

The Operational Framework for Homeland Security: A Primary Mission for the National Guard

**A Monograph
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Abstract

THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY: A PRIMARY MISSION FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD by MAJ William J. Coffin, United States Army National Guard, 78 pages.

Before 11 September 2001, the U.S. military's responsibilities for homeland security focused on providing support to civilian authorities during the aftermath of natural and manmade disasters. The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September changed the nation's perceptions of and the U.S. military's role in homeland security. The primary operational construct must remain support to civilian authorities; however, the U.S. military must take the lead in shaping and fostering unity of effort among the many federal, state and local agencies with homeland responsibilities.

The U.S. military's homeland security responsibilities at the tactical level flow from the traditional support to civilian authorities in disaster relief operations and the Office of Homeland Security's mission to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the terrorist attacks. The Department of Defense must establish an operational-level structure within the U.S. Northern Command to tie these tactical missions to the President's strategic objectives for homeland security.

An effective operational-level framework for the land and maritime homeland security requirements within US Northern Command is a joint, multi-component command and control organization structured at the national, regional and state level. The U.S. National Guard draws on its historical experience in support to civilian authorities and established relationships in the local communities to provide the leadership for this operational framework.

At the national level, a joint task force (JTF-USA) aligns with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and develops the land and maritime campaign for homeland security. At the regional level, ten Regional Homeland Security Commands (RHLSCOM) align with the ten FEMA regions and develop region-specific homeland security operation plans and facilitate interagency coordination. At the state level, each state National Guard establishes a Homeland Security Command (HLSCOM) under the governor's control to provide first response capabilities for terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Once the President declares a federal emergency or disaster, the Secretary of Defense federalizes the state HLSCOM so it can take operational control of all U.S. military assets committed to response and recovery missions.

Recommendations to meet the U.S. military's homeland security responsibilities fall under three areas; doctrine, operational structure, and force structure. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should develop a definition for homeland security and revise joint doctrine for domestic support and interagency coordination. The Commander-in-Chief for U.S. Northern Command should establish the JTF-USA operational structure for the land and maritime homeland security mission. Congress should authorize at least one Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team for each state and the Director of Army National Guard should develop a force structure plan to provide each state with sufficient combat service and combat service support units.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of September 11th against the United States forever changed the nation's historic notion of a safe and secure homeland. When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld presented his security goals before the House Armed Services Committee on 6 February 2002, he stated that, "For most of our history, thanks to favorable geography and friendly neighbors, United States territory was left largely unscathed by foreign aggressors. As we painfully learned on September 11th, this will not be the case in the 21st Century."¹ The destruction of the World Trade Center, the devastation at the Pentagon, and the plane crash in Pennsylvania violently demonstrated the country's vulnerability to an asymmetric attack. The anthrax attacks shortly thereafter illustrated that every U.S. citizen is vulnerable to individuals and organizations committed to inflicting random casualties on American soil. Unprecedented measures of security and law enforcement such as establishing combat air patrols over major cities and deploying American soldiers at airports and on the nation's borders demonstrated the United States' capability to rapidly employ the U.S. Armed Forces and the nation's resolve to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. However, the surge of domestic military deployment is a temporary measure, and, as President George W. Bush stated, "America's vulnerability to terrorism will persist long after we bring justice to those responsible for the events of September 11... The country is at war, and securing the homeland is a national priority."² For this very reason, the Department of Defense (DoD) must develop an operational level capability nested within the nation's homeland security³ strategy.

¹ House Armed Services Committee, *Full Committee hearing on the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Budget Request*, Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 6 February 2002. Available [Online] <<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-02-05rumsfeld.html>> [2 March 2002].

² President, "Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation," (Washington, D.C.: 2002), 2. Available [Online] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland_security_book.html> [9 February 2002]

³ Over the past decade, the term "Homeland Defense" was the common term to describe those actions related to protecting Americans from terrorist attack on United States soil. The term "Homeland Security"

The September 11th attacks on the nation demonstrated that the United States had no coherent ability to unify the multitude of efforts to secure the homeland. In a report to Congress, the General Accounting Office noted that, “Federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently difficult to lead and manage because the policy, strategy, programs, and activities cut across many agencies.”⁴ Within the Department of Defense, there was a similar lack of coherence and unity of effort to support the nation’s homeland security requirements at the operational level. Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman stated that, “Organizationally, DoD responses are widely dispersed. An Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support has responsibility for WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] incidents, while the Department of the Army’s Director of Military Support is responsible for non-WMD contingencies. Such an arrangement does not provide clear lines of authority and responsibility or ensure political accountability.”⁵ The military as a whole has the depth and robust capabilities to operate at all areas of the security spectrum ranging from support to first responders at an incident site to securing the nation’s borders and airspace. However, similar to the civilian organizations with homeland security responsibilities, military organizations lacked the unity of effort to maximize capabilities and link military operations to the President’s strategic objectives for homeland security.

The Secretary of Defense released the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report* shortly after the September 11th attacks and reinforced that homeland security is a primary military mission for the DoD. He stated that, “Promoting the defense of the United States to the top priority restores its primacy and better allows the Department to focus and prioritize its efforts to mitigate operational risk... The new strategy calls for assessing changes in capabilities, concepts

has now replaced the term “Homeland Defense.”

⁴ GAO, *Combating Terrorism; Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response* (Washington D.C.: April 2001), 1.

⁵ *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century*, by Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, co-chairmen (Washington, D.C.: The U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, February 15, 2001), 23.

of operations, and organizational designs to help reduce risk.”⁶ To unify all military efforts for homeland security under one four-star Commander-in-Chief (CINC), the Secretary of Defense announced on 17 April 2002 the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) with the mission of defending the United States and supporting the full range of military assistance to civil authorities.⁷

The premise of this monograph is that homeland security must be a primary mission for the National Guard. It describes the development of homeland security strategy over the past decade and the requirements supporting the National Guard’s homeland security mission. Next, it examines the nation’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th and explores the operational level requirements and the military tasks essential to support the President’s strategic concept for homeland security. Based on these military responsibilities, the U.S. Armed Forces are not organized to accomplish the tasks emerging in the post-September security environment. Evidence includes Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s plan to create a new unified command to consolidate military efforts for homeland. Therefore, this monograph examines two options for reorganizing the National Guard to implement homeland security as a primary mission: Option One is restructuring current combat units into specialized homeland security units and Option Two is consolidating the nation’s military responsibilities for homeland security in a standing National Guard command and control structure. To evaluate these two options, the monograph applies three criteria; the National Guard’s ability to serve as the nation’s strategic reserve, to facilitate unity of effort among organizations with homeland security responsibilities, and to allocate and commit resources for homeland security requirements. Finally, the monograph proposes an organizational structure for the National Guard to coordinate operational requirements for the nation’s homeland security strategy. The focus is on the military homeland

⁶ DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: 2001), 60-61.

⁷ DoD News Release, No. 188-02, 17 April 2002. Available [Online]
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/b04172002_bt188-02.html> [17 April 2002]

security organizational requirements as they apply to land and maritime operations; other mission areas, such as missile defense and airspace security, are beyond the scope of the monograph.

II. AMERICA'S HOMELAND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Over the past ten years, the United States committed increasing resources to establish capabilities to protect the nation against and mitigate the consequences of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Enhanced High Explosive (CBRNE)⁸ attacks. However, the many organizations responsible for some portion of homeland security, both civilian and military, developed capabilities in an isolated mode without a clear overarching strategy for national homeland security. Before the devastating attacks of September 11th, two overarching issues defined the complex homeland security environment. The first was lack of unity of effort at the federal, state and local levels and the second was the primacy of response capabilities over strategies to prevent a CBRNE attack. This chapter sets the stage for change in the military's organizational structure by defining the strategic environment just before 11 September 2001.

Unity of Effort

Throughout the past decade, the multitude of agencies and organizations⁹ with homeland security responsibilities struggled with coordinating their efforts across agency boundaries, up and down to higher and lower governmental levels, and between military and civilian organizations. "The problem," cited Stephen Duncan in his article "Catastrophic Terrorism," "is complicated by overlapping legal jurisdiction, fragmentation of effort, redundancy, an absence of standards, the complexity of the structure of the Federal Government, and by the widely varying resources and expertise of the individual departments and agencies of the Federal Government,

⁸ The familiar term, "Weapons of Mass Destruction – WMD" was used over the last decade and usually identified with chemical or biological events. The federal government now uses the more descriptive term, "Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Enhanced High Explosive - CBRNE" to describe events with the potential to cause mass casualties and catastrophic effects to critical infrastructures.

the States, and local communities.”¹⁰ For example, Lieutenant Colonel Terrence Kelly, Senior Military Security Officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, described competing demands for resources at the federal level that hinder interagency coordination. “The House and Senate appropriations committees,” he said, “view the world through their individual stovepipes. Programs that require broader perspective – those that do not fall neatly in any one of these stovepipes – tend to go wanting. The result is that multi-agency programs that are important to the nation and make it into the President’s budget are frequently not funded or are partially funded by the Congress.”¹¹

Over the past ten years, federal officials conducted several exercises to identify weaknesses in coordination and response capabilities throughout local, state and federal jurisdictions. In November 1996, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the National Defense University conducted the Wild Atom exercise to evaluate incident management for a simulated atomic bomb attack on Baltimore. Because the method of attack was to smuggle a primitive nuclear device into Baltimore Harbor on a commercial cargo vessel, responsibilities cut across several agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Exercise observers noted that, “U.S. agencies appeared unaccustomed to each other’s roles and competencies... The major theme in all the recommendations resulting from ‘Wild Atom’ is the need to increase interagency cooperation and synchronization in these complex operations.”¹²

In the spring of 2000, the Department of Justice (DoJ) conducted the TOPOFF exercise to assess the nation’s ability to coordinate crisis and consequence management procedures. The results of TOPOFF further demonstrated the unity of effort shortfalls among responding agencies.

⁹ There are over fifty federal organizations with homeland security missions. See Appendix B.

¹⁰ Stephen M. Duncan, “Catastrophic Terrorism,” *The Officer*, December 2000, 33.

¹¹ Terrence Kelly, “An Organizational Framework for Homeland Defense,” *Parameters* 31, no. 3 (2001): 106.

¹² Michael Colpo, “Smell the Coffee: Military Support to Civilian Authorities & Homeland Defense Here

A no-notice simulated release of plague bacilli at the Denver Performing Arts Center caused an estimated 3,700 cases of plague and 950 deaths and quickly overwhelmed public health resources and coordination measures. Doctor Thomas Inglesby of Johns Hopkins University's Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies observed that, "Several different emergency operations centers (EOCs) were set up by a variety of state and federal law enforcement and emergency management agencies. The EOCs were intended to help coordinate management of the crisis, but it was unclear to some observers how a number of distinct EOCs would be able to coordinate management, make decisions or communicate information to medical and public health stakeholders such as the hospitals."¹³ These exercises are representative of other exercises and training events that demonstrated shortfalls in planning and preparation for homeland security operations at the local, state, and federal levels.

Response vs. Preparedness

The second overarching characteristic of America's homeland security environment before September 11th was the primacy of consequence and crisis management over preparedness for a potential CBRNE attack. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Federal Response Plan (FRP) defines crisis management as "measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism and to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators." The FRP defines consequence management as "measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism."¹⁴ Jeffrey Brake, a National Defense Fellow, noted in April 2001 that, "These two

and Now" (U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 1999), 15.

¹³ Thomas Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF," *Biodefense Quarterly* 2 (2000), 7. The TOPOFF (Top Officials) exercise in Denver was the first of three congressionally mandated exercises. The DOJ's Office for Domestic Preparedness will build upon the lessons learned from TOPOFF for the planned TOPOFF II in FY 2002.

¹⁴ FEMA, *Federal Response Plan* (Washington, D.C.: April 1999), TI-1.

responses – crisis management and consequence management – are the cornerstones of current United States policy towards combating terrorism.”¹⁵ The successful integration of local, state, and federal officials when responding to recent disasters demonstrated the United States’ ability to coordinate interagency operations using the FRP. This success, however, led government agencies to focus resources and planning on response rather than preparedness.

Given this experience in successfully responding to and mitigating the effects of a CBRNE attack or a natural disaster, the nation placed less emphasis on preparedness. Preparedness focuses on actions and strategies to detect, prepare for, prevent, and protect against a CBRNE attack. Joseph Collins and Michael Horowitz of the Center for Strategic and International Studies reinforced this reality and stated that, “U.S. homeland defense efforts have been reactive, disjointed, and focused on post facto consequence management.” They concluded that, “In addition to the critically important issues of crisis and consequence management, we must see homeland defense in terms of preventing, deterring, disrupting, and attributing attacks on the homeland.”¹⁶

The military’s homeland security efforts paralleled the government’s priority of response over preparedness. The principal policy document, Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, *Military Support to Civilian Authorities*, defined the realm of military assistance only in terms of responding to acts of terrorism and requests for aid to civil law enforcement agencies.¹⁷ Within this narrow scope of support, the military suffered the same unity of effort shortfalls as other federal agencies. Researchers Rebecca Hersman and Seth Carus at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies identified the ambiguity of the homeland security responsibilities and stated that, “Multiple organizations in the Office of the Secretary of

¹⁵ Library of Congress. *Terrorism and the Military Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress*, report for Congress prepared by Jeffrey D. Brake, 2001, 5.

¹⁶ Joseph J Collins and Michael Horowitz, *Homeland Defense: A Strategic Approach* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), 40.

¹⁷ DoD, *DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civilian Authorities* (Washington D.C.: 1993).

Defense share responsibility for various consequence management activities with several regional and functional commands. Poor communication and conflicting priorities with DoD have made its consequence management activities difficult to coordinate and nearly impossible to integrate.”¹⁸

The Emerging Threat

Over the past quarter century, the United States has been a tempting target of terrorist organizations seeking to gain support for their own causes, discredit American strategy and policies, or weaken America’s alliances with certain nations. The 1983 suicide bombing in Lebanon that killed 241 Marines in their barracks established that terrorists committed to die to kill American servicemen could defeat most security measures. Other attacks over the past decade clearly demonstrated the continued vulnerability of American citizens and military forces overseas. These attacks included the 1996 attack in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 servicemen at Kohbar Towers, the 1998 attacks on the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that left 12 United States citizens dead, and the 2000 suicide bombing that killed 17 sailors on the USS *Cole* off the coast of Yemen.

Although the U.S. Armed Forces and American citizens overseas understood the risk of and implemented measures against terrorist attacks abroad, citizens within the United States felt that terrorist groups would not be audacious enough to risk attacks on American soil.¹⁹ Several events over the past ten years, however, indicated that the contemporary terrorist threat evolved from hierarchical organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization to loose networks of transnational terrorists such as the al Qaida. The objective of the contemporary terrorist threat also evolved from coercing political leaders to indiscriminately killing the maximum amount of

18 Rebecca Hersman and W. Seth Carus, “DoD and Consequence Management: Mitigating the Effects of Chemical and Biological Attack,” *Strategic Forum* no. 169 (1999). Available [Online] <<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum169.html>> [7 December 2001]

¹⁹ Collins and Horowitz, 13-14.

people. The 1993 car bombing of the World Trade Center that killed six and injured more than 1,000, and the 1995 destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City that killed 186 and injured hundreds more demonstrated that vulnerability of the homeland to future attacks by a multitude of methods. President Bush stated in February 2002 that, “The characteristics of American society that we cherish – our freedom, our openness, our great cities and towering skyscrapers, our modern transportation systems – make us vulnerable to terrorism of catastrophic proportions.”²⁰ September 11th greatly expanded the threshold of United States preparation for homeland security and stimulated the federal government to assess efforts and response capabilities to defeat the domestic terrorism threat.

National Security Strategy

Throughout the 1990’s, the Clinton Administration realized the United States was woefully unprepared to prevent or respond to an attack of grave proportions. In June 1995, President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” designating the FBI as the lead federal agency (LFA) in crisis management and the FEMA as the LFA in consequence management. This distinction of crisis versus consequence management delineated responsibilities and aligned most first responders and other applicable agencies with either the FBI or the FEMA. However, during an incident, there is no fine line between crisis and consequence management (see Figure 1). For example, when President Clinton declared a federal emergency to employ federal assistance in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building, he established the FEMA as the LFA. Although the first responders’ priority was to rescue victims and recover remains, the FEMA was aware that the bombing site was a crime scene and coordinated its consequence management efforts with the FBI’s criminal investigation.

²⁰ President, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation,” 2.




Figure 1, Relationship of Crisis and Consequence Management²¹

Subsequent efforts since PDD 39 to establish federal responsibilities for crisis and consequence management included directives and measures to address training first responders, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures, and maximizing the military’s unique capabilities. The 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation (enacted as part of the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act) directed the DoD to provide consequence management training in 120 cities for first responders. DoD actions included establishing the Domestic Preparedness in the Defense Against WMD Program and the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams.²² From October 1996 to March 2001, the DoD prepared over 28,000 first responder trainers in over 105

²¹ Adapted from Eric V. Larson, Eric and John E. Peters, *Preparing the U. S. Army for Homeland Security* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 258.

²² In 2000, DoD changed the designation of the RAID teams to Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST).

cities through the city training program²³ and in accordance with the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, transferred authority to DoJ in FY2001.

As the nation developed capabilities to mitigate terrorist attacks, federal officials addressed the vulnerability of the nation's critical infrastructures. In May 1998, President Clinton signed PDD-62, "Combating Terrorism," and PDD-63, "Critical Infrastructure Protection," to reinforce PDD-39 and establish a National Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure, and Counterterrorism. PDD-63 specifically addressed measures and strategies to prevent the degradation or halt of infrastructure services such as information and communications, banking and finance, water supply, transportation, and power. In addition to establishing the National Infrastructure Assurance Plan, PDD-63 designated responsibilities to protect these infrastructure sectors to specific federal agencies.

Military Strategy

During this period of federal government emphasis on increasing the nation's ability to prepare for and respond to potential acts of terrorism, the military faced the challenging task of preparing capabilities to support homeland security while maintaining readiness to conduct operations overseas. Although the lead for homeland security responsibilities rests with civilian federal agencies such as the DoJ and the FEMA, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle indicated the U.S. military is integral to the nation's ability to counter terrorist threats. "Only the armed services," he said, "have the managerial and logistical capabilities to mount the all-out defensive effort called for by the enormity of these contingencies. It stands to reason that we, as Americans, would expect and demand that our armed forces defend our own homeland against attacks worse than Pearl Harbor."²⁴

²³ Michael Dobbs, "Homeland Security: New Challenges for Old Responsibility," *Journal of Homeland Security* (March 2001): 5.

²⁴ Fred C. Ikle, *Defending the U.S. Homeland, Strategic and Legal Issues for DOD and the Armed Services* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), 9.

The military has been proactive in developing capabilities to meet homeland security requirements. In 1999, The Secretary of Defense appointed an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD-CS) to reorganized homeland security agencies within the following guiding principles:

- Public accountability and strict respect for federalism and civil rights.
- Maintenance of a supporting role to the LFA.
- Emphasis on core competencies, such as mobilization and logistics.
- Use of the Reserve and National Guard units as “forward deployed” units for domestic consequence management.²⁵

In addition to appointing a civilian coordinator within the DoD , the Secretary of Defense directed the CINC of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to establish a standing joint task force to coordinate military response efforts in support of the LFAs. On 01 October 1999, the CINC USJFCOM created Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) with the mission “to deploy to the vicinity of a WMD incident site as requested by the LFA, establish command and control of designated DoD forces and provide military assistance to civilian authorities to save lives, mitigate injuries, and provide temporary critical life support.”²⁶

Within DoD, several organizations exist with unique capabilities related to the full spectrum of homeland defense and military support to civilian authorities (MSCA). These organizations include the Director of Military Support (DOMS), the Technical Escort Unit (TEU), the Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) and combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units.

Coordination for all military assistance to LFA falls to the DOMS, the Army staff agent to assist the Secretary of the Army in fulfilling his duties as the DoD executive agent for civil emergencies.²⁷ The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*, prescribes

²⁵ Collins and Horowitz, 29.

²⁶ Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. *Opening Statement of Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, United States Joint Forces Command.* (24 March 2000): 10.

²⁷ DoD, *DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities* (Washington D.C.: 1997), Sect 4.7.5.5.

the DOMS and his joint staff as the primary point of contact for all federal departments and agencies during times of civil emergencies or disaster response.²⁸ The DOMS serves as the clearinghouse for all MSCA and has the authority to task DoD components and CINCs to plan for and commit military resources in response to requests from civilian authorities.

The U.S. military has several deployable organizations capable of rapidly responding to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. The U.S. Army TEU provides the DoD and other federal agencies with an immediate response capability to provide chemical and biological advice, verification, sampling, detection, mitigation, decontamination, packaging, escort and remediation of chemical and biological devices or hazards worldwide in support of crisis or consequence management.²⁹ The TEU's range of operations includes worldwide deployment to incidents involving chemical or biological agents, safe transport of chemical and biological materials, and remediation and restoration of contaminated DoD sites. Additionally, using its specialized training and state-of-the-art facilities, the TEU conducts research and development programs to identify and prioritize requirements related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism.

The CBIRF is the U.S. Marine Corps' rapid response force providing consequence management for terrorist-initiated chemical and biological attacks. The CIBRF, located at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, maintains a 24-hour on-call status and can deploy its 80-person initial response force (IRF) to arrive at an aerial port of embarkation (APOE) within six hours of notification. Once the IRF arrives at the incident site, it can decontaminate 35-50 ambulatory and 20-35 non-ambulatory casualties per hour. The follow-on force (approximately 250 Marines and Navy personnel) can be ready for deployment within 18-24 hours of notification. The fully

On 2 October 2001, the Secretary of Defense expanded the Secretary of the Army's responsibility by appointing him the DoD executive agent for all homeland security matters.

²⁸ U.S. Army, *Field Manual 100-19, Domestic Support Operations* (Washington, D.C., 1993), 2-5.

²⁹ TEU Mission Statement. Available [Online]< <http://www2.sbcom.army.mil/teu/missions.htm>>[3 March 2002]

deployed CBIRF can process 200 chemical and trauma patients per hour as well as establish a robust communications node to DoD agencies.³⁰

The Army National Guard's WMD-CSTs represent the DoD's immediate local response capabilities to a terrorist incident. The WMD-CSTs' capabilities enable the state governors to assess a suspected CBRNE event in support of a local incident commander, provide civilian responders with military expertise and advice, and facilitate the arrival of additional state and federal military forces to support civilian requests for assistance.³¹ To facilitate unity of effort between the WMD-CSTs and federal response personnel, the DoD stationed the first ten WMD-CSTs in the states that had the FEMA's ten regional headquarters.³² Taking advantage of both the National Guard's standing relationship with the local communities and dual nature of command and control, the WMD-CSTs provide to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)³³ the leverage to quickly integrate military support to the local first responders.

In addition to specialized units, the U.S. Armed Forces possess diverse and unique capabilities in both the active and reserve components³⁴ that are essential for consequence and crisis management operations. The headquarters units from battalion through corps echelons rapidly establish command and control coordination for operations in support of LFAs. Signal and intelligence units assist in establishing interagency communications and processing relevant

³⁰ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Defending the Homeland" (A504 Syllabus, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2001), L7-2-2.

³¹ Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, *Statement by the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Russell C. Davis, USAF*. 106th Cong., 2nd sess.01 May 2001.

³² DoD certified all 27 teams authorized in fiscal years 1999 and 2000. DoD is currently organizing the five teams authorized in fiscal year 2001 to be certified in fiscal year 2003. See Appendix C for WMD-CST stationing and status.

³³ The FEMA Director, on behalf of the President, appoints an FCO, who is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal disaster assistance to the affected state, local governments, and disaster victims. In many cases, the FCO also serves as the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) to administer the financial aspects of assistance authorized under the Stafford Act. The FCO works closely with the State Coordinating Officer (SCO), appointed by the governor to oversee disaster operations for the state, and the Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR), empowered by the governor to execute all necessary documents for disaster assistance on behalf of the state. Source: FEMA, *Federal Response Plan*, 8.

³⁴ The reserve component consists of the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserves, Air

terrorist threat data. nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and health services units provide initial assessment and response capabilities at a disaster or CBRNE attack site. Transportation, military police and engineer units provide personnel, equipment and capabilities to minimize second and third order effects during response and recovery operations. Lastly, the ability to rapidly mobilize large numbers of servicemen enables the U.S. Armed Forces to mitigate the devastating effects of natural disasters such as the Mississippi floods of 1993 and 1997 and the western wildfires of 2000 and 2001.

Homeland Security Strategy: 10 September 2001

The congressionally mandated Hart-Rudman Commission (U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century chaired by Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman) was probably the best, most thorough attempt to develop homeland security strategy before the September 11th attacks. The Hart-Rudman Commission, “chartered to be the most comprehensive examination of the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus since the core legislation governing it was passed in 1947,”³⁵ completed its work in three phases over a two-year period. The Commission released its final report on February 15, 2001 and concluded that, “The U.S. government is not well organized, for example, to ensure homeland security. No adequate coordination mechanism exists among federal, state, and local government efforts, as well as those of dozens of agencies at the federal level.”³⁶ The key recommendation was for the federal government to designate “a single person, accountable to the President, to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government activities related to homeland security.”³⁷ The Commission further recommended that the Secretary of Defense “should make homeland

Force Reserves, Naval Reserves, Marine Corp Reserves, and Coast Guard Reserves.

³⁵ *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century*, v.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

security a primary mission of the National Guard, and that the Guard should be organized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake this mission.”³⁸

The General Accounting Office (GAO), in testimony before Congress on 24 April 2001, reinforced the Hart-Rudman Commission’s recommendations. Based on assessment of three bills before Congress along with several other congressional committee reports and congressionally chartered commissions, the GAO recommended that the federal government take the following actions:

- Create a single high-level federal focal point for policy and coordination.
- Develop a comprehensive threat and risk assessment.
- Develop a national strategy with a defined end state to measure progress against.
- Analyze and prioritize government wide programs and budgets to identify gaps and reduce duplication of effort.
- Coordinate implementation among the different federal agencies.³⁹

The GAO report and the Hart-Rudman Commission demonstrated that a terrorist attack within the nation’s borders with catastrophic results was probable and that the federal government was implementing organizational change to prevent or mitigate the results of such an attack.

III. STRATEGIC RESPONSE

The events of September 11th far exceeded what most Americans expected as a probable terrorist attack within the nation’s borders. The attacks on the American icons of economic and military power truly stirred the will and resolve of the nation like no other event since the attack on Pearl Harbor. “In a flash,” said former U.S. Delta Force commander Rod Paschall, “this attack on America’s soil propelled the U.S. from peace to war. Terrorists had achieved what 30 years of dire warnings from U.S. leaders had failed to accomplish – to alert the world’s most powerful

³⁸ Ibid., 25.

³⁹ GAO, *Combating Terrorism; Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response* (Washington D.C.: April 2001), 2. In addition to considering the Hart-Rudman Commission’s conclusions, this GAO report assessed the following congressional bills, reports and commissions: H.R. 525, the *Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001* (8 Feb 2001); H.R. 1158, the *National Homeland Security Act* (21 Mar 2001); H.R. 1292, *Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001* (29 Mar 2001); S.R. 106-404, to accompany H.R. 4690 on the *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related*

nation to the grim prospect of massive killings in the homeland.”⁴⁰ A week after the devastating attacks on America, the Comptroller General of the United States, David Walker, stated before the Senate Committee of Government Affairs that, “At present, we do not have a national strategy for ensuring homeland security.”⁴¹ He summarized in his statement that, “The government needs clearly defined and effective leadership with clear vision to develop and implement a homeland security strategy. The large number of organizations that will be involved in homeland security need to have articulated roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms.”⁴²

As the nation responded to the September 11th terrorist attacks, President Bush and his cabinet began to establish the strategy to defeat terrorism and secure the homeland. During his address to the nation on 20 September 2001, the President announced that Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Ridge would head up the Office of Homeland Security to coordinate homeland security responsibilities at “the highest level.”⁴³ In his “Executive Order Establishing the Office of Homeland Security,” President Bush stated that, “The mission of the office shall be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The function of the Office shall be to coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the terrorist attacks within the United States.”⁴⁴ Two weeks later, he established the Homeland Security Council (HSC) consisting of executive department agencies to “ensure coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and implementation of all homeland security

Agencies Bill 2001 (8 Sep 2000); and the report of the Gilmore Panel (15 Dec 2000).

⁴⁰ Rod Paschall, “10 Times of Terror,” *America’s New War*, 2001, 25.

⁴¹ GAO, *Homeland Security, A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Effort* (Washington D.C., September 2001), 4.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴³ President, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People” (Washington D.C., 20 September 2001), 4. Available [Online] < <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> > [23 November 2001]

⁴⁴ President, Executive Order, “Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security” (Washington D.C., 8 October 2001), sections 2&3. Available [Online]

policies.”⁴⁵ To integrate public and private sectors from the local, state, and federal levels with the HSC, President Bush established the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council consisting of members from the “private sector, academia, professional service associations, federally funded research and development centers, nongovernmental organizations, state and local governments, and other appropriate professions and communities.”⁴⁶

In the months following the terrorist attacks, the American people united behind the President's efforts to counter the terrorist threat to the homeland. Congress demonstrated the nation's will and resolve by appropriating a \$40 billion Emergency Response Fund to fight the war against the Al Qaida. Of this, Congress directed \$10.4 billion for homeland security enabling the federal government to:

- Increase the number of sky marshals on the airlines.
- Acquire enough medicine to treat up to 10 million people for anthrax.
- Strengthen the states' capacity to respond to bioterrorism.
- Increase the U.S. Coast Guard's ability to protect the nation's ports.
- Acquire equipment for mail sorting facilities to find and destroy biological agents.
- Station 8,000 soldiers at 420 major airports.⁴⁷

State and local communities committed almost \$1.2 billion to protect critical infrastructures and U.S. citizens. The National Governors Association estimated that the states spent over \$650 million to secure potential terrorist targets such as airports, sea and water ports, chemical, nuclear, and biological facilities, water and sewage plants, electrical power plants, gas pipelines, dams, and bridges. Security expenses at the local jurisdictions included \$525 million to purchase and upgrade equipment, pay overtime for first responders and law enforcement personnel, and respond to threats to America's urban, suburban and rural communities.⁴⁸

<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/print/20011008-2.html>> [23 November 2001]

⁴⁵ President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, (Washington D.C., 29 October 2001), section A. Available [Online] <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011030-1.html>> [23 November 2001]

⁴⁶ President, Homeland Security Council Executive Order, (Washington D.C., 21 March 2002), Sec 1. Available [Online] <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020321-9.html>> [28 March 2002]

⁴⁷ President, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation,” 4.

⁴⁸ Remarks by the President to U.S. Mayors and County Officials, [24 January 2002], Office of the Press

The DoD's efforts to support local, state, and federal agencies paralleled and complemented the strategic path set by the President. Even before the last of the four hijacked planes crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside on September 11th, the U.S. military commenced recovery operations at both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and deployed forces throughout the nation to secure borders, transportation nodes, and high value targets. Initial operations included: state activation of 1,200 National Guardsmen from Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia for rescue and recovery operations at the Pentagon; state activation of over 3,800 New York National Guardsmen to assist civilian authorities in New York City⁴⁹; combat air patrols to secure the nation's airspace; and domestic call-up of a third of the U.S. Coast Guard's Selective Reserve to control inbound vessels and to protect vulnerable ports and waterways.⁵⁰ The public support for the commitment of troops and call-up of the reserve component to meet immediate security shortfalls demonstrated the nation's resolve to bear any load in defense of the homeland. By April 2002, of the 82,600 service members from both the National Guard and Reserve on active duty to support the war on terrorism, over 25,000 were serving to support security at home.⁵¹

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld charted the strategic and operational course for U.S. Armed Forces support to the President's homeland security strategy. When he submitted the *QDR Report* on 30 September 2001, the Secretary of Defense established the framework for transforming the U.S. Armed Forces to support the National Security Strategy. Of the six operational goals for transformation, "protecting critical bases of operations (homeland, forces abroad, friends and

Secretary, the White House. Available [Online]

<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020124-1.html>> [1 March 2002]

⁴⁹ National Guard Association of the United States, *Fiscal Year 2003 Legislative Priorities* (Washington, D.C.: NGAUS, 2002), 2. Available [Online] <<http://www.ngaus.org/legislative/2003lp.pdf>> [1 March 2002]

⁵⁰ James M. Loy, "Coast Guard Changing Course." *Retired Officer* LVIII, no. 1 (2002): 54.

⁵¹ DoD News Release, No.190-02, 17 April 2002. Available [Online]


<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/b04172002_bt190-02.html> [17 April 2002]

allies) and defeating CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery”⁵² is the first. On 17 April 2002, he announced the establishment of a new combatant command to defend the United States and support the full range of military assistance to civil authorities. Effective on 01 October 2002, the new Unified Command Plan will establish geographic responsibilities for the continental United States, Canada, and Mexico under USNORTHCOM and unify all military efforts for homeland security under one four-star CINC.

To coordinate the land and maritime defense requirements of the United States, the CINC USJFCOM established in January 2002 the Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS) to “plan, integrate and execute the full spectrum of civil support and homeland defense support to lead federal agencies such as the FEMA.”⁵³ Additionally, JFHQ-HLS is the command and control headquarters for JTF-CS and Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), the DoD counter-drug support to federal, regional, state, and local law enforcement agencies throughout the continental United States. This monograph assumes a notional structure for USNORTHCOM and focuses homeland security organizational requirements within the scope of JFHQ-HLS mission responsibilities (see Figure 2).

⁵² DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30.

⁵³ JFHQ-HLS Mission Statement. Available [Online] <http://www.jfcom.mil/About/com_jfhqhls.htm> [26 March 2002]



* The land and maritime homeland security requirements of the JFHQ-HLS is the focus of this monograph.

ARFOR: Army Forces; **AIRFOR:** Air Forces; **NAVFOR:** Naval Forces; **MARFOR:** Marine Forces; **SOC:** Special Operations Command; **NORAD:** North American Aerospace Defense Command; **JTF-CND:** Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense; **JFHQ-HLS:** Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security; **JTF-CS:** Joint Task Force for Civil Support; **JTF-6:** Joint Task Force-Six

Figure 2, Notional Organizational Structure, U.S. Northern Command

IV. THE MILITARY MISSION

The military tasks required by the U.S. Armed Forces to carry out the primary responsibility of defending the nation have evolved throughout the country's history. Following the Revolutionary War, the new nation raised military forces to defeat foreign invasions and defend against the Indians. The British capture and destruction of Washington D.C. during the War of 1812 demonstrated the United States' vulnerability to attack from the sea and prompted Congressional authorization for the Army to build fixed harbor defenses and the Navy to build blue-water ships for the nation's homeland defense. Following the Civil War, the U.S. military's homeland defense priority shifted from repelling a foreign attack to protecting courts and former slaves in the former Confederate states. As Reconstruction ended in 1876, Congress passed the *Posse Comitatus Act* in 1878 to end the U.S. military's civilian law enforcement powers.

The Spanish threat to the United States in the latter part of the 19th century triggered another era of coastal defense construction and shipbuilding. As World War I raged in Europe, the powerful U.S. Navy and the protection of two oceans secured American citizens from foreign attacks. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor shattered the notion of domestic security and caused the nation to defend its borders throughout World War II. Although the U.S. military soon realized that land invasion was improbable, the potential of sea and air attacks required significant air and sea patrols of the coasts.

The Cold War changed the parameters of homeland defense to nuclear air and missile attacks from the Soviet Union. The military priority of protecting the nation from conventional attack shifted to detecting a nuclear air or missile attack and maintaining a retaliatory strike capability. With the exception of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the connection of the conventional U.S. military forces to homeland defense eroded and “in the mind of the average American, ‘homeland defense’ became ‘civil defense.’”⁵⁴

As the terrorist threat emerged on the world scene in the late 1960’s in the form of civilian airline hijackings, the United States responded with law enforcement measures as opposed to military operations. Over the past 25 years, United States responsibilities for homeland defense evolved to the FBI countering terrorist threats, the FEMA mitigating the effects of attacks, and the U.S. Armed Forces supporting these LFAs as needed. With the events of September 11th, the nation again felt the threat of attack on American soil and turned to the military for security of the homeland.

With the U.S. military again at the forefront of homeland security, the tasks and missions required to defend United States citizens at home are more ambiguous than those conducted over the nation’s history. President Bush reaffirmed the primacy of homeland security as the DoD’s

⁵⁴ Jim Garamone, “Defending the Homeland: A History of Civil Defense” *American Forces Press Service* (2001). [Online]<<http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/a102601a.htm>>[26 March 2002] The U.S. military’s historical role in homeland defense presented in this chapter is a summation of Jim Garamone’s

responsibility to the nation and ensured that the weight of the federal government is behind the U.S. military's efforts both to succeed in operations overseas and to organize homeland security capabilities. In terms of the Ends-Ways-Means paradigm,⁵⁵ the military conditions (Ends) to meet the President's strategic homeland security objectives are a safe and secure homeland. The resources (Means) to accomplish the actions are the capabilities of available military forces and local, state, and federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities. The actions (Ways) to produce the military conditions, however, are more ambiguous than the historical military responsibilities to defend the homeland. The U.S. military must develop a coherent operational structure and campaign plan to apply military resources and capabilities to ensure a safe and secure homeland.

Currently, neither the Office of Homeland Security nor the DoD has defined homeland security in terms of the contemporary threat to United States citizens. As part of the *Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001*, Congress defined homeland security as “the protection of the territory, critical infrastructures, and citizens of the United States by federal, state, and local government entities from the threat or use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber, or conventional weapons by military or other means.”⁵⁶ This definition omits mitigating the effects from natural or manmade disasters and providing MSCA. The trend among military planners and strategists, however, is to link military response to both aggressive attacks and domestic emergencies as one operational construct. The U.S. Army's draft *Homeland Security Planning Guidance* defined homeland security as “protecting our territory, population, and infrastructure at home by deterring, defending against, and mitigating the effects of all threats to US sovereignty; supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and helping to ensure the

article.

⁵⁵ DoD, CJCS, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. (Washington, D.C., 2001): II-3.

⁵⁶ Congress, House, *Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001*, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., HR 1292 IH, Sec 6.

availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.”⁵⁷ Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton stated before Congress that consequence management for all domestic emergencies is an integral component of the U.S. military’s homeland defense responsibilities⁵⁸ and the CINC USJFCOM embraced this concept when he established the JFHQ-HLS. The mission of the JFHQ-HLS is to “plan and integrate the full spectrum of JFCOM civil support and homeland defense support to lead federal agencies from prevention through crisis and consequence management.”⁵⁹ To determine the military operational and tactical requirements for homeland security, this monograph uses the following definition for homeland security:

The prevention, deterrence, and preemption of and defense against aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies.⁶⁰

Unity of Effort

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

defines operational art as:

The Employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.⁶¹

Through operational art, the CINC for USNORTHCOM must ensure unified action to fill the current void between tactical missions at the local level and the homeland security strategy at the national level.⁶² Without this operational link, the nation cannot leverage the U.S. military’s

⁵⁷ Antulio J. Echevarria II, “The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective” (Strategic Studies Institute monograph, U.S. Army War College, 2001), 7.

⁵⁸ DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 69.

⁵⁹ JFHQ-HLS Mission Statement. Available [Online]<http://www.jfcom.mil/About/com_jfhqhls.htm>[26 March 2002]

⁶⁰ Michael Dobbs, “Homeland Security: New Challenges for an Old Responsibility,” *Journal of Homeland Security*, (March 2001): 2.

⁶¹ DoD, CJCS, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C., 2001): 316.

⁶² Unified action synchronizes and/or integrates joint, single-Service, special, multinational, and supporting

capabilities to secure the homeland. As the CINC shapes his campaign to support the President's homeland security strategy, he must consider the first responders, local and state governments, and non-governmental organizations as integral partners. The first operational imperative to embrace this civil-military partnership is unity of effort.

Military operations in support of homeland security objectives rely on successful interagency coordination at the local, state, and federal level. There are over 30,000 municipalities and political subdivisions in the nation⁶³ and, as John Brinkerhoff of the Institute of Defense Analysis stated, "Many Americans are already engaged in defending America. A million firefighters and emergency medical technicians, 700,000 sworn police officers, 700,000 physicians, about 10 million other health care workers, and many more fight fires, crime, and disease daily."⁶⁴ The U.S. military must be able to tap into this tremendous human resource to shape successful operations. The overlying theme must be to build strong relationships and trust between the U.S. Armed Forces and civilian agencies responsible for protecting U.S. citizens and responding to domestic crisis. The reserve component is forward deployed in over 4,100 communities throughout the United States and its territories; 2,900 of which are home to National Guard units.⁶⁵ In many cases, service members in these reserve units are the first responders and community leaders such as firefighters, health care professionals, law enforcement officials, and local legislators who shape the local homeland security environment. Therefore, the CINC USNORTHCOM must leverage established relationships among reserve component service members and community officials to facilitate civil-military operations in the local jurisdictions.

operations with the operations of government agencies, and NGOs to achieve unity of effort in the operational area. Source: *JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces*, 2001, viii.

⁶³ Remarks by Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge at the National Governors' Association Committee on Human Resources, [26 February 2002], Office of the Press Secretary, the White House. Available [Online] <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020224-2.html>> [1 March 2002]

⁶⁴ John R. Brinkerhoff, "Defending America," *Journal of Homeland Security* (August 2001): 6.

⁶⁵ DoD, Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs* (Washington, D.C.: 2000), 127

At the federal level, USNORTHCOM must build on proven associations and partnerships to foster unified action and gain the synergistic effect of focusing resources and capabilities for preparedness and response. An excellent example of federal leadership and interagency coordination is the Y2K task force formed to mitigate the potential shutdown of computers at the start of the new millennium. David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, cited before Congress that emerging homeland security strategy “may require a similar level of leadership, oversight, and partnerships with nearly every segment of American society-including individual U.S. citizens-as well as with the international community.”⁶⁶ A second example is the FEMA’s demonstrated success at integrating numerous agencies in a short amount of time when conducting disaster relief operations. The U.S. military must build on its proven success with the Y2K task force and the FEMA to shape interagency coordination requisite for the nation’s homeland security strategy.

At the state, regional, and local levels, the U.S. military must provide infrastructure and programs to facilitate interagency coordination. Information technology enables the U.S. military to leverage established systems to integrate information flow among local jurisdictions and between local, state and federal agencies. The Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) is an established automated information management system linking over 8,900 reserve component units at over 3,800 locations throughout the United States and its territories.⁶⁷ This system links all National Guard State Area Commands (STARCs) with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and can serve as the communications backbone to link civilian agencies on a common information system. In addition to sharing information electronically, the system can facilitate communications between federal officials and first responders during domestic emergencies.

⁶⁶ GAO, *Homeland Security, A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Effort* (Washington D.C.: 2001), 6.

⁶⁷ RCAS Webpage. Available [Online] <http://www.rcas.com/rcas_summary.htm> [14 March 2002]

Unity of Command

The second operational imperative linking military operations to the nation's homeland security strategy is unity of command. Unity of effort is critical to coordinate interagency actions and shapes the U.S. military's mission. However, the U.S. military's robust ability to establish command and control during times of crisis is the essential capability required by the nation for crisis and consequence management. When the President declares a federal emergency or disaster, he appoints a FCO to direct all federal efforts and the Secretary of Defense appoints a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to coordinate MSCA. The DCO establishes a crucial command and control capability to channel military resources flowing into a disaster area and manage military operations in support of the LFA. The local incident commander is often overwhelmed during the early stages of crisis and consequence management and struggles to establish an effective command and control structure. When this happens, the incident commander can draw on the U.S. military's capability to establish a fully functional EOC with robust communications both within the disaster area and with the federal command structure.

Tactical Tasks

The U.S. military's response to the September 11th attacks on the nation demonstrated its flexibility and responsiveness in support of homeland security tasks. Department of Defense joint doctrine emphasizes this capability and states that, "The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to assist civil authorities in meeting challenges that cannot be adequately addressed by nonmilitary institutions."⁶⁸ The majority of these missions, however, are temporary in nature and fill the gap until civilian authorities are capable of performing the tasks themselves. To meet the responsibility to defend the homeland, the U.S. military must accomplish fundamental tactical tasks required for homeland security and shape capabilities to support the President's homeland

⁶⁸ DoD, CJCS, *Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington

security strategy. This monograph explores the tactical tasks required to meet the Office of Homeland Security's charter to "coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States."⁶⁹

Detection

Detecting potential terrorist threats to the United States is a multi-agency issue that includes intelligence collection on terrorist groups at home and abroad. Because the *Posse Comitatus Act of 1878* prohibits U.S. service members in a federal status from performing law enforcement and collecting intelligence on American citizens, civilian agencies are responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of antiterrorist and counterterrorist intelligence within the United States. At the state level, the governor can support law enforcement officials and integrate National Guard soldiers and airmen in a state status with counterterrorist and antiterrorist activities. The National Guard enables the U.S. military to disseminate and exchange law enforcement information among the local, state, and federal agencies. Specifically, the CINC USNORTHCOM must provide a system within the limits of the *Posse Comitatus Act* to augment the intelligence the National Guard receives from state sources with relevant intelligence processed through federal military channels.

A second area of intelligence relevant to the U.S. military is detecting the release of biological, chemical and radiological hazards. The DoD has several specialized units capable of performing this task, but most are focused on response rather than detection before an attack. The DoD can improve its capabilities in this area by coordinating with the Center for Disease Control and Department of Energy to posture forces based on valid threat assessments. By doing this, one benefit to the nation is the synergy created by interagency cooperation. For example, the

D.C., 2000), viii.

⁶⁹ President, "Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security," Sec. 3.

improved military detection of bioterrorism will be a strategic investment in the Department of Health and Human Services' ability to detect outbreaks of illnesses in the United States.

Preparedness

The nation's ability to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats and attacks relies on the U.S. military's robust capability to plan and conduct simulations, exercises, and training. The training doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces is a model civilian agencies can use to develop training programs for crucial mission areas. At the federal level, the CINC USNORTHCOM can conduct JTF-level exercises in collaboration with the FBI and the FEMA to foster permanent relationships with the interagency community. At the local and state levels, first responders can shape their training readiness programs by drawing on U.S. military expertise in the areas of command and control of operations, logistics, mass casualty response, NBC detection and response, and urban search and rescue. Additionally, the National Guard can capitalize on its strong relationship with the communities to educate the public about terrorist threat awareness, risks to the local community, and the U.S. military's role in homeland security.

Medical and bioterrorism preparedness is another area the U.S. military can augment shortfalls in local jurisdictions. Medical service personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces must establish permanent relationships with local hospital officials to assist them in identifying shortfalls and preparing the hospitals in their jurisdictions for consequence management. The anthrax attacks on the nation in October of 2001 demonstrated the requirement to prepare U.S. citizens for future biological attacks. The U.S. military's experience in efficiently immunizing large numbers of people can serve as a logistical model to implement a civilian immunization program.

Prevention

Although it is improbable that the United States can secure the nation against all forms of terrorist attacks, increased awareness among the public and actions by the federal government can reduce the risk of most forms of attacks. Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, presented a broad spectrum of preventive measures the United States government can apply for homeland security:

- Anti-proliferation and counter-proliferation programs.
- Intelligence collection (traditional military & non-traditional economic intelligence).
- Deterrence through credible threat of massive retaliation.
- In-transit interception, including national missile defense.
- Active self-protection and vulnerability reduction antiterrorist measures.
- Pre-emptive actions, including military and other counterterrorist measures.⁷⁰

Considering the U.S. military's land and maritime homeland security responsibilities, the CINC USNORTHCOM can influence the last two identified preventative measures: antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

The DoD *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines antiterrorism as “defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.”⁷¹ In a state status role, the National Guard can augment the civilian agencies in their efforts to prevent terrorists from entering the country. In February 2002, the DoD deployed more than 1,600 National Guard soldiers to assist the U.S. Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and U.S. Border Patrol along the 7,500 miles of border shared with Canada and Mexico. In this case, the National Guard forces provided a temporary capability to meet the personnel shortfall of these civilian agencies.

⁷⁰ James M. Loy and Robert G. Ross, “Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled Strategy for a Balanced and Practical Response” *Journal of Homeland Security*, (September 2001): 8.

⁷¹ DoD, CJCS, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 32.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines counterterrorism as “offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.”⁷² As demonstrated by the military action against the Taliban and al Qaida in Afghanistan following the September 11th attacks, the U.S. Armed Forces can employ a flexible and agile force to fight terrorism abroad. Domestically, the U.S. military’s offensive options to prevent and deter terrorism are more limited. Based on credible intelligence of an impending CBRNE attack on the nation’s homeland, the U.S. military is capable to take direct action to prevent the attack.

Protection

A terrorist attack to destroy or disrupt the nation’s critical infrastructures can paralyze daily operations and leave the country vulnerable to follow-on CBRNE attacks. The U.S. Armed Forces has the equipment, personnel, and expertise to augment civilian law enforcement agencies and protect critical infrastructures such as communications networks, utilities and water supplies, banking and financial systems, transportation nodes, and intelligence systems.⁷³ The availability of military personnel enables the President to quickly deploy forces to vulnerable areas. For example, in the six months following the September 11th attacks, over 7,000 National Guard soldiers deployed to the nation’s 420 major airports to meet security shortfalls until the Federal Aviation Administration could develop a coherent plan to assume the airport security mission. Another example is the deployment of reserve component service members to meet the heightened security requirements at federal installations and facilities such as military bases and government buildings.

To protect the nation’s public and privately owned information systems, the federal government can draw on the U.S. military’s expertise and infrastructure designed to coordinate and direct the defense of DoD computer systems and networks. The mission of the U.S. Space

⁷² *Ibid.*, 105.

⁷³ *Defending the American Homeland*, by L. Paul Bremer III and Edwin Meese III, co-chairmen

Command's Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) is "to defend DoD computer networks and systems from any unauthorized event whether it be a probe, scan, virus incident, or intrusion."⁷⁴ The successful interagency coordination to protect computer systems during the Y2K operations indicates that the federal government could leverage the JTF-CND capabilities to secure networks from terrorist attack.

Another area of military support for antiterrorism is prevention of attacks against highly vulnerable events. The President designates these events as National Special Security Events (NSSE) and appoints a LFA to head the security operations. These events include presidential inaugurations, political summits and, most recently, the Superbowl in New Orleans and the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. To support the U.S. Secret Service, the LFA for security at the Winter Olympics, the CINC USJFCOM established Joint Task Force-Olympics (JTF-O) and deployed over 5,000 active and reserve component service members.

One of the missions President Bush tasked the Office of Homeland Security to do is "to coordinate efforts to prevent unauthorized access to, development of, and unlawful importation into the United States of CBRNE or other related materials that have the potential to be used in terrorist attacks."⁷⁵ The USJFCOM's counter-drug support to local, state and federal agencies is fundamentally linked to this mission. JTF-6 provides operational training and intelligence support to law enforcement agencies in their mission to detect, deter, disrupt, and dismantle illegal drug trafficking organizations. Building upon this experience, the CINC USNORTHCOM can apply "many of the capabilities and interagency procedures designed to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States to improve our ability to intercept the importation of CBRNE materials and weapons into the homeland."⁷⁶

(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2002), 1.

⁷⁴ JTF-CND Mission Statement, Available [Online] < <http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspacecom/jtf-cno.htm> > [29 March 2002]

⁷⁵ President, "Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security." Sec 3.

⁷⁶ Michael Dobbs, "Homeland Security: New Challenges for old Responsibility," 5.

Response and Recovery

The U.S. military continually provides essential support to LFAs when domestic disasters such as hurricanes, floods, wildfires, ice storms and CBRNE attacks overwhelm local and state officials. The FEMA's FRP⁷⁷ is the President's method to mitigate the consequences of domestic emergencies to include terrorist attack. Within the scope of the FRP, the DoD has two areas of responsibility: public works and engineering provided by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and essential response and recovery tasks coordinated by the JTF-CS.

The DoD is the Primary Agency for the FRP's Emergency Support Function (ESF) #3 (Public Works and Engineering) and supports the DCO in meeting goals related to lifesaving and life-sustaining actions, damage mitigation, and recovery activities. The USACE, as the DoD executive agency for ESF #3, provides technical advice and evaluation, engineering services, contracts for construction management and the emergency repair of water and wastewater treatment facilities, potable water and ice, emergency power, and real estate management.⁷⁸

Although the DoD is the Primary Agency for ESF #3, it is a fundamental Supporting Agency in the other eleven ESFs (see Appendix D, ESF Responsibilities). The proven success of the FRP to coordinate the numerous federal agencies for response and recovery operations serves as an excellent model for DoD's homeland security operations. This link to the FEMA and the FRP is the CINC's key operational tenant in the USNORTHCOM's ability to provide homeland security. To successfully integrate into the FRP during domestic disasters and CBRNE attacks, both the National Guard and the JFHQ-HLS must train headquarters and units for consequence management. The essential response and recovery tasks to support the FRP include incident site

⁷⁷ The FEMA's FRP is the mechanism and structure by which the Federal Government mobilizes resources and conducts activities to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency that overwhelms the capabilities of state and local governments.

⁷⁸ FEMA, ESF#3-1.

support, medical assistance and support to include casualty assistance and treatment, civilian displaced persons support, logistics support, and air operations.⁷⁹

Incident site support relies on the U.S. military's ability to establish effective and robust command and control to coordinate operations among the first responders and with the LFA. Other site support tasks include security of the contaminated zone, search and rescue, NBC reconnaissance and survey, hazardous materials containment, and initial chemical decontamination.

CBRNE attacks have a high probability of quickly producing casualties that overwhelm local medical authority's capability to respond and handle mass casualties. Medical assistance and support in the early stages of consequence management depends on the U.S. military's ability to conduct casualty treatment and evacuation. Essential tasks include triage and trauma care, patient decontamination and evacuation, and civilian hospital augmentation. Medical support after the early stages of response rely on the U.S. Armed Forces combat health support capabilities. Key mission areas include personnel decontamination at civilian hospitals, medical technical support, medical logistics, and definitive care at combat support hospitals

Domestic disasters usually overwhelm the local and state government's ability to provide logistics for crisis and consequence management. The DoD's ability to quickly provide logistical support is a critical component of the U.S. military's response capabilities. Essential mission areas include joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration of deploying units, general logistics and supply support, mortuary affairs, and transportation. Additionally, the U.S. military provides fixed and rotary wing transportation, air medical evacuation and air space management in and around the disaster area.

Throughout recovery operations, the U.S. military must focus on restoring local and state governmental authority and ensuring military capability to perform follow-on missions. Quickly

⁷⁹ USJFCOM, "Joint Task Force Civil Support Command Brief." Norfolk, VA, 2001. Available [Online]

restoring essential government functions and services “can greatly reassure citizens and can minimize the risks that military support to consequence management activities is misperceived as an imposition of martial law.”⁸⁰ As the U.S. military focuses on consequence management, the DoD must reduce the military’s vulnerability to subsequent terrorist attacks. Essential tasks include force protection for deployed units, critical infrastructure, installations, and higher headquarters operations.⁸¹

V. ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS

There are two areas of organizational change the National Guard can pursue to meet the responsibilities for homeland security. Option One, the National Guard can restructure current combat units into specialized homeland security units with the sole responsibility of executing military tasks in support of LFAs. Option Two, the National Guard can consolidate the nation’s military responsibilities for homeland security in a standing command and control structure capable of receiving OPCON of units to prepare for specific missions or to respond for crisis and consequence management. This monograph applies three evaluation criteria to compare the two options. The first is the National Guard’s ability to conduct operations in order to fulfill its primary charter to serve as the nation’s strategic reserve. Second is the ability of the National Guard to facilitate unity of effort and communicate missions and intents throughout the network of civilian and military agencies with homeland security responsibilities. Third is the National Guard’s ability to allocate and commit resources for homeland security requirements.

<http://www.jfcom.mil/jtfc/Cmd%20Brf_011105.ppt> [2 March 2002]

⁸⁰ Eric V. Larson, Eric and John E. Peters, *Preparing the U. S. Army for Homeland Security* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 99.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 109.

Option One: Standing Homeland Security Forces

The Army National Guard (ARNG) currently has over 357,000 soldiers in 400 units deployed in 2,700 communities.⁸² The basic warfighting organizations of the ARNG are eight combat divisions, two separate brigades, one armored cavalry regiment (ACR), two Special Forces groups, and fifteen enhanced separate brigades. Current war plans include the fifteen enhanced separate brigades while the eight combat divisions, two separate brigades, and one ACR serve as the nation's strategic reserve and align with the four active component corps as part of the U.S. Army Forces Command's Army Teaming.⁸³ The two Special Forces groups fall under OPCON of U.S. Special Operations Command upon activation. Option One entails keeping the fifteen enhanced separate brigades intact and reorganizing the eight combat divisions into homeland security divisions⁸⁴ composed of CS and CSS units such as NBC, medical service, military police, transportation, and engineers essential for homeland security operations. These homeland security divisions would provide a governor or a FCO with flexible military capabilities for homeland security operations.

Strategic Reserve

Converting the ARNG's eight combat divisions into homeland security divisions leaves the United States with an inadequate strategic reserve. History has proven that the U.S. Armed Forces required ARNG units to fight and win the nation's wars. Army National Guard divisions made up 40% of the American Expeditionary Force's combat strength in World War I and all 18 ARNG divisions saw combat in World War II. Over 138,600 Army National Guardsmen mobilized and

⁸² DoD, Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs*, 53.

⁸³ Department of the Army, *FORSCOM Regulation 350.4, Army Relationships* (Fort McPherson, GA: 20 July 2000), 5.

⁸⁴ Melvin Spiese's monograph "National Guard Homeland Defense Division: Filling the Gap in Weapons of Mass Destruction Defense" (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1999) and George E. Irvin, Sr's monograph "Integrating the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management Role" (U.S. Army War College, 2001), propose options to reorganized ARNG combat divisions to homeland defense divisions.

two divisions along with non-divisional artillery and engineer units deployed for the Korean War. More than 63,000 ARNG personnel activated for the Persian Gulf War.⁸⁵

The National Guard does not need to have standing units with the sole purpose of homeland security. Over the past decade, several operations demonstrated the ARNG's flexibility to execute Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) with its current force structure. These MOOTW included numerous disaster relief operations, drug interdiction and eradication efforts, command and control for peacekeeping in the Balkans, and most recently, mobilization for airport security and assistance to federal border control agencies. If the DoD reorganizes the eight combat divisions into homeland security divisions, the nation will not be able to guarantee an adequate strategic reserve to meet future operations. As history demonstrated, a governor or the President can easily call up and activate units to provide the military manpower required for homeland security operations. Reserving eight divisions of soldiers with the sole responsibility of homeland security would be a waste of military capability and leave the United States with an inadequate strategic reserve to fight and win the nation's wars.

Unity of Effort

Option One does not improve unity of effort among federal agencies for homeland security but facilitates better interagency coordination at the local and state level. Units assigned to these divisions can develop closer relationships with local and state officials to standardized first responder training and equipment and conduct scenario-based exercises to certify a state's response capability. Two shortfalls exist for Option One. First, the Homeland Security Divisions will suffer the same lack of interagency coordination at the federal level that typified the nation's homeland security environment before September 11th. The homeland security divisions would be mostly state-focused and would not provide a capability to the DoD to link military operations to

⁸⁵ Army National Guard, "History of the Army National Guard" (Arlington, VA: 2002). Available [Online] < <http://www.arng.army.mil/history/> > [30 March 2002]

the National Security Strategy. Second, although most National Guard Divisions are multi-state divisions, several states would receive no homeland security units under this reorganization plan.

Resources

In the long term, Option One increases resource capabilities for MSCA. Strategically, the National Guard can focus on organizing, equipping, manning, and training the homeland security divisions for homeland security tasks while prioritizing resources for combat operations with the fifteen enhanced separate brigades.⁸⁶ Operationally, JFHQ-HLS can build upon improved coordination between the homeland security divisions and state and local officials to standardize training for preparedness and crisis and consequence management. Attaining these resource benefits however, will take several years. In the short term, converting to homeland security divisions could cost billions of dollars. The Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS) demonstrated that the ARNG must invest billions of dollars over several years to convert combat units to CS and CSS units essential for homeland security operations. The current ADRS conversion of twelve combat brigades to meet the Army's shortfall of 124,800 CS and CSS personnel will cost approximately five billion dollars over a nine-year period.⁸⁷

Option Two: Standing Command and Control Structure

Option Two retains the current force structure of all the ARNG warfighting divisions, brigades, and groups and consolidates the nation's military responsibilities for homeland security in a standing National Guard command and control structure with few assigned military organizations. When disaster strikes or a CBRNE incident occurs, the command and control

⁸⁶ Melvin G. Spiese, "The National Guard Homeland Defense Division Filling the Gap in Weapons of Mass Destruction Defense" (School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 41.

⁸⁷ James E. Taylor, "Integration of the Army National Guard in Force Projection Operations-A Concept for a New Millennium" (School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1999) 20.

structure can activate and receive OPCON of units to prepare for and respond to crisis and consequence management.

Strategic Reserve

The current ARNG combat structure is a critical component in Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces. In the *QDR Report*, he set the current force structure of eight ARNG divisions and fifteen enhanced separate brigades together with the ten active divisions and two ACRs as the U.S. Army's "baseline from which the Department will develop a transformed force for the future."⁸⁸ In this strategic framework, the eight ARNG combat divisions serve two crucial functions as the nation's strategic reserve. They nearly double the combat power of the Army in the event of general war and provide a source of legacy units equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles as the U.S. Army transforms to lighter and more agile units. Additionally, the eight ARNG combat divisions serve as a force provider to deploy unit level replacements to the ten active component divisions, provide theater commanders the capability to react to unexpected contingencies, and mobilize for stability and support operations to reduce the operations tempo of active component.⁸⁹ The National Guard can function as the strategic reserve and have homeland security as a primary mission.

Unity of Effort

The President is focusing federal efforts on interagency coordination for the unified purpose of securing the homeland. For successful operations integrated with the President's efforts, the U.S. military must hold unity of effort as the central principle to fill the current void between tactical missions at the local level and the homeland security strategy at the national level. The CINC USNORTHCOM can leverage established relationships among reserve component service

⁸⁸ DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 22.

⁸⁹ James E. Taylor, 24.

members and community officials to facilitate civil-military operations in the local jurisdictions. Option Two, a standing National Guard command and control structure, facilitates interagency coordination and unity of effort between military and civilian authorities at the federal, state and local level.

Resources

The majority of near-term resource requirements for Option Two will be absorbed in the costs of standing up USNORTHCOM. The DoD must identify the personnel requirement for a standing National Guard command and control structure and incorporate those requirements in the force structure development of the USNORTHCOM. The DoD can reduce the costs for the facilities required for a standing command and control organization by using existing facilities. Assuming a new command and control structure will absorb existing military organizations, USNORTHCOM can use headquarter facilities vacated by those organizations. USNORTHCOM can then identify shortfalls and coordinate with the NGB for new construction to meet identified shortfalls.

Option Two provides efficient resource management for MSCA. A standing National Guard command and control structure can develop OPLANs and present mission-based resource requirements for state ARNG units to the CINC USNORTHCOM for submission in the planning, programming, and budgeting system. Option Two also has the synergistic effect of integrating capabilities among the National Guard and the civilian agencies responsible for homeland security.

Option Selection

Option Two provides the CINC USNORTHCOM with an organizational solution to meet the U.S. military requirements inherent in the President's homeland security strategy. It retains ARNG combat divisions to serve as the strategic reserve and meets the Secretary of Defense's

guidance for transformation. It fosters the essential principle of unity of effort for homeland security between the U.S. military and the civilian agencies forming under the Office for Homeland Security. Lastly, it facilitates the federal government's efficient allocation of military resources. The following chapter delineates an operational structure for the U.S. military to employ its capabilities to meet the President's strategic homeland security objectives.

VI. PROPOSED OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

The military's essential homeland security mission is to provide the operational framework to link the tactical tasks identified in this monograph to the nation's strategic homeland security objectives. This chapter proposes a three-echelon operational structure under USNORTHCOM organized at the federal, regional, and state levels. A joint task force, JTF-USA, heads the land and maritime homeland security mission for USNORTHCOM and absorbs the current JFHQ-HLS, JTF-CS, and JTF-6. Responsibilities for missile defense, airspace security, computer network defense fall to other organizations within USNORTHCOM (see Figure 2). The major subordinate organizations under JTF-USA are ten Regional Homeland Security Commands (RHLSCOMs) aligned with the ten existing FEMA regions. The major subordinate organizations under the ten RHLSCOMs are Homeland Security Commands (HLSCOMs) for each state within the geographical responsibility of the ten RHLSCOMs.

Joint Task Force-USA

Joint Task Force-USA is USNORTHCOM's organization for land and maritime homeland security. To effectively coordinate and integrate DoD efforts with the Office of Homeland Security, the FEMA, and the NGB, JTF-USA is stationed in the Washington D.C. area. Joint Task Force-USA is a multi-component organization commanded by an ARNG Lieutenant General in a federal Title-10 Active Guard Reserve (AGR) status.

Functions

The DoD *Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, states, “Demonstrated military capability is the cornerstone of deterrence, which remains a principle means for dissuading would-be aggressors and adversaries from actions harmful to the United States.”⁹⁰ The operational imperative for JTF-USA is the demonstrated capability to detect, prepare for, prevent, and protect against terrorist attacks and, if an attack occurs, to possess the ability to mitigate the effects and to bring those responsible to justice. The first priority for JTF-USA is to develop a campaign plan that supports the CINC USNORTHCOM’s strategic plan for homeland security. The national level campaign for land and maritime operations provides “the basis for unified effort, centralized direction and decentralized execution”⁹¹ crucial in the interagency process. The JTF-USA campaign provides the strategic and operational guidance and a flexible range of capabilities and options for the RHLSCOM commanders to develop region-specific OPLANs. Elements of the JTF-USA campaign are antiterrorism and counterterrorism, consequence management, maritime intercept and freedom of navigation operations, DoD support to counter-drug operations, and domestic support operations.

The second priority for JTF-USA is to establish a standing EOC linked into the FEMA’s National Emergency Coordination Center (NECC) and develop an interagency communications network built on the RCAS infrastructure. A common communications network is essential to foster relationships among the federal homeland security agencies, facilitate coordination, and reduce redundancy in operations. Additionally, this capability enhances the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)⁹² to disseminate information regarding the risks of terrorist threats and

⁹⁰ DoD, CJCS, *Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: 2000), vi.

⁹¹ DoD, CJCS, *Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I* (Washington, D.C.: 1996), II-6.

⁹² The HSAS provides a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks to federal, state, and local authorities and to the American people. The HSAS establishes five Threat Conditions with associated suggested Protective Measures: GREEN-Low Condition (low risk

integrates the JTF-USA EOC with the FEMA's NECC. The dismantled \$40 million federal coordination center set up for Y2K is a good prototype for the JTF-USA EOC.⁹³

Other functions of the JTF-USA are to promote standard procedures for homeland security tasks and missions, plan training to support the FRP, and conduct joint-level exercises to facilitate interagency integration. The JTF-USA also has the responsibilities to prepare the U.S. Armed Forces for land and maritime operations supporting the future national military strategy for homeland security. Based on the CINC USNORTHCOM's vision, the JTF-USA commander determines the doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier requirements for the DoD homeland security mission.

Mission

The mission of JTF-USA is to facilitate unity of effort between land and naval forces and civilian agencies to detect, prepare for, prevent, and protect against CBRNE attacks targeted at United States, territories and possessions, sovereignty, population and infrastructure. The JTF-USA provides DoD counter-drug support to assist federal, regional, state and local law enforcement agencies in their mission to detect, deter, disrupt, and dismantle illegal drug trafficking organizations throughout the continental United States. When directed by the CINC USNORTHCOM, JTF-USA employs military forces in support of the FCO to respond to and recover from a CBRNE attack or a natural disaster in the United States, territories and possessions.

When the President declares a federal emergency or disaster, the USNORTHCOM is the supported command and some or all of the other nine unified commands are the supporting


of terrorist attacks), BLUE-Guarded Condition (general risk of terrorist attack), YELLOW-Elevated Condition (significant risk of terrorist attacks), ORANGE-High Condition (high risk of terrorist attacks), and RED-Severe Condition (severe risk of terrorist attacks). Source: White House Press Release, "Gov. Ridge Announces Homeland Security Advisory System," 12 March 2002. Available [Online] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-1.html> [14 March 2002]

⁹³ Randall A. Larsen and Ruth A. David, "Homeland Defense: Assumptions First, Strategy Second,"

commands. The DOMS, a subordinate of JTF-USA, tasks the Services and CINCs of the supporting commands for required personnel, assets, and capabilities. The JTF-USA deputy commander serves as the DCO when the effects of a disaster or hostile attack cross over regional boundaries.

Organizational Structure

Components of the JTF-USA headquarters are the joint staff, the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), and the DOMS. The subordinate organizations of JTF-USA are JTF-6, CBIRF, the ten RHLSCOMs, and the mobility detachment (see Figure 3).



CMOC: Civil-Military Operation Center; **DOMS:** Director of Military Support; **JTF-6:** Joint Task Force Six; **CBIRF:** Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force; **HLS CMD:** Homeland Security Command; **AIRFOR:** Air Forces; **ARFOR:** Army Forces.

Figure 3, Proposed Organizational Structure, JTF-USA


Headquarters

The Deputy Commander for JTF-USA is an active component Major General and the Command Sergeant Major is a Title-10 AGR (ARNG) CSM. The Chief of Staff is Title-10 AGR (ARNG) Brigadier General (see Appendix E, Figure 8 for staff organization).

The CMOC is a key element of JTF-USA's ability to conduct homeland security operations. DoD joint doctrine is broad and states, "The organization of the CMOC is theater and mission dependent-flexible in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the [local, state and federal government.]"⁹⁴ The function of the JTF-USA CMOC is to facilitate and integrate interagency operations to support the JTF-USA homeland security campaign. The CMOC officer is a Title-10 AGR (ARNG or USAR) Civil Affairs Colonel and reports to the deputy commander of JTF-USA. The CMOC serves as a coordinating organization and includes representation from federal, state and local agencies to include the Office of Homeland Security, FBI and FEMA (see Figure 4).

The Secretary of Defense transfers the DOMS from the Department of the Army to the USNORTHCOM to facilitate unified action for homeland security. The CINC USNORTHCOM directs the JTF-USA commander to take charge of the DOMS to coordinate all MSCA in the United States.

⁹⁴ DoD, CJSC, *Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: 2001), IV-10.



OHS: Office of Homeland Security; **FEMA:** Federal Emergency Management Agency; **FBI:** Federal Bureau of Investigation; **DEA:** Drug Enforcement Agency; **USBP:** U.S. Border patrol; **USCG:** U.S. Coast Guard; **FAA:** Federal Aviation Administration.

Figure 4, Proposed JTF-USA CMOC

JTF-6

The DoD counter-drug mission is interrelated with United States homeland security. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense transfers the JTF-6 from USJFCOM to JTF-USA.

CIBIRF


To facilitate unity of effort in providing consequence management for terrorist-initiated chemical and biological attacks, the Secretary of Defense transfers the CIBRF from the USMC to JTF-USA.

Mobility Detachment

The mobility detachment consists of Air National Guard (ANG) fixed-wing and ARNG rotary-winged aircraft and ARNG ground transportation assets. The purpose of the mobility detachment is to provide organic transportation assets to JTF-USA. The priority for the air and ground transportation assets is to deploy the CIBIRF and the JTF-USA commander when serving as the DCO during consequence management.

Regional Homeland Security Command

The RHLSCOMs are the JTF-USA's major subordinate organizations for land and maritime homeland security and are essential to the operational structure of USNORTHCOM. Although the RHLSCOMs have no permanently assigned units with homeland security capabilities, when the President declares a federal emergency or disaster, the RHLSCOM in the affected area becomes the joint task force to receive OPCON of units and coordinate military response. To effectively coordinate and integrate U.S. military efforts with the FEMA, the ten RHLSCOMs are stationed at the ten cities where the regional FEMA headquarters are located (see Figure 5). The RHLSCOM is a multi-component organization commanded by an ARNG Major General in a federal Title-10 AGR status.



● RHLSCOM and FEMA regional headquarters

☆ JTF-USA and FEMA headquarters

The current FEMA regional organization assigns consequence management responsibilities for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to FEMA Region II. To take advantage of established regional National Guard relationships, JTF-USA assigns homeland security responsibility for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to the Commander, IV RHLSCOM.

The following U.S. territories, possessions, and lands do not have a National Guard and fall under state HLSCOMs in the IX RHLSCOM: American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Island, and Johnston Island (under the Hawaii HLSCOM) and the Northern Marianas Islands, Republic of Palau, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia (under the Guam HLSCOM).

Figure 5, Geographic Responsibilities for Proposed Regional Homeland Security Commands

Functions

There are four critical functions for the commander of each RHLSCOM: develop region-specific homeland security OPLANs, appoint the deputy commander to serve as the DCO when the President activates the FRP, maintain a standing EOC coordinated with the FEMA regional operations center (ROC), and facilitate interagency coordination within the region.

Through operational art, the commander of each RHLSCOM considers the national homeland security strategy and JTF-USA commander's operational guidance, conducts a mission analysis, and creates OPLANs to accomplish the JTF-USA campaign objectives. The RHLSCOM commander's first priority is to develop an OPLAN for military response to a CBRNE attack or natural disaster in his Region. This OPLAN addresses military support to the FRP and the RHLSCOM deputy commander serves as the DCO. The scope of this OPLAN covers specific terrorist threats to and critical vulnerabilities such as hurricanes, floods, and wildfires of the region. Other RHLSCOM OPLANs may include counter-drug operations, force protection for critical infrastructures, contingency security operations at the nation's borders and transportation nodes, and MSCA for NSSE and other vulnerable public events.

The RHLSCOM establishes a standing EOC linked to the FEMA ROC and JTF-USA EOC to facilitate preparedness operations, disseminate HSAS information, and establish command and control during the early stages of crisis and consequence management.

The RHLSCOM facilitates unity of effort and interagency coordination to ensure successful integration of U.S. military operations and federal response to CBRNE attacks or natural disasters. Key to the RHLSCOM's ability to coordinate military forces for homeland security operations is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), "an interstate mutual aid agreement that is designed to supplement state, local and federal response resources during natural and man-made disasters."⁹⁵ As the RHLSCOM coordinates response efforts vertically between the federal and state agencies, the EMAC enables a state responding to a natural or manmade disaster to quickly coordinate additional assistance from nearby states in the region.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ FEMA, "Emergency Management Assistance Compacts." Available [Online] <<http://www.fema.gov/y2k/y2kmedia1.htm>> [28 March 2002]


⁹⁶ Currently, 46 states to include the District of Columbia ratified the EMAC. The four remaining states considering joining the EMAC are Alaska, California, Hawaii and Wyoming. Refer to the EMACweb for detailed EMAC information: <<http://www.nemaweb.org/emac/index.cfm>>.

Mission

The mission of the RHLSCOM is to facilitate unity of effort between land and naval forces and civilian agencies to detect, prepare, prevent, and protect for a CBRNE attacks targeted at the region, population and infrastructure. When the President declares a federal emergency or disaster, the RHLSCOM deputy commander serves as the DCO and takes OPCON of the state HLSCOMs necessary to conduct consequence management in the region.

Organizational Structure

The components of the RHLSCOM headquarters are the joint staff and the CMOC. The subordinate organizations of RHLSCOM are the mobility detachment and, when federalized by the President, the state HLSCOMs within the region. When serving as the DCO, the RHLSCOM deputy commander can receive OPCON of active and reserve component forces to support the FRP during crisis and consequence management (see Figure 6).



CMOC: Civil-Military Operation Center; **AIRFOR:** Air Forces; **ARFOR:** Army Forces.

Figure 6, Proposed Organizational Structure, Regional Homeland Security Commands

Headquarters

The Deputy Commander for RHLSCOM is an active component Brigadier General and the Command Sergeant Major is a Title-10 AGR (ARNG) CSM. The Chief of Staff is a Title-10 AGR (ARNG) Colonel (see Appendix E, Figure 9 for staff organization). The CMOC for the RHLSCOM is similar to the organization of the JTF-USA CMOC. The CMOC officer is a Title-10 AGR (ARNG or USAR) Civil Affairs Colonel and reports to the deputy commander of the RHLSCOM. Each RHLSCOM commander adjusts the composition of his CMOC to meet the operational requirements for the region.

Mobility Detachment

The mobility detachment consists of ANG fixed-wing and ARNG rotary-winged aircraft and ARNG ground transportation assets. The purpose of the Mobility Detachment is to provide organic transportation assets to RHLSCOM. The priority for the air and ground transportation assets is to deploy the RHLSCOM deputy commander and his OPCON forces when serving as the DCO during crisis and consequence management.

State Homeland Security Command

The state HLSCOM represents the governor's military capability for homeland security. When federalized, it becomes an essential subordinate organization of the RHLSCOM for land and maritime homeland security. The state HLSCOM is a joint ANG and ARNG organization stationed near the STARC and commanded by an ARNG Brigadier General in a state Title-32 AGR status.

Mission

The mission of the state HLSCOM is to facilitate unity of effort between National Guard forces and civilian agencies to detect, prepare for, prevent, and protect against CBRNE attacks targeted at state territory, population and infrastructure.

State Mission: When directed by the Adjutant General, the HLSCOM employs National Guard forces in support of the State Coordinating Officer to respond to and recover from a CBRNE attack or a natural disaster in the state.

Federal Mission: When directed by the RHLSCOM commander, the HLSCOM employs military forces in support of the DCO to respond and recover from a CBRNE attack or a natural disaster in the Region.

Functions

The state HLSCOM is the essential building block for the nation's homeland security efforts. The dual state-federal command structure of the National Guard facilitates flexibility to build strong interagency relationships within the states, provides the governor with immediate response capabilities, and supports federal homeland security missions. Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating presented an assessment from his experience in responding to the Oklahoma City bombing in April of 1995 and his participation in the *Dark Winter*⁹⁷ exercise in June of 2001 that supports a flexible, agile and versatile capability at the state level for homeland security. Governor Keating concluded that in virtually every terrorism scenario:

- First responders will be local.
- Teamwork among first responders is achievable.
- The rapid and accurate flow of information both internally and among government agencies is essential.
- Interagency experts are critical to response and recovery.
- Federalization of the National Guard should only occur when response and recovery exceed the capabilities of the state government.⁹⁸

The state HLSCOM embraces these conclusions and enables the state governor to maximize his military capabilities for local response and recovery.

⁹⁷ On 22-23 June 2001, the CSIS, Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, and Oklahoma National Memorial Institute for the Prevention Terrorism conducted the *Dark Winter* to examine the national security, intergovernmental, and information challenges of a biological attack on the American homeland.

⁹⁸ Frank Keating, "Catastrophic Terrorism – Local Response to a National Threat" ANSER Institute's *Journal of Homeland Security* (August 2001). Available [Online]

There are four critical functions for each state HLSCOM: develop state-specific homeland security OPLANs, provide first response capabilities to the governor for CBRNE attacks and natural disasters, maintain the state's EOC coordinated with the RHLSCOM's EOC, and facilitate interagency coordination within the state. Based on the U.S. military's counter-drug campaign, a state may have a fifth critical function to support DoD counter-drug operations.

The state HLSCOM commander's first priority is to develop an OPLAN for military response to a CBRNE attack or natural disaster in his state. This OPLAN addresses military support under the governor's control and contains a sequel to address escalate response under a Presidential activation order. Other RHLSCOM OPLANs may include counter-drug operations, force protection for critical infrastructures, contingency security operations at the nation's borders and transportation nodes, and MSCA for NSSEs and other vulnerable public events.

The WMD-CST provides the state HLSCOM organization first response capabilities. The governor also has the ability to activate any ANG or ARNG units to provide equipment, manpower and facilities to conduct crisis and consequence management in the state. State activation of forces provides flexible capabilities to save lives and property, relocate displaced persons, secure critical infrastructures, and support law enforcement authorities.

The state HLSCOM maintains an EOC in accordance with the governor's operating procedures for emergency management. Once federally activated, the state HLSCOM establishes an EOC to facilitate command and control within the RHLSCOM's concept of operations.

The state HLSCOM is the crucial component to the nation's ability to facilitate unity of effort and interagency coordination for homeland security. Lieutenant General Rodger Schultz, Director of the Army National Guard, stated that the National Guard's homeland security charter is "about exercising with state and community first responders and exercising with federal government partners around the nation. It's integrating the Guard and Reserve into the response community's

<<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/Keating.htm>> [23 November 2001]

capabilities in such a way [to] create a habitual relationship.”⁹⁹ The National Guard is forward deployed in communities and, as stated by Major General Tim Lowenberg, Adjutant General for the Washington National Guard, “ties every firehouse to the Pentagon and every State House to the White House.”¹⁰⁰ The state HLSCOM enables the governor to unify his local state assets and to prepare for response and posture his state to receive federal assistance when needed.

Organizational Structure


The components of the state HLSCOM headquarters are the general staff and the CMOC. The subordinate organizations of state HLSCOM are the WMD-CST, the counter-drug unit and the mobility detachment (see Figure 7).

Headquarters

The deputy commander for state HLSCOM is a Title-32 AGR (ARNG) Colonel and the Command Sergeant Major is a Title-32 AGR (ARNG) CSM. (see Appendix E, Figure 10 for staff organization). The CMOC for the state HLSCOM is similar to the organization of the JTF-USA CMOC. The CMOC officer is a Title-32 AGR (ARNG) Civil Affairs Colonel and reports to the deputy commander of the state HLSCOM. Each state HLSCOM commander adjusts the composition of his CMOC to meet the operational requirements for the state and local communities.

⁹⁹ George E. Irvin, Sr., “Integrating the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in the Weapons of Mass Destruction: Consequence Management Role” (U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2001), 31.

¹⁰⁰ William Matthews, “Preventing the Next One,” *National Guard*, November 2001, 21.



JTF-USA: Joint Task Force USA; CMOC: Civil-Military Operation Center; CST: Civil Support Team; AIRFOR: Air Forces; ARFOR: Army Forces.

Figure 7, Proposed Organizational Structure, State Homeland Security Commands

WMD-CST

The WMD-CST is the basic building block for the state HLSCOM and forms the nucleus of the state’s response to a CBRNE attack. The WMD-CST is an on-call organization and provides “assessment of the damage, consultation on logistics, medical, chemical and biological defense, and transmission of the situation to higher headquarters to facilitate follow-on military forces.”¹⁰¹ Under the proposed operational structure, the state HLSCOM commander organizes the WMD-CSTs into three elements: a command and control response team, a chemical and biological response team and a medical response team. The command and control element must be able to

¹⁰¹ National Guard Association of the United States, 3.

arrive at an APOE within four hours to link into the RHLSCOM's EOC. The chemical and biological and the medical teams must be able to commence operations within twelve hours.

Counter-Drug

For those states that have a Counter-Drug Team assigned, the state HLSCOM coordinates with the commander of JTF-6 for mission guidance.

Mobility Detachment

The mobility detachment consists of ANG fixed-wing and ARNG rotary-winged aircraft and ARNG ground transportation assets. The purpose of the mobility detachment is to provide organic transportation assets to the state HLSCOM. The priority for the air and ground transportation assets is to maintain 24-hour capability to deploy the WMD-CSTs and to provide the state HLSCOM commander command and control capabilities during crisis and consequence management.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Recommendations

Doctrine

The President charged the Director of the Office of Homeland Security to develop the homeland security strategy for the United States. From this, the Secretary of Defense will implement the national military homeland security strategy to support the President's strategic objectives. The CINC USNORTHCOM requires sound joint doctrine to accomplish unified action for the homeland security campaign. This monograph makes the following recommendations to facilitate campaign planning for homeland security:

1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should include in *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, the following definition of homeland security:

The prevention, deterrence, and preemption of and defense against aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies.

2. The commander for JFHQ-HLS should review the First Draft of *Joint Publication 3.07.7, Doctrine for Civil Support*, dated 19 December 2001 and recommend to the Director, J-7, USJFCOM changes to incorporate the operational level requirements for homeland security presented in this monograph.
3. The commander for JFHQ-HLS should coordinate with the Office of Homeland Security to determine interagency requirements for homeland security, review the *Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, dated 09 October 1996 and recommend to the Director, J-7, USJFCOM changes to facilitate effective interagency coordination for homeland security.
4. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate should review updated *Joint Publications 3-07.7 and 3-08* and update Chapter 9, "Stability Operations" of U.S. Army *Field Manual 3-0, Operations* to reflect current U.S. Army operational requirements for homeland security.

Operational Structure

The U.S. Armed Forces lacks an effective operational structure for military operations in support of the President's homeland security strategy. This monograph makes the following recommendations to create an operational structure subordinate to USNORTHCOM:

1. The CINC USNORTHCOM should establish JTF-USA on 01 October 2002 to meet the land and maritime operational requirements for homeland security.
2. The CINC USNORTHCOM should establish the ten Regional Homeland Security Commands to integrate with the FRP and to coordinate U.S. military efforts at the state and regional level with the national homeland security strategy.

3. The Chief of the NGB, in coordination with the commander of JTF-USA and the state Adjutants General, should establish the fifty-four state Homeland Security Commands to integrate National Guard response with the national homeland security strategy.

Force Structure

The U.S. Armed Forces is not organized to meet the military requirements for the President's homeland security strategy in two areas. First, the CS and CSS units and WMD-CSTs are unevenly distributed across the nation and leave several states lacking adequate capabilities to meet homeland security requirements. Second, the reserve component lacks strategic plans to simultaneously conduct homeland security operations and support military operations overseas. "To ensure the appropriate use of the reserve components," stated Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, "DoD will undertake a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources."¹⁰² This monograph makes the following recommendations to meet force structure requirements for national homeland security strategy:

1. The CINC USNORTHCOM and the JTF-USA commander should define the military requirements to support the national homeland security strategy and recommend to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with his QDR guidance, force structure changes to meet military objectives.¹⁰³
2. The Secretary of Defense should recommend to Congress that they authorize at least one WMD-CST for each state National Guard to facilitate the establishment of HLSCOM in every state.

¹⁰² DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 23.

¹⁰³ Antulio J. Echevarria II presents an approach to determine force structure requirements for Homeland Security in his monograph "The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective." He proposes the development of force-sizing metrics that include high-end Homeland Security missions in addition to the force requirements of the National Military Strategy.

3. The Director of the ARNG, in coordination with the state Adjutants General, should determine a baseline CS and CSS unit force structure for homeland security in each state and recommend to the Chief of Staff of the Army a redistribution plan to provide adequate CS and CSS capabilities to the governors.

Conclusion

Before September 11th, many factions within the United States feared U.S. military operations within the U.S. borders to counter terrorism would infringe on freedoms set by the U.S. Constitution. When President George W. Bush presented his emerging homeland security strategy to the nation, he stated, “Out of the crisis triggered by September 11 has emerged a renewed commitment by all Americans to their country. We will transform the adversity of September 11 into greater opportunities for the future.”¹⁰⁴ The devastating attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon united the nation for the war on terrorism and caused a critical examination on the nation’s capabilities to defend U.S. citizens on American soil. This monograph identified the vulnerabilities of the United States to CBRNE attacks and the operational requirements to overcome the shortfall in the nation’s ability to detect, prepare for, prevent, and protect against those attacks. The U.S. military now must develop a homeland security campaign in conjunction with the Office of Homeland Security to fulfill its primary mission to secure the nation.

Throughout the nation’s history, the National Guard has been on the front lines supporting U.S. citizens in their communities to prepare for and respond to civil disturbances, natural disasters, and foreign threats to the nation. The current domestic requirement for the war on terrorism is a natural evolution for the National Guard’s traditional role of supporting civilian authorities. This monograph proposed an operational structure that permits the National Guard to

¹⁰⁴ President, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation,” 3.

fulfill this role and enables the U.S. Armed Forces to secure the homeland. Joint Task Force USA draws on all military Services in both the active and reserve components to channel the nation's efforts and fulfill the President's homeland security strategy. The Regional Homeland Security Commands capitalize on the FEMA's proven interagency coordination capabilities and establish standing command and control structure to deploy forces early for crisis and consequence management. The state Homeland Security Commands preserve the dual command nature of the National Guard and keep the U.S. military's first response capabilities where they are most effective – in the states and local communities under the command of the governors. When the President declares a federal emergency or disaster, the state Homeland Security Commands are forward deployed in the disaster area and quickly integrate with the Federal Response Plan. Successful implementation of this operational structure will channel the nation's resources for homeland security and enable the U.S. Armed Forces to defend the nation, both at home and abroad.

President Bush stated, "The Government of the United States has no more important mission than fighting terrorism overseas and securing the homeland from future terrorist attacks. This effort will involve major new programs and significant reforms by the Federal government. But it will also involve new or expanded efforts by State and local governments, private industry, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens. By working together we will make our homeland more secure."¹⁰⁵ Two conditions must exist to meet the President's vision for a safe and secure environment in the United States. The first is a strong interagency partnership led by the Office of Homeland Security. The ability to seamlessly coordinate efforts among federal, state and local agencies and between the U.S. military and civilian authorities will greatly enhance the nation's ability to detect, prepare for, prevent, and protect against a hostile attack on the American homeland. The second is deterrence. The demonstrated capacity of the United States to defeat a

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

CNRNE attack and bring terrorists to justice must dissuade would-be aggressors from considering an attack on the United States territory, sovereignty, population, and infrastructure. Creation of JTF-USA is the first step of an aggressive unified campaign to reduce America's vulnerability to domestic attack and dissuade terrorists from attempting a hostile attack.

APPENDIX A

Acronyms

AGR	Active Guard Reserve
ANG	Air National Guard
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
ARNG	Army National Guard
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Enhanced High Explosive
CBIRF	Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DoD	Department of Defense
DOMS	Director of Military Support
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
HLSCOM	Homeland Security Command
HSAS	Homeland Security Advisory System
HSC	Homeland Security Council
JTF-CND	Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense
JTF-CS	Joint Task Force for Civil Support
JTF-6	Joint Task Force Six
JFHQ-HLS	Joint Forces Headquarters Homeland Security
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MSCA	Military Support to Civilian Authorities
NECC	National Emergency Coordination Center
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
USNORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command (notional for this monograph)
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RCAS	Reserve Component Automation System
RHLSCOM	Regional Homeland Security Command
TEU	Technical Escort Unit
STARC	State Area Command
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
WMD-CST	Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team

APPENDIX B

Federal Agencies with Homeland Security Responsibilities

This Appendix lists Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) responsibilities for the Federal Response Plan

White House

Executive Office of the President
National Security Council (NSC)
Homeland Security Council (HLSC)

Intelligence Community (Director of Central Intelligence - DCI)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
National Security Agency (NSA)
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

Cabinet-Level Positions

Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) – **ESF #10**
Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Response Office

President's Cabinet

Department of Defense (DoD)
Defense Treat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
Missile Defense Agency
Secretary of the Army – **Executive Agent for Homeland Security**
Director of Military Support (DOMS)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) – **ESF #3**
Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST)
Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
Technical Escort Unit (TEU)
U.S. Army Medical Research & Material Command
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)
Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS)
Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS)
Joint task Force Six (JTF-6)
U.S. Space Command (USPACECOM)
Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND)
U.S. Strategic Command (USTRATCOM)
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

Department of Agriculture (USDA) – **ESF #4 & 11**
 Forest Service (FS)
 Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)

Department of Commerce (DOC)
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)

Department of Energy (DOE) – **ESF #12**
 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
 Atmospheric Release Advisory Release Capability (ARAC)

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) – **ESF #8**
 Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
 National Center for Infectious Diseases
 National Center for Environmental Health
 Office of Public Health Preparedness
 Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)
 Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)

 Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

Department of the Interior (DOI)
 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
 Bureau of Reclamation
 National Parks Service (NPS)

Department of Justice (DOJ)
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) – **LFA for Crisis Management**
 Counterterrorism Division
 National Domestic Preparedness Office
 National Infrastructure Protection Center
 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
 U.S. Border Patrol
 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)

Department of Labor
 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

Department of Transportation (DOT) – **ESF #1**
 Transportation Security Administration
 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
 National Response Center
 Federal Highway Administration (FHA)
 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
 Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
 Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

U.S. Treasury Department
 U.S. Customs Service
 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
 U.S. Secret Service

Other Federal Agencies

Department of Veterans Affairs

Emergency Management Strategic Healthcare Group (EMSHG)

Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) – **LFA for Consequence Management;
ESFs #5 & 9**

Office of National Preparedness

U.S. Fire Administration

National Communications System (NCS) – **ESF #2**

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) – **ESF #7**

U.S. Postal Service (USPS)

Non-Governmental Organization

American Red Cross (ARC) – **ESF #6**

APPENDIX C

Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams

Locations and Certification Status

AUTHORIZATION	STATE	DESIGNATION	LOCATION	DoD CERTIFICATION
Fiscal Year 1999	MA	1 st WMD-CST	Natick	AUG 01
	NY	2 nd WMD-CST	Scotia	JUL 01
	PA	3 rd WMD-CST	Fort Indian Town Gap	AUG 01
	GA	4 th WMD-CST	Dobbins AFB	OCT 01
	IL	5 th WMD-CST	Bartonville	AUG 01
	TX	6 th WMD-CST	Austin	AUG 01
	MO	7 th WMD-CST	Fort Leonard Wood	AUG 01
	CO	8 th WMD-CST	Aurora	JUL 01
	CA	9 th WMD-CST	Los Alamitos	AUG 01
	WA	10 th WMD-CST	Tacoma	JUL 01
Fiscal Year 2000	ME	11 th WMD-CST	Waterville	JAN 02
	VA	34 th WMD-CST	Fort Pickett	JAN 02
	KY	41 st WMD-CST	Louisville	JAN 02
	SC	43 rd WMD-CST	Eastover	JAN 02
	FL	44 th WMD-CST	Stark	JAN 02
	OH	52 nd WMD-CST	Columbus	FEB 02
	MN	55 th WMD-CST	Saint Paul	DEC 01
	AR	61 st WMD-CST	N. Little Rock	JAN 02
	LA	62 nd WMD-CST	Carville	DEC 01
	OK	63 rd WMD-CST	Oklahoma City	JAN 02
	NM	64 th WMD-CST	Santa Fe	JAN 02
	IA	71 st WMD-CST	Johnston	JAN 02
	AZ	91 st WMD-CST	Phoenix	JAN 02
	HI	93 rd WMD-CST	Honolulu	APR 02
	CA	95 th WMD-CST	Hayward	JAN 02
	ID	101 st WMD-CST	Boise	JAN 02
	AK	103 rd WMD-CST	Fort Richardson	MAR 02
	Fiscal Year 2001*	WV	3** WMD-CST	
AL		4 WMD-CST		
TN		4 WMD-CST		
MI		5 WMD-CST		
KS		7 WMD-CST		

Source: DoD Defense Link, Available [Online]

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/b04302002_bt220-02.html> [01 May 2002]

Notes:

* As of 01 APR 02, the National Guard Bureau had not issued the fielding plan for the WMD-CSTs authorized in FY 01

** The first number of the numerical designation for the WMD-CSTs is the FEMA region the WMD-CST is located.

APPENDIX D

Emergency Support Function (ESF) Responsibilities FEMA Federal Response Plan

#	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
ESF	Transportation	Communications	Public Works and Engineering	Firefighting	Information and Planning	Mass Care	Resource Support	Health and Medical Services	Urban Search and Rescue	Hazardous Materials	Food	Energy
Agency												
USDA	S	S	S	P	S	S	S	S	S	S	P	S
DOC		S	S	S	S		S			S		
DOD	S	S	P	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
DOEd					S							
DOE					S		S	S		S		P
HHS			S		S	S		P	S	S	S	
HUD						S						
DOI		S	S	S	S					S		S
DOJ					S			S	S	S		
DOL			S				S		S	S		
DOS	S									S		S
DOT	P				S		S	S		S		S
TREAS	S				S		S					
VA			S			S	S	S				
AID								S	S			
ARC					S	P		S			S	
EPA			S	S	S			S		P	S	
FCC		S										
FEMA	S	S		S	P	S	S	S	P		S	
GSA	S	S			S	S	P	S			S	
NASA					S		S		S			
NCS		P			S		S	S				S
NRC					S					S		S
OPM							S					
SBA					S							
TVA	S		S									S
USPS	S					S		S				

P = Primary Agency: Responsible for Coordination of the ESF
S = Support Agency: Responsible for Supporting the Primary Agency

Source: FEMA, Federal Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: April 1999), 14.

Figure 8, Emergency Support Function Designation Matrix

APPENDIX E

Staff Organizations




Figure 9, Proposed Staff Organization, JTF-USA




Figure 10. Proposed Staff Organization, Regional Homeland Security Command




Figure 11. Proposed Staff Organization, State Homeland Security Command

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