

**COUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM:
DEVELOPING THE ANTITERRORIST CAPABILITIES
OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARIES**

Roger N. McDermott

February 2004

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/index.html>, at the Publications button, then the Publishing with SSI button.

The author wishes to thank the many individuals and institutions whose assistance and cooperation proved invaluable in carrying out this research. In particular, he is grateful for the comments and advice on draft versions of this monograph from Dr. Steven Metz, Director of Research, SSI; and Richard Giragosian, Peter Konecny; Carleton University, Canada; Stéphane Lefebvre; Colonel Robert McMullin; and, William D. O'Malley.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/>

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at outreach@carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-152-0

FOREWORD

Central Asia is a key theater in the war on terrorism. It is a region of fragile new states, all facing a wide range of challenges. Ungoverned regions—the cauldron of terrorism—are common. As the U.S. State Department notes, the United States, “learned a harsh lesson after we disengaged from Afghanistan in the early 1990s. We must not allow countries to become breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. To prevent these destructive forces from taking root in Central Asia, we have intensified our efforts to help the countries of this area become stable, prosperous, and fully integrated members of the world community and the global economy.” The question is how to undertake this complex endeavor.

In this monograph, Roger N. McDermott offers a framework for improving the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries. This includes increased and focused military training with a special emphasis on Special Forces units. The training should take place within a regional train and equip program to increase effectiveness and efficiency. But, McDermott argues, all assistance to the Central Asian states must complement broader diplomatic efforts to promote social, economic, and political reform.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph to provide Army and Department of Defense leaders with ideas for augmenting the antiterrorist capabilities of America’s partners in Central Asia.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ROGER N. MCDERMOTT is a graduate of the University of Oxford specializing in defense and security issues in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He is an Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK); Senior Associate, Cornell Caspian Consulting (Stockholm and Washington, DC), and Senior Consultant, Promineon Consulting (London). Dr. McDermott regularly writes for scholarly journals, including the *Journal of Slavic Military Studies and Central Asia and the Caucasus*, *The Analyst*, Central Asia and Caucasus Institute (CACI), and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, have published his articles, which analyse the geopolitics and course of military reform in Central Asia. His papers have also been published by Conflict Studies Research Center, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom (Sandhurst) and Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth (Kansas). Dr. McDermott is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and the co-editor of the book, *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002* (Frank Cass: London/Portland, 2003).

SUMMARY

Political: U.S. military and security engagement programs in the Central Asian region **must complement** Washington's broader diplomatic efforts to promote democratic, social, economic, and political reform programs; and these ought to be part of a long-term drive toward promoting greater stability and avoiding the risk of failing states slipping further into trouble. The United States must reassure its partners in the region, particularly those assisting in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), that they will not be abandoned at a later date, giving a more **long-term commitment to assisting** the development of their young independent states, helping them move towards democracy, strengthening them economically, and ensuring the avoidance of a security vacuum in the region. They also need to be reassured that the security situation in Afghanistan will settle, and that "warlordism" and terrorism training camps will not again flourish there and serve as a training ground for many of the terrorist groups that threaten to infest the region.

In pursuing its security strengthening and assistance programs in the region, the United States should, directly or through NATO (which has specific mechanisms to that effect), underscore the common nature of the threat to each of the regional actors and seek to **encourage deeper and more widespread sharing of intelligence within Central Asia**. Furthermore, developing the antiterrorist capabilities of these states still further should be conditional upon **closer regional cooperation and security integration**; weak and isolated states must avoid pursuing "islands of security," rather they must join together in a new spirit of security cooperation to promote long-term stability in Central Asia. This must be done with finesse in a region where there are two rival states, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, vying for dominance and the other three, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are essentially failing states. Clearly, the latter three states will see benefit in security cooperation, but the real challenge will be to develop a political and military base to the assistance program that will attract the stronger states. Policymakers must work equally strenuously to foster political and social progress

within the region to deprive radical groups of potential local popular support, based upon social injustice, human rights abuses, and poverty. Security policymakers must also pay attention equally to **emerging threats** within Central Asia, such as the Islamist Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Islamic Party of Liberation), working with its partners in the region on **preventing** their full emergence, besides concentrating on reducing or countering more pressing or immediate threats, such as the remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

Military training: The conventional force capability of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is far superior to that of their neighbors, and this situation will not change in the foreseeable future. U.S. training and broader assistance efforts should avoid contributing to the military rivalry between these two states. These future Central Asian military assistance programs need to focus on two threat parameters: counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. There cannot be a cookie cutter approach to the development of these programs, as the effort must recognize the dramatic differences in the capabilities and needs of each of the state's military and security forces. These two missions also require specialized skills, training, and equipment sets that are not generally standard in a conventional force. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) should **train and accompany** their Central Asian counterparts on military exercises **and operations**, and attempt to train their leaders differently; in particular, leading them to carefully examine the uses of SOF in modern warfare. Improved in-country training, utilizing Mobile Training teams (MTTs) for the delivery of whole unit training that addresses the needs of developing an effective NCO corps that will in turn train their rank and file, will **encourage individual initiative** and help further undermine the old Soviet style top-down management system.

U.S. training should encompass **all the SOF type units** from the various security agencies responsible for securing the country's border and counterterrorist operations. In many cases the military will not have the lead in such operations, but will be supporting another agency. The goal is to train these agencies together to promote **greater operational integration**.

More training should be structured for the long term, including help **creating special warfare centers, mountain warfare/light**

infantry centers, mountain warfare leaders, common operational skills, and an interagency communications structure to facilitate closer integration between the military and other security agencies. Future trainers within each state then will have the necessary skills and education to carry out effective training without overseas assistance. Clearly, not all of these states can afford developments of such centers; a possible solution would be regional centers fostering closer cooperation among the states.

Military Equipment: Military equipment supplied to the Central Asian militaries should be targeted carefully towards achieving improved **defensive and offensive capabilities**; that will entail basic protective kit, communications, tactical intelligence, and troop mobility. Such equipment would include light-weight and functional body armor capable of giving adequate protection against a 7.62mm round; body armor to protect against fragmentation weapons; gas masks; protective head gear; night vision equipment; thermal sights; modern sniper weapons; communication equipment at operational and tactical level; modern individual and crew-served weapons with sufficient quantities of ammunition to train with them; Global Position System (GPS); mobile sensors; troop carriers; armored mobile vehicles such as the High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) or Light Armored Vehicle (LAV); and helicopters for greater small unit mobility. A greater effort should be made to ensure maximum overlap between equipment given to these militaries and that utilized in military-to-military training.

Devising a Central Asia Train and Equip Program (CATEP): U.S. political decisionmakers and military planners are faced with growing challenges developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries. Consistent with U.S. policy in the Caucasus, the United States should devise a **systemic and coordinated train and equip program in Central Asia**. A CATEP would require flexibility both at the planning and implementation stages, allowing for adaptation to the particular needs of each participating state as well as the constructive participation from the regional militaries themselves. The scope and cost of such a program suggests the need to develop a multinational approach, building on the NATO Secretary General's efforts to enhance the alliance's relations with

the states in Central Asia. A NATO based supporting structure should be formed to strengthen the program, utilizing the experience of member states and partners in Partnership for Peace (PfP). Thus, the burden of the assistance program would be shared. There should be political linkage between investing in such a program and **encouraging the Central Asian militaries to cooperate more closely**; this could be especially beneficial in fostering a longer-term regional approach to security. A CATEP could be organized around **regional training centers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan**. U.S. DoD officials should work closely with the regional MODs to assist in producing workable **blueprints for continued training after U.S. military advisors have completed their assigned tasks**. Concurrently, U.S. policy must promote the formation of elite units within the region, capable of meeting the future and evolving security needs of the 21st century. As the distinction between war and peace has blurred as a consequence of the post 9/11 security environment, a CATEP should cultivate enhanced levels of interagency cooperation. Evaluating the cost of such programs should be weighed against the cost of a continued open-ended risk of having to deploy U.S. forces in support of regional partners: these states seek to fight terrorism themselves, and not to depend on U.S. power projection in a crisis.

COUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM: DEVELOPING THE ANTITERRORIST CAPABILITIES OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARIES

Introduction.

“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”¹ President George W. Bush, addressing the U.S. Congress on September 20, 2001, highlighted the protracted and on-going nature of combating international terrorism on a global scale in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, (henceforth 9/11). The ensuing military campaign, which began with the violent overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, brought the Central Asian states, (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) to the forefront of U.S. global strategy.² On September 24, 2001, Turkmenistan offered transport and overflight rights for humanitarian relief in support of U.S. antiterrorism efforts in Afghanistan; there soon followed offers from Kazakhstan of airfields, bases and overflight rights, and subsequent proposals from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.³

The Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev offered basing rights to U.S. forces; the fact that no bases were created in the early stages of the campaign was not caused by lack of trying on the part of the Kazakh government.⁴ The Kazakhs did allow more than 800 overflights during 2002 in support of operations in Afghanistan, as well as transshipment of supplies through its territory, and have generally proven supportive in the war on terrorism and the conduct of U.S. policy.⁵ Kazakhstan sent a small team of representatives to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); the three officers arrived in June 2002 and serve there in a liaison capacity.⁶ Other Central Asian states, notably Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, were more forthcoming in their support and proved crucial in providing bases for the projection of U.S. power into Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan granted basing for combat and combat support units at Manas

airport for U.S., Canadian, French, Italian, Norwegian, and South Korean forces. Tajikistan permitted the use of its international airport at Dushanbe for refueling and basing for U.S., British, and French forces. Uzbekistan offered basing for U.S. forces at Karshi-Khanabad and opened a land corridor for humanitarian aid to reach Afghanistan through Termez.⁷ Thus, the Central Asian states emerged as key partners in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the bases established in the region proved critical to U.S. forces securing the rapid downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, removing a long-standing threat to the region. Their continued partnership will be a significant piece of the strategy for preventing the resurgence of terrorism.⁸

On April 10, 2003, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones highlighted the continued importance of security within Central Asia and the ongoing commitment of the U.S. Government to the region:⁹

A stable, prosperous Central Asia and the Caucasus will mean a more secure world for the American people and a more prosperous future for the people of the region. I want to reaffirm in the strongest terms the United States long-term commitment to intensive engagement in this important region of the world. Engagement results in a classic win-win situation for everyone. This is attainable, and we will continue to strive for it.¹⁰

In the following monograph, recent U.S. military engagement in Central Asia will be explored in the context of the complex operational environment in which the countries of the region struggle to cope with terrorism. At a time when the coalition against global terrorism appears internally divided and many question the benefits of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. policymakers must keep the Central Asian states focused on reform and the struggle against terrorism. Finally, methods of furthering U.S. and western “intensive engagement” will be examined, with an emphasis on the development of the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries.

Operational Environment.

The operational environment within Central Asia covers an area of 5.8 million square kilometers (km). It includes huge expanses of steppe and desert. This flat landscape also gives way to several mountainous areas: the Pamir range stretching 800km across Tajikistan rises to between 5,000 to 7,000 meters (m); the Tian Shan range extends across Kyrgyzstan through eastern Xinjiang, China. These jagged ice-clad peaks rise to between 4,000 to 7,000m. The region is an earthquake zone; in 1948 Ashgabat was destroyed by a major earthquake, and in 1966 Tashkent was also leveled. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are Caspian littoral states. The road and rail infrastructure often covering very large distances is poor, with few hard surfaced roads, for instance, including between major urban areas.¹¹

Within this operational environment with its mountainous areas and rugged terrain with many passes and transit routes known only to locals and militants, drug traffickers and criminal networks operate and consequently overstretch the resources of the regional security structures. Terrorists have proven resilient and manifold, keen to promote their political goals by destabilizing the regimes and conducting offensive operations against various targets.¹² Islamic extremism has burgeoned, helping foment Civil War in Tajikistan between 1992-97 and insurgencies within the Batken region in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, as well as the series of bombings in Tashkent in 1997 and 1999. Although these were closely associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), other dangerous groups have emerged. These include Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation), a professed nonviolent Islamic movement, and its early splinter group, Akromiyilar, established in 1997 by Yuldashev Akrom, whose aims range from establishing an Islamic Caliphate throughout the region based on Shariah law to overthrowing the government of Uzbekistan. In 1999 a more secretive splinter group from Hizb-ut-Tahrir was established by Mirzazhanov Atoyevich, again advocating the violent overthrow of the Central Asian governments. Additional groups known to operate in the Ferghana valley (which straddles Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) include Adolat Uyushmasi, Islam Lashkarlari, Tovba,

Nur (Ray of Light), Tabligh (Mission), and Uzum Sokol (Long Beard).¹³

IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

Russian intelligence, like their counterparts in Central Asia, have long monitored the activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, expressing concern about the group's radical tendencies and its espoused aim of overthrowing secular governments in Central Asia. Indeed, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested more than 100 members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Moscow in June 2003. According to Sergey Ignatchenko, head of the FSB Public Relations Center, two members were charged. The Kyrgyz arrested member was alleged to have possessed 100 grams of plastic explosive and 3 grenades, while the Tajik member was alleged to have 400 grams of TNT and two detonators with Bickford fuses—both men also possessed propaganda literature.¹⁴ After the discovery of the weapons cache in Moscow, other Western states stepped up their surveillance of Hizb-ut-Tahrir within their own countries. Henning Fode, the Danish Solicitor General, confirmed that Denmark is considering following Germany by proscribing the group, already declared as a terrorist organization in the Russian Federation. Intelligence services in the Ukraine—particularly in the Crimea where there is a large Muslim population—have begun monitoring it. Hizb-ut-Tahrir is also banned in the Gulf states.

There is little doubt that the Central Asian Republics perceive the existence of a continued and difficult to quantify threat from regional terrorists, though concerns have been raised that they overstate the case against Hizb-ut-Tahrir to justify repression. Nevertheless, from within the ranks of this secretive Islamic group, a vast residue of potential recruits for terrorism exists. Preventing its emergence as a new terrorist organization would be consistent with the broader aims of the GWOT.¹⁵

Overlap between the various militant groups is not difficult to find, nor is it surprising. The Islamic Party of Tajikistan was thought to have been formed from the remnants of the IMU after fighting in Afghanistan during the fall of 2001. This group contains Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik militants and could even contain the ubiquitous

Chechens.¹⁶ Likewise the IMU is reported to contain Afghans, Chechens, Tajiks, and Uighurs, and has received financial support from Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, many of whom are experienced veterans of guerrilla conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Kyrgyz Defense Minister Esen Topoyev believes that Taliban remnants and IMU members have merged to form a “new” structure, the Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT), which in fact simply represents the IMU under a different name.¹⁷ In Kyrgyzstan in December 2002 and May 2003 a series of bombings took place, resulting in 8 people killed and 40 injuries; these attacks have been attributed to the IMT.¹⁸ But fears of a resurgence of the IMU continue to haunt the Central Asian Republics. In June 2003 the Kyrgyz National Security Service (KNB) discovered weapons belonging to the IMU in the Itijaz Gorge of the Batken containing ordnance of Soviet, Iranian and Pakistani origin. Kyrgyz intelligence suspects these weapons were left there for possible use by the IMU.¹⁹ Tokon Mamytov, deputy chairman of the Kyrgyz KNB, was in little doubt that these weapons caches were linked to the IMU, and furthermore, he intimated that intelligence links IMU with Chinese terrorists. Mamytov also disclosed that terrorists within Central Asia have received \$400,000 in funding from other international terrorist organizations during the first 6 months of 2003.²⁰

Other dangerous radical extremist groups such as the Uighur separatists, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), China, maintain links with the IMU.²¹ In July 2003, Chairman of the Kazakh KNB Nartai Dutbayev confirmed the increased activity of IMU in Kazakhstan, resulting in increased surveillance and monitoring of their movements. In southern Kazakhstan, according to Dutbayev, Chinese separatists are also becoming more organized and causing concern for the Kazakh authorities; consequently a number of Uighurs were detained by the KNB, which reportedly confiscated weapons, ordnance, and home-made explosives.²² The Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) reportedly tracked over 600 members of the IMU to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya.²³ Recent discoveries of weapons caches in the Batken Region of Kyrgyzstan will only further fuel such concerns.²⁴ The existence of these terrorist groups, religious extremists, and separatists provides security interests for

regional powers such as Russia and China, both keen to achieve regional stability and minimize the potential spillover effect of political violence into their own territories.²⁵

Hizb-ut-Tahrir represents a potential threat within the region, not simply insofar as it espouses the aim of overthrowing the Central Asian governments, but also in its links to international and regional terrorists. It openly spreads its propaganda against these states, as well as promoting anti-Semitism and spreading propaganda against the United States and the United Kingdom. Hizb-ut-Tahrir uses its international headquarters in London to orchestrate its global activities in more than 40 countries. Since the beginning of the GWOT, it has strongly opposed the presence of U.S. and coalition military forces deployed in Central Asia.²⁶

An important focus of the GWOT is on emerging terrorist threats to U.S. interests overseas, as well as seeking to deny international terrorists the opportunity to launch global operations. During his national address on September 20, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush linked al Qaeda and the Taliban directly to the IMU.²⁷ Indeed, the nature of such links, long suspected by regional intelligence services, points to a potentially explosive nexus of militant Islamic groups, drug traffickers, and criminal groups. The Central Asian states will need ongoing assistance in assessing, analyzing, identifying, and countering this historical and evolving threat.

The activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir within Central Asia have reportedly increased since the war in Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). This has been related largely to the dissemination of propaganda against the west and the countries within the region supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).²⁸ Despite the undoubted success of OEF in decimating the IMU, a risk remains of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU cooperating with al Qaeda remnants and a dangerous radical Islamic terrorist threat emerging within Central Asia.²⁹ Although scholars such as Ahmed Rashid have highlighted this very danger of disparate militant Islamists uniting to form a new terrorist organization, in reality a high level of disunity among these groups makes it unlikely to succeed.³⁰ What is clear, however, is that the criminal gangs, narcotics barons, and religious ideologues endemic in Central Asia, notably in the Ferghana valley, will continue to foment terrorism for the foreseeable future.³¹

Counterterrorism: Police and Intelligence Factors.

Counterterrorism within any modern state involves the use of police-based operations leading to investigation and conviction through the criminal courts. Currently the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is developing regional counterterrorist legislation.³² A police-led investigative approach, depending upon the timely gathering and use of intelligence, is a vital preventative measure and part of a process of professionally dealing with terrorist incidents in a way that does not foment further support for the terrorists' cause among the local population. Nonetheless, the police forces in Central Asia, which are inherently corrupt and lacking professional experience in dealing with the intelligence-gathering process and the construction of databases, desperately need reform.

A reformed police structure could increase the efficiency in dealing with actual incidents and bring to justice those responsible for utilizing political violence. It would also have the distinct advantage of avoiding arrests and incarceration on a grand scale which often increases public support or sympathy for the terrorist cause. The heavy-handed pounding of Chechen villages and widespread destruction inflicted by the Russian armed forces during what it describes as a "counterterrorist operation" has had reverberations beyond the region, generating sympathy among Islamic extremists, human rights campaigners, and others throughout the world.

A police- and intelligence-led strategy, with the military only involved when necessary, is an important element of counterterrorism for a modern state. The Central Asian states can be assisted in this by more contacts and liaison with western counterterrorist specialists and national police and intelligence services. The experience of the British Special Branch police in countering Irish Republican terrorism for more than 30 years, and the Antiterrorist Branch's forensic and investigative skills can be shared with the Central Asian states.³³ Equally, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States can share their experience.³⁴ The post 9/11-security environment demands improved intelligence cooperation, not just between

agencies but between nations. Precedents do exist. The UKUSA Agreement, signed in June 1948 between the United States, the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, authorized the sharing of signals intelligence among its signatories. The NATO Special Committee (AC/46), established by the North Atlantic Council in 1952, provides a long established intelligence exchange mechanism between allies. Despite these multilateral mechanisms, the bilateral sharing of intelligence has always been the preferred and more effective route. In Central Asia, agreements exist between the regional security agencies that supply a theoretical basis for sharing intelligence, but in practice it is limited in its scope and nowhere near effective enough.³⁵

The Experience of Terrorism in 1999/2000.

With weak armed forces and security structures, the antiterrorist operations conducted by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 were rendered ineffective by militant incursions. In 1999 the IMU raised more than \$3 million by kidnapping four Japanese geologists, and a further \$50,000 for three Kyrgyz district officials, including General Anarbek Shamkeyev, the commander of the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry troops, during an incursion into the Batken Region. The funding of the IMU includes money raised from drug trafficking in the region.

The IMU incursion into the Batken in 1999 left deep wounds within the region. The memory is still fresh, along with the failures of the local forces to combat them effectively, especially within the security forces and militaries. In the summer of 1999 approximately 800 IMU members launched well-planned incursions into the Batken, apparently in an effort to establish a forward base for future operations against Uzbekistan.³⁶ In the following summer of 2000, a smaller force of around 100 IMU members launched another incursion, attacking Kyrgyz security forces and seizing villages in Uzbekistan where 27 soldiers were killed.³⁷ The three-pronged attack came close to Tashkent, and saw a repetition of rebel demands for the overthrow of Karimov's government and the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Shariah law.³⁸

Weaknesses of the Military Campaigns.

Kyrgyz security structures failed to cope adequately with the challenge of well-organized terrorists utilizing the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the terrorists effectively used the rugged, sparsely populated terrain to mask their movement into and out of Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz military was severely hampered in its ability to find, fix, and engage enemy forces, lacking vital intelligence or reconnaissance assets as well as operational mobility. Enemy forces also successfully used the cover of darkness to move, while the Kyrgyz units deployed were powerless to respond in the absence of any night fighting capability.³⁹

In this context, the Kyrgyz armed forces proved unable to rapidly contain the crisis, which escalated as time passed. Reporting indicated the Kyrgyz military employed artillery against the terrorist camps, only to find they were earlier abandoned. While Kyrgyz soldiers, often inexperienced conscripts, searched for the militants, the enemy maintained the initiative and engaged in sporadic attacks on the soldiers. According to some Kyrgyz soldiers, they felt that the militants could have picked off more soldiers had they chosen to do so.⁴⁰

Poorly trained Kyrgyz conscripts had dated communications equipment and old Soviet rifles which, in some cases, lacked sights.⁴¹ Undeniably Kyrgyz soldiers were not adequately trained or properly equipped to conduct effective combat operations. In response to these setbacks, a battalion was speedily constructed in Koi-Tash in September 1999 consisting of conscripts, volunteers, and veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. It was rushed into the field without a night fighting capability, inferior air support, poor communication and intelligence, no body armor, proper maps of the area, or essential rations, and with helmets incapable of withstanding a round from a Kalashnikov assault rifle.⁴² Many reportedly felt exposed and at risk. They faced a determined enemy armed with light weapons and night vision goggles, who was prepared for a lengthy armed struggle.⁴³ The militants' rations included dried fruit and other easily transportable foodstuffs, from which the Kyrgyz MoD learned the necessity of improving the rations for their soldiers in the field.⁴⁴ In terms of cost to the Kyrgyz economy, the Batken campaign in 1999

consumed around one-third of the defense budget. More costly still was the singular lesson it had taught the government and military: Kyrgyzstan simply did not possess the forces capable of neutralizing the terrorists. Despite proposals for reform by analysts close to the government, including restructuring and reequipping the armed forces, President Akayev could only offer vague commitments to creating “small, mobile forces” capable of rapid reaction in a crisis.⁴⁵ The promises were there, but the assets—trained and experienced personnel and equipment—necessary to fulfill these promises were not.

The IMU incursions of 1999, which took several months to resolve and cost the lives of many Kyrgyz and Uzbek servicemen, were being evaluated throughout the region when the situation reoccurred in the summer of 2000. This time, tentative plans, agreed between the states in the aftermath of events in the Batken in 1999, were for the regional militaries to cooperate on operations and intelligence to resolve the crisis.⁴⁶ In theory, the cooperation pledges involved the formation of a coordination center for the security agencies in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Bishkek’s proposal to unite and form a joint task force to destroy the terrorists quickly exposed the tenuous nature of regional military cooperation; as the prospect of a joint task force fell apart an appeal was made by the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Russian support based on previous antiterrorist agreements. The Central Asian Republics were unable to integrate the response of their own security agencies closely, or cooperate with neighbors to counter the resurgent threat to national security from the IMU successfully.⁴⁷

During military operations in August 2000, IMU members were allowed to escape during the incursion into the Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan, owing to inaccurate Soviet maps of the local area being used by the Uzbek and Kyrgyz armies that precluded accurate coordination and accurate force on target.⁴⁸ Kyrgyz “Scorpion” Special Forces were deployed to the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border areas, working with the local administrations in efforts to subdue the militant activity. Additional border posts were set up along the frontier with Tajikistan, and local guides were used.⁴⁹ Although the response to the incursion in 2000 was more effective than the previous year, it revealed the continued weaknesses of

the Kyrgyz security forces and served as a stark reminder of the imbalance within the region; Uzbek armed forces were better able to coordinate their efforts among border troops, Special Forces units from the MOD, MVD, and SNB.⁵⁰

The identified operational weaknesses from the military campaigns against the IMU incursions in both 1999 and 2000 can be summarized as follows:

- Failure at the planning and implementation stages to properly coordinate the deployment and operational activities of the armed forces between the various power ministries.
- Absence of well-trained, mobile, combat-ready soldiers capable of effectively conducting operations in mountainous terrain.
- Lack of basic protective kit for soldiers deployed to carry out combat. Poor equipment and communication systems in the field.
- Inferior quality military intelligence resulting from the lack of operational and tactical intelligence and reconnaissance assets.
- Poor targeting information, which prohibited finding, fixing, targeting, and then effectively engaging enemy forces. The process remains too slow and cumbersome to provide timely targeting data to either air or ground assets.
- Support from air assets was sporadic, inaccurate, and unproductive, degrading the morale of ground forces.
- SOF did not play the lead role in operations, being used instead as light infantry.
- Limited transnational military cooperation rendering ineffectual any efforts to pursue fleeing insurgents, or contain the conflict.
- Failure to achieve a synergy of the armed forces deployed in the Batken region or gain full spectrum dominance over the enemy.

Russia's Role in Central Asia: Promoting Stability.

President Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia promising to resolve the Chechen crisis, and had staked his reputation on a

tough approach to terrorism. Russia rightly has regarded the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia as a source of instability and sought to promote ways of countering the spread of Islamic militancy, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and criminality from these states into Russia. Moscow thus has committed itself to supporting border security within Tajikistan, basing a Federal Border Guard group along the Tajik-Afghan border, and continuing to station its 201st Motor Rifle Division (MRD) in Dushanbe.⁵¹ Despite being professional, the 201st MRD suffers from a host of problems symptomatic of the malaise in the modern Russian armed forces: under financing, a shortage of new equipment, difficulties in retaining new recruits, undermanning, poor health among recruits, low morale, and no field training above that of battalion level. Consequently it fails to maintain a high level of combat readiness, despite its supportive role in conjunction with the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) in bolstering Tajik border security.⁵² The FPS has now been placed under Russia's FSB as a result of the Putin's reforms in March 2003.

Russia's military presence within Central Asia has provided important leverage over the countries, but did not prevent the stationing of U.S. and coalition forces in support of OEF.⁵³ Thus, Moscow perceived that it had lost out in the "zero-sum" game, and its influence had waned in the region.⁵⁴ Despite this, Moscow has doggedly attempted to reassert its security agenda within Central Asia, principally through multilateral CIS bodies created before 9/11. These institutions, such as the Collective Security Treaty (CST),⁵⁵ while generally eliciting support in the region's capitals, have been undermined by a sense that they are mere "paper" organizations and critically by Uzbekistan's decision in 1999 to withdraw from the CST.⁵⁶

After years of paper agreements calling for cooperation against regional and international terrorism, in April 2003, at the Dushanbe summit of the CST members, the body was transformed into a new political-military body: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Members agreed that a united headquarters for the organization would be formed in Moscow in January 2004, headed by Russian General Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff.⁵⁷ Its charter contains a NATO-like provision for a joint response to

aggression against any member state. Secretary-General of the CSTO Council Colonel-General Nikolai Bordyuzha is a former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Director of the FPS.⁵⁸ Indeed, Russia has agreed to finance 50 percent of the CSTOs activities, with the other members each contributing 10 percent. Furthermore, the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) created under the CST is placed under the command of the Russian Major-General Sergey Chernomordin.⁵⁹ Since its inception on May 25, 2001, the CRDF, with its headquarters in Bishkek, was tasked with providing a security mechanism for defense against regional terrorism within Central Asia, capable of deployment across the borders of its members.⁶⁰ Although the CRDF are to be based on designated components of the militaries of the member states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia—in reality the reaction force is built around the 201st MRD in Dushanbe; battalions from the other signatories in Central Asia initially totaling 1,300 personnel join a battalion from the 201st MRD.⁶¹ Thus, although the CRDF is a regional multilateral force, in practice it is Russian funded and designed and built around a Russian combat formation and presumably its division's support structure.

Attempts to improve the potential effectiveness of the CRDF have not been restricted to political efforts to strengthen the CSTO, they have manifested in an agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan to create an aviation component to support the CRDF, through a joint base at Kant, 20 km east of Bishkek. The Russian air force first deployed to Kant in late 2002 in order to test facilities before the formal opening the joint Russian-Kyrgyz base in October 2003. Bishkek has both Washington and Moscow vying to maintain a military presence in Kyrgyzstan. They are currently playing a difficult game, walking a security tightrope between the two in an effort to secure access to much-needed military assistance and to enhance their own long-term security.⁶²

Antiterrorist cooperation within the CIS developed in response to the increased threat posed by Islamic militancy within the former Soviet Union. The first "Agreement on Cooperation in the Fight Against Crime," containing a provision against terrorism, was signed on November 25, 1998. This paved the way for a CIS Treaty on Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism in June 1999, and in

June 2000 the Presidents' Council approved a program for combating international terrorism until 2003.⁶³ A CIS Antiterrorist Center (ATC) was formed at that time under the command of Russian Lieutenant-General Boris Mylnikov, with a staff of 60 based in Moscow. It functions as an information support structure, holding information in a database on terrorists and terrorists groups operating within the CIS facilitating interaction among the antiterrorist agencies of CIS member states.⁶⁴ The CIS ATC has an office in Bishkek, which collects information on terrorists and acts as a focal point for information gathering and dissemination in Central Asia. It runs at an estimated annual cost of \$821,226.⁶⁵ However, given the troubled history of intelligence sharing and cooperation between the Central Asian states, it remains unclear how effective the ATC is in practical terms.⁶⁶

CSTO Military Exercises.

The CRDF remains untested in conflict, making any assessment of its actual capabilities subject to real world developments. Its military exercises reveal much concerning how it may be used in a crisis. For example, SOUTH ANTITERROR 2002 featured a series of operational-tactical exercises held in Kyrgyzstan in April 2002. The regional ATC based in Bishkek was also a key player in the exercises, supported by the national components of the CRDF using heavy ground equipment, combat aircraft, and air defense systems.⁶⁷ The tactics used in these exercises implied a potentially heavy-handed and inefficient way of combating terrorists and suggested that little new thinking existed in the potential use of the CRDF. Tashkent, meanwhile, has made known its view that the training exercises were irrelevant, vehemently opposing the emergence of what it perceives as military blocs within Central Asia.⁶⁸

Similarly high profile command and staff exercises were held in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan June 13-16, 2002. SOUTHERN SHEILD OF THE COMMONWEALTH 2002 rehearsed combating terrorist incursions within the region. Participation included ground forces, Special Forces and aviation. A battalion from the 201st MRD in Tajikistan represented Russia. Kazakhstan contributed an airborne assault company, and the Kyrgyz supplied a mountain infantry

battalion, its “Scorpion” Special Forces and Mi-8 helicopters.⁶⁹ Despite these military exercises and the public statements regarding its capacity to react robustly to terrorism, doubts remain concerning the CRDFs ability to respond to any future crisis.

In addition, antiterrorist exercises are periodically conducted under the direction of the FSB, in cooperation with the ATC and regional power structures. These exercises usually involve a re-run of events similar to the Batken incursions in 1999 and 2000, with terrorists leading an incursion in large numbers, meeting with a response from air and ground assets.⁷⁰ More rarely, they entail hostage rescue, storming a building, or ending a siege. Scenarios appear stilted, often showing little awareness of the terrorists’ capacity to alter chosen tactics. The exercises are Russian organized, led, coordinated, financed, and utilized, therefore, Russian methods of counterterrorism are employed—which, if the campaigns in Chechnya are considered, revolve around disproportionate tactics that in long run only fan the flames of terrorism through the levels of civilian and collateral damage inflicted.⁷¹

One new feature of CRDF military exercises, however, was revealed in April 2003, when evidence emerged that Russian military planners were attempting to learn from OEF and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. During exercises held in southern Tajikistan, information warfare (IW) techniques saw the deployment of an experimental mobile TV and radio station⁷² on the firing range in Tajikistan, in clear recognition of the need to conduct IW concurrent with antiterrorist combat operations. It reportedly acted as a reliable communication center and had the capacity to jam enemy broadcasts.⁷³ These changes demonstrate the desire to use Russia’s experience with IW in Chechnya, and avoid repeating the same mistakes; more significantly it highlights a recognition within the Russian military for the need to gain information dominance within the theater of operations, minimizing the risk of sympathy for the terrorists’ cause spreading among the local population—helping to localize the conflict. According to Major-General Chernomordin, commander of the CRDF, plans exist to standardize communications equipment among the participants of the CRDF, since the lack of standardized equipment has presented command and control, and coordination problems.⁷⁴ SOUTHERN SHIELD OF THE

COMMONWEALTH exercises under the command of the CSTO, focusing on counterterrorism, scheduled for late 2003, with more exercises planned for 2004.⁷⁵

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Chinese Influence.

Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),⁷⁶ formerly known as the Shanghai Five, existed principally to address issues stemming from border security and delineation, the Alliance, with the guidance of its leading members, Russia and China, has developed an interest in countering regional and international terrorism.⁷⁷ Various SCO declarations have reiterated the intention of member states to work together to promote a UN-based approach to countering terrorism.⁷⁸ Thus it acts as a forum within which the Russian and Chinese governments can seek to equate their own domestic experience of terrorism, in Chechnya and Xinjiang, with the GWOT, while the Central Asian states use the opportunity to balance the regional influences of Moscow and Beijing.⁷⁹ The SCO has also formed its own ATC. Scheduled to open in January 2004 in Tashkent, it has established a secretariat in Beijing, which will work closely with its CIS counterpart.⁸⁰ China and Russia will each contribute between 32-38 percent of the costs for the ATC, with the rest being shared among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Consequently, most of its staff will come from China and Russia with the other SCO participants contributing technical personnel.⁸¹

Thus, China is gradually becoming engaged in regional political and military efforts to combat terrorism. This was highlighted in China's historic participation in joint SCO-sponsored antiterrorist military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in October 2002. These exercises took place in the border areas between China and Kyrgyzstan; the first part of the exercise was conducted in the Sary-Tash Gorge in Kyrgyzstan and the second in China's Lanzhou Province. Border guards, supported by helicopters and tanks used in the exercises, were observed by the CIS ATC, testing their cooperative capabilities. The exercise's scenario focused on eliminating terrorists entering and operating in each of their countries.⁸² At an SCO summit held in Moscow, SCO defense ministers met on May 29, 2003, reaching an

agreement on the participation of China in the SCO's first multilateral military exercises focusing on antiterrorism. In August 2003, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined China and Russia in the conduct of COOPERATION-2003, setting up an "antiterrorist joint headquarters" deploying combat units along the Sino-Kazakh border.⁸³ Russia and China agreed to work closely to foster a more coordinated approach to countering terrorism. Believing they share common interests in this area, they will emphasize more effective cooperation between the two ATCs as well as upgrading the interaction between antiterrorist agencies in both Russia and China.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, Uzbekistan's refusal to play any part in these military exercises weakens the SCO's attempts to promote such multilateral initiatives.


It is apparent that, while Russia remains militarily engaged in Chechnya, it will be in no position to conduct any major or significant military operations beyond its territory.⁸⁵ The conduct of such operations, which it is committed to on paper through the CRDF, would not only be Russian-led but perhaps also presage a political price for such support exacted upon the regional states. In any case, Moscow's efforts to date have been aimed, however imperfectly, at achieving regional stability. Russian security assistance within the region is restricted by continued economic constraints and its own efforts to reform its armed forces, leaving it in a limited position to lend moral and political support to regional states seeking to build professional armies. Russia lacks experience in this field, struggling as it is with the Herculean task of professionalizing its own army—an experiment still in its infancy in Russia after more than a decade of discussion and aborted efforts.⁸⁶

In fact, there need not be a clash of interests within the region, between the United States and Russia. Indeed, the United States and NATO engagement programs and Russia's security interests pursued bilaterally and through the CSTO all share a common aim, namely the promotion of greater security and stability within the region. Security can only be pursued and enhanced through cooperation, not competition. General Anthony Zinni, former commander of U.S. CENTCOM, noted the following about the convergence of security interests, particularly in addressing the threat of Islamic militancy: "I think the conduct of those operations

against terrorism, and eventually dealing with the drug trade is both in the United States and Russian interests.”⁸⁷ Russia will seek to expand its security interests in Central Asia for the foreseeable future, while China will become more actively engaged, reflecting its growing economic interests as well as its security concerns related to Uighur separatists.

Antiterrorist Capabilities in Central Asia.

Military reform has been prioritized within the Central Asian militaries in the context of the growing international security interest in the region, coping with the problems linked to Soviet legacy forces, domestic economic constraints, and recognition of a fluid and volatile threat environment. The most marked progress has been in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, while the others have lagged behind, reflecting their economic and political weakness.



Source: *The Military Balance 1994-95 to 2002-03.*

Figure 1. Defense Budgets in Central Asia.

As the graphic above illustrates, defense budgets within the region have fluctuated during the last decade, though Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have remained consistently above the smaller regional militaries—reflecting their larger countries and economies.

Allowing for inconsistency in the reported defense figures and the problems of the figures in *The Military Balance*, these figures broadly support the picture of inadequately funded militaries. Kazakhstan's defense budgets in 1992-93 were disproportionately large (1992: \$1,480 million and 1993: \$707 million). These out-of-range figures are tied principally to the nuclear weapons they inherited from the USSR, and the budget began to stabilize itself once they had agreed to get rid of them. The early attempts to maintain large legacy forces may explain the dip toward the mid 1990s, which presaged the subsequent lowering of defense budgets. Fluctuations in the figures for Uzbekistan reflect its evolving military reform priorities combined with the exclusion, since 1999, of "other troops" (MVD, Border Guards, etc.) from the budget. The defense budgets in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have been largely static throughout the period.

Although these defense budgets are generally small, they exclude spending items that would be included in a defense budget of a NATO member state. They also conceal greater spending potential in the local currency, as well as privileges extended to servicemen such as tax exemptions.⁸⁸ The average defense budget in the period, for the leading militaries, represents one-third to one-half the size of the defense budget of the smallest NATO members, excluding Luxembourg.⁸⁹ It is clear, therefore, that the Central Asian Republics cannot afford broad-scale conventional force modernization, but can afford to focus on the development of small, elite formations that are more professional and combat capable. This will need the full support of foreign assistance programs and the maintenance of closer links with the region's militaries and security forces, emphasizing follow-up work and more multilateral military exercises maximizing their exposure to foreign militaries.

Force Structures.

Among the Central Asian states, the militaries' efforts to combat terrorists incursions have generally employed Soviet legacy forces that were structured and equipped for Moscow's conventional wars. Much of this heavy force structure is ill-equipped for unconventional, guerrilla type conflict. Where they existed or are

being constituted, the militaries are finding that their elite, more professional and better trained, lightly armored, and more mobile formations (most likely special operations forces) are best suited to confront this type of threat. This kind of formation often has a specific or more narrow mission orientation than traditional conventional units. Undoubtedly, the most competent and battle ready of the regional Special Operation Forces (SOF)⁹⁰ are those of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Like their counterparts throughout the region, these units are under the control of the various state “power ministries,” immediately raising problems of effective coordination and deployment. The Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (MVD) Special Purpose Forces (OMON) are in essence the paramilitary arm of the police and are similarly structured to their Soviet predecessor. An MVD Special Forces company also is based in Tashkent as well as the Special Forces under the operational control of the National Security Service (SNB).⁹¹ However, in Uzbekistan the SOF which are most effective and well-trained are the SOF Battalions under the MOD. Counterterrorism in Uzbekistan is placed under the operational control of the SNB and the armed forces support them as needed; under certain circumstances for a specific mission or campaign they could be placed under the operational command of the military.⁹²

In Kazakhstan the National Security Service (KNB) has operational control of its antiterrorist “Aristan” (Lion) unit based in Astana. The KNB oversees the police volunteer units known as “Sarbazy” (Warriors), which operate within the local districts. In addition, the police units (OMON) also support antiterrorist tasks and include a “rapid reaction” group “Kyran” (Eagle), which has 10 teams deployed in Almaty. The MVD also controls its Alpha, or renamed KGB units with bases in Almaty and Semey including two Special Forces units: “Sunkar” (Hawk) and “Berkut” (Golden Eagle). Its MOD SOF is also based in Almaty and Semey. Operational control for counterterrorism in Kazakhstan is currently shared by the MOD and MVD, but it is likely that in future the KNB will be assigned this position.⁹³ This pattern for the organization and operational control of SOF in Central Asia is also replicated in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.⁹⁴

Throughout the region, SOF is affected by “Soviet thinking” within the older generation of officers. This is especially significant

since it acts as a constraint on efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of these forces. However, key skills tend to be found among these older Soviet and Russian trained officers.

U.S. SOF can be used in a variety of ways and have excellent capabilities against terrorists. They are light, mobile, and trained to work well with the local populace; tailored for deep and long-range reconnaissance; and trained and equipped to identify, target and designate, if needed, terrorist groups and their operating bases. They can maximize the use of conventional assets while minimizing the loss of life among civilians. U.S. SOF often operate in small teams, performing reconnaissance missions as well as direct action against enemy targets. They need operational mobility and good communications to keep them within range, responding quickly to terrorist activity and a fluid "front-line."

The Central Asian states do not yet possess the mobility or communications, essential equipment, and training to support the development of highly combat-ready SOF.⁹⁵ One key is their inability to recognize the battle utility of SOF operating in small groups. Such a transformation will necessitate the reform of the structure, doctrine and thinking of the commanding officers, who need to learn the importance of "bottom up" initiative from the junior ranks.

In 1993, the 7th Special Operations Squadron toured the Central Asian states, supplying initial U.S. SOF contacts with the newly independent former Soviet Republics of Central Asia.⁹⁶ U.S. military links with the region in the 1990s developed most with Uzbekistan on a bilateral basis and through multilateral military exercises utilizing NATO's PFP.⁹⁷ Since 1999, however, the five Central Asian states have been in CENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR)⁹⁸ and U.S. SOF that deploy to the region are under the operational control of Special Operations Command-Central (SOCCENT) based at MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida. Since then U.S. SOF have been the lead provider of military-to-military training of the Central Asian militaries.⁹⁹ 12-man A-teams deliver training in the host nation for a month at a time four times each year, with the focus on patrolling, small arms and explosives and small unit skills. These links were crucial politically in gaining the support offered by the Central Asian states for OEF.¹⁰⁰ Understandably, given the energy and security interests of the United States in the Caspian Sea, levels of

financial assistance through existing programs rose steadily during the 1990s. U.S. funded security programs for Central Asia totaled \$356,120,000 during 1992-2001.¹⁰¹ Assistance increased still further after 9/11. All of the states receive Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and since 2002 became eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis.¹⁰² In 2002, FMF to the region was as follows: Kazakhstan, \$4,750,000; Kyrgyzstan, \$11,000,000; Tajikistan, \$3,700,000; and Uzbekistan, \$36,210,000.¹⁰³ IMET funds: Kazakhstan, \$800,000; Kyrgyzstan, \$600,000; Tajikistan, \$250,000; Turkmenistan, \$450,000; and Uzbekistan, \$1,000,000.¹⁰⁴

These levels of funding have gone some way to furthering U.S. military engagement within the region, but the programs and training given have had to face the harsh realities of poor, underfunded post-Soviet militaries. Although some of the facilities within which training occurred were reportedly very good,¹⁰⁵ the quality of the soldiers in the indigenous militaries often left a lot to be desired. For example, the Kazakh soldiers receiving training from U.S. SOF in 2002 were alleged by some trainers to be of poor quality.¹⁰⁶ The nature of this training has not always specifically targeted the antiterrorist side of these militaries, instead training border and peacekeeping troops in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In January and February 2003, U.S. SOF conducted joint military exercises in Kyrgyzstan, called BALANCE KNIGHT, which included the Kyrgyz National Guard (MVD) and the Kyrgyz SOF "Scorpion" battalion. During BALANCE KNIGHT, shooting, mountaineering, rapid response, helicopter maneuvers, and medical and engineering skills were drilled.¹⁰⁷

Uzbek Special Forces.

Uzbek armed forces, particularly its Special Forces, are regarded as the most effective in the region. Its MOD SOF are organized into seven battalions with the brigade headquarters in Tashkent; these battalions are not under the command of the Military Districts and have responsibilities along Uzbekistan's borders. All Uzbek SOF battalions are professional, with their servicemen signing 3-year contracts. Yet in training and operations, they are utilized as light infantry.¹⁰⁸

In 2000 in Surkhandarya, for example, they were inserted in small teams and took casualties while attempting to confront the IMU in well-prepared defensive positions. During the operation they were utilized as light infantry, pushing the IMU into hard terrain before calling in air and artillery strikes. Although they eliminated the small group of IMU guerrillas, the local population had to be evacuated, allowing sympathy to grow for the insurgents and their cause.¹⁰⁹ Thus, Uzbek SOF were essentially misused, failing to fix and locate the enemy and call in conventional light infantry and close air support to wipe out their targets. The Uzbek SOF, professional and the most advanced in the region, may have expanded too rapidly, sacrificing quality for quantity. Clearly they need more effective reform programs, to include better counterterrorist training, refined tactics, critical equipment items, etc.

The United States has given critical support to the Central Asian militaries, but this can be developed still further through **training**, providing **equipment**, and promoting **intelligence cooperation**, both within the region itself and internationally. In what follows, some of the shortcomings of U.S. military engagement will be highlighted and the continued weakness of the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian states will be explored before suggesting a roadmap for markedly enhancing these capabilities in the future.

Training and Equipment.

The Central Asian Republics with the least effective SOF are those that have received less exposure to U.S. and western militaries either through bilateral training or NATO's PfP activities. Consequently, the least combat-ready forces in the region are those in Turkmenistan, closely followed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The majority of SOF training in Tajikistan has been geared towards the enhancement of the Tajik border guards (KOGG) and the OMON unit of the MVD. However, if properly and thoroughly trained through U.S. assistance programs, these forces could become very effective as covert operators, gathering intelligence and helping to prevent specific events. Achieving this will involve a comprehensive rise in the number of U.S. SOF carrying out training in unconventional warfare techniques.¹¹⁰ This requires political will

and direction, as well as provision of more effective equipment and materials to the trainers for use during training. There is little point in assisting these forces by providing training using equipment that does not stay with the recipients. Likewise, the best quality and most cost effective training is provided through MTTs, which can be deployed to the host nation and encompass whole unit training.¹¹¹

Officers in Central Asia should also be exposed to improved psychological training, widening their horizons by teaching them political and social awareness. The future success of these militaries will depend upon the creation of a new generation of officers capable of leading their armed forces in the 21st century, responding to the evolving international and regional security environment.¹¹² More English language training is needed to facilitate interoperability with Western militaries; enabling officers to access English language learning tools will be a key to closer integration with the West. However, in some cases C² breaks down within the region, through language barriers that reflect the rapid changes in the ethnic composition of the post-Soviet legacy forces. In Uzbekistan, for example, most officers speak Russian and Uzbek, while the soldiers, whether contract or conscript speak only Uzbek. Though the Uzbeks are working toward more Uzbek language courses for their officers, assistance would speed up this process.¹¹³

Another key factor on enhanced training in the region, inculcating more independence in the junior officers, would involve access to e-learning tools. Through such promotion of self-training, an Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) option within the officers' ordinary training cycles would stimulate self-awareness and professional development.¹¹⁴

They also require more use of a modeling and simulation system, providing Computer Assisted Exercises. This is a cost effective way of training the individuals, staffs, combat teams or multiple combat formations, and may be used to diversify the standard scenarios of conventional military exercises held within the CIS.¹¹⁵ All too often their exercises are inflexible and show little awareness of the potential of terrorist groups to vary their targets and strategies. Doctrinal awareness of the nature of low-intensity conflict, stability operations, and counterterrorist operations needs to be developed at the theoretical level. These militaries were originally designed by the

Soviets for large-scale conventional war, using divisions and carrying out operations on a massive scale. Within the military academies, they must break this mold and develop or embrace new doctrinal manuals and begin teaching the basics of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.¹¹⁶ Officers must learn basic practices associated with counterterrorism, such as setting up roadblocks, vehicle searches, etc.

Effective training is only one of the building blocks needed in developing the antiterrorist capabilities of these militaries. Despite their best efforts and most financial resources being funneled towards the SOF in each state, they lack basic kit and advanced weaponry. For instance, they find it difficult to obtain a clear picture of the battle space, lacking C⁴ISR equipment and remote sensors.

The region's SOF require the type of equipment that will enhance their operational mobility and generally improve their combat capabilities. This includes night-vision equipment and thermal sights; modern sniper weapons; communication equipment at operational and tactical level; modern individual and crew-served weapons with sufficient quantities of ammunition to train with them; light-weight and functional body armor capable of giving adequate protection against a 7.62mm round; body armor to protect against fragmentation weapons; gas masks; protective head gear; spare parts to assist in repairing the Soviet era equipment they possess; Global Position System (GPS); communications equipment to enhance C³I; mobile sensors; armored mobile vehicles such as the HMMWV; and helicopters for greater small unit mobility.¹¹⁷ It is also important to stress the fundamental requirement for engineers and support staff being sent the host nation before, during and after the supply of any Western equipment; the regional militaries are not automatically capable of carrying out their maintenance and repairs.¹¹⁸

Furthermore, specific needs such as mobile sensors, which are essential for use by SOF, would enable the local SOF to "watch" for traffic in unusual places, or could be utilized in aiding the security of remote or inaccessible areas in the mountains, through which drug traffickers and militants may seek to pass. In particular a Remote Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) would allow greater awareness of movements and potentially dangerous incursions, filling the gaps

along very extended and rugged borders and providing oversight of remote trails into and out of the country¹¹⁹

Small Units.

Their weaknesses are manifold, as observed in the use SOF during the terrorist incursions within the region in 1999 and 2000. These include unit movement, collective task proficiency, react-to-contact skills and individual marksmanship.¹²⁰

More exercises, in-country whole unit training, military exchanges inside the United States and other coalition partner countries, as well as U.S. SOF military-military training are all useful. Yet they need to be coupled with recognition that security can also be enhanced by commitment to long-term military reform, especially professionalization and development of an NCO corps with distinct management/command responsibilities. This should include SOF professionalization. Indeed, counterterrorist-operations demand a high level of professionalism on the part of the ordinary soldier. There is little doubt that creating professional armed forces within Central Asia would result in greater security, deter some terrorist activities and improve interoperability with western militaries. Progress is being made toward professionalizing the armed forces in Uzbekistan. There is evidence that Kazakhstan may be seriously pursuing similar goals. But challenges remain within Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and especially Turkmenistan.¹²¹

Small units capable of mobile rapid reaction, professionally trained and able to minimize the widening of local conflict by using a "light touch" in their operations still require the operational support of the other branches of the armed forces. The Central Asian militaries will need upgraded airframes and platforms to facilitate support operations, small unit insertion, battlefield logistics, C², airborne fire support, and reconnaissance.

Central Asian Train and Equip Program?

Growing support exists within the Central Asian militaries for deeper engagement with the United States as well as expanded participation within NATO's PfP. Although the challenges are

significant, options for greater levels of successful engagement can be found in examples from the experiences of the former Warsaw Pact members, and indeed elsewhere within the former Soviet republics.

In Eastern Europe, for instance, Romania faced the challenges of poor unit readiness, questionable force capability and force restructuring after the end of the Cold War. Its 812th Battalion, "Carpathian Hawks," successfully carried out joint missions in Afghanistan under the operational command of the 1st Brigade Task Force "Devil," headed by U.S. Colonel John F. Campbell.¹²² At Kandahar, the "Carpathian Hawks" were responsible for base security, patrols, data collecting, and information operations. They also participated in complex reconnaissance and joint combat missions.¹²³ The undoubted success of the "Carpathian Hawks" lay in their adoption of modern training methods and NATO standard operating procedures, enhancing readiness and combat capability and then gaining invaluable operational experience between 1996-2002 in various missions under UN and NATO command in Angola, Bosnia, and Kosovo.¹²⁴

The Georgian Model: GTEP.

A critical part of the U.S political and military assistance to Georgia began in May 2002, with the implementation of the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), costing \$64 million. The program was designed to run over 2 years, enhancing the antiterrorist capabilities of the Georgian army, promoting their cooperation in the GWOT, and helping to alleviate the tension created within the Georgian state as a result of Chechen and other militants operating in the Pankisi Gorge.¹²⁵ This important security program is a time-phased training program, conducted in-country in cooperation with the Georgian MOD, with its prime focus on training the Georgian 16th Mountain Battalion, 113th Light Infantry Battalion and 11th MRD.¹²⁶ The initial program, conducted under the command of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), focused on the Georgian MOD and Land Forces Command to enhance their effectiveness in creating and sustaining standard operating procedures, training plans, and a property accounting system.¹²⁷ The curriculum consisted of

performance-oriented practical exercises similar to those taught at the U.S. National Defense University, Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Army War College.

Tactical training, consisting of approximately 100 days per unit, is designed to instruct the Georgian battalions in light infantry tactics, platoon-level offensive and defensive operations, and airmobile tactics. Its curriculum includes basic individual skills, combat lifesaver, radio operator procedures, land navigation, human rights education, and combat skills, including rifle marksmanship, movement techniques, and squad and platoon tactics.¹²⁸ The program also ensures that those trained and entering service in the battalions do so on a professional basis, signing contracts on completion of their training, thus enhancing the status of the battalions.¹²⁹ Furthermore, the participation of Georgian border troops and two platoons from the MVD ensures greater interoperability among the forces.¹³⁰

The program has not been without its problems. Requests for more equipment have been made by the Georgian MOD during the course of the program, and there have been difficulties in persuading the Georgian MOD to devise a blueprint for future training following the scheduled departure of U.S. military advisors in 2004.¹³¹

Nonetheless, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised the level of training during a visit to Georgia in November 2002, equating it with what he would expect to see in U.S. training of similar sized units.¹³²

Adapting the Georgian Model.

Devising a version of GTEP for the enhancement of Central Asian security is certainly a viable option, provided it can be formulated to address the specific needs of the Central Asian militaries, enabling them to develop their antiterrorist capabilities within a difficult and challenging operational environment. It must be coupled with long-term interagency planning, and efforts to develop new levels of regional security cooperation. Moreover, there is a vital role for NATO to play in supporting and implementing such a program.

CATEP.

CATEP regional centers should be established in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and be open to full participation from all the Central Asian militaries. NATO should play an active role through the PfP program to further strengthen the international dimension of the assistance program and expand the scope of its activities. Achieving this would entail the following **basic outline**.

A Political Steering Group (PSG) would be formed to coordinate the program, maximizing its efficiency and effectiveness. The PSG would maintain control and direction over the multinational program, supply political oversight of the Military Working Group; and liaise between NATO and national governments. The PSG should be restricted to NATO members and representatives for the CA states. A military working group (MWG) would be responsible for planning details and proposing further assistance required to the PSG. It would facilitate pooling international expertise and scarce resources in support of the CATEP; preparing an implementation plan; and overseeing the execution of all aspects of the assistance programs. CA states could provide representatives to participate in the work of the MWG. Finally, a Training Assistance Sub-Working Group (TASWG) would coordinate, manage, and oversee the implementation of the MWGs' training assistance programs. The United States should assume chairmanship of the TASWG, with the participation of other NATO members willing to become involved in the program. See Figure 2.

At the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, stressed the importance of closer links with Central Asia. The Alliance must secure the political will to deepen PfP engagement in the region in the near future. Russia ought to play a positive consultative role, in keeping with the cooperative spirit being cultivated through the NATO-Russia Council mechanism, though Moscow should not have a veto on such a program.¹³³ NATO has gained experience in dealing with terrorism since 9/11 which its members can share with Central Asia. It can also encourage these partner states to utilize Article VIII of the NATO Charter, in seeking additional security assistance programs and antiterrorism training.¹³⁴

Country	Proposed Role
Canada	Member, PSG and MWG; Possible Chairman, MWG and PSG.
Denmark	Possible Member, MWG and TASWG; and provision of trainers and training assistance.
France	Member, PSG and MWG, Chairman of TASWG; provision of training assistance.
Germany	Possible Chairman, PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance.
Italy	Member PSG and/or MWG.
Netherlands	Member, PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance.
Poland	Member, MWG; Member TASWG; provision of trainers and access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.
Turkey	Member of PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance and access to its training facilities for CATEP personnel.
UK	Member, PSG, MWG, and TASWG; provision of trainers and access to its training centers for CATEP personnel.
United States	Member, PSG and MWG; Chairman of TASWG; alternative Chairman of PSG or MWG; provision of training assistance and access to its training centers for CATEP personnel.

Figure 2. Possible NATO Participants in CATEP Support Structure.

Many NATO members are actively engaged in Central Asia through bilateral assistance programs. NATO PfP nations could also join this assistance effort. In particular, the Baltic States, with their experience of English Language Training, could play an invaluable role. (See Figure 3.) Moreover, other PfP members such as Ukraine have good facilities for exercises and have recently held multilateral military exercises at their Yarovsky firing range in the Lvov region, aimed at improving antiterrorist operations; these witnessed the participation of Austria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldavia,

Country	Proposed Role
Estonia	Member TASWG; provision of trainers and ELT assistance and access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.
Latvia	Member TASWG; provision of trainers and ELT assistance and access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.
Sweden	Access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.
Ukraine	Provision of trainers and access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Figure 3. Possible NATO PfP Participants in CATEP Support Structure.




Figure 4. Proposed First Year Outline for CATEP.¹³⁶

Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, United States, Turkey, and Ukraine.¹³⁵

The key to success will be the development of a systematic and well-coordinated assistance program that focuses on improving the capabilities of each of the CA member states. The first step is breaking the local militaries' ties to their Soviet legacy and developing a building block training support program that will allow them to do this. In the end, the U.S. and NATO participants hope that the resulting forces/formations will have improved operational capability against the terrorist threat and will be better prepared, if necessary, to operate in concert with Western forces.

The proposed first-year training program outlined in Figure 4 would be an initial step towards implementing the CATEP. At the end of its first year, the antiterrorist capabilities of the region's militaries would not be greatly enhanced, but the organization will be in place, with training programs specifically designed to meet the needs of the local militaries, conducted by experienced or trained personnel, and with the training support and management systems that will help them to develop their own future training systems with greater effectiveness.

1. ELT. An essential building bloc for the program will be ELT, designed and implemented by teaching those who will in turn train their rank and file; language laboratories are insufficient to guarantee success in this vital area.

2. Revise the annual training plan. This needs to be done in conjunction with the CA MODs, addressing the on-going needs of the program and promoting greater efficiency in the management of the MODs.

3. Develop a detailed curriculum. This will cover all the aspects of SOF operations, conducting antiterrorist operations and incorporating the necessary flexibility to meet the requirements of the various militaries and types of formations, especially local SOF.

4. Prepare instructors for antiterrorist SOF training. Designed as a train-the-trainers package, this should concentrate on the leadership cadre and foster inoperability and individual initiative.

5. SOF Staff management training. This should place particular emphasis upon encouraging delegation of responsibility down the chain of command, thus fostering individual responsibility

and initiative at the small unit level, so necessary for antiterrorist operations.

6. The ELT and military training antiterrorist cadre. This would also include training that is topic specific for unit leaders, officers, and NCOs. It would comprise C³I issues, use of intelligence and the supporting roles of air, logistics, MEDEVAC, operating with coalition forces, etc.

7. Operational and tactical intelligence training. This should prepare the leadership and NCOs in the full use of intelligence assets, including SOF units used in intelligence gathering missions, to achieve full-spectrum dominance of the enemy in battle. Military intelligence failings contributed significantly to the weaknesses of the antiterrorist campaigns in the Batken in 1999 and 2000.

8. NATO SOF unit training. This will establish the basis for NATO operational practices and enhance the scope for future joint operations.

9. Counterterrorist operations in special conditions. Given the diverse topography of Central Asia, this should prepare elite units for conducting operations under special conditions such as mountainous or desert terrain.

10. Consolidated antiterrorist exercise. This will allow detailed assessment of progress and revision of new skills absorbed during the training cycle.¹³⁷

Developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries will involve the formulation of an antiterrorist training cadre in each state—a crucial element in establishing a CATEP. The long-term aim is the development of an independent, national training capability for these elite units, rather than reliance on foreign assistance. The security problems presented by the specter of terrorism can only be met by these countries themselves in the long term, through the development of effective, professionally trained elite units. The West has an undoubted assistance role to play, but it can only do so with the political support and commitment of the Central Asian Republics.

ENDNOTES

1. George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," United States Capitol, Washington, DC, September 20, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

2. Robert G. Kaiser, "U.S. Plants Footprint in Shaky Central Asia," *Washington Post*, August 27, 2002.

3. Jim Nichol, "Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests," Congressional Research Service (CRS), Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, January 6, 2003.

4. Col. Robert C. McMullin, "Caspian Sea Regional Security in the 21st Century," USAWC, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 2003, p. 16; Lyle J. Goldstein, "Making the Most of Central Asian Partnerships," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 2002, pp. 82-90.

5. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department, April 30, 2003, www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19984.htm.

6. They also report to the Kazakh mission at NATO HQ, Brussels, acting as a useful facilitator in the deployment of 25 Kazakh military specialists to Iraq in support of the international peacekeeping operation. Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian state to send a small team of representatives to CENTCOM, sending four officers in December 2001; Kyrgyzstan followed by sending five officers in May 2002; and Tajikistan shortly afterwards assigned four liaison officers to CENTCOM. See www.centcom-mil/operations/coalition/coalition-pages/kazakhstan.htm.

7. Jim Nichol, "Central Asia's New States"; "International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism," U.S. Department of Defense Fact Sheet, June 7, 2002, www.defenselink-mil/news/Jun2002/d20020607contributions.pdf.

8. Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander U.S. Central Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 9, 2003, p. 15.

9. In using the word "region" in referring to Central Asia, it is important to remember that it is not a region in any sense other than geographically; there is no recent history of the formation of a real political, economic, and security regional based approach. The long-term aim of western engagement is partly to foster the development of genuine regional cooperation on security and other issues: first the Central Asian governments must be dissuaded from any isolationist tendencies, while developing interstate trust.

10. Elizabeth Jones, "U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Staying our Course Along the Silk Road," Speech delivered at the University of Montana, Missoula, MT, April 10, 2003; See Elizabeth Wishnick, *Growing U.S. Security Concerns in Central Asia*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2002.

11. *Atlas Des d'Orient, La Découverte*, 2002; William D. O'Malley, "Central Asia and South Caucasus as an Area of Operations: Challenges and Constraints," Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, eds., *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, pp. 272-276.

12. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Moscow, April 15, 2003; See Tamara Makarenko, "The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 2002.

13. Some of these, such as Adolot, are registered as political parties and seek the opportunity of standing in an election, while the regimes themselves contribute to the problem by refusing to open their political systems to greater democracy, thus risking radicalizing the opposition in many cases; *Vecherniy Bishkek*, Bishkek, May 28, 1999; M. Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995; Nancy Lubin and Barnett Rubin, *Calming the Ferghana Valley. Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia*, New York: Century Foundation, 1999; "Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia's Localized Poverty and Social Unrest," ICG, *Asia Report*, No. 16, Osh/Brussels, 2001; Michael Fredholm, *Uzbekistan and the Threat From Islamic Extremism*, K39, CSRC: Camberley, March 2003.

14. "Russian FSB Detains 121 Suspected Members of Banned Islamic Salvation Party," *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, June 9, 2003; *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, Moscow, June 18, 2003, p. 4.

15. Another important dimension in the GWOT is the prevention of failing states being used, such as Afghanistan was used by al Qaeda and the Taliban, as harbingers of international terrorism. Likewise, the economically weaker Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, must not become the future breeding grounds for international terrorists; otherwise the problem is simply shifted around without any resolution.

16. *Ibid*; Central Asian militants have probably exaggerated the idea of a pan-Asiatic movement, scaring the authorities as a consequence. The IPT may never have existed in reality.

17. *Khabar Television*, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, July 16, 2003.

18. *The Military Balance, 2003-04*, Oxford, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2003, p. 22.
19. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Moscow, July 1, 2003, p. 5.
20. Kryrgyzstan has suffered a series of terrorist attacks in recent months, leaving 28 dead. In addition to an attack on a bus on December 26, 2002, a bomb planted in a Bishkek market place killed 7 and wounded another 40. Hamid Toursunof, "Turkestan: A New Terrorist Nexus? Kyrgyz Authorities Warn that Chinese Separatists, the IMU, and Hizb ut-Tahrir are Joining Forces," *Week in Review*, July 8-14, 2003, *Transitions Online*, July 14, 2003.
21. The UN and the U.S. State Department both have officially proscribed this terrorist organization. Xu Tau, "Extremist Threat in Northwestern China," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 5, 2000, p. 85.
22. *Khabar Television*, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, 1400 GMT, July 11, 2003; *Novye Izvestia*, Moscow, July 22, 2003, p. 5.
23. *Berlingske Tidende*, Copenhagen, BBC Monitoring Service, June 10, 2003; *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, Moscow, June 18, 2003, p. 4.
24. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability," Testimony Before the U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 23, 2003.
25. Bakhram Turnasov, "Extremism in Uzbekistan," K33, Conflict Studies Research Center, RMA, Sandhurst, July 2002, p. 9.
26. The radical anti-western and anti-Semitic nature of its literature can be seen on the groups website: www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org; "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb-ut-Tahrir," *International Crisis Group*, Osh/Brussels, June 30, 2003; Ariel Cohen, "Hizb-ut-Tahrir: an Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia," Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, May 30, 2003, www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm; Ariel Cohen, "Have American Officials Identified a New Threat in Central Asia?," *Eurasianet*, June 24, 2003; *Izvestia*, Moscow, July 4, 2003, p. 4.
27. George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," United States Capitol, Washington, DC, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
28. *Vecherniy Bishkek*, Bishkek, April 30 2003; *Biznes I Politika*, Dushanbe, BBC Monitoring Service, February 21, 2003, pp. 1-2; Michael Lueders, "Borderland: Power and Faith in Central Asia," *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, Bonn, March 31, 2003.

29. Extreme caution should be exercised in comparing Islamic extremism in Central Asia with the Middle East. The practice of religion differs significantly, while there is no “struggle for homeland liberation” paradigm as in the Middle East. The ethnic politics are very different and the average village dweller in Central Asia does not care about Israel; while the U.S. dynamics at play are also distinct. See further Tamara Makarenko, “The Rising Threat of Militant Islam in Central Asia,” M. Ranstrop, ed., *Islamic Extremism and Terrorism in the Greater Middle East*, Hurst & Co: London, 2003.

30. Vitaly V. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Spring 2003.

31. Fiona Hill, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability,” House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July 23, 2003; Alisher Khamidov, “Countering the Call: The U.S., Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and Religious Extremism in Central Asia,” Muskie Fellow in International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, *U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World*, Analysis Paper #4, The Brookings Institution, July 2003, www.brook.edu/fjp/saban/khamidov20030701.pdf.

32. “Review of the Implementation of OSCE Commitments to Prevent and Combat Terrorism,” *OSCE*, June 10, 2003.

33. Author discussions with Western intelligence services.

34. FEMA existed as an independent agency until March 2003 when it became part of the Department of Homeland Security, www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm.

35. See “Central Asia: the Politics of Police Reform,” International Crisis Group, Brussels/Osh, December 2002; British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), tasked with producing intelligence assessments for senior policymakers, has long involved the CIA in its work, and vice-versa. Israel has been effective in developing good intelligence liaison links with the intelligence services of Arab states including Jordan; Stéphane Lefebvre, “International Intelligence Cooperation: Difficulties and Dilemmas,” *Colloque Renseignement et Sécurité Internationale*, Laval University, Quebec, March 20, 2003, (forthcoming in the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*).

36. Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors 2001,” *CRS Report for Congress*, Library of Congress, September 10 2001, p. 16.

37. Sultan Jumagulov and Kubut Otorbaev, “Kyrgyz IMU Fears Mount,” *IWPR*, August 3, 2001, www.iwpr.net.

38. David Filipov, "Islamic Rebels Thrive in Central Asia," *The Boston Globe*, December 31, 2000.
39. *ITAR-TASS*, Moscow, *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS)-SOV-1999-1002*, October 2, 1999; *ITAR-TASS*, Moscow, September 20, 1999; *Interfax*, Moscow, October 2, 1999.
40. Bakhrom Tursunov and Marina Pikulina, *Severe Lessons of Batken*, Camberley, England: K28, Conflict Studies Research Center (CSRC), pp. 8-10; Asel Otorbaeva, "Kyrgyz Private Relives Batken Nightmare," *IWPR*, September 1, 2000.
41. Kyrgyz soldiers were issued with old Soviet manpad radios, and many failed to work in the field, making it impossible to coordinate ground and air elements or receive and convey intelligence. They were promised \$50 per day and received only a fraction of that amount. The Kyrgyz government evidently believed a show of force could affect the end of the incursion, deploying troops without adequate training or equipment to respond to the threat.
42. The militants were armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and their rounds would not be stopped by the helmets issued to the Kyrgyz soldiers; Otorbaeva, "Kyrgyz Private Relives Batken Nightmare," *Military Parade*, www.milparade.com/ra/content1.htm.
43. One Kyrgyz officer later recounted the extent of their predicament:
- Only we and the police special forces were left. Two generals commanded them, Isakov and Sadiev. The operation led to nothing. In approaching the place, a militant fired a shot from a sniper rifle and hit a soldier in the leg. After that, the detachment waited a little more and left empty-handed. And what we were dealing with was only a band numbering 25-30.
- Vecherniy Bishkek*, Bishkek, August 23, 2002.
44. *Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 5, No. 162, September 3, 1999; *Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 5, No. 173, September 21, 1999.
45. Leonid Bondarets, "On the Optimization of the Defense and Security Systems," George C. Marshall Center, 2000; *Interfax*, Tashkent, *FBIS-SOV-1999-1129*, November 29, 1999.
46. *BBC Monitoring Service*, London, April 24, 2000.

47. *BBC Monitoring Service*, August 20, 2000; *BBC Monitoring Service*, August 27, 2000.
48. *Novye Izvestia*, Moscow, July 23, 2003, p. 1.
49. Turat Akimov, "Batken Conflict Returns," *IWPR*, August 18, 2000.
50. Bondarets, "On the Optimization of the Defense and Security Systems," 2000.
51. Roger N. McDermott, "Russia's Security Agenda in Central Asia," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 2, No. 14, Information and Analytical Center, Sweden, 2002, pp. 16-23.
52. M. J. Orr, "The Russian Garrison in Tajikistan—201st Gatchina Twice Red Banner Motor Rifle Division," *Occasional Brief No. 85*, Camberley, England: CSRC, October 2001, pp. 5-6.
53. The Russian military have well-known reservations concerning the continued presence of U.S. and NATO forces within Central Asia, and were reportedly dismayed by the 3-year extension of the lease agreement between the United States and Kyrgyzstan for the coalition base at Manas, Bishkek. See *Kommersant*, Moscow, August 13, 2003.
54. McDermott, "Russia's Security Agenda in Central Asia"; Marcel de Haas, "The Development of Russia's Security Policy 1992-2002," in Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott, eds., *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*, London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 3-21.
55. The CRDF is divided into three operational zones—Western Zone (Russia and Belarus), Caucasus Zone (Russia and Armenia) and the Central Asian Zone (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).
56. Kenley Butler, "Internal Conflicts and Security Concerns in Central Asia and Afghanistan," NIS Nonproliferation Program, Monterey Institute of International Studies, cns.miis.edu/research/wt01/caconf.htm.
57. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Moscow, April 21, 2003, p. 9.
58. Bordyuzha graduated from the Perm Higher Command and Engineering School in 1972 and then entered the KGB, where he remained until 1992. Between 1992-95 he was Deputy Commander of the Federal Border Troops, and between 1995-98, he was Deputy Commander of the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) before being appointed to the presidential administration. See *Kommersant*, Moscow, April 24, 2003, p. 4; *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Moscow, May 12, 2003, p. 10.

59. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Moscow, April 19 2003, p. 2.

60. *Interfax*, Moscow, May 16, 2002.

61. It retains a total strength of around 1,300 troops, as of September 2003; *Ibid.*

62. See William D. O'Malley and Roger N. McDermott, "Kyrgyzstan's Security Tightrope: Balancing its Relations Between Moscow and Washington," FMSSO, Fort Leavenworth: KS, 2003.

63. Miriam Arunova, "The CIS: Summing up the Past Decade and Future Prospects," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 3, No. 15, 2002, pp. 14-16.

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Interfax*, Moscow, September 18, 2002.

66. *Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 7, No. 108, June 5, 2001; Sophie Lambroschini, "Central Asia: CIS Plans Rapid-Reaction Force to Fight Terrorism," *RFE/RL Newslines*, May 22, 2001, www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/05/22052001112028.asp.

67. *Vremya Novosti*, Moscow, April 4, 2002.

68. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Moscow, April 23, 2002.

69. *ITAR-TASS*, Moscow, 1327 GMT, BBC Monitoring Service, June 13, 2002.

70. *Ibid.*

71. *Khabar TV*, Almaty, April 18, 2002; *Interfax*, Moscow, BBC Monitoring Service, April 23, 2002; *AKIpress website*, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, June 12, 2002; *Asia-Plus News Agency*, Dushanbe, BBC Monitoring Service, 0946 GMT, June 14, 2002; M. J. Orr, "Better or Just Not so Bad? An Evaluation of Russian Combat Effectiveness in the Second Chechen War," *The Second Chechen War*, p. 94.

72. The 100-megawatt transmitter reportedly receives signals from two satellites simultaneously. See *Channel One TV*, Moscow, BBC Monitoring Service, 0800 GMT, April 4, 2003.

73. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Moscow, April 7, 2003, p. EV.

74. *ITAR-TASS News Agency*, Moscow, April 8, 2003.

75. *The Military Balance, 2003-04*, Oxford, England: IISS, 2003, pp. 22-23.

76. The six member states of the SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

77. Zulfia Rakhimova, "Uzbekistan in GUUAM and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 5, No. 11, 2001, pp. 158-168; Alexander Lukin, "China Advancing Bilateral Cooperation," *International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2002, pp. 141-152.

78. Bruce Pannier, "Central Asia: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit Ends," *RFE/RL*, Prague, June 15, 2001; *Xinhua News Agency*, Beijing, BBC Monitoring Service, 0848 GMT, January 7, 2002; *Xinhua News Agency*, Beijing, BBC Monitoring Service, 1043 GMT, May 15, 2002; *Izvestia*, Moscow, June 7, 2002, p. 4; *Parlamentskaya Gazeta*, Moscow, June 8, 2002, p. 1.

79. Xing Guangcheng, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Fight Against Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 4, No. 16, 2002, p. 16.

80. *Kyrgyz-Press International News Agency*, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, 1425 GMT, April 1, 2003; *ITAR-TASS*, Moscow, August 6, 2003.

81. *Interfax*, Bishkek, *FBIS-SOV-2002-1226*, December 26, 2002.

82. *Public Educational Radio and TV*, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, 1430 GMT, October 14, 2002; *Xinhua News Agency*, Beijing, *FBIS-CHI-2002-1224*, December 24, 2002.

83. *Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao*, (*Internet Version*), BBC Monitoring Service, June 4, 2003; *ITAR-TASS*, Moscow, August 6, 2003; *People's Daily Online*, Beijing, August 13, 2003; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Moscow, August 12, 2003, p. 1.

84. *Interfax*, Moscow, July 17, 2002.

85. Pavel Baev, "The Challenge of "Small Wars" for the Russian Military," in Aldis and McDermott, eds., *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*, pp. 189-208.

86. Roger N. McDermott, "Putin's Military Priorities: The Modernization of the Armed Forces," in Aldis and McDermott, eds., *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002*, pp. 259-277.

87. An Interview With General Anthony Zinni, "Russia and the Middle East," *Washington Profile News Agency*, May 19, 2003, www.washprofile.org.

88. Sam Perlo-Freeman and Peter Stalenheim, "Military Expenditure in the South Caucasus and Central Asia," in Alyson J. K. Bailes, *et al.*, *Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, July 2003, pp. 15-20; Chris Hill and Peter Sutcliffe, "An Economic Analysis of Military Expenditure Levels in Central Asia and Transcaucasia," *NATO Colloquim 2001*, pp. 271-90, www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/colloq01.htm.

89. *The Military Balance, 1992-03 to 2002-03*, Oxford, England: IISS.

90. I am making a clear distinction between forces whose function is to carry out combat operations (SOF) and those that are referred to as Special Forces, which are in fact combined forces with special designated tasks: chemical units, construction units, engineering units, intelligence units, signal units, medical units, and topography and cartography units.

91. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Russia and the CIS*, Issue 11, 2002, pp. 819, 827, 829.

92. Author interviews with Western military officers.

93. *Ibid.*

94. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, pp. 286, 295-296.

95. Edward F. Bruner, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O'Rourke, "Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, October 15, 2001; author interviews with Western military officers.

96. See 7 acs/7 sof/7 sos History, via www.7thsos.com/History.htm.

97. See Shamil Gareyev, "Military Cooperation: Uzbekistan and the U.S.A.," Winter 1997-98, www.pacom.mil/forum/UZBEK.html. Four of the Central Asian Republics joined NATO's PfP in 1994, Tajikistan finally joined in 2002. On multilateral military exercises, see J. Moffat, "Central Asia: U.S. to Participate in Joint Military Exercise," RFE/RL, August 29, 1997; "NATO PfP Exercise Cooperative Nugget 97," www.saclant.nato.int/pio/EVENTS/Exercises/COOP%20Nugget/cn97.htm; "Fact Sheet on Centrasbat 2000," www.usembassy.uz/centcom/military.htm.

98. See: Major William M. Tart, "Ethnic Conflict and CENTCOM Policy for the Central Asian Republics," Air Command Staff College, Air University, AU/ACSC/175/2000-04, April 2000.

99. Turkmenistan has been the exception, seeking to eschew foreign military contacts.

100. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Central Asian Partners: Low Key Spadework by Green Berets Reaps Valuable Benefits for War in Afghanistan," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 2002, p. 60.

101. These programs were as follows: Collaborative Research Program, Department of Health and Human Services–BTEP, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, Materials Protection, Control & Accounting, Export Control Program (Nuclear), Arms Control Support, IMET, Counterproliferation, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, FMF, Science Centers, Export Control and Border Security, Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), Comprehensive Threat Reduction, Customs Border Security and Counterproliferation, DoD/FBI Counterproliferation, and Civilian R&D Foundation. See Nichol, "Central Asia's New States."

102. *Ibid.*

103. No FMF funds were assigned to Turkmenistan in the FY 2002.

104. The Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) funds were Kazakhstan, \$2,660,000; Kyrgyzstan, \$2,000,000; Tajikistan, \$7,500,000; Turkmenistan, \$5,000,000; and Uzbekistan, \$4,300,000. These were broadly in line with the prioritizing of border security in the region in an attempt to counter the flow of narcotics, arms, militants, and illegal migration. See "U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities With Eurasia," *FY 2002 Annual Report*, Prepared by the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, U.S. State Department, January 2003.

105. Anthony Davis, "U.S. Special Forces Train Kyrgyz Units," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, August 29, 2001.

106. *The Times*, London, March 30, 2002, p. 20.

107. *Interfax*, Moscow, January 24, 2003.

108. Author interviews with Western military officers.

109. *Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 6, No. 171, September 15, 2000.

110. Author interviews with U.S. SOF.

111. Author interviews with Western military officers.

112. The United States and NATO are currently moving away from the view of the armed forces existing for the defense of territory to the defense of values.

Such a revolution in military terms will generate experience that will be invaluable if shared with partner states in Central Asia; they also must face such challenges, since their main threat parameters are not about the defense of territory.

113. Author's interview with the MOD of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

114. *Ibid.*

115. Author interviews with Central Asian military officers.

116. An article that appeared in the Russian *Armeyskiy Sbornik* in October 2002 illustrated adequately the limited nature of Russian counterinsurgency theory, despite the Russian armed forces being so heavily involved in "small wars" during the last decade. Russian military journals have continued to stick doggedly in this period to analysis of general war, rather than what is termed "operations other than war." Both the organization and tactics explored within the article were presented in very vague terms, consequently of questionable value as an aid to training soldiers in counterinsurgency. See Colonel Sergey Batyushkin, *Relying on Surprise*, Camberley, England: CSRC, UK Translation 606, October 2002. Since the Central Asian militaries share a Soviet heritage, they likewise suffer from unsophisticated and underdeveloped doctrinal and training manuals for counterinsurgency operations, within their academies and military education facilities. The one regional exception at present is Uzbekistan; since 9/11, the Uzbek Armed Forces Academy in Tashkent has run counterterrorism and counterinsurgency lectures, though it still needs further support and assistance in strengthening this component of its training and education programs.

117. Author interviews with Western and Central Asian military officers. U.S. SOF use communications systems such as the Special Mission Radio System (SMRS) and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS); such systems would radically improve communications within the Central Asian SOF.

118. There are reported cases of Kazakh soldiers being killed in mobile vehicles that have been supplied to Kazakhstan simply because they did not properly prepare their soldiers in their use. Equally, Naval Cutters that have been supplied to the embryonic Kazakh Navy have been subjected to a lack of maintenance skills. During the 1990s, when the U.K. supplied Challenger tanks to Jordan, the first step was precisely this task of dispatching engineers to teach the necessary basic maintenance skills.

119. Author interviews with U.S. SOF. The system operates on the basis of collecting information in response to seismic-acoustic energy, magnetic field changes and changes to the infrared field production. It can, therefore, detect movement of enemy personnel and vehicles, processing the information and transmitting the information in short bursts to a system monitor set. It can be used to produce a time-phased record of enemy activity. The I-REMBASS is designed

for SOF use, but is smaller and lighter. See www.usaic.hua.army.mil/SCHOOL/111MI/309th/96R/rembass.htm.

120. Author interviews with Western military officers.

121. Murat T. Laumulin, "The Armed Forces, Military Reform and Civilian Control Over the Security Structure in Kazakhstan," *Institute for Strategic Studies Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, 2003, www.kisi.kz/English/Our_publications/Laumulin_1_en.html; O'Malley and McDermott, "Kyrgyzstan's Security Tightrope"; Rustam Burnashev and Irina Chernykh, "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 6, No. 18, 2002, pp. 93-105; Anton Alexeyev, "The Armed Forces of Turkmenistan," Paper Presented at the Department of Oriental Studies of St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, 2002; Sergey Masurenko, "Civil-Military Relations in Uzbekistan and the Reform of the Armed Forces," PFP Consortium, Security Sector Reform Working Group Meeting, NATO Defense College, Rome, April 7-8, 2003; Author interviews with Central Asian military officers.

122. *Bucharest Ziua*, (Internet Version), Bucharest, June 11, 2003.

123. *Ibid.*

124. *Ibid.*

125. *Prime-News*, News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1130 GMT, November 27, 2002.

126. The program breaks down as follows: Phase I: logistics and engineering; Phases IIA and IIB: military joint doctrine, C2, staff/organizational training for the Georgian MOD and Land Forces Command; Phase IIIA: Unit level tactical training of the Georgian Commando Battalion; Phase IIIB: Unit level tactical training and specialized military mountaineering training for the 16th Mountain Battalion; Phase IIIC: training the 560 man 113th Light Infantry Battalion/11th MRD to conduct patrol base operations, ambush procedures, urban terrain operations, long-range patrols, platoon level raids, and daylight company-level attacks and night defensive operations.

127. "Georgia Train and Equip Program Begins," U.S. Department of Defense, April 29, 2002, www.defenselink.mil/news.

128. *Ibid.*

129. *Kaokasia-Press News Agency*, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1303 GMT, May 22, 2003.

130. *Rustavi-2 TV*, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1000 GMT, May 23. 2003.

131. Eric A. Miller, "Morale of U.S. Trained Troops in Georgia is High, But U.S. Advisors Concerned About Sustainability," *Eurasia Insight*, Eurasianet, May 5, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050503_pr.shtml.

132. *Prime-News*, News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1130 GMT, November 27. 2002.

133. Russia has proven uncomfortable with the entry of U.S military forces into Central Asia, which traditionally it has regarded as being in its own sphere of influence. In February 2003, Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister, called on the UN Security Council to establish "time-frames" for limiting the duration of the U.S. military presence in the region. Moreover, the Russian military press often portrays the basing of U.S. and Western forces in Central Asia in sinister terms, believing it goes beyond supporting the GWOT. See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Moscow, July 15, 2003.

134. *NATO Basic Texts*, April 11, 2000, www.nato.int/docu/basic/basictxt/b541023u.htm.

135. *RIA, Oreanda*, Kiev, July 21, 2003.

136. The provisional first year program focuses on inculcating the prerequisite leadership skills among the officer corps within the region's militaries.

137. An enhanced and further refined second-year program would follow, consolidating the first-year achievements and concentrating on antiterrorist small unit training. At that stage, drawing on the U.S. military engagement experience gained in Georgia through the GTEP, follow-up work would begin with the region's MODs, constructing appropriate blueprints for how the host nations will continue training their antiterrorist forces after the completion of the program.