs is diminished. As noted, 41 percent of NIOs are serving in joint billets, and NIOs in joint billets are locked into those assignments for up to 36 months. Also, the Navy Intelligence community has 130 more NIO billets than active duty NIOs. Combined, these factors can create problems for commands in need of intelligence support.

As for the JSO requirement, an officer's competency in joint matters is critical. Broad-based training, knowledge, and experience in joint issues improves a NIO's performance in joint duty assignments.

**Processes for Senior NIO Assignment to the US Marine Corps.** Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officers have different career paths. However, the two services do not have fundamentally different

intelligence requirements. Matching and filling cross-service billet assignments requires the Senior Assignment Manager to identify candidates and to conduct interservice staff coordination. Like the Navy, intelligence requirements at the Marine Corps senior officer level are focused on intelligence production and resource management.

Assignment of senior NIOs to staff intelligence billets in the Marine Corps is a concept undergoing evaluation. Prior experience at a Marine Corps organization does not automatically qualify a NIO for a Marine Corps senior staff intelligence assignment. Other Senior Assignment Manager considerations include Navy Intelligence community priorities, officer availability, career development needs, training requirements, duty preferences, billet rotation timing, reciprocal Marine Corps Intelligence Officer swaps, and permanent change of station (PCS) costs.<sup>(65)</sup>

**Analysis.** The senior Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Officer exchange program will not evolve beyond its current scope unless a significant Navy Intelligence community training commitment is specifically aimed at developing long-term NIO expertise in Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operational-level maneuver warfare concepts. Presently, the Navy does not provide NIOs with the preparation necessary to provide MAGTF intelligence support.

In an interview with the Commander, 1st Marine Division, I informed the Brigadier General that a NIO was recently assigned to a Marine Corps G-2 staff billet, II MEF, Camp Lejeune. He stated that if a NIO was sent to 1st Marine Division, his chief concerns would be required training for the Navy officer. He expects all newly-assigned Marine Corps staff officers to arrive at the 1st Marine Division ready to deploy and fight in amphibious and land operations. He makes no exceptions for Navy officers.<sup>(66)</sup>

**Key Biographic Factors in Assignment Processes.** The following biographic factors, in priority order, were identified as key determinants for sustained career success and for gaining challenging opportunities and assignments:

- (1) Performance: An NIO's prior performance in a demanding billet is the Senior Assignment Manager's foremost consideration during the assignment process. The better the NIO's performance, the more competitive the NIO is for subsequent assignment to demanding billets.
- (2) Experience: When experience is associated with performance values, it can be a critical consideration in the assignment process. When experience is associated with time-in-service and time-in-grade values, it has limited utility.
- (3) Education and training: Professional education and training is vital, but it must be balanced with priority Navy needs.<sup>(67)</sup> Civilian education, while reflecting high personal achievement, is inconsequential in the assignment process.
- (4) Personality: The DNI has the option of casting a yes-no vote on all senior NIO billeting assignments. The intangibles--personal knowledge of an NIO's performance and confidence in the NIO's ability--are

non-quantifiable and non-reportable elements of consideration. The DNI's close scrutiny of personal record files, biographic data, and face-to-face interviews can be major sub-elements of the selection process, particularly for those billets on major military staffs.

**Analysis.** The NIO has complete control over the application and outcome of the biographic factors. Here, the burden of accountability in determining challenging and rewarding opportunities for future career development processes falls squarely on the NIO's shoulders. The most outstanding career management processes cannot overcome poor NIO performance, a lack of experience, poor professional preparation, and difficult personality traits.

With regard to education and training, it is wrong to undervalue civilian education in the preparation of the NIO. Civilian education can be a tremendous factor in the professionalization process. Civilian education must be judged by what it does for the NIO and the Navy. Civilian education adds solid value to the Navy Intelligence community at no cost to the Navy.

**Weaknesses in the NIO Assignment Process.** Several concerns were identified: (1) the Senior Assignment Manager must manage billets and assignments within established laws, regulations, and policies; (2) some NIOs fail to maintain communication with the Senior Assignment Manager; and (3) persistent funding shortages do not allow the Navy Intelligence community to maximize NIO development opportunities, that is, NIO preparation.

**Analysis.** First, the Senior Assignment Manager's office is provided considerable leeway in managing NIO assignments within certain limitations. Laws, regulations, and policies governing assignment processes are dare not arbitrary. Second, it is the responsibility of the NIO to provide and maintain correspondence with the Senior Assignment Manager and advise the manager of any special circumstances; NIO needs cannot be met unless those needs are communicated. And finally, examples of missed opportunities related to funding shortages include: (1) involuntary tour of duty extensions, and (2) consecutive tours of duty in a fixed geographic area. Restriction of opportune assignments is mostly caused by increasing Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moving costs.<sup>(68)</sup> Here, a lack of NIO preparation for future assignments can be directly traced to funding shortfalls. Budget concerns associated with the high cost of family moves continue to handicap training and educational opportunities. The issue of costs is becoming more acute as Defense budgets continue to shrink and managers are forced to be more creative with fewer PCS dollars.

**Improving NIO Management Processes.** First, the Senior Assignment Manager must follow all laws, regulations, and policies--waivers are rare. However, if laws, regulations, and policies are interfering with the effectiveness of the NIO, if they impede rather than support, then those factors must be documented and brought to the attention of the senior-level chain of command. Second, improved communication between the NIO and the Senior Assignment Manager's office can resolve issues before they become intractable problems. Pro-active NIOs are less likely to experience difficulties with career management processes. And finally, increased PCS funding is needed. Moving people is expensive. Under-funded budgets freeze valuable people in place and seriously reduce the long-term effectiveness of

the Navy Intelligence community. Persistent PCS funding shortages continue to inhibit the Senior Assignment Manager's ability to maximize a career officer's potential and put the best qualified officer--vice the best available officer--in a billet; because of this, both the NIO and the Navy Intelligence community are shortchanged.

**Summary.** Top-performing NIOs, armed with the best education and technology, and supported by strong management and funding--a consistent leadership challenge--will drive Navy Intelligence to long-term success. However, standing in the way of long-term success is a Navy Intelligence community trend toward adopting emerging and non-traditional missions without sufficient NIO preparation. A shortage of highly qualified NIOs, historically traced to competing demands for Defense dollaassigned missions. Moreover, a shortag of qualified NIOs undercuts future planning, limits flexibility, and shortchanges naval warfighter support.

## CHAPTER 6

### FLEET SURVEYS AND CAREER ANALYSES

This chapter is sub-divided into two sections, VI-1 and VI-2. Section VI-1 discusses the results of surveys sent to battle group Commanders and Navy Intelligence Officers (NIOs) to assess the effectiveness of NIO preparation. Section VI-2 analyzes the careers of battle group-deployed NIOs to determine the scope of their professional training preparation and experiences.

**Section VI-1: Battle Group Surveys.** A pilot survey was conducted with five Navy students at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, to validate survey questions. Survey questions were derived from Naval Doctrine Publication 2 (NDP 2): Naval Intelligence. Tailored surveys were then sent to 14 current Navy Carrier and Cruiser Destroyer Battle Group Commanders and their senior staff NIOs (see Appendixes E and F). Eleven of 14 Commander surveys (78.5 percent) and 12 of 14 NIO surveys (85.7 percent) were returned. Survey responses, detailed assessments, and comments from the Commander and NIO surveys were then tabulated (see Appendixes G and H).

**Commander Survey - Conclusions.** The battle group Commanders regarded the overall quality of the battle group NIOs as excellent. In the opinion of the Commanders, the NIOs were effective and they did an outstanding job of providing intelligence across the broad spectrum of support requirements. Moreover, the afloat NIOs communicated the fundamentals of what the intelligence community can and cannot do--critical to ensure that intelligence support capability was not oversold. Some Commanders appeared to enjoy close and comfortable working relationships with their NIOs while other relationships appear guarded; however, there were indications that the upward flow of ideas was sometimes impeded. Support to the battle group planning teams on long-range and crisis planning appeared to be solid. Also, the Commanders' confidence in their NIOs to present an accurate battlespace picture was good--not excellent or outstanding--i aspects of operational art, a key skill of the forward-thinking warrior. Arguably, operational art can and should be taught to NIOs. Addressing operational art, the Commanders' surveys revealed an intellectual shortfall on the battle staff, where the minds of NIOs and

Operations Officers necessarily intermingle. And, finally, the Commanders indicated that the Navy Intelligence community should provide strong support to emerging and non-traditional military missions and develop new intelligence strategies that will ensure continued robust mission support to the battle groups across the spectrum of future conflicts.

**Navy Intelligence Officer Survey -- Conclusions.** The battle group NIOs were confident in their abilities. They awarded their intelligence staffs excellent scores--as did the Commanders--in providing tailored, accurate, and timely intelligence production support to the battle groups. Moreover, the NIOs communicated their capabilities accurately and did not oversell themselves--they did not promise something to the commander that they could not deliver. As reflected in the Commanders' surveys, the NIO's intra-staff communications suffered, albeit not to the degree that the Commanders reported; a cliché or not, senior leadership reported that it did not hear enough from down below. The majority of NIOs reported that their staffs did a good job of portraying the battlespace picture; intelligence staff awareness of the regional situation was high. In support of long-range and crisis planning, the NIO's ability to support the battle group team effort was outstanding; the Commanders' comments were laudatory in this area as well.

The NIOs reported a poor-to-fair ability to support deception operations and to recognize centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities--key tactical, operational, and strategic warfare skills--primarily due to training shortfalls. In retrospect, the Commanders intimated a desire to see change in these areas--the Commanders understand the implications. The NIOs reported only a fair-to-good ability to develop combat assessments, again, mostly because of training shortfalls.<sup>(69)</sup> NIOs rated themselves as fair-to-good in intelligence education and training preparation for battle group intelligence support.<sup>(70)</sup> NIOs were supportive of changing intelligence collection, production and dissemination strategies to accommodate emerging and non-traditional missions. However, survey results, from the Commanders and the NIOs, indicated considerable differences of opinion on the direction in which Navy Intelligence is headed; some see a need for gradual change, while others see a need for immediate change.

**Summary.** Naval Intelligence doctrine has been promulgated and the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) has endorsed the role that Navy Intelligence will play in support of emerging and non-traditional missions. Therefore, with a doctrinal framework in place, it can be argued that a strong education and training regimen, supported by leadership which is dedicated to strong maritime intelligence support, will overcome commander and NIO apprehensions with regard to post-Cold War education and training issues and the immutable character of emerging non-traditional intelligence missions. The Commander and NIO surveys point out lofty commander expectations and some serious shortfalls in NIO effectiveness. With solid proof in hand, the Navy Intelligence community cannot sidestep these issues. The credibility of the Navy Intelligence community is on the line.

**Section VI-2: Career Summary.** The career paths of 14 battle group senior NIOs were assessed to determine the level of professional training and experience received since their commissioning (see Appendix I). In addition to disclosing the number of joint, shore, and deployed tours experienced by NIO, the data base also identified periods of graduate-level education and Joint Professional Military

Education (JPME) opportunities--key elements of interest for this paper. Research data for this assessment was derived from Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) Officer Location Summary data base files, effective October 1995. All officers evaluated in this summary are at the rank of Commander.

**Joint and Graduate Education.** opportunity to achieve a Master's degree education in their early commissioned years, probably at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), while 5 of 14 officers had experienced an opportunity to attend a 10-month JPME program while at the rank of Lieutenant Commander.

**Joint Duty.** The data base indicated that 11 of 14 officers had at least one joint duty tour; however, only 8 of the 11 joint duty tour-experienced officers had attended a junior service college. Two of 14 officers had multiple joint duty tours. Only 3 officers had no joint duty education opportunities or joint duty experience.

**SEA DUTY.** All officers had at least 2 sea duty tours. Seven officers had 3 sea duty tours. Four officers had 4 sea duty tours.

**Navy Shore Duty.** Only 1 officer, a prior submarine officer, had just 1 shore duty tour. Five officers had 2 shore duty tours. Six officers had 3 shore duty tours. Two officers had 4 shore duty tours.

**Summary.** At least 8 of 14 senior NIOs surveyed (57 percent) had an opportunity to attend Navy-funded advanced service schools and, presumably, but not necessarily, went on to become Joint Duty Officer (JSO) qualified. These officers received considerable exposure to PhD-level academics and graduate-level courses of instruction--theory of warfare, operational maneuver warfare, strategic warfare, service-oriented tactical warfare--necessary to truly enrich the joint experience. The data base did not identify officers who may have received privately-funded graduate-level education, but most likely, there are some in this group. All officers had experienced the requisite sea duty assignments; several officers were lateral transfers--from the warfare communities--which would explain the additional sea tours.

Of great interest to me is the deployed NIO with a combination of joint education and joint tours in his portfolio. The Commander and NIO surveys indicated their role and contributions in today's fast-changing military environment. It is my firm contention--supported by interviews, surveys, personnel record assessments, and analysis of education and training programs--that those NIOs who successfully completed graduate-level education--private or Navy-funded, fully accomplished JPME I, and served at least one or more successful joint duty tours, are the best prepared battle group NIOs; these officers are more ready to meet emerging Navy Intelligence missions. Moreover, these officers are leading the way, working hard at sea today, for the Navy Intelligence community of tomorrow. Those NIOs with no graduate-level education, no JPME, and no joint duty experience have less utility. Furthermore, they are more likely to be performance challenged and professionally frustrated in an increasingly non-traditional and joint military environment.

## CHAPTER 7

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper's hypothesis is validated by research findings: some senior Navy Intelligence Officers (NIOs) serving in arduous sea duty billets have not experienced robust contemporary education and demanding training since their early commissioned years. This in turn hinders their ability to provide complete intelligence support to battle staffs across the full spectrum of emerging and non-traditional Navy missions. These officers are also experiencing increased challenges in providing complete support to traditional Navy missions. NIOs who lack adequate preparation can imperil lives, degrade battle force effectiveness, and depreciate the capability and credibility of the Navy Intelligence community. These officers will be increasingly challenged and frustrated as changes occur throughout the fleet and joint military environment.

All NIOs receive basic intelligence education and training soon after commissioning, or upon lateral transfer into the Navy Intelligence community. Many go on to graduate- and post-graduate level educational experiences. But as billet demands keep more NIOs at sea or locked into joint billets, opportunities for catch-up education will fade. Continuing education over the span of a career is critical to the continued development of the NIO. Because there are fewer education opportunities as the NIO becomes more senior, at a minimum it is essential the officer be positioned at all times to educate himself.

Navy Intelligence community leadership must also do its part and ensure the vitality and fungibility of NIOs across the spectrum of emerging and non-traditional Navy missions. It is vital for the Navy Intelligence community to remember that the senior NIO afloat is a key member of the deployed warfighting team--the at-sea battle staff. On the shoulders of the NIO lies a great burden of responsibility. As the deployed representative of the Navy Intelligence culture, it is imperative the NI be given skills beforehand so that he can acceptive manner possible.

This paper demonstrated that education and training experiences, regardless of their scope and vintage, do connect somehow with the current and future battle staff support challenges of the Navy Intelligence profession. However, current education and training institutions provide only a basic framework of building blocks for the junior NIO. After a period of sea duty or overseas experience, NIOs may return to those institutions to receive continuing education and training in the form of theater-unique command and fleet-oriented waterfront instruction. East and West Coast fora provide additional opportunities to participate in seminars and in the sharing of work experiences which enrich knowledge throughout the intelligence culture. The Navy and joint graduate-level education programs, which specialize in intelligence theory, research, and application, are superior education programs; however, these programs do not by themselves produce outstanding NIOs. The graduate-level education complements a NIO's undergraduate education, basic intelligence training, personal experience, and self-study. Service colleges teach warfare theory and prepare the mid-grade officer for intermediate-level decisionmaking and joint staff duty. Senior War Colleges teach still more theory, take advantage of greater senior officer experience, and further prepare the senior officer for critical thinking and senior-level decisionmaking. However, nowhere does Navy Intelligence provide the NIO a single-point opportunity to gain a solid

educational foundation on the full spectrum of emerging and non-traditional Navy missions. This preparation deficiency must be addressed and corrected. The unprepared senior NIO afloat is at risk of losing professional credibility along with the commander's confidence.

So, where does the Navy Intelligence go from here? Here are some recommendations:

(1) Collectively, military schools should accelerate and expand in-depth explored throughout the Department of Defense, RMA theory describes the future as a return to an emphasis on nonnuclear warfare, both conventional and unconventional. A dramatic departure from nuclear warfare planning during the Industrial Age, RMA is a revolution in information-based warfare and in the weapons, doctrines, and organizations which will fight it in the Information Age. The Information Age and US military intelligence activities make a perfect union. The challenge to the NIO is to gain a deeper understanding of the framework principles of RMA: information dominance, synergy, disengagement, and civilianization. Then, the NIO must apply that new understanding of an increasingly decentralized and economically interdependent global environment to the role of the NIO in supporting the commander's vision of the battlespace.

Absent institutional military educational opportunities, there are ways for the NIO to take charge personally and overcome intelligence preparation shortfalls. First, each NIO must accept greater personal responsibility for education and training, be it at a public university, on-the-job training, or self-study. Working closely with the Senior Assignment Manager, all opportunities for off-duty education and training should be pursued energetically. Professional reading is critical. Development of a professional home library, frequently updated, is recommended. NIO professional association with proven organizations is encouraged to gain an appreciation of diverse political and cultural ideas.

(2) Another way to help overcome preparation shortfalls is for the Navy Intelligence community leadership to promote and support personal education and training initiatives vigorously as an adjunct to Navy-funded programs. For example, Navy Intelligence can recommend to its officer corps academic areas where NIOs might profit intellectually. For 1997, ONI could recommend the Navy Intelligence community focus area is "US Foreign Policy and Trade that keeps America's heart beating strongly. Key sub-areas for 90-day periods of concentration could be specified: politics, finance, culture, and historical perspectives. For 1998, the ONI could recommend an altogether different focus, such as "US Navy and Brown Water Operations," with 90-day periods of concentration on Pacific, Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean littoral areas; Navy leadership has begun to recognize that the Navy's future lies closer to the shoreline. For 1999, the ONI could recommend, "Foreign Information Systems." With the accelerating developments in information technology, a NIO could make a career out of this one area. The possibilities are endless for NIO intellectual development in areas compatible with Navy Intelligence interests. However, all recommendations for study must be available at the open source (unclassified) level to facilitate the widest possible exchange of information and ideas.

(3) A third way to overcome preparation shortfalls begins with the recently approved 10-day Naval Intelligence Professionals Advanced Course (NIPAC). NIPAC is a legitimate training effort, but its short

duration only serves to whet appetites for serious learning. The Navy Intelligence community might consider using NIPAC as a starting point for a self-paced education and training recertification program for senior NIOs. The objective would be to establish a baseline of critical knowledge for all NIO careerists. Cornerstone topics could be modern international politics, and joint military intelligence management issues. The baseline topics and NIO recertification would need to be refreshed at least bi-annually so that the NIO could stay abreast of developments. Such a project would require DNI approval and centralized management, probably by a major training center. Costs could be kept low by decentralizing participation and by using existing public or military computer network server systems to facilitate fulfillment of curricula objectives.

The Navy Intelligence community now faces domestic and international situations similar to those it faced prior to and during World War II; the community also faces the continuing challenge of integrating the overwhelming volumes of information from disparate intelligence disciplines into a unified battlespace picture; and, the community faces the demand for specialized support to a single branch of the armed forces even as the highest management levels insist on joint forces support. Notwithstanding the above tasks, Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence doctrine is now firmly established and well supported; this one fact--combined with solid leadership--can and will mitigate Navy Intelligence community shortfalls and provide for a smoother transition to future challenges.

Navy Intelligence education and training is in a constant state of re-invention, re-organization, and re-shaping, and it continues to adjust to the realities of a changing world--declining defense resources, the telecommunications technology explosion, and new and expanded missions. Thinking, planning, and decisionmaking processes demand greater flexibility and determination. The above realities are not helpful when it comes to changing the Navy Intelligence community, yet progress is being made.

## **Appendix A**

### **NMITC Intelligence Officer Training 1994-95<sup>(71)</sup>**

#### **Operational Intelligence Training**

Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course

Length:151 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM [\*]

Joint Intelligence Course

Length:20 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

Intelligence Officer Refresher Course

Length:10 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM [\*]

Naval Intelligence Mid-career Course (Seminar)

Length:10 day/Focus:NW-EM [\*]

### **Marine/Amphibious Operations Intelligence Training**

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Officer Course

Length:70 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

Expeditionary Warfare Intelligence Course

Length:13 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

USMC Theater and Tactical Aviation Intelligence Officer's Orientation Course

Length:15 day/Focus:NW-SYS

### **Counterintelligence Training**

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Counterintelligence Course

Length:87 day/Focus:NW-EM

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Advanced Counterintelligence Course

Length:20 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

### **Automated Intelligence Systems Training**

Afloat Intelligence Systems Managers Overview Course

Length:5 day/Focus:SYS [\*]

NTCS-A Intelligence Center Manager Course

Length:10 day/Focus:SYS [\*]

Ocean Systems Information System (OSIS) Baseline Upgrade

(OBU) System Management Course

Length:40 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

Ocean Systems Information System (OSIS) Baseline Upgrade

(OBU) System Analyst Course

Length:20 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

### **Counterdrugs and Terrorism Training**

Counterdrug Basic Intelligence Course

Length:5 day/Focus:SYS-EM

EMERALD (Workstation) User Course

Length:5 day/Focus:SYS

Joint Visually Integrated Display System Course

Length:5 day/Focus:SYS

Joint Maritime Information Element Course

Length:5 day/Focus:SYS

(Key: NW=Naval Warfare; SYS=Automated Intelligence Systems; EM=Emerging Missions; [\*]=Core courses received CRITRR review)

### **Appendix B**

**FITCPAC Intelligence Officer Training 1994-95**[\(72\)](#)

### **Operational Intelligence Training**

Intelligence Officer Refresher Course

Length:10 day/Focus:NW-SYS

Joint Task Force Intelligence Manager's Course

Length:10 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

### **Marine/Amphibious Operations Intelligence Training**

Expeditionary Warfare Intelligence Course

Length:13 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

### **Automated Intelligence Systems Training**

Afloat Intelligence System manager Overview (Seminar) Course Length:5 day/Focus:SYS-EM

NTCS-A Intelligence Center Manager Course

Length:10 day/Focus:SYS

### **Cryptologic Training**

Cryptologic Staff Officer Training Course

Length:10 day/Focus:NW-SYS-EM

(Key: NW=Naval Warfare; SYS=Automated Intelligence Systems; EM=Emerging Missions)

## **Appendix C**

### **Past and Present Training Compared**

#### **Basic Naval Intelligence Officer Training 1944-45<sup>(73)</sup>**

Naval Staff Procedures 52 hours 6.5 days

Photo Interpretation 38 hours 4.7 days

Order of Battle<sup>(74)</sup> 34 hours 4.2 days

Amphibious Warfare 27 hours 3.3 days

Combat Info Center and Radars 25 hours 3.1 days

Navigation 24 hours 3.0 days

Ships and Aircraft 24 hours 3.0 days

OPINTEL Procedures 18 hours 2.2 days

Communications 18 hours 2.2 days

Anti-submarine Warfare 9 hours 1.1 days

Meteorology 6 hours 0.7 days

Mine Warfare 5 hours 0.6 days

Miscellaneous 34 hours 4.2 days

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Total 314 hours 38.8 days

**Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC)**[\(75\)](#)

**(13 March - 13 October 1995)**

Administration 24 hours 3.0 days

Word Processing 8 hours 1.0 days

Maps/Charts/Geography 8 hours 1.0 days

Introduction to Intelligence

and Analysis 8 hours 1.0 days

Security Manager 40 hours 5.0 days

Briefing Skills 40 hours 5.0 days

Electronic Warfare 80 hours 10.0 days

Geopolitics 80 hours 10.0 days

Ground Warfare 40 hours 5.0 days

U.S. Naval Aviation 80 hours 10.0 days

Naval Warfare 112 hours 14.0 days

Air Warfare 120 hours 15.0 days

Imagery 32 hours 4.0 days

Integrated Air Defense 56 hours 7.0 days

Strike Planning (TAMPS) 24 hours 3.0 days

Strike Warfare 200 hours 25.0 days

OPINTEL 72 hours 9.0 days

Advanced Systems 80 hours 10.0 days

Amphibious Operations (BDOC) 40 hours 5.0 days

CVIC and JIC 40 hours 5.0 days

Washington DC tour 24 hours 3.0 days

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Total 1208 hours 151.0 days

## **Appendix D**

### **Senior Assignment Manager Interview Questions**

1. What is the role of the Senior Assignment Manager in facilitating NIO career development?
2. What is the selection process for senior Navy Intelligence Officer assignment to an afloat battle staff

billet and, what are some of the key biographic factors?

3. What is the process for senior Navy Intelligence Officer assignment to a joint battle staff billet?

4. Assignment of senior Navy Intelligence Officers to staff intelligence billets in the Marine Corps is a new phenomena. How is this process accomplished and what are the personnel requirements?

5. What are the key elements of the process for assigning senior Navy Intelligence Officers to battle staff billets?

6. What would you consider to be a primary weakness in the Navy Intelligence Officer assignment process?

7. How would the Senior Assignment Manager improve the Navy Intelligence community management processes?

## **Appendix E**

### **Battle Group Commander Survey**

9 October 1995

To: Commander, Carrier Group One

Commander, Carrier Group Two

Commander, Carrier Group Three

Commander, Carrier Group Four

Commander, Carrier Group Five

Commander, Carrier Group Six

Commander, Carrier Group Seven

Commander, Carrier Group Eight

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group One

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Two

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Three

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Five

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Twelve

From: Commander (Sel) Richard L. Saunders, USN

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, MCCDC

2076 South Street

Quantico, VA 22134-5068

Sir,

I am a naval intelligence officer (1630) currently enrolled at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia. In support of a Master's in Military Studies degree requirement I am working on a Master's paper titled "The Naval Intelligence Officer: Preparation for Battle Staff," which requires surveys of U.S. Navy Battle Group Commanders and senior staff intelligence officers.

Attached is a 13 question confidential "eyes only" survey. I am seeking a seasoned operator's point of view; therefore, I respectfully request that only you or your Chief of Staff review and complete the survey; then please mail it back to me in the enclosed envelope by 30 October 1995. Your N2 will also receive a survey--one asking for an assessment of his pre-battle group intelligence training, education and experience.

This survey is strictly non-attribution. If you desire to make comments, please do not use names, or otherwise identify yourself, except as either the Commander or Chief of Staff. The survey will become the property of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College upon submission of my Master's paper. Survey questions are derived from material in the "Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence," Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 30 September 1994, pp 7-10.

Thank you for taking a few moments to assist with this project.

Very respectfully,

Richard L. Saunders

## Commander Survey (shell)

With regard to current battle group intelligence support, on a scale of 0-10 (zero = no agreement; 10 = total agreement), please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:

1. The battle group's senior intelligence officers (CG, CDG, CVIC, CVW) provide accurate, tailored intelligence support and accurately convey the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence system.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

2. These senior intelligence officers provide a clear understanding of what intelligence can and cannot provide in support of operations.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

3. These senior intelligence officers are effective and have credibility.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

4. These senior intelligence officers would advise the battle staff when a planned course of action is probably not obtainable, even if that advice goes against the conventional wisdom.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

5. These senior intelligence officers provide an accurate picture of the battlespace from which the battle staff can identify clear and attainable objectives.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

6. These senior intelligence officers are skilled at identifying the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

7. These senior intelligence officers provide support to both deliberate planning and crisis action planning [deliberate planning is conducted primarily in peacetime to develop operations plans for contingencies; crisis action planning is the process of formulating and implementing plans and orders in response to time-sensitive crisis.].

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

8. These senior intelligence officers provide the information needed to support successful deception measures against the adversary.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

9. These senior intelligence officers are skilled at developing combat assessments to include battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness, reattack recommendations, insight into enemy morale, materiel status, and ability to continue hostilities.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

10. These senior intelligence officers are educated and trained to fulfill the full spectrum of direct battle group intelligence support requirements.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

11. A close partnership exists between the battle group's senior intelligence and operations officers which keeps operations efforts focused on the mission and ensures that intelligence requirements are met.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

12. Effective intelligence support can be assured only when the commander and his intelligence organization have a clear understanding of the fundamentals of intelligence.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

13. Recent changes in the focus of the President's National Security Strategy and DoD's National Military Strategy--to include greater national emphasis on military support of non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping, weapons counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, immigration control, and domestic/international relief--require the naval intelligence community to develop new strategies for collection, production and dissemination to make intelligence products more responsive to current battle staff needs.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

Comments?

## **Appendix F**

### **Navy Intelligence Officer Survey**

9 October 1995

To: Commander, Carrier Group One, (N2)

Commander, Carrier Group Two, (N2)

Commander, Carrier Group Three, (N2)

Commander, Carrier Group Four, (N2)

Commander, Carrier Group Five, (N2)

Commander, Carrier Group Six, (N2)

Commander, Carrier Group Seven, (N2)

Commander, Carrier Group Eight, (N2)

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group One, (N2)

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Two, (N2)

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Three, (N2)

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Five, (N2)

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight, (N2)

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Twelve, (N2)

From: Commander (Sel) Richard L. Saunders, USN

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, MCCDC

2076 South Street

Quantico, VA 22134-5068

Sir,

I am a naval intelligence officer currently enrolled at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at

Quantico, Virginia. In support of a Master's in Military Studies degree requirement I am working on a Master's paper titled "The Naval Intelligence Officer: Preparation for Battle Staff," which requires surveys of U.S. Navy battle group commanders and senior staff intelligence officers.

Attached is a 13 question confidential "eyes only" survey. I am seeking an intelligence officer's informed but subjective point of view; therefore, I respectfully request that only you complete the survey; then please mail it back to me in the enclosed envelope by 30 October 1995. Your commander will also receive a survey--one asking for his assessment of naval intelligence officer training, education and experience.

This survey is strictly non-attribution. If you desire to make comments, please do not use names, or otherwise identify yourself, except as the N2. The survey will become the property of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College upon submission of my Master's paper. Survey questions are derived from material in the "Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence," Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 30 September 1994, pp 7-10.

Thank you for taking a few moments to assist with this project.

Very respectfully,

Richard L. Saunders

### **Navy Intelligence Officer Survey (shell)**

With regard to current battle group intelligence support, on a scale of 0-10 (zero = no agreement; 10 = total agreement), please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:

1. The battle group's senior intelligence officers (CG, CDG, CVIC, CVW) provide accurate, tailored intelligence support and accurately convey the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence system.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

2. The senior intelligence officers provide a clear understanding of what intelligence can and cannot provide in support of operations.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

3. The senior intelligence officers effectively communicate ideas.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

4. The senior intelligence officers would advise the battle staff when a planned course of action is probably not obtainable, even if that advice goes against the conventional wisdom.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

5. The senior intelligence officers provide an accurate picture of the battlespace from which the battle staff can identify clear and attainable objectives.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

6. The senior intelligence officers are skilled at identifying the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

7. The senior intelligence officers provide support to both deliberate planning and crisis action planning [deliberate planning is conducted primarily in peacetime to develop operations plans for contingencies; crisis action planning is the process of formulating and implementing plans and orders in response to time-sensitive crisis.].

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

8. The senior intelligence officers provide the information needed to support successful deception measures against the adversary.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

9. The senior intelligence officers are skilled at developing combat assessments to include battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness, reattack recommendations, insight into enemy morale, materiel status, and ability to continue hostilities.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

10. The senior intelligence officers are educated and trained to fulfill the full spectrum of direct battle group intelligence support requirements.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

11. A close partnership exists between the senior intelligence and operations officers which keeps operations efforts focused on the mission and ensures that intelligence requirements are met.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

12. Effective intelligence support can be assured only when the commander and his intelligence organization have a clear understanding of the fundamentals of intelligence.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

13. Recent changes in the focus of the President's National Security Strategy and DoD's National Military Strategy--to include greater national emphasis on military support of non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping, weapons counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, immigration control, and domestic/international relief--require the naval intelligence community to develop new strategies for collection, production and dissemination to make intelligence products more responsive to current battle staff needs.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( ) 10( )

Comments?

## **Appendix G**

### **Battle Group Commander Survey: Evaluation**

(With regard to current battle group intelligence support, on a scale of 0-10, zero = no agreement; 10 = total agreement)

1. The battle group's senior intelligence officers (CG, CDG, CVIC, CVW) provide accurate, tailored intelligence support and accurately convey the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence system.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8(10) 10( 1)

Mean score, 81.8 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Improve quality of intelligence analysis and judgment; improve systems knowledge.

2. These senior intelligence officers provide a clear understanding of what intelligence can and cannot provide in support of operations.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( 8) 10( 3)

Mean score, 85.4 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Improve systems knowledge; improve intra-staff communication on subject of intelligence and operations objectives and capabilities.

3. These senior intelligence officers are effective and have credibility.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( 2) 10( 9)

Mean score, 96.3 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Low. Evaluation: Intelligence officers provide outstanding staff support; intelligence officers are competent and trusted.

4. These senior intelligence officers would advise the battle staff when a planned course of action is probably not obtainable, even if that advice goes against the conventional wisdom.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 1) 8( 4) 10( 6)

Mean score, 89.0 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Improve intra-staff communication; improve intelligence officer decision processes and understanding of subtle differences between "risky" versus "bold" decisions.

5. These senior intelligence officers provide an accurate picture of the battlespace from which the battle staff can identify clear and attainable objectives.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 3) 8( 7) 10( 1)

Mean score, 76.3 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: High. Evaluation: Improve battlespace awareness; improve intra-staff communication; clearly define intelligence objectives and capabilities as compared with operations.

6. These senior intelligence officers are skilled at identifying the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.

0( ) 2( 1) 4( ) 6( 7) 8( 2) 10( 1)

Mean score, 63.6 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Very High. Evaluation: Critical deficiency; improve and reinforce training; improve intra-staff communication; the Commanders do not believe staff intelligence officers have a solid understanding of "center of gravity" and "critical vulnerability" concepts (re: Joint Pub 3-0, III-20). Identification of enemy and friendly centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities is critical to the successful mission.

7. These senior intelligence officers provide support to both deliberate planning and crisis action planning [deliberate planning is conducted primarily in peacetime to develop operations plans for contingencies; crisis action planning is the process of formulating and implementing plans and orders in response to time-sensitive crisis.].

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( 6) 10( 5)

Mean score, 89.0 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Intelligence officers provide excellent support to planning; improve systems knowledge.

8. These senior intelligence officers provide the information needed to support successful deception measures against the adversary.

0( ) 2( 1) 4( 1) 6( 4) 8( 4) 10( 1)

Mean score, 65.4 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Very High. Evaluation: Critical deficiency; improve and reinforce friendly force protection training; the Commanders do not believe staff intelligence officers have a solid understanding of counterintelligence methods; improve intra-staff communication. The Commanders are concerned that deception tactics remain a key part of intelligence and operations practices.

9. These senior intelligence officers are skilled at developing combat assessments to include battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness, reattack recommendations, insight into enemy morale, materiel status, and ability to continue hostilities.

0( ) 2( 2) 4( 1) 6( 5) 8( 1) 10( 2)

Mean score, 58.1 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Very High. Evaluation: Critical deficiency; improve and reinforce "campaign-type" planning and training through termination phase of hostilities; improve theater (AOR) cultural training; conduct training on basic logistics concepts; improve intra-staff communication; improve systems knowledge. Recommended follow-up inquiry: What effect does the non-traditional military mission have on critical warfare skills? What are the costs? What are the benefits?

10. These senior intelligence officers are educated and trained to fulfill the full spectrum of direct battle group intelligence support requirements.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 1) 8( 7) 10( 3)

Mean score, 83.6 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Improve advanced intelligence skills training; improve intra-staff communication; improve systems knowledge.

11. A close partnership exists between the battle group's senior intelligence and operations officers which keeps operations efforts focused on the mission and ensures that intelligence requirements are met.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 1) 8( 3) 10( 7)

Mean score, 90.9 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Low. Evaluation: The Commanders observe that the fundamental working relationship between most intelligence and operations staff members is cooperative and effective.

12. Effective intelligence support can be assured only when the commander and his intelligence organization have a clear understanding of the fundamentals of intelligence.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( 3) 10( 8)

Mean score, 94.5 percent commander agreement. Improvement potential: Low. Evaluation: The commander understands the critical principle of effective intelligence support in relation to the success of his mission; the commander depends on candid intelligence staff responses to accurately assess mission potential.

13. Recent changes in the focus of the President's National Security Strategy and DoD's National Military Strategy--to include greater national emphasis on military support of non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping, weapons counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, immigration control, and domestic/international relief--require the naval intelligence community to develop new strategies for collection, production and dissemination to make intelligence products more responsive to current battle staff needs.

0( ) 2( 1) 4( 1) 6( 2) 8( 3) 10( 4)

Mean score, 74.5 percent commander agreement. Evaluation: Accelerate systems development and specialized officer training to better accomplish non-traditional missions. The end of the Cold War has moved the president to redefine National Strategy and reshape the military's mission--these are indisputable facts. The distribution of commander responses underscores their concern that the naval intelligence community is slow to adjust to mission enhancements as reflected in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Naval intelligence doctrine has been promulgated, and it must be implemented in training regimens and the fleet now.

### **Commander comments:**

(1) "The systems are only as good as the people who operate and use them. Broad backgrounds and a solid experience in operations afloat are the essential building blocks."

(2) "Two problems seen in Arabian Gulf Operations 1995 with Lincoln Battle Group--neither new: (A) Joint interaction was manpower intensive but made easier by JDISS [Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System]; (B) BDA [Battle Damage Assessment] remains difficult--harder than it should be."

(3) [Re: #9] Frequently the req[ui]re[d] info[r]mation] to make those assessments just does not exist. If a country is not involved in the "crisis de jour," we probably don't have the minimum, current

intel[ligence] to make any capabilities assessment for that country."

(4) "The problem with intel[ligence] is we don't know what we don't know! Intelligence officer success can be evaluated after a victory (or loss) on the battlefield. At other times it is difficult."

(5) "Need more HUMINT [human intelligence] sources and inputs."

## **Appendix H**

### **Navy Intelligence Officer Survey: Evaluation**

(With regard to current battle group intelligence support, on a scale of 0-10, zero = no agreement; 10 = total agreement)

1. The battle group's senior intelligence officers (CG, CDG, CVIC, CVW) provide accurate, tailored intelligence support and accurately convey the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence system.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 2) 8( 7) 10( 3)

Mean score, 81.6 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Improve intra-staff communication; broaden professional knowledge base into non-traditional areas.

2. The senior intelligence officers provide a clear understanding of what intelligence can and cannot provide in support of operations.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 3) 8( 6) 10( 3)

Mean score, 80.0 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Improve intra-staff communication; improve systems knowledge.

3. The senior intelligence officers effectively communicate ideas.

0( ) 2( ) 4( 1) 6( 1) 8( 4) 10( 6)

Mean score, 85.0 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Improve intra-staff communication; Improve intelligence officer communication skills through professional writing, listening, and speaker training.

4. The senior intelligence officers would advise the battle staff when a planned course of action is probably not obtainable, even if that advice goes against the conventional wisdom.

0( ) 2( ) 4( 1) 6( ) 8( 3) 10( 8)

Mean score, 90.0 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Low. Evaluation: (Note that Commanders were 89.0 percent in agreement on the same statement) Improve intra-staff communication; use proven methods when making assessments and judgments; be honest--be bold--make the call.

5. The senior intelligence officers provide an accurate picture of the battlespace from which the battle staff can identify clear and attainable objectives.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 2) 8( 7) 10( 3)

Mean score, 81.6 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Medium. Evaluation: Improve systems reliability--shortfalls may be handicapping battlespace assessments; improve systems knowledge; improve intra-staff communication.

6. The senior intelligence officers are skilled at identifying the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.

0( ) 2( 1) 4( 1) 6( 3) 8( 6) 10( 1)

Mean score, 68.3 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Very High. Evaluation: Critical deficiency (note that the Commanders were 63.6 percent in agreement on the same statement); improve and reinforce training; improve intra-staff communication; the Intelligence Officers do not have a solid understanding of "center of gravity" and "critical vulnerability" concepts (re: Joint Pub 3-0, III-20). Identification of enemy and friendly centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities is critical to the successful mission.

7. The senior intelligence officers provide support to both deliberate planning and crisis action planning [deliberate planning is conducted primarily in peacetime to develop operations plans for contingencies; crisis action planning is the process of formulating and implementing plans and orders in response to time-sensitive crisis.].

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 1) 8( 1) 10(10)

Mean score, 95.0 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Low. Evaluation: Intelligence Officers are confident and well trained in deliberate and crisis planning procedures; improve intra-staff communication.

8. The senior intelligence officers provide the information needed to support successful deception measures against the adversary.

0( ) 2( 1) 4( 1) 6( 3) 8( 5) 10( 2)

Mean score, 70.0 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: High. Evaluation: Critical deficiency (note that the Commanders were 65.4 percent in agreement with the same statement); improve and reinforce friendly force protection training; the intelligence officers do not have a solid understanding of counterintelligence methods; improve intra-staff communication. Despite the end of the Cold War, it is vital that deception tactics remain part of intelligence and operations practices.

9. The senior intelligence officers are skilled at developing combat assessments to include battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness, reattack recommendations, insight into enemy morale, materiel status, and ability to continue hostilities.

0( 1) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 3) 8( 5) 10( 2)

Mean score, 65.0 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Very high. Evaluation: Critical deficiency (note that the Commanders were 58.1 percent in agreement with the same statement); improve and reinforce "campaign-type" planning and training through termination phase of hostilities--include combat assessment training; improve theater (AOR) cultural training; conduct training on basic logistics concepts; improve intra-staff communication; improve systems knowledge. Intelligence Officers are sometimes excluded from participating in combat assessments, traditionally the domain of the operations staff, because of a lack of training and familiarity with concepts of operational art.

10. The senior intelligence officers are educated and trained to fulfill the full spectrum of direct battle group intelligence support requirements.

0( 1) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 3) 8( 6) 10( 2)

Mean score, 71.6 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: High. Evaluation: Critical deficiency (note that the Commanders were 83.6 percent in agreement with the same statement--conclusion: significant shortfall in education and training); improve advanced intelligence skills training; improve intra-staff communication; improve systems knowledge; examine the impact of non-traditional mission tasks on intelligence officer effectiveness.

11. A close partnership exists between the senior intelligence and operations officers which keeps operations efforts focused on the mission and ensures that intelligence requirements are met.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( 2) 8( 2) 10( 8)

Mean score, 90.0 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Low. Evaluation: The fundamental working relationship between most intelligence and operations staff members is cooperative and effective.

12. Effective intelligence support can be assured only when the commander and his intelligence organization have a clear understanding of the fundamentals of intelligence.

0( ) 2( ) 4( ) 6( ) 8( 3) 10( 9)

Mean score, 95.0 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Improvement potential: Low. Evaluation: The Intelligence officers are well-informed on the principles of effective intelligence support and understand that their commander needs candid intelligence staff responses to accurately assess mission potential.

13. Recent changes in the focus of the President's National Security Strategy and DoD's National Military Strategy--to include greater national emphasis on military support of non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping, weapons counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, immigration control, and domestic/international relief--require the naval intelligence community to develop new strategies for collection, production and dissemination to make intelligence products more responsive to current battle staff needs.

0( ) 2( 3) 4( 1) 6( 2) 8( 1) 10( 5)

Mean score, 66.6 percent Intelligence Officer agreement. Evaluation: (Note that Commanders were 74.5 percent in agreement with this statement) Intelligence Officers are mostly supportive of the statement to change intelligence strategy in the areas of collection, production and dissemination to accommodate the non-traditional mission. However, the wide distribution of scores on this question indicates considerable difference of opinion on the direction Naval Intelligence should be going. Regardless, Naval intelligence doctrine has been promulgated and the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) has endorsed the role that naval intelligence will play in support of non-traditional missions. Deployed intelligence staffs must implement doctrine as appropriate in at sea training and to accommodate the new intelligence support missions.

### **Intelligence Officer Comments:**

(1) [Re: #10] "Some battle groups have superstar caliber people--some don't. Our battle group is very lucky--top notch CVN IO [carrier staff intelligence officer] and CVW AI [air wing staff intelligence officer]."

(2) "In my experience as BATGRU N2 [battle group intelligence officer] (preparing for 2nd deployment to EUCOM/CENTCOM [Europe Command/Central Command] - previous experience in VIGILANT WARRIOR operations [in] Arabian Gulf, Adriatic Ops), [the] key measure of effectiveness is how well the team has been able to collect, process, analyze, fuse and disseminate meaningful data--up echelon to the commander and down echelon to each unit. By sheer good fortune I've had the 'best and brightest' in the key positions comprising BATGRU, CVN, CVW team. Success was possible because each of these individuals had background and training which far exceeded the norm for 1630s [intelligence], 1610s [cryptology], IS's [enlisted intelligence specialist], etc. That, more than anything else, has allowed us to

support what might be considered 'non-traditional' missions, exploiting new technologies such as CHALLENGE ATHENA development equipment."

(3) "I interpreted questions 1-10 as my job description and answered according to my perception of how I am doing. The following specifics are intended to amplify: #1. We do a good job of portraying facts as we know them, but not always what they mean; #3. The multiple foci required by #'s 9, 10, 13 are a tough challenge when it comes to developing ideas--getting them across is secondary; #6. No training, no supporting doctrine or Intelligence Community Analytical Priority to support; #6 and #9 are closely linked. Firsthand knowledge of this came when tasked to develop method to determine superiority/supremacy for JTFEX [Joint Task Force Exercise]. Exhaustive with naval think tanks (NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND, TACTICS TRAINING GROUP, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE) producing zero supporting references and products. We developed a method in-house which has promise but it elicited no interest from the above organizations and will likely die at turnover. We have had no call to employ it on deployment and would have trouble implementing it as we did due to on board workload required. What JIC produces anything to support it?; #8. No tasking or priority by big Navy. Could probably do it if tasked. BATGRU OPDEC [operational deception] works for C2W [command and control warfare] and does virtually no OPDEC work; #13. The world has shifted dramatically and we have our heads in the sand. Good luck with your paper and I wish you even more luck in finding an audience to listen and take heed."

(4) [Re: #9] "We do very little munitions effectiveness training." [Re: #10] "Hard to measure." [Re: #11] "A close partnership should exist but may not." [Re: #13] "May want to refine existing strategies rather than developing new ones." [N2's Summary Comment] "I am a CRUDESGRU [cruiser destroyer group] N2 [intelligence officer]. I have found that my surface warfare (SWO) operations officer(s) know very little about intelligence and the role the N2 plays about operations than they do about process that, unfortunately, has to be done on-the-job and by the N2. This education process should begin long before he arrives and should be formalized. Also, not only should the N2 have a functional relationship with his N3 [operations officer], but he also needs to work very closely with his N6 [communications officer]. If not, you risk functional redundancy and negative competition between the two codes [N2 and N3]."

(5) [Re: #2] "Too often intelligence program offices oversell their capabilities in overview briefs provided to senior officers raising expectations to unrealistic heights." [Re: #6] "Accurate identification of centers of gravity requires more area expertise than is normally available within a battle group. DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] country expert help should be required."

## **Appendix I**

### **Career Analysis**

OFFICER Joint Shore Navy School

1 1 2 2 BASIC/JPME

2 1 2 3 BASIC

3 1 4 3 BASIC/JPME

4 0 4 3 BASIC

5 1 3 4 BASIC

6 0 3 4 BASIC/NPS

7 1 2 2 BASIC/JPME

8 2 3 2 BASIC

9 0 4 3 BASIC/NPS/JPME

10 3 2 3 BASIC/JPME

11 1 3 3 BASIC

12 1 1 4 BASIC/JPME

13 1 2 3 BASIC/NPS

14 1 3 4 BASIC

## **NOTES**

## **NOTES**

1. Throughout this paper, naval applies jointly to the US Navy and the US Marine Corps.
2. This is stressed in, Naval Doctrine Publication 2 (NDP 2), Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy), 22.
3. NDP 2, 5-10.
4. NDP 2, 50.
5. Naval Doctrine Publication 3 (NDP 3), Naval Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the

Navy). NDP 3 develops doctrine to reaffirm the foundation of US Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary maritime traditions.

6. 6.Naval Doctrine Publication 4 (NDP 4), Naval Logistics (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy). NDP 4 addresses the full range of logistical capabilities that are essential in the support of naval forces.

7. 7.NDP 2, 38.

8. 8.NDP 2, 60.

9. 9.For a review of current military intelligence requirements and strategies--for both for U.S. Navy and National-level consumers, see, U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 1995), 2-3 and 6-12; U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Naval Intelligence Ready for Joint Operations (Suitland, MD: ONI, 1995), 14-16; U.S. President, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: White House, February 1995), 8-24.

10. 10.James R. Green, "The First Sixty Years of the Office of Naval Intelligence," M.A. thesis (Washington, DC: The American University, 1963), 47. In 1910, the first group of Navy officer language students was sent to Japan. All students had diplomatic status and were assigned to Navy attache billets. However, this program was abruptly terminated by President Wilson in 1913 when he determined the fewest number possible of US Navy officers should be assigned to shore duty.

11. 11.Wyman H. Packard, Captain (Ret), USN, "A Century of Naval Intelligence," manuscript (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, October 1995), 372. The course was initially taught at ONI, then later moved to the Francis Scott Key Hotel, Frederick, MD. The Navy officer intelligence indoctrination course was closed on 4 September 1943. The reason for closure is undetermined.

12. 12.Packard, 372. Organized under the Bureau of Aeronautics at Naval Air Station, Anacostia, and convening on 5 January 1942, the first class was comprised of Navy and Marine Corps intelligence officers. The school was to teach students how to analyze data from factual evidence contained in photographs of enemy holdings and to present that information in the form of oral and written intelligence reports. The school based its techniques on a study of British methods of extracting information from photographs taken over enemy territory.

13. 13.Through the end of World War II, one persistent and serious gap in naval intelligence had been the inadequate indoctrination of prospective commanders in the utility of intelligence. Throughout the US military, the intelligence culture was little understood; its products were usually in doubt and always handled as an exception to the routine. Intelligence work was conducted quietly and unobtrusively behind a shroud of mystery.

14. 14.Packard, 373. Established at Quonset Point, RI, and like the Navy's PI school, this 8-10 week program took advantage of British expertise in the art of aviation intelligence. Most students were graduates of the Navy's Aviation Volunteer Specialist (AVS) Indoctrination School, meaning they had first received primary instruction in the aviation sciences. Principle courses taught at Naval Air Combat Intelligence Officers School (NACIOS) included briefing and debriefing techniques, maps and charts, elements of photo analysis, air tactics and navigation, meteorology, economic geography, aircraft and ship recognition, performance characteristics, naval communications, armaments of principle air forces of the world, antisubmarine warfare, radar, flak analysis, amphibious warfare, and air support doctrine. The school was closed in January 1944; the reason for closure is undetermined.

15. 15.Packard, 373. The course was taught at the Henry Hudson Hotel, New York City. The two principle courses taught were Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) and Commerce and Travel; the OPINTEL course was specifically designed to train officers for duty with advanced bases, staffs, and forces afloat in foreign theaters. The basic course included institutionalized intelligence courses similar to those offered in the advanced Naval Air Combat Intelligence Officers School (NACIOS), but with less emphasis on air intelligence. The OPINTEL course included a mock-up Combat Information Center (CIC), organized like those found aboard Navy ships.

16. 16.Packard, 374. See also ONI, "OPINTEL Notes," June 1945. ANIS provided a 10-week course which included a standard instructional package on intelligence artform, but also now included 52 hours of instruction on Navy staff procedures. ANIS also taught specialized classes for officers headed to military-government staff teams. Some ANIS students acted as instructors so that they could share firsthand experiences and further enrich the academic environment.

17. 17.See, U. S. Navy, "ONI WWII Admin History," (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy), 1399-1400.

18. 18.Packard, 374.

19. 19.Packard, 374. NIS matriculated 55 students on 1 July 1946: 50 Navy officers and 5 Marine Corps officers. NIS curricula consisted of seven months of instruction in basic operational, strategic, amphibious and air intelligence followed by 10 weeks of at-sea application. Students then transitioned immediately back to the classroom for language training lasting from 4-18 months. After language training--language students typically had a choice of Spanish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Chinese, or Japanese--students continued studies in geography, history, government, economics, politics, customs and culture--all through their language specialization.

20. 20.See, ONI-19(A), Naval Intelligence Manual, May 1947, para. 7104.

21. 21.Packard, 375. Some former World War II graduates of the Air Combat Intelligence School were recalled to active duty and sent directly to the fleet without the benefit of refresher training. New Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates and other qualified officers were routed through nine-week Air

Intelligence and Photo Intelligence (AI/PI) schools in the Washington, DC, area.

22. 22.US Navy, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, "Interim Evaluation Report No. 2, Korean War Naval Operations," 231. In the early phase of the Korean War, it was found that the training of air intelligence officers (AIOs) needed to be revised to provide a basic concept of general intelligence and a better grasp of the duties of staff, ship, air groups and squadron AIOs in combat and in preparation for combat.
23. 23.Packard, 376. At the NIS, the goal was to produce a naval officer qualified in air intelligence, photo intelligence, and radar analysis in a period of 32 weeks. Graduates were subsequently assigned to, and quickly rotated through, numerous intelligence specialty areas so that officers could broaden their knowledge as much as possible. Later in 1962, the NIS was absorbed into the newly established Defense Intelligence School (DIS) at Anacostia. DIS later became the Defense Intelligence College (DIC), under the newly organized Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), offering both undergraduate and graduate degrees in intelligence studies to qualified Department of Defense personnel.
24. 24.Derived from the author's personal experience: The AFAITC provided training in basic Navy intelligence skills: fleet order of battle, analysis, photo interpretation, report writing, and briefing techniques. Training was primarily tailored to supporting tactical- and operational-level Navy air warfare against Soviet-style maritime threats. The AFAITC continued to train and graduate Navy Air Intelligence Officers (AIOs) through the Reagan-era defense build-up, until it was disestablished in 1986.
25. 25.See, U. S. Navy, OP-009M ltr, ser 1543P009, 14 Sep 1972, (no subject). The objective of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) master's degree program was twofold: first, attract talented line officers to the intelligence sub-specialty; and second, fulfill the educational needs of Navy intelligence personnel capable of developing systems analysis and computer techniques for intelligence research.
26. 26.NMITC also provides refresher training for Navy and Marine Corps intelligence personnel assigned throughout the Atlantic Fleet region. NMITC's waterfront counterpart on the West Coast is the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific (FITCPAC), at San Diego, CA, which provides refresher intelligence training to Pacific Fleet personnel. East and West Coast waterfront tactical intelligence training is a legacy of the Korean War era when the fleet was unable to meet rapidly escalating theater intelligence support requirements; NMITC and FITCPAC provide officer and enlisted reservist training as well.
27. 27.See endnote 9, Naval Intelligence Ready for Joint Operations, 8.
28. 28.See endnote 9, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 8-18; and, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2-16.
29. 29.Desktop Guide to Intelligence Training (DGIT), jointly produced, (Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, VA, and, Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific, CA: Department of the

Navy, 25 April 1994), B-5.

30. 30.NDP 2, 60. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), as executive agent, approves NMITC's curricula. ONI organizes and trains intelligence personnel, provides highly specialized, maritime-related intelligence analysis, and administers intelligence oversight, security, and intelligence manpower issues. Its day-to-day operations include liaison with both Department of Defense (DoD) and non-DoD agencies, long-term analysis of foreign military and naval forces and operations, foreign liaison support, scientific and technical analysis, strategic trade analysis, and intelligence systems acquisition.

31. 31.DGIT, 2-1-3 to 2-10-10.

32. 32.W. Bung, Commander, USN, Navy Intelligence Basic Training Department Head, and others, panel discussion, interviewed by the author at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), 27 September 1995.

33. 33.W. Bung, and others, interview, 27 September 1995.

34. 34.See, Chief of Naval Operations, N20, unclassified message to Navy intelligence commands and others, subject: "Cryptologic and Intelligence Training Requirements Review (CRITRR) for Intelligence Officer (163X) Training," 281449Z March 1995.

35. 35.Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) Conference, "Cryptologic and Intelligence Training Requirements Review (CRITRR) Conference Directory, 5-9 June 1995," (Dam Neck, VA: NMITC, 1995), not paginated. Core courses are reviewed in this paper, at Appendix A.

36. 36.Official CRITRR findings and recommendations were not available to the author for inclusion into this paper.

37. 37."CRITRR," 5-9 June 1995.

38. 38.DGIT, B-1.

39. 39.DGIT, 1-2-3 to 1-7-2.

40. 40.F. Kelly, Captain, USN, Commanding Officer, Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific (FITCPAC), telephone interview by author, 2 October 1995.

41. 41.F. Kelly, telephone interview by author, 2 October 1995.

42. 42.P. Becker, Lieutenant Commander, USN, Intelligence Assignments, Junior Detailer and Community Manager, interview by author at Naval Annex, Washington, DC, 18 September 1995.

43. 43."NPS Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles," under the key words "Military Colleges and Universities," downloaded from Banyan on-line service, 14 November 1995. The mission of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is to enhance the security of the US through graduate and professional education programs which are sustained by research and advanced studies directed towards the needs of the Navy and DoD. NPS goals are to increase the combat effectiveness of the armed forces and to contribute to fundamental scientific, engineering, policy, and operational advances.
44. 44.See, Defense Intelligence College (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1992), 2-3. The Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), formerly the Defense Intelligence College (DIC), is authorized by the Congress and accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges Schools. The mission of JMIC is to assist in the development and training of military and civilian personnel, conduct academic research on topics of significance to present and future intelligence missions, prepare DoD personnel for duty in the Defense Attache System, and to prepare DoD personnel for command, staff, and policymaking positions in security activities.
45. 45.At the Marine Command and Staff College, AY 1995, the student body included US military officers, Federal grade civilians, and foreign officers. During periods of classified instruction, all foreign officers were temporarily excused. Most intelligence education for US students was ineffective in teaching the intelligence artform.
46. 46.P. Becker, interview by author 18 September 1995.
47. 47.First, the Navy Intelligence community has 130 more officer billets than officers available to fill them. Second, the requirement for the Assignment Manager to fill priority operational billets--these billets are located primarily on board Navy ships or with critical joint intelligence support commands and staffs ashore--takes priority over filling graduate-level school quotas.
48. 48.E. Exner, Lieutenant Commander, USN, Intelligence Assignments, Junior Detailer/Placement Officer and Community Manager, telephone interview by author, 5 February 1996. Navy-funding for graduate-level school quotas is not a limiting factor in how many officers are enrolled during any given year. The task of balancing operational requirements and locating available intelligence officers is central to the issue of filling the billets for graduate school quotas. The DNI--cognizant of competing intelligence officer needs throughout the fleet--establishes policy and guidance for Intelligence community requirements for graduate-level school quotas.
49. 49."CRITRR," 5-9 June 1995.
50. 50.Packard, 373-374.
51. 51.NDP 2, iii.
52. 52.James J. Tritten, "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine," Naval War College Review, Spring

1995, Vol XLVIII, No. 2, 22-38.

53. 53.Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1 February 1995), i.

54. 54.Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) Series (NWP 12-X), Intelligence: (Various Titles), (Washington, DC: Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, Department of the Navy) 1977-1985. Documents are variously classified as: (U) Unclassified, (C) Confidential, and (S) Secret. See also, Naval Tactical Support Activity, "List of Current Naval Warfare Publications," Report No. NTSA-FLT60-3, dtd 27 September 1985, for a complete listing of all previous Naval Warfare Publications.

55. 55.The Maritime Strategy was a scenario based upon a protracted conventional war with the Soviet Union. For a full discussion of the antecedents to the Maritime Strategy and the pre-1982 formulations, see Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN, "The Maritime Strategy Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of US Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s," Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988, and Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, ed., "Seapower and Strategy," Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1989.

56. 56.For additional reading on the question of whether the Navy's maritime strategy is alive or dead, see William F. Hickman, "Is the Maritime Strategy Dead?," in Essays on Strategy, IX, ed. Thomas C. Gill (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), 145-163.

57. 57.NDP 2, 50.

58. 58.NDP 2, 50.

59. 59.Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, J-2, 5 May 1995), IV-14 to VIII-3. Joint Pub 2-0 is the keystone document of the joint intelligence support to joint operations series (Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare; Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF); Joint Pub 1-0, Personnel and Administration; Joint Pub 2-0, Intelligence; Joint Pub 3-0, Operations; Joint Pub 4-0, Logistics; Joint Pub 5-0, Plans; Joint Pub 6-0, C4 Systems). Joint Pub 2-0 sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of US military forces in joint operations and the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders, and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands.

60. 60.See endnote 9, NDP 2, Naval Intelligence Ready for Joint Operations, 12.

61. 61.J. Darrah, Captain, USN, Intelligence Assignments, Senior Assignments and Community Manager, interview by author at Naval Annex, Washington, DC, 6 September 1995.

62. 62. See, Assignment Basics: Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC), produced by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities to assist the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), formerly NMPC, in providing functional user training for BUPERS Distribution System.
63. 63. The Navy Officer Fitness Report is a periodic report on an officer's past performance and fitness for continued duty. The Navy Officer Fitness Report system underwent a significant revision effective 1 January 1996.
64. 64. JSO designation means the officer should have Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), both Phase I and II, and completed a Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) tour, Phase III. Prospective JSOs must be nominated by an administrative Navy JSO board and have their nomination for JSO approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). As a JSO, a nominee for a joint billet will have his name entered onto a form memorandum, "Nomination of Officer for Joint Duty," and routed from the Senior Detailer, for further review and recommendations to Chief, Support and Restricted Officer Assignments (P-44), then to Chief Assistant, Bureau of Naval Personnel (P-4B), and then to Chief, Bureau of Naval Personnel (P-4), for ultimate approval. Attachments to the memorandum of nomination include a current Officer Data Card (ODC), Officer Summary Report (OSR), a microfiche copy of the nominee's Officer Record, and a Joint Duty Assignment Sheet which details key requirements for the battle staff billet, such as senior and intermediate service college, previous joint experience, service department staff experience, graduate education, and training.
65. 65. Through the start of Fiscal Year 1996, under the fledgling Navy-Marine Corps senior intelligence officer exchange program, only one senior Navy intelligence officer--a Commander, and recent Tufts University graduate--had been assigned to a Marine Corps G-2 staff billet, located at II MEF, Camp Lejeune, NC. No senior Marine Corps intelligence officers had been assigned to navy staff intelligence billets through 1995. It appeared the program was dead on arrival with Headquarters Marine Corps when it came time to send an Intelligence Officer over the Navy.
66. 66. F. Libutti, Major General, USMC, Commanding, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, interview by author at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 12 December 1995.
67. 67. Professionalization takes many forms. Most joint (Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)) staff billets require an officer to successfully complete of in-residence JPME; acceptance of joint duty orders obligates the service member to a mandatory three-year tour (Navy sea duty staff billets are not JDAL coded and do not require JPME). The Navy's Federal Executive Fellowship (FEF) program helps fill the Navy's requirement for senior-level officers knowledgeable in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy and in the intricacies of the decision-making process at the highest levels of government; FEF fellows incur a two-year service obligation. FEF institutions in the Washington, DC, area include the American Enterprise Institute, Atlantic Council of the United States, Brookings Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Foreign Service Institute. The Executive Training Program (ETP) sends senior-rank (O-6) Department of Navy officers (both Navy and Marine Corps officers) to advanced management courses. ETP institutions are Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology (MIT). The Advanced Education Program (AEP) allows a limited number of active duty officers to participate in full time, personally-funded graduate education programs at civilian institutions.

68. 68.The following are examples of approximate Permanent Change of Station (PCS) costs effective January 1995 (Source is Navy Intelligence Senior Assignment Manager):

From Washington, DC

to LCDR(1) LCDR+1(2) CAPT(1) CAPT+1(2)

Norfolk, VA 1000 5000 1000 5000

San Diego, CA 3000 11000 3000 13000

Honolulu, HI 8000 15000 9000 20000

Bahrain 9000 20000 9000 25000

From Honolulu, HI

to

San Diego, CA 8000 15000 8000 19000

Norfolk, VA 6000 18000 9000 21000

Rota, Spain 8000 24000 8000 29000

Bahrain 21000 64000 21000 79000

Key:

(1) Unaccompanied tour. The officer elects not to move family members.

(2) Accompanied tour. The officer elects to move family members. Comparisons reflect increased averaged costs for household goods (HHG) shipments and airfare. Each additional family member adds \$500-\$2000 to PCS costs.

69. 69.One intelligence officer reported zero ability to perform combat assessments. In his defense, it may be that the officer was newly arrived and lacked training, misunderstood the survey, or, as unlikely as it could be, the battle staff has restricted the officer from participating in combat assessments.

70. 70. See previous endnote. The same Navy officer reported a strong negative assessment for Navy Intelligence education and training.

71. 71. DGIT, 11-13.

72. 72. DGIT, 9-10.

73. 73. Packard, 373-374.

74. 74. The terminology used in 1945 to describe military manpower and war machines was, "Means Available/Opposed," vice the contemporary terminology, "Order of Battle."

75. 75. "CRITRR," 5-9 June 1995.

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