



[Terrorism Resources](#)

INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING

UNCLASSIFIED
PART A and B

Without Attachments

LTGEN JAMES F. RECORD



INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING

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PART A

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31 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

IN TURN

FROM: 12AF/CC

2915 S Twelfth AF Dr., Ste 218

Davis-Monthan AFB AZ 85707-4100

SUBJECT: Air Force Review of Gen (Ret.) Downing Report - Khobar Towers Bombing

On 4 September 1996, you directed me to head a team to consider and to make recommendations on issues raised in General (Ret.) Wayne A. Downing's report regarding how the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips to support forces deployed to U.S. Central Command. After an exhaustive review of all directives, documents, testimonies, additional interviews, and a site visit to Saudi Arabia, I am forwarding the attached report for your consideration and implementation as appropriate. You will find that the recommendations are relevant, not just to the CENTCOM AOR, but have application to deployments worldwide.

Additionally, you designated me as the disciplinary review and court-martial convening authority for actions or omissions by Air Force personnel associated with the bombing of Khobar Towers. As you would expect, this part of the tasking requires extensive review of action(s) or lack thereof, taken by each Air Force member in the chain of command, as well as those other personnel that contributed directly to the Khobar Towers environment. This part of my tasking will be forwarded under separate cover on or before 4 December 1996.

JAMES F. RECORD, Lt Gen, USAF
Commander

[Attach](#)
[Proposed Air Force Responses to Downing Report](#)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background:

The Khobar Towers terrorist bombing on 25 June 1996, a cold-blooded act of murder, was a tragic and costly event of unprecedented magnitude, involving a high degree of sophistication. It was an act of war where terrorists detonated a bomb with an estimated likely yield of more than 20,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent explosives outside the fence of the American occupied sector of Khobar Towers. The explosion killed 19 service members and injured hundreds more. It also injured many Saudi Arabian citizens and third country nationals (TCNs) and severely damaged or destroyed a significant amount of property. This was the second bombing in Saudi Arabia in less than a year, a country where tens of thousands of Americans had lived safely for decades prior to these attacks.

The first significant terrorist attack occurred in November, 1995. Five Americans were killed when terrorists exploded a much smaller car bomb (estimated to be about 200 pounds of TNT-equivalent explosives) in front of the Office of the Program Manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG). Understandably, Saudi Arabian officials viewed this as an unprecedented and isolated event. They believed they had solved this problem by capturing and executing the terrorists. However, U.S. commanders at every level took a different view and immediately initiated increased security measures, including vulnerability assessments. For example, at Khobar Towers alone, over 130 such enhancements were implemented between November 1995 and 24 June 1996.

Charter:

In a memorandum dated 4 September 1996 (Tab A), the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed Lieutenant General James F. Record, Commander, Twelfth Air Force, to consider and to make recommendations on issues raised by General (USA, Ret.) Wayne A. Downing in his 30 August 1996 report on the bombing at Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Specifically, Lieutenant General Record was tasked to make recommendations regarding how the Air Force organizes, trains and equips to support forces deployed to U.S. Central Command with focus on Force Protection (Part A). Additionally, Lieutenant General Record was designated the disciplinary review authority regarding any actions or omissions by Air Force personnel associated with the bombing (Part B).

Methodology:

Lieutenant General Record and members of his assessment team (Tab B) carefully reviewed the transcripts of over two hundred interviews conducted by the Downing Task Force, conducted numerous additional interviews (Tab C); reviewed extensive documentary evidence, including numerous historical staff documents and briefings relating to Force Protection (Tab D), and visited several locations in Saudi Arabia, including Khobar Towers. The findings and recommendations on how the Air Force should organize, train and equip to better protect forces deployed in contingency operations are addressed in Part A of this report. Part A specifically addresses each finding of the Downing Task Force (except findings number 19 and 20) and makes recommendations about those and other matters affecting Force Protection. Matters relating to accountability, including findings 19 and 20 of the Downing Task Force, are addressed under separate cover in Part B.

Major Observations:

A Department of State (DoS) Accountability Review Board investigation of the OPM-SANG attack concluded improvements in U.S. security measures were needed. Further, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted an independent Antiterrorism Senior Assessment following the OPM-SANG bombing that also identified security deficiencies. All involved U.S. organizations in Saudi Arabia could have benefited from both a more timely and a wider distribution of the findings and recommendations of these reports. This is not to say that this information and knowledge would have negated/deterred a terrorist attack, but those recommendations may have mitigated some of the tragic results.

In the aftermath of the Khobar Towers bombing, it is extremely prudent to review exactly how, and to what degree, the Air Force needs to improve the way it prepares forces for joint and combined operations in a rapidly and ever-changing world. In this regard, there are many areas in which the Air Force has excelled. For example, in this case, self aid/buddy care, the actions and reactions of security police, and the deployment and employment of air forces to multiple operations in

varied task scenarios, were particularly noteworthy. However, as a result of the coalition successes in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, coupled with American dominance in the skies, terrorists have focused on vulnerabilities on the ground. As a result, the Air Force can no longer consider overseas locations as risk-free sanctuaries from which to operate. In an effort to overcome these vulnerabilities, the Air Force must institutionalize a completely different Force Protection mind-set. The Air Force must inculcate this new mind-set into every service member through all levels of education and training, from accession to separation. Further, an enduring organizational structure must be established that will ensure Force Protection remains on course through frequent reviews which address threat dynamics.

U.S. national security objectives drive worldwide military deployments. These operations cover a broad spectrum of scenarios ranging from humanitarian operations to peacekeeping to warfighting contingencies. In each of these diverse operations, there is a need to strike an appropriate balance between Force Protection and other competing mission requirements. This balance must be consummated in a manner designed to achieve both the political and military objectives of the United States while operating within the cultural norms and subject to the sovereignty of the host nations. Even under the best of circumstances, this is not an easy balancing act. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Commanders in Chief (CINCs), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DoD, DoS, and the National Command Authority (NCA) negotiating together with the host nation, to establish written agreements regarding the nature of the mission, the threat environment, the required resources, and the status of deployed forces. This is essential in order to identify the appropriate force structure, required specialized pre-deployment Force Protection training, and the necessary beddown/facility requirements.

The Downing Assessment Task Force identified some Force Protection areas upon which the Air Force should focus. These areas are addressed in Tab E. Even given unconstrained dollars and resources, absolute Force Protection can never be achieved. Based upon the very nature of military missions and the unpredictability of terrorism, deployed U.S. forces will always be at some degree of risk. As terrorism continues to evolve in scope and in sophistication, the Air Force must make course corrections in organizational structure, must continually improve education and training, and must make use of advanced technology to reduce this risk to its personnel and resources .

Major Recommendations:

As a result of this extensive review, the following are major action recommendations:

Designate a general officer-led Air Staff organization to oversee Force Protection

Expand/develop Force Protection doctrine and policy

Develop a Force Protection field organization to integrate Force Protection programs

Integrate technology/tactics/training to increase capabilities

Provide trained/ready deployment base for Force Protection resources

Expand Air Force Planning and Programming Guidance to integrate Force Protection

Exhibit aggregated Force Protection resources in budget submission

Develop Air Force Instructions (AFI) supplementing DoD guidance on Force Protection

Expand the JCS Vulnerability Assessment Rating System to highlight Force Protection oversight and resource allocation

Expand AFI guidance to Air Component Commanders:

Include requirements for a Force Protection structure on their staffs

Consider extending tour-lengths for key personnel, including Force Protection personnel

Direct theater-specific, predeployment training

Expand rules of engagement (ROE) for Force Protection during deployment to countries without a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

Inculcate Force Protection awareness through education and training at all levels

Accession through separation, with annual refreshers

Develop blocks of instruction for officer and enlisted Professional Military Education (PME)

Incorporate Force Protection into enlisted Promotion Fitness Examinations (PFE)

Provide cultural and language orientation for key officials

Support the streamlined intelligence/counterintelligence structure for Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA)

Review capability to disseminate counterintelligence (CI) and antiterrorist (AT) information to Force Protection officials

Provide operational control (OPCON) of CI personnel to deployed wing commanders in areas of increased threat and attach to Security Police (SP) squadrons for Force Protection purposes

Assign, when appropriate, Air Force Intelligence personnel to the SPs along with CI personnel to complete a tactical SP ground intelligence cell within the Security

Police

Clarify guidance on sanitizing/releasing Force Protection information and encourage its broadest use

Review interpreter/translator requirements and capabilities

Enhance Air Force's medical readiness

Include cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training in self aid/buddy care training for all members

Include biological warfare/chemical warfare (BW/CW) casualties in mass casualty training/exercises

Expand advanced trauma life support training to all physicians on mobility

Review automated patient administration capability for mass casualties

Develop requirements for surveillance systems for installation security and Force Protection

Procure commercially available pagers, in the near term, for alerting/warning systems in deployed locations

Explore advanced technologies for this capability

A more detailed description of specific actions to implement the above recommendations and other recommendations are included in the full report. Some of these actions have already been initiated. Included at Tab E is a synopsis of the Downing Task Force findings and recommendations, along with the DoD responses/actions already underway. As all of the aforementioned investigations, assessments and reviews have concluded, Force Protection requires the collective, proactive support of all involved in our national defense mission.

PART A

FOREWORD: Findings and recommendations of the Task Force led by General Wayne Downing are presented in italics, in order, and followed by proposed United States Air Force (USAF) Responses from the USAF Downing Report Review Team, led by Lieutenant General James F. Record.

DoD PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FORCE PROTECTION

FINDING 1: *There are no published DoD physical security standards for force protection of fixed facilities.*

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 1:

Publish prescriptive DoD physical security standards.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. USAF will comply with the Military Department responsibilities as defined in DoD Directive 2000.12, embrace and put into action JCS Publications 3-07.2 and 3-10 for Force Protection by developing Service doctrine and directives. HQ USAF/XO/SP must develop doctrine to guide Force Protection actions/responsibilities inside and outside the perimeters of air bases and other USAF facilities. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and HQ USAF/SP should publish prescriptive threat assessment and physical security instructions for commanders.

Designate a single agency within DoD to develop, issue, and inspect compliance with force protection physical security standards.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The Chief of Staff USAF (CSAF) should designate an Air Staff organization, led by a general officer, to oversee Force Protection doctrinal, policy, and resource advocacy issues and to monitor compliance with DoD Force Protection standards. Due to the cross-cutting nature of Force Protection, this organization should be composed of personnel from operations, security police, civil engineers, medical, AFOSI, intelligence, logistics, and other technical agencies, as needed. Also, see Proposed USAF Response to Finding 17.

Provide this DoD agency with sufficient resources to assist field commanders on a worldwide basis with force protection matters. Consider designating an existing organization, such as a national laboratory, Defense Special Weapons Agency, or the Corps of Engineers, to provide this expertise.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The Air Force has requested additional resources for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 and programmed funds for Force Protection requirements for FY 1998 and beyond. HQ USAF/SP should continue efforts to identify Force Protection requirements and seek USAF Corporate Structure support for funding as priorities dictate. CSAF should establish an organization (squadron, agency, center) responsible for Force Protection activities. It should have functional area representatives assigned or attached from operations, security police, AFOSI, medical, civil engineer, communications, services, intelligence, transportation and supply. As an illustrative example, HQ USAF/SP could, through its Field Operating Agency (FOA), USAF Security Police Agency, expand its Force Protection doctrine and training by developing, in conjunction with Air Education and Training Command (AETC), a Center of Excellence, e.g. at Camp Bullis, TX. It is envisioned that this Center would train provisional SP deployment squadrons, manage and integrate Force Protection training, tactics, technology development, and vulnerability assessment programs.

Further, this Center should work with Major Command (MAJCOM) Inspectors General (IG), interface with the JCS and Unified Commands' Force Protection Divisions, and Numbered Air Forces (NAFs)/Combatant Commands on staff assistance visits and vulnerability assessments at USAF locations. Regardless of the ultimate structure, MAJCOMs/Agencies should establish the criteria for, and then conduct, evaluations/inspections of units, as appropriate. Also, see Proposed USAF Response to Finding 17.

Provide funds and authority to this agency to manage Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts to enhance force protection and physical security measures.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. HQ USAF/SP and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) support as appropriate.

DoD FUNDING AND RESOURCES FOR FORCE PROTECTION

FINDING 2: Force protection requirements had not been given high priority for funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 2:

Establish priorities for force protection requirements in the Defense Planning Guidance and, as recommended by the Antiterrorism Task Force report, include force protection as a defense-wide special interest item.

Coordinate DoD priorities for force protection of noncombatant forces with the Department of State (See Finding 16).

Address force protection in the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process.

Implement the recommendations of the Antiterrorism Task Force on establishment of a separate Office of the Secretary of Defense-managed program element to fund high priority antiterrorism requirements.

Encourage combatant commanders to articulate and prioritize force protection requirements in their Integrated Priorities List.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. Given the existing higher headquarters guidance, and the understanding of the nature of the threat, field commanders gave appropriate priority to force protection requirements. In fact, the 4404th WG (P) had already implemented significant Force Protection initiatives and had submitted a first-ever five-year plan/program. Force Protection was an integral part of their programming; and was given priority based on the known threat. However, as a result of both the OPM-SANG and Khobar Towers terrorist events, all-encompassing Force Protection measures must be given a higher priority throughout the entire defense planning cycle. Force Protection in the ground environment is now an additional essential element of the equation that leads to mission accomplishment. Force Protection is an absolute requirement that must be addressed in all phases of the Defense Planning cycle and included in USAF basic doctrine. For example, Force Protection at the source of sortie generation is as essential to successful mission accomplishment as is Force Protection over the battle area. If the sortie never leaves the ground, then the force projection mission cannot be accomplished.

Air Force Planning and Programming guidance must specify the requirements for Force Protection during all phases of the planning cycle. Specifically: HQ USAF/XO/PE should ensure USAF Planning and Programming Guidance clarifies the dependence of ultimate mission accomplishment on Force Protection, both in the air and on the ground. It should further emphasize the need for all responsible MAJCOMs/Air Component Commanders to plan, program, and implement enhancements to Force Protection (pre-sortie generation, sortie generation, sortie execution, and sortie regeneration) as an essential element of force projection. Identified and validated Force Protection requirements should be programmed and budgeted as integral parts of force projection programs. Additionally, CSAF should direct Air Component Commanders to submit Force Protection requirements to their respective Unified Commanders for inclusion in CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). CSAF should further encourage them to seek access to CINC/JCS Initiative Funds to enhance Force Protection efforts, when appropriate.

DoD REVIEW OF JOINT TASK FORCES

FINDING 3: Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units in the region were not structured and supported to sustain a long-term commitment that involved expanded missions, to include increased force protection from an emerging and viable terrorist threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 3:

Review the composition of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units to insure that they are structured and have resources appropriate for the mission and the conditions.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. The JTF-SWA and 4404th WG (P) were initially structured based on the national requirement for a short-term response to Iraqi aggression and for the policing of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 687 and 688. When additional USAF forces were required, the 4404th WG (P) facilitated the follow-on force beddown. Since August 1992, CENTCOM has reacted to increases in the Iraqi threat by deploying additional forces. VIGILANT WARRIOR, UNITED SHIELD, VIGILANT SENTINEL, and DESERT STRIKE are a few examples. In every case, the established command structure functioned very well, and there were lessons learned in each case. From these and other lessons learned, JTF-SWA, the 4404th WG (P) and its support elements adjusted their structure, primarily by extending tours for selected key billets. This evolution and deliberate adjustment will continue for the foreseeable future. This notwithstanding, MAJCOMs/NAFs, along with HQ USAF/XO, must develop/review/update AFIs that supplement JCS/DoD guidelines for determining the composition of Combatant Command staffs. Updated AFIs should include guidance on the Air Component Commander's contingency organization and structure, functional responsibilities, and billet structure. Whenever possible, the ideal staff template created by these guidelines should be applied to planned combatant staffs during their inception. These AFIs should also provide specific guidance to Air Component Commanders on deployment rotation policy recommendations they should make to their respective CINCs (recognizing that CINCs set rotation policy). Additionally, Air Component Commanders should review their command's compliance with the template on at least an annual basis, or whenever a significant change in the mission and/or operational environment occurs. Reviews should be submitted to HQ USAF/XO from/through the appropriate NAF and/or MAJCOM as required. If problems/shortfalls are identified the review should be presented to the USAF Corporate Structure. Joint issues identified during these reviews should be submitted simultaneously by the Air Component Commander to the appropriate CINC.

Review current manning and rotation policies, to include tour lengths for key leaders and Staff, with the aim of promoting continuity in the chain of command and unit cohesion.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Incorporated in response to the preceding recommendation.

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

FINDING 4: Current U.S. Central Command command relationships do not contribute to enhanced security for forces operating in the region.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 4: Assign operational control of all combatant forces operating in Saudi Arabia and Gulf region to one headquarters.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. Command relationships had no impact on this terrorist act. While assigning operational control of all combatant forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Region to one headquarters may be advantageous and provide standardization throughout the theater, there is no evidence the existing command relationships degraded security. Commanders at all levels recognized Force Protection as an inherent responsibility of command and acted accordingly. Those in the chain of command from the

CINC to the security policemen on the Khobar Towers rooftop had consistently improved their Force Protection posture based on the known threat. The documentary evidence in the Downing Report, additional interviews, including interviews of top-level officials at the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, confirm that those in the chain of command were appropriately focused on Force Protection issues given the known threat. Further, the over 130 Force Protection measures taken at Khobar Towers alone, in the seven months preceding the terrorists bombing, may well have saved hundreds of lives.

This notwithstanding, HQ USAF/XO must develop USAF guidance, and/or supplement existing DoD/JCS guidance on Force Protection for the theater, region, base, unit and individual levels. Moreover, because not all commanders understand all the meanings and nuances of OPCON, tactical control (TACON), etc., Air Component Commanders must ensure command relationships are clearly established and explained in Operations Plans and Operation Orders, to include Force Protection issues. Additionally, they should insure these are reviewed on an annual basis, or whenever there is a significant change in mission and/or operational environment. Also, see Proposed USAF Responses for Findings 3 and 17.

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SECURITY POLICIES

FORCE PROTECTION PRACTICES

FINDING 5: Force protection practices were inconsistent in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf region.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 5:

Develop common guidance, procedures, and standards to protect the force.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. All concerned **should** have had the benefit of the DoS Accountability Review Board Findings and the DoD Antiterrorism Senior Assessment on the OPM-SANG 13 November 1995 bombing. These products identified many findings and recommendations that would have helped refine DoS/DoD procedures in the Force Protection area. As a result of lessons learned from both tragedies, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has appointed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the focal point for Force Protection, and has directed that DoD 2000.12H, a handbook on combating terrorism, be directive. The HQ USAF/XO, along with other Services, must now write implementation directives to support the DoD standard. It should also be noted that Central Command (CENTCOM) has established a Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC), who is now the focal point for Force Protection throughout the CENTCOM theater. This response also applies to the third recommendation for this finding.

Assigning operational control of all combatant forces to one headquarters (Finding 4) will facilitate a common approach.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support in principle. However, OPCON requires a significant support staff. If specific OPCON responsibilities are given to the deployed commander, administrative/training burdens could be reduced, and the forward-deployed staff could be tailored.

Closely coordinate all antiterrorism countermeasures with host country agencies.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support, with comment. Testimony from key AFOSI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DoS officials, USAF security police and commanders clearly demonstrated that major efforts were made to coordinate counterterrorism measures with the Saudis over the seven month period prior to the bombing at Khobar Towers (post-OPM-SANG). The USAF attempted to offset vulnerabilities within installation boundaries, and achieved additive host nation patrols outside the base perimeter. This was evident by the significant Force Protection measures directed by the 440th WG (P) Commander to deter terrorist attacks. **Local Saudi Arabian officials had made it clear to U.S. personnel that security at any installation is primarily a Saudi responsibility; and that U.S. personnel are "guests" who are not allowed to extend force protection measures beyond the fence line. As highlighted by U.S. Embassy personnel during our 16-17 October 1996 visit and discussions, this subject remains a concern today.**

Although an emergency deployment situation may not afford perfect Force Protection conditions, SECAF/CSAF should engage the DoD and the DoS to actively seek a SOFA as a precursor to deployment, whenever possible. If a deployment is to a theater/country without a SOFA, the JCS/CINC must provide specific guidance/exceptions, to the Standing ROE (CJCS Pub 3121.00) concerning operations, to include Force Protection, to the deployed commanders. This specific guidance must be coordinated with DoS and the appropriate U.S. Embassy/Consulate, and provided to the individual soldier/sailor/airman/marine.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION POLICIES

FINDING 6: There is no theater-specific training guidance for individuals or units deploying to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 6:

Establish training qualification and certification procedures for all units, individuals, and civilians prior to deployment to and after arrival in the Area of Responsibility. This should include force protection measures and be applicable to service members on both permanent change of station and temporary duty assignment.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. SECDEF has now directed Combatant Commanders to identify specific pre-deployment training requirements that all units and individuals must receive prior to arrival in theater. HQ USAF/XO should develop AFI guidance that directs Air Component Commanders to provide and implement guidance regarding theater-specific training for **all** individuals deploying to contingencies. This guidance should also direct the Air Component Commanders to provide theater-specific training requirements to the CINC for inclusion in CJCS Deployment orders. Likewise, this guidance must include the requirement for theater-specific, pre-deployment training to be included in the line-item remarks for Contingency-Exercise-Mobility (CEM) orders. Guidance will direct wings to ensure theater-specific training includes current terrorism threat information. Theater-specific, pre-deployment training should be reinforced by "Right Start" or similar briefings/training as soon as feasible upon arrival in theater. If the schedule requires that this training be delayed, members must be given the essential briefing/training elements required for their protection upon arrival, and be made aware of any/all restrictions to their activities until they have been fully briefed/trained.

Conduct mandatory force protection and risk management training for all officers and senior non-commissioned officers deploying to high threat areas. Integrate this training into officer and non-commissioned officer professional military education to assure long-term development of knowledge and skills to combat terrorism at all levels.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. Force protection/antiterrorism must be imbedded in all levels of USAF education: precommissioning, commander training, officer and enlisted PME, and enlisted promotion fitness testing and study material. HQ USAF/XO guidance to Air Component Commanders should direct deploying JTF, wing and group commanders to attend the AFOSI Senior Officer Security Seminar. Also, see Proposed USAF Response to Finding 17.

Support development of antiterrorism training and education supporting materials, using innovative media methodologies, as recommended by the Antiterrorism Task Force and

directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support.

Conduct refresher training for installation/unit antiterrorism officers immediately prior to assignment in the theater, as outlined in DoD Instruction 2000.14.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. CINC-directed theater-specific training must include Force Protection in the ground environment, to include a refresher in antiterrorism measures for individuals. Whenever possible, theater-specific unit training should be initiated or updated as soon as practical after an Alert order is issued and prior to beginning the deployment for planned rotations. Ancillary training programs must include Force Protection and antiterrorism instruction. Also, see response above and Proposed USAF Response to Finding 17.

FINDING 7: *Intelligence provided warning of the terrorist threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. **No Recommendation.***

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support, with comment. In its broadest context, intelligence provided non-specific terrorist warnings to U.S. combatant and non-combatant personnel. However, by the very nature of the environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), threat specificity to the tactical level was not available. Notwithstanding this lack of specificity, commanders at all levels were proactive and had initiated directives, specific guidance, and physical security measures that substantially improved Force Protection for assigned personnel.

FINDING 8: *(Classified Omitted)*

FINDING 9: *The ability of the theater and national intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long term analysis of trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists is deficient.*

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 9: *Allocate sufficient analytic resources to conduct in-depth, detailed analysis of trends, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The newly created DIA Counterterrorism Center is the DoD focal point for fusion and dissemination of all-source intelligence and counterintelligence information pertaining to terrorist threats against DoD interests. SECAF should direct AFOSI to review their current capabilities to collect, analyze, and disseminate terrorist related all-source intelligence and counterintelligence information. This will ensure that those responsible/accountable for Force Protection are provided the best possible description of the terrorist threat with recommended counter measures.

FINDING 10: *The Department of State and elements within DoD ascribe different Threat Level assessments for countries of the same region, causing confusion among recipients of this information.*

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 10: *Institute one interagency methodology for assessing and declaring terrorist Threat Levels, allowing commanders to determine Threat Conditions in a local area.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. DoD has been designated the focal point for assessing and declaring terrorist Threat Levels. This should eliminate the identified dichotomy regarding Threat Level declaration within a country. Furthermore, USAF supports allowing appropriate commanders to determine and apply various local Threat Conditions to different locations in their area of responsibility.

FINDING 11: *The lack of an organic intelligence support capability in the U.S. Air Force Security Police units adversely affects their ability to accomplish the base defense mission.*

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 11: *Provide U.S. Air Force Security Police units assigned an air base defense mission an organic intelligence capability.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. The lack of organic intelligence capability did not inhibit the 4404th WG (P) internal base defense mission. After extensive review of documentation and additional interviews, this Review Team found that AFOSI, Intelligence, and SP operations were in very close and constant contact on Force Protection issues. Unlike the U.S. Army structure, in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy the responsibility for intelligence and counterintelligence is lodged in separate organizations because the two missions, while related, are distinctly different. USAF intelligence units target enemy order of battle, indications and warning of military attack, weapon system types and capabilities, war plans, etc. By DoD definition, counterintelligence personnel target hostile intelligence services which are employing espionage, sabotage, terrorism and subversion against U.S. forces. In the USAF, AFOSI is organized, trained, and equipped to do the counterintelligence mission.

Because the U.S. Army may not provide protection outside Air Force installations overseas, Army ground order of battle experts may not be available. Therefore, recommend AF/IN and AFOSI assign intelligence personnel to SP units to support Force Protection activities in contingency operations. The AFOSI counterintelligence special agents should be OPCON to the installation commander (i.e., OPCON to WG/CC, attached to SP Squadron), to act as liaison among AFOSI, SP, U.S. and foreign security/police agencies charged with antiterrorism missions. At all times, a close working relationship, such as existed in the 4404th WG (P), should be maintained among AFOSI, intelligence, and the security police.

FINDING 12: *(Omitted Classified)*

FINDING 13: *(Omitted Classified)*

COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE TO SUPPORT INTELLIGENCE

FINDING 14: *While the communications architecture in the US Central Command Area of Responsibility supported the flow of intelligence throughout the upper echelons of the chain of command, field units had limited access due to classification restrictions.*

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 14: *Make collateral versions of systems such as Intelink, Defense Intelligence Threat Data System, and the Community Automated Counterterrorism Information System, available to the lowest appropriate level.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. The Combat Intelligence System (CIS) is the USAF standard automated intelligence work station. It operates at the SECRET level and provides access to

INTELINK-S (a SECRET-level version of the more highly classified worldwide intelligence dissemination network, known as INTELINK). It is deployed at the 4404th WG (P) and

its subordinate flying and operational support squadrons. A TOP SECRET Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence (SCI) version of CIS is under development. This will allow access to INTELINK. HQ USAF/IN should make arrangements for SECRET-level information from the Defense Intelligence Threat Data System to be received and displayed on CIS. The Community Automated Counterterrorism Information System (CACTIS) is an SCI/TK/G system. It is composed of a dedicated network of work stations from which users can access the CACTIS repository of DoS, DIA, CIA, and National Security Agency data. The AFOSI Investigative Operations Center has CACTIS workstations. While CACTIS is not currently available on INTELINK, CIA has indicated it should be available within a year, once required security features are installed on and approved for INTELINK. Furthermore, AFOSI should program for CIS terminals to be placed with their agents in deployed locations.

Distribute compartmented intelligence, as a minimum, in sanitized form to all key force protection officials, as well as coalition partners.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. Key USAF officials responsible for the security and protection of people, equipment, and facilities, in deployed locations, require access to the best available intelligence regardless of classification or compartmented controls. Consequently, HQ USAF/XO guidance should include the requirement for deployed USAF wing commanders to request TOP SECRET/SI/TK/G access for key staff members, e.g., wing commander, support group commander, wing intelligence officer, security police squadron commander, AFOSI detachment commander and medical group commander. The personnel security process should fully support the commander's requirements, not hinder them. In addition, HQ USAF/IN should aggressively seek the promulgation of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Directive 1/7, Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information and DCI Directive 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy at the earliest possible date. Maximum use of "tear-line" reporting **must** be encouraged. HQ USAF/IN must then disseminate to all MAJCOMS, NAFs and wings, clear guidance and simple procedures for the proper sanitization and release of intelligence at the lowest possible levels to appropriately cleared U.S. and host nation Force Protection personnel.

FINDING 15: *The division of responsibility between U.S. and host nation police and military forces for security at facilities throughout Saudi Arabia and Arabian Gulf is clear.*

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 15:

a. Promulgate memorandums of understanding (MOU) between host nation and U.S. forces, delineating responsibilities for protecting U.S. operated facilities, to include procedures for upgrading security when threat levels change.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support the need for a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), versus an MOU. An MOU does not have the status of an "agreement" in international affairs parlance. A strong, cohesive effort is needed by both DoD and DoS to influence nations to accept U.S. Force Protection requirements. As pointed out in Finding 5, a single point of contact must be established within each agency to oversee Force Protection agreements. As noted earlier, SECDEF has appointed the CJCS to perform this function.

b. Increase the number of interpreters available to security forces.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. CENTCOM is reviewing its requirements for interpreters. (Note: There is a difference between translators and simultaneous interpreters. Interpreters have to be much more adept at language skills, versus translators who have more time to react.) HQ USAF/XO should determine worldwide requirements for interpreters. HQ USAF/DP should then determine the availability/qualification of potential interpreters within the existing force. This comparison of need versus availability should illuminate the need to contract for interpreters and/or adjust accessions.

FINDING 16: *(a) U.S. Embassy security resources are insufficient to adequately protect large numbers of noncombatant forces in selected countries.*

(b) The U.S. Defense Representative has insufficient resources to adequately protect large numbers of noncombatant military forces in selected countries.

(c) The U.S. Defense Representative does not have directive authority over selected "stovepipe" organizations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 16:

Assign all DoD personnel to the unified combatant commander, except those whose principal mission supports the Chief of Mission.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The recent MOU between DoD and DoS addresses this issue. This MOU addresses the respective combatant/non-combatant security responsibilities between the two departments in the countries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. HQ USAF/XO should develop guidance to comply with this MOU.

Provide the U.S. Defense Representative directive authority for force protection matters over ALL DoD personnel not assigned to the unified combatant commander.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The MOU between DoS and DoD corrects this deficiency.

Provide the U.S. Defense Representative with appropriate Staff to assist the Chief of Mission in the execution of force protection responsibilities, to include conducting vulnerability assessments, identifying funds for force protection, and developing force protection standards.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support DoD initiatives. HQ USAF/XO should work in conjunction with SAF/IA to delineate responsibilities and forward to appropriate DoD staff.

FINDING #17: *U.S. Forces and facilities in Saudi Arabia and the region are vulnerable to terrorist attack.*

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 17:

General Security

a. Conduct vulnerability assessments for every site within the Area of Responsibility and repeat them on an appropriate schedule. Each site must be examined individually and in-depth.

b. Locate facilities in secluded areas, wherever possible.

c. Assign all security force members a weapon. Rifles and machine guns must be zeroed and fired for sustainment training. Identify special weapons requirements early and train to

meet requirements. Stress weapons maintenance.

- d. Examine and prioritize terrorist threats for both potential of occurrence and degree of vulnerability at each site. Prepare defenses accordingly.
- e. Coordinate with host nation police and military forces to develop and maintain a combined ability to counter the surface-to-air missile threat from terrorist elements.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

- f. Employ integrated technology, including intrusion detection systems, ground sensors, closed circuit television, day and night surveillance cameras, thermal imaging, perimeter lighting, and advanced communication equipment, to improve the security of all sites.
- g. Employ technology-based explosive detection and countermeasure devices.
- h. Physically harden structures based on the threat.
- i. Develop guidance on required stand-off distances and the construction of blast walls and the hardening of buildings.
- j. Relocate and consolidate units at vulnerable facilities to more secure, U.S.-controlled compounds or bases.
- k. Reinforce the entry control points to U.S. facilities and provide defense in depth.
- l. Cable single rows of Jersey barriers together.
- m. Use enhanced barriers, similar to those designed by United Kingdom and Israel, to shield and protect vulnerable compounds and structures.
- n. Establish threat based stand-off or exclusion areas around compounds and bases.
- o. Procure personal protective equipment suitable for extreme hot weather operations.
- p. (Omitted Classified)

TRANSPORTATION

- q. Harden or procure armored buses to transport service members between housing areas and work sites.
- r. Provide armed guards, at a minimum in pairs, on buses and provide armored escort vehicles.
- s. Ensure host country military and police are actively involved in securing routes of travel.
- t. Provide and maintain communications for all modes of transportation and centrally control and monitor transportation movements.

TRAINING

- u. Provide personal protection anti-terrorism training to all deployed service members and their families.
- v. Conduct training exercises to rehearse responses to a terrorist attack, including building evacuation and re-assembly procedures.
- w. Develop and use an extensive list of potential terrorist scenarios to assist force protection measures at each site in the area of responsibility.

FOLLOW-ON ASSESSMENTS

x. The Task Force could not physically survey all locations in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility within the time frame of this Report. Locations in the theater which the Task Force did not survey should be assessed as soon as possible. These include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Oman, Sudan, and Yemen. The Task Force had only limited opportunity to assess force protection in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain. Urgent priorities to improve force protection have been identified at U.S. facilities in these countries. A follow-on assessment team should conduct a more in-depth survey of these sites.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: The Air Force supports the Downing Report recommendations, which were extracted from Joint Pub 3-07.2. Due to the evolutionary nature of terrorism, U.S. Air Force personnel and facilities will always be vulnerable to a widening range of terrorist attacks. No amount of Force Protection measures will prevent a determined terrorist from executing an attack if he/she chooses to do so. Appropriate Force Protection measures may, however, deter an attack and, if deterrence fails, mitigate damage and casualties, as occurred at Khobar Towers. However, this review revealed evidence of certain mind-sets and institutional shortcomings that need to be addressed to enhance Force Protection. These are addressed below:

MIND-SETS:

a. "**Saudi Arabia is safe.**" The Saudi government exercises extremely tight control of its population. Crime and terrorism are dealt with by strict and often harsh Islamic law. Resultant crime rates and terrorist incidents are historically very low. The Saudis and many U.S. residents considered the bombing of OPM-SANG as an unprecedented and isolated event; and that beheading the perpetrators would deter future terrorist activity. This feeling persisted despite evidence that agents of other Middle Eastern nations were known to be operating in the KSA and in particular in the eastern province.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: USAF must develop/expand Force Protection training and education at all levels within the service to instill a "nowhere is totally safe" mentality and create an environment where Force Protection is as much a way of life as safety is today.

b. "The Saudis are extremely proud and sensitive to any possible 'loss of face' in dealing with any visible situation, especially when foreigners are involved." This is a cultural reality. As a result, information flow (including intelligence information) and decision making is very stratified within the KSA. This drove a policy/mind-set that "U.S. forces must maintain a low profile, or risk an international incident and/or possible expulsion from the country." U.S. contingency commanders were, therefore, very careful how they requested support of any kind from the Saudis. Requests for Force Protection measures might have been taken to mean that the Saudis did not control their own country--hence, a loss of face. Force Protection measures around the Khobar Towers perimeter created the dilemma of calling attention to the presence of U.S. forces on the one hand, but served to separate and hide them from the general Saudi populace on the other. Therefore, Saudi officials routinely did not respond immediately/completely to most U.S. requests, including Force Protection measures, to avoid appearing to be servants/puppets of the U.S. This left U.S. commanders with the impression that the harder they pushed, the more reluctant the Saudis would be to act. All of these factors served to influence, consciously or subconsciously, what, when, and how commanders requested support from the Saudis for Force Protection measures.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: Experts on the language and culture of the area must be provided to the wing/base commander. The number required will be determined by the size of the base, proximity to and amount of contact required with the local populace. But as a minimum, USAF must provide 24-hour-a-day interpreter support to the security forces. Further, USAF should provide cultural and language orientation to wing/base, support group, security police commanders and AFOSI detachment commanders (those personnel most likely to come into contact with host nation security forces and/or intelligence agencies). This should enhance relations with host nation officials, and facilitate communication and approval of support requests.

INSTITUTIONAL SHORTCOMINGS:

a. "The Air Force is responsible for Force Protection inside the fence." Air base ground defense (ABGD) doctrine, developed during the cold war gives responsibility for external defense of USAF bases to the U.S. Army. The USAF has historically expected to operate from bases reasonably far behind enemy lines in friendly territory, and expected the U.S., allied, or host nation's Army/police force to protect them in the unlikely event they came under attack. The emergence of the terrorist threat has erased the concept of "battle/enemy lines" and "friendly territory" but has not cause any significant change to this doctrinal mind-set. Additionally, as a result of post cold war force reductions, the Army modified its response to this doctrine to say they would not provide continuous external base defense, but would respond if required, and if their forces were not involved with higher priority missions. This change was not well advertised in the USAF at large, and did not result in any significant change to USAF base defense practices. This doctrinal mind-set placed an artificial limit on the range of options a USAF wing commander and staff might consider, if they were not completely satisfied with the external response forces' capabilities outside the fence line.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: HQ USAF/XO must develop/modify/ expand ABGD doctrine, policy and tactics to extend well beyond the fence line to ensure defense in depth. Security police must deploy as Unit Type Codes (UTCs) with their assigned weapons fully "sighted." Weapons qualifications must be current and complete prior to deployment. Consideration must be given to how the USAF will provide for protection of aircraft from surface-to-air threats by terrorists operating in proximity to U.S. bases.

b. *(Omitted Classified)*

PROPOSED SOLUTION: To provide the proper focus and to institutionalize Force Protection at every level within the USAF, the following organizational changes and training initiatives should be instituted:

a. CSAF should designate a general officer-led organization on the Air Staff that would be responsible for:

USAF doctrine and policy guidance on Force Protection.

Resource advocacy for Force Protection programs.

Selection and oversight of Force Protection related research and development (R & D) programs.

Strategic level interface with joint and allied offices on Force Protection issues.

Presentation of Force Protection status/issues to the USAF Corporate Structure.

b. CSAF should establish a field organization (squadron, agency, center) responsible for Force Protection activities. It should have functional area representatives assigned or attached from operations, security police, AFOSI, medical, civil engineer, communications, services, intelligence, transportation and supply. It would be responsible for:

Force Protection training for senior officers, wing, support group, and security police squadron commanders and AFOSI DetCos.

Training-the-trainer for base level and other Force Protection training personnel.

Developing syllabus and course materials for Force Protection courses.

Developing and publishing Force Protection tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Testing and integrating new Force Protection technologies.

Providing tactical-level interface with joint and allied Force Protection agencies.

Providing expert teams for all initial base vulnerability assessments.

c. Force Protection training must be started early and be reinforced regularly so that Force Protection actions and reactions become second nature. The following topics should be taught in addition to those mentioned immediately above in subparagraph b.

Personal awareness and response training, initially taught during Basic Training, Officer Training School, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and at the USAF Academy, and reinforced annually at base level.

Unit level Force Protection theory, taught at Squadron Officer School and the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy.

Wing/base level Force Protection theory, taught at Air Command and Staff College and the Senior NCO Academy.

Theater Force Protection theory, taught at Air War College.

Functional area specific courses (SP, AFOSI, Medical, etc.) as required. (Also, see Proposed USAF Response to Finding 6.)

Base-specific, family member, predeployment, and personal refresher Force Protection training taught at base level.

Transient personnel, i.e. Temporary Duty personnel and aircrews, must receive base-specific information immediately upon arrival in high-threat areas. Transient aircraft commanders flying into overseas, non-military installations must ensure adequate Force Protection is provided (aircraft, aircrew, and cargo); OPR HQ USAF/XO.

d. CSAF should consider establishing a primary deployment source for highly trained Force Protection UTCs, dedicated to providing rapid response to contingencies. Further consideration should be given to collocating these forces with the organization proposed in paragraph b, above.

FINDING 18: While intelligence did not provide the tactical details of the date, time, place, and exact method of attack on Khobar Towers, a considerable body of information was available that indicated terrorists had the capability and intention to target U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, and the Khobar Towers was a potential target.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 18:

(The first two recommendations for Finding 18 are classified. They and the proposed U.S. Air Force responses are omitted.)

Provide commanders of units operating in a high threat air base defense environment direct access to a dedicated intelligence analytic capability.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. Counterintelligence analytic capability is centrally provided by AFOSI, and the national counterintelligence community, and the results are disseminated through the InteLink system. Products are currently available to commanders through unit intelligence and the AFOSI.

Findings 19 and 20 are addressed in PART B, Accountability Assessment, provided under separate cover.

ADEQUACY OF FUNDING AND RESOURCES FOR FORCE PROTECTION

FINDING 21: Funding for force protection requirements was not given a high priority by the 4404th Wing (Provisional).

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 21: Separately identify force protection requirements in budget submissions and assign funding priorities based on specific threats to service member and facilities.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support recommendation, in part. (Elaboration of this Finding is addressed in the PART B, Accountability Assessment.) Force Protection is an integral element of all successful missions. For example, adequate Force Protection is just as essential at the source of sortie generation as it is over the battle area. Hence, Air Force considers Force Protection from pre-sortie generation, to sortie generation, to sortie execution, to sortie regeneration, as essential to mission accomplishment. Therefore, resources for Force Protection should be planned and programmed as essential elements of the force structure they support, instead of being planned and programmed as a separate action. SECAF/CSAF should direct all USAF commanders to assign funding priorities for Force Protection based on specific threats, vulnerability assessments, and DoD/USAF Force Protection guidance. The USAF Corporate Structure should support planning and programming of Force Protection resources as essential elements of the force structure. HQ USAF/PE and SAF/FM should ensure USAF Program and Budget Submissions contain exhibits that aggregate Force Protection resources across mission program element codes.

SAUDI RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF KHOBAR TOWERS

Finding 22: (a) The division of responsibility for the protection of Khobar Towers was clearly understood by both U.S. and Saudi officials.

(b) Saudi security forces were unable to detect, deter, and prevent the truck bomb attack outside the perimeter fence at Khobar Towers.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 22:

Establish and maintain regular working relationships between senior commanders and appropriate host nation officials that promote honest exchanges of opinions on key issues.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. Liaison relationships are, in part, a function of the duration of that relationship. Commanders and key personnel with job-related requirements to interact with host nation personnel on Force Protection matters, should be assigned on one-year tours. HQ USAF/XO/PE/DP should work through the NAF with CENTCOM to examine tour type and length to support extended, multiyear, JTF/contingency operations. Interviews revealed that UTCs instead of individuals are preferred for SP and medical units. HQ USAF/XO/SP/SG should support these requirements as redefined by the Air Component Commander. CSAF should direct AETC to make available culture/language orientation courses for key personnel. HQ USAF/XO guidance should require Air Component Commanders to designate which billets/individuals require this training prior to deployment. Additionally, HQ USAF/XO guidance should require Air Component Commanders to identify interpreter requirements for key Force Protection functions to their Unified Commander.

Raise critical force protection issues to the chain of command, if unable to resolve them at local level.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support the intent of this finding. Those assessed critical Force Protection issues were forwarded from the local level, all the way to the CINC. The additive military working dog teams is but one example. Senior echelons of command should have visibility of Force Protection programs and resource shortfalls. To this end, CSAF should recommend to CJCS that his staff expand the existing Vulnerability Assessment Rating System (Joint Pub 3-07.2) in order to keep commanders informed on the Force Protection status where forces are assigned or deployed, and to facilitate Force Protection resource allocation.

Finding 23: The medical care provided to the victims of the June 25 bombing at Khobar Towers was outstanding; however, mass casualty procedures could be improved.

Recommendations FOR FINDING 23:

a. *Continue emphasis on first aid, bandaging and splinting, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training for all individuals. Initiate similar training for all services, where appropriate.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. As highlighted by the Downing Report, self aid/buddy care and medical support were **OUTSTANDING**. Further, interviews taken by the Downing team indicated some shortfall in this type of training for some deployed personnel. CSAF should direct emphasis on ensuring that **ALL USAF PERSONNEL** are trained in self aid/buddy care as a core competence. HQ USAF/SG should develop a CPR training program that exposes all personnel to the elements of CPR as part of self aid/buddy care training. HQ USAF/SG should establish an Integrated Process Team (IPT) that addresses the total self-aid/buddy care program.

b. *Continue emphasis on realistic mass casualty training and exercise scenarios, and increase Advanced Trauma Life Support training for medical providers.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. CSAF should ensure that installation commanders conduct mass casualty exercises at contingency beddown locations, as well as home station and should include simulated BW/CW casualties. Installation commanders should stress command and control, casualty response, evacuation, medical logistics, and casualty intransit visibility. Further, HQ USAF/SG should ensure USAF physicians on mobility, at a minimum, are trained in advanced trauma life support.

c. *Provide an increased number of ambulances in Saudi Arabia.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Do not support. Adequate prepositioned ambulance assets exist in SWA; they should be re-positioned based on new beddown locations. HQ USAF/LG should ensure the priority "in commission" of emergency response vehicles is followed. Installation commanders should identify vehicle augmentation requirements, as appropriate.

d. *Make the wearing of identification tags mandatory in contingency operations.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. HQ USAF/LG should implement/enforce DoD mandated wear of identification tags and reflect this in appropriate directives.

e. *Provide a patient on-line data base at all medical facilities in contingency plans for mass casualties.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. DoD/HA is developing this capability.

f. *Include requirements for patient administration in contingency plans for mass casualties.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. HQ USAF/SG should review patient administration capabilities for mass casualty events.

g. *Establish contingency contracting for local translator support in a crisis.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. HQ USAF/SG should include the requirement for interpreter support in the medical planning process.

FINDING 24: (Omitted Classified)

FINDING 25: *Technology was not widely used to detect, delay, mitigate, and respond to acts of terrorism.*

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 25:

a. *Provide professional technical assistance and information on force protection from the DoD to units in the field.*

b. *Designate a DoD element to rapidly acquire and quickly field integrated force protection technology to deployed forces.*

c. (Omitted Classified)

d. *Develop and train military leaders on an integrated systems approach to physical security and force protection technology.*

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. DoD has directed that the CJCS serve as the focal point for Force Protection. The JCS will ensure professional technical assistance is provided through the Joint Staff to deployed forces. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has been tasked with the responsibility to integrate Force Protection technology for deployed forces. HQ USAF/XO should identify and direct USAF Force Protection UTC managers to review their design operational capabilities and logistics details for requirement for and inclusion of high-tech equipment. This will integrate Force Protection technology into existing readiness reporting systems, i.e. Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), as well as existing inspection processes, Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs), and provide oversight/visibility to senior leaders.

The base emergency warning systems and appropriate responses need to be a focus during vulnerability assessments. A rapid and reliable wide-area notification system is needed to alert personnel in emergency situations. For example, commercially available, number-only pager systems are small, relatively inexpensive and would allow notification of personnel within seconds. HQ USAF/SC/LG/XO should explore this potential application of off-the-shelf equipment. Pagers can be programmed for multiple groupings, permitting notification of individuals, flights, units, buildings, an entire wing or any other desired combination. The use of codes (i.e. 111 = squadron recall, 222 = building evacuation to point X, or 223 = building evacuation to point Y) would allow the transmission of messages from fairly simple (one to three digit codes) to quite complex. Additionally, depending on signal strength, terrain, and availability of repeaters, personnel could be recalled/alerted from several miles away.

Drawbacks to this alerting method include frequency availability in the theater for pre-purchased systems or availability of systems purchased on site; pager loss or theft; and ensuring individuals change batteries regularly. More complex (and more expensive) voice, alpha-numeric, satellite, and response-capable systems are available and should also be investigated.

Similarly, security forces should incorporate 24-hour video recording capability covering perimeter, entry points, and other critical locations. Additionally, they should have audio recording capability at control centers to record incoming transmissions.

HQ USAF/SP should task MAJCOMs to develop a requirement for, and to program funding for, installation and operation of a combination of fixed and mobile surveillance systems at all USAF installations. These systems should have the capability of transmitting/recording video images back to control centers. Fixed video systems should have remotely controlled telephoto, pan and tilt, and date/time features. Night (low light) detection capability is also essential. Similarly, all incoming communications to control centers (includes both radio and telephone calls) should be recorded (voice activated). Caller ID capability, where available, should also be included. Recordings should be preserved for a period to be determined and recycled if not needed for further investigative purposes. HQ USAF/SP should incorporate these requirements/capabilities in appropriate directives.

FINDING 26: *U.S. allies have an extensive experience and have accumulated significant lessons learned on force protection applicable to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.*

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 26:

a. Develop and implement an integrated systems approach to force protection planning using lessons learned from U.S. allies.

Strengthen cooperative efforts between the United States and allies on terrorism and force protection matters.

b. Develop a means of sharing information obtained during cooperative exchanges with other force protection professionals in the United States.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. DoD is undertaking extensive consultations with U.S. allies on Force Protection issues, including "lessons learned," technology sharing, and information exchanges. CSAF should task the designated Air Staff organization for Force Protection to ensure this DoD information is passed to field units and also incorporated into USAF operations, equipment acquisition initiatives, and training programs. It should be noted that the 4404th WG (P)/CC engaged coalition members from Great Britain and France, residing at Khobar Towers, to review and make recommendations regarding security measures. They provided valuable inputs and assisted in security measures at the installation.

ADDITIONAL recommendation:

a. CSAF direct the USAF Corporate Structure to establish an IPT co-chaired by HQ USAF/XO/SG to review current USAF policies, directives, and programs designed to maximize warfighter performance. This review must evaluate, at a minimum, the issues of: high noise, circadian rhythm, maximum working hours per month, temperature extremes and acclimatization factors. The IPT should provide recommendations to USAF Corporate Structure on standards, policies, training programs, employment procedures, and deployment requirements necessary to meet the human performance demands of continuous and sustained Force Protection operations.

b. This review found instances where the casualty reporting process did not function in an accurate and timely manner in this particular mass casualty disaster. Coupled with this was the fact that USAF no longer has dedicated personal affairs individuals that are knowledgeable on the notification process. HQ USAF/DP should review the casualty reporting system and training to ensure it will meet AF Quality of Life expectations.

MEMORANDUM FOR 12 AF/CC SEP 4, 1996

SUBJECT: Report of Gen (Ret.) Wayne A. Downing - Khobar Towers Bombing

We are forwarding for your review a copy of the report submitted by General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Ret) regarding the bombing of Khobar Towers and the adequacy of security arrangements in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility. We have not evaluated this report nor formed any conclusions based upon its findings and recommendations. We also enclose for your consideration a staff report on this matter issued by the House National Security Committee entitled "The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident," dated 14 August 1996.

You are directed to consider and to make recommendations on issues raised in General (Ret.) Downing's report regarding how the Air Force organizes, trains and equips to support forces deployed to U.S. Central Command. Your focus should be on matters of force protection. You are authorized to interview witnesses, obtain documents, conduct site visits, and take whatever additional steps you deem necessary to review fully the issues raised. This is a critical task. You are to identify the Air Force resources you require in support of it, and they will promptly be made available to you.

If during the course of your review you identify matters of concern relating to another service or the unified command, please advise us so that we may refer those matters to the Secretary of Defense.

Additionally, as the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, you are hereby designated as the disciplinary review authority and General Court-Martial Convening Authority regarding any actions or omissions by Air Force personnel, associated with the bombing of Khobar Towers at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 25 June 1996. The Commander, Air Combat Command, remains the appellate authority for any disciplinary action initiated by the Commander, Twelfth Air Force. Air Force personnel will be assigned or attached to Twelfth Air Force for these purposes as necessary.

Appropriate disposition regarding any individual, whether consisting of no action, administrative action, nonjudicial punishment, court-martial, or otherwise, is entirely within your discretion as Commander, Twelfth Air Force, under applicable directives. No inferences whatsoever should be drawn from this transfer of disciplinary authority or attachments of personnel to your command.

Please submit a written report of your findings and recommendations within 90 days.

SIGNED

Ronald R. Fogleman
General, USAF
Chief of Staff

SIGNED

Sheila E. Widnall
Secretary of the Air Force

cc:
COMAC

INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM MEMBERSHIP

Lieutenant Gen James F. Record is the Commander, 12th Air Force and U.S. Southern Command Air Forces. The command is comprised of eight active wings, a communications group, a heavy engineering squadron, and an air support group with more than 35,000 active duty and civilian personnel and 450 aircraft. The command also consists of over 21,000 people and 360 aircraft in units of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. His responsibilities also include the air component command USAF assets provided to U.S. Southern Command.

He has commanded three fighter wings (to include Kunsan, ROK,) and an air division, served as J-3 for U.S. Central Command, served as the first deputy of Joint Task Force Middle East operating in South West Asia (SWA) area, served as Air Component and Joint Force Air Component Commander of Operation Uphold Democracy, and senior U.S. member to the United Nations Command at Panmunjom, ROK, and as Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia.

Colonel Robert H. Baskett is the Chief, Contingency and Joint Matters Division, Directorate of Military Personnel Policy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF. He has held that position since August, 1993. Colonel Baskett was commissioned in 1968 and has served on active duty since 1970. He is a command pilot with more than 3600 flying hours, has flown four different aircraft, but logged most of his time in C-130s. While stationed in the Philippines, he flew missions in the Pacific, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, including the Saigon Evacuation in April, 1975. He has flown in Europe, the Middle East; served as Operations Officer in the C-130 CCTS and the Tactical Airlift Instructor School, as well as Commander of the C-130 RTU Squadron. Additional tours include Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering at USAFA, Senior Airlift Controller in the Military Airlift Command (MAC) Command Center, Director of Personnel Plans, Systems, and Readiness in the MAC Crisis Action Team (CAT) during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and Chief of Assignments for Air Mobility Command.

Colonel William H. Booth is the Chief, Manpower Program Development Division, Directorate of Programs and Evaluation, HQ USAF/PE. Colonel Booth has over 22 years experience in a wide variety of Manpower Management positions at all echelons within the Air Force command structure. Early in his career he was a base level management engineering officer and management engineering detachment commander. His four most recent positions before his current assignment were as Chief, Manpower Resources Branch, HQ TAC/XP; Chief, Manpower Budget Development Team, HQ USAF/PE, Chief, Manpower Requirements Division, HQ SAC/XP, and Chief, Manpower and Organization Division and Deputy Director of Manpower and Personnel, United States Strategic Command/J1.

Colonel Thomas Leo Cropper is the Chief of Public Health, AF Medical Operations Agency. He has twenty-three years experience in disease prevention and control, medical readiness, training, plans, and exercise evaluation. He was stationed at RAF Upper Heyford, UK from 1978-1981. His overseas TDY's include Germany, Portugal, and Korea. He served as director of Battlefield Medical Operations, School of Aerospace Medicine from 1986-1990. He was responsible for the Brooks AFB exercise evaluation team from 1986-1992. He served on numerous AF and DoD panels to improve medical readiness and plans, disease and injury prevention, and operational medical support from 1985-1996. He has special training and expertise in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare defense.

Colonel Robert A. Ferguson, USAF, BSC, is the Associate Director, Medical Readiness Doctrine and Training, Office of the Surgeon General, HQ USAF, Bolling AFB, DC. He has over nineteen years military service, the last nine of which have been as a medical readiness officer, serving at HQ TAC, USCENTAF, Joint Staff, and Air Staff. His experience includes serving as deliberate planner, crisis action planner, and SWA theater planner during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, focusing on operational and strategic levels of war. In his current billet he is responsible for managing Air Force medical readiness, organization, training, and equipping as the Medical Service re-engineers its medical capabilities.

Colonel James M. Holt has been assigned to HQ USAF/XOFC to work special projects for XOF since 6 Aug 96. A command pilot with over 3000 flying hours, he entered the AF in Feb 1970. He has extensive experience in operations and command relations both as a commander and as a war planner. He was Support Group Commander, 354th Fighter Wing, Eielson AFB, AK from Aug 94 to Jul 96, 673rd Air Base Group Commander, Eareckson AFS, AK from Sep 93 to Aug 94 and Squadron commander of the 25th Tactical Air Support Squadron, Eielson AFB, AK from May 88 to Oct 89. He served as a plans officer from Jul 85 to May 88 at Headquarters Alaskan Air Command.

Colonel David W. Madsen is the Chief, Appellate Defense Division, Air Force Legal Services Agency. He is a judge advocate with over 22 years experience in military justice. While assigned to the HQ USAF Military Justice Division, he was the Air Force representative on the working group of the Joint Services Committee on Military Justice. This committee is responsible for recommending changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He served as staff judge advocate at Mountain Home AFB, ID and served on the headquarters staffs at 17 AF, TAC, SAC and USAFE, where he served as the deputy MAJCOM staff judge advocate.

Colonel Thomas J. McDonald is the Director of Operations for the Directorate of The Civil Engineer. Colonel McDonald has over 23 years of experience in a variety of Civil Engineer assignments at all levels of command. Prior to that he was the Chief of Programs for the Civil Engineer directorate at HQ AETC, Randolph AFB, TX. He also served as the commander of the 375 Civil Engineer Squadron at Griffiss AFB, New York. He was the Chief of the Programs Requirements branch for the Civil Engineer directorate at HQ PACAF and was an evaluator on the HQ USAFE Inspector General team.

Colonel Gerald E. Reynolds is the Director of Plans, Policy and Evaluation, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington, DC. Colonel Reynolds has 29 years experience in intelligence operations as a photo interpreter, targeting officer, nuclear and conventional weapons, regional and counterterrorism analyst, financial programmer, special security officer and trainer. He commanded an imagery and electronic intelligence exploitation squadron at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska (SAC, 16 months) and the 3480th Technical Training Wing at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas (ATC, 26 months), where he provided basic and advanced intelligence training to over 8000 students per year from all four United States military services. He was the senior United States intelligence officer at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium, and the Director of Intelligence at Air Combat Command, the Air Force's largest major command.

Colonel James R. Silliman is the Vice Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC. He was commissioned in April 1967 and has spent his entire career in AFOSI, serving in command and staff positions at all echelons within AFOSI. His various tours of duty have included base level counterintelligence collections, theater-wide responsibility for USAF counterintelligence in Europe, counterintelligence input to security police for air base ground defense in the United Kingdom, and oversight of the Air Force counterespionage double agent program.

Colonel Frank M. Willingham is the Deputy Chief of Security Police for the Air Force. Colonel Willingham has over 20 years experience in security and law enforcement and has a diverse range of experience which is unique among Air Force security policemen. He directed security operations at Ramstein Air Base in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on HQ USAFE. In a follow-on assignment, Colonel Willingham directed security operations in protecting air crews after the Libyan air strikes at RAF Lakenheath. While there, Colonel Willingham pioneered the use of thermal imagery technology in security which was later used in the Philippines and Panama. His field experience was followed by assignments to the USAFE IG Team and the Air Staff where he managed the AF Air Base Ground Defense program. In a Joint Service capacity, he managed research and development of new nuclear security systems while assigned to the Defense Nuclear Weapons Agency. After his tour in Washington, Colonel Willingham was sent to HQ USEUCOM in Germany where he oversaw the largest shipment of nuclear weapons back to the United States from an overseas location.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Woods is presently the Chief of the Air Force Central Labor law Office (CLLO), Civil Law and Litigation Directorate, Air Force Legal Service Agency. He has served as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, McGuire AFB, NJ; Staff Judge Advocate, San Antonio Real Property Maintenance Agency, San Antonio, TX; Trial Attorney, CLLO, Washington DC; and Staff Judge Advocate, RAF Alconbury, UK. Lt Col Woods attended law school under the sponsorship of the Air Force Funded Legal Education Program and has 13 years of litigation experience.

INTERVIEWS

RANK	ORGANIZATION
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
CMSgt	377th Security Police Squadron
Maj	58th Fighter Squadron
Capt	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj Gen	JTF-SWA
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	741st Maintenance Squadron
SMSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Gen	Third Army, USA CENTCOM
SrA	41 Rescue Squadron
Col	SAF/IG
Col	4404th Vice Commander
Lt Col	USCENTCOM, Provost Marshal
Maj	220th 3d Army Provost Marshal, USA
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
Col	4409th Operations Group
SSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SrA	45th Security Police Squadron
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	4404th Support Group
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Capt	71st Rescue Squadron

TSgt	45th Security Police Squadron
Amn	741st Maintenance Squadron
Brig Gen	USMC, Dir. Of Operations
CIV	58th Fighter Squadron
Sgt	71st Rescue Squadron
Lt Col	CENTCOM, USA
TSgt	33d Fighter Wing
CIV	Deputy Consul, Dhahran
SrA	76th Security Police Squadron
CIV	RSO, U.S. Embassy, Rihyad
CIV	POL MIL, U.S. Embassy Rihyad
MSgt	33d Fighter Wing
Amn	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	33d Fighter Wing
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Col	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj	USCENTCOM, JAG
CIV	DIA
Lt Col	91st Security Police Squadron
Capt	91st Security Police Squadron
Lt Col	USCENTCOM, J3
Amn	71st Rescue Squadron
A1C	58th Fighter Squadron
SrA	Robins AFB, GA
CIV	4404th Wing
SSgt	58th FS/IN
Lt Col	US Liaison Office, Doha
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj	HQ Third Army
SA	Det 241, OSI
Maj	325th Security Police Squadron
Brig Gen	4404th Wing (P)/CC
Col	USCENTCOM
SrA	41st Rescue Squadron
MSgt	96th Security Police Squadron
Sgt 1 Class	HQ Third Army
SrA	4404th Security Police Squadron
LCDR	VP1, US
Maj	Advisor OPM/SANG
Lt Col	4404th Medical Group
Vice Adm	Naval Central, USN
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	Fwd HQ Element, USA
Lt Col	ARCENT, QUATAR
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Gen	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SA	AFOSI, Det 241
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	741st MSS
Capt	89th Security Police Squadron
Maj	341st Medical Group
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron

SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
A1C	4404th Wing
Lt Col	355th Air Wing
SSgt	4404th Wing
Maj Gen	OMC, USAF
SSgt	45th Security Police Squadron
Lt Col	4409th Operations Group
Lt Col	4404th Wing
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SSgt	28th Test Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SrA	75th SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON
Maj Gen	USCENTCOM, J3
Lt Col	JTF-SWA
TSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SA	AFOSI, Det 624
SSgt	321st Security Police Squadron
Lt Gen	HQ USAF/XO
CIV	Dep Chief of Mis, U.S. Embassy Riyadh
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	USCENTCOM, Dep Surgeon
GS-15	Joint Intelligence Center
SrA	741st Maintenance Squadron
MSgt	HQ AFOSI/DFO
Lt Col	USACOM
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj	ARCENT
A1C	71st Rescue Squadron
SrA	96th Security Police Squadron
SrA	Beale AFB, CA
Maj	Misawa AB, Japan
A1C	96th Security Police Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj	Lackland AFB
SMSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	75th Medical Group
Rear Adm	USCENTCOM, J-5
CMSgt	4404th Civil Engineering Squadron
Sgt	71st Rescue Squadron
Lt Col	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	18th Wing
1st Lt	MEDAC, Ft. Lee, VA
SA	AFOSI, Det. 110
SrA	71st Rescue Squadron
Maj	Third Army, Provost Marshal, USA
Capt	71st Rescue Squadron
Capt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Gen	USCENTCOM, USMC
Col	DAO, U.S. Embassy Riyadh
SrA	71st Rescue Squadron
Lt Col	HQ, Third United States Army
Col	CCJ-2, USCENTCOM
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Col	4404th Wing
Maj	HQ AFOSI
Maj	Force Protection Intel Officer, USA
Gen	USCENTCOM
Capt	4404TH Medical Group
TSgt	45th Security Police Squadron
SrA	41st Rescue Squadron
Col	Third Army Engineer
Vice Adm	JCS, DJ5
SA	AFOSI, Det 241
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron

MSgt	4404th Civil Engineering Squadron
Maj Gen	Chief, Mil Trng Mis to Saudi Arabia
Brig Gen	Office of Military Cooperation
SrA	71st Rescue Squadron
Col	Dir of Intel, AU, Maxwell AFB, Al
Maj	AFOSI
Col	USCENTCOM
SSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
Amn	91st Security Police Squadron
A1C	Beale AFB, CA
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	741st Maintenance Squadron
SSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
LCDR	Joint Intel Center, USCENTCOM
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Sgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SrA	377 SPS
Col	140th Wing
Brig Gen	4404th Wing (P)/CC
Lt Col	71st Rescue Squadron
Lt Col	19th Air Force
SrA	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	ARCENT-KUWAIT
A1C	71st Rescue Squadron
Brig Gen	AEF Free, US Army
Brig Gen	US Army Security Assistance Agency
SSgt	741st Maintenance Squadron
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
CIV	
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
CDR	USCENTCOM, US NAVY
Maj Gen	Commander, Eastern Province
Lt Col	4404th Intelligence Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	AFMC, Kirtland AFB
Maj	436th Air Wing
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Col	USCENTAF, A-1
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	60th Fighter Squadron
Maj	HQ AFOSI
SA	4404th Wing
Col	US Army, Cmdr, CENTCOM
Lt Col	Macdill, Fl
CIV	DCM, Saudi Arabia
SSgt	41st Rescue Squadron
Capt	Joint Intel Analysis
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SrA	41st Rescue Squadron
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
1st Sgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Capt	71st Rescue Squadron
CIV	Consul General, Dharhan
Lt Col	FORSCOM, Provost Marshall
Col	USCENTCOM - Operations, planning
A1C	58th Fighter Squadron
SrA	1st Security Police Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron

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AFI 10-402, Mobilization Planning	14 Feb 94/(U)
AFI 51-201, Administration of Military Justice	1 Sep 96/(U)
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AFI 70-101, Criminal Investigations, Counterintelligence, and Protective Service Matters	22 Jul 94/(U)
AFI 90-201, Inspector General Activities	01 May 96/(U)
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DoD News Briefing on Khobar Towers Bombing	12 Jul 96/(U)
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Downing Report Briefing to Military Intelligence Board by LtGen Clapper	20 Oct 96/(S)

DP XFC Chart-SW Asia Tour Length Options	27 Sep 96/(U)
DPP Memo - Force Protection and Antiterrorism (A Second Request)	30 Sep 96/(U)
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Force Protection in Southwest Asia: An Air Force Perspective (AF/XO Brief)	17 Sep 96/(U)
Force Protection: Secretary of Defense Report to the President	16 Sep 96/(S)
Gen Peay, III - Statement before Senate Armed Service Committee	9 Jul 96/(U)
House National Security Committee Staff Report, The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident	14 Aug 96/ (U)
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I. There are no published DoD physical security standards for force protection of fixed facilities.	a. Publish prescriptive DoD physical security standards.	a. Accept/Completed -Published DoD Directive 2000.12, Combating Terrorism Program.
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	<p>b. Designate a single agency within DoD to develop, issue, and inspect compliance with force protection physical security standards.</p>	<p>b. Partially Accept/Completed -CJCS designated lead official for force protection. New agency will not be established.</p>
	<p>c. Provide this DoD agency with sufficient resources to assist field commanders on a worldwide basis to enhance force protection matters.</p>	<p>c. Partially Accept/Implement-Resources have been requested from Congress in FY 97 to enhance force protection.</p>
	<p>d. Consider designating an existing organization, such as a national laboratory, defense Special Weapons Agency, or the Corps of Engineers, to provide this expertise.</p>	<p>d. Accept/Completed - DoDD 2000.12, Combating Terrorism Program, establishes CJCS as the lead official for all military Force Protection issues and USD (A&T) responsibility for force protection technology integration.</p>
	<p>e. Provide funds and authority to this agency to manage Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts to enhance force protection and physical security measures.</p>	<p>e. Partially Accept/Implement - Additional funds have been requested from Congress for force protection initiatives for FY 1997 and force protection initiatives are being developed for the FY 1998 President's budget submission.</p>
<p>2. Force protection requirements had not been given high priority for funding.</p>	<p>a. Establish priorities for force protection requirements in the Defense Planning Guidance and, as recommended by the Antiterrorism Task Force report, include force protection as a Defense-Wide special interest item.</p>	<p>a. Accept/Implement - Priorities for force protection will be added to the Defense Planning Guidance.</p>
	<p>b. Coordinate DoD priorities for force protection of noncombatant forces with the Department of State (See Finding 16).</p>	<p>b. Accept/Implement - Requirements are being coordinated with Department of State for force protection in Southwest Asia and DoD then will coordinate worldwide next.</p>
	<p>c. Address force protection in the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process.</p>	<p>c. Accept/Implement - JWCA will address force protection requirements; beginning September 1996 in accordance with DoDD 2000.12.</p>
	<p>d. Implement the recommendation of the Antiterrorism Task Force on establishment of a separate Office of the Secretary of Defense-managed program element to fund high priority antiterrorism requirements.</p>	<p>d. Accept/Completed - A separate OSD managed account has been established for high-priority force protection requirements. FY 1997 funds have been identified to provide quick response, high priority force protection solutions to the CINCS</p>
	<p>e. Encourage combatant commanders to articulate and prioritize force protection requirements in their Integrated Priorities List.</p>	<p>e. Accept/Implement - A memorandum will be sent in October 1996 from OSD/Program Analysis and Evaluation directing the CINCS to include force protection programs in their Integrated Priority Lists.</p>
<p>3. Joint Task Force - Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units in the region were not structured and supported to sustain a long term commitment that involved expanded missions, to include increased force protection from an emerging and viable terrorist threat.</p>	<p>a. Review the composition of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units to ensure that they are structured and have resources appropriate for the mission and the conditions.</p>	<p>a. Accept/Implement - The Joint Staff, CINCS and Services are now conducting this review.</p>
	<p>b. Review current manning and rotation policies, to include tour lengths for key leaders and staff, with the aim of promoting continuity in the chain of command and unit cohesion.</p>	<p>b. Accept/Implement - Same as 3a.</p>
<p>4. Current U.S. Central command relationships do not contribute to enhanced security for forces operating in the region.</p>	<p>. Assign operational control of all combatant forces operating in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region to one Headquarters.</p>	<p>a. Partially Accept - Changes have already been undertaken by the CJCS and CINCCENT to modify the existing tactical command relationship with JTF-SWA, to include force protection. Force protection responsibility and directive authority have been given to CJTF-SWA to implement and enhance CENTCOM force protection policies and directives for units supporting Operation Southern Watch.</p>
<p>5. Force protection practices were inconsistent in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf region.</p>	<p>a. Develop common guidance, procedures, and standards to protect the force.</p>	<p>a. Accept/Complete - Existing guidance, procedures, and standards are continually reviewed. Force protection is addressed in over 20 Joint Doctrine publications, e.g., Joint Pub 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism. Additionally, CINCCENT issued CENTCOM OPORD 96-01 (Force Protection)/ DoDD 2000.12 and DoD Instruction 2000.14 provide policies and assign responsibilities for implementation of the DoD antiterrorism program.</p>

	<p>b. Assigning operational control of all combatant forces to one headquarters</p> <p>(Finding 4) will facilitate a common approach.</p>	<p>b. Same as 4a.</p>
	<p>c. Closely coordinate all antiterrorism countermeasures with host country agencies.</p>	<p>c. Accept/Implement - Antiterrorism countermeasures are being coordinated with host country agencies.</p>
<p>6. There is no theater-specific training guidance for individuals or units deploying to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.</p>	<p>a. Establish training qualification and certification procedures for all units, individuals, and civilians prior to deployment to and after arrival in the Area of Responsibility. This should include force protection measures and be applicable to service members on both permanent change of station and temporary duty assignment.</p>	<p>a. Accept/Implement - USACOM is developing a proposal for standardizing predeployment antiterrorism training for all CONUS-based forces.</p>
	<p>b. Conduct mandatory force protection and risk management training for all officers and senior non-commissioned officers deploying to high threat areas. Integrate this training into officer and non-commissioned officer professional military education to assure long-term development of knowledge and skills to combat terrorism at all levels.</p>	<p>b. Accept/Implement - DoD Instruction 2000.14 is being reviewed to require mandatory training for all officers and senior NCOs deploying to high threat areas.</p>
	<p>c. Support development of antiterrorism training and education supporting materials. Using innovative media methodologies, as recommended by the Antiterrorism Task Force and directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.</p>	<p>c. Accept/Implement - Training and education supporting materials have been developed and are being distributed.</p>
	<p>d. Conduct refresher training for installation/unit antiterrorism officers immediately prior to assignment in the theater, as outlined in DoD Instruction 2000.14.</p>	<p>d. Accept/Implement - DoD Instruction 2000.14 is being reviewed to specify frequency of refresher training.</p>
<p>7. Intelligence provided warning of the terrorist threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.</p> <p>9. The ability of the theater and national intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long-term analysis of trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists is deficient.</p>	<p>a. None</p> <p>a. Allocate sufficient analytic resources to conduct in-depth, detailed analysis of trends, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists.</p>	<p>a. None</p> <p>a. Accept/Implement - DIA has created the Office of Counter terrorism Analysis to improve U.S. capability to conduct detailed analysis of terrorist organizations. CENTCOM has enhanced terrorism analysis in its Joint Intelligence Center. DIA is reviewing the number of analysts dedicated to this task.</p>
<p>10. The Department of State and elements within the DoD ascribe different Threat Level assessments for countries of the same region, causing confusion among recipients of this information.</p>	<p>a. Institute one interagency methodology for assessing and declaring terrorist Threat Levels, allowing commanders to determine Threat Conditions in a local area.</p>	<p>a. Accept/Implement - DoD has proposed adoption of the DoD methodology as the standard for determining threat levels. Requires coordination by the State and other agencies.</p>
<p>11. The lack of an organic intelligence support capability in U.S. Air Force Security Police units adversely affects their ability to accomplish the base defense mission.</p>	<p>a. Provide U.S. Air Force Security Police units assigned an air base defense mission an organic intelligence capability.</p>	<p>a. Accept/Implement - SECDEF directed Air Force to review intelligence requirements for the air base defense mission. Recommendations to SECDEF in 90 days.</p>
<p>14. While the communications architecture in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility supported the flow of intelligence throughout the upper echelons of the chain of command, field units had limited access due to classification restrictions.</p>	<p>a. Make collateral communications systems available to the lowest appropriate level.</p> <p>b. Distribute compartmented information, as a minimum, in sanitized form to all key force protection security officials, as well as coalition partners.</p>	<p>a. Accepted/Completed - Intelink-S is available at the Secret level as the primary means of intelligence dissemination to the lowest tactical command levels and is now deployed to 90% of the combat locations in the AOR.</p> <p>b. Accept/Implement - DCI Directive 1/7, Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information, and DCI Directive 5/6 Intelligence Disclosure Policy will be implemented by October 1996. These directives will allow sufficient dissemination of critical intelligence to the lowest echelons and release products to all appropriate foreign governments.</p>
<p>15. The division of responsibility between U.S. and host nation police and military forces for security at facilities throughout Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf is clear.</p>	<p>a. Promulgate memorandums of understanding (MOU) between host nation and U.S. forces, delineating responsibilities for protecting U.S. operated facilities, to include procedures for upgrading security when threat levels change.</p>	<p>a. Partially Accept/Implement - Will negotiate memoranda of understanding with host nations where applicable.</p>

	b. Increase the number of interpreters available to security forces.	b. Accept/Implement - CENTCOM will review requirements for interpreters for all components.
16. (a) U.S. Embassy security resources are insufficient to adequately protect large numbers of noncombatant military forces in selected countries.	a. Assign all DoD personnel to the unified combatant commander, except those whose principal function supports the Chief of Mission.	a. Accept/Complete - Established under new DoS/DoD MOU, September 1996.
b. The U.S. Defense Representative has insufficient resources to adequately protect large numbers of noncombatant military forces in selected countries.	b. Provide the U.S. Defense Representative directive authority for force protection matters over ALL DoD personnel not assigned to the unified combatant commander.	b. Accept/Complete - Established under new DoS/DoD MOU, September 1996.
c. The U.S. Defense Representative does not have directive authority over selected "stovepipe" organizations.	c. Provide the U.S. Defense Representative with appropriate staff to assist the Chief of Mission in the execution of force protection responsibilities, to include conducting vulnerability assessments, identifying funds for force protection, and developing protection standards.	Study to verify the requirements and identify implementation of additional staff for the USDR.
17. U.S. Forces and facilities in Saudi Arabia and the region are vulnerable to terrorist attack.	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>GENERAL SECURITY</u></p> <p>a. Conduct vulnerability assessments for every site within the Area of Responsibility and repeat them on an appropriate schedule. Each site must be examined individually and in-depth.</p> <p>b. Locate facilities in secluded areas, wherever possible.</p> <p>c. Assign all security force members a weapon. Rifles and machine guns must be zeroed and fired for sustainment training. Identify special weapons requirements early and train to meet requirements. Stress weapons maintenance.</p>	a through y. Accept/Implement Facility relocation commenced on 5 August 1996. CINCCENT has augmented JTF-SWA with a force protection cell that will include a theater-wide force protection assessment capability. CINCCENT has completed a force protection assessment of all combatant sites on the Arabian Peninsula. Additional funds have been requested for 1997. Force protection initiatives are also being developed for the FY 1998 budget submission.
	d. Examine and prioritize terrorist threats for both potential of occurrence and degree of vulnerability at each site. Prepare defenses accordingly.	
	e. Coordinate with host nation police and military forces to develop and maintain a combined ability to counter the surface-to-air missile threat from terrorist elements.	
	<u>PHYSICAL SECURITY</u>	
	f. Employ integrated technology, including intrusion detection systems, ground sensors, closed circuit television, day and night surveillance cameras, thermal imaging, perimeter lighting, and advanced communication equipment, to improve the security of all sites.	
	g. Employ technology-based explosive detection and countermeasure devices.	
	h. Physically harden structures based on the threat.	
	i. Develop guidance on required stand-off distances and the construction of blast walls and the hardening of buildings.	
	j. Relocate and consolidate units at vulnerable facilities to more secure, U.S.-controlled compounds or bases.	
	k. Reinforce the entry control points to U.S. facilities and provide defense in depth.	
	l. Cable single rows of Jersey barriers together.	
	m. Use enhanced barriers, similar to those designed by United Kingdom and Israel, to shield and protect vulnerable compounds and structures. (See finding 26).	
	n. Establish threat based stand-off or exclusion areas around compounds and bases.	

	o. Procure personal protective equipment suitable for extreme hot weather operations.	
	TRANSPORTATION	
	q. Harden or procure armored buses to transport service members between housing areas and work sites.	
	r. Provide armed guards, at a minimum in pairs, on buses and provide armored escort vehicles.	
	s. Ensure host country military and police are actively involved in securing routes of travel.	
	t. Provide and maintain communications for all modes of transportation and centrally control and monitor transportation movements.	
	<u>TRAINING</u>	
	u. Provide personal protection anti-terrorism training to all deployed service members and their families.	
	v. Conduct training exercises to rehearse responses to a terrorist attack, including building evacuation and re-assembly procedures.	
	x. Develop and use an extensive list of potential terrorist scenarios to assess forces protection measures at each site in the area of responsibility.	
	<u>FOLLOW-ON ASSESSMENTS</u>	
	y. The Task Force could not physically survey all locations in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility within the time frame of this Report. Locations in the theater which the Task Force did not survey should be assessed as soon as possible. These include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Oman, Sudan, and Yemen.. The Task Force had only a limited opportunity to assess force protection in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain. Urgent priorities to improve force protection have been identified at U.S. facilities in these countries. A follow-on assessment team should conduct a more in-depth survey of these sites.	
19. The chain of command did not provide adequate guidance and support to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).	a. That the Secretary of Defense take action, as appropriate.	Referred to the Secretary of the air Force for action within 90 days.
20. The Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack.	a. Refer to the Chain of Command for action, as appropriate.	Referred to the Secretary of Air Force for action within 90 days.
21. Funding for force protection requirements was not given a high priority by the 4404th Wing (Provisional)	a. Separately identify force protection requirements in budget submissions and assign funding priorities based on specific threats to service members and facilities.	a. Accept/Implement -- DepSecDef invoked special budget authority on August 9, 1996 to support immediate force protection needs in JTF-SWA. The President requested from Congress additional funding for FY 1997. The SECDEF directed a comprehensive review of force protection requirements be included in the FY 1998 budget submission.
22. The division of responsibility for the protection of Khobar Towers was clearly understood by both U.S. and Saudi officials.	a. Establish and maintain regular working relationships between senior commanders and appropriate host nation officials that promote honest exchanges of opinions on key issues.	a. Accept/Implement -- Increased tour lengths for additional key billets such as commanders and security personnel are being implemented to promote better working relationships.
b. Saudi security forces were unable to detect, deter, and prevent the truck bomb attack outside the perimeter fence at Khobar Towers.	b. Raise critical force protection issues to the chain of command, if unable to solve them at the local level.	b. Accept/Completed - DoDD 2000.12 reinforces forces protection for every level of command. CJCS as DoD focal point will review force protection efforts throughout every level.

<p>23. The medical care provided to the victims of the June 25 bombing at Khobar Towers was outstanding; however, mass casualty procedures could be improved.</p>	<p>a. Continue emphasis on first aid, bandaging and splinting, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training for individuals. Initiate similar training for all services, where appropriate.</p>	<p>a. Accept/Completed -- Ongoing training will be continued.</p>
	<p>b. Continue emphasis on realistic mass casualty training and exercise scenarios, and increase Advanced Trauma Life Support training for medical providers.</p>	<p>b. Accept/Completed -- Ongoing training will be continued.</p>
	<p>c. Provide an increased number of ambulances in Saudi Arabia.</p>	<p>c. Reject -- Sufficient vehicles are available.</p>
	<p>d. Make the wearing of identification tags mandatory in contingency operations.</p>	<p>d. Accept/Completed -- Wearing of ID tags already is mandatory.</p>
	<p>e. Provide a patient on-line data base at all medical facilities to assist in identification and treatment of patients.</p>	<p>e. Accept/Completed -- An on-line patient database is available in Area of Responsibility.</p>
	<p>f. Include requirements for patient administration in contingency plans for mass casualties.</p>	<p>f. Accept/Completed -- Contingency plans already include such requirements.</p>
	<p>g. Establish contingency contracting for local translator support in a crisis.</p>	<p>g. Partially accept/Implement -- Request for additional translators is being pursued in host nation support negotiations.</p>
<p>25. Technology was not widely used to detect, delay, mitigate, and respond to acts of terrorism.</p>	<p>a. Provide professional technical assistance and information on force protection from the DoD to units in the field.</p>	<p>a and b. Accept/Complete -- DoDD 2000.12 assigns responsibility for force protection technology integration to USD/A&T.</p>
	<p>b. Designate a DoD element to rapidly acquire and quickly field integrated force protection technology to deployed forces.</p>	
	<p>d. Develop and train military leaders on an integrated systems approach to physical security and force protection technology.</p>	<p>d. The DoD acquisition process requires that training requirements and plans be integrated into system development and acquisition. The Services are required to provide operational concepts and accompanying training plans in the development process. DoDD 2000.12 requires training military leaders on new technology for physical security.</p>
<p>26. U.S. Allies have extensive experience and have accumulated significant lessons learned on force protection applicable to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.</p>	<p>a. Develop and implement an integrated systems approach to force protection planning, using lessons learned from U.S. allies.</p> <p>b. Strengthen cooperative efforts between the United States and allies on terrorism and force protection matters.</p> <p>c. Develop a means of sharing information obtained during cooperative exchanges with other force protection professionals in the United States.</p>	<p>a to c. Accept/Implement - Reexamine bilateral agreements within 90 days to determine needed improvements.</p>

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Ancillary--refers to additional training , beyond the skill training specifically required for a particular Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). This training may be initial or refresher.

Counterintelligence (CI)--the targeting of hostile intelligence services which are employing espionage, sabotage, terrorism and subversion against DoD.

IPT, i.e., Integrated Process Team--a team of people with representatives from all areas involved in a process chartered to make recommendations to the convening authority to improve that process

Op Orders, Operations Orders--Directive orders, usually written, issued or published by authority of a command element, for a specific operational purpose/event/mission

OPCON--Operational Control: total control of forces assigned

Oplans--Operations Plans--Written plans for the conduct of an operation.

OPM-SANG--Office of Program Management--Saudi Arabia National Guard; the U.S. DoD organization headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that was the target of the 13 November 1995 terrorist bombing attack. This event is referred to throughout as the OPM--SANG bombing.

Self aid/buddy care--A program of "first aid", built mainly around a buddy system, to recognize a casualty situation and provide immediate assistance and antidote/care to casualties from conventional or biological/chemical attacks/accidents.

SOFA--A Status of Forces Agreement or treaty between the US and another sovereign nation regarding legal status of US forces assigned/operating in that country.

SROE--Standing Rules of Engagement--Prescribed, basic rules of engagement which serve as the initial basis for conduct of operations by US forces until expanded/modified.

TACON--Tactical Control: Limited control of forces solely for the purpose of conducting sorties/missions/operations. Does not include UCMJ authority or administrative responsibility..

Threat Condition, or Threatcon--A condition/posture of increased alertness/actions a wing or base takes in response to a threat or threat level. These are generally referred to as Threatcon Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta. Each posture increase, from Alpha to Delta, has a checklist of options/measures to take, based on the nature of the threat.

Threat Level--An assessment of the threat situation in a vicinity, region, country, or area.

PART B

ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

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ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION: In a memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, dated September 4, 1996, (Part A, Tab A), I was directed to review the circumstances surrounding the terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996, and the report of General Wayne A. Downing (U.S. Army, Ret.), dated August 30, 1996, regarding the bombing and the adequacy of security arrangements in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (hereinafter referred to as the Downing Report). Specifically, I was directed "to consider and to make recommendations on issues raised in General Downing's Report regarding how the Air Force organizes, trains and equips to support forces deployed to U.S. Central Command." I was directed to focus on "matters of force protection." I have provided my recommendations regarding these issues under separate cover in Part A of this report on October 31, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as Part A).

The second task of the September 4, 1996, directive designated me as the disciplinary review authority and general court-martial convening authority regarding any actions or omissions by Air Force personnel associated with the bombing of Khobar Towers at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996. This part of the report, Part B, contains a factual overview of the Khobar Towers bombing, the context of the mission, and an analysis of the actions and omissions of commanders in the chain of command. Additional comments on the Downing Report findings which might relate to accountability issues are contained in an Appendix to Part B. I have assessed the actions and omissions of Air Force personnel at the 4404th Wing (Provisional), Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), and United States Central Air Forces (USCENTAF). I have also considered the actions and omissions of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) personnel because I was informed in the above memorandum.

Lieutenant General James F. Record is the Commander, Twelfth Air Force and U.S. Southern Command Air Forces. He was in this command position from July 1995 through December 1996. The command is comprised of eight active wings, a communications group, a heavy engineering squadron, and an air support group with more than 35,000 active duty and civilian personnel and 450 aircraft. The command also consists of over 21,000 people and 360 aircraft in units of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. His responsibilities also include the air component command of USAF assets provided to U.S. Southern Command.

Lieutenant General Record is a combat veteran having served two tours in Viet Nam. He flew over 600 combat missions and accumulated over 1100 combat flying hours. He commanded three fighter wings from May 1982 through September 1985 (to include Kunsan, ROK) and an air division from September 1985 through January 1988, served as J-3 for U.S. Central Command from March 1988 through June 1990, served as the first deputy of Joint Task Force Middle East operating in the Southwest Asia (SWA) area from September 1987 through March 1988, served as Air Component and Joint Force Air Component Commander of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY from September through December 1994, and senior U.S. member to the United Nations Command at Panmunjom, ROK from September 1991 through June 1992, and as Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) from November 1992 through March 1993. He also served as Vice Commander of Twelfth Air Force from June 1992 through June 1995.

II. METHODOLOGY: In performing this accountability review, I was assisted by Colonel David W. Madsen and Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Woods, legal advisors, as well as other members of my Review Team listed in Part A, Tab B. We carefully reviewed 191 transcripts of interviews conducted by the Downing Task Force; conducted numerous additional interviews; reviewed over 100 directives, studies, and other pertinent documentary evidence in addition to the Downing Report; and, Colonel Madsen and I visited several locations in Saudi Arabia, including Khobar Towers, and conducted additional interviews there. When appropriate, Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), rights advisement and legal counsel were provided and those individual's testimony was taken under oath and signed.

III. THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING – FACTUAL OVERVIEW:

a. Background. The bombing of Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, was a hideous act of terrorism--an event of enormous magnitude, involving a high degree of sophistication. An Air Force security policeman, Staff Sergeant Alfred R. Guerrero, spotted unknown individuals backing up what appeared to be a cylindrical-shaped sewage truck perpendicular to the north perimeter fence, near Building 131, outside of the American sector of the Khobar Towers

complex (Khobar Towers also housed British, French, and Saudi military forces). After noticing two men run from the truck and jump into an awaiting car, which then sped away, Staff Sergeant Guerrero, who was checking on two security police lookouts posted on the top of Building 131, immediately ordered his men to begin evacuating the building and notified the security police law enforcement desk. The evacuation was conducted using a floor-by-floor notification system. Although there was an operational Giant Voice public announcement and warning system, it was not used on the night of June 25, 1996. Up until that time, the Wing Operations Center (WOC) had the sole authority to activate the Giant Voice, which was intended for use for SCUD missile alerts. After Lieutenant Colonel James J. Traister, Chief of Security Police, received the telephone call notifying him of the suspicious truck in front of Building 131, he immediately tried to call the WOC, but his phone line went dead. He dispatched runners to notify the WOC in person, but the runners did not reach the WOC in time for activation of the Giant Voice. Within four minutes of spotting the truck, the bomb detonated, with what the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) estimated to be a "yield" of more than 20,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent explosives, killing 19 service members and injuring 500 service members. It also injured many Saudi Arabian citizens and Third Country Nationals (TCNs), and severely damaged or destroyed a significant amount of property. The blast formed a crater that was approximately 16 feet deep and approximately 55 feet wide. (See photograph at Tab Y.) This was the second bombing in Saudi Arabia in less than a year. The first terrorist attack occurred on November 13, 1995. Five Americans were killed when terrorists exploded a much smaller bomb (estimated to be between 200 - 250 pounds of TNT-equivalent explosives) in front of the Office of the Program Manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG).

b. Security Focus Prior to OPM-SANG Bombing. Prior to these terrorist attacks, Saudi Arabia was a country where tens of thousands of Americans, both military and civilian, and other Westerners had lived safely for decades. U.S. forces lived and worked in urban environments as they did elsewhere overseas. They felt secure throughout Saudi Arabia, and security practices reflected that widely-held belief. The security posture at OPM-SANG and other facilities in Saudi Arabia where U.S. forces worked and lived had not changed substantially in years.

c. Security Focus After OPM-SANG Bombing. Some Saudi Arabian officials viewed the bombing of OPM-SANG as an isolated aberration. U.S. commanders at every level took a different view and many characterized this bombing as a "wake-up call," and a "watershed" event demarcating a new escalation in the terrorist threat. As discussed below, commanders at all levels in the chain of command went to Saudi Arabia and assessed the changing terrorist threat and associated Force Protection measures. The Defense Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Colonel Gary Nelson (U.S. Army), observed that following the OPM-SANG bombing, everyone from Lieutenant General Carl L. Franklin (Commander, JTF-SWA at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) to Brigadier General Terry J. Schwalier (Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia) sharpened their focus and took extra measures. They worked Force Protection hard to the point that some thought it was an overreaction.

At Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, the host nation, exercises sovereignty both inside and outside the complex. Saudi Arabia does permit the U.S. latitude in its activities within the installation, but permanent physical improvements, such as even the construction of a wall, or modifications to buildings, require Saudi approval. Internal security is a shared responsibility between the U.S., coalition forces and the Saudi Arabian military police. Security outside the fence is the responsibility of the Saudis.

As Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM, General J. H. Binford Peay, III, (U.S. Army), was responsible for refining policy and guidance provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fit theater conditions under his command; assessing the threat for the theater and providing these assessments to the Services; ensuring proper coordination of local policies and measures for Force Protection; and, serving as DoD point of contact with embassies and host nation officials within the theater.

Soon after the OPM-SANG bombing, General Peay met with the ambassadors in the region to discuss shared security responsibilities. He met with his senior component commanders and with senior military leaders in regional countries to review the terrorist threat, chain of command responsibilities, and legal and military Force Protection responsibilities. In November 1995, USCENTCOM changed the threat level from "medium" to "high" and reassessments of the security of facilities were directed theater-wide. Mr. Ted Kattouf, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy, commented that from his viewpoint everybody in Saudi Arabia was engaged in Force Protection and security. There was a well-established dialogue among the Air Force chain of command, other U.S. military organizations in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. intelligence community in-country. Between November 1995 and March 1996, USCENTCOM dispatched seven messages to subordinate units related to Force Protection. One of the purposes of the messages was to ensure that all commanders understood their responsibilities in an effort to prevent another OPM-SANG type incident. These messages set the tone for Force Protection measures in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). For example, they started by implementing the Secretary of Defense directive to review installation antiterrorism measures and advising commanders to "go the extra mile" and to err on the side of being "overly cautious." They also required commanders to forward information about their Force Protection efforts including their latest vulnerability assessments for "full staff review" and to help "refine Force Protection enhancements and develop support relationships." In response to concerns that Force Protection actions were not consistent within Saudi Arabia, General Peay used his mid-winter Commander's Conference (February 1996) to conduct follow-on discussions with component commanders on Force Protection. This conference resulted in the publication of the USCENTCOM April 12, 1996 Letter of Instruction (LOI) on Force Protection. The LOI outlined Force Protection responsibilities and established the oversight role of the Commander, JTF-SWA, for combatant forces and support personnel in Saudi Arabia. General Peay designated the Commander, JTF-SWA, as his senior representative so that Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT) would have "more control forward in terms of executing force protection...."

The USCENTCOM command and control arrangement stressed command through the service components to facilitate a rapid execution of crisis response and the smooth transition to war. The component commanders were to articulate the policy, as set by USCENTCOM for threat levels and for Force Protection issues, and ensure that the policies were communicated to all combatant organizations in Saudi Arabia. This is similar to the command and control arrangements applied by other Commanders in Chief (CINCs).

In USCENTCOM, operational control (OPCON) runs from the CINC to the component commander to the installation or unit commander, with tactical level Force Protection being the responsibility of the installation or unit commander. The command and control arrangements implemented by General Peay reflected the principles and guidelines detailed in Joint Publication 1 (Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the U.S.), Joint Publication 0-2 (Unified Action Armed Forces), Joint Publication 3-0 (Doctrine for Joint Operations), Joint Publication 3-07.2 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Anti-Terrorism), and Joint Publication 3-10.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense).

USCENTCOM has few assigned forces. Almost all of its forces are provided to the supported unified command by other unified/specified command(s), then the appropriate component command is delegated OPCON of forces for specific missions. General Peay and his staff compensated for the long distances that separated him from his forward units by making frequent visits to the USCENTCOM AOR. General Peay visited Saudi Arabia nine times between September 1994 and June 1996. In addition, General Peay held meetings with subordinate commanders and their staffs and directed his component commanders to assist "their forward deployed elements in reviewing and implementing installation and facility security and antiterrorism measures." General Peay spoke to the component commanders at least two or three times a week and his Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Richard I. Neal (USMC), or his J-3, Major General Joseph E. Hurd, spoke with JTF-SWA daily.

Major General Hurd, J-3, USCENTCOM, was responsible for managing the command's Force Protection Program and was General Peay's primary officer for these matters. Following the OPM-SANG bombing, Major General Hurd visited Khobar Towers and was shown the security enhancements by the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional), Brigadier General Schwalier. The Commander, USCENTAF, Lieutenant General John P. Jumper, and the Commander, Air Combat Command, General Joseph W. Ralston, also visited Khobar Towers immediately after the OPM-SANG bombing and were briefed by Brigadier General Schwalier on the status of the Wing's security and Force Protection measures. Although not in the operational command chain of the 4404th Wing (Provisional), both Major General (now Lieutenant General) Franklin, and Major General Kurt B. Anderson, Commanders, JTF-SWA, visited Khobar Towers frequently and were shown enhancements in Force Protection, including the M-60 machine gun posts at the front gate, rooftop sentries and elaborate entrance requirements. Numerous senior officers from sister services, as well as a representative from the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, other State Department officials, and the Chief, National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) also visited the Wing on various occasions between November 1995 and June 1996. Brigadier General Schwalier and his subordinate commanders asked these visitors for recommendations and were told by the visitors that the Wing was taking more than appropriate security measures.

Colonel James R. Ward (U.S. Army), the United States Armed Forces Central Command (USARCENT) Commander had similar Force Protection responsibilities for his own installation at Lucky Base in Saudi Arabia, and over 200 members of his command lived in Khobar Towers. He assessed security at Khobar Towers as follows:

I was fairly satisfied with the security at Khobar Towers ... All the changes that were made to the fence lines through the barriers out to improve the security of the fence line were all prudent measures that we were fairly comfortable with....Given what we had done, we thought we had done a good job of presenting a hardened area that was not accessible.

Lieutenant General Jumper had operational control over the 4404th Wing (Provisional). He was Brigadier General Schwalier's immediate supervisor. He had the duty to provide guidance to and supervision of Brigadier General Schwalier. This included guidance and supervision for matters relating to Force Protection. In addition to visiting Khobar Towers on 19-20 November 1995, Lieutenant General Jumper spoke frequently with Brigadier General Schwalier. In other visits to the AOR, Lieutenant General Jumper visited other operational locations under Brigadier General Schwalier's command. These discussions included security matters at Khobar Towers and at other locations under the Wing's jurisdiction. During these visits and conversations, Lieutenant General Jumper assured himself that Brigadier General Schwalier and his staff were focused on and engaged in active Force Protection measures. He agreed with their focus on the multitude of possible threats with emphasis on preventing a penetration of the facility.

Lieutenant General Jumper deployed members of his immediate staff, including Lieutenant Colonel James J. Traister, a career security policeman, to serve at the 4404th Wing (Provisional) and at other locations. Lieutenant Colonel Traister reviewed the July 1995 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment at HQ USCENTAF and talked with former commanders of the 4404th Security Police Squadron (Provisional) before deploying as the new Security Police Squadron Commander. The Commander, USCENTAF, and members of his staff traveled to the AOR on numerous occasions and were very familiar with and engaged in the operations there. Both Lieutenant General Jumper and his Vice Commander, Major General Arnold R. Thomas, deployed to the AOR in 1994 and 1995, respectively, as Commander, JTF-SWA.

USCENTAF responded to the requests of the 4404th Wing (Provisional) for assistance. For example, USCENTAF supported a recommended increase in tour lengths for key personnel and provided additional bomb detection dogs for the security police. In addition, USCENTAF deployed 75 additional security police to Kuwait.

As the Commander, JTF-SWA, then-Major General Franklin, who had one previous tour as Commander, JTF-SWA, had authority and responsibility for Force Protection matters for his staff and their facilities at Riyadh. The USCENTCOM LOI on Force Protection was issued in April 1996 during the last few weeks of Lieutenant General Franklin's second tour as Commander, JTF-SWA. Prior to that, he had actual authority and responsibility for Force Protection matters only as they related to the facilities and staff personnel under his command in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This consisted of less than 200 assigned personnel and a relatively small facility. Lieutenant General Franklin assumed command of Ninth Air Force and USCENTAF on June 6, 1996.

Major General Anderson assumed command of JTF-SWA on April 27, 1996, for a one year tour. As of the day of the bombing at Khobar Towers, June 25, 1996, Major General Anderson had been the Commander, JTF-SWA, for approximately two months. During that time, he worked to implement the provisions of the USCENTCOM LOI on Force Protection. For example, he issued a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) providing detailed guidance to JTF-SWA in carrying out Force Protection responsibilities. The CONOPS also provided for a Force Protection Team consisting of representatives from JTF-SWA, the 4404th Wing (Provisional), ARCENT, and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). The team assisted the Commander, JTF-SWA in carrying out his Force Protection tasks. In addition, Major General Anderson established a review process for vulnerability assessments to ensure local responses to recommendations contained in the assessments were being implemented. This review process called for vulnerability assessments to be conducted semi-annually and for commanders to report their actions to Major General Anderson and his Force Protection officer for their review and coordination.

Major General Anderson visited Khobar Towers several times in the first two months of his command, and noted increases in security measures on each visit. Specifically, he testified that Brigadier General Schwalier was:

...proactive, aggressive. I used the word earlier, and I don't use it in a negative sense, he was 'consumed' with force protection, and you saw it

on every visit. I visited Khobar often, and it was never the same. There was always better force protection -- in-depth.

Major General Anderson attended meetings of the Emergency Action Committee held at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, attended country-wide Force Protection Coordination Meetings in Riyadh, and gave direction to his own Executive Force Protection Committee at which matters of Force Protection and threat assessment were discussed. He talked regularly with Brigadier General Schwalier and General Peay about Force Protection matters.

Brigadier General Schwalier, Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional), was responsible for implementing, at the wing level, policy and guidance regarding Force Protection provided by CINCCENT. He was also responsible for detailed planning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executing Force Protection measures for the security of his command. These responsibilities were inherent in his position as Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).

Brigadier General Schwalier arrived at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in July of 1995 to take command of the 4404th Wing (Provisional). He was the first commander of that unit to have been assigned for a one-year tour. His predecessors had been assigned for much shorter tours of duty, usually for 90 days. USCENTCOM had obtained permission from Saudi officials to increase the tour length of this position, and the position of Commander, JTF-SWA, to provide greater continuity in key positions. By letter dated August 30, 1995, Brigadier General Schwalier recommended additional key positions be converted to one-year tours to further increase stability. These positions consisted of members of his immediate staff, including: the Wing Vice Commander; the commanders of the Services, Transportation, and 4402 Reconnaissance Squadrons; the commanders of the Medical Group and of the 4406 Support Flight; as well as the Chief of the Wing Operations Center. This recommendation was supported and implemented by USCENTAF and USCENTCOM.

A semi-annual AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment was underway when Brigadier General Schwalier arrived. He received it in September 1995 and began responding to the recommendations. While the Wing was working on the recommendations in this vulnerability assessment, terrorists exploded the car bomb in front of the OPM-SANG Headquarters in Riyadh. Before the Wing could implement many of the recommendations, a new vulnerability assessment was started in light of the heightened security concerns resulting from the bombing.

Immediately following the OPM-SANG bombing, on November 13, 1995, Brigadier General Schwalier issued the first of many Battle Staff Directives (BSDs) aimed at further improving the Wing's security posture. He raised the Wing's local threat condition (THREATCON) to THREATCON BRAVO and set into motion more stringent Force Protection measures to contend with various types of possible attacks. Among other measures, Brigadier General Schwalier deployed physical barriers and serpentine driving control patterns at checkpoints; directed that stationary objects, such as trash dumpsters and parked vehicles, be moved at least 25 meters from all buildings; restricted off-base travel; implemented measures to check for letter and parcel bombs; suspended non-essential commercial deliveries; instituted procedures to verify the identity of unannounced or suspicious visitors; directed commanders to brief personnel at regular intervals on all forms of terrorist threats; and stressed increased threat awareness.

Some of the measures implemented in December included training the Disaster Control Group, conducting a tabletop terrorist bombing exercise, initiating weekly Security Review Meetings with his Security Police Squadron Commander, AFOSI Detachment Commander and Wing Intelligence Officer, and initiating numerous additional physical and personal security measures.

In January 1996, he reviewed the second AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment issued during his tour. This vulnerability assessment recommended 39 security measures. By the time of the bombing on June 25, 1996, 36 of the recommendations had been implemented (see additional discussion below). Brigadier General Schwalier also issued additional BSDs. Among other measures, he reinforced perimeters against possible high speed penetration by placing dumpsters at strategic locations, conducted the first quarterly Chiefs of Security Police Conference for units under his command, and initiated Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM), a discretionary security police program outlined in Air Force Instruction 31-210, The Air Force Antiterrorism (AT) Program.

Brigadier General Schwalier emphasized the need for security awareness. For example, he personally briefed incoming personnel in the Wing's "Right Start" newcomer's orientation briefing program, emphasizing the nature of the Saudi environment, known threats, and the need for vigilance and security consciousness.

Colonel James A. Coning, Ohio Air National Guard, was the Deputy Chief of Logistics with the 4404th Wing (Provisional) from November 13, 1995 to February 17, 1996. He testified that the Wing leadership received daily and weekly threat briefings. Colonel Coning further stated:

Brigadier General Schwalier and the staff (in my opinion) did as much as humanly possible to provide maximum security, have the Wing at the correct THREATCON level and ensure the individual personnel were as safe as possible.

Brigadier General Schwalier commissioned security awareness and antiterrorism articles for the Wing newspaper, *Gulf View*, and features for the closed circuit TV Commander's Access Channel. He admonished his subordinate commanders, in staff meetings and Force Protection meetings, to brief their personnel about security and safety concerns.

Brigadier General Schwalier and his subordinate commanders asked coalition members and sister service leaders, as well as a NIST official in country, to critique their security efforts and to make constructive security enhancement recommendations. They found the Wing's efforts to be extensive and recommended no substantive changes.

Brigadier General Schwalier established the first 4404th Wing (Provisional) Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan which included several measures intended to enhance personal and physical security, such as Mylar window film (see further discussion of Mylar below), fire alarms, perimeter fence improvements, surveillance equipment for the perimeter, and a vehicle entry control facility. He submitted a FY96 unfunded budget request for 765 additional concrete highway barriers (Jersey barriers) for use around Wing facilities at Dhahran, Bitburg barriers, and land mobile radios for the security police. He also submitted unfunded budget requests for additional security measures at the other facilities in Saudi Arabia for which he was also responsible.

As a further illustration of Brigadier General Schwalier's focus on Force Protection Colonel Gary S. Boyle, 4404th Wing (Provisional) Support Group Commander, referred to him as "the Wing Security Officer." Brigadier General Schwalier personally inspected security enhancement measures and visited security personnel at their duty stations and, on occasion, briefed them at guardmount. The former Consul General to Dhahran, Mr. David Winn, a 25-year State Department veteran of the Middle East and a frequent visitor to Khobar Towers, observed that Brigadier General Schwalier's efforts "...were so stringent, so draconian, so professional that I thought he almost had overreacted." Mr. Winn also stated that the security measures at Khobar Towers were so impressive that Khobar Towers was "in a league by itself" in comparison to other facilities in the region.

Even more rigorous security measures were implemented in the spring of 1996 as the period of the Hajj approached, a religious holiday when millions of visitors are permitted into Saudi Arabia, and terrorist activities are known to occur. These included doubling concrete barriers along the fence line, increasing Saudi patrols outside of the fence line, getting local police to check license plate numbers of suspicious vehicles, positioning manned sand-filled dump trucks to provide an emergency blocking of the entrance to the compound, installing M-60 machine-gun emplacements at the entrance, and placing armed sentries on building rooftops to gain better vantage points.

Regarding individual off-base activities, a variety of measures were used depending on the threat level and/or the terrorist events that transpired in the immediate region. At times, personnel were required to remain on the installation or were restricted from visiting certain locations. When off-base travel was permitted, personnel were directed to avoid agitated crowds or large groups of Westerners. They could not travel alone or in groups larger than four, and as noted in BSDs, they were restricted from visiting Bahrain where security incidents were not uncommon. The Wing dress and appearance instruction directed appropriate off-base attire. Wing personnel were instructed, through various means such as the Wing newspaper and briefings by commanders, to maintain a low profile outside the compound. Brigadier General Schwalier required unit commanders to brief and account for their personnel traveling off-base. For senior personnel and distinguished visitors, who were most at risk for kidnapping or ambush, personal security officers were used, plus travel and lodging plans were developed which were designed to minimize the risk.

Ten suspicious incidents, including four of possible surveillance, were reported by Wing personnel in April, May, and June 1996. These incidents were subsequently reported in summary form in the 17 June 1996, issue of the *Military Intelligence Digest*, which stated that the incidents led to increased security measures. Many were during the period of the Hajj. These incidents were investigated by the AFOSI, the Saudi military and local police. None indicated an attack on Khobar Towers was imminent. These suspicious incidents near the Khobar Towers in the Spring of 1996 were also thoroughly evaluated by the entire chain of command, to include USCENTCOM.

These incidents included one possible threat indicator -- the suspected ramming of a Jersey barrier on the east perimeter. It was reported to Saudi authorities, who permitted the Wing to secure the barriers by staking them into the ground. There were four incidents of possible surveillance, which were reported to local Saudi authorities for further investigation. These occurred on April 1, 4, 17 and 25, 1996, and all involved reports by Wing personnel of Middle Eastern men driving by or parked and observing the compound. Of the five remaining incidents, two were inconclusive and three were completely discounted.

These incidents were discussed with the Saudis, who did not view them as threatening. They attributed the incidents of possible surveillance to natural curiosity on the part of the Saudi populace about the activities of Americans inside the perimeter. Just outside the northern perimeter of Khobar Towers is a parking lot which was used by people visiting a nearby mosque. It also serviced a recreational area. During the month-long period of the Hajj, it was not unusual for many people to congregate in this area in the evenings. Most of the reported incidents took place during this time, and this may have caused the Saudi police to dismiss them as non-threatening. The Saudis said they had undercover security personnel in the area and they were not concerned.

The 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not conduct formal evacuation exercises of buildings. Staff Sergeant Jeffrey Hill explained, "We were told building evacuations wouldn't be done as a drill. That way people wouldn't get redundant, and they told us that if someone told us to evacuate the building, that we do it, because it would be the real thing." Further, when asked by the Downing Task Force, "So, in essence, they justified not going through drills because it would instill some complacency with everyone?," (Staff Sergeant Hill) responded "Right."

While some Wing personnel interviewed by the Downing Task Force stated that they were not aware of any building evacuations prior to the June 25th bombing, a review of the 4404th Security Police Squadron Desk Blotters reveals at least eight buildings were actually evacuated at Khobar Towers because Wing personnel discovered suspicious packages. In fact, Building 131, the building in front of which the bomb exploded, was evacuated in May 9, 1996 because of a reported suspicious package, which turned out to be a tool box. It was evacuated because it was within the 300-foot cordon surrounding the suspicious package which was discovered in neighboring Building 129. The buildings were evacuated in five minutes or less, an interval which the Support Group Commander and the Wing Fire Chief, who were in charge of the evacuation scenes, considered to be as fast as possible. The testimony suggesting no evacuations may be attributable to the fact that Wing personnel worked in shifts around-the-clock. Some personnel also stated that they were not aware of any warning devices or evacuation plans. The January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment found that:

An active fire prevention program is in effect. Articles are routinely published in the base paper to remind everyone of fire safety procedures and all personnel are briefed on emergency evacuation procedures, extinguishers, smoke detectors, and emergency phone numbers at the mandatory "Right Start" briefing attended by all incoming personnel.

In addition, evacuation procedures were posted on the doors and walls of the rooms in Khobar Towers.

Following the OPM-SANG bombing, the Wing implemented a number of specific measures regarding potential threats posed by Third Country Nationals (TCNs) who worked at Khobar Towers. The number of TCNs living in the compound was reduced and movement restrictions within the compound were increased. Wing personnel were briefed on the need to increase scrutiny of TCN activities. Efforts to improve TCN living and working conditions were initiated to increase their loyalty.

In summary, between November 1995 and June 25, 1996, the Wing implemented over 130 new security measures. Additional Force Protection measures, such as Mylar on the windows, barriers and surveillance cameras, were being planned and programmed for when the terrorist attack occurred. By June 25, 1996, 36 of the 39 recommendations contained in the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment had been implemented. Two were being addressed and one had been considered but rejected.

Installation of a fire alarm system was one of the two recommendations that had been programmed for inclusion in the Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan, but not installed prior to the bombing. The Downing Report was critical of the lack of a fire alarm system, suggesting that the Wing might have been more successful in evacuating the building if it could have relied on a fire alarm system rather than the floor-by-floor notification system that was used. The Civil Engineer Squadron Commander at Khobar Towers at the time of the bombing, Lieutenant Colonel Robin Schellhaus, explained that installation of a fire alarm system (in addition to the smoke detectors already there) was not a high priority because the buildings were constructed out of concrete. There are no DoD standards for warning systems, and the Saudi construction standards for Khobar Towers did not require a fire alarm system.

USCENTAF Fire Protection Staff Assistance Visits (SAV) to the 4404th Wing (Provisional) were conducted on January 3-20, 1995 and January 2-18, 1996. These SAVs assessed fire protection operational capabilities and reviewed progress in correcting items identified in End-of-Tour reports or through previous SAVs to the AOR. Neither SAV mentions the lack of fire alarm systems or emergency lighting systems. The 1996 SAV on Khobar Towers contains a recommendation "That BCE [Base Civil Engineer] and senior leadership continue to actively support the AOR Fire Protection Program (emphasis added)."

The other AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment recommendation programmed, but not implemented at the time of the bombing, concerned the installation of Mylar. Mylar is a shatter resistant window film coating which, under certain circumstances, can mitigate the effects of flying glass. I made a special point to examine the issue of why Mylar was not installed on the windows in Khobar Towers as recommended. The January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment recommended the installation of Mylar on windows throughout the Khobar Towers compound or in the alternative, it recommended a piecemeal approach starting with the perimeter faces of Buildings 133 and 131 and working clockwise around the perimeter. Brigadier General Schwalier programmed for this four million dollar project in the Wing's Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan. Brigadier General Schwalier made this decision to defer immediate installation after discussions with his Support Group and Civil Engineering Squadron Commanders, and considering a variety of factors, including the then-known threat, the effects of other security enhancements which had been or were being implemented to mitigate risks, the cost and complexity of the project, the absence of DoD or Air Force requirements for the installation of Mylar, the fact that Saudi approval would have been necessary, and other competing priorities.

The installation of Mylar is a complex process requiring special expertise to install. According to the Defense Special Weapons Agency:

Every potential terrorist target is unique, making "cookbook" mitigation measures potentially ineffective, and possibly counterproductive. For example, simply placing mylar on windows, without improving the window frames may result in trading glass shard injuries for blunt trauma injuries when the entire window frame is blown into a room. There are powerful, calculational and design tools available for improving a structure's (and an installation's) response to a terrorist bombing, but these must be applied by professionals who not only understand the engineering implications, but also the threat implications of the retrofits and new construction they propose to implement.

In comparison, after the OPM-SANG bombing, Mylar was requested for some of the State Department buildings in Riyadh, but the State Department denied the request on the basis that the threat level was not high enough. When the Headquarters, OPM-SANG was moved following the November 1995 bombing, they contracted for the installation of Mylar on the windows on the facility at the new location. This Mylar project was not completed until October 1996 due to the complexity of the contracting and installation processes.

The January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment. As discussed above, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations began to update the July 1995 vulnerability assessment of Khobar Towers immediately following the bombing at OPM-SANG. It was completed in January of 1996 and contained 39 recommendations. As noted above, the Wing had implemented all but three of these recommendations before June 25, 1996. Two of these recommendations were for the installation of Mylar window film and a fire alarm system. (see discussion above) These were both included in the Wing's Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan. The one recommendation that was considered and not adopted was a recommendation to disperse mission essential personnel, such as aircrews, throughout the various facilities within the compound, rather than have all members of a given unit stay in any one location. The Wing leadership decided against adopting this recommendation because they decided it was preferable to maintain unit integrity. The Wing did implement a recommendation to disperse key personnel for all THREATCONs. The Wing's senior officers were spread out and moved to living facilities in several buildings. This dispersal was in effect to minimize the chances of the entire command element being killed at the same time. Although with the benefit of hindsight such a move would have been tremendously advantageous, the evidence reflects that neither the AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment nor personnel at Khobar Towers recommended that personnel be moved to interior buildings. Colonel Boyle was specifically asked : "Was there ever a staff recommendation to move people from the perimeter buildings into the interior based on the threats folks saw that week?" Colonel Boyle responded "Never discussed that, never considered we had a threat large enough that we would want to do that ... [I]f we'd had a threat and we're doing it right now, we'd have done that, but we didn't think we had a threat like that." Likewise, Brigadier General Schwalier stated that based on the threat known to him or anticipated, he did not consider moving people in this manner.

The testimony attributed to Colonel Boyle may be a response taken out of context. In his interview with the Downing Task Force, Colonel Boyle was asked for his recommendation "looking back on what happened ... hindsight ... Monday morning quarterback ... [W]hat are the lessons learned that you take away?" In that dialogue, he was asked the question, "You would take a less quality of life by going to a place like Jack and Jill Village?" Colonel Boyle's affirmative response must be considered in the context of his discussing the advantages of having facilities located in a rural, rather than an urban, environment.

In discussing the issue of moving personnel from the exterior of the installation, Lieutenant General Jumper voiced a concern with densely packing the base population inside a compound with the threat assessment of a penetration, that is, if a bomb had penetrated to the interior of the compound, we would have seen many more casualties.

The Downing Report alleges that neither AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment (July 1995, January 1996) specifically addressed the north parking area outside of the fence as a vulnerability, other than noting the overgrown vegetation. To the contrary, the January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment conducted after the OPM-SANG bombing contained numerous observations and recommendations concerning the perimeter fence around Khobar Towers, to include securing gates with locks designed for external use, welding hinge pins on the gates to prevent removal, securing fence sections so that individuals could not crawl under, and removing or repositioning items near the perimeter fence.

Specifically concerning the north perimeter fence area, the January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment identified the adjacent public parking lot as a significant weak point for three reasons: (1) The size and relative remoteness of the parking lot, (2) the visual obstruction that limits the ability of U.S. forces to identify an oncoming threat, and (3) access to the parking lot was uncontrolled and open to anyone. Recommended "fixes" included cutting back the vegetation, installing bollards (half buried steel pipes) connected by chain or cable along the easement on the Saudi side of the fence or along the sidewalk on the U.S. side of the fence, reinforcing the existing concrete barrier line with one-inch steel cable, and parking heavy vehicles along the fence to limit high speed penetration of the installation. The Vulnerability Assessment noted the increased cooperation between U.S. and local Saudi police, and noted that the Royal Saudi Air Force would coordinate with local civilian authorities to increase the uniformed police presence outside the northwest and northeast fence lines.

Likewise, the July 1995 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment addressed security measures to be taken around the perimeter fence, including the proper placement of Jersey barriers, removing or repositioning objects near the vegetation on the north perimeter to increase visibility. The Vulnerability Assessment also commented on the successful efforts by the security police to establish liaison with the various local military and civilian police agencies, which has resulted in an increased willingness for cooperation between the Air Force and local police, e.g., Saudi patrol responses to check out suspicious activities or minor acts of violence or criminal activity.

Wing officials responded by improving security on the north perimeter of Khobar Towers through the implementation of 36 of 39 recommendations, some of which are discussed above, in the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment.

Stand-off Distance and Moving the Barriers Outside the Perimeter Fence.

As discussed in the Downing Report, DoD Handbook O-2000.12-H does not establish any required standards or provide guidance on stand-off distances for existing structures; rather, it mentions a 100-foot minimum set back between perimeter and exterior whenever possible for new construction.

Neither the July 1995 nor the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment contained a recommendation to extend the perimeter or enhance stand-off distances. The AFOSI at Khobar Towers consulted Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel for guidance on damage estimates for the buildings on the north perimeter. EOD believed the damage would be held to a minimum if vehicles were kept a minimum of 25 yards from the building.

Attachment 3 to the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment is a background paper that considers the explosive effects of a car bomb with a main charge of 200 pounds of C-4. The paper lists various targets, such as windows, metal buildings, concrete block and personnel, with the damage that could be anticipated at a certain level of overpressure. The paper's annotation that the standard security cordon for an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is 92.5 meters apprises the reader that EOD or other personnel establish a security cordon at 92.5 meters regardless of the nature or size of the IED observed. The annotation is not a recommendation for any specific perimeter around a building, nor does it take into consideration any type of horizontal deflection.

The Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh related that a representative of his office had visited Khobar Towers prior to the bombing and was satisfied that the existing stand-off distance was adequate even though it was 20 feet less than the desired 100 foot State Department standard for fixed facilities. The RSO indicated that they would not have questioned an 80-foot stand-off distance even if the known threat had included a 1,000 pound bomb.

The Chief of the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) in Riyadh indicated that they considered the threat to be a bomb the size of the one that exploded at OPM-SANG, "maybe 500 pounds but -- we never went above 1,000 pounds." Additionally, the U.S. Consul General in Dhahran stated that "the thought of a 20,000 or even 5,000 pound bomb driving up was pretty inconceivable."

After the OPM-SANG bombing, the intelligence community provided warning of a heightened threat. The intelligence provided concerning explosives was suggestive and inferential, but was not specific. The intelligence available did not suggest the threat of a bomb of the magnitude used in the attack on Khobar Towers. According to the Chief of the NIST in Riyadh, when asked about the specificity of the intelligence data,

Everybody wants more [information] ... the reports didn't give a target ... there weren't many specifics ... that's just unfortunate...part of the life of terrorist reporting. But I never got the feeling that anyone was taking any of the reporting lightly. It was more of a feeling that they tried to do whatever they could ... but weren't sure what special steps it would take because we didn't have a specific [threat] ... whether it would be ... truck bomb ... kidnapping, assassination.

The minutes of the February 27, 1996 Force Protection Meeting chaired by the AFOSI Detachment assigned to the JTF-SWA indicate that the Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh described the current intelligence flow essentially as follows:

Since the OPM-SANG Bombing, intelligence information traffic regarding possible threats has increased; however, it also appears to be a lot more "junk" reporting is being provided than previously.

The U.S. Consul General in Dhahran at the time of the bombing stated "no one really thought anything was going to happen in Dhahran [I] never had a piece of paper or anyone else outlining any particular threat."

The specific information they did have on terrorist capability consisted of evidence concerning the size of the car bomb used in the OPM-SANG bombing, (the equivalent of about 250 pounds of TNT)," and numerous small pipe bombing incidents in nearby Bahrain. Senior officers in Saudi Arabia generally concluded that the upper limit of a terrorist bomb was no higher than what had been used in the OPM-SANG bombing. Likewise, the Saudis did not see a threat larger than the bomb at OPM-SANG.

When interviewed by investigators from the Downing Task Force, Lieutenant General Neal (USMC), Deputy Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM, observed:

I quite candidly couldn't create a mosaic that would give me indications that Khobar Tower was going down. I was concerned about Khobar Tower because of its vulnerability from a structure facility point of view.... I don't think the Intel told them that there was anything to be characterized as what occurred would occur [sic]. I don't think they had a tipper that said, "Hey, we are dealing with now five and ten times the size of what they did at OPM-SANG.

Special Agent Steve Kipp, Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations, visited Khobar Towers in May 1996, after the Hajj, and conducted an informal physical security assessment. He provided Special Agent Reddecliff a list of recommendations, one of which was to build a 9 - 12 foot concrete wall around the Khobar Towers facility or, at a minimum, along the north perimeter. Special Agent Reddecliff considered the recommendation for construction of the wall but decided not to send it forward for several reasons. First, it was his sense that the Saudis had a good handle on the security of the parking lot. Second, Special Agent Kipp had not come up with any new vulnerability or threat information. Finally, it would have required a contracting action, with Saudi approval. As Special Agent Reddecliff stated:

I was unaware of any particular physical security expertise that he had. I don't believe it was a detailed study, and given my working relationship with Brigadier General Schwalier and my knowledge of what I perceived his impression or his reaction to be, I did not think that he would build a wall based on one recommendation. To my knowledge, no other recommendation had come in before or after regarding that wall, including the vulnerability assessments and so forth. So it was for these reasons that I pressed on without moving that forward.

The idea of a wall around the perimeter of Khobar Towers was not a new idea. Special Agent Richard McDonald surfaced that proposal after the OPM-SANG bombing, in the mid-October 1995 to mid-January 1996 timeframe. The proposal was discussed in several of the weekly security review meetings and serious concerns were raised. Specifically, the Security Police did not want to be sealed in because they would not be able to see what was going on outside the compound. EOD personnel stated that the wall might not be effective due to the physics of the blast wave. The proposal for a wall did not progress beyond this discussion phase.

In order to understand why the Saudis may have been reluctant to extend the perimeter fence farther out, the following factors should be taken into account. The Khobar Towers complex consists of dozens of tightly arranged high-rise buildings located in the middle of a densely populated metropolitan area. (See photograph #2 at Part B, Tab Y) According to the U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, the population of the Dhahran metropolitan area is approximately one million people. Khobar Towers is directly adjacent to civilian housing, religious buildings and a recreational area (children playing soccer, picnicking, etc.) available to Saudi civilians. (See photograph #5 at Part B, Tab Y). Any changes to the perimeter fence line and barriers, therefore, would have an impact on Saudi civilian lifestyle.

When interviewed by investigators from the Downing Task Force, Major Ray Elloso, Operations and Intelligence Advisor for the Western Region Headquarters, OPM-SANG, discussed an initiative to move barriers for a larger stand-off distance at OPM-SANG following the Khobar Towers bombing. He characterized the impact on the Saudis as, "We would be cutting off the community at large if we shut down the streets." (Photograph #2 at Part B, Tab Y depicts the amount of Saudi property needed beyond the perimeter to fully protect against the affects of a bomb the size of which detonated at Khobar Towers. As shown on the DSWA Patio Door Damage calculations in photograph #1, the potential damage extends to those areas within the 2,000 foot circle from the bomb site.)

Special Agent Reddecliff discussed with his Saudi counterpart his "best case scenario" where the parking lot on the north perimeter would be closed to vehicle traffic. The Saudis deemed such an action unnecessary considering the threat and other security measures already in place there, including undercover security personnel and unmarked cars. However, the Saudis did increase their patrols of the area.

An interview with Major General Sultan al-Mutairi, Commander, Eastern Province, Saudi Arabia, further underscores the Saudi sensitivity to expanding the Khobar Towers perimeter. The General told the Downing Task Force that the fence had been moved closer to the north side of Khobar Towers in 1994, by order of the Saudi Government because the fence denied local families easy access to their homes.

Because they were concerned about the vulnerability on the perimeter, Colonel Gary Boyle, Support Group Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Traister, Security Police Squadron Commander, testified they had asked their Saudi military counterparts to expand the north, east and west perimeters by moving the concrete barriers a short distance outside the fence. They also requested to move the fence and clear out vegetation growing on the north perimeter in order to provide better visibility. The request regarding the east and west perimeters was granted and concrete barriers were placed approximately five feet outside the fence. In addition, two rolls of concertina wire were installed between the barriers and the fence, and a third roll was added on top to prevent access over or through the fence. The requests to cut down the vegetation on the north perimeter were not granted because the Saudis did not want their people easily to see activities inside the compound, such as jogging in shorts and other Western attire. However, the vegetation was cut on the inside anyway and as much on the outside as could be reached. The requests to move the fence or place concrete barriers outside the fence also were not granted because the Saudis believed the distance was adequate to defend against a bomb such as the one used at OPM-SANG, and stated it was not a request that could be approved at that time. Mr. David Winn, the Consul General at Dhahran stated that moving the fence would be like "moving heaven and earth."

Brigadier General Schwalier was aware that these requests had been made and that the requests regarding the vegetation, the fence and the barriers on the north perimeter had not been granted. When questioned on why he did not elevate this issue, Brigadier General Schwalier stated that given the alternative cooperation received from the Saudis (e.g. increased Saudi patrols), other security measures taken, including measures to improve visibility (e.g., position of

rooftop sentries), the then-known threat, and the nature of the property involved (a public parking area, next to a public park and a mosque, used as a recreation areas), he believed that pursuing this from a higher level was not necessary and would have been fruitless. According to Lieutenant General Neal (USMC), "the Saudis convinced Brigadier General Schwalier in no short order that they were going to make up for not moving the fence by active patrols, increased patrols, and more active a more active [sic] vigilance." Brigadier General Schwalier stated he was not reluctant to pass things up the chain of command and cited operational examples of having done so, but added he did not have a reason to elevate the issue of removing vegetation and moving the barriers or the fence based upon the information that he knew at the time and the threat that he saw.

Lieutenant General Neal when interviewed by the Downing Commission summed up this issue as follows:

But at the end of the day, I mean, you have to cut to the chase, they [Saudi] were responsible for the outside security. The truck was outside the perimeter. Unfortunately, the bomb was of such a magnitude or such size that it broke through the perimeter.

Mr. Ted Kattouf, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy, Saudi Arabia, explained that even four months after the Khobar Towers bombing, the Saudis had not changed their view of terrorism activity in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, as of October 1996 they had not approved a request for enhanced security stand-off measures at the U.S. Embassy.

Size of the bomb: The Downing Task Force estimated the bomb contained the equivalent of from 3,000 to 8,000 pounds of TNT, "most likely about 5,000 pounds." The Secretary of Defense commissioned a special study by the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) Report, of which the Downing Task Force was aware, estimated that the bomb was much larger, that its likely yield was from 20,000 to 30,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent. General Downing testified he and his Task Force experts arrived at the 5,000 pound estimate based upon a number of factors. The first factor cited was their interview of an airman "who was in an unprotected position, 80 feet away from the bomb when it detonated, survived, and was on his feet the day after the bombing." This and other anecdotal evidence cited by General Downing, such as "...foliage still on trees and bushes in the vicinity of the blast..." is discussed by the DSWA in their report.

The DSWA found, in tests simulating the Khobar Towers explosive device, that lower pressures existed at various angles from the explosion. For example, the pressure at a 45-degree angle from the truck bomb to the Humvee parked at the northwest corner of Building 131, was three times lower than the pressure experienced by Building 131 directly to the rear of the truck bomb, and over seven times lower than pressure emanating from the sides of the truck bomb. The DSWA tests were conducted in conjunction with the Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station.

DSWA compared physical attributes of the Khobar Towers crater and blast with physical attributes of craters formed by vehicle bomb tests conducted under terrain conditions similar to those at Dhahran. DSWA determined that the "best" estimate for the Dhahran yield would be 11.5 tons or 23,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent explosive." DSWA compared the 5,000-pound TNT-equivalent yield estimate against the physical information known about the Khobar Towers crater and the crater information generated by the vehicle bomb tests, but found no correlation between the 5,000-pound estimate and this known information. Instead, DSWA found that the 5,000-pound value is implausible because it "implies a cratering efficiency greater than that produced by any known conventional explosive." DSWA's analysis of glass breakage from the Khobar Towers bombing resulted in an even larger estimated TNT-equivalent yield of 31,000 pounds. This figure was derived by plotting the actual number of windows broken at Khobar Towers on a computer-generated graph that depicts the number of glass patio doors that would be broken by the blast pressures generated by various TNT-equivalent yields.

A peer review by a panel of outside experts concluded the "DSWA analysis credibly supports the conclusion that the explosive power of the bomb was in the 20,000 pounds of TNT equivalent class and probably larger." The DSWA also noted that Building 133, located some 400 feet from the blast (much farther than the trees with remaining foliage) sustained major structural damage. The weight of the evidence supports the DSWA estimate as to the size of the explosive.

Brigadier General Schwalier's End-of-Tour Report. The Downing Report comments that, despite the significant change in the terrorist threat during his command tenure, Brigadier General Schwalier did not mention Force Protection in his end-of-tour report, which was written just prior to the bombing. The short end-of-tour report discussed three focus areas and discussed progress in those areas. Brigadier General Schwalier was writing this report to his commander, Lieutenant General Jumper, who was very familiar with the local environment and was aware of Force Protection measures that Brigadier General Schwalier had accomplished. While Force Protection was not mentioned as a major focus area, Brigadier General Schwalier did indicate in the report that he was suggesting seven more positions for tour extensions, including the Security Police Squadron Commander, the staff officer primarily responsible for Force Protection matters. The end-of-tour report also addressed one of the focus areas, maintaining good host nation relationships, which was important in obtaining positive results on security initiatives outside the fence. The end-of-tour report was not necessarily an all-inclusive list of accomplishments and concerns. For example, Brigadier General Schwalier did not mention flying safety or many other concerns or actions. The fact that Brigadier General Schwalier did not focus on Force Protection in his report does not, in my view, suggest that he did not focus on Force Protection during his tenure. A better measure of Brigadier General Schwalier interest in and emphasis on Force Protection is the sum total of his actions from the day he assumed command until the bombing.

IV. MISSION CONTEXT:

Having served for a number of years in USCENTCOM, I agree with General Peay that Force Protection must be framed in the context of the missions faced by USCENTCOM, and its subordinate commands, in USCENTCOM's area of operations. It is also important to understand the significant host nation sovereignty issues and cultural sensitivity issues faced by the 4404th Wing (Provisional) in Saudi Arabia, in particular, as well as at operating locations in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. To be effective in the USCENTCOM AOR, U.S. commanders must foster the necessary working relationships with their host nation counterparts.

Force Protection is, of course, one of many important factors affecting military operations which USCENTCOM must consider in the context of its overall mission. USCENTCOM's AOR consists of 20 countries, stretching from the Horn of Africa and Egypt through Jordan and the Gulf states to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and includes the waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and the western half of the Indian Ocean. It is

home to more than 400 million people making up 17 different ethnic groups, 420 tribal groupings, speaking six major languages, and hundreds of dialects. It is a place of ancient antagonisms and rivalries. On any given day, over a dozen conflicts plague the region ranging from terrorist activities to civil wars to inter-state wars--conflicts rooted in long-standing religious and tribal strife, competition for resources, economic strains, and exploding populations. We have U.S. personnel assigned or stationed in most of these countries.

The National Command Authorities (NCA)-directed mission of USCENTCOM, as directed in the JCS Unified Command Plan, is to defend the enduring and vital interests of the United States in this complex and volatile region. It includes meeting the challenges of: hostile states armed with ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and weapons of mass destruction; an aggressive Iraq; an expansionist Iran; India's and Pakistan's festering conflict; and instability and change within regional states. It also includes enforcing maritime intercept operations against Iraq in support of UN sanctions, conducting OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH over southern Iraq, deterring Iraqi and Iranian aggression, combating state-sponsored terrorism, improving military capabilities of regional friends, securing the flow of oil from the Gulf, and enforcing freedom of navigation on international waterways. These missions are accomplished with a relatively small, but robust and effective, mix of U.S. and coalition forces in the theater, augmented by deploying additional forces when necessary.

The United States expects, and USCENTCOM has demonstrated the ability to conduct contingency military operations within hours of an unfolding crisis, in spite of expansive geographical distances, the absence of treaties, diverse languages and cultures, differences in military capabilities of regional partners, host nation sensitivities, and differing degrees of access and presence in each of the regional countries. This is a daunting strategic challenge when military power must be projected over lines of communication extending more than 7,000 air-miles and over 12,000 sea-miles between the continental United States and the Gulf region. Additional propositioning of military hardware and supplies has facilitated USCENTCOM's ability to react quickly and effectively in responding to hostilities, as have its efforts to improve the capabilities of friendly nations within the region through security assistance and combined exercises.

In addition to ongoing maritime intercept operations and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, USCENTCOM has successfully engaged in several key contingency operations during the last two years including VIGILANT WARRIOR (the deployment of nearly 30,000 personnel to deter Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in October 1994), UNITED SHIELD (the deployment of nearly 15,000 personnel to oversee the withdrawal of United Nations peace keepers from Somalia in March 1995), VIGILANT SENTINEL (the deployment of nearly 5,000 personnel to deter Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in August 1995), DESERT FOCUS (implementation of Force Protection enhancements and relocation of U.S. forces in the Central Region commencing August 1996), and DESERT STRIKE (air and naval operations against Iraq in September 1996).

Gaining and sustaining the support of regional partners in these matters is a daily challenge. Working with the Saudi Arabians can be particularly challenging. What may appear on the surface as Saudi Arabian indifference or unwillingness to act on an issue is, in fact, a reflection of their different sense of time and perspective of that issue. Similarly, what may appear as foot dragging by various levels of government is often a reflection of the compartmentalized nature of Saudi Arabian government bureaucracy and decision making. Decisions at all levels can be slow by our standards and are often reached by consensus. In addition, the King's role as the custodian of two holy mosques of Islam heightens Saudi Arabian sensitivity.

Recognition by U.S. commanders of these dynamics, and sensitivity towards them, promotes internal stability, friendship, increased cooperation, and protection of mutual interests. The intricacies of working with the Saudi Arabians and other regional partners impact directly on Force Protection, particularly when the U.S. requests host government support, among other things, to carry out troop relocations, achieve stand-off, close roads, emplace barriers and guards, permit the carrying and use of firearms and make permanent changes to the Saudi-provided facilities. Because of these sovereignty concerns and significant host nation sensitivities, it is incumbent upon U.S. commanders to foster the necessary working relationships with their host nation counterparts to facilitate operations and transition to a wartime posture if necessary. These challenges differ in each of the countries in the region where USCENTCOM, JTF-SWA, and the 4404th Wing (Provisional) operate.

Acting under the tactical control of the Commander, JTF-SWA, and the operational control of USCENTAF, the 4404th Wing (Provisional), headquartered at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, is responsible for USAF aircraft operations at four other locations in Saudi Arabia, as well as operating locations in Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Shorter-term Airpower Expeditionary Force deployments to Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan also report directly to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional). Most of the sorties generated by the 4404th Wing (Provisional) are tasked and directed by the Commander, JTF-SWA, who reports directly to the Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM.

During the one-year period of Brigadier General Schwalier's command of the 4404th Wing (Provisional), July 19, 1995 through July 15, 1996, the Wing generated over 27,000 OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH combat sorties tasked by JTF-SWA to ensure Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 688, and 949. These resolutions resulted in the adoption by the coalition of first a "no-fly" zone and later a "no-drive" zone in southern Iraq. The 4404th Wing (Provisional) performed this complex and dangerous mission without a single mishap involving a USAF flight during Brigadier General Schwalier's tenure.

V. ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW:

a. Foundation. I was, and still am, deeply concerned for the victims of this terrible tragedy and their loved ones. I was also concerned about fairness to all individuals involved, accountability and the integrity of our disciplinary process. In conducting my review, I could not exercise "hindsight," but rather, I had to consider only the circumstances as they existed at and preceding the time of the bombing. I reviewed the facts known, or that should have reasonably been known, by the individuals and analyzed them accordingly.

My task was to determine if there were any acts or omissions by Air Force personnel involved in this tragic incident that were in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or other Air Force standards. I was to determine whether any of their acts or omissions failed to meet established standards, for which they should be held accountable. As a result of my findings, I must determine whether court-martial, nonjudicial punishment, administrative actions, or no action is appropriate. The most serious action is the referral (initiation) of court-martial charges.

I have taken this task very seriously and reviewed the evidence honestly and critically. I have made my decisions based upon the evidence and facts surrounding the incident, the law as it has been explained to me, my professional experiences, and technical advice provided by subject matter experts. It was in this context that I conducted my review.

b. The Law. As noted above, my task was to determine whether any Air Force personnel committed offenses punishable under the UCMJ or otherwise failed to meet Air Force standards. I considered all potential UCMJ offenses and focused particularly on dereliction of duty, the most likely UCMJ offense applicable to whether personnel performed their duties properly. I used the following legal framework to analyze the facts as they related to the possible offense of dereliction of duty, in violation of Article 92, UCMJ.

Dereliction of Duty - Article 92(3), UCMJ

"Any person subject to this chapter who is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial shall direct."

Elements: Dereliction in the performance of duties. Manual for Courts Martial (MCM)

That the accused had certain duties; That the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duties; and That the accused was (willfully) (through neglect or culpable inefficiency) derelict in the performance of those duties.

Explanation: Dereliction in the performance of duties.

Duty: A duty may be imposed by treaty, statute, regulation, lawful order, standard operating procedure, or custom of the service.

Knowledge: Actual knowledge of duties may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Actual knowledge need not be shown if the individual reasonably should have known of the duties. This may be demonstrated by regulations, training or operating manuals, customs of the service, academic literature or testimony, testimony of persons who have held similar or superior positions, or similar evidence.

Derelict: A person is derelict in the performance of duties when that person willfully or negligently fails to perform that person's duties or when that person performs them in a culpably inefficient manner. "Willfully" means intentionally. It refers to the doing of an act knowingly and purposely, specifically intending the natural and probable consequences of the act. "Negligently" means an act or omission of a person who is under a duty to use due care which exhibits a lack of that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. "Culpable inefficiency" is inefficiency for which there is no reasonable or just excuse.

c. Discussion. I have considered everyone in the military chain of command with Force Protection responsibilities associated with the Khobar Towers incident. I have not uncovered any evidence that causes me to believe anyone in that chain of command, or elsewhere, committed any offense punishable under the UCMJ or failed to meet Air Force standards.

In keeping with my charter, I have also considered the actions and omissions of General J.H. Binford Peay, III, (U.S. Army), Commander, USCENTCOM, and Major General Joseph Hurd (USAF), J-3, USCENTCOM, to determine whether there are any matters of concern to refer to the Secretary of Defense. I have not identified any matters of concern to be referred regarding their conduct.

This analysis first addresses the conduct and performance of military personnel at the 4404th Wing (Provisional), followed by the senior officers in the military chain of command.

1. Brigadier General Terryl J. Schwalier – Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional)

A. Force Protection Duties:

Brigadier General Schwalier, among his other duties, was responsible for:

Implementing, at the wing level, policy and guidance regarding Force Protection provided by the CINCCENT.

Detailed planning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executing Force Protection measures for the security of his command. These responsibilities were inherent in his position as Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of Brigadier General Schwalier, I considered whether or not he may have been derelict in the performance of those duties.

Brigadier General Schwalier, Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional), was responsible for implementing, at the wing level, policy and guidance regarding Force Protection provided by CINCCENT. He was also responsible for detailed planning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executing Force Protection measures for the security of his command. These responsibilities were inherent in his position as Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional). There is no question that he was actively engaged in enhancing Force Protection measures throughout his tenure as Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).

Brigadier General Schwalier arrived at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in July of 1995 to take command of the 4404th Wing (Provisional). He was the first commander of that unit to have been assigned for a one-year tour to provide greater continuity in key positions. Brigadier General Schwalier recommended additional key positions be converted to one-year tours to further increase stability. These positions consisted of members of his immediate staff, including: the Vice Wing Commander; the commanders of the Services, Transportation, and 4402 Reconnaissance Squadrons; the commanders of the Medical Group

and of the 4406 Support Flight; as well as the Chief of the Wing Operations Center.

A semi-annual AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment was underway when Brigadier General Schwalier arrived. He received it in September 1995 and began responding to the recommendations. While the Wing was working on the recommendations in this vulnerability assessment, terrorists exploded the car bomb in front of the OPM-SANG Headquarters in Riyadh. Before they could implement many of the changes, a new AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment was started in light of the heightened security concerns resulting from the bombing.

Immediately following the OPM-SANG bombing, Brigadier General Schwalier issued the first of many Battle Staff Directives (BSDs) aimed at further improving the Wing's security posture. He raised the Wing's local threat condition (THREATCON) to THREATCON BRAVO and set into motion more stringent Force Protection measures to contend with various types of possible attacks. Among other measures, Brigadier General Schwalier deployed physical barriers and serpentine driving control patterns at checkpoints; directed that stationary objects, such as trash dumpsters and parked vehicles, be moved at least 25 meters from all buildings; restricted off-base travel; implemented measures to check for letter and parcel bombs; suspended non-essential commercial deliveries; instituted procedures to verify the identity of unannounced or suspicious visitors; directed commanders to brief personnel at regular intervals on all forms of terrorist threats; and stressed increased threat awareness. He specifically directed Security Police to give attention to vulnerable points outside the installation.

In December 1995, Brigadier General Schwalier issued an additional BSD focused on security. Some of the measures he implemented in December included training the Disaster Control Group, conducting a tabletop terrorist bombing exercise, initiating weekly Security Review Meetings with his Security Police Squadron Commander, AFOSI Detachment Commander and Wing Intelligence Officer, and initiating numerous additional physical and personal security measures.

In January 1996, he reviewed the second AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment. This vulnerability assessment recommended 39 security measures. By the time of the bombing on June 25, 1996, 36 of the recommendations had been implemented. The two recommendations not immediately implemented concerned the installation of Mylar and a fire alarm system.

The Downing Report criticized the lack of DoD standards requiring warning systems and noted that Saudi construction standards for Khobar Towers-type buildings did not require a fire alarm system. The Report suggested that had there been a fire alarm system, the Wing might have been more successful in evacuating the building than it was relying on a floor-by-floor notification system. The Civil Engineer Squadron Commander at Khobar Towers at the time of the bombing, Lieutenant Colonel Robbin Schellhous, explained that the addition of a fire alarm system was not a high priority because the buildings were constructed out of concrete. Numerous civil engineers and commanders concurred in this decision over the preceding five years. Smoke detectors had been installed after the buildings had been completed.

In addition, USCENTAF Fire Protection Staff Assistance Visits (SAV) to the 4404th Wing (Provisional) were conducted on January 3-20, 1995, and January 2-18, 1996. Neither SAV mentions the lack of fire alarm systems or emergency lighting systems. The 1996 SAV on Khobar Towers contains a recommendation "That BCE [Base Civil Engineer] and senior leadership continue to actively support the AOR fire protection program (emphasis added)."

In January 1996, Brigadier General Schwalier also issued additional BSDs. Among other measures, he reinforced perimeters against possible high speed penetration by placing dumpsters at strategic locations, conducted the first quarterly Chiefs of Security Police Conference for units under his command, and initiated Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM), a security police program in Air Force Instruction 31-210.

Throughout his tour in Dhahran, Brigadier General Schwalier emphasized the need for security awareness. For example, he personally briefed incoming personnel in the Wing's "Right Start" newcomer's orientation briefing program, emphasizing the nature of the Saudi environment, known threats, and the need for vigilance and security consciousness. He commissioned security awareness and antiterrorism articles for the Wing newspaper and features for the closed circuit television Commander's Access Channel. He admonished his subordinate commanders to brief their personnel about security and safety concerns. While some Wing personnel interviewed stated they had not received antiterrorism briefings, the vast majority of those interviewed support the conclusion that antiterrorism briefings were conducted, that Brigadier General Schwalier was pro-active in this area, and that security awareness information was disseminated regularly.

He and his subordinate commanders asked coalition members and sister service leaders, as well as a National Intelligence Support Team official in-country, to critique their security efforts and to make constructive security enhancement recommendations. They found the Wing's efforts to be extensive and recommended no substantive changes. When asked about Force Protection at Khobar Towers after the OPM-SANG bombing, Colonel James R. Ward (U.S. Army), Commander, USARCENT, who had several hundred troops living at Khobar Towers, said: "there was a real sense of urgency;" "[w]ewere worried about a car bomb;" "[g]iven what we had done, we thought we had done a good job of presenting a hardened area that was not accessible."

Brigadier General Schwalier established the first 4404th Wing (Provisional) Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan which included several measures intended to enhance personal and physical security. These measures included Mylar window film, perimeter fence improvements, surveillance equipment for the perimeter, and a vehicle entry control facility.

The Downing Report was critical of Brigadier General Schwalier's decision not to install Mylar window film immediately following the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment. The Review Team made a special point to examine the issue of why Mylar was not installed on the windows in Khobar Towers as recommended.

Brigadier General Schwalier testified that he included Mylar in the Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan rather than seek approval for its immediate installation. While Brigadier General Schwalier certainly could have requested the project be considered for immediate approval and funding, the issue is whether it was reasonable at the time for him to postpone the installation in order to complete other projects and meet the known or anticipated threats.

I am aware that, of the other U.S. Armed Forces potential targets in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (e.g., the International School, USMTM, and the commissary at Riyadh), none had Mylar at the time of the Khobar Towers bombing. As stated previously, a State Department request to install Mylar on windows in some of their buildings in Riyadh following the OPM-SANG bombing was not approved because the threat level was not thought to be high enough. It was reasonable for Brigadier General Schwalier to delay undertaking what was estimated to be a four million dollar Mylar installation project.

Brigadier General Schwalier made this decision to defer immediate installation after discussions with his Support Group and Civil Engineering Squadron Commanders, and after considering a variety of factors, including the then-known threat, the effects of other security enhancements which had been or were being implemented to mitigate risks, the cost and complexity of the project, that there were no DoD or Air Force requirements for the installation of Mylar, that Saudi approval would have been necessary, and other competing priorities. Either a full-scale or piecemeal application would have taken months to implement.

It has been asserted that Mylar would have prevented several fatalities. There is some uncertainty here whether that assertion is accurate. When interviewed by the Downing Task Force, Colonel Paul Ray, (U.S. Army), the Third Army Engineer, opined that based on the actual effects of the bomb, "you could put all the Mylar on earth on your windows, but the building's going to be gone." The Wright Laboratory, Air Base Technology Branch, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, having reviewed the Downing investigation data and conducted studies of their own, concluded that Mylar would not have prevented any of the 18 fatalities in Building 131. These individuals sustained "fatal blunt trauma injuries from structural debris and translation/impact." However, the Wright Laboratory stated that Mylar might have prevented the one fatality in Building 133, which was approximately four hundred feet away from the detonation location. Glass fragmentation did cause many of the non-fatal injuries. Wright Laboratory concluded that the force of a large window mass "may still have caused a fatal injury." Brigadier General Schwalier decided to program for this four million dollar project in the Wing's Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan.

Based on the above and the Mylar discussion found in Section III, Part B of this report, I conclude that it was reasonable under the circumstances for Brigadier General Schwalier to delay the installation of Mylar.

Brigadier General Schwalier also submitted a FY96 unfunded budget request for additional Bitburg barriers, land mobile radios for the security police, and 765 additional concrete highway barriers for use around Wing facilities in Dhahran. Furthermore, he submitted unfunded budget requests for additional security measures at the other facilities in Saudi Arabia for which the Wing was responsible.

The Downing Task Force estimated that between five and 11 deaths would have occurred from even a 200 pound blast. The Task Force further opined that the deaths would have resulted from the effects of flying glass and not from blunt trauma. The implication is that Brigadier General Schwalier did not take sufficient action (install Mylar and/or increase the stand-off distance) to meet even the identified threat from a bomb blast of that size. In contrast, the DSWA determined that a 200 pound blast could theoretically take from one to five lives.. Based on the intelligence information available at the time and the recommendations made to him by his Civil Engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Schellhaus, Brigadier General Schwalier took all reasonable precautions to meet the identified threat. (See discussion of Mylar and Stand-off Distance in Part B, Section III.)

Lieutenant Colonel Schellhaus focused on addressing the recommendations captured in the vulnerability assessments. Based on the identified bomb threat, and given the fact that a 75 foot stand-off had been created, it was expected that the buildings would be safe.

Under Brigadier General Schwalier's leadership, even more rigorous security measures were implemented in the spring of 1996 as the period of the Hajj approached when terrorist activities are known to occur. The security measures included doubling concrete barriers along the fence line on the north, east and west perimeters, increasing Saudi patrols outside of the fence line, getting local police to check license plate numbers of suspicious vehicles, positioning manned sand-filled dump trucks to provide an emergency blocking of the entrance to the compound, installing M-60 machine-gun emplacements at the entrance, and placing armed sentries on building rooftops to gain better vantage points to observe activities beyond the perimeter fence.

On April 4, 1996, Special Agent Reddecliff sent a memo to Headquarters (HQ), AFOSI describing the steps he had taken to increase security at Khobar Towers, and seeking guidance on whether there was more that he could do. In the message, Special Agent Reddecliff stated

Security police measures here are outstanding, which in my view would lead a would-be terrorist to attempt an attack from a position outside the perimeter....[I]f a truck parks close to the fence line and the driver makes a quick getaway, I think the building should be cleared immediately.

HQ AFOSI recognized the threat described in the message and responded to Special Agent Reddecliff that from what they could see, he was "Right on the money in terms of [his] security concerns." They also provided Special Agent Reddecliff a list of ten investigative steps that he should take. Headquarters AFOSI stated they would use the information obtained from these investigative steps to help Special Agent Reddecliff enhance the Wing's security posture.

Special Agent Reddecliff did not show his message to Brigadier General Schwalier or to anyone else in the 4404th Wing's (Provisional) chain of command. The Downing Report concluded that by keeping the message internal, AFOSI "in effect, denied [Brigadier General Schwalier] direct access to Special Agent Reddecliff's prophetic 4 April message." Special Agent Reddecliff, however, did not view his message as concerning any matter that could be addressed by Brigadier General Schwalier. Instead, the message was solely intended to be an internal request for expert AFOSI analysis of and guidance on the situation at Khobar Towers.

The Downing Report concluded that personnel were provided inadequate security guidance when traveling off the installation. Regarding individual off-base activities, a variety of measures were used depending on the threat level and/or the terrorist events that transpired in the immediate region. At times, personnel were required to remain on the installation or restricted from visiting certain off-base locations. When off-base travel was permitted, personnel were directed to avoid agitated crowds or large groups of Westerners. They could not travel alone or in groups larger than four, and as noted in BSDs, they were restricted from visiting Bahrain where security incidents were not uncommon. The Wing dress and appearance instruction directed appropriate off-base attire. Wing personnel were instructed, through various means such as the Wing Newspaper and briefings by commanders, to maintain a low profile

outside the compound. Brigadier General Schwalier required unit commanders to brief and account for their personnel traveling off base. For senior personnel and distinguished visitors, who were most at risk for kidnapping or ambush, personal security officers were used, plus travel and lodging plans were designed to minimize the risk. I am convinced that Brigadier General Schwalier was concerned with and took reasonable measures to insure the safety of Wing personnel while traveling off the installation.

When one of the spring 1996 suspicious incidents included a possible threat indicator -- the suspected ramming of a Jersey barrier on the east perimeter-- the Wing obtained Saudi permission to secure the barriers by staking them into the ground. There were four incidents of possible surveillance that were potentially serious and reported to local Saudi authorities for further investigation. (A discussion of the other incidents reported, as well as the Wing responses, is contained in Section III, Part B.)

The 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not conduct formal evacuation exercises. Staff Sergeant Jeffrey Hill explained, "We were told building evacuations wouldn't be done as a drill. That way people wouldn't get redundant, and they told us that if someone told us to evacuate the building, that we do it, because it would be the real thing." When asked by the Downing Task Force, "So, in essence, they justified not going through drills because it would instill some complacency with everyone?," (Staff Sergeant Hill) responded "Right."

While some Wing personnel interviewed by the Downing Task Force stated that they were not aware of any building evacuations prior to the June 25th bombing, a review of the 4404th Security Police Squadron Desk Blotters reveals at least eight buildings were actually evacuated at Khobar Towers because Wing personnel discovered suspicious packages. In fact, Building 131, the building in front of which the bomb exploded was evacuated in May 9, 1996, because of a reported suspicious package, which turned out to be a tool box. It was evacuated because it was within the 300-foot cordon surrounding the suspicious package which was discovered in neighboring Building 129. The buildings were evacuated in five minutes or less, an interval which the Support Group Commander and the Wing Fire Chief, who were in charge of the evacuation scenes, considered to be as fast as possible.

The Downing Report suggested that Brigadier General Schwalier did not adequately address the potential threats posed by Third Country Nationals (TCNs) who worked at Khobar Towers, because he continued to employ them. The Wing implemented a number of specific measures regarding these threats. The number of TCNs living in the compound was reduced and movement restrictions within the compound were increased. Wing personnel were briefed on the need to increase scrutiny of TCN activities. Efforts to improve TCN living and working conditions were also initiated to increase their loyalty. These were reasonable steps to protect against the potential threat.

In summary, between November 1995 and June 25, 1996, the Wing implemented over 130 new security measures. Additional Force Protection measures, such as Mylar on the windows, barriers and surveillance cameras, were being planned and programmed for when the terrorist attack occurred. As previously discussed in Part B, Section III, of the 39 recommendations contained in the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment, the Wing had implemented 36, and two others were programmed in the Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan by June 25, 1996.

The one recommendation from the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment that was considered and not adopted was a recommendation to disperse mission essential personnel, such as aircrews, throughout the various facilities within the compound, rather than have all members of a given unit stay in any one location. Brigadier General Schwalier and the Wing leadership decided against adopting this recommendation because they believed it was preferable to maintain unit integrity.

The January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment did not include any recommendation to relocate personnel occupying rooms on the exterior of Khobar Towers. The Downing Report attributed to Colonel Boyle the statement that it would have adversely affected the quality of life at Khobar Towers had the Wing been forced to put two to three persons into each room of the interior buildings. A review of Colonel Boyle's interview reflects no such statement. Rather, Colonel Boyle was asked "Was there ever a staff recommendation to move people from the perimeter buildings into the interior based on the threats folks saw that week?" Colonel Boyle responded, "Never discussed that, never considered we had a threat large enough that we would want to do that ... [I]f we'd had a threat and we're doing it right now, we'd have done that, but we didn't think we had a threat like that." Likewise, Brigadier General Schwalier confirmed that he did not consider moving people based on the threat.

In discussing the issue of moving personnel from the exterior of the installation, Lieutenant General Jumper voiced a concern with densely packing the base population inside a compound with the threat assessment of a penetration. Had there been a penetration to the interior of the compound, Lieutenant General Jumper believed we would have seen many more casualties.

The testimony attributed to Colonel Boyle may be a response taken out of context. In his interview with the Downing Task Force, Colonel Boyle was asked for his recommendation "looking back on what happened ... hindsight ... Monday morning quarterback ... [W]hat are the lessons learned that you take away?" In that dialogue, he was asked the question, "You would take a less quality of life by going to a place like Jack and Jill Village?" Colonel Boyle's affirmative response must be considered in the context of his discussing the advantages of having facilities located in a rural, rather than an urban, environment.

Stand-off Distance, Moving the Barriers Outside the Perimeter Fence, and Moving the Perimeter Fence.

Neither the July 1995 nor the January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment contained any recommendation to extend the perimeter or enhance stand-off distances. As discussed in the Downing Report, DoD Handbook O-2000.12-H does not establish any required standards or provide guidance on stand-off distances for existing structures; rather, it mentions a 100-foot minimum set back between perimeter and exterior whenever possible for new construction.

The AFOSI in Dhahran consulted Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) for guidance on damage estimates for the buildings on the north perimeter. EOD believed the damage would be held to a minimum if vehicles were kept a minimum of 25 yards from the building.

The Downing Report is critical of Brigadier General Schwalier for not moving the perimeter in response to Attachment 3 to the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment. Attachment 3 is a background paper that considers the explosive effects of a car bomb with a main charge of 200 pounds of C-4.

The paper lists various targets, such as windows, metal buildings, concrete block and personnel, with the damage that could be anticipated at a certain level of overpressure. The paper's annotation that the standard security cordon for an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is 92.5 meters merely apprises the reader that EOD or other personnel should establish the security cordon at 92.5 meters regardless of the nature of the IED observed. It does not establish minimum stand-off distances around static (fixed) facilities.

The Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh related that a representative of his office had visited Khobar Towers prior to the bombing and was satisfied that the existing stand-off distance was adequate even though it was 20 feet less than the desired 100-foot State Department standard for fixed facilities. The RSO indicated that they would not have questioned an 80-foot stand-off distance even if the known threat had included a 1,000 pound bomb.

The Chief of the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) in Riyadh indicated that they considered the threat to be a bomb the size of the one that exploded at OPM-SANG, "maybe 500 pounds but -- we never went above 1,000 pounds." Additionally, the U.S. Consul General in Dhahran stated that "the thought of a 20,000 or even 5,000 pound bomb driving up was pretty inconceivable."

After the OPM-SANG bombing, the intelligence community provided warning of a heightened threat. The intelligence provided concerning explosives was suggestive and inferential, but was not specific. The intelligence available did not suggest the threat of a bomb of the magnitude used in the attack on Khobar Towers. According to the Chief of the NIST in Riyadh, when asked about the specificity of the intelligence data,

Everybody wants more [information] ... the reports didn't give a target ... there weren't many specifics ... that's just unfortunate...part of the life of terrorist reporting. But I never got the feeling that anyone was taking any of the reporting lightly. It was more of a feeling that they tried to do whatever they could ... but weren't sure what special steps it would take because we didn't have a specific [threat] ... whether it would be ... truck bomb ... kidnapping, assassination.

The minutes of the February 27, 1996 Force Protection Meeting hosted by the AFOSI Detachment assigned to the JTF-SWA indicate that the Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh described the current intelligence flow essentially as follows:

Since the OPM-SANG Bombing, intelligence information traffic regarding possible threats has increased; however, it also appears to be a lot more "junk" reporting is being provided than previously.

The U.S. Consul General in Dhahran at the time of the bombing stated "no one really thought anything was going to happen in Dhahran ... [I] never had a piece of paper or anyone else outlining any particular threat."

The specific information they did have on terrorist capability consisted of evidence concerning the size of the car bomb used in the OPM-SANG bombing, the equivalent of about 250 pounds of TNT," and numerous small pipe bombing incidents in nearby Bahrain. Senior U.S. officials in Saudi Arabia generally concluded that the upper limit of a terrorist bomb was no higher than what had been used in the OPM-SANG bombing. Likewise, the Saudis did not see a threat larger than the bomb at OPM-SANG.

Because they were concerned about increasing visibility on the perimeter, Colonel Gary Boyle, Support Group Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel James Traister, Security Police Squadron Commander, testified they had asked their Saudi military counterparts to move the concrete barriers a short distance outside the east, west and north fences and to clear out vegetation growing on the north perimeter. Colonel Boyle made his request in November 1995 after the OPM-SANG bombing while on a perimeter tour of the fence line with the Royal Saudi Air Force liaison officer. Lieutenant Colonel Traister made his request in April 1996. The request regarding the east and west perimeters was granted and concrete barriers were placed approximately five feet outside the fence.

Additional security measures were implemented, such as installing two rows of concertina wire between the barriers and the fence on the east and west perimeters, and a third row on top, to prevent access over or through the fence.

The request to cut down vegetation and to place barriers outside the vegetation on the north perimeter was not granted because the Saudis did not want their people easily to see activities inside the compound, such as jogging in shorts, and because they believed it was not necessary for security. Mr. David Winn, the Consul General at Dhahran, stated that moving the fence would be like "moving heaven and earth."

Brigadier General Schwalier was aware that these requests had been made and that the request regarding the vegetation and barrier outside the fence on the north perimeter had not been granted. He did not make a similar request or elevate the matter to his superiors given the alternative cooperation received from the Saudis (e.g. increased Saudi patrols), other security measures taken, including measures to improve visibility (e.g. posting of rooftop sentries), the then-known threat, and the nature of the property involved (a public parking area, used as a recreational area, next to a public park and a mosque). Brigadier General Schwalier stated he was not reluctant to pass things up the chain of command and cited examples of having done so, but added he did not have a reason and did not believe it would be fruitful to elevate the issue of removing vegetation and moving the barriers based upon the information that he knew at the time and the threat that he saw. According to Lieutenant General Neal (USMC), "the Saudis convinced Brigadier General Schwalier in no short order that they were going to make up for not moving the fence by active patrols, increased patrols, and more active a more active [sic] vigilance."

Special Agent Reddecliff discussed with his Saudi counterpart his "best case scenario" where the parking lot on the north perimeter was closed to vehicle traffic. The Saudis considered such an action unnecessary because there was no reason to do so, and they had sources and unmarked cars there. However, the Saudis did increase their patrols of the area.

The Downing Report criticized Brigadier General Schwalier for not raising the issue of expanding the perimeter or security outside of the fence with his superiors or with his Saudi counterparts in the Eastern Province. The expansion of the perimeter by moving the barriers or fence is clearly a critical issue. It

is impossible to state categorically that elevating the request up the chain of command would have been fruitless. Perhaps if Brigadier General Schwalier had discussed this matter with his Saudi counterpart or had elevated the request up the chain of command, sufficient political/diplomatic pressure could have been applied to convince the Saudis that the need to move the perimeter fence and/or the barriers was imperative. Brigadier General Schwalier determined otherwise based on all the circumstances known to him. I find Brigadier General Schwalier's decision reasonable. Brigadier General Schwalier chose to concentrate on those initiatives that he believed could be accomplished to meet the perceived threat.

Anecdotal information supports Brigadier General Schwalier's assessment that the Saudis would not have moved the north perimeter fence. The Deputy Chief of Mission stated that even four months after the bombing, the Saudis had not changed their view of terrorism activity in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, as of the time of the Deputy Chief's interview, the Saudis had not approved U.S. requests for enhanced security stand-off measures believed necessary at the U.S. Embassy.

Size of the bomb: (A detailed discussion of the facts concerning the size of the bomb is contained in Section III, Part B.) "A peer review by a panel of outside experts concluded the 'DSWA analysis credibly supports the conclusion that the explosive power of the bomb was in the 20,000 pounds of TNT equivalent class and probably larger.'" The weight of the evidence supports the DSWA estimate. As previously discussed, the specific nature of the threat, including the size of the bomb and target, was not anticipated by the Chief of National Intelligence Support Team, the Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. General Counsel at Dhahran, the Saudis, AFOSI, Brigadier General Schwalier, his Wing staff, nor anyone else in the military chain of command.

Force Protection.

Regarding Brigadier General Schwalier's overall emphasis on Force Protection, Major General Anderson testified that Brigadier General Schwalier was: "proactive, aggressive. I used the word earlier, and I don't use it in a negative sense, he was 'consumed' with force protection, and you saw it on every visit. I visited Khobar often, and it was never the same. There was always better force protection -- in-depth." His commitment to Force Protection was well-known throughout the Wing. For example, Colonel Boyle referred to Brigadier General Schwalier as "the Wing Security Officer."

The former Consul General to Dhahran, Mr. David Winn, a 25-year State Department veteran of the Middle East and a frequent visitor to Khobar Towers, observed that Brigadier General Schwalier's efforts "were so stringent, so draconian, so professional that I thought he almost had overreacted." Mr. Winn also stated that the security measures at Khobar Towers were so impressive that Khobar Towers was "in a league by itself" in comparison to other facilities in the region.

Brigadier General Schwalier's End-of-Tour Report. The Downing Report comments that, despite the significant change in the terrorist threat during his command tenure, Brigadier General Schwalier did not mention Force Protection in his end-of-tour report, which was written just prior to the bombing. The short end-of-tour report discussed three focus areas and discussed progress in those areas. Brigadier General Schwalier was writing this report to his commander, Lieutenant General Jumper, who was very familiar with the local environment and was aware of Force Protection measures that Brigadier General Schwalier had accomplished. While Force Protection was not mentioned as a major focus area, Brigadier General Schwalier did indicate in the report that he was suggesting seven more positions for tour extensions, including the Security Police Squadron Commander, the staff officer primarily responsible for Force Protection matters. The end-of-tour report also addressed one of the focus areas, maintaining good host nation relationships, which was important in obtaining positive results on security initiatives outside the fence. The end-of-tour report was not necessarily an all-inclusive list of accomplishments and concerns. For example, Brigadier General Schwalier did not mention flying safety or many other concerns or actions. The fact that Brigadier General Schwalier did not focus on Force Protection in his report does not, in my view, suggest that he did not focus on Force Protection during his tenure. A better measure of Brigadier General Schwalier interest in and emphasis on Force Protection is the sum total of his actions from the day he assumed command until the bombing.

C. Conclusion: Brigadier General Schwalier performed his duties in a reasonable and prudent manner. He was responsible for making many difficult decisions and using available resources to accomplish the mission. He was responsible for meeting the many challenges concerning the safety of his personnel. Under the circumstances, his actions were reasonable. He was not derelict in the performance of his duties.

2. Colonel Gary S. Boyle -- Support Group Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional)

A. Force Protection Duties:

Colonel Boyle, among his other duties, was responsible for:

Providing inputs and observations regarding Force Protection matters to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).

Implementing Force Protection directives issued by the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).

Ensuring the Security Police and Civil Engineers were performing their duties properly.

Coordinating security concerns with Saudi Arabian Counterparts.

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of Colonel Boyle, I considered whether or not he may have been derelict in the performance of his duties.

Colonel Boyle was the 4404th Support Group Commander. As such, he was the immediate supervisor of the Commanders of the Security Police, Civil Engineering, Communications, Mission Support, and Services Squadrons. As noted above, he was responsible for providing inputs and observations regarding Force Protection matters to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional), implementing Force Protection directives issued by Commander, 4404th

Wing (Provisional), and ensuring the Security Police and Civil Engineers, among others, were performing their duties properly. These duties were inherent in his position as Support Group Commander.

Colonel Boyle was actively engaged in enhancing Force Protection measures throughout his tenure as Commander, 4404th Support Group (Provisional). Because the Wing was concerned about increasing visibility on the perimeter, he and Lieutenant Colonel Traister testified they had asked their Saudi military counterpart to expand the north, east and west perimeters by moving the concrete barriers a short distance outside the fence, and to move the fence and clear out vegetation growing on the north perimeter. The request regarding the east and west perimeters was granted and concrete barriers were placed approximately five feet outside the fence. In addition, 40,000 linear feet of concertina was installed between the barriers and the fence, and on top of the barriers to prevent access over or through the fence. The request to cut down the vegetation and to place concrete barriers outside the vegetation on the north perimeter was not granted because the Saudis did not want their people easily to see activities inside the compound, such as jogging in shorts and other Western attire. The requests to move the fence or to place concrete barriers a short distance outside the north fence were not granted because the Saudis believed the distance was adequate to defend against a bomb such as the one used at OPM-SANG, and stated that these requests could not be approved at the time. Colonel Boyle did not ask for the fence to be moved a specific distance, but did state that he would have been "pleased to have gotten a space in the order of 100 feet from the building, ... even 150 feet (meaning an additional 20 to 70 feet from the north perimeter)." Lieutenant Colonel Traister also did not ask for a specific distance; he said he would have been pleased with having the barriers moved "to the outside of the fenceline, right up to the edge of the sidewalk."

Specific issues that may raise questions regarding Colonel Boyle's conduct include inadequate stand-off distances between the perimeter and the buildings, THREATCON manning situations, movement of personnel to other locations, lack of fire alarm systems, and the lack of evacuation exercises and adequate procedures. These issues are addressed in the analysis pertaining to Brigadier General Schwalier and in Part B, Section III. In addition, a discussion of the Downing Report's concerns about training, manning and equipping the guard force can be found in the analysis section pertaining to Lieutenant Colonel Traister. For the same reasons stated in those sections, I find that Colonel Boyle appropriately addressed Force Protection as related to these matters.

C. Conclusion: Colonel Boyle performed his duties in a reasonable and prudent manner. He was not derelict in the performance of his duties.

3. Lieutenant Colonel James J. Traister – Commander, 4404th Security Police Squadron (Provisional)

A. Force Protection Duties:

As the 4404th Security Police Squadron (Provisional) Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Traister, among his other duties, was responsible for:

Identifying, to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional), security weaknesses at the facilities under his command.

Providing technical advice about security matters to his chain of command.

Implementing security and law enforcement measures at those facilities.

Providing training, guidance, and oversight for Security Police in support of the Wing mission.

Coordinating with local Saudi Arabian counterparts.

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of Lieutenant Colonel Traister, I considered whether or not he may have been derelict in the performance of those duties.

Prior to being deployed to the 4404th Wing (Provisional), Lieutenant Colonel Traister reviewed the July 1995 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment and talked with former commanders of the 4404th (Provisional) Security Police Squadron. Upon arrival and throughout his tenure as Commander, 4404th Security Police Squadron, he was actively engaged in enhancing Force Protection measures. He was considered to be a superb squadron commander. My investigation revealed that Lieutenant Colonel Traister, with the support of Colonel Boyle and Brigadier General Schwalier, did more than any single person in the AOR to enhance the security of the facilities he was responsible for.

Lieutenant Colonel Traister diligently surveyed the environment, reviewed vulnerability reports and led the implementation of significant improvements. These included doubling concrete barriers along the fence line, increasing Saudi patrols outside of the fence line, getting local police to check license plate numbers of suspicious vehicles, positioning manned sand-filled dump trucks to provide an emergency blocking of the entrance to the compound, installing M-60 machine-gun emplacements at the entrance, seeking and obtaining additional bomb-detection dogs, placing armed sentries on building rooftops to gain better vantage points and filling and positioning 25,000 sand bags at key locations.

As was Colonel Boyle, Lieutenant Colonel Traister was concerned with increasing visibility on the perimeter. He and Colonel Boyle testified they had asked their Saudi military counterparts to expand the north, east and west perimeters by moving the concrete barriers a short distance outside the north fence and to clear out vegetation growing on the north perimeter. The requests to cut down the vegetation and to place concrete barriers outside the vegetation on the north perimeter were not granted because the Saudis did not want their people easily to see activities inside the compound, such as jogging in shorts or other western attire. The requests to move the fence or to place concrete barriers a short distance outside the north fence were not granted because the Saudis believed the distance was adequate to defend against a bomb such as the one used at OPM-SANG, and stated that these requests could not be approved at the time. The request regarding the east and west perimeters was granted and concrete barriers were placed approximately five feet outside the fence. In addition, 40,000 linear feet of concertina wire was installed between the barriers and the fence, and added on top of the fence to prevent access over or through the fence.

Lieutenant Colonel Traister insured sufficient manning to meet mission requirements. As previously discussed, manning was appropriate for the known threat. Had it been necessary to maintain THREATCON CHARLIE for a sustained period, indicated that he would have requested additional manning.

The Downing Report is critical of the training, manning, and equipment of the guard force. The Downing Report concluded that individuals were issued weapons that had not been maintained, zeroed or fired, nor was weapons training conducted in-country. The Task Force also made nonspecific statements that they found dirty weapons which may not have functioned properly if fired.

Regarding the concern that no formal training program existed, Colonel Boyle stated:

...People come here trained, this is not a training environment, it's a contingency zone, so they don't get formal training where you have an [on the job training] record and you have things certified and checked off, but we were training them on things like that.

Our review determined that the Wing was carefully checking the training and qualification status of arriving members. In one instance, Wing personnel discovered one arriving security policeman who was not qualified with his M-16. He was taken to a firing range used by the French and qualified. Lieutenant Colonel Traister was also in the process of obtaining 5,000 M-60 rounds for firearms training.

In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Traister was aware of the nature of the various threats and he created a special response team to deal with them. He also required his personnel to practice with trucks positioned at the main gate to ram any vehicle attempting to penetrate the entrance checkpoint. Brigadier General Schwalier provided security awareness training to Wing personnel. For example, he personally briefed incoming personnel in the Wing's "Right Start" newcomers orientation briefing program, emphasizing the nature of the Saudi environment, known threats, and the need for vigilance and security consciousness. Additionally, the Wing newspaper often contained articles reminding personnel of the terrorist threat in the AOR and measures they should take to minimize being a victim of a terrorist attack. In addition, many of the Battle Staff Directives issued by Brigadier General Schwalier alerted Wing personnel of various security measures. Further, OSI agents provided antiterrorism training and briefings to the security police at guardmounts, at Lieutenant Colonel Traister's request.

The statement in the Downing Report that individuals were issued weapons that they had not maintained, zeroed, or fired and which, in some instances, may not have been able to be fired was so general that it was difficult to confirm by later investigation. In my review, I was unable to find any independent evidence to support this statement by the Downing Task Force. Unlike the Army, Air Force security police, while qualified, did not deploy with their weapons; rather, they were issued weapons upon arrival. It is true that it is difficult to maintain clean weapons in a desert environment, and these weapons had been in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War in 1991. There is no way to determine the condition of the weapons at the time of the arrival of the Wing leadership or the bombing. We questioned Lieutenant Colonel Traister regarding this Downing Report allegation. Lieutenant Colonel Traister stated he conducted weapons inspections at guardmount. He also made spot inspections of weapons in the armory, and issued a policy requiring security police personnel to clean their weapons weekly. He was satisfied that the weapons were in good working order. The evidence we found did not suggest Lieutenant Colonel Traister failed to take appropriate steps. Nevertheless, as this is a potential problem which would clearly impact the effectiveness of deployed Air Force security, we recommended in Part A that in the future, the Air Force deploy security police as units with their assigned weapons fully-sighted and that weapons qualifications are current and complete prior to deployment.

The Downing Report asserts that the 4404th Wing security police guards "were on 12-hour shifts for six days or longer. Some worked on the same observation post for 12 hours at a time, exposed to 100 degree heat, with only meal and comfort breaks." It is true that Wing security police worked in 12-hour shifts. According to Colonel Boyle, half of the bases in Air Combat Command (ACC) routinely schedule their security police to work 12-hour shifts. ACC is the service Major Command for the 4404th Wing (Provisional). The 4404th security police, therefore, in working 12-hour shifts, were not being asked to do any more than they would have been asked at a comparable ACC base. Further, during Lieutenant Colonel Traister's tenure as Security Police Squadron Commander, although the security police guards worked 12-hour shifts, they did not work the same post for the entire 12 hours, and they were given more than meal and latrine breaks during their shifts. The security police would periodically swap posts during their shifts. During the hottest parts of the day, they would be allowed up to three hours break-time to cool off in the shade. Lieutenant Colonel Traister would sometimes use his staff members to relieve the main gate guards.

Lieutenant Colonel Traister frequently sought the advice of other security experts and asked for their observations about his Force Protection initiatives. He improved relations with his Saudi counterparts and engaged them in enhancing Force Protection efforts. As a result of his extensive efforts, Khobar Towers was, on occasion, referred to as "Fort Traister."

The Downing Task Force criticized the Wing for choosing to concentrate the majority of its Force protection efforts on preventing a penetration of the perimeter by a car, truck, or man made suicide bomb. Photograph #3 at Part B, Tab Y, shows the range of potential damage had the terrorists been able to penetrate the perimeter at Khobar Towers and detonated the bomb near the dining facility.

Other specific issues that may raise questions regarding Lieutenant Colonel Traister's conduct include inadequate stand-off distances between the perimeter and the buildings, THREATCON manning situations and lack of evacuation exercises and adequate procedures. These issues are addressed in the analysis pertaining to Brigadier General Schwalier and in Part B, Section III. For the same reasons stated in those sections, I find Lieutenant Colonel Traister properly addressed Force Protection as related to those matters.

When interviewed by members of the Downing Task Force and asked to what he attributed all the increased Force Protection measures at Khobar Towers post-OPM-SANG, Major Kelly M. Langdorf (U.S. Army), the ARCENT Security Officer explained:

Lieutenant Colonel Traister. He came in, took a look at what was there and said there's a lot more we can do. He started doing it. He's a very dynamic individual, worked his butt off, worked his peoples' butt off the entire time he was here.

C. Conclusion: Lieutenant Colonel Traister performed his duties in a reasonable and prudent manner. He was not derelict in the performance of his duties.

4. Special Agent Richard M. Reddecliff – Commander, AFOSI Det 241, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

A. Force Protection Duties:

Special Agent Reddecliff, among his other duties, was responsible for:

Identifying to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) security weaknesses at the facilities under his command.

Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating "threat" information.

Coordinating with U.S. and host nation security and law enforcement agencies concerning "threats" to the security of the 4404th Wing (Provisional).

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of Special Agent Reddecliff, I considered whether or not he may have been derelict in the performance of his duties.

Special Agent Reddecliff was actively engaged in enhancing Force Protection measures throughout his tenure as Commander, AFOSI Detachment 241. Much of his involvement and actions in Force Protection matters are outlined in the message he sent to AFOSI Headquarters on April 4, 1996, and as described in Brigadier General Schwalier's testimony.

Special Agent Reddecliff's actions relating to obtaining threat information from all available sources were reasonable under the circumstances. He consulted with national intelligence agencies and higher headquarters in an effort to obtain information they could provide

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Special Agent Steve Kipp, Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations, visited Khobar Towers after the Hajj in May 1996 and conducted an informal physical security assessment. He provided Special Agent Reddecliff a list of recommendations, one of which was to build a 9 - 12 foot concrete wall around the Khobar Towers facility or, at a minimum, along the north perimeter. Special Agent Reddecliff considered the recommendation for construction of the wall, but decided not to send it forward because it was his belief that the Saudis had a good hold on the security of the parking lot, that Special Agent Kipp had not come up with any new vulnerability or threat information, and it would have required Saudi approval of a contracting action.. As Special Agent Reddecliff stated:

I was unaware of any particular physical security expertise that he had. I don't believe it was a detailed study, and given my working relationship with Brigadier General Schwalier and my knowledge of what I perceived his impression or his reaction to be, I did not think that he would build a wall based on one recommendation. To my knowledge, no other recommendation had come in before or after regarding that wall, including the vulnerability assessments and so forth. So it was for these reasons that I pressed on without moving that forward.

The idea of a wall around the perimeter of Khobar Towers was not a new idea. Special Agent McDonald surfaced that proposal after the OPM-SANG bombing, in the mid-October 1995 to mid-January 1996 timeframe. The proposal was discussed in one of the weekly security review meetings and serious security concerns were raised. Specifically, the Security Police did not want to be sealed in because they would not be able to see what was going on outside the compound. EOD personnel also stated that the wall might not be effective due to the physics a bomb's blast wave. The proposal for a wall did not progress beyond this discussion phase.

Special Agent Reddecliff discussed with his Saudi counterpart his "best case scenario" where the parking lot on the north perimeter would be closed to vehicle traffic. The Saudis considered such an action unnecessary because there was no reason to do so, and they had undercover security personnel and unmarked cars there. However, the Saudis did increase their patrols of the area.

C. Conclusion: Special Agent Reddecliff performed his duties in a reasonable and prudent manner. He was not derelict in the performance of his duties.

5. Lieutenant General Carl L. Franklin -- Formerly Commander JTF-SWA and Presently Commander, USCENTAF

A. Force Protection Duties:

During the last few weeks of his tour as Commander, JTF-SWA, Lieutenant General Franklin, among his other duties, was responsible for:

Coordination and oversight of Force Protection in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (These responsibilities were assigned by CINCCENT in April 1996 to clarify Force Protection responsibilities in the AOR.)

Responsibility for Force Protection matters as they related to the facilities and personnel under his command in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of Lieutenant General Franklin, I considered whether or not he may have been derelict in the performance of those duties.

Throughout most of Lieutenant General Franklin's tenure as Commander, JTF-SWA, he had actual authority and responsibility for Force Protection matters relating only to the facilities and staff personnel under his command in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This consisted of less than 200 assigned personnel and a

relatively small facility.

Lieutenant General Franklin actively participated in Force Protection, both for his own troops and facilities and for personnel and facilities under other commanders in the AOR. For example, he directed a sandbag wall be erected to protect the Joint Intelligence Center located on a main street in Riyadh. Lieutenant General Richard I. Neal described Lieutenant General Franklin as a "very forward reading [sic] commander out there who worked the problem ... from a macro sense." He further stated that Lieutenant General Franklin took Force Protection seriously, he was the ideal officer for making Force Protection issue important throughout JTF-SWA and the commands thereunder. Lieutenant General Franklin was not hesitant to elevate the threat condition if he sensed something was wrong. In addition, Lieutenant General Franklin, as JTF-SWA, attended the February 1996 USCENTCOM Component Commanders Conference in which Force Protection issues and future enhancements were discussed in developing the USCENTCOM LOI.

Lieutenant General Franklin left prior to the Khobar Towers bombing and assumed command of Ninth Air Force and USCENAF on June 6, 1996.

C. Conclusion: Lieutenant General Franklin performed his duties in a reasonable and prudent manner. He was not derelict in the performance of his duties.

6. Major General Kurt B. Anderson – Commander, Joint Task Force - Southwest Asia

A. Force Protection Duties:

Major General Anderson, among his other duties, is responsible for:

Coordination and oversight of Force Protection in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Force Protection matters as they relate to the facilities and personnel under his command in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of Major General Anderson, I considered whether or not he may have been derelict in the performance of those duties.

Major General Anderson's duties were established by CINC CENTCOM in a Letter of Instruction issued on April 12, 1996. Major General Anderson assumed command of JTF-SWA on April 27, 1996. His tour was for one year. As of the day of the bombing at Khobar Towers, June 25, 1996, Major General Anderson had been the Commander, JTF-SWA, for approximately two months. During that time, he worked to implement the provisions of the April 12, 1996, USCENTCOM LOI on Force Protection. For example, he established a review process for vulnerability assessments to ensure local responses to recommendations contained in the assessments were being implemented. This review process called for vulnerability assessments to be conducted semiannually and commanders to report their actions to Major General Anderson and his Force Protection officer for their review and coordination. Major General Anderson visited Khobar Towers several times in the first two months of his command and noted increases in security measures on each visit.

Major General Anderson attended meetings of the Emergency Action Committee held at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, he attended country-wide Force Protection Coordination Meetings in Riyadh, and gave direction to his own Executive Force Protection Committee at which matters of Force Protection and threat assessments were discussed. He regularly discussed Force Protection with Brigadier General Schwalier and General Peay.

C. Conclusion: Major General Anderson performed his duties in a reasonable and prudent manner. He was not derelict in the performance of his duties.

7. Lieutenant General John P. Jumper – Commander, USCENAF

A. Force Protection Duties:

Lieutenant General Jumper, among his other duties, was responsible for:

Operational control over air assets and was a force provider for the CINC USCENTCOM.

Supervising the efforts of the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) and therefore, responsible to review those efforts for adequacy and appropriateness.

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of Lieutenant General Jumper, I considered whether or not he may have been derelict in the performance of those duties.

Lieutenant General Jumper had Operational Control (OPCON) over the 4404th Wing (Provisional). He was Brigadier General Schwalier's immediate supervisor. He had the duty to provide guidance to and supervision of Brigadier General Schwalier. This included guidance and supervision for matters relating to Force Protection.

The Downing Report found specific fault with the absence of USCENAF chain of command physical security inspections of the region and at Khobar Towers. While formal military inspections by USCENAF were not accomplished, the Commander, USCENAF made frequent trips to the region. In response to OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR, Lieutenant General Jumper and 65 staff members also deployed on October 16, 1994, to Saudi Arabia and he assumed command of JTF-SWA in Riyadh on October 17, 1994. During the October 12-13, 1995 trip to the AOR, Lieutenant General Jumper visited Dhahran. Lieutenant General Jumper returned to Dhahran and other AOR locations during the period of November 13-21, 1995 and again visited facilities and was briefed on security measures. He made additional trips to the AOR during the periods of December 5-15, 1995, and April 14-24, 1996,

although they did not include specific visits to Dhahran or Khobar Towers.

In addition to personally visiting and reviewing Khobar Towers on November 19-20, 1995, Lieutenant General Jumper spoke frequently with Brigadier General Schwalier by telephone. These discussions included security matters at Khobar Towers and at other locations under the Wing's jurisdiction. During these visits and conversations, Lieutenant General Jumper assured himself that Brigadier General Schwalier and his staff were focused and engaged in active Force Protection measures. He agreed with their focus on the multitude of possible threats with emphasis on preventing a penetration of the facility. In addition, he deployed members of his immediate staff, including Lieutenant Colonel James J. Traister, a career security policeman, to serve at the 4404th Wing (Provisional) and at other locations after he reviewed the AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment.

As stated, Lieutenant General Jumper and his staff traveled to the AOR on numerous occasions and were very familiar with and engaged in the operations there. Major General Arnold R. Thomas, Vice Commander, USCENTAF, also deployed to the AOR as Commander, JTF-SWA.

USCENTAF Fire Protection Staff Assistance Visits (SAV) to the 4404th Wing (Provisional) were conducted on January 3-20, 1995, and January 2-18, 1996. The 1996 SAV on Khobar Towers contains a recommendation "That BCE [Base Civil Engineer] and senior leadership continue to actively support the AOR fire protection program." Although not inspections, as contemplated by the Downing Task Force, these SAVs reflect USCENTAF involvement to identify issues and potential problems.

The Downing Report also criticized CENTAF for not conducting theater specific training in antiterrorism (but relying instead on generic Air Force deployment standards) and for making no effort to modify the Air Force 90-day rotation policy. It was reasonable for Brigadier General Schwalier to rely on the generic Air Force training plus additional in-theater training. Staff Sergeant Guerrero, the Security Policeman who saw the terrorists' truck and sounded the alarm, testified that the Security Police duties they were doing in Dhahran were things they had been trained for in their regular Security Police Squadrons.

There probably wasn't anything they could have told us at our home station that would have helped us over here because, like I said, as a Security Policeman, we're always trained in evacuation; we're trained in response to alert aircraft, that kind of thing. Everybody knows that's kind of taught to you from day one. This is what you do.

Staff Sergeant Guerrero characterized the "Right Start" briefing as "pretty good, excellent – That's probably the best information we got of what we are dealing with," and, in addition, he testified to the daily briefings given at guardmount prior to going on duty. So the combination of their regular training plus in-theater training adequately prepared the Security Police for the challenges facing them at Khobar Towers.

USCENTAF responded to requests for assistance from the 4404th Wing (Provisional). For example, USCENTAF provided additional bomb detection dogs for the security police, sent approximately 75 security police to Kuwait when requested by the Wing, and supported a recommended increase in tour lengths for key personnel.

Lieutenant General Jumper attended the February 1996 USCENTCOM Component Commanders Conference in which Force Protection issues and future enhancements were discussed in developing the USCENTCOM LOI.

C. Conclusion: Lieutenant General Jumper performed his duties in a reasonable and prudent manner. He was not derelict in the performance of his duties.

8. Major General Joseph Hurd - J-3, USCENTCOM

A. Force Protection Duties:

As the J-3, USCENTCOM, Major General Hurd, among his other duties, was responsible for:

Managing the command's Force Protection Program and was General Peay's primary Action Officer for these matters.

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of Major General Hurd, I considered whether or not he may have been derelict in the performance of those duties.

Based on the same facts as outlined in the discussion of General Peay's actions, Major General Hurd performed his duties in a reasonable and prudent manner.

C. Conclusion: Major General Hurd was not derelict in the performance of his duties.

9. General J.H. Binford Peay, III – Commander-In-Chief, USCENTCOM;

A. Force Protection Duties:

As Commander-In-Chief, USCENTCOM, General Peay, among his other duties, was responsible for:

Refining policy and guidance provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fit theater conditions under his command.

Assessing the "threat" for the theater and providing these assessments to the Services.

Ensuring proper coordination of local policies and measures for Force Protection.

Serving as DoD point of contact with Embassies and host nation officials within the theater.

B. Analysis: Given the responsibilities of General Peay, I considered whether during the course of my review I had identified reason to believe that General Peay may have been derelict in the performance of those duties.

The command and control arrangements General Peay implemented reflected the principles and guidelines detailed in Joint Publication 1 (Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the U.S.), Joint Publication 0-2 (Unified Action Armed Forces), Joint Publication 3-0 (Doctrine for Joint Operations), Joint Publication 3-07.2 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Anti-Terrorism), and Joint Publication 3-10.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense). I note that USCENTCOM has few assigned forces and that almost all of its forces are provided to the unified command by component commands, with OPCON for specific missions. The USCENTCOM command and control arrangement stressed command through the service components to rapidly execute a crisis response and smoothly transition to war, if necessary. This is similar to the command and control arrangements applicable to the other CINCs. OPCON runs from the CINC to the component commander to the installation or unit commander, with tactical level Force Protection being the responsibility of the installation or unit commander. Though the great distances between Headquarters USCENTCOM, ARCENT and CENTAF and their installations and units in the USCENTCOM AOR placed significant demands upon those commanders, these demands were not unusual. In fact, it is the very nature of most contingency operations scenarios that drives this posture. These same demands are also present for CINC U.S. Pacific Command, CINC U.S. Southern Command, and CINC U.S. European Command who must also discharge multifaceted responsibilities over great distances. The introduction of modern, rapid, secure, and reliable telecommunications systems permits senior commanders to control forces with fewer forward positioned staffs and infrastructure. Split-based operations, which require a balance between forward and rear area staffs, have become a crucial aspect of America's smaller post-Cold War military. I found that General Peay and his staff attempted to compensate for these long distances by making frequent visits to the AOR.

In addition, General Peay conducted routine meetings with subordinate commanders and staffs, directed his component commanders to make frequent visits to the AOR, and issued detailed guidance for Force Protection through regular messages, LOIs, and orders.

After the OPM-SANG bombing in November 1995, General Peay and his staff, through Major General Hurd, reviewed and clarified Force Protection relationships and responsibilities. USCENTCOM established a Force Protection Board as a link to the component commanders and the field on Force Protection matters. The Force Protection Board had representation from across the USCENTCOM staff. Message guidance was provided on Force Protection issues, requesting feedback information on Force Protection enhancements since the previous message on the subject. These messages also detailed responsibilities and stressed the need to reassess Force Protection measures in light of this event. In February 1996, General Peay convened a Component Commanders' Conference at which Force Protection matters were discussed and the USCENTCOM LOI was developed.

In response to concerns expressed by then-Major General Franklin, Commander, JTF-SWA, that Force Protection actions were not consistent within Saudi Arabia, General Peay also designated the Commander, JTF-SWA as his senior representative for Force Protection to ensure consistency.

I have not identified any matters of concern regarding General Peay which need to be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

10. Negligent homicide in violation of Article 134, UCMJ. I found no evidence to conclude that any service member acted with a lack of that degree of care for the safety of others which a reasonably careful person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances or in such a manner that their actions or omissions could in any way be considered the proximate cause (the primary cause producing the injury or event) of the bombing or any of the tragic deaths.

11. Air Force Standards. I have also considered whether any acts or omissions by these officers failed to meet Air Force standards and should therefore result in administrative discipline. I conclude that there were no acts or omissions that failed to meet Air Force standards and warrant such action.

It is my firm belief that the tragic bombing of Khobar Towers would have occurred regardless of any chain of command that might have been in effect. Commanders, from General Peay down through the Security Police Squadron Commander at the 4404th Wing (Provisional), knew their Force Protection responsibilities and were actively engaged in carrying them out. This tragedy reflects the harsh reality that a persistent terrorist may be able to wait, watch, and pick the optimum time, place and mode of attack to ensure success.

CONCLUSION

I believe the nation's Armed Forces and especially the Air Force should be indebted to General Downing and his Task Force for their recommendations to enhance security of our forces. My review team concurred with the vast majority of their findings and recommendations on Force Protection, as noted in Part A of this report. Many improvements have already been made as a direct result of their efforts.

After carefully reviewing all of the evidence, I believe that the chain of command of the 4404th Wing (Provisional) and their superiors performed their duties in a reasonable manner given the known threat and the situation in Dhahran.

The Downing Task Force indicated they were impressed with the magnificent work being performed by Americans throughout the region and added:

The 4404th Wing (Provisional) was especially notable. The reaction of these men and women to the bombing on the night of June 25th saved many lives...The Wing reconstituted and began flying combat missions over Iraq within 48 hours of the tragedy, a testament to the professionalism and fortitude we observed throughout the command. (Emphasis added)

I not only believe that the 4404th Wing (Provisional) performed their duties in a reasonable manner under the circumstances as they existed, but I also

believe they performed their duties with "professionalism and fortitude"--before, during, and after the terrorist bombing attack on Khobar Towers.

We have a responsibility to use our very best efforts to minimize the risks from future terrorist acts, but we must also recognize that we will never achieve perfection in Force Protection, or in any endeavor, despite our best efforts. Risks are inherent in military operations. Expecting Force Protection efforts to result in zero casualties could well lead to a situation where military missions are undertaken worldwide only when there are no risks of casualties, or only when such risks are extremely minimal. Evolving to this mindset is neither realistic nor desirable. Our focus must be able to deploy and employ when our national security interests are at stake.

Finally, this nation must never forget that the bombing of Khobar Towers was not an accident--it was a cold-blooded terrorist act of murder.

[Appendices](#)



Terrorism Resources

Appendix 1

COMMENTS REGARDING THE DOWNING REPORT

RELATING TO ACCOUNTABILITY

a. Introduction. The Secretary of Defense, in his report to the President, commented on the important contributions of the Downing Task Force Report (hereinafter referred to as the Task Force Report). He stated, "On the whole, I accept General Downing's recommendations and I believe we can take effective action to deal with each of the problems identified in his comprehensive report." In Part A of this report, my review team supported, or partially supported, 22 of the 24 Task Force Report findings and recommendations. The Air Force has already accepted our recommendations in Part A on how the Air Force should organize, train, and equip for Force Protection and has already begun implementing them. However, Part A did not address Findings 19 and 20 as they relate to accountability. Finding 19 states, "The chain of command did not provide adequate guidance and support to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional). Finding 20 states, "The Commander 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack."

From my perspective, the different far reaching focus and the desire to deliver results in a very short period of time led to findings and conclusions in the Task Force Report, relating to the critical area of accountability, without a sufficiently in-depth investigation or substantiation of evidence. Consequently, individuals were unfairly and publicly criticized as being derelict in their duties for failure to properly provide Force Protection. I did not have the same time constraints, and benefited from General Downing's work products and observations. Further, the focus of my inquiry was considerably more narrow than General Downing's. My review team went to great lengths to thoroughly investigate and assess whether the actions of those in the military chain of command were reasonable under the circumstances. I found that all commanders in the chain of command not only acted

reasonably, but professionally, under the circumstances known to them at the time.

b. Comments. This section will focus specifically on the accountability issues of Findings 19 and 20 in the Task Force Report. This section will also discuss those portions of other Findings addressed in Part A, which relate to accountability under the "Additional Task Force header." Findings 19 and 20 contain numerous "assessments" by the Downing Task Force which I discuss in my "comments" below in the order of their appearance in the Task Force Report, referenced to the page number in the classified version of the Report.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 62) FINDING 19: The chain of command did not provide adequate guidance and support to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).

Task Force Assessment: (Page 62) The Task Force determined that conditions and circumstances created at all levels of the chain of command caused vulnerabilities that were exploited in the actual attack.

Comments: Following the OPM-SANG bombing, commanders at all levels in the chain of command went to Saudi Arabia and assessed the changing terrorist threat and associated Force Protection measures. Soon after the OPM-SANG bombing, General Peay met with the ambassadors in the region to discuss shared security responsibilities. He met with his senior component commanders and with senior military leaders in regional countries to review the terrorist threat, chain of command responsibilities, and legal and military Force Protection responsibilities. On November 13, 1995, USCENTCOM changed the threat level from "medium" to "high" and reassessments of the security of facilities were directed theater-wide. Between November 13, 1995 and April 12, 1996, USCENTCOM dispatched seven messages to subordinate units related to Force Protection. One of the purposes of the messages was to ensure that all commanders understood their responsibilities in an effort to prevent another OPM-SANG type incident. These messages set the tone for Force Protection measures in the USCENTCOM AOR. For example, they started by implementing the SECDEF directive to review installation antiterrorism measures and advising commanders to "go the extra mile" and to err on the side of being "overly cautious." They also required commanders to forward information about their Force Protection efforts including their latest vulnerability assessments for "full staff review" and to help "...refine Force Protection enhancements and develop support relationships."

In response to concerns that Force Protection actions were not consistent within Saudi Arabia, General Peay used his mid-winter Commander's Conference (February 1996) to conduct follow-on discussions with component commanders on Force Protection. This conference resulted in the publication of the USCENTCOM April 12, 1996 Letter of Instruction (LOI) on Force Protection. The LOI outlined Force Protection responsibilities and established the oversight role of the Commander, JTF-SWA, for combatant forces and support personnel in Saudi Arabia. General Peay designated the Commander, JTF-SWA, as his senior representative so that General Peay would have "more control forward in terms of executing force protection.... [He] wanted a capability there to respond to threats more quickly than [sic] to respond from seven thousand miles away...."

USCENTCOM has few assigned forces. Almost all of its forces are provided to the unified command by component commands, with OPCON for specific missions. General Peay and his staff compensated for the long distances that separated him from his forward units by making frequent visits to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). General Peay visited Saudi Arabia nine times between September 1994 and June 1996. In addition, General Peay held meetings with subordinate commanders and their staffs and directed his component commanders to assist "their forward deployed elements in reviewing and implementing installation and facility security and antiterrorism measures." General Peay spoke to the component commanders at least two or three times a week and his Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Richard I. Neal (USMC), or his J-3, Major General Joseph E. Hurd spoke with JTF-SWA daily.

Major General Hurd, J-3, USCENTCOM, was responsible for managing the command's Force Protection Program. Following the OPM-SANG bombing, Major General Hurd visited Khobar Towers and was shown the security enhancements by the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional), Brigadier General Terry J. Schwalier. The Commander, USCENTAF, Lieutenant General John P. Jumper, and the Commander, Air Combat Command, General Joseph W. Ralston, both visited Khobar Towers immediately after the OPM-SANG bombing and were briefed by Brigadier General Schwalier on the status of the Wing's security and Force Protection measures. Although not in the operational command chain of the 4404th Wing (Provisional), both Major General (now Lieutenant General) Carl L. Franklin, and Major General Kurt B. Anderson, Commanders, JTF-SWA, visited Khobar Towers frequently.

As Commander, USCENTAF, Lieutenant General Jumper had operational control over the 4404th Wing (Provisional). He was Brigadier General Schwalier's immediate supervisor. He had the duty to provide guidance to and supervision of Brigadier General Schwalier. This included guidance and supervision for matters relating to Force Protection. In addition to visiting Khobar Towers on November 19-20, 1995, Lieutenant General Jumper visited many operational locations in the AOR during his command tenure. Additionally, Lieutenant General Jumper spoke frequently with Brigadier General Schwalier. These discussions included security matters at Khobar Towers and at other locations under the Wing's jurisdiction. During these visits and conversations, Lieutenant General Jumper assured himself that Brigadier General Schwalier and his staff were focused on and engaged in active Force Protection measures. He agreed with their focus on the multitude of possible threats with emphasis on preventing a penetration of the facility. In addition, Lieutenant General Jumper deployed members of his immediate functional staff, (including Lieutenant Colonel James J. Traister, a career security policeman), to serve at the 4404th Wing (Provisional) and at other locations. The Commander, USCENTAF, and his functional staff traveled to the AOR on numerous occasions and were very familiar with and engaged in the operations there. Both Lieutenant General Jumper and his Vice Commander, Major General Arnold R. Thomas, deployed to Saudi Arabia in 1994 and 1995, respectively, as Commander, JTF-SWA, had walked the ground and lived in the environment.

USCENTAF responded to the requests of the 4404th Wing (Provisional) for assistance. For example, USCENTAF supported a recommended increase in tour lengths for key personnel and provided additional bomb detection dogs for the security police.

Major General Anderson established a review process for vulnerability assessments to ensure local responses to recommendations contained in the assessments were being implemented. This review process called for vulnerability assessments to be conducted semi-annually and for commanders to report their actions to Major General Anderson and his Force Protection officer for their review and coordination.

Major General Anderson visited Khobar Towers several times in the first two months of his command, both to fly and visit, during which he noted increases in security measures on each visit. Specifically, he testified that Brigadier General

Schwalier was:

...proactive, aggressive. I used the word earlier, and I don't use it in a negative sense, he was 'consumed' with force protection, and you saw it on every visit. I visited Khobar often, and it was never the same. There was always better force protection -- in-depth.

Every commander in the chain of command knew that Force Protection was an inherent responsibility of command. Frequent dialogue occurred up and down the chain of command on Force Protection issues. The chain of command was there to assist and act when the known threat required action.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 63) In U.S. Central Command, command relationships did not support the enhancement of force protection under increased Threat Conditions. The April 12, 1996 Letter of Instruction on Force Protection caused confusion, and its implementation was subject to differing interpretations.

Comments: Units are not routinely manned for higher threat conditions (THREATCONs). The 4404th Wing (Provisional) determined it had sufficient manning and resources for THREATCON BRAVO except for bomb detection dogs, which they requested and the chain of command provided. If there would have been a need to sustain THREATCON CHARLIE, a request for additional manning would have been made and, as the USCENTAF track record reflects, the request would have likely been granted.

The April 12, 1996 Letter of Instruction (LOI) on Force Protection from USCENTCOM to its subordinate commanders provided additional guidance on Force Protection oversight and coordination. When the bombing occurred, this new structure was in its early stage of development. This was an evolving process which stemmed from the preceding dialogue of component commanders at the USCENTCOM Commanders' Conference on this topic. I found there was no confusion regarding the inherent responsibility of a commander to protect forces under his command.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 63) USCENTCOM did not inspect the force protection posture of its combatant units in the theater.

Comments: Major General Hurd, the USCENTCOM J-3, was taken on a perimeter

tour of Khobar Towers by Brigadier General Schwalier in December of 1995. Also, Brigadier General Schwalier frequently showed his continuing Force Protection improvements to successive JTF-SWA commanders. Each JTF-SWA commander talked regularly with Brigadier General Schwalier and General Peay about Force Protection matters.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 63) There are no theater-specific training programs in USCENTCOM.

Comments: USCENTCOM is not responsible for training. I covered that Air Force deficiency in Part A. The force provider has the responsibility to train the personnel to meet the CINC's requirements. Supplementally, the 4404th Wing (Provisional) had theater specific training. Throughout his tour at Dhahran, Brigadier General Schwalier emphasized the need for security awareness. For example, he personally briefed incoming personnel at the Wing's weekly "Right Start" newcomer's orientation program, emphasizing the nature of the Saudi environment, known threats, and the need for vigilance and security consciousness. He commissioned security awareness and antiterrorism articles for the Wing newspaper, *Gulf View*, and features for the closed circuit television Commander's Access Channel. He instructed his subordinate commanders, both in staff meetings and Force Protection meetings, to brief their personnel about security and safety concerns. While some Wing personnel interviewed claimed not to have received antiterrorism briefings, the vast majority of those interviewed indicated otherwise. These interviews support the conclusion that antiterrorism briefings were conducted, and that Brigadier General Schwalier was extremely pro-active in this area, and that security awareness information was disseminated regularly. Colonel James A. Coning, Ohio Air National Guard, was the Deputy Chief of Logistics with the 4404th Wing (Provisional) from November 13, 1995 to February 17, 1996. He stated that the Wing leadership received daily and weekly threat briefings. Colonel Coning further added:

Brigadier General Schwalier and the staff (in my opinion) did as much as humanly possible to provide maximum security, have the Wing at the correct THREATCON level and ensure the individual personnel were as safe as possible.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 63) No member of the U.S. Central Command chain of command inspected force protection at Khobar Towers.

Comments: Major General Hurd, J-3, USCENTCOM, (while not in the chain of command) was responsible for managing the command's Force Protection Program and was General Peay's primary officer for these matters. Following the OPM-SANG bombing, Major General Hurd visited Khobar Towers and was shown the security enhancements by the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional), Brigadier General Schwalier. The Commander, USCENAF, Lieutenant General John P. Jumper (who was in the chain of command), and the Commander, Air Combat Command, General Joseph W. Ralston, both visited Khobar Towers immediately after the OPM-SANG bombing and were briefed by Brigadier General Schwalier on the status of the Wing's security and Force Protection measures. Although not in the operational command chain of the 4404th Wing (Provisional), both Major General (now Lieutenant General) Carl L. Franklin, and Major General Kurt B. Anderson, Commanders, JTF-SWA (who reported directly to the Commander, USCENTCOM), visited Khobar Towers frequently and observed and were shown enhancements in Force Protection, including the M-60 machine gun posts at the front gate, roof top sentries and elaborate entrance requirements.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 64) U.S. Air Forces Central Command relied upon Headquarters, U.S. Air Combat Command for some critical functions, like Inspector General inspections. This reliance on Air Combat Command did not, however, relieve U.S. Air Forces Central Command of its command responsibilities.

Comments: The current Air Force structure does not include Inspector General (IG) functions in the Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) to do the type of "IG Inspections" contemplated in the Task Force Report. The current structure allows the NAFs to do IG inspections of Guard and Reserve units. Within Air Combat Command, NAF Commanders rely on the MAJCOM IG to provide inspections in areas deemed necessary. MAJCOMs do not inspect deployed contingency forces. However, many members of the USCENAF functional staff traveled to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, both to conduct staff assistance visits (SAVs), in support of their deployed functional counterparts, and to perform deployments themselves, usually with JTF-SWA. In fact, the Commander, USCENAF, deployed Lieutenant Colonel Traister from his staff to serve as the security police squadron commander for the 4404th Wing (Provisional). Also, Major General Arnold R. Thomas, the Ninth Air Force Vice Commander, had served as the Commander JTF-SWA from 8 August through 1 September 1995 and

was therefore very familiar with the AOR.

In addition, USCENTAF Fire Protection SAVs to the 4404th Wing (Provisional) were conducted on January 3-20, 1995, and January 2-18, 1996. Although not inspections, as contemplated by the Downing Task Force, SAVs reflect a higher headquarters involvement to identify issues and potential problems.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 64) No member of the U.S. Air Forces Central Command chain of command inspected physical security at Khobar Towers or reviewed Vulnerability Assessments.

Comments: The Commander, USCENTAF, Lieutenant General John P. Jumper, and the Commander, Air Combat Command, General Joseph W. Ralston, both visited Khobar Towers immediately after the OPM-SANG bombing and were briefed by Brigadier General Schwalier on the status of the Wing's security and Force Protection measures.

Lieutenant Colonel Traister reviewed the July 1995 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment at HQ USCENTAF and talked with former commanders of the 4404th (Provisional) Security Police Squadron before deploying as the new Security Police Squadron Commander. The Commander, USCENTAF, and his staff traveled to the AOR on numerous occasions and were very familiar with and engaged in the operations there.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 64) Despite end-of-tour reports from the Security Police Squadron commanders, no effort was made to modify the Air Force 90-day rotation policy.

Comments: The 90-day rotation policy was modified. Brigadier General Schwalier recommended seven additional key positions be converted to one-year tours to further increase stability. These positions consisted of members of his immediate staff, including the Wing Vice Commander, the commanders of the Services, Transportation, and 4402 Reconnaissance Squadrons, the commander of the Medical Group and of the 4406 Support Flight, as well as the Chief of the Wing Operations Center. This recommendation was supported and implemented by USCENTAF and USCENCOM. Brigadier General Schwalier had discussed additional extended tour positions with the CENTAF commander, and in his end-of-tour report, written before the Khobar Towers bombing, he identified seven more

positions for tour extension, including the Security Police Squadron Commander.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 64) Security Police were not structured for sustained Threat Condition CHARLIE operations.

Comments: In a peacetime contingency, an Air Force unit is not manned to sustain THREATCON CHARLIE for an indefinite period of time. If it became apparent, based on the threat or circumstances, that a wing would stay in THREATCON CHARLIE for an extended period, it would request additional manning. Similarly, the security police were not manned for wartime operations either. If that had occurred, additional manning would have been requested and obtained.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 66) FINDING 20: The Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack.

Comments: The legal standard for accountability is whether Brigadier General Schwalier exhibited a lack of that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. The standard is not whether he took what would or would not prove to be "adequate" measures, or whether he took "all measures possible" to protect his forces.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 65) A review of end-of-tour reports written by previous commanders of the 4404th Security Police Squadron revealed little activity in force protection or physical security upgrades until after the November 1995 bombing.

Comments: Prior to the OPM-SANG bombing, Saudi Arabia was considered a low threat area. Nevertheless, Brigadier General Schwalier had begun to implement measures identified in the July 1995 Vulnerability Assessment commensurate with the known threat.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 68) The 4404th Wing (Provisional) concentrated on preventing penetration of the compound to the exclusion of other vulnerabilities.

Comments: While the Wing leadership focused on penetration of the compound, as they should have, they did pay attention to other threats. For example, rooftop sentries were posted to detect threats from stand-off weapons and snipers along

with any suspicious conditions that might indicate other potential external threats. In fact, it was the rooftop sentries who detected the truck carrying explosives. The Wing also sought and received additional cooperation from Saudi authorities regarding increased patrols outside the fence. The Wing established liaison procedures to allow Air Force Security Police to report rapidly the license plate number of suspicious vehicles observed around the Khobar Towers area to the local Saudi police. They also increased the scrutiny of Third Country National workers entering Khobar Towers.

Regarding individual off-base activities, a variety of measures were used depending on the threat level and/or the terrorist events that transpired in the immediate region. At times, personnel were required to remain on the installation or were restricted from visiting certain locations. When off-base travel was permitted, personnel were directed to avoid agitated crowds or large groups of Westerners. They could not travel alone or in groups larger than four, and as noted in Battle Staff Directives (BSDs), they were restricted from visiting Bahrain where security incidents were common. The Wing dress and appearance instruction directed appropriate off-base attire. Wing personnel were instructed, through various means such as the Wing newspaper and briefings by commanders, to maintain a low profile outside the compound. Brigadier General Schwalier required unit commanders to brief and account for their personnel traveling off-base. For senior personnel and distinguished visitors, who were most at risk for kidnapping or ambush, personal security officers were used, plus travel and lodging plans were developed which were designed to minimize the risk.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 69) The Report stated there were ten incidents of possible surveillance on Khobar Towers.

Comments: Ten suspicious incidents were reported by Wing personnel in April, May, and June 1996, however, only four of these were determined to be possible surveillance. Many were during the period of the Hajj. These incidents were investigated by the AFOSI, the Saudi military and local police. None indicated an attack on Khobar Towers was imminent. These suspicious incidents near the Khobar Towers in the Spring of 1996 were thoroughly evaluated by the entire chain of command, to include USCENTCOM. These incidents included one possible threat indicator -- the "alleged" ramming of a Jersey barrier on the east perimeter. It was reported to Saudi authorities, who permitted the Wing to secure the barriers by staking them into the ground. There were four incidents of possible surveillance,

which were reported to local Saudi authorities for further investigation. These occurred on April 1, 4, 17 and 25, 1996, and all involved reports by Wing personnel of Middle Eastern men driving by or parked and observing the compound. Of the five remaining incidents, two were inconclusive and three were completely discounted.

These incidents were discussed with the Saudis, who did not view them as threatening. They attributed the incidents of possible surveillance to natural curiosity on the part of the Saudi populace about the activities of Americans inside the perimeter. Just outside the northern perimeter of Khobar Towers is a parking lot which was used by people visiting a nearby mosque. It also serviced a recreational area. During the month-long period of the Hajj, it was not unusual for many people to congregate in this area in the evenings. Most of the reported incidents took place during this time, and this may have caused the Saudi police to dismiss them as non-threatening. The Saudis also said they had undercover security personnel in the area.

While it may appear that these incidents represented an increase in potentially suspicious activity, it should be noted that, due to the Wing's increased emphasis on security (especially during the period of the Hajj), airmen were being much more vigilant and were more likely to report suspicious incidents. There is no way of knowing how often such incidents had been occurring or would have been reported if this level of vigilance had been in effect during the previous years.

Task Force Assessment: (Pages 69-70) Leaders and staffs at various levels met regularly to discuss force protection in committees formed for that purpose. These groups "reviewed and coordinated" measures to counter terrorism. There was little or no physical command inspection or follow-up.

Comments: The meetings at the 4404th Wing (Provisional) were effective; the extensive list of Force Protection measures was implemented as a result of discussions at those meetings. Moreover, at the 4404th Wing (Provisional), inspection was a constant process, often conducted by the Wing Commander himself.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 70) The Report cited the following quote for the proposition that these meetings were ineffective: "Lessons Learned: The things learned are there is a lack of follow-up on projects, the leadership are (sic) unaware

of problems until too late, little or no Staff Assistant Visits or Assessment at Dhahran flightline." Minutes from March 26, 1996, 4404th Wing Security Council meeting. Lt Col Traister, Recorder.

Comments: Rather than being an example of lack of effectiveness, this passage indicates that the Wing Security Council was effective. This meeting was used to identify problem areas which led to corrective actions. This particular observation resulted in a staff assistance visit and an assessment of the Dhahran flightline.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 72) Brigadier General Schwalier failed to mention force protection in his end-of-tour report, despite the significant change in terrorist threat during his command tenure.

Comments: The short end-of-tour report, written prior to the bombing, discussed three focus areas and discussed progress in those areas. Brigadier General Schwalier was writing this report to his commander, Lieutenant General Jumper, who was very familiar with the local environment and was well aware of Force Protection measures that Brigadier General Schwalier had accomplished. While Force Protection was not mentioned as a focus area, Brigadier General Schwalier did indicate in the report that he was suggesting seven more positions for tour extensions, including the Security Police Squadron Commander, the staff officer primarily responsible for Force Protection matters. The end-of-tour report also addressed one of the focal areas, maintaining good host nation relationships, which was important in obtaining positive results on security initiatives outside the fence. The end-of-tour report was not an all inclusive list of accomplishments and concerns. For example, Brigadier General Schwalier did not mention flying safety, nor many other concerns and actions which he effectively addressed during his tenure as commander.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 72) During his tour of duty, Brigadier General Schwalier never raised to his superiors force protection matters that were beyond his capability to correct. Nor did he raise the issue of expanding the perimeter or security outside of the fence with his Saudi counterparts in the Eastern Province.

Comments: The expansion of the perimeter by moving the barriers or fence is clearly a critical issue. It is impossible to state categorically that elevating the request up the chain of command would have been fruitless. Perhaps if Brigadier General Schwalier had discussed this matter with his Saudi counterpart or had

elevated the request up his own chain of command, sufficient political/diplomatic pressure could have been applied to convince the Saudis that the need to move the perimeter fence was imperative. Brigadier General Schwalier determined otherwise based largely on the threat as it was then evidenced, the other security measures implemented, and his assessment of the overall dynamics. He chose to concentrate on those initiatives that he believed were appropriate and could be accomplished. Further, he was satisfied with the additional external Saudi security measures. I find this decision reasonable under the circumstances.

Anecdotal information supports Brigadier General Schwalier's decision. The Deputy Chief of Mission in Saudi Arabia stated that even after the bombing, the Saudis had not changed their view of terrorism activity in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, as of the time of the Deputy Chief's interview, four months after the Khobar Towers bombing, the Saudis had not approved the request for enhanced security stand-off measures believed necessary at the U.S. Embassy.

Because they were concerned about the vulnerability on the perimeter, Colonel Gary Boyle, Support Group Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Traister, Security Police Squadron Commander, testified they had asked their Saudi military counterparts to expand the north, east and west perimeters by moving the concrete barriers a short distance outside the fence. They, along with Special Agent Reddecliff, also requested to move the fence and clear out vegetation growing on the north perimeter in order to provide better visibility. The request regarding the east and west perimeters was granted and concrete barriers were placed approximately five feet outside the fence. In addition, two rolls of concertina wire were installed between the barriers and the fence, and a third roll was added on top to prevent access over or through the fence. The requests to cut down the vegetation on the north perimeter were not granted because the Saudis did not want their people easily to see activities inside the compound, such as jogging in shorts and other Western attire. The requests to move the fence or place concrete barriers outside the fence also were not granted because the Saudis believed the distance was adequate to defend against a bomb such as the one used at OPM-SANG, and stated it was not a request that could be approved at that time. Mr. David Winn, the Consul General at Dhahran stated that moving the fence would have been like "moving heaven and earth."

In order to understand why the Saudis may have been reluctant to extend the perimeter fence farther out, the following factors should be taken into account. The

Khobar Towers complex consists of dozens of tightly arranged high-rise buildings located in the middle of a densely populated metropolitan area. (See the photographs of Khobar Towers and the surrounding city at Part B, Tab Y) According to the U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, the population of the Dhahran metropolitan area is approximately one million people. Khobar Towers is directly adjacent to civilian housing, religious buildings and a recreational area (where children play soccer, residents picnic, etc.) available to Saudi civilians. Any changes to the perimeter fence line and barriers, therefore, would have had an impact on Saudi civilian lifestyle.

When interviewed by investigators from the Downing Task Force, Major Ray Elloso, Operations and Intelligence Advisor for the Western Region Headquarters, OPM-SANG, discussed an initiative to move barriers out to obtain a larger stand-off distance at OPM-SANG following the Khobar Towers bombing. He characterized the impact on the Saudis as, "We would be cutting off the community at large if we shut down the streets." ((S N/F) The photographs at Tab Y illustrate the impact on the Saudi civilian community had various stand-off distances been implemented to further protect Khobar Towers.)

Special Agent Reddecliff discussed with his Saudi counterpart his "best case scenario" where the parking lot on the north perimeter would be closed to vehicle traffic. The Saudis deemed such an action unnecessary considering the threat and other security measures already in place there, including undercover security personnel and unmarked cars. However, the Saudis did increase their patrols of the area.

An interview with Major General Sultan al-Mutairi, Commander, Eastern Province, Saudi Arabia, further underscores the Saudi sensitivity to expanding the Khobar Towers perimeter. The General told the Downing Task Force that the fence had been moved closer to the north side of Khobar Towers in 1994, by order of the Saudi Government, because the fence denied local families easy access to their homes.

Brigadier General Schwalier was aware that these requests had been made and that the requests regarding the vegetation, the fence and the barriers on the north perimeter had not been granted. When questioned on why he did not elevate this issue, Brigadier General Schwalier stated that given the alternative cooperation received from the Saudis (e.g. increased Saudi patrols), other security measures

taken, including measures to improve visibility (e.g., positioning of rooftop sentries), the then-known threat, and the nature of the property involved (a public parking area, serving a public park and a mosque, used as a recreation area), he believed that pursuing this from a higher level was not necessary and would have been fruitless. According to Lieutenant General Neal (USMC), "the Saudis convinced Brigadier General Schwalier in no short order that they were going to make up for not moving the fence by active patrols, increased patrols, and more active a more active [sic] vigilance." Brigadier General Schwalier stated he was not reluctant to pass things up the chain of command and cited several operational examples of having done so, but added he did not have a reason to elevate the issue of removing vegetation and moving the barriers or the fence based upon the information that he knew at the time and the threat that he saw.

Task Force Assessment: (Pg. 72) The Report states Brigadier General Schwalier did not respond to memorandum dated November 15, 1995 from Commander, JTF-SWA, Subject: Security of Subordinate Units, asking to identify potential weaknesses, shortfalls and requirements.

Comments: The memorandum in question was sent by then-Major General Franklin to Brigadier General Schwalier indicating Lieutenant General Franklin planned to assess the status of security throughout the AOR. Brigadier General Schwalier responded and sent him a package that was also intended for use in connection with an upcoming DoD inspection.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 72) Brigadier General Schwalier was not well served by an "ad hoc" intelligence structure. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations "stovepipe" system, in effect, denied him direct access to Special Agent Reddecliff's prophetic 4 April message. This same system did not allow him to receive Special Agent Kipp's germane force protection recommendations one month before the bombing.

Comments: The Wing Commander improved the existing intelligence structure by adding weekly Security Review Meetings to focus specifically on threats to Wing facilities and operations. These augmented his daily threat meetings. The Report also states, "The combination of frequent rotations, inconsistency in the professional qualifications of officers assigned to counterintelligence duties, and their lack of area expertise degraded the support provided the Wing Commander." I found no evidence any member of the Wing's counterintelligence structure was

lacking in "professional qualifications" or that the Wing Commander would have been better served by a different intelligence structure. Brigadier General Schwalier and his subordinate commanders asked coalition members and sister service leaders, as well as the Chief of the National Intelligence Team (NIST), to critique their security efforts and to make constructive security enhancement recommendations. They found the Wing's efforts to be extensive and recommended no substantive changes. It was his local intelligence structure that was the first to learn of the imminent beheadings by the Saudi government of the perpetrators of the OPM-SANG bombing.

In his April 4, 1996 message to HQ AFOSI in Washington D.C., the AFOSI Detachment Commander, Special Agent Reddecliff, explained that "Security measures here [Khobar Towers] are outstanding, which in my view would lead a would be terrorist to attempt an attack from a position outside the perimeter... and if a truck parks close to the fence line, and the driver makes a quick getaway, I think the building should be cleared immediately."

With the benefit of hindsight, the message may be viewed as "prophetic." At the time, it merely identified a known risk which the Wing was thoroughly engaged in addressing. While Brigadier General Schwalier was not shown this message, he had discussed the issues in the message with Special Agent Reddecliff. This report has described the Wing's efforts to address this and other vulnerabilities in detail. Many of Brigadier General Schwalier's added security measures (e.g., rooftop lookouts, etc., discussed below) were in direct response to Special Agent Reddecliff's assessment.

The scenario described by Special Agent Reddecliff is one of the five Department of State scenarios advanced in the January 1996 AFOSI vulnerability assessment. Due to the threat posed by this potential scenario, sentries were posted on top of Building 131, increased Saudi patrols were requested and provided. Subsequently, the lookout sentries posted on the roof saw the truck driver make a "quick getaway," and initiated evacuation of the building "immediately."

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The Wing implemented a number of specific measures regarding potential threats posed by Third Country Nationals (TCNs) who worked at Khobar Towers. The number of TCNs living in the compound was reduced and movement restrictions

within the compound were imposed. Color-coded identification badges were required to be displayed based on the individual's job location. Wing personnel were briefed on the need to increase scrutiny of TCN activities. Efforts to improve TCN living and working conditions were initiated to increase their loyalty.

The Report indicates that Headquarters, Air Force Office of Special Investigations sent Special Agent Steven Kipp to Khobar Towers from May 22 through May 25, 1996, in response to the above message from Special Agent Reddecliff. He conducted an informal physical security assessment. He provided Special Agent Reddecliff a list of recommendations, one of which was to build a 9 - 12 foot concrete wall around the Khobar Towers facility or, at a minimum, along the north perimeter. Special Agent Reddecliff considered the recommendation for construction of the wall but decided not to send it forward because it was his sense that the Saudis had a good handle on the security of the parking lot, that Special Agent Kipp had not come up with any new vulnerability or threat information, and it would have required a contracting action, with Saudi approval. As Special Agent Reddecliff stated:

I was unaware of any particular physical security expertise that he had. I don't believe it was a detailed study, and given my working relationship with Brigadier General Schwalier and my knowledge of what I perceived his impression or his reaction to be, I did not think that he would build a wall based on one recommendation. To my knowledge, no other recommendation had come in before or after regarding that wall, including the vulnerability assessments and so forth. So it was for these reasons that I pressed on without moving that forward.

The idea of a wall around the perimeter of Khobar Towers was not a new one. Special Agent McDonald surfaced that proposal in the mid-October 1995 to mid-January 1996 timeframe. The proposal was discussed in several of the weekly Security Review Meetings and serious concerns were raised. Specifically, the Security Police did not want to be sealed in because they would not be able to see what was going on outside the compound. EOD personnel stated that the wall might not be effective due to the physics of a blast wave. The proposal for a wall did not progress beyond this discussion phase.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 73) The 4404th Wing (Provisional) chose to

concentrate the majority of its force protection efforts on preventing a penetration of the perimeter by a car, truck, or man-pack suicide bomb.

Comments: While the majority of the Wing's Force Protection efforts were focused on a penetration of the perimeter by a car, truck, or man-pack suicide bomb, many other precautions were taken. Immediately following the OPM-SANG bombing, on November 13, 1995, Brigadier General Schwalier issued the first of many Battle Staff Directives (BSDs) aimed at further improving the Wing's security posture. He raised the Wing's local threat condition (THREATCON) to THREATCON BRAVO and set into motion more stringent Force Protection measures to contend with various types of possible attacks. Among other measures, Brigadier General Schwalier deployed physical barriers; directed that stationary objects, such as trash dumpsters and parked vehicles, be moved at least 25 meters from all buildings; restricted off-base travel; implemented measures to check for letter and parcel bombs; suspended non-essential commercial deliveries; instituted procedures to verify the identity of unannounced or suspicious visitors; directed commanders to brief personnel at regular intervals on all forms of terrorist threats; and stressed increased threat awareness. He specifically directed the Security Police to give attention to vulnerable points outside the installation.

Even more rigorous security measures were implemented in the spring of 1996 as the period of the Hajj approached, a religious holiday when millions of visitors are permitted into Saudi Arabia, and terrorist activities are known to occur. These included increasing Saudi patrols outside of the fence, getting local police to check license plate numbers of suspicious vehicles, and placing armed sentries on building rooftops to gain better vantage points.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 73-74). The decision to budget Mylar in later years was made despite Recommendation #36 in the January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment and the alternative recommendation that if the cost of upgrading all perimeter windows is deemed too great, begin with the perimeter faces of building 133 and 131, then work roughly clockwise around KT through to building 117.

Comments: The Downing Task Force criticized Brigadier General Schwalier for not installing Mylar window film immediately following the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment. My Review Team made a special point to examine the issue of why Mylar was not installed on the windows in Khobar Towers as recommended.

Brigadier General Schwalier testified that he chose to include Mylar in the Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan rather than seek approval for its immediate installation. While Brigadier General Schwalier certainly could have requested the project be immediately considered for approval and funding, the issue is whether it was reasonable for him to program for the Mylar project in the Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan instead. I found this to be reasonable.

Of the other potential targets in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the International School, USMTM, and the commissary at Riyadh, none had Mylar at the time of the Khobar Towers bombing. As stated elsewhere in this report, a U.S. Embassy request to install Mylar was not approved by the State Department on some of their buildings in Riyadh following the OPM-SANG bombing, the request was not approved because the threat level was not thought to be high enough.

It has been alleged that Mylar would have prevented several of the deaths. When interviewed by the Downing Task Force, Colonel Paul Ray (U.S. Army), the Third Army Engineer, opined that based on the actual size of the bomb, "you could put all the Mylar on earth on your windows, but the building's going to be gone." The Wright Laboratory, Air Base Technology Branch, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, having reviewed the Downing investigation data and conducted an independent assessment, concluded that Mylar would not have prevented any of the 18 deaths in Building 131. The assessment determined these individuals sustained "fatal blunt injuries from structural debris and translation/impact." However, the Wright Laboratory stated that Mylar might have prevented the one fatality in Building 133, which was approximately four hundred feet away from the detonation location. On the other hand, installation of Mylar may have reduced the number of non-fatal injuries.

Brigadier General Schwalier decided to program for this four million dollar project in his Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan. Brigadier General Schwalier made this decision to defer immediate installation after discussions with his Support Group and Civil Engineer Squadron Commanders, and considering a variety of factors, including the then-known threat, the effects of other security enhancements which had been or were being implemented to mitigate risks, the cost and complexity of the project, that there were no DoD or Air Force requirements for the installation of Mylar, that Saudi approval would have been necessary, and other competing priorities. Also, either a full-scale application or the piecemeal approach

would have taken months to implement. At this same time, there were discussions at higher command levels about vacating Khobar Towers and moving the Wing to Al Kharj I found Brigadier General Schwalier's decision reasonable under the circumstances.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 74) Captain McLane, the 4404th Wing (Provisional) Explosive Ordnance specialist recommended, at attachment 3 of the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment, a 300 foot (92.5 meter) perimeter to mitigate the effects of a 200 pound blast. There is no evidence that any action was taken regarding this aspect of the assessment by the Commander.

Comment: The referenced Attachment 3 to the January 1996 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment is a background paper that considers the explosive effects of a car bomb with a main charge of 200 pounds of C-4, not a recommendation or directive. The paper lists various potential targets, such as windows, metal buildings, concrete block and personnel, with the damage that could be anticipated at a certain level of overpressure. The paper's annotation that the standard security cordon for an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is 92.5 meters apprises the reader that EOD or emergency response personnel routinely establish the security cordon at 92.5 meters regardless of the nature of the IED observed. These cordons are temporary, are usually adjusted based on the EOD Team assessment, and are removed as soon as the device is neutralized. It is not always appropriate to establish a perimeter that large around every potential target.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 74) Even if the bomb at Khobar Towers had been much smaller -- similar to that used at OPM/SANG on November 13, 1995 -- the casualties would have been significant. A Task Force explosives expert calculated that if a 200 pound bomb had exploded 80 feet from Building 131, severe window frame failure and spalling of reinforced concrete would have resulted. Injuries from glass fragments would have been extensive. Major structural damage would probably have caused the building to be condemned. The Task Force estimated between five and 11 deaths would have occurred from the 200 pound blast.

Comments: This estimate is not adequately substantiated. The DSWA believes that casualties would have been much lower. They concluded that the effects of a 200 pound bomb would be similar to the effects of the actual bomb on Building 133. Additionally, a smaller bomb would most likely be conveyed to the scene in a smaller vehicle, one closer to the ground than a large vehicle. Consequently, more

of the blast effects would have been absorbed by the Jersey barriers. The Downing Task Force Report estimated that between five and 11 deaths would have occurred from even a 200 pound blast. The Report further stated that the deaths would have resulted from the effects of flying glass and not from blunt trauma. The implication is that Brigadier General Schwalier did not take sufficient action (install Mylar and/or increase the stand-off distance) to meet even the identified threat from a bomb blast of that size. In contrast, the DSWA determined that a 200 pound blast could theoretically take from one to five lives.. Based on the intelligence information available at the time and the recommendations made to him by his Civil Engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Schellhous, Brigadier General Schwalier took reasonable precautions to meet the identified threat. (See discussion of Mylar and Stand-off Distance in Part B, Section III.)

Task Force Assessment: (Page 74-75) The January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment indirectly mentioned movement of personnel to safer buildings. Alternative lodging of key personnel and distinguished visitors was briefed as being implemented; however, the Task Force could find no evidence supporting this assertion.

Comments: The January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment did not recommend moving personnel so they would be in "safer buildings" rather, it recommended dispersing mission essential personnel, such as aircrews throughout various facilities within the compound. The Wing leadership decided that it was preferable, instead, to maintain unit integrity. This later proved beneficial on the night of the bombing in accounting for personnel. Regarding alternative lodging for key personnel and distinguished visitors, the Wing Commander had initiated such a plan. For example, he had prepared different quarters for the follow-on Wing Commander in a different location and planned to relocate each group commander's living quarters upon the incumbent's departure.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 75) Despite the risk to airmen identified in Findings #23 and #24 of the January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment, the rooms facing the vulnerable exterior perimeter of Khobar Towers remained occupied.

Comments: The inference in the Task Force Report results from the alleged testimony of Colonel Boyle that it would have adversely affected the quality of life at Khobar Towers had the Wing been forced to put two to three persons into each room of the interior buildings. The testimony attributed to Colonel Boyle was a

response taken out of context. In his interview with the Downing Task Force, Colonel Boyle was asked for his recommendation "looking back on what happened ... hindsight ... Monday morning quarterback ... [W]hat are the lessons learned that you take away?" In that dialogue, he was asked the question, "You would take a less quality of life by going to a place like Jack and Jill Village?" Colonel Boyle's affirmative response must be considered in the context of his discussing the advantages of having facilities located in a rural, rather than an urban, environment.

In discussing the issue of moving personnel from the exterior of the installation, Lieutenant General Jumper voiced a concern with densely packing the base population inside a compound when the threat assessment included the potential of a penetration. That is had a bomb penetrated to the interior of the compound, we would have seen many more casualties. The January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment conducted after the OPM-SANG bombing contained numerous observations and recommendations concerning the perimeter fence around Khobar Towers, to include securing gates with locks designed for external use, welding hinge pins on the gates to prevent removal, securing fence sections so that individuals could not crawl under, and removing or repositioning items near the perimeter fence.

Specifically concerning the north perimeter fence area, the January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment identified the adjacent public parking lot as a significant weak point for three reasons: (1) the size and relative remoteness of the parking lot, (2) the visual obstruction caused by vegetation that limits the ability of U.S. forces to identify an oncoming threat, and (3) access to the parking lot was uncontrolled and open to anyone. Recommended "fixes" included cutting back the vegetation, installing bollards (half buried steel pipes) connected by chain or cable along the easement on the Saudi side of the fence or along the sidewalk on the U.S. side of the fence, reinforcing the existing concrete barrier line with one-inch steel cable, and parking heavy vehicles along the fence to limit high speed penetration of the installation. The Vulnerability Assessment noted the increased cooperation between U.S. and local Saudi police, and noted that the Royal Saudi Air Force would coordinate with local civilian authorities to increase the uniformed police presence outside the northwest and northeast fence lines.

Likewise, the July 1995 AFOSI Vulnerability Assessment addressed security measures to be taken around the perimeter fence, including the proper placement of Jersey barriers, removing or repositioning objects near the vegetation on the north

perimeter to increase visibility. The Vulnerability Assessment also commented on the successful efforts by the security police to establish liaison with the various local military and civilian police agencies, which had resulted in an increased willingness for cooperation between the Air Force and local police, e.g., Saudi patrol responses to check out suspicious activities or minor acts of violence or criminal activity.

Wing officials responded by improving security on the north perimeter of Khobar Towers through the implementation of 36 of 39 recommendations, some of which were discussed above, in the January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment.

This Downing Task Force Report statement assumes that there was only one "vulnerable" perimeter. The entire perimeter was vulnerable to the effects of the bomb that was actually used. Although there was a potential risk to airmen in rooms facing the northern perimeter, it represented only one of many risks military people faced. Crowding personnel into interior-facing rooms, versus dispersing them, would have increased the risks from a penetration attack or a man-pack bomb, which the known intelligence indicated were the more likely scenarios.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 75) The Security Police had no special training program on the threat they were facing, and terrorist response exercises were not conducted. Guards were on 12-hour shifts for six days or longer. Some worked on the same observation post for 12 hours at a time, exposed to 100 degree heat, with only meal and comfort breaks.

Comments: Security police are fully trained before they deploy and their basic skills training include terrorist act responses. Although there was no additional formal training program on the threats they were facing, Lieutenant Colonel Traister was aware of the nature of various threats and ensured all security policemen were kept up to date. Furthermore, the "Right Start" and guardmount briefings augmented their basic knowledge. For example, SrA Burgess briefed personnel on vehicle, ground safety, General Order #1...and weapons cleaning. Lieutenant Colonel Traister created a special response team to deal with terrorist threats. He also required his personnel to practice with sand-filled trucks positioned at the main gate to block or ram any vehicle attempting to penetrate the entrance checkpoint.

The shifts observed by the Task Force were those in place nearly a month after the

bombing. There is no indication that security police work schedules before the bombing had any detrimental effect on their performance. The Wing Commander and his subordinate commanders took a keen interest in the well being of personnel exposed to these extreme conditions. Saudi Arabia is a harsh environment and, unfortunately, sentries must be outside to see and hear what is going on. Air conditioning was provided for those manning M-60 machine-gun positions inside the bunkers. During daily one-on-one conversations with security police or at the guardmounts he attended, Brigadier General Schwalier received no complaints regarding security police working conditions. Nor did he receive complaints from other sources. The security police performed admirably before, during, and after the bombing attack on Khobar Towers. In Part A, I recommended a study be performed to address working hours and conditions for deployed operations.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 76) Security Police personnel were issued weapons they had not maintained, zeroed, or fired. There was no in-country weapons training. Dirty weapons were found which may not have functioned if fired.

Comments: In my review, I was unable to find any independent evidence to support this statement by General Downing. Unlike the Army, Air Force security police, while qualified, did not deploy with their weapons; rather, they were issued weapons upon arrival. It is true that it is difficult to maintain clean weapons in a desert environment. Also, these weapons had been in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War in 1991. There is no way to determine the condition of the weapons at the time of the arrival of the Wing leadership. We questioned Lieutenant Colonel Traister in-depth regarding this allegation. Lieutenant Colonel Traister stated he and others conducted weapons inspections at guardmount. He also made spot inspections of weapons in the armory. As this is a potential problem which would clearly impact the effectiveness of deployed Air Force security, I recommended in Part A that security police deploy as units with their assigned weapons fully-sighted and that weapons qualifications must be current and complete prior to deployment.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 76) The Security Police Squadron was not manned to sustain the security measures inherent in high Threat Conditions.

Comments: It is accurate to state that the Wing was not manned for a sustained THREATCON CHARLIE situation. No other Air Force unit is. Had there been a need to sustain THREATCON CHARLIE for an extended period of time, then more personnel would have been requested and obtained. Further, I found no

evidence that manning levels degraded the performance of the security police at Khobar Towers.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 76) In April 1996, as the threat escalated, the decision not to go to THREATCON CHARLIE appeared to have been based on the availability of security forces and their ability to sustain operations for an extended period of time, rather than what was required by the threat.

Comments: This decision was not based on lack of manning but on the lack of an imminent threat. Had there been a requirement to go into THREATCON CHARLIE, manning would have been requested. Such decisions were made in consultation with the ARCENT Commander.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 77) The 4404th Security Police Squadron had no formal training program.

Comments: The security police were trained at guardmounts and, along with all other personnel, were advised of specific threat information in the "Right Start" briefing, and also received information through regular Wing newspaper articles, the closed circuit cable television Commander's Access Channel and through information provided by their commander as it was passed to him via Battle Staff Directives.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 77) Antiterrorism measures adopted by the 4404th Wing (Provisional) focused on Khobar Towers and did not extend beyond the perimeter of the compound.

Comments: Antiterrorism measures adopted by the Wing were not only focused on Khobar Towers but also extended beyond the perimeter of the compound. For example, sentries not only watched for possible penetrations, they also watched for any threat to Khobar Towers from outside the perimeter. As noted elsewhere, sentries were the first to observe the suspicious truck on the night of the bombing. Regarding individual off-base activities, a variety of measures were used depending on the threat level and/or the terrorist events that transpired in the immediate region. At times, personnel were required to remain on the installation or restricted from visiting certain off-base locations. When off-base travel was permitted, personnel were directed to avoid agitated crowds or large groups of Westerners and to travel in groups not to exceed four persons. Personnel were frequently restricted

from Bahrain where security incidents were not uncommon. The Wing dress and appearance instruction directed appropriate off-base attire. Wing personnel were instructed, through various means such as the Wing Newspaper and briefings by commanders, to maintain a low profile outside the compound. Brigadier General Schwalier required unit commanders to brief and account for their personnel traveling off base. For senior personnel and distinguished visitors, who were most at risk for kidnapping or ambush, personal security officers were used, plus travel and lodging plans were designed to minimize the risk.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 77) Overall, the orientation and training of personnel was inadequate for the environment in which they were operating.

Comments: Brigadier General Schwalier emphasized the need for security awareness. For example, he personally briefed incoming personnel in the Wing's weekly "Right Start" newcomer's orientation briefing program, emphasizing the nature of the Saudi environment, known threats, and the need for vigilance and security consciousness. He commissioned security awareness and antiterrorism articles for the Wing newspaper and features for the closed circuit television Commander's Access Channel. He instructed his subordinate commanders, in staff meetings and Force Protection meetings, to brief their personnel about security and safety concerns. The actions of Wing personnel on the night of the bombing suggest that the Wing's orientation and training efforts were more than adequate. Nevertheless, in my team's review in (Part A), we recommended further Air Force-wide improvements for theater specific and enhanced training regarding Force Protection.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 77) Although warned by Special Agent Reddecliff of the threat posed by Third Country National workers to the operational security of Khobar Towers, the 4404th Wing commander continued to employ them extensively.

Comments: The Wing implemented a number of specific measures regarding potential threats posed by Third Country Nationals (TCNs) who worked at Khobar Towers. The number of TCNs living in the compound was reduced and movement restrictions within the compound were imposed. Color-coded identification badges were required to be displayed based on the individual's job location. Wing personnel were briefed on the need to increase scrutiny of TCN activities. Efforts to improve TCN living and working conditions were initiated to increase their loyalty.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 77-78) The 4404th Wing (Provisional) and subordinate groups and squadrons did not practice evacuation procedures.

Comments: The 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not conduct formal evacuation exercises of buildings. Some Wing personnel interviewed by the Downing Task Force stated that they were not aware of any building evacuations prior to the June 25th bombing. Building 131, the building in front of which the bomb exploded, was in fact evacuated on May 9, 1996 because of a reported suspicious package, which turned out to be a tool box. There were other building evacuations around that period of time also, e.g., Buildings 127 and 133. The buildings were evacuated in five minutes or less, an interval which the Support Group Commander and the Wing Fire Chief, who were in charge of the evacuation scenes, considered to be as fast as possible. The testimony suggesting no evacuations may be attributable to the fact that Wing personnel worked in shifts around-the-clock. Some personnel also stated that they were not aware of any warning devices or evacuation plans, but the vast majority interviewed were. The January 1996 Vulnerability Assessment found that:

An active fire prevention program is in effect. Articles are routinely published in the base paper to remind everyone of fire safety procedures and all personnel are briefed on emergency evacuation procedures, extinguishers, smoke detectors, and emergency phone numbers at the mandatory "Right Start" briefing attended by all incoming personnel.

In addition, evacuation procedures were posted on the doors and walls of the rooms in Khobar Towers.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 79) Procedures to test the evacuation system and the emergency warning system at Khobar Towers were never exercised. The Giant Voice procedures were elaborate, unwieldy, and did not work.

Comments: Although there was an operational Giant Voice public announcement and warning system, which was tested weekly, it was not used on the night of June 25, 1996. Up until that time, the Wing Operations Center (WOC) had the sole authority to activate the Giant Voice, and it was intended for use for SCUD missile alerts. Not all systems are appropriate for all emergencies. The Giant Voice system

required a small period of time in order for a person in authority, armed with available information appropriate to make an informed decision on whether or not to make an announcement and what to say. It would be dangerous for directions to be issued without properly evaluated information.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 79) Brigadier General Schwalier was advised that a viable terrorist threat existed and was kept informed that his facility was a terrorist target. Knowing that some vulnerabilities were beyond his capability to correct, he failed to coordinate with his host nation counterpart to address these areas. He accepted the adequacy of host nation security measures in the area outside the fence. Additionally, he failed to raise any force protection issues to his superiors.

Comments: The evidence indicated that Khobar Towers was identified as a potential target, as were all other U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia and the Region. As detailed elsewhere in this report, the Wing took many wide-ranging and appropriate security measures based upon the known threat information. As also discussed above, Brigadier General Schwalier coordinated with his counterparts as he reasonably deemed appropriate, and frequently discussed Force Protection issues in person or by telephone. In addition, USCENAF and USCENCOM responded to the requests of the 4404th Wing (Provisional) for assistance; for example by supporting and complementing a recommended increase in tour lengths for key personnel and providing additional bomb detection dogs for the security police.

I found that the Wing leadership did take reasonable actions to mitigate vulnerabilities based upon the known threat. In my opinion, their actions may well have saved hundreds of lives by preventing the terrorists from exploding such a bomb within the compound.

Additional Task Force Assessments

There are other findings and conclusions in the Report which may relate to accountability. I will now address them in the order in which they appear in the Report.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 1) The terrorist truck bomb estimated to contain the equivalent of 3,000 to 8,000 pounds of TNT (most likely 5,000).

Comments: The Downing Task Force estimated the bomb contained the equivalent

of from 3,000 to 8,000 pounds of TNT, "...most likely about 5,000 pounds." The Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) Report, estimated that the bomb was much larger, that its likely yield was from 20,000 to 30,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent. General Downing testified he and his Task Force experts arrived at the 5,000 pound estimate based upon a number of factors. The first factor cited was their interview of an airman "...who was in an unprotected position, 80 feet away from the bomb when it detonated, survived, and was on his feet the day after the bombing." This and other evidence cited by General Downing, such as "...foliage still on trees and bushes in the vicinity of the blast..." is discussed by the DSWA in their report, including where they describe blast asymmetry. The DSWA found, in tests related to their findings about the Khobar Towers explosive device, that lower pressures existed at various angles from the explosion. For example, the pressure at a 45-degree angle from the truck bomb to the Humvee parked at the northwest corner of Building 131, was three times lower than the pressure experienced by Building 131 directly to the rear of the truck bomb, and over seven times lower than pressure emanating from the sides of the truck bomb. The DSWA estimate was conducted in conjunction with the Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station. DSWA compared physical attributes of the Khobar Towers crater and blast with physical attributes of craters formed by vehicle bomb tests conducted under terrain conditions similar to those at Dhahran. DSWA determined that the "'best' estimate for the Dhahran yield would be 11.5 tons or 23,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent explosive." DSWA compared the 5,000-pound TNT-equivalent yield estimate against the physical information known about the Khobar Towers crater and the crater information generated by the vehicle bomb tests, but found no correlation between the 5,000-pound estimate and this known information. Instead, DSWA found that the 5,000-pound value is implausible because it "implies a cratering efficiency greater than that produced by any known conventional explosive." DSWA's analysis of glass breakage from the Khobar Towers bombing resulted in an even larger estimated TNT-equivalent yield of 31,000 pounds. This figure was derived by plotting the actual number of windows broken at Khobar Towers on a computer-generated graph that depicts the number of glass patio doors that would be broken by the blast pressures generated by various TNT-equivalent yields. "A peer review by a panel of outside experts concluded the 'DSWA analysis credibly supports the conclusion that the explosive power of the bomb was in the 20,000 pounds of TNT equivalent class and probably larger'." The DSWA also noted that Building 133, located some 400 feet from the blast (much farther than the trees with remaining foliage) sustained major structural damage. As discussed in detail in Part B, the weight of the evidence supports the DSWA estimate.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 23) Air Force Office of Special Investigations agents are all assigned on 90-day tours of duty.

Comments: AFOSI detachment commanders served for 179 days, not 90 days.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 23) The frequency of individual rotations into the Security Police Squadron means that the squadron always has a wide mix of experience and knowledge. It never stabilizes long enough to conduct training and develop unit cohesion.

Comments: While longer tour lengths may be desirable, I found no evidence that short tour lengths degraded the performance of the security police, before, during, or after the bombing. Nevertheless, we recommended in Part A of this Report assigning teams of security police, versus individuals, in the future to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of these units.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 23) Frequent rotations of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel in the region have had adverse impacts on both intelligence collection and force protection. The typical Air Force 90-day temporary duty rotation does not support effective liaison with host nation counterparts and force protection teams.

Comments: As mentioned above, AFOSI detachment commanders served for longer periods, 179 days, not 90 days. The evidence based on interviews indicates that Special Agent Reddecliff and Lieutenant Colonel Traister had effective liaison with their Saudi counterparts. Further, as noted in the AFOSI Vulnerability Assessments, this was also documented. While longer tour lengths might well enhance relationships, I found that local relationships with the 4404th Wing (Provisional) were adequate. Contacts with local officials were frequent and effective. In fact, it was Special Agent Reddecliff who was first notified about the imminent beheading of the four perpetrators of the OPM-SANG bombing.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 28) Major General Anderson assumed command of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia on April 22, 1996, but was not briefed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command on force protection issues prior to assuming his post.

Comments: Major General Anderson stated that before assuming command he was briefed by General Peay on four major priorities, one of which was Force Protection. Major General Anderson said they spent the majority of their time together discussing this priority.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 38) Overall, the intelligence provided commanders warning that the terrorist threat to U.S. service members and facilities was increasing. As a result, those responsible for force protection at Khobar Towers and other U.S. Government facilities in Saudi Arabia had time and motivation to reduce vulnerabilities.

Comments: This statement implies that commanders did not properly use their time, lacked motivation to reduce vulnerabilities, and did not reduce them. I found the opposite to be the case. For example, in the case of the 4404th Wing (Provisional) alone, they implemented over 130 security enhancements following the OPM-SANG bombing which significantly reduced vulnerabilities.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 44) The Security Police unit at Khobar Towers depended upon periodic vulnerability assessments performed by "ad hoc" composite assessment teams to determine vulnerabilities. The Security Police commander essentially served as his own intelligence officer for base defense with assistance from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations Detachment. Given the scope of his responsibilities and austere manning levels, he had little opportunity to conduct base defense-related intelligence assessments.

Comments: The AFOSI Vulnerability Assessments were conducted regularly and in accordance with Air Force directives. In the Air Force, the AFOSI is responsible for providing the same kind of intelligence support to the security police commander as military intelligence specialists do for the military police commander in the Army. Although structured differently from the Army, the relationship between the local AFOSI personnel and the security police commander was excellent. Moreover, the Wing Commander established a weekly "Threat" meeting where AFOSI, security police, and wing intelligence discussed the full spectrum of threats with the wing's senior leadership. The Report evaluated the Wing's intelligence structure by comparing it to the Army Military Police Battalion model. I found no evidence that such a structure, in this case, would have worked any better in predicting or preventing the attack.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 57) As at all U.S. overseas facilities, the host nation exercised sovereignty over its territory outside of U.S. installations and assumed responsibility for the overall security and safety of U.S. servicemen and women.

Comments: Saudi Arabia, the host nation, exercises sovereignty both inside and outside Khobar Towers, which belonged to the Government of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia did permit the U.S. latitude in its activities within the installation. Internal security was a shared responsibility between the U.S., coalition forces and the Saudi Arabian military police.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 57) The security infrastructure and systems at Khobar Towers proved inadequate to deter and defend against the June 25, 1996 terrorist bomb attack. This was despite significant efforts by the United States and Saudi Arabia to enhance security of the facility.

Comments: The relevant issue for accountability is not whether the security infrastructure and systems were adequate or inadequate to deter and defend against this particular terrorist bomb attack, but whether the actions taken by the chain of command were reasonable under the circumstances.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 57) The 4404th Wing (Provisional) initiated extensive force protection measures beginning in November 1995. These initiatives focused on the threat from a bomb penetrating to the interior of Khobar Towers. The Wing did not take adequate protective measures to meet other viable terrorist threats to service members and facilities in the Dhahran area. These threats included attacks by stand-off weapons, assassination and/or kidnapping of individuals, ambush of vehicles, and stand-off bombs.

Comments: Intelligence did not indicate that there was an imminent threat from stand-off weapons, assassination or kidnapping, or ambush of vehicles. Despite the lack of a known threat, Brigadier General Schwalier implemented Force Protection measures that extended beyond the perimeter. For example, he posted roof top sentries. They were positioned to observe any threat to Khobar Towers from outside the perimeter. In fact, this Force Protection measure saved lives since such sentries were the first to observe the suspicious truck in the parking lot outside the compound, to notify their control center, and to begin the evacuation of Building 131. Regarding individual off-base activities, a variety of measures was used

depending on the threat level and/or the terrorist events that transpired in the immediate region. At times, personnel were restricted to base or restricted from visiting certain locations. When off-base travel was permitted, personnel were directed to avoid agitated crowds or large groups of Westerners, they could not travel alone or in groups larger than four, and frequently they were restricted from Bahrain where security incidents were not uncommon. The Wing dress and appearance instruction directed appropriate off-base attire. Wing personnel were instructed, through various means such as the Wing newspaper and briefings by commanders, to maintain a low profile outside the compound. Brigadier General Schwalier required unit commanders to brief and account for their personnel traveling off-base. For senior personnel and distinguished visitors, who were most at risk for kidnapping or ambush, personal security officers were used, plus travel and lodging plans were designed to minimize the risk.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 60) In April and May 1996, several incidents occurred which, while individually insignificant, indicated possible reconnaissance and surveillance of the Khobar Towers complex. None of these incidents have yet been linked to the actual attack.

Comments: While it may appear that these incidents represented a increase in potentially suspicious incidents, it should be noted that, due to the wing's increased emphasis on security (especially during the period of the Hajj), airmen were being much more vigilant and much more likely to report suspicious incidents. There is no way of knowing how often such incidents had been occurring or would have been reported if this level of vigilance had been in effect during the previous years.

The ten incidents included four of possible surveillance. They were reported by Wing personnel in April, May, and June 1996. Many were during the period of the Hajj. These incidents were investigated by the AFOSI, the Saudi military and local Police. None indicated an attack on Khobar Towers was imminent. These suspicious incidents near the Khobar Towers in the Spring of 1996 were thoroughly evaluated by the entire chain of command, to include USCENTCOM. These incidents included one possible threat indicator -- the suspected ramming of a Jersey barrier on the east perimeter. It was reported to Saudi authorities, who permitted the Wing to secure the barriers by staking them into the ground. There were four incidents of possible surveillance, which were taken seriously and reported to local Saudi authorities for further investigation. These occurred on April 1, 4, 17 and 25, 1996, and all involved reports by Wing personnel of Middle

Eastern men driving by or parked and observing the compound. Of the five remaining incidents, two were inconclusive and three were completely discounted.

These incidents were discussed with the Saudis, who did not view them as threatening. They attributed the incidents of possible surveillance to natural curiosity on the part of the Saudi populace about the activities of Americans inside the perimeter. Just outside the northern perimeter of Khobar Towers is a parking lot which was used by people visiting a nearby mosque. It also serviced a recreational area. During the month-long period of Hajj, a religious celebration, it was not unusual for many people to congregate in this area in the evenings. Most of the reported incidents took place during this time, and this may have caused the police to dismiss them as non-threatening. The Saudis said they had undercover security personnel in the area.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 61) Brigadier General Schwalier was not well served by an "ad hoc" intelligence structure. The combination of frequent rotations, inconsistency in the professional qualifications of officers assigned to counterintelligence duties, and their lack of area expertise degraded the support provided to the Wing Commander.

Comments: The Wing Commander improved the existing intelligence structure by adding weekly threat meetings. I found no evidence any member of the Wing's counterintelligence structure was lacking in "professional qualifications" or that the Wing Commander would have been served better by a different intelligence structure. The Wing leadership did not rely only upon themselves but sought help from others. They asked coalition members and sister service leaders, as well as a National Intelligence Support Team official in-country, to critique their security efforts and to make constructive security enhancement recommendations. They found the Wing's efforts to be extensive and recommended no substantive changes. When asked about Force Protection at Khobar Towers after the OPM-SANG bombing, Colonel James R. Ward (U.S. Army), Commander, USARCENT, who had several hundred troops living at Khobar Towers, said: "there was a real sense of urgency;" "[w]e were worried about a car bomb;" "[g]iven what we had done, we thought we had done a good job of presenting a hardened area that was not accessible."

Task Force Assessment: (Page 80) FINDING 21: Funding for force protection requirements was not given a high priority by the 4404th Wing (Provisional) Prior

to the bomb attack on June 25, there were no significant budget requests from the 4404th Wing (Provisional) for force protection. This implies that the relatively minor force protection measures adopted during the 1996 fiscal year budget period were sufficient.

Comments: Brigadier General Schwalier established the first 4404th Wing (Provisional) Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan which included several measures intended to enhance personal and physical security. These measures were Mylar window film, perimeter fence improvements, surveillance equipment for the perimeter, and a vehicle entry control facility. (see previous discussion on Mylar)

Task Force Assessment: (Page 80) The Wing submitted a fiscal year 1996 unfunded budget request (UFR) for \$6.5 million to U.S. Air Forces Central Command on May 15, 1996. It identified only five items related to force protection: Bitburg barriers, video cameras for closed-circuit recording of incidents at the dormitories, computers to operate the badge system for entry of Third Country National workers onto Khobar Towers, land mobile radios for security forces, and door alarms which cumulatively totaled approximately \$450,000.

Comments: The budget process requires a reasonable approach to prioritization and requires substantiation. Funds are not unlimited. The Wing Commander established the Wing's first five-year plan. It was based on the perceived threat.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 80) A comparison of the command budgets for U.S. Army Forces Central Command-Saudi Arabia and the 4404th Wing (Provisional) reveals a significant difference in command emphasis. In the budget for U.S. Army Forces Central Command-Saudi Arabia, force protection measures were prioritized just behind mission readiness, In fact, preliminary budgets submitted by the staff were changed by the commander, Colonel James Ward, to reflect the force protection priority.

Comments: While the Task Force may have perceived a difference in prioritization in budgetary matters, this did not prevent the Wing from taking reasonable steps to enhance the security of Khobar Towers. When asked about Force Protection at Khobar Towers after the OPM-SANG bombing, Colonel James R. Ward (U.S. Army), Commander, USARCENT, who had several hundred troops living at Khobar Towers, said, "There was a real sense of urgency. We were worried about a car bomb. Given what we had done, we thought we had done a good job of

presenting a hardened area that was not accessible." The former Consul General to Dhahran, Mr. David Winn, a 25-year State Department veteran of the Middle East and a frequent visitor to Khobar Towers, observed that Brigadier General Schwalier's efforts "...were so stringent, so draconian, so professional that I thought he almost had overreacted." Mr. Winn also stated that the security measures at Khobar Towers were so impressive that Khobar Towers was "in a league by itself" in comparison to other facilities in the region.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 81) FINDING 22: (a) The division of responsibility for the protection of Khobar Towers was clearly understood by both U.S. and Saudi officials.(b) Saudi security forces were unable to detect, deter, and prevent the truck bomb attack outside the perimeter fence at Khobar Towers.

Comments: I concur with Finding 22. The division of responsibility for protection of Khobar Towers was clearly understood by both U.S. and Saudi officials. I also agree with the Report's conclusion that Saudi forces were unable to detect, deter, and prevent the truck bomb from an attack outside the perimeter of Khobar Towers.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 81) Brigadier General Schwalier never requested to move the fence nor did he request additional force protection support from Saudi officials for the security of Khobar Towers.

Comments: As discussed previously, because they were concerned about increasing visibility on the perimeter, Colonel Gary Boyle, Support Group Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel James Traister, Security Police Squadron Commander, testified they had asked their Saudi military counterparts to move the concrete barriers a short distance outside the east, west and north fences and to clear out vegetation growing on the north perimeter. Colonel Boyle made his request in November 1995 after the OPM-SANG bombing while on a perimeter tour of the fence line with the Royal Saudi Air Force liaison officer. Lieutenant Colonel Traister made his request in April 1996. The request regarding the east and west perimeters was granted and concrete barriers were placed approximately five feet outside the fence. The request to cut down vegetation and to place barriers outside the vegetation on the north perimeter was not granted because the Saudis did not want their people easily to see activities inside the compound, such as jogging in shorts, and because they believed it was not necessary for security.

Brigadier General Schwalier did not raise with his counterparts the request

regarding the vegetation and barrier outside the fence on the north perimeter, given the alternative cooperation received from the Saudis (e.g., increased Saudi patrols), other security measures taken, including measures to improve visibility (e.g., posting of rooftop sentries), the then-known threat, the nature of the property involved (a public parking area, used as a recreational area, next to a public park and a mosque), and the overall dynamics.

Task Force Assessment: (Page 82) Despite the coordination with local civilian police officials and the increased patrols of the north parking lot by the local civilian police, the terrorists exploited a vulnerability. The security of the north parking lot was clearly the responsibility of Saudi security forces.

Comments: While I concur with this assessment, it highlights the difficult circumstances under which the Wing operated with regard to extending Force Protection measures beyond its perimeter.

APPENDIX 2

REVIEW TEAM BIOGRAPHIES

Lieutenant Gen James F. Record is the Commander, 12th Air Force and U.S. Southern Command Air Forces. The command is comprised of eight active wings, a communications group, a heavy engineering squadron, and an air support group with more than 35,000 active duty and civilian personnel and 450 aircraft. The command also consists of over 21,000 people and 360 aircraft in units of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. His responsibilities also include the air component command USAF assets provided to U.S. Southern Command.

He has commanded three fighter wings (to include Kunsan, ROK,) and an air division, served as J-3 for U.S. Central Command, served as the first deputy of Joint Task Force Middle East operating in South West Asia (SWA) area, served as Air Component and Joint Force Air Component Commander of Operation Uphold Democracy, and senior U.S. member to the United Nations Command at Panmunjom, ROK, and as Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia.

Colonel Robert H. Baskett is the Chief, Contingency and Joint Matters Division, Directorate of Military Personnel Policy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF. He has held that position since August, 1993. Colonel Baskett was commissioned in 1968 and has served on active duty since 1970. He is a command pilot with more than 3600 flying hours, has flown four different aircraft, but logged most of his time in C-130s. While stationed in the Philippines, he flew missions in the Pacific, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, including the Saigon Evacuation in April, 1975. He has flown in Europe, the Middle East; served as Operations Officer in the C-130 CCTS and the Tactical Airlift Instructor School, as well as Commander of the C-130 RTU Squadron. Additional tours include Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering at USAFA, Senior Airlift Controller in the Military Airlift Command (MAC) Command Center, Director of Personnel Plans, Systems, and Readiness in the MAC Crisis Action Team (CAT) during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and Chief of Assignments for Air Mobility Command.

Colonel William H. Booth is the Chief, Manpower Program Development Division, Directorate of Programs and Evaluation, HQ USAF/PE. Colonel Booth has over 22 years experience in a wide variety of Manpower Management positions at all echelons within the Air Force command structure. Early in his career he was a base level management engineering officer and management engineering detachment commander. His four most recent positions before his current assignment were as Chief, Manpower Resources Branch, HQ TAC/XP; Chief, Manpower Budget Development Team, HQ USAF/PE, Chief, Manpower Requirements Division, HQ SAC/XP, and Chief, Manpower and Organization Division and Deputy Director of Manpower and Personnel, United States Strategic Command/J1.

Colonel Thomas Leo Cropper is the Chief of Public Health, AF Medical Operations Agency. He has twenty-three years experience in disease prevention and control, medical readiness, training, plans, and exercise evaluation. He was stationed at RAF Upper Heyford, UK from 1978-1981. His overseas TDY's include Germany, Portugal, and Korea. He served as director of Battlefield Medical Operations, School of Aerospace Medicine from 1986-1990. He was responsible for the Brooks AFB exercise evaluation team from 1986-1992. He served on numerous AF and DoD panels to improve medical readiness and plans, disease and injury prevention, and operational medical support from 1985-1996. He has special training and expertise in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare defense.

Colonel Robert A. Ferguson, USAF, BSC, is the Associate Director, Medical Readiness Doctrine and Training, Office of the Surgeon General, HQ USAF, Bolling AFB, DC. He has over nineteen years military service, the last nine of which have been as a medical readiness officer, serving at HQ TAC, USCENTAF, Joint Staff, and Air Staff. His experience includes serving as deliberate planner, crisis action planner, and SWA theater planner during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, focusing on operational and strategic levels of war. In his current billet he is responsible for managing Air Force medical readiness, organization, training, and equipping as the Medical Service re-engineers its medical capabilities.

Colonel James M. Holt has been assigned to HQ USAF/XOFC to work special projects for XOF since 6 Aug 96. A command pilot with over 3000 flying hours, he entered the AF in Feb 1970. He has extensive experience in operations and command relations both as a commander and as a war planner. He was Support Group Commander, 354th Fighter Wing, Eielson AFB, AK from Aug 94 to Jul 96, 673rd Air Base Group Commander, Eareckson AFS, AK from Sep 93 to Aug 94 and Squadron commander of the 25th Tactical Air Support Squadron, Eielson AFB, AK from May 88 to Oct 89. He served as a plans officer from Jul 85 to May 88 at Headquarters Alaskan Air Command.

Colonel David W. Madsen is the Chief, Appellate Defense Division, Air Force Legal Services Agency. He is a judge advocate with over 22 years experience in military justice. While assigned to the HQ USAF Military Justice Division, he was the Air Force representative on the working group of the Joint Services Committee on Military Justice. This committee is responsible for recommending changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He served as staff judge advocate at Mountain Home AFB, ID and served on the headquarters staffs at 17 AF, TAC, SAC and USAFE, where he served as the deputy MAJCOM staff judge advocate.

Colonel Thomas J. McDonald is the Director of Operations for the Directorate of The Civil Engineer. Colonel McDonald has over 23 years of experience in a variety of Civil Engineer assignments at all levels of command. Prior to that he was the Chief of Programs for the Civil Engineer directorate at HQ AETC, Randolph AFB, TX. He also served as the commander of the 375 Civil Engineer Squadron at Griffiss AFB, New York. He was the Chief of the Programs Requirements branch for the Civil Engineer directorate at HQ PACAF and was an evaluator on the HQ

USAFE Inspector General team.

Colonel Gerald E. Reynolds is the Director of Plans, Policy and Evaluation, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington, DC. Colonel Reynolds has 29 years experience in intelligence operations as a photo interpreter, targeting officer, nuclear and conventional weapons, regional and counterterrorism analyst, financial programmer, special security officer and trainer. He commanded an imagery and electronic intelligence exploitation squadron at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska (SAC, 16 months) and the 3480th Technical Training Wing at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas (ATC, 26 months), where he provided basic and advanced intelligence training to over 8000 students per year from all four United States military services. He was the senior United States intelligence officer at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium, and the Director of Intelligence at Air Combat Command, the Air Force's largest major command.

Colonel James R. Silliman is the Vice Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC. He was commissioned in April 1967 and has spent his entire career in AFOSI, serving in command and staff positions at all echelons within AFOSI. His various tours of duty have included base level counterintelligence collections, theater-wide responsibility for USAF counterintelligence in Europe, counterintelligence input to security police for air base ground defense in the United Kingdom, and oversight of the Air Force counterespionage double agent program.

Colonel Frank M. Willingham is the Deputy Chief of Security Police for the Air Force. Colonel Willingham has over 20 years experience in security and law enforcement and has a diverse range of experience which is unique among Air Force security policemen. He directed security operations at Ramstein Air Base in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on HQ USAFE. In a follow-on assignment, Colonel Willingham directed security operations in protecting air crews after the Libyan air strikes at RAF Lakenheath. While there, Colonel Willingham pioneered the use of thermal imagery technology in security which was later used in the Philippines and Panama. His field experience was followed by assignments to the USAFE IG Team and the Air Staff where he managed the AF Air Base Ground Defense program. In a Joint Service capacity, he managed research and development of new nuclear security systems while assigned to the Defense Nuclear Weapons Agency. After his tour in Washington, Colonel Willingham was

sent to HQ USEUCOM in Germany where he oversaw the largest shipment of nuclear weapons back to the United States from an overseas location.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Woods is presently the Chief of the Air Force Central Labor Law Office (CLLO), Civil Law and Litigation Directorate, Air Force Legal Service Agency. He has served as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, McGuire AFB, NJ; Staff Judge Advocate, San Antonio Real Property Maintenance Agency, San Antonio, TX; Trial Attorney, CLLO, Washington DC; and Staff Judge Advocate, RAF Alconbury, UK. Lt Col Woods attended law school under the sponsorship of the Air Force Funded Legal Education Program and has 13 years of litigation experience.