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National Guard Civil Support Teams
A Force Not Ready

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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15. Abstract: The National Guard Civil Support Teams are not mission capable. The teams are not doctrinally supported, they do not have equipment required meet mission requirements, and they are severely understaffed. The teams were to be certified fully mission capable on 1 January 2000. As of the date of this paper, the teams remain uncertified because the key pieces of equipment, the Unified Command Suite and the Mobile Analytical Laboratory do not currently meet mission requirements. Additionally, the teams were developed with little or no interagency coordination, and thus have little support outside the DoD. The problems are numerous and require considerable effort and funding to alleviate. The teams are useful as a deterrent at the local and state level, but they must be retrained on doctrine with a basis on solid established concepts before they can be a viable deterrent for a WMD attack. The teams stated mission is unreasonable. A complete in depth mission analysis must be conducted before the teams can be certified "Fully Mission Capable" as mandated by current federal law.			
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Concern for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) events within the borders of the United States increased dramatically as a result of the 1995 Tokyo subway Sarin (nerve) gas attack that killed 10 people and injured thousands moreⁱ. In the commencement address at the United States Naval Academy in May 1998, President Bill Clinton announced that our nation would do more to protect its citizens against the growing threat of domestic chemical and biological terrorism. As part of this effort, President Clinton stated that the Department of Defense would form 10 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). The mission of these teams is to support state and local authorities in assessing situations surrounding WMD emergencies, advise these authorities regarding appropriate actions, and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of additional state and federal assetsⁱⁱ.

The Secretary of Defense charged the Army National Guard with the responsibility of implementation. In March 1998, the Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS) established the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) to execute the taskⁱⁱⁱ of developing the plans for organizing, staffing, training and equipping the teams. CoMPIO was budgeted approximately \$75M for FY99 and directed to have 10 WMD-CSTs fielded, operational and fully mission capable by 1 January 2000. As of September 15, 2000, 10 WMD-CSTs are fielded and Congress has authorized 17 more^{iv}.

CoMPIO's failure to conduct an in-depth mission analysis and develop comprehensive doctrine supporting mission critical tasks, both specified and implied, for the Civil Support Team's mission statement, resulted in the National Guard fielding WMD-CSTs that are not sufficiently trained, equipped or logistically supported to accomplish their mission. These teams, as currently configured, cannot effectively respond to a domestic

WMD attack. Further, the lack of comprehensive doctrine inhibits these teams from being effectively integrated into the Joint Task Force Civil-Support by the J-5 elements within U.S. Joint Forces Command.

While complicated, there are solutions. However, this will require significant emphasis from senior leadership inside and outside the DoD; including the identification of an overarching lead agency and a substantial increase in funding. A tremendous amount of interagency coordination and cooperation must occur to build a consensus within the crisis management community that the teams are useful and viable elements within the Federal Response Plan. The WMD-CST program is a valuable deterrent for potential adversaries intending to use a WMD domestically, but in order to be a realistic deterrent, the teams must be able to demonstrate significant capabilities to counter the effects of a weapon of mass destruction. Effective capabilities require development of comprehensive doctrine that efficiently integrates the Civil Support teams into the Federal Response Program

The stated mission of the MSD-CSTs is; "Provide early assessment, initial detection, and technical advice to the incident commander during an incident involving WMD. Facilitate identification of DoD asset requirements"^v. Conceptually, the teams will arrive on site and be able to identify a chemical or biological agent within four hours of notification. Staffing of each Civil-Support team includes 22 full-time National Guard members organized into six cells: command, operations, administration and logistics, communication, medical, and survey. Members are to be on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Each element of the team provides a different level of support. For example, the medical cell provides medical support to CST personnel, guidance to the incident commander on the medical implications of the WMD event and coordinates with local, state, and federal health

care facilities for follow-on support requirements. Each function will have personnel trained to perform their particular mission. The survey unit has the mission of conducting search, survey, surveillance, and sampling of a WMD incident site and advising the incident commander of appropriate response protocols. The survey unit is capable of working in the “hot zone”, the highest level of HAZMAT entry^{vi}. According to the “Tiger Team” report, “the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection element (since renamed WMD -Civil Support Teams)^{vii} is the point of the military response spear to a WMD attack^{viii}.”

Since the publication of the “Tiger Team” Report, Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated that:

The WMD Civil Support Teams are unique because of their federal-state relationship. They are federal resources, federally trained and federally evaluated, and they operate under federal doctrine. However, they will perform their mission primarily under the command and control of the governors of the states in which they are located. They will be, primarily, state assets. Operationally, they fall under the command and control of the adjutant generals of those states. As a result, they will be available to respond to an incident as part of a state response, well before federal response assets would be called upon to provide assistance.^{ix}

Cragin raises a doctrinal command and control issue within the Civil Support Team program. The teams initially fall under the control of the individual state adjutants general. To date, no federal doctrine has been developed and published for use by the states outlining what actions must occur within the CSTs when federalized. In fact, just the opposite has occurred. Given that each state adjutant general retains total control of his respective team, each equips, utilizes, trains and exercises them as he desires. There is no central command structure from which to develop and disseminate standardized doctrine, and no enforcement capability.

Most states have augmented their respective teams with extra equipment that each particular state deems necessary, resulting in 10 teams, with 10 different equipment sets, and 10 different operating procedures for utilizing that equipment. For example, the Georgia Adjutant General convinced the John Deere Corporation to donate a six-wheel "Gator" vehicle to the Georgia Civil Support team^x. Georgia's operational doctrine now focuses on using this vehicle to carry extra equipment into the "hot-zone", giving it capabilities and operational procedures that none of the other teams has. This will impede integration of the teams into a unified federal response effort. Further, the lack of standardization will make incorporating any CST into the JTF OPLAN even more complicated for J-5 planning cells, in view of the fact that each individual team has different capabilities and different operating procedures.

Development of comprehensive command relationship doctrine is necessary to counter the State (Title 32) and Federal (Title 10) control issue, as well as the JTF team integration problem. CoMPIO's current draft doctrine states that "operational control of the WMD-CST transfers from the state adjutant general to the Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support when federalized. The teams will remain on station, and the Joint Task Force Civil-Support will monitor WMD-CST reports and communications^{xi}." Doctrinally, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and its subordinate element, JTF-Civil Support, is responsible for WMD incidents within the United States. The JTF-Civil Support is currently in the process of drafting comprehensive federal WMD doctrine, but to date, no coordination between CoMPIO, JTF-Civil Support and the individual state adjutants general has taken place to streamline and coordinate these doctrinal developmental efforts. The JTF-CS is chartered to provide oversight for all federalized U.S. military efforts in response to WMD incidents in

the United States. To accomplish this task, coordination between the JTF planners and the WMD-CSTs must occur to provide a unified military effort. Solid doctrine development, to provide a unified federal response to a WMD attack is easily solvable but requires emphasis from senior military leaders.

Command structure issues become even more difficult when non-military agencies become involved. Minimal interagency coordination has occurred between the CoMPIO and federal agencies, resulting in a complete lack of understanding and support of the CST mission by agencies outside the DoD. Operationally, federal efforts to combat terrorism are organized along a lead agency concept. The Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is responsible for crisis management of domestic terrorist incidents and for pursuing, arresting, and prosecuting the terrorists. State governments have primary responsibility for managing the consequences of domestic disasters, including major terrorist incidents; however, the federal government can support state and local authorities if they lack the capabilities to respond adequately. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages this federal support through a generic disaster contingency plan known as the Federal Response Plan, which outlines the roles, responsibilities, and emergency support functions of various federal agencies, including DOD, through U.S. Joint Forces Command, for consequence management.

The National Security Council's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, created in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62, oversees the broad variety of relevant policies and programs, including such areas as counter-terrorism, preparedness, and consequence management for WMD^{xii}.

Officials from FEMA and the FBI, as well as other federal officials, who are intimately involved in the complex WMD federal response system, question the need for the WMD-CSTs because of the federal structure already available to respond to WMD incidents. Additionally, they also expressed concern about the WMD-CSTs impact on first responders (local fire-fighters and law enforcement personnel), if the teams do not arrive for several hours (doctrinally, up to four) after the incident occurs. FEMA's current position regarding an incident of chemical terrorism is; "First, local responders - not National Guard or other federal teams that arrive hours later,- will perform the most immediate life-saving response tasks. Second, there are currently federal assets in place that can assist state and local officials with follow-on response tasks for chemical terrorism. New chemical capabilities for the Guard are not necessary to support federal operations. Third, there is a difference of opinion among individual states regarding the need for new National Guard teams to support state operations^{xiii}."

These attitudes are a direct result of CoMPIO's failure to conduct effective interagency coordination during program development and the lack of comprehensive doctrine defining the relationship between the WMD-CSTs and other federal organizations. The lack of coordination between the law enforcement community and the DoD is a prime example. A domestic WMD attack is considered a criminal act, thus the Justice Department, and through them, the FBI is designated the lead agency. One of the missions of the WMD-CSTs is to rapidly provide onsite identification of potential agents through collection and sampling. No interagency coordination with the FBI occurred resulting in an FBI memorandum issued on 14 September 2000 stating:

U.S. Military personnel, including active duty, Reserve Components and/or National Guard personnel will not collect evidence... unless specifically authorized by law enforcement and/or requested by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) as the lead agency for crisis management^{xiv}

The primary mission of the CSTs is to gather specimens and identify agents. The FBI will not authorize the CSTs to gather specimens as they are considered evidence, thus the teams cannot accomplish their primary mission: Rapid Agent Identification. The lack of interagency coordination and consensus building resulted in a conflict between agencies and a failure to reach unity of effort. This violates a basic principle of Military Operations other than War. "Efforts among agencies must be coordinated, outlined and agreed upon despite philosophical and operational differences separating agencies to achieve unity of effort^{xv}."

Doctrinally, MOOTW, require in-depth interagency coordination to build unity of effort, and coordinate synchronization of all elements toward a common objective. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. The solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency^{xvi}. Effective interagency coordination is the key to the resolution of this issue. To accomplish this, initial senior level coordination must occur to reestablish effective lines of communication.

The current training issue with the CSTs is directly linked to the lack of concise doctrine. The absence of finalized doctrine has encouraged and promoted an environment of persistent change to operational concepts and mission requirements, and a focus on short-term actions^{xvii}. The development and implementation of clear doctrine will solve the majority of the training issues with the exception of long-term sustainment and certification

training. The WMD-CST Commanders are dedicated individuals, highly motivated about their positions and committed to their mission, as they understand it. They remain focused on mission accomplishment, but need solid doctrinal guidance to establish operational parameters. Establishment of overarching interagency doctrine will eliminate the major training issues facing the WMD-CSTs.

Once the doctrinal issue is addressed, the second major concern regarding the WMD-CSTs is its operational equipment and sustainability. The majority of the equipment issued the teams is commercial-off the shelf (COTS) items^{xviii}. CoMPIO decided to take advantage of state of the art technology and field commercial equipment rather than existing military equipment^{xix}. Commercial equipment gives the teams innovative technology, but it dramatically magnifies the risks of unit mission degradation in the event of malfunction. Additionally, there is no infrastructure currently in place to logistically support or sustain this commercial equipment. Personnel at the National Guard Bureau headquarters state that 75 to 85 percent of the CSTs equipment requirements could have been met with existing military equipment and the major end items could have been maintained at any National Guard center^{xx}. Again, coordination between agencies could have addressed this problem, but CoMPIO made the decision with no outside agency coordination.

Equipment safety and limitations are also a concern within the teams themselves. The majority of the equipment fielded is untested, and the teams have expressed some fear that personnel protective items issued have not been tested by an independent third party and purchase decisions were made based solely on the assertions of the manufacturer^{xxi}. To ensure an acceptable level of safety, commercial items need to be tested against militarized agents, and military chemical defense equipment needs to be tested against toxic industrial

compounds and toxic industrial materials. Commanders must know the limitations of their equipment to make informed operational decisions, and further, planning staffs must know unit limitations in order to integrate them effectively into operational plans^{xxii}. While personal protective equipment capabilities are important, they are on the periphery of the equipment problem.

Two key systems are the source of the equipment issue. They are the Unified Command Suite (UCS) and the Mobile Analytical Laboratory (MAL). These unique pieces of equipment define the mission of the WMD-CSTs. According to Charles Cragin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the MAL “allows the teams to identify chemical and biological agents in the field and the UCS allows the team to coordinate communications among the first responders and all other areas”^{xxiii}. Both pieces of equipment were developed and fielded without a mission needs statement, at a cost of \$1.6M per team. The UCS is intended to provide connectivity between the Civil Support Team, the incident commander, the DoD, and other federal assets^{xxiv}, using wireless Internet, SIPRNET, and NIPRNET capabilities. Additionally, secure telephones; high frequency radios, and other communications equipment were installed in the UCS giving the team and thus the incident commander “reach-back” capability to organizations such as the Center for Disease Control, in Atlanta.

Unfortunately, the reach back capability of the teams and their ability to establish communications for the Incident Commander on the scene are doubtful. Infrastructure to conduct reach back, real time, communications operations to agent identification subject matter experts for verification, or other experts, does not exist^{xxv}. While the reach back capability is a key advantages of the CSTs over other response elements, and was heavily

leveraged by CoMPIO during team development and funding, no protocols and infrastructure were ever coordinated or adopted. First U.S. Army communications officials who evaluated the UCS during the CSTs external evaluations consider the UCS useless until communications infrastructure and communications protocol has been developed and tested^{xxvi}.

In addition to UCS problems, the WMD-CSTs have not been assigned radio frequencies by the U.S. Army Frequency Management Office. To conduct any contingency operations, the teams would need dedicated long-range capable radio frequencies on a full time basis. Currently, the Frequency Management Office requires approximately two to three hours to assign and establish a working radio frequency, and since it is not a 24 hour a day operation, the teams have no way to rapidly establish around-the-clock connectivity. The U.S. Army Frequency Management Office officials state they could easily work out solutions, but have not been contacted with a request^{xxvii}.

The issues with the UCS require in depth analysis by communications personnel, but can be resolved given time. The issues with the MAL cannot. The MAL is the backbone of the Civil Support Team. In the MAL, team members examine samples from an incident site to determine the type and amount of agent released, and what federal assets are required to minimize the effects. The MALs does not accommodate the mission requirements^{xxviii}. CoMPIO contracted NAWCAD to develop the UCS from the ground up including the vehicle itself, but decided to use a standard Ford GSA van to carry the MALs. Engineers at Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) assigned to equip the MALs did not choose the vehicle. To be an effective field laboratory, the MALs must be equipped with a glove box, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter system for

handling and preparing samples, and refrigeration capability. SBCCOM officials stated that the “ability to prepare, refrigerate, and deliver a sample to the nearest health organization afforded by a glove box and on-board refrigeration unit provides an essential and unique capability^{xxix}.” The glove box, once installed in the van, occupies almost half the usable space. As a result, the MAL has no room for two soldiers, in full protective overgarments, to work. They cannot accomplish their mission.

Even more problems exist regarding the MALs. Different standards exist within different states regarding the introduction of contaminated agents. In California for example, once a sample has been taken into the MALs for analysis, the entire vehicle is considered contaminated and must be considered a new “hot-zone”. This requires that the MALs be destroyed following its use. At the cost of \$400K per vehicle, the MAL is not a consumable item^{xxx}. Again, comprehensive interagency coordination before fielding could have identified these issues and agreements could have been worked out, or system designs changed to accommodate existing requirements.

The MAL, as currently fielded, has no ability to detect biological agents, one of its primary stated missions. The laboratories do not yet contain the required florescent microscope, the polymerase chain reaction technology, and the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. These items provide the biological detection capability. Regardless of equipment availability, the equipment requires five electrical outlets to function and the lab is only equipped with three. Polymerase technology is still in the real time development stage and will not be available for fielding until at least 2003^{xxxi}. The DOD Inspector General determined that the MAL “will not be able to provide timely and effective

biological agent identification to incident commanders and will not be able to protect public health and safety.^{xxxii}

The MAL as currently engineered will not work. If the WMD-CSTs are to be integrated into a Federal Response Program and the JTF-CS, then complete reengineering of the MAL system must occur. SBCCOM has the capability to build an effective mobile laboratory. It designed, engineered and built a mobile lab for the FBI's Hazardous Material Response Unit and the fly-away lab for the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) but the MAL as currently configured must be discarded and a complete reengineering effort be authorized and funded. The MAL does not meet minimum mission requirements and is not considered mission capable.

The UCS and the MAL are considered the unique pieces of equipment that the WMD-CSTs bring to a WMD incident. Currently, neither function adequately to provide any additional resources to an incident commander. Other issued Civil Support Team equipment has not been tested and proven capable in a contaminated environment. If the WMD-CSTs are to be considered mission capable for integration into a Federal Response Team, then each teams current equipment inventory needs to be examined, evaluated and standardized prior to fully mission certification. Both the UCS and the MAL require complete reviews by experts from their respective MACOM to determine what system modification are required for the systems to meet mission requirements.

Unit deployment capability and sustainment are the final areas that need to be examined. Currently there is no long-term logistics plan for the WMD-CSTs, but Headquarters National Guard and the individual state adjutants general are addressing the issue. Personnel sustainability and deployability, have been ignored and is another area

where doctrinal inconsistencies cast doubt on CST capabilities. Current doctrine states that the WMD-CSTs are on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and must respond to a WMD site within four hours of notification. This is absurd. No military unit manned by only 22 people with no personnel redundancies can be expected to accomplish this task.

Extensive cross training of personnel must take place to ensure the team's ability to field an effective team when an emergency arises. For example, the Army's Technical Escort Unit; the FBI's Hazardous Materials Response Unit; and the Fairfax County, Virginia, HAZMAT team have sufficient personnel to field multiple units. This allows the units to rotate between on duty, off duty, and training status. If members from the unit on duty are unable to make their shift, the unit leader can call on an equivalent replacement from training or from an off duty element to fill the void. This process alleviates the concern of having the entire team on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. This level of readiness cannot be maintained and will create significant hardships for team members trying to maintain normal lives. The CSTs do not have any replacement capability, and will suffer because of it. Any member of a CST who cannot respond to a deployment will create a loss of capability for the team.

The WMD-CSTs were originally stationed in close proximity to air transportation. This was supposed to be their primary means of movement to an incident site. However, there were no plans developed for dedicated ground crews, flight crews, or on-call aircraft. If Air National Guard or Air Force aircraft were required to transport the CSTs, authorization would have to be obtained from the U.S. Transportation Command^{xxxiii}. Again, the lack of interagency coordination results in a reduction of capability. The lack of dedicated airlift for the CSTs adds to concerns about the delayed arrival.

Recent CoMPIO doctrinal changes now state the primary means of CST deployment ground transport using unit vehicles^{xxxiv}. Accordingly, a team member will now receive notification, move to the National Guard Armory, prepare for movement, conduct movement (up to 300 miles in some cases), and prepare to conduct operations, all within four hours. The most rapid response team within the DoD has four hours from notification to deployment time. It is completely unreasonable to expect a National Guard CST to be able to accomplish this task.

Even if the teams could successfully deploy within four hours, local, state, and federal officials have expressed concern that the four-hour period will get the team to an incident site too late to be useful. They state that, for the incident Commander to benefit from information the teams could produce, he needs the team at the scene within the first one to two hours. After that time, local or state HAZMAT teams will have the basic detection and identification information allowing management of the situation to begin. By that point, the incident commander will either be in control of the situation and not need additional assessment input from the CST, or be so completely overwhelmed by the enormity of the situation that the FBI and FEMA would already have been notified and mobilized federal response assets. Additionally, each CST has only one set of equipment for both training and deployment. This makes it very difficult to train and be operationally ready to deploy within the four hour window.

The concept of the WMD-Civil Support Team is solid. National Guard personnel are located in every community throughout this country and should be utilized as a deterrent to WMD attacks. The Consequence Management Program Integration Office however, failed to follow the most basic of developmental guidance when establishing these teams.

Standard military doctrinal principles require the development of an initial mission needs statement that meticulously defines a units mission. Formulation of comprehensive doctrine centered on the specified and implied missions within the mission statement follows. Unit equipment is then determined based upon total mission requirements. Development of a detailed training plan focusing on mission accomplishment utilizing available equipment is the final step in the process.

CoMPIO attempted, but failed, to accomplish all these tasks simultaneously without coordinating existing expertise within the DoD and federal Agencies. This resulted in fielded units that are unsupportable, and even worse, incompatible with other DoD elements. The teams as currently fielded do not have the capabilities mandated by Congress, and cannot, in their current state, be effectively integrated into the Federal Response Plan or the Joint Task Force-Civil Support.

The teams should by no means be disbanded. Joint Forces Command must authorize the JTF-CS to coordinate with the respective MACOMs within DoD to identify and develop a corrective plan of action solving the doctrinal issues. This must be accomplished using active duty personnel and subject matter experts provided by the Major Army Commands (MACOMs). Interagency issues will require Senior DoD leadership reestablishing lines of communications within the Federal Government. The National Security Council's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, should be tasked as the overall leader for interagency coordination. Not only must interagency coordination be developed, but also federal/state level coordination must occur before any federalization of the teams.

Funding increases must be identified, justified, budgeted and included in the POM cycle. The teams as currently staffed do not have the personnel to maintain the state of readiness required by law and must be augmented. Current equipment inventories must be approved by their responsible MACOMs to include the UCS and the MAL. These issues are resolvable, but require significant emphasis from the Joint Forces Commander and the individual states adjutants general.

Once comprehensive doctrine has been developed, the teams should be federalized for an extended period and undergo extensive initial training. This training should be based upon solid training principles, developed by JFCOM and TRADOC, utilizing equipment identified by subject matter experts within the respective MACOMs. This will establish a solid training base that will allow the teams to be integrated into the JTF-CS. The team Commander can then modify the doctrine to adapt to their individual state requirements. Federalization of the teams should occur annually on a rotating basis for training, certification, and to ensure the teams maintain their capability to conduct the federally mandated missions. Successful completion of annual training will ensure the teams easy integration into both the Federal Response Plan and the JTF-Civil Support OPLAN. The task will be difficult and expensive, but achievable, if emphasized at the right level.

A domestic weapon of mass destruction attack will create chaos within the United States. The WMD-CSTs give federal and state governments an asset that can be continually exercised and publicly displayed as a viable response to the WMD threat. However, the teams must be able to display the capability to quickly minimize the effects of a WMD attack, to be a deterrent.

ⁱ Mike Tharp, "Death in the Subway", U.S. News and World Report (April 3, 1995; quoted in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, Joint Pub 3-11 (Washington, DC: 11 July 2000), VI-2.

ⁱⁱ General Accounting Office, COMBATING TERRORISM; Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. (Washington, DC: 1999), 1.

ⁱⁱⁱ Department of Defense, Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass-Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Draft), Office of the Inspector General. (Washington, DC: 2000), 1.

^{iv} Ibid, p1.

^v Department of Defense, Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass-Destruction. Prepared by the DoD Tiger Team. (Washington, DC: 1998), 30.

^{vi} General Accounting Office, COMBATING TERRORISM; Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. (Washington, DC: 1999), 5.

^{vii} Department of Defense, Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass-Destruction. Prepared by the DoD Tiger Team. (Washington, DC: 1998), 29.

^{viii} Ibid, p29.

^{ix} Charles L. Cragin, Defense Leaders Commentary: The Facts on WMD Civil Support Teams, Special to the American Forces Press Service, 6 April 2000.

^x Department of Defense, Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass-Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Draft), Office of the Inspector General. (Washington, DC: 2000), 18.

^{xi} Ibid, p6.

^{xii} General Accounting Office, COMBATING TERRORISM Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. (Washington, DC: 1999), 3.

^{xiii} Ibid, p5.

^{xiv} Department of Defense, Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass-Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Draft), Office of the Inspector General. (Washington, DC: 2000), 6.

^{xv} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996) V.

^{xvi} Ibid, p1-2.

^{xvii} Department of Defense, Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass-Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Draft), Office of the Inspector General. (Washington, DC: 2000), 5.

^{xviii} Department of the Army, Quick Response Audit Report No. Q99-6: Utmost Advantage, (Natick, MA: 1999).

^{xix} Department of Defense, Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass-Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Draft), Office of the Inspector General. (Washington, DC: 2000), 15.

^{xx} Ibid, p15.

^{xxi} Ibid, p17.

^{xxii} Ibid, p15.

^{xxiii} Jim Garamone, "Guard Teams to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction", American Forces Press Service, 4 January 2000.

^{xxiv} Department of Defense, Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass-Destruction-Civil Support Teams (Draft), Office of the Inspector General. (Washington, DC: 2000), 24.

^{xxv} Ibid, p26.

^{xxvi} Ibid, p24.

^{xxvii} Ibid, p26.

^{xxviii} Ibid, p18.

^{xxix} Ibid, p20.

^{xxx} Ibid, p21.

^{xxxi} Ibid, p23.

xxxii Ibid, p24.
xxxiii Ibid, p18.
xxxiv Ibid, p24.

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