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Author:

MAJOR R. J. BUIKEMA, USMC

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Approved:_____

(Mentors)

DR.H.W.GHOLSON

LTCOL M.V. JACOCKS

Date: 18 APRIL 96

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study reviews the ongoing changes that are being implemented in the intelligence community of the United States Marine Corps, and examines the relevant implications for professional military education at Marine Corps University. One of the basic premises of the approved changes in intelligence doctrine, structure, and training was that Marines would understand the role that they played in the intelligence cycle. However, an instructional plan was never developed that was capable of accomplishing that end.

After the analysis, recommendations are provided concerning what type of courses need to be taught, the best approach for the university to teach them effectively, other concerns that may have not been previously examined, and a recommendation for further review of enlisted and non-resident education.

This fiscal year, Marine Corps University will be gaining additional intelligence instructors, assigned to each of the major professional military education schools. This research paper offers a starting point for their employment, as well as some concerns that should be addressed by directors of schools, deans of academics, Marine Corps University operations, and MCCDC. Headquarters Marine Corps has directed that intelligence instruction be integrated into our professional military education curriculums. This paper provides the first formal study of how to accomplish that directive.

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INTRODUCTION

The goal of this study is to provide a foundation for an intelligence education plan within the professional military education (PME) system established by Marine Corps University. It is a logical progression from my earlier assignments as Process Action Team member, Intelligence Study Group member, Occupational Field Specialist (sponsor) for Intelligence, and Intelligence Battalion Quality Management Board (QMB) Chairman. Based on these experiences, much of the information related was obtained from first-hand knowledge. The paper progresses, however, upon the premise that the reader has no prior knowledge of the ongoing implementation plan for intelligence adopted by Headquarters Marine Corps. It attempts to follow a logical progression of identifying a problem, determining a solution, and recommending specific steps that will result in solving the problem. The Combat Development Process, developed by Marine Corps Combat Development Command, is at the hub of these changes. For a more thorough understanding of Marine Corps training and education, the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) book should be referred to. Military education constantly changes as a result of evolving doctrine, reorganizations, budgetary constraints, and other factors. This paper will hopefully provide the starting point for standardizing, improving, and integrating intelligence into the curriculums of Marine Corps University schools. The entire Marine Corps leadership (from our SNCOs to our General Officers) must understand the vital role that intelligence plays in warfighting. Educating our officers and SNCOs is the first step toward real improvement. That is the ultimate goal of the recommendations contained in this paper.

CHAPTER 1

METHODOLOGY

Research for this paper involved the review of numerous publications and papers written recently on intelligence instruction and training. Of note, very little written information is available relating specifically to intelligence and professional military education. There are significant amounts of written information relating to intelligence training (formal and informal); generic phrases noting the importance of including intelligence into formal education occasionally appear, but usually a discussion regarding what exactly needs to be taught, or how it should be instructed is missing. Interviews with instructors, students, occupational field specialists, as well as civilian education experts proved extremely useful, and showed that there is not a general consensus within Marine Corps University or the educational field in general on the best way to educate our Marines on the subject of intelligence.

While conducting the research, no assumptions were initially made about either the current quality of

intelligence instruction at Marine Corps University, or the credence of the recommendations contained in the Intelligence Implementation Plan document.

The chronological methodology used to produce this paper involved (1) a research and data call of pertinent documents, journals, orders, electronic mails, and meeting notes, (2) interviews of persons having a first-hand knowledge of education, intelligence, training standards, instruction, and the Marine Corps intelligence implementation plan, (3) analysis of the data, (4) stating findings and conclusions, (5) and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

ANALYSIS: A Review and Assessment of Initiatives Effecting the Integration of Intelligence into Professional Military Education

The United States Marine Corps commenced on an ambitious plan to revitalize the Marine Corps intelligence community during the summer of 1993. Under the tutelage of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control, Communications, Computer & Intelligence (AC/S, C4I), Headquarters Marine Corps, Major General Paul K. Van Riper, the community was thoroughly examined by intelligence leaders, users of intelligence, tactical and operational commanders, and the senior leadership of the Corps. The evaluation comprised separate critiques and recommendations for doctrine, training, and structure.(1) This three-fold approach, based on the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) developed by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command as part of the Combat Development Process (CDP), was seen as essential for a "total fix" to identified intelligence deficiencies.(2) Since 1993, several executive decisions were made that approved initiatives for improvement that are either currently being implemented or have already been implemented. Doctrine is currently being updated, with new publications already released in draft form.(3) Intelligence structure additions and modifications commenced during fiscal year 1996 and will continue through fiscal year 1999.(4) Intelligence training pipelines were modified during fiscal year 1995 and will be completed during fiscal year 96 with the commencement of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Intelligence Officers Course during the Spring of 1996 at the Navy/Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), Dam Neck, VA.. All of the above mentioned changes represent major improvements in the intelligence field. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the intelligence occupational field have been compared to the major improvements in the Marine Corps logistics field undertaken during the 1980s, highlighted by the Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) program. One major initiative in the intelligence field, however, still remains. *Intelligence is a command responsibility*. It involves information management (direction), collection, analysis, production, dissemination, and utilization of products; all of the above functions must be related to the *command mission*. The key to this *relevance*, however, is not the competence of the S-2/G-2 section. The key to relevance is ensuring that all officers and staff non-commissioned officers understand their individual roles in the intelligence process. **A formal intelligence instruction plan must be adopted and implemented by the Marine Corps University to ensure that all Marines, both officers and enlisted, understand their potential impact on tactical and operational intelligence, and the impact intelligence has on mission accomplishment.**

Initial Look at Intelligence

Before a determination can be made regarding formal training requirements, the current status of Marine Corps intelligence must be examined. On 1 July 1993, Major General Van Riper, serving as AC/S, C4I, HQMC, established a four man Process Action Team (PAT)(5). The PAT was directed to (1) assess Marine Corps Intelligence in light of the post Desert Shield/Desert Storm environment, (2) initiate an Intelligence Study Group (ISG) comprised of officers from throughout the Fleet Marine Force (primarily non-intelligence officers) to identify intelligence deficiencies in structure, training, and doctrine, and (3) draft a Concept of Intelligence to Support Expeditionary Operations, serving as the cornerstone publication for a doctrinal basis.(6) Major General Van Riper's initial guidance to the PAT, issued on 3 JUL 93 at MCCDC, Quantico, VA, envisioned an expedient process, no-holds barred, based on creative thinking, brain-storming, and "looking outside of the box."(7) His guidance indicated that the PAT would be the impetus for new ideas, with guidance and direction coming from him personally, since he understood that there were several large "rice bowls" involved in the intelligence process.(8) This approach marked a drastic improvement in identifying deficiencies and recommending solutions in the intelligence field. The first step was to assess the health of the intelligence field as it stood at the time.

Congressional oversight also provided a strong motivator for the Marine Corps to modify its concept of intelligence support. As a result of service intelligence deficiencies reported to Congress during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, The Senate Committee on Armed Services "...directed that the Commandant of the Marine Corps submit a roadmap for improving Marine Corps intelligence capabilities."(9) In response, the Marine Corps submitted its Intelligence Roadmap document during April 1993.(10) The roadmap was in consonance with the vision of the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper "...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century."(11) The Marine Corps Concept of Intelligence Support to Expeditionary Operations is discussed in the roadmap document, with the assurance that the publication would be completed by JUN 93.(12) Additionally, deficiencies noted in the Mission Area Analysis 12 document(13) of MAY 90 are addressed. New intelligence systems are predominantly emphasized, particularly in the last half of the 29 page document. Funding and procurement of systems, however, was *not what the Senate had in mind*. Upon review of the document, Congress directed further review by the Marine Corps of its intelligence deficiencies, with new approaches to the problems.(14) As Major General Van Riper checked in during the spring of '93 to his new billet at HQMC as AC/S, C4I, this was the first challenge that confronted him.

The Marine Corps intelligence field had been examined by several organizations after Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, providing an outstanding starting point. Following is a list of the major reports that were examined with regard to Marine Corps intelligence capabilities:

a. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) report to the President on Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 24 FEB 92 (Top Secret)

b. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, Communications, & Intelligence (ASD C3I)

report to Secretary of Defense on Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm lessons learned, 15 MAY 91 (Top Secret)

c. Department of Defense Inspector General Report, 24 SEP 93 (unclassified with Top Secret addendums)*

d. Defense Intelligence Agency report on Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm lessons learned, 25 NOV 90 (Top Secret)

e. National Security Agency report on Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 20 JUL 92 (Top Secret)

f. Director, Naval Intelligence report on Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm lessons learned, 29 MAR 91 (Top Secret)

g. Intelligence Study Group Report, OCT 91

h. Intelligence Study Group Report, OCT 93 *

i. Mission Area Analysis 12, MAY 91

j. Mission Area Analysis 12, FEB 94 *

* Indicates that the report was either evaluated in draft form or at a later time due to submission dates.

Congress had also used many of these same documents to formulate its own conclusions regarding Marine Corps intelligence.(15) Throughout all of these documents, some things remained remarkably similar...the deficiencies. In fact, the deficiencies noted in the MAY 91 MAA-12 report(16) are reflected in almost all of the other documents (to include the FEB 94 MAA). It seemed clear that we had no problem identifying our deficiencies. The real problem revolved around finding viable solutions.

Six fundamental intelligence deficiencies were identified. MAA-12 of FEB 94 notes 29 distinct deficiencies, but the basic deficiencies remain unchanged.(17) These fundamental intelligence deficiencies were identified as six distinct problems that need to be addressed. They are: (1) Inadequate doctrinal foundation,(18)

(2) Lack of a "Professional" Occupational Field,(19) (3) Insufficient Tactical Intelligence Support,(20)

(4) Insufficient Joint Manning,(21) , (5) Inadequate Imagery Capability,(22)

and (6) Insufficient Language Capability.(23)

Based on the framework of the identified deficiencies and a path outlined by the PAT, an Intelligence Study Group (ISG) met to formulate possible solutions. During AUG 93, approximately 45 officers from every major command (to include the reserve establishment), representing every major occupational field met at The Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Quantico, VA for nine days to listen to the problems of Marine Corps intelligence, state their own concerns, and set the direction for the future, based on the draft ideas of the PAT. This ISG represented a major manpower and time investment for the Marine Corps, particularly since an ISG had been conducted just 2 years earlier.(24) The ISG also represented an acknowledgment by the intelligence community that this was a Marine Corps problem, not just a problem for the intelligence field. Results of the ISG were published in a report submitted to AC/S, C4I. Training deficiencies were addressed as a continuous shortfall in the intelligence community that had to be addressed. *Several participants also expressed their concerns regarding the lack of standardized intelligence training and education for their "non-intelligence" personnel, particularly commanders*. It was related that all officers and Marines need to understand and be involved in the intelligence process.(25) That message was received by AC/S, C4I, where the next step was already ongoing.

Development of an Implementation Plan

Resources Division, HQMC C4I, was directed by MajGen Van Riper to develop an Intelligence Implementation Plan. This plan was designed to continue the development of the Concept of Intelligence for Expeditionary Operations, designated by a Tiger Team of four intelligence officers from HQMC and MCIA.(26) Additionally, Colonel Jim Clark, Director, Resources Division, HQMC C4I, was directed to find solutions to each of the six deficient areas noted, and produce a consolidated plan that could (1) Serve as the answer to the Congressional questions regarding our service deficiencies that were not satisfactorily answered in the Intelligence Roadmap document, (2) Provide a solution that coordinated the triad of doctrine, training, and structure, while breaking the rice bowl disciplines, and (3) Produce the solution in a format that would be considered feasible to the Executive Steering Group (ESG).(27) MajGen Van Riper clearly understood that potential changes would represent a major commitment by the Marine Corps in time, money, and manpower. Colonel Clark's task was a daunting one; even more so since he was an infantry officer by trade, not an intelligence officer. While some officers in the intelligence community expressed their concern that a "grunt" was now deciding the future course of the intelligence community, Colonel Clark saw it as a distinct advantage. He pointed out that the intelligence community, with years of opportunity to fix itself, from the SRIG to Congressional plus-ups for training, from numerous studies to the Intelligence Roadmap itself, had not fixed the problem.

The first task for Colonel Clark was to identify what the Marine Corps wanted its intelligence community to do. In fact, he was looking for a mission statement for intelligence. Without a mission statement, how could anyone determine if we were deficient or not? Colonel Clark considered a concise mission statement as essential to the implementation plan. Therefore, he conducted in-depth research to determine what intelligence was currently doing, how the other services viewed their own intelligence communities, how the unified commands and the Joint Staff viewed intelligence, how our allies viewed intelligence, and how our own Marines viewed intelligence. Colonel Clark visited every major service

intelligence training command, met with Defense Intelligence Agency representatives, Canadian officers, and his own action officers. He studied current doctrine, as well as sister service doctrine. Finally, he formulated his mission statement. The mission of Marine Corps intelligence became (and still is) to **"...Provide commanders, at every level, with seamless, tailored, timely, minimum essential intelligence, and ensure that this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning process."**(28) This mission statement was the foundation from which all changes in the intelligence field were built. The mission statement meant that the Marine Corps would be making proactive changes, instead of simply reacting to the requirements of the joint community and other interested parties. It also laid the path for changes in education, training, and doctrine. It encompassed what our intelligence personnel would be trained to do. Note that key elements of this mission statement contain the following:

a. "Provide commanders, at every level..." This is the "who" portion of the mission statement. It indicates that intelligence must support the commander in the accomplishment of the command mission. Implied is that the staff sections and subordinate commands will also need to be supported. Note that "...at every level" implies that intelligence will be passed horizontally and vertically, requiring a means of reporting, dissemination, and information management. Also, the statement is not limited to Marine Corps commands. Intelligence may be needed to support a joint task force (JTF) or multi-national force (MNF).

b. "...with seamless, tailored, timely, minimum essential intelligence..." This statement is the "what" and "when" of the mission. It indicates a fused, all-source intelligence connectivity link (possibly with the Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Group and the MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center). The intelligence must be based on the needs of the command, not generic products made inside the Washington beltway or at a theater Joint Intelligence Center. This means that an analytical capability must be present at all major commands, with the further capability to push critical information or intelligence elements to the consumer, while filtering other items that are not time-sensitive or relevant to the command's mission accomplishment.

c. "and ensure that this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning process." This part contains the "how" of the mission statement. The key word is "integration," meaning that a strong relationship must be established between the operations and intelligence community. MajGen Van Riper was fond of stating that "...if the 3 dies, the most likely replacement is not the 3 alpha, but the 2."(29) The implication is that the **operations community must understand the capabilities and limitations of what intelligence can provide**,(30) while the intelligence community must understand the intelligence requirements that the operators have. The 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A.M. Gray, was fond of stating that "...intelligence drives operations."(31) If intelligence is truly going to drive the operational concept, *more than just intelligence officers need to understand the basic concepts of intelligence support*. Therefore, an additional phase was added to the intelligence cycle of the Marine Corps. The stages of intelligence direction, collection, processing,(32) and dissemination had one important step added...**utilization**. This last step means that intelligence is not merely dropped into the commander's lap. Instead, the intelligence officer needs to understand what the operations officer and commander want to do to the enemy. Conversely, the CO and operations officer must understand what intelligence *can and cannot do for them*. The step of utilization is more than a new buzzword; it is having

a profound impact on the way intelligence officers are taught, and the type of intelligence products that are being produced.(33) Additionally, the utilization step has ramifications for professional military education. The mission statement infers that the operational community understands the basic tenants of intelligence, and that it is capable of using the products presented to it. *None of the above items are currently addressed at Marine Corps schools*. This mission statement, therefore, set the stage for changes that were required in the intelligence community.(34)

Concepts and Actions

Based on the intelligence mission statement, thirteen functional concepts were developed. They are:(35)

a. The target is tactical intelligence.

b. The focus of support must be downward.

c. Intelligence must drive operations.

d. Intelligence disciplines must complement each other.

e. Intelligence must be directed and managed by a multi-discipline trained and experienced intelligence officer.

f. Intelligence staffs use intelligence; intelligence organizations produce intelligence.

g. Intelligence products must be timely and tailored to both the unit and its mission.

h. The last step in the intelligence cycle is utilization, not dissemination.

i. Our human intelligence (HUMINT) capability must be enhanced.

j. Increased efforts in HUMINT must not be at the expense of force protection.

k. Force protection must become a multi-discipline effort.

l. Signals intelligence must focus on tactical, vice operational or strategic intelligence.

m. Signals intelligence must broaden its perspective to include command and control warfare (C2W).

The target is tactical intelligence (See 'a' above). Based on the concept that the Marine Corps fights battles, not wars, it was clearly evident that the focus of intelligence could not be broad-based across the spectrum of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence. The Marine Corps is required to train and

equip intelligence personnel to support the mission of the United States Marine Corps, not DIA, the joint community, or a CINC. For years, the scope of intelligence training had become too convoluted, due to the perceived requirement to train Marines across the spectrum of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence. During the General Intelligence Training Advisory Council (GITAC) annual meeting of '94 and '95, the Marine Corps representative reiterated the position that the Marine Corps must stay focused on the service requirements.(36) Strategic intelligence (and training and educating of the same) is the requirement of the national community, while the JICs and USACOM have the requirement to train for operational intelligence, to include regional-specific training. The Marine Corps must stay focused on tactical intelligence.(37)

If the functional concepts were correct, major changes would be required in Marine Corps training, education, doctrine, and structure. These changes were specified as implementing actions. The implementing actions are detailed recommendations relating to identified deficiencies, consistent with the mission statement and functional concepts. Each implementing action was identified by the deficiency in the Mission Area Analysis 12 (Intelligence) document that it would address. Of the eleven implementing actions noted, *two deal specifically with formal schools education at Marine Corps University (MCU).* The actions contain specific guidance for MCU schools, including general intelligence areas to be taught and structure changes required to complete the actions. The implementing actions state:

"Implementing Action 12.3.1 **Incorporate capabilities, limitations, planning and integration of intelligence, counterintelligence and collection organizations into PME curriculums."**(38)

and

"Implementing Action 12.3.2 **Incorporate into the PME system instruction on the capability and employment of air reconnaissance."**(39)

The stated goal of these two actions is to incorporate intelligence into the curriculums of the MCU schools, because the "institutional expectations of intelligence are unclear."(40) Stated recommendations for implementing action 12.3.1 are (1) "Identify, [sic] and implement, PME requirements for intelligence," and (2) "Convert 9910 instructor billets to 0202 at TBS, AWS, and C&SC..."(41) **This paper will provide the implementation plan of the PME requirements for intelligence.** The goal of the MOS conversion is to provide expertise at the Marine Corps Schools regarding intelligence, capable of preparing and presenting intelligence courses to students of the Marine Corps University. As of fiscal year 95, there was only one intelligence officer billet designated in the Marine Corps University table of organization.(42) PME requirements are specified in the intelligence implementation document. They read: "**OUR SCHOOLS MUST MEET THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:**

TBS - 1. Thoroughly ingrain that intelligence is a battlefield function equal in importance to fire support and maneuver.

2. Familiarize with our intelligence system.

3. Demonstrate how intelligence supports the commander.

CLS - 1. Review our intelligence system.

2. Illustrate responsibilities of all to our intelligence system.

3. Establish expectations of our intelligence system.

4. Familiarize with procedures used by S2/G2 to meet those expectations.

5. Demonstrate the role of intelligence in planning.

6. Illustrate how intelligence can drive operations.

ILS - 1. Thoroughly ingrain product expectations from our intelligence system.

2. Familiarize with how a commander or staff can help the S2/G2 or intel unit commander [to] optimize performance of our intelligence system.

3. Utilize realistic intelligence in planning.

4. Demonstrate how intelligence must drive operations.

5. Familiarize with how to integrate our intelligence system with joint and combined systems.

PME FOR COMMANDERS

Commanders must thoroughly understand the following:

1. Capabilities and limitations of our intelligence system.

2. Architecture of our intelligence system.

3. Commander's role in focusing and prioritizing the intelligence effort.

4. How intelligence is synchronized with other battlefield functions.

5. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

6. How to utilize intelligence in planning.

7. How to use intelligence to drive operations.

8. How to infuse intelligence training into exercises."(43)

Additionally, implementing action 12.3.2 (air reconnaissance) states "...C4I [CRP] to develop PME package on tactical and operational level air reconnaissance capabilities (e.g.. UAV, VMAQ, Quickfix, Guardrail, JSTARS, U2R) for delivery to MCCDC during 3d QTR FY94."(44) Further information regarding who should present the material, what schools should teach an air reconnaissance package, and what the learning objectives are is not contained in the document. Air reconnaissance training, however, should also be examined in light of the PME objectives listed above.

The implementing actions represented the "bread and butter" part of the intelligence implementation plan, providing a viable course of action. The approach taken was methodical, logical, and integrated along the lines of doctrine, training, and manpower/structure requirements. The implementing actions provided a long-term solution to a major functional area, intelligence. The plan was produced with the cooperation of every major staff section of Headquarters Marine Corps, up to and including the Executive Assistant (EA) level. MCCDC Formal Training Division participated fully. The Fleet Marine Force (FMF) had participated in the Intelligence Study Groups. Now, a decision was needed.

Approval and Execution of the Plan

The C4I Intelligence Implementation Plan required approval of the Executive Steering Group (ESG). The ESG is a panel comprised of every Lieutenant General serving with the Marine Corps, plus the chair, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC). The function of the ESG is to review items with regard to policy, procedures, and operations that have an effect Marine Corps wide, make recommendations and seek guidance from the Commandant of the Marine Corps as required, and ensure that directed actions are being implemented. The C4I Intelligence Implementation Plan was formally briefed at the March 94 ESG meeting. A prior meeting during December 93 had required some additional changes and coordination based on guidance from ACMC. Since then, all Department EAs had briefed again, and the March 94 meeting represented the decision brief on the plan. The plan was approved at the meeting. During discussion, General Boomer, ACMC, noted that this (changes in the intelligence field) was something that the Marine Corps had needed to do for a long time; it was time to make an investment.(45) With the meeting completed, the C4I Intelligence Implementation Plan became the Marine Corps Implementation Plan. Based on the ESG decision and guidance by General Boomer, changes started to be made almost immediately.

Major General Van Riper met with Colonel Clark and other action officers to plan the next steps of implementation. Major General Van Riper determined that a public affairs campaign was essential to the success of the plan. Therefore, he held meetings and discussions with senior officers from Marine Forces

Atlantic (MARFORLANT) and Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), spoke to Marines in the fleet about the coming changes at every opportunity, provided interviews with professional journals and publications on the status of Marine Corps Intelligence to include the Navy Times, and drafted an All Marines (ALMAR) message for release.(46) CG MCCDC and AC/S, C4I now had to coordinate execution of the implementing actions.

Since authorization by the ESG and Force Structure Working Group (FSWG)(47) had been granted for implementation, C4I started making changes. A review of relevant actions that have taken place to date follows:(48)

a. **(1) Implementing Action 12.3.1. Incorporate capabilities, limitations, planning and integration of intelligence, counterintelligence and collection organizations into PME curriculums**.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- Identify and implement PME requirements for intelligence. PME requirements are identified in the document (and are included in this document above), **but no implementing action was planned or is ongoing.**

- Convert MOS 9910 instructor billets to 0202 at TBS, AWS, and C&SC. Billet modifications have been approved. Command and Control Systems Course currently has an intelligence officer on the staff. The Basic School, Amphibious Warfare School, and Command and Staff College will also be receiving intelligence officers on their instructor staff. Additional staffing requirements will be addressed later in this paper.

b. (1) Implementing Action 12.3.2. **Incorporate into the PME system instruction on the capability and employment of air reconnaissance.**

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- C4I to develop a "PME package" on tactician and operational level air reconnaissance capabilities for delivery to MCCDC during FY 94. No "package" has been delivered, although some schools offer minimal training on air reconnaissance. This requirement should be integrated into Implementing Action 12.3.1.

- Joint targeting course in development. Under the Navy as the Executive Agent for the course, a joint targeting course has been developed at NMITC, with instruction commencing during calendar year 96.

Concerns for Instruction at MCU

All of the implementing actions are currently on track, *with the exception of the sections pertaining to*

professional military education.(49) If intelligence is being taught at Marine Corps University (and it is, in varying degrees, at most of the formal schools), it is because of other initiatives that *may no longer be consistent* with the guidance found in the Marine Corps implementation plan for intelligence. Concerns regarding intelligence training at MCU have been voiced recently by General Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and LtGen Van Riper, Commanding General, MCCDC.(50) As recently as November 95, LtGen Van Riper indicated that he did not have a strong feeling about current intelligence instruction in our PME schools.(51) To study the issue, a meeting was held at MCCDC on 19 December 95 to discuss intelligence training at MCU. Some of the conclusions of that meeting were:

a. **The current number of instructors dedicated to teaching intelligence at MCU is inadequate.** MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) has been attempting to assist in instruction, but the schools do not have enough instructors on their staff. This will be rectified in the near future as the new intelligence billets at the schools are staffed, most during the next summer rotation.

b. MCU needs to identify future instruction gaps. This item was assigned to MCU Operations Officer, for coordination of other schools and MSTP. This problem is also temporary, based on the current lack of intelligence officers assigned to MCU.

c. The intelligence instruction at MCU needs to be validated and updated. MCU is initiating a curriculum review board during the second quarter of FY 96 to address the issue. Intelligence subject matter experts will participate in the review.(52) Doctrine Division will also participate.

d. The C4I portion of the Commander's Course needs to be reviewed for its intelligence content. C4I will review the issue. This item was also addressed in the implementing actions of the Intelligence Implementation Plan.

e. Future intelligence instruction at MCU needs revision. Instructors will be reporting to individual schools during the Summer of 1996, but there is no course instruction plan prepared. One of the solutions addressed at the 19 December meeting (with representatives from MCCDC, MCU, and HQMC) was this paper.(53)

f. Intelligence instruction at TBS needs a review and update of course materials. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity agreed to handle the requirement for the remainder of the year, although they are not staffed to conduct regular PME instruction. TBS will also be receiving an intelligence officer to provide instruction on its staff. **All** schools scheduled to have intelligence officers will have those billets staffed by the summer of 1996.(54), (55)

From the results of this meeting, it is clear that (1) interest in improving our intelligence instruction continues to exist at the highest levels, and (2) training and education issues regarding intelligence have suffered from a lack of communication and coordination. Additionally, other problems also need to be surfaced that were not highlighted in either the meeting or the implementing actions. They include (1) an

examination of PME instruction for enlisted Marines, and (2) a review of non-resident instruction through the Marine Corps Institute (which is part of MCU). If these two fields are not looked at, the solution is not complete.

Based on approval of the intelligence implementation plan and ongoing actions, the following actions remain unresolved:

a. Course development for PME schools, as defined by the training stipulated in the intelligence implementation plan.

b. Course development for the Commander's Course, as stipulated in the intelligence implementation plan.

c. Other areas that are essential for a successful intelligence instruction plan, but not considered or implemented by CG MCCDC or HQMC/C4I. Specifically, these areas include:

(1) Requirements for training enlisted Marines.

(2) Non-resident training.

(3) An intelligence review process for PME instruction.(56)

Assignment of Additional Intelligence Instructors to MCU

The placement of intelligence instructors on school staffs has become a contentious issue at MCU. As mentioned previously, TBS, AWS, CCSC, and C&SC are all scheduled to have intelligence officers assigned to them by the summer of 96 (CCSC already has an instructor on the staff, Major Eric Segarra). At the 19 DEC 95 intelligence training meeting held at MCIA, Quantico, VA, several of the participants recommended that intelligence personnel be "pooled," working together to standardize training and conduct courses at the different schools as required.(57) Consolidating your personnel allows a synthesis of skills and experience to be used to their utmost, according to some attendees of the meeting.(58) This approach is currently being used by the logistics community, and has been used in the past by intelligence personnel under the former MAGTF Instruction Team (MIT) concept.(59) LtCol John Taxeras, Operations Officer for MCU, stated his preference for the consolidated approach, because of the "synergy" realized by 4 instructors, vice "one guy deep" at each school.(60) He also discussed the ease of supporting additional requirements such as mobile training teams, the SNCO Academy, and the Commanders Course through the consolidated approach. Additionally, LtCol Taxeras felt that the team approach provided a means of supporting doctrinal reviews and standardizing lesson plans. Finally, LtCol Taxeras noted that a team approach (if adopted similarly to the Logistics Instruction Team) would work for the Operations Officer of the University, meaning the instructional direction of the President of the University would be adhered to instead of individual Directors of Schools.(61) LtGen Van Riper has

stated that he is not in favor of consolidating the intelligence personnel under a pool concept. This should not be surprising, since he was an early advocate of assigning intelligence personnel to the various schools. Some officers have argued that schools assignments are important because the intelligence officer must be *integrated* into the staff just as intelligence must be integrated into the operational concept in the fleet.(62) Major Eric Segarra a current intelligence instructor and Command Control, and Systems Course, discussed the value of having an intelligence officer integrated in the school staff during a recent interview.(63) Segarra noted the problem of being "inundated" by collateral duties and other responsibilities as a Faculty Advisor, but also stated that there is a big value of actually being on the staff. He noted that the Logistics Instruction Team "can't stay in touch" with the current instruction of the school, that their instruction does not "blend" well with the rest of the instruction. He stated that students refer to the Logistics Team approach as "canned classes," frequently having little relevance to the rest of the instruction. He stated that CCSC currently has 3-4 weeks of intelligence instruction during the school year. He also noted that each school at MCU has a different mission, student population, and mode of teaching.(64)

Two other interviews offered a different perspective on the best way to use the limited intelligence instructors that will be assigned to MCU. LtCol Stephen Carnes is currently assigned as a faculty advisor at Command & Staff College.(65) He noted that it is extremely difficult to serve as an effective Faculty Advisor and as a full-time instructor. Additionally, he noted that the Director of the school has made it clear that the primary focus of every faculty advisor should be on their conference groups. Therefore, assigning additional tasks to a faculty advisor (such as instructing an intelligence package) will have the effect of assigning another collateral duty.(66) Finally, an opinion was solicited from a noted civilian educator, Dr. James Roberts.(67) Dr. Roberts noted that in his experience, "...one-person departments don't work." He stated that one person could do a fine job, but, on the other hand, "...you could be in the school and not know what is going on." He believed the benefits of synergy achieved by consolidating the intelligence personnel at the university was the superior solution. The Basic School, Career Level Schools, and Intermediate Level Schools each need intelligence courses developed. In an interview with LtCol J.G. Hughes, Branch Head, Occupational Field Management and Structure Branch, Resources Division, C4I, HQMC, he stated that inbound instructors need a starting point of course materials already developed, or the first year of their tour will be spent simply developing this material.(68) Based on the training requirements listed in the Intelligence Implementation Document, the PME training is divided into TBS, Career Level School, and Intermediate Level School. This means that training for Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Control Systems Course (both a Phase I CLS) could be standardized in their learning objectives. The intelligence instruction will have to be designed to compliment the missions of the separate schools, taking into account the different student populations and unique curriculums of each. Therefore, there are three separate course development packages in need of development: TBS, CLS, and ILS (the Commander's Course will be handled separately).

Integration of Intelligence Instruction into Current Curricula

Recommendations for intelligence training must be developed along established guidelines. First, we must answer the question of who is directing this effort? The answer is the Executive Steering Group,

Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Commanding General of MCCDC.(69) What guidelines are to be used in establishing training requirements for intelligence? All training standards should be developed using the Combat Development Process, specifically, the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS). MAA-12, Intelligence, is part of CBRS. The recommended plan for correcting these deficiencies is contained in the Intelligence Implementation Plan. Finally, specific recommendations regarding training must be consistent with guidance contained in the Individual Training Standards (ITS) for the Intelligence Occupational Field, as well as the USMC Systems Approach to Training (SAT) manual.(70) These documents provide the guidelines for developing and implementing education and training programs. The ITS Order for intelligence is important because our training of the general military community must be *consistent* with more detailed training that is designed for the intelligence occupational field.(71) Finally, we must determine the level of detail required for the implementation of a new intelligence training plan. LtCol J.G. Hughes, HQMC/C4I/CRP, stated that he considered it essential to have a detailed training plan, again citing the shortage of intelligence instructors currently on the staff. Additionally, instructors must be given a standardized starting point, reflecting the recent changes in structure, doctrine, and training; many of the instructors may not have access to complete information regarding these changes.(72) Clearly, then, a detailed training plan needs to be developed that focuses on the subjects needing to be taught, not how they are presented.

The Basic School presents the first challenge for intelligence instruction. No intelligence officer is currently assigned to the school, though one will be assigned during the summer of 96. Intelligence instruction during the entire Basic School curriculum is currently limited to two one-hour courses, providing rudimentary instruction pertaining to the functions of Marine Corps intelligence, the intelligence cycle, and intelligence reporting.(73) Additional field training relating to intelligence is occasionally conducted, based on the desires of the company commander or student platoon commanders. This training normally emphasizes intelligence reporting at the battalion level or covers the details of debriefing patrols. Based on the implementation plan, numerous changes are required.

Career Level Schools (CLS) offer unique instructional challenges. The first challenge is that there are two resident schools, Amphibious Warfare School, and Command, Control and Systems School. Command, Control and Systems School already has an intelligence instructor on the staff, while Amphibious Warfare School will be staffed during the summer of 96. Both instructors will have to integrate their training within their own particular syllabus.(74) The training objectives, however, remain the same. The next challenge is that Captains attending CLS may have anywhere from 5-11 years of commissioned service. This means that their initial training and formal education (TBS), MOS training, and FMF experiences vary greatly. Since the intelligence implementation plan is just being implemented now, none have received formal instruction on the ongoing changes. Until all officers attending CLS have received some fundamental intelligence instruction at TBS, we must assume that they require a review of the ongoing doctrinal and structural changes in the intelligence field before addressing their specific educational objectives.(75)

Intermediate Level School (ILS) requires the officer to understand the role of intelligence from the tactical to the national level. While Command and Staff College emphasizes the operational art of war,

intelligence must show connectivity from the SRIG to the use of national space systems. The training goal is to instill the role intelligence plays in the planning and execution of the MAGTF as the warfighter, and its relationship to the Joint Force Commander (JFC), theater, and national intelligence systems. Colonel Pratt, former Director of Command and Staff College, had proposed a Marine Corps Systems Exploitation Facility (MCSEF) to demonstrate the C4I systems currently employed at the theater and MAGTF level.(76) Colonel Pratt felt strongly that ILS officers need to understand the C4I systems, be able to see them working, and understand their fundamental capabilities to support the MAGTF. This requirement remains as an education objective (5) below, although an alternative means to achieve the result will be offered in chapter 3. Several graduates of Command & Staff College will be assigned as MEF planners and staff officers; it is essential that these officers understand the capabilities and limitations of Marine Corps intelligence, as well as what can be obtained from the theater and national intelligence systems. Whenever possible, during seminar discussion, *use the intelligence personnel within the conference groups* to instill educational objectives. Officers attending C & SC should already be proficient in their MOS. Use the intelligence officers. Additionally, *whenever possible, intelligence products and systems should be shown to the students*, not just talked about. In order to be effective, do not block training by separate sub-disciplines (i.e. SIGINT, IMINT, etc.). Demonstrate an integrated intelligence community, working together. Discussion on the effort to remove the stovepipes from intelligence would be appropriate, as would a discussion regarding changes in the doctrine, training and education, and structure of the intelligence community. Read-ahead packages should center on discussing the intelligence implementation plan, the intelligence battalion and SRIG, DSTs, and connectivity to national systems.

Due to the unique challenges facing intelligence instructors for the commander's course, different instructional techniques may have to be used. Existing material from TBS, CLS, and ILS could be used, much of it in a read-ahead package only. Instruction pertaining to the educational objectives is the responsibility of the MCU Operations Officer. If intelligence instructors are assigned to the four schools as currently planned, the C & SC instructor (the senior intelligence instructor) could be delegated to prepare an instruction package, using material from other instructors, as applicable. This package would be provided to each commander during the commander's course. Material should be updated annually. At least one course (1 hour in length) should be presented to the commanders by an MCU intelligence instructor. The focus should be on the use of intelligence in the planning process, and how intelligence drives operations. Integration of the staffs should be a central theme, as well as coordination of planning, and use of the commander's intent. All educational objectives should be covered in a read-ahead package. Points of contact for intelligence personnel should be provided to the commanders. These POCs should include each MEF G-2, each major subordinate command G-2, the component G-2, a Doctrine Division POC, a training standards POC, and the Occupational Field Specialist for Intelligence POC. Instructing the commanding officers on intelligence is no less important than at the Marine Corps Schools. Current structure limitations and the abbreviated training schedule will simply not permit resident instruction. The MCU Operations Officer should ensure that these objectives are met, using whatever means necessary.

Additional Concerns

Annual Course Curriculum Review Boards (CCRBs) are essential for the maintenance of intelligence instruction. Based on the increase of intelligence instructors allocated for Marine Corps University, the recommended approach would be to let the schools run their own curriculum boards, but allow other intelligence instructors to observe. In the first few years of instruction, instructors will be able to learn much from each other. Techniques tried at one school may well have relevance for a similar course at another school. It is essential that the Dean of Academics, Course Director, and Director of the School stay actively involved in the CCRB process. Without their comments and participation, intelligence instruction could continue to be diffused with the rest of the instruction blocks. Participation from HQMC/C4I/CRP, Standards Branch, MCCDC, Doctrine Division, and the FMF should also be encouraged.(77) The CCRB would identify weaknesses in the intelligence curriculum, note doctrinal or structural changes that need to be implemented, identify a means of standardization among the intelligence instructors at MCCDC, and provide a forum for the effectiveness of the instruction within the FMF. Input from student critiques will be especially important in the first 36 months of new instructional development. Consolidating the CCRB for all intelligence instructors will ensure that each instructor learns from the trials of others.

The largest student population in the Marine Corps also needs to meet these intelligence objectives. More Marines receive their instruction through non-resident education from the Marine Corps Institute (MCI) than any other source. Professional Military Education is mandated as service policy for career progression. How then, can we reach the many thousands of Marines desiring to learn more about the intelligence field? How can we ensure that the non-resident equivalent courses contain the same high quality of instruction? Current intelligence structure for MCI is limited to one Staff Sergeant, MOS 0231.(78) This structure is simply inadequate to write the changes, update the latest doctrine, and incorporate the training objectives contained herein.(79) These courses were not examined by the Intelligence Study Group or C4I, but it is clear that further changes in this area (non-resident education) may be necessary. Non-resident education continues to be the most effective means of teaching large quantities of Marines.

CHAPTER 3

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis of the preceding chapter, it is clear that a consensus has not been reached on the best way to proceed for improving intelligence instruction within MCU. Therefore, the following recommendations are submitted, with justification:

a. **Intelligence instructors should be pooled under the cognizance of the Operations Officer, MCU**. Pooling allows the instructors to dedicate the majority of their time to the preparation of intelligence courses and instruction, instead of managing those courses as a collateral duty. The result will be standardized intelligence instruction throughout the university.

Each school should designate an officer responsible for ensuring intelligence courses are integrated into

the curriculum. This officer would make recommendations concerning ways to integrate intelligence courses, participate in course curriculum review boards, and serve as a liaison with the school and the Operations Officer of MCU regarding intelligence instruction.

Intelligence officers should continue to serve on the staffs of schools as they currently do today. The concern raised by several personnel regarding intelligence officers being seen as integrated into the staff can be easily overcome by the continuance of assigning qualified officers to MOS 9910 billets, as is done today. Command & Staff College alone has two intelligence instructors on the faculty, serving as faculty advisors. As the intelligence occupational field gets healthier, the number of personnel assigned to MOS 9910 billets will continue to increase. The goal is to make intelligence an integral vice a peripheral subject during the school year. The Marine Corps has stated that it has made a major commitment to improve the intelligence field. One of the key ways that we can prove this commitment is by the way that we assign our intelligence instructors. Instruction is a full-time job, and should be addressed accordingly.

b. **Intelligence instruction that is prepared and presented must be in support of objectives directed by HQMC**. Those objectives are described in Chapter 2 and the Intelligence Implementation Plan. They are, in fact, directive in nature, and are not currently being adhered to. Therefore, the following courses are recommended:

(1) Training objectives(80) for **TBS** include:

(a) Thoroughly ingrain that intelligence is a battlefield function equal in importance to fire support and maneuver.

(b) Familiarize with our intelligence system(s).

(c) Demonstrate how intelligence supports the commander.

The following intelligence instruction should be implemented:

Introduction to Intelligence

Summary. This three hour course should cover the following topics:

- Definition of intelligence. How does intelligence differ from information?

- Introduction to the five intelligence officer MOSs (0202, 0203 0204, 0206, 0207).

- Explanation of the intelligence training tracks.

- Introduction to intelligence functions (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, General Military

Intelligence).

- Introduction to the intelligence cycle (include the new step of utilization).

- Intelligence drives operations. Cite an example and explain how intelligence is incorporated into the planning and execution of an operation.

Objectives covered: (a) and (b).

Introduction to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB).

This eight hour course should cover the following items:

- IPB is an essential part of the Commander's planning process.

- IPB assists the Commander in shaping the battlespace.

- All staff sections participate in the IPB process.

- IPB is a continuous process.

- IPB is relevant from the fire team level to the Joint Force Commander.

- The focus of IPB is on the thought process, the analysis, not the product.

- IPB is a tool for analysis of the enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and likely courses of action.

Objectives covered: (c)

MAGTF Intelligence

This three hour course should cover the following items:

- Introduction to MAGTF intelligence assets. Discussion of the roles and capabilities of the SRIG, MAFC, Intelligence Battalion and Intelligence Company, Radio Battalion, Scout/Sniper Platoon, Force Reconnaissance Company, Division Reconnaissance Company, UAV squadrons, and VMAQ squadrons. Emphasis is on the way these organizations support the commander, and how they provide timely intelligence.

- Role of the G-2/S-2. Emphasis is on the battalion/squadron level.

- Relationship of the S-2 and S-3, and Commander. Stress intelligence drives operations.

- Role of the National Intelligence Community. What is the Marine Corps' place in the National Intelligence Community, and how do they support the MAGTF? Include examples of National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) support to the MAGTF.

- Introduction to intelligence reporting.

Objectives covered: (b) and (c).(81)

Practical Application

During field training, the following areas should be covered:

- Reporting of combat information.

- Using intelligence products for planning and execution (imagery, topographic products, intelligence summaries, and SIGINT reports). **Recommend requesting assistance from SRIGs for production of support products, thereby emphasizing what the Marine is likely to see and use in the FMF.**

- Role playing of the battalion S-2 by staff and students.

- Analytical exercise development to determine enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and likely courses of action (DRAW-D).

Objectives covered: (b) and (c).

(2) The following training objectives have been identified for **CLS**:

(a) Review our intelligence system.

(b) Illustrate responsibilities of all to our intelligence system.

(c) Establish expectations of our intelligence system.

(d) Familiarize with procedures used by S-2/G-2 to meet those expectations.

(e) Demonstrate the role of intelligence in planning.

(f) Illustrate how intelligence can drive operations.

The following CLS intelligence courses should be implemented:

MAGTF Intelligence

This five hour course (three hours of lecture followed by a two hour seminar) should cover the following items:

- Review of intelligence officer MOSs (0202, 0203, 0204, 0206, 0207).

- Review of intelligence organizations within the MAGTF. These include SRIG, Intelligence Battalion, Intelligence Company, Radio Battalion, Force Reconnaissance Company, Division Reconnaissance Company, UAV Squadron, VMAQ Squadron, Scout/Sniper Platoons.

- **Employment of Direct Support Teams within the MAGTF.** Emphasis on the difference between organizations that use and produce intelligence. Discuss the ways the MAGTF Commander can shape the battlespace by employing these assets.

- Review of the intelligence cycle. Emphasis on the utilization step.

- National Intelligence Community support to the MAGTF (NIST).

- Theater and national intelligence systems in support of the MAGTF.

Intelligence objectives covered: (a), (d).

Intelligence Planning

This 5 hour course includes 3 hours of lecture, followed by a 2 hour practical application. Items covered include:

Lecture - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. Discuss the role of IPB in support of the commander's planning process. Demonstrate the integration of IPB to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), and establishment of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), identification of collection requirements and gaps.

- Intelligence Collection Management. Discuss who participates in the management of the collection assets. Discuss redundancy, tasking, multiple source coverage, timeliness, reserving assets, theater and national assistance, and dissemination. Introduce a collection management worksheet (students only require a familiarization with the worksheet).

- Demonstrate how intelligence drives operations. Cite an example (i.e. Desert Shield/Desert Storm) and

illustrate the intelligence cycle, starting with the planning process, ending with execution of a mission based on tactical intelligence (utilization).

Practical Application

- Conduct a practical application with Faculty Advisors in the conference groups. Dedicate the first half of the time to development of IPB templates, demonstrating named areas of interest, target areas of interest, decision points, and templating the enemy order of battle.

- Dedicate the second half of the time to a scenario of developing an intelligence collection plan (actual worksheets are at the discretion of the instructor). Discuss how the intelligence would be disseminated in a timely manner.

- Discuss employment of the DSTs at the command element, ACE, GCE, and CSSE.

Intelligence objectives covered: (b), (c), (d), and (e).

Intelligence Seminar

- This 1 1/2 hour seminar, conducted in the conference groups, should discuss the effectiveness of the Marine Corps intelligence community. Does it support the commander? What are the roles of the other staff sections in developing intelligence requirements? Is intelligence responsive to our needs on the battlefield? Why does intelligence drive operations? What should we realistically expect from intelligence?

Intelligence objectives covered: (a) and (c).

War Gaming

- During war gaming, ensure that events support the intelligence training objectives already taught. Demonstrate intelligence in the planning and execution of a mission, and the effectiveness of tactical intelligence. Emphasis for the intelligence support to the war games should be targeted at the regimental and battalion level. Practice employing collection assets and the DSTs. Ensure that a means of dissemination and systems connectivity is planned for. **Staff support for events supporting the intelligence training objectives is essential during war games.** If time permits, discuss national system connectivity [i.e. Trojan Spirit, Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP)].

Intelligence objectives covered: (a), (b), (d), (e), and (f).

(3) Training objectives for **ILS** include:

(a) Thoroughly ingrain product expectations from our intelligence systems.

(b) Familiarize with how a commander or staff can help the S-2/G- 2 or intelligence unit commander to optimize performance of our intelligence system.

(c) Utilize realistic intelligence in planning.

(d) Demonstrate how intelligence must drive operations.

(e) Familiarize with how to integrate our MAGTF intelligence system with joint and combined systems.

These training objectives will be met by the following means:

Intelligence Collection (Secret, U.S. officers only) 2 hours

- Provide an overview of national and theater intelligence collection systems.

- Show examples of national, theater, and tactical intelligence products. Cite how these products could be used, and when (planning, execution).

- Discuss availability of national and theater products, capabilities of collection systems, establishment of collection priorities, and responsiveness (timeliness).

- Discuss national agencies involved in tasking, and the military interface to these agencies.

- Discuss the role of the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC).

- Discuss the NIST (recommend NIST guest speaker to discuss their capabilities, preferably with one of the Marine Corps officers on the staff).

Intelligence training objectives covered: (1) and (5).

Intelligence Systems Connectivity Course and Tour (Secret, U.S. officers only) 4 hours; two hour lecture, two hour tour of Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, MCCDC.(82)

- Discuss intelligence connectivity within the MAGTF, means of reporting and dissemination.

- Discuss means of connectivity to national and theater intelligence sources.

- Discuss intelligence pull, and broadcast technology.

-Provide an overview of intelligence systems such as Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Intelligence Analysis System (IAS), Trojan Spirit, and others. Emphasize those systems that will be seen at MCIA or at a later date.

- Conduct a tour of MCIA to view the intelligence systems currently fielded. Provide station time to try systems, view products, and talk to systems operators. Discuss system limitations as well as capabilities, particularly when deployed to an expeditionary environment.

Intelligence training objectives covered: (1), (3), and (5).

Seminar on Intelligence 3 hours

- Use students that are intelligence officers to lead the discussion (the current mix provides approximately one trained intelligence officer per conference room).(83)

- Discuss intelligence during the planning process. Examine the roles of the commander and other staff officers in developing IPB and PIRs.

- Discuss the shortfalls of MAGTF intelligence.

- Discuss the ongoing changes in Marine Corps intelligence.

-Discuss whether intelligence really drives operations...why or why not?

Intelligence training objectives covered: (2) and (4).

Intelligence Planning 2 hours(84)

- Discuss IPB from an overview perspective (assigned readings should be used for detailed study). Note the roles of the staff and the commander, and the importance of IPB to the commander's planning process.

- Discuss the intelligence cycle; note that it is continuous, and now includes the step of utilization. Discuss why that step was added, and the relationship the new DST concept has to utilization.

- Provide examples of intelligence driving operations during the planning and execution process.

- Discuss intelligence pull, and how it is applied to maneuver warfare.

Intelligence training objectives covered: (2), (3), and (4).

Practical Application and War Gaming (as required)

- Intelligence products, either actual or produced for exercise support, should be used whenever possible during practical application and war gaming. Students must gain an appreciation for seeing, using, and understanding intelligence products in the planning and execution phases. Intelligence should be scripted into practical applications and controlled by the intelligence instructor on the staff.(85) The intelligence instructor must be allowed to be proactive.

Intelligence training objectives covered: (1) and (3).

MAGTF Intelligence Demonstration (half day)

The intelligence instructor should attempt to coordinate a static demonstration day with II MEF, to demonstrate the intelligence systems and capabilities of the MAGTF.(86) CLS schools may be invited to attend based on availability and pertinence (although the visits would be more effective if they were conducted at different times, such as CLS in the a.m. and ILS during the p.m.). The goal would be to demonstrate the intelligence systems currently employed. SCAMP, FIIU, Scout/Sniper, Force and Division Reconnaissance, CI and Interrogator Translator personnel, topographic personnel, analysts from the MAFC, IAS, a UAV ground receive station, and Radio Reconnaissance personnel are just some of the possibilities. Coordination would have to be made well in advance, and funding would be a school responsibility.(87) The opportunity for learning, however, would be unmatched.

Intelligence training objectives covered: (1) through (5).

Intelligence instruction for commanding officers is also mandated. The problems relating to this instruction concern (1) no intelligence instructors available for support of the commanders course, (2) only 10 instruction days are available (with little or no flexibility in the schedule), and (3) assignments for these officers varies from an infantry battalion to a maintenance battalion. Non-FMF commands are also included in the course. The intelligence requirements of these commanders will vary accordingly. Intelligence education requirements are:

Commanders must thoroughly understand the following:

(1) Capabilities and limitations of our intelligence system.

(2) Architecture of our intelligence system.

(3) Commander's role in focusing and prioritizing the intelligence effort.

(4) How intelligence is synchronized with other battlefield functions.

(5) Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

(6) How to utilize intelligence in planning.

(7) How to use intelligence to drive operations.

(8) How to infuse intelligence training into exercises.

c. **Current and planned intelligence structure at MCU is not adequate to meet the required instruction**. Therefore, a *civilian intelligence instructor* should be added to the structure of MCU. This instructor should also be assigned to the intelligence training section, modeled under the current logistics training team concept. The civilian instructor would be responsible for coordinating mobile training team support, conducting liaison with other service schools and national intelligence agencies/organizations, representing MCU during discussions relating to intelligence doctrine and training standards within MCCDC, preparing instruction (including read-ahead packages) for the commanders' course, preparing instructional support for other MCU schools, and coordinating non-resident training support. The current structure recommendations did not foresee the many additional requirements that are levied by the intelligence implementation document.(88) A civilian instructor would provide the continuity, standardization, and coordination required to accomplish the many educational objectives now facing the intelligence community. Recommendations for the one person structure would be a re-alignment from Marine Corps Intelligence Activity or Office of Naval Intelligence.(89)

d. The Assistant Occupational Field Specialist for Intelligence, HQMC/C4I/CRP must **identify PME intelligence requirements for enlisted Marines**, coordinating this effort with Standards Branch, Formal Training Division, CG MCCDC. Without addressing the SNCO Academy as well as the many other schools and courses attended primarily be enlisted Marines, this paper only provides a partial recommendation. The efforts of HQMC were focused on the officer corps. Enlisted Marines also must have intelligence educational objectives, for the same reasons our officer PME must be modified in this and other areas. The first step is to identify educational objectives. The next step is to determine the best method of instruction, and the last step is determining what will be needed to accomplish that instruction (manpower, time, non-resident assistance, etc.). HQMC/C4I should take the lead on examining these issues.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Implementation of this intelligence education plan requires the support and concurrence of several different offices. CG MCCDC's support is essential for a smooth implementation. His role is to offer guidance and direction, and evaluate possible structure changes.(90) He also can coordinate the actions by the President of MCU, MCIA, Doctrine Division, and Formal Training Division. The President of MCU must provide oversight for implementation of the plan, provide required support for establishment

of the commanders' intelligence instruction, as well as ensuring that the schools provide quality, standardized, and useful courses to their respective students. The Schools' Directors must integrate the intelligence instruction into their syllabi, ensuring that it compliments their own mission statements while complying with the direction from higher headquarters. AC/S, C4I must be involved to ensure that the instruction is implemented in consonance with the guidance received from the Commandant and the ESG, as outlined in the Intelligence Implementation Plan. He must coordinate with CG MCCDC on changes in the occupational field (i.e. standup of the intelligence battalions) and provide representation for CCRBs. The most important people, however, are the instructors. They will require the support of MCU, HQMC, school directors, and fellow faculty members. They must determine the "how" of this implementation plan. This is especially true since doctrine, training, and structure are likely to continue to evolve. The time required to train the students, prepare read-ahead packages, plan the lecture to seminar mix, and the integration of alternative styles of teaching such as video or digitized training, all need the dedication and support of strong intelligence instructors. Much of the new intelligence syllabus will take approximately the same amount of time as current instruction. It may take more. Schools do not have "free time," nor the luxury of expanding their course lengths. Creativity and alternative teaching styles may have to be considered. This also falls within the lap of the new instructors, working with the support of the staffs and directors.

PME intelligence instruction is the last step to be implemented. Doctrine is being re-written. MOS training tracks have been changed. Structural plus-ups are being implemented. This (PME instruction) represents a crucial step in the intelligence implementation process. Without PME instruction, the field of intelligence could still change radically within its little realm. The changes would not cause a ripple, however, because no one would understand or care about new doctrine, structure, or training tracks. We need to instruct from a holistic approach, demonstrating how the changes in intelligence are good for the Marine Corps, not just the intelligence field. The Marine Corps' new concept of intelligence support for expeditionary operations represents an improvement in our warfighting capability. This is what must be taught at our schools, written about in our journals, discussed in seminars and our working spaces. This [intelligence] change represents a real improvement for the Marine Corps as a whole, and affects all Marines, regardless of billet or MOS. This is what must be instilled through the PME instruction. Could we accomplish that instruction by continuing to have guest speakers from the beltway as opposed to adding officers to our university? No. We must instill in our schools what we practice in the FMF. Training, planning, and executing must be integrated; intelligence and operations, logistics, C4I, fires, maneuver, protection. Integration of the instructional staff within MCU is absolutely essential if we are to gain the credibility of the students. To be successful, the cooperation of several people from numerous organizations aboard MCCDC Quantico, HQMC, the Fleet Marine Force, and the supporting establishment will have to work together. This study attempted to identify a deficiency and offer a course of action. The real work will be done by the new instructors. With their dedication and initiative, intelligence in the Marine Corps will have a new and better way of supporting the warfighters...that is what intelligence is all about.

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1. The term "structure" refers to the billets that are required to accomplish the command mission. Structure does not equate to manning, which is the process of placing personnel in specific billets. The Marine Corps has more structure spaces than manning available, which means a determination has to made concerning which billets will be filled, and which ones will not be filled.

2. Major General Van Riper directed the use of CBRS for the process, and directed close working relationships be established between HQMC/C4I and MCCDC for this project. This was directed at a meeting with MajGen Van Riper and project action officers during AUG 93, at MCIA, Quantico, VA.

3. According to LtCol J.D. Williams, Doctrine Division, MCCDC, as of JAN 96.

4. According to HQMC/MMOA and C4I/CRP action officers, as of MAR 96.

5. The four members of the team were LtCol (sel) J.G. Hughes, MAJ Rick Raftery, MAJ Alden Hingle, and MAJ (sel) R. J. Buikema. CWO3 Will Sturgill also served intermittently as a member of the PAT. Due to manpower and structure shortages in the intelligence field, these officers were assigned on a Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) basis from various organizations under an agreement with the Deputy Director for Intelligence, HQMC, Mr. John Guenther. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided Hingle, Buikema, and Sturgill, HQMC provided Hughes, and Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) provided Raftery.

6. MajGen Van Riper stated during a meeting at MCIA, Quantico, VA in AUG 93 that he wanted this document to be the first document to be submitted formally through the CBRS process. In a show of support for the strong working relationship and appreciation for the CBRS process, MajGen Van Riper stated at the same meeting that when he was posted as AC/S, C4I, he reported aboard to CG MCCDC, MajGen Fulford, in acknowledgment that no changes would occur without the coordination and support of the MCCDC Marines (MajGen Van Riper actually worked for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, not CG MCCDC).

7. Quotes of Major General Van Riper, as taken from meeting notes of the author.

8. MajGen Van Riper was referring to the intelligence field as divided into distinct domains, each with supporters in the Marine Corps. These domains are Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare, Imagery Intelligence, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence, and the generalist field of MAGTF intelligence officers (including all others). Each domain understood that potential cuts in structure, manning, and funds could be associated with any changes in the status quo.

9. United States Marine Corps, **Intelligence Roadmap**, Washington, April 1993. See page 1, Introduction. The Roadmap reads "The United States Senate Committee on Armed Services directed that the Commandant of the Marine Corps submit a roadmap for improving Marine Corps intelligence capabilities." (p.1). No specific documentation, however, was discovered indicating when the committee directed this roadmap.

10. While MajGen Van Riper was assigned as AC/S, C4I during April 93, the Intelligence Roadmap was already completed.

11. Department of the Navy, **From the Sea**, Washington, 1992.

12. That date was never met. The document remains in draft form only, and has had over 30 revisions.

13. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Studies and Analysis Division), **Mission Area**

Analysis (MAA) for Intelligence (1993-2003) Study, Final Report, Quantico, VA, 15 DEC 94.

14. According to Mr. John Guenther, Deputy Director for Intelligence, HQMC/C4I, during a briefing to the PAT, AUG, 93 at HQMC. The additional guidance to HQMC was delivered orally only by Senate staffers (unnamed).

15. As described by Mr. Guenther during discussions with the PAT, 15 JUL 93.

16. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Studies and Analysis Division), **Mission Area Analysis (MAA) for Intelligence Study, 1991-2000**, Final Report, Quantico, VA, 7 May 91.

17. For a specific review of deficiencies, see MAA-12, FEB 94, Section 5.

18. Doctrine is at the very core of our training requirements, as well as determining our structure requirements. Without a strong doctrinal foundation, we fail to have a common understanding of what we are trying to accomplish, and how we are trying to accomplish it.

19. The intelligence field was primarily reserved for Limited Duty Officers, Female Officers, and Warrant Officers until the late 1970s. As late as 1983, Marine Amphibious Units were commonly deploying without an unrestricted officer as the S-2. Consequently, the intelligence field became renowned for its high percentage of lateral move officers, personnel who had minimal intelligence training, but were possibly serving in senior intelligence billets. Limited Duty Officers, Warrant Officers, and Female Officers certainly can and do make significant contributions to the intelligence field. By limiting unrestricted male officers, however, we were restricting a significant pool of potential intelligence officers from even being considered. Causes of this deficiency were identified as:

(a) The officer accession policy. Until fiscal year 1992, unrestricted intelligence officers had to serve in another military occupational specialty (MOS) prior to being assigned to the intelligence field (with few exceptions). This led to a number of officers considered not competitive by their first MOS being permitted to laterally move to the intelligence field.

(b) Separate intelligence "disciplines." These disciplines, normally described as human intelligence/counterintelligence, imagery intelligence, signals intelligence/electronic warfare, and general military intelligence/all others, led to a "stovepipe" mentality, where there was little regard for any of the disciplines one was not familiar with.

(c) Training. Formal intelligence training was failing to teach our future intelligence officers and enlisted Marines what they needed to know. For the officers, one 14 week course as a Second Lieutenant would possibly be the only formal intelligence training that they would receive in a 20 year career, lagging a full 20 weeks behind the DOD average for the other services.

20. This insufficiency was partially caused by the centralization of all intelligence production assets at

the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) during the implementation of the Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Group (SRIG) during 1988 and 1989. The resulting shift in structure, collection assets, and production capabilities to the MEF meant that Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) were lacking in manpower, automated data processing, and tactical collection assets, while their mission remained unchanged. Automated data systems were also noted as insufficient to support tactical intelligence.

21. While the force structure had remained unchanged, the standup of Joint Intelligence Centers, Joint Analysis Centers, and additional organizations such as Central Imagery Office had caused excessive burdens on an already critically short occupational field. Due to the HQMC policy of joint billets being excepted, the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) continued to receive a smaller portion of the Marine Corps intelligence manpower pool, particularly for field grade officers. During fiscal year 94, 50% of all field grade intelligence officers were assigned outside of the FMF. This problem was attributed to an unprecedented growth of requirements, while there was no structure allocated to accommodate this growth. Until FY 96, HQMC identified all billets based on their staffing precedence: excepted meant the billet would be filled with the rank and MOS assigned to the billet; priority meant that they would be filled with the right MOS, but possibly at a junior rank than identified by the billet; and all others meant any personnel still qualified to fill the billet not already assigned. Manning figures examined are available from the Officers Staffing Report and Command Staffing Report, FY 94, HQMC, MMOA.

22. Two months prior to Iraqi Republican Guard forces crossing into Kuwait, our only manned tactical imagery squadron, VMFP-3, stood down in what was originally intended to be a short interval between introduction of the F/A 18 D+ with the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS). The system will possibly be fielded during FY 97 or 98.

23. The Marine Corps was assessed as deficient in targeting Marines for target languages, maintaining language proficiency, and utilizing these trained Marines in appropriate billets. Language and cultural skills are always critical, but they are expensive to maintain in both time and money. The Marine Corps was not correcting the problem.

24. See **Intelligence Group Study**, final report, MCCDC, Quantico, VA 1991.

25. Professional Military Education was cited several times during the study as being deficient in providing a baseline of intelligence education for Marine Corps officers.

26. The Tiger Team work continued to work separately from the rest of the Intelligence Implementation Plan development, reporting to MajGen Van Riper or his designated representative as required. Members of the Tiger Team included LtCol J.G. Hughes, Resources Division, C4I, LtCol Steve Robb, Intelligence Division, C4I, LtCol Dan Carter, Intelligence Division, C4I, and LtCol Bob Livingston, MCIA. Doctrine Division, MCCDC, is now incorporating the efforts of the Tiger Team into new doctrinal publications.

27. The Executive Steering Group, Chaired by Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, is comprised of the Lieutenant Generals of the Marine Corps, serving with the Marine Corps. The ESG evaluates

major policy changes, doctrinal changes, manpower changes, and fiscal changes, forwarding pertinent topics to the Commandant of the Marine Corps with their recommendations, as required.

28. The mission statement is taken from the Intelligence Implementation Brief prepared by Colonel Clark, dated with revisions 7 FEB 1994 (as produced by Capt Rick Natale, HQMC/C4I/CRP).

29. This was a popular phrase with MajGen Van Riper. The author first heard him use it at the initial meeting with the PAT on 3 JUL 93 at the Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico, VA.

30. Highlighted due to its relevance for the formulation of education requirements that will be addressed later.

31. While General Gray was fond of using this expression, he was certainly not the first military leader to coin the phrase. More important, however, was his conviction in its meaning.

32. The production phase of the intelligence cycle is also assessed as two separate phases, processing and production. This cycle will be clarified with the next doctrinal release, CDP xxx, Intelligence, taken from FMFM 3-20, Intelligence.

33. Colonel Clark is responsible for the idea of utilization as an additional phase to the intelligence cycle. Other services (particularly the Army) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have also considered changing their instruction of the intelligence cycle to include utilization. Dr. Robert DeGross, Director of Training at the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, and Mr. Barry Wickersham, DIA, have raised the idea for inclusion in the joint intelligence manual, Joint Pub 2-0.

34. The concepts are presented here because they are at the very foundation of areas that also need to be addressed for professional military education.

35. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (AC/S, C4I), **Marine Corps Intelligence Implementation**, Washington, 7 FEB 94. See the implementation document for additional information on the functional concepts (p.7).

36. According to Major R.J. Buikema, HQMC/CRP, Marine Corps representative. GITAC is an intelligence training council comprised of each service, each unified command, and every national intelligence agency. Meetings occurred during JUN 94 at Goodfellow AFB, San Angelo, TX, and JUL 95 at Fleet Intelligence Training Center Pacific, San Diego, CA.

37. In accordance with the current training policy, the Marine Corps standing Joint Task Force is coordinating with USACOM for additional intelligence training, not the Marine Corps, according to action officers at HQMC/CRP.

38. HQMC, Intelligence Implementation, p. 28.

39. HQMC, Intelligence Implementation, p. 33.

40. HQMC, Intelligence Implementation, p. 29.

41. HQMC, Intelligence Implementation, p. 29. Abbreviations refer to The Basic School, Amphibious Warfare School, and Command and Staff College. Conversion means that no additional structure is allocated for the schools.

42. See MCCDC table of organization, Marine Corps University. Information obtained from Major Rick Natale, HQMC/CRP. This billet is a 2602 (Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Officer), Major, at the Command and Control Systems Course. Information obtained from HQMC/MM, Command Staffing Report (CSR).

43. HQMC, Intelligence Implementation, 29-31. Bold type as it appears in the document.

44. Ibid, p. 33.

45. General Boomer's comments are included in transcripts of the ESG meeting. While a formal report is not normally released by the ESG, a court reporter is always present to record the event. Records of ESG meetings are maintained by the office of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

46. CMC **ALMAR 100-95**, "Program to Improve Marine Corps Intelligence," 4 March 95.

47. The Force Structure Working Group, which was co-chaired by Colonel Lee, MCCDC, and Colonel Stenner, HQMC/MM, was established to review, direct, and authorize recommended changes in structure, particularly from one functional area to another. For example, if the Marine Corps had disbanded a Motor Transport Battalion, the FSWG would determine what the priorities were for that structure. The FSWG had to approve the structure changes and timeline developed by AC/S, C4I. Captain Rick Natale, C4I/CRP, developed the structure requirements, timelines for implementation, and briefed the FSWG. The FSWG was so impressed with the presentation that they stated the C4I approach was to be the model for further functional area changes. Public Affairs used the C4I approach developed by Captain Natale for their structure changes as well.

48. Of the eleven implementing actions, two (12.3.1 and 12.3.2) are relevant to formal education, addressed in the text. Status of the other nine implementing actions follow:

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a. (1) Implementing Action 12.1.1. Develop Doctrine to support all-source collection of intelligence, counterintelligence, combat information, and the timely flow of fused products to subordinate elements.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

-Creation of a multi-discipline trained and experienced intelligence manager (MAGTF Intelligence Officer). Currently being written into doctrine by CG MCCDC, Doctrine Division.

- Replace lateral moves with TBS accessions. Done.

- Creation of four separate entry level tracks with a common core of general military intelligence. Done. MOSs of Ground Intelligence Officer (0203), Aviation Intelligence Officer (0207), Counterintelligence/HUMINT (0204), and Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare (0206) have been created.

- All entry level billets will be subordinate to experienced (MAGTF) intelligence officers. Based on structure changes, this item is completed.

- All augmented Captains will attend an advanced course for multi-discipline training. The MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course is currently being developed by a training team at the Navy/Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), Dam Neck, VA. The first course is scheduled for Spring, 1996.

- HQMC assignment policy will provide multi-discipline experience (alternate tours between primary and secondary disciplines). MMOA is in concurrence. Each officer will be evaluated based on the needs of the Marine Corps and career development.

b. (1) Implementing Action 12.1.2. Ensure doctrinal service intelligence requirements are established with theater and national level intelligence organizations.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- Recommend structure increase to man joint billets not resourced. All joint billets will be manned by FY 97.

c. (1) Implementing Action 12.1.3. Develop doctrine for receipt, processing, and dissemination of all-source intelligence from national, theater, and other service sources.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- Increase intelligence structure to support doctrine development. Done.

- Develop doctrine in support of the Intelligence Implementation Plan, based on the draft of Intelligence Support to Expeditionary Operations developed by the Tiger Team. Doctrine development is ongoing.

d. (1) Implementing Action 12.1.4. Develop information transfer architecture to support the timely flow of requirements and all-source intelligence and combat information between MAGTF CE's and subordinate elements.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- Develop a new organizational architecture to support the timely flow of intelligence, and to tailor that flow. To accomplish this task, the concept of direct support teams was developed to provide a linkage between the MAGTF All-source Fusion Cell (MAFC) and the supported subordinate command. Structure for these teams has been approved, and is being implemented between now and FY 99.

e. (1) Implementing Action 12.2.1. Develop a plan to staff intelligence, counterintelligence, and collection organizations with sufficient numbers and an appropriate variety of MOS skills to meet contingency requirements.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- Increase the intelligence structure of the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). Intelligence personnel are being added to each MEF by increased structure, plus higher manning percentages. New organizations such as the HUMINT Company and Intelligence Battalion are being added to each MEF between FY 97 and FY 99.

f. (1) Implementing Action 12.2.2. Develop a plan to staff foreign area officers, SIGINT, and interrogator translator unit billets with sufficient numbers and skills of linguists to meet operational requirements.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- Linguist requirements are being addressed by the addition of MOS 8611, translator, expanding our eligibility of language qualified personnel, and increasing personnel receiving Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP). Approved and being implemented.

g. (1) Implementing Action 12.3.3. Conduct realistic intelligence training during field exercises to include integration of national, theater, and other service intelligence support; force-on-force scenarios; realistic collection operations; exercise of actual intelligence communications architectures and dissemination plans.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- Direct Support Teams and additional intelligence structure will provide adequate personnel to script and control exercises within the MEF without augmentation. This structure has been approved and is being implemented through FY 99.

- MEF-level intelligence Command Post Exercises (CPXs) and Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs). Initiative is dependent on the MEF commanders.

h. (1) Implementing Action 12.3.4. Conduct realistic targeting training during field exercises and CPXs to include all-source intelligence identification of targets, target analysis, target list development, target engagement, and bomb damage assessment.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- Introductory targeting to be taught at entry level for ground intelligence officers. The Military Intelligence Officers Basic Course (MIOBC) Ft. Huachuca, AZ, is the MOS-producing course for MOS 0203, Ground Intelligence Officer. The course includes a targeting block of instruction, with a Marine instructor on the staff to ensure that Marine Corps training requirements are being met.

- Advanced targeting to be taught at the entry level for aviation intelligence officers. The Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC), NMITC, Dam Neck, VA, is the MOS-producing course for MOS 0207, Aviation Intelligence Officer. The course is has an advanced targeting block with strong participation by naval aviators and Marine Corps intelligence personnel assigned to NMITC.

- Extensive targeting training for all in the advanced course (MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course). An advanced targeting block will be one of the main parts of the advanced course, currently being developed.

i. (1) Implementing Action 12.3.5. Provide resources to maintain language proficiency for requisite personnel.

(2) Recommendations and current status.

- FLPP eligibility to be expanded to all with language proficiency in target languages. This program is being commenced during this fiscal year.

- Authority will be requested for full FLPP for reservists with specified capabilities. This program continues to be pursued by HQMC/C4I/CRP, according to Captain Jim Durand, action officer.

49. All of the implementing actions were derived from the Intelligence Implementation Document. Much of the status information was derived from personal knowledge of the author, based on his experience as the Occupational Field Specialist for Intelligence.

50. These comments were addressed in electronic mail (e-mail) messages. They include:

(1) Electronic mail (no subject), from LtGen P.K. Van Riper to Col Jerry Mcabee, 1 NOV 95, stating "I

do not have a 'warm and fuzzy' feeling about Intell instruction in our PME schools.

(2) Electronic mail (no subject), from Gen C.C. Krulak to Capt John Steere, stating "...I think that we have 'turned the corner' on some of the more difficult issues that we have faced [regarding intelligence]. Unfortunately, you have highlighted others [problems] that we obviously need to solve. You have raised an issue of 'mindset'---an issue of education [referring to intelligence]."

51. Ibid.

52. **Systems Approach to Training Guide (SAT)**, MCCDC, Quantico, VA, OCT 93, defines a subject matter expert (SME) as: "a. An individual who has a thorough knowledge of a job, duties/tasks, or a particular topic, which qualifies him to assist in the training development process (for example, consultation, review, analysis, advise [sic], critique). b. A person who has a high level of knowledge and skill in the performance of a job." p. G.9.

53. **Intel Instr. at MCU**, electronic mail, Col Bruce Harder, HQMC, 4 JAN 96. Colonel Harder provided a summary of the meeting at MCIA. Among the issues discussed was sub paragraph "e" above.

54. Based on an interview with Capt Mark Johnson on 11 JAN 96. Capt Johnson is the Occupational Field Specialist for Intelligence, HQMC/C4I/CRP.

55. Harder, 2. It is unclear why intelligence instruction at TBS was noted separately.

56. This review is considered important due to the drastic changes with intelligence doctrine, training, and structure. As noted previously, intelligence education currently being conducted at MCU may or may not be consistent with the guidance contained in the Intelligence Implementation document. A review would be the first step in determining the validity of current PME (regarding intelligence).

57. See Harder E-mail for a summary of the meeting.

58. According to LtCol Stephen Carnes, a meeting participant.

59. According to LtCol J.G. Hughes, HQMC/CRP, there was an Intelligence Instruction Division within the education center prior to the MIT concept.

60. LtCol John Taxeras, Operations Officer, Marine Corps University, MCCDC, Quantico, VA. Interview by author, 9 FEB 96.

61. LtCol Taxeras stated this when responding to a question regarding the best way to ensure the training direction of HQMC, outlined in the Intelligence Implementation Document, was adhered to.

62. This was the initial reason for placement of the structure at the schools, as outlined by HQMC/CRP. First-hand knowlege of the author.

63. Major Eric Segarra, Faculty Advisor and Intelligence Instructor, Command and Control Systems Course, MCU, MCCDC, Quantico, VA. Interviewed by the author, 28 FEB 96. Major Segarra has been teaching intelligence at CCSC since FEB 94.

64. The "mode of teaching" refers to the different instructional approaches used, from the extensive seminar approach of C&SC to the formal classroom technique of TBS.

65. LtCol Steven Carnes, Faculty Advisor, Command & Staff College, MCU, MCCDC, Quantico, VA. Interviewed by the author, 16 FEB 96.

66. Of note, C&SC has two faculty advisors that are intelligence officers, currently serving in MOS 9910 billets, LtCol Jacocks, and LtCol Carnes. Neither have been tasked extensively with providing intelligence instruction. Their focus continues to be their conference groups, as directed by Colonel Conry, Director, C&SC.

67. Dr. James Roberts, noted educator. Interviewed via phone by the author, 8 MAR 96. Dr. Roberts has taught at every level of formal education for the past 40 years. He has served as Dean of Academics at the College of the Ozarks, Vice President of Academics at Slippery Rock University, President of the University, undergraduate accreditation team member, and School Board President.

68. LtCol James G. Hughes, Branch Chief, HQMC/C4I/CRP, Arlington, VA. Interviewed by the author, 29 NOV 95. LtCol Hughes also served previously as an intelligence instructor on the MIT, Quantico, VA, and was a member of the intelligence PAT and Doctrine Tiger Team.

69. The basis for these is the ESG decision brief, Intelligence Training meeting of DEC 95 at MCCDC, and the Intelligence Implementation Plan. The ALMAR does not specifically address PME.

70. See the SAT Guide. The SAT manual describes in detail the process of "...analyzing, designing, developing, implementing, and evaluating instructional programs." (forward, p. A).

71. Due to the rapidly changing environment of the intelligence occupational field, the current version of the ITS Order for intelligence is outdated. A draft copy of the new order was used, along with interviews with Mr. Ramsey and GySgt King. Standards Branch, Training and Education Divison, MCCDC. Interviews were conducted during NOV 95.

72. This is based on the lack of detailed doctrine and implementation information that has been disseminated to the general public. As previously noted, most of the doctrine is still being developed or is currently being routed in draft format, while the Intelligence Implementation Plan was never disseminated in whole to the fleet or MCCDC beyond the action officer level.

73. Information derived from recent graduates of TBS, current instructors who requested non-attribution, and LtCol J.D. Williams, Doctrine Division, MCCDC, who has served as adjunct faculty for TBS on intelligence instruction. Individual curriculums of schools may not reflect what is actually being taught. While curriculums were reviewed at MCCDC T&E Division during NOV 95, discussions with students and instructors was deemed a more accurate reference of what is being taught. For example, if a school lists intelligence reporting as covering two hours of instruction because the instructor mentions at the end of a field exercise that the enemy information should be reported to the 2, is that real training? A more accurate assessment could probably be reached by asking students what they were taught about intelligence, and asking instructors how the subject was taught, and how much emphasis it was given as a subject matter by the faculty.

74. See Chapter 3, Recommendations, for the author's suggestion for another way of using this instructor structure.

75. Actually, it is fair to assume that a review of fundamentals will always be required, due to the student breakdown including sister service attendees. Additionally, doctrine and structural changes are always changing. Starting from a common ground is essential for the training process.

76. The MCSEF concept was briefed to MajGen Van Riper, AC/S, C4I, during January 1994. The requirements included extensive construction for a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF). The idea was tabled due to a lack of funding and structure to support it. Author attended the meeting.

77. Funding for CCRB participation of the FMF would have to be planned in advance by MCU, or coordinated with pre-scheduled visits. Another approach would be using video tele-conferencing (VTC).

78. Based on HQMC Command Staffing Report, JAN 96.

79. See Chapter 3, Recommendations.

80. The educational objectives are derived from the Intelligence Implementation Plan, described previously in the paper. These objectives were agreed to by the ESG, and are directive in nature.

81. Clearly, some training objectives will have to be taught in more than one class in order to achieve a greater understanding and familiarization with the topic.

82. This block of instruction should preferably be taught in conjunction with the command and control block, enabling students to understand how different types of information are passed by different types of pathways. Hands-on time with systems and hardware should be emphasized as much as practicable.

83. HQMC only divides MOS quotas for Marine Corps students. The current mix is three 0202 officers and two 2602 officers. This number will now be changed to five 0202 officers, since all field grade

officers will be designated MAGTF Intelligence Officers (MOS 0202). Additional intelligence officers attending C&SC are from national intelligence agencies, MCIA, and the other services. USMC data provided by MMOA-3, HQMC.

84. This block is in addition to the MSTP two day presentation on IPB, which is planned to continue through FY 97, according to LtCol Al Baldwin, intelligence instructor, MSTP. If MSTP would not provide the IPB block, those hours would have to be added into this equation. The planning block would be most advantageous immediately following the MSTP presentation.

85. The current process of using CIA and State Department personnel proves ineffective due to their lack of familiarization with the scenario, the school, students, and training objectives. Some would argue that this confusion is realistic, and should be left alone. Participation of national agencies and departments should not, in fact, be diminished. It does, however, need someone to coordinate their actions, ensure that they are familiar with the script, and have an appreciation of the training objectives.

86. Due to the possibility of inclement weather, this event should be scheduled for an indoor/outdoor phase (HMMWVs cannot be brought inside, nor can some of the other equipment, but items such as ground sensors and computer hardware could be demonstrated indoors), such as at Ellis Hall and the adjacent field to the north of C&SC.

87. Fund sites may be possible from General Defense Intelligence Procurement (GDIP) funds, since many of the systems have joint connectivity, are part of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and are being instructed to a joint audience. Whatever fund site is identified, it is anticipated that at least 24 months would be required to find funding and have it planned into the normal funding cycle.

88. Based on the author's personal observations while recommending the structure currently being implemented, during tenure as the occupational field specialist for intelligence.

89. Funding for the civilian structure may be available from General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funding, if it is in support of joint intelligence objectives. MCIA has a GDIP Program Manager that can provide additional information.

90. As a result of recent changes by the Commandant, CG MCCDC is now the only structure sponsor within the Marine Corps. This means that he has the authority to evaluate the structure requirements for the FMF, supporting commands, and external billets, and re-apportion structure as required.