

Soldiers on Point for the Nation... Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War

Installation Preparedness for Weapons of Mass Destruction

INSTALLATION COMMANDERS' BLUEPRINT




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In March 2000 the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff endorsed the Antiterrorism and Force Protection Installation Commanders' Guide. This book provided eight critical tasks to guide installation Commanders in pursuit of their AT/FP programs. The prescience of the "Guide" was highlighted in October 2000 by a terrorist attack on the USS Cole. This attack and others before it are grim reminders of the necessity for constant vigil across the entire range of Army activities. The threat outlook will not improve in the near future.

In his endorsement of the Installation Commanders' Guide the Chief of Staff said, "Commanders must, as the law and resources permit, act proactively to deter would-be attackers and establish procedures to enable effective response to save lives and contain damage if an attack does occur." This we will do. By the end of CY 2000 all installations had developed plans to respond to WMD incidents. However, assessments indicate that we are still not doing all that we can to prepare for the possibility of a WMD incident. We must ensure the thought of force protection is foremost in every Commander's mind. Programs must be more than a plan that sits on a shelf. They must include daily actions and long term solutions to vulnerabilities. At the installation level, Commanders must orient on the threats specific to his or her location. Each must clearly assign responsibilities, identify vulnerabilities and define priorities. The follow on book to the Installation Commanders' Guide, the Installation Preparedness for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Installation Commanders' Blueprint will help Commanders do this.

The "Blueprint" gives you, the installation Commander, procedural guidance that can help you develop immediate improvements and a strategy for long-term progress. Improved physical security alone is not sufficient to deter a terrorist. The "Blueprint" emphasizes the importance of building partnerships with the local community and host nation providers. It focuses on the significance of using every possible tool to combat the prospect of WMD. The "Blueprint" highlights ways for a Commander to use technology and human expertise to bring all functions to bear on the problem and suggests ways to improve intelligence collection, reduce vulnerabilities and acquire the necessary first responder capability. All of these things and more create the sum total of weapons at your disposal to deter, defend and respond to WMD. You must use them all.

We face constant reminders that, more than any other threat, WMD imperils our ability to accomplish the Army mission. The warning sirens have sounded. The lives of our soldiers, civilians and their families depend upon our ability to face the challenge. There can be no excuses that there was not enough money or training time or understanding. We must be ready.

Larry R. Ellis
LTG, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
For Operations and Plans



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army published their initial guidance on the subject of antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) in March 2000. This guidance, in the form of the *United States Army Antiterrorism and Force Protection Installation Commanders' Guide*, is a landmark document in the field of FP. The *Guide* represents "the most important things that Commanders must do to enhance FP programs on their installations." It brings focus to the WMD topic and designates the start point for installation Commanders in establishing their programs. Still, this guidance must be translated into action. The follow on *Installation Commanders' Blueprint* takes the next step. It assists installation Commanders in converting Army Leadership guidance into action, specifically in the area of WMD preparedness.

The challenges of translating guidance into action is frequently one of understanding the mission, those tasks required to accomplish the mission and the best method of organizing tasks and assigning responsibility for them. Using the "must do's" specified in the *Commanders' Guide*, the *Blueprint* translates those missions into a series of tasks installation Commanders can use as the basis for WMD planning. It adds depth to the "must do's" so that an installation Commander can more easily place them in an operational context. In addition, the online *Blueprint* (<http://www.doms.pentagon.mil>) includes internet links to many of the agencies and literature available today that can, if necessary, give even more detailed information about the subject of installation preparedness for WMD. The remaining difficulty of organizing the information for an plan is also addressed in the *Blueprint*. In a very real sense, force protection is not a new mission for an Army organization. The *Blueprint* proposes that, by using the traditional estimate of the situation and order format, a Commander can best determine a course of action and implement the Army Leadership's directive for installation preparedness for WMD.

The shadow of terrorist acts on Army installations will not soon disappear. The *Blueprint* cannot make the phantom go away but it can assist the Commander in dealing with the possibility. In

today's Army, a Commander's willingness to act is never in question and force protection is not a new requirement. Protection of life and property are an inherent element of command regardless of circumstance or location. The *Blueprint* adds one more tool for the installation Commander in his goal of protecting the force from the WMD threat.

"The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are increasingly a fact of life that first must be acknowledged and then managed."

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense



INTRODUCTION

Today the outlook of the enemy is significantly changed from years past. There is little in the way of a defined threat for which to prepare. The specter of terrorism has diminished the threat of a monolithic foe. Instead of relief at the ebbing threat, for an Army installation commander, the contemporary enemy requires a greater sense of alertness. The broad range of possibilities encompassed in today's apparent enemy leave open the prospect of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The potential accompanying devastation requires that Army installation commanders prepare to deter the enemy from this possibility and respond should deterrence fail. A shift from a more predictable adversary, this new more malignant menace caught many installations off guard.

“The security and protection of US Army soldiers, civilians employees, family members, and equipment is the personal responsibility of Commanders at every level... Our obligation to the force and to the nation is to ensure that appropriate security measures are established, continuously reviewed and sustained. Commanders will review their force protection plans and programs to ensure they understand the threat associated with their specific location and mission, and apply appropriate security measures to mitigate the threat.”

General Shinseki Sends, 10 November 2000

Recent assessments of Army installations suggest that there is a significant shortcoming in their planning for WMD. In March 2000 the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army endorsed the *Antiterrorism and Force Protection, Installation Commanders' Guide*. The Guide clarifies the eight basic/primary responsibilities of Army commanders for antiterrorism and force protection policy compliance. This follow-on document, *Installation Preparedness for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Installation Commander's Blueprint*, suggests ways to do just that.

The *Installation Commanders' Blueprint* serves three purposes. It operationalizes the eight critical tasks assigned to installation commanders by the Secretary of the Army in the *Installation Commanders Guide*. It highlights the fundamentals of the WMD aspects of FP, providing suggestions for commanders on how to address those challenges. Finally, it addresses the planning for a WMD incident in a standard military decision making context. Just as the AT/FP Guide did for antiterrorism before it, the “Blueprint” should prove a valuable resource guide when planning for deterrence and response to a WMD incident.

Often the most formidable challenge in developing a plan for an unusual situation is developing the task list that supports the objective. In the case of protecting an installation and all of its resources from the devastation of a WMD incident, the objective is clear: stop it before it transpires or respond quickly and efficiently when it does. This objective places the problem in an operational context and makes it vulnerable to traditional military problem solving. Using that as a framework, the “Blueprint” takes

the eight responsibilities laid out in the Guide and delineates tasks to accomplish each. It guides the commander through the unfamiliar terrain of a determined yet unpredictable antagonist.

There is no magic that can make the potential for a WMD incident go away. Effective preparation is the best tool to combat the problem. Planning is the most critical part of that preparation. A well thought-out plan provides the commander the best opportunity for victory in a random environment. The “Blueprint” can guide the commander through that most significant of planning scenarios.



FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM
Commanders need to take personal charge of their FP Program

Commanders Need to Take Personal Charge of Their Antiterrorism Force Protection (AT/FP) Program

The Army AT/FP Guide lists four key actions commanders should take to ensure their FP program becomes a successful one. These four actions complement WMD planning.

- The commander should personally chair the installation FP Committee to promote command emphasis on the Installation Preparedness (IP) for WMD Program.
- Assign key staff personnel to the Committee so that all functions of the installation participate in the WMD planning.
- Assign a FP officer for WMD plan coordination.
- Ensure that the installation develops appropriate plans and trains for WMD incidents.

The significance of these suggestions must not be understated. Command emphasis, an inclusive committee, a dedicated focal point, and strategic planning represent the foundation of an installation program. The commander's ability to influence this will determine the eventual success of the Program on his installation.

A viable, long term focused FP Committee is the cornerstone upon which the FP program is built. In less effective programs, because a WMD incident appears unlikely, the meetings are frequently relegated to a less important role in the life of the installation. The Committee actually represents much more than that. At all levels it guides the program and, with a commander's presence, it becomes a decision-making body. It is the commander's presence that promises prompt execution of Committee decisions. It is the commander that makes certain the Committee meetings do not waste valuable time and that the IP initiatives integrate with other installation priorities. Focused objectives define the goals of the Committee.

FOUR COMMANDER'S ACTIONS THAT GUIDE AN INSTALLATION PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM:

- Develop an Installation Preparedness for WMD incident strategy
- Conduct risk analysis
- Coordinate resources
- Conduct regular FP meetings



FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM
Commanders need to take personal charge of their FP Program

Develop Installation Preparedness for WMD Strategy

A long-term strategy is the first step in a successful installation preparedness program. Because of limited resources it takes time to achieve a fully prepared posture. The strategy provides that long-term direction to guide the installation in a coordinated series of steps to realize the goal. The actual length of time the strategy considers is based upon available resources and other missions of the installation. Generally, five years is a reasonable planning figure. Finally, the approved strategy must be translated into an executable plan or annex on the shelf.

It begins with a candid assessment of the current status of the installation. The assessment is an appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the installation functions. It may identify the installation's lack of experienced HAZMAT personnel or it may identify a public road that passes through the heart of the installation. It is imperative that the key 1st responder leadership is involved in these assessments. (See Chapters 3 and 8, and Annex C.) An accurate assessment is the groundwork for the strategy.

Once the assessment is complete the commander and his staff, develop a vision that defines successful installation preparedness. The vision gives definition to the ultimate goal of the program. It orients on the future and provides a clear concise statement of the precise picture of installation preparedness. It could include comments about healthy relationships with the local community or effective security measures to deter a prospective terrorist. In short, the vision gives the commander's view of the end product of installation preparedness.

Using the assessment as the start point and the vision as the end point the commander and staff develop the strategy. The strategy provides the "how to" for achieving installation preparedness. The steps to develop the strategy are similar to those to develop a plan described in Annex B. The strategy is the "road map" for building a program over a period of time. The strategy should:

- Orient on the threat
- Identify phases or steps to reach the vision
- Assign objectives to each phase
- Identify main and supporting efforts in each phase
- Assign priorities for resources in each phase
- Identify indicators of success to monitor the progress of the strategy





United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM *Commanders need to take personal charge of their FP Program*

Conduct Risk Analysis

As stated above an installation will execute its program over a period of time. Planning and risk analysis is continual in nature. By approving the long-term strategy the commander acknowledges short-term risks. The clear statement of the risks is beneficial in two ways. It encourages initiative in subordinates by allowing them to focus their work on the most important aspects of the program. They are released from guessing those things that may be perceived as important over the short term. In addition it reduces the day to day decisions necessary for the commander because staff sections and individuals recognize the direction of the program. However, the risks remain and the Commander must consider ways to reduce them.

One method to reduce risk is to emphasize those most current improvements in the program through media and command information sources. An aggressive effort focused on positive progress strengthens the awareness of a dynamic program and lessens the external focus on weaknesses. Obtaining temporary assistance can also reduce risk in the short term . As an example,

“The commander’s ability to influence this will determine the eventual success of the IP Program on his installation.”

if the installation does not have or cannot immediately procure the necessary antidote for a particular chemical threat, the installation can coordinate with the local hospital or another nearby service installation to fill the gap until the installation can become self-sufficient. Deception is another consideration to increase security. There have been cases where broken discarded cameras have given the impression that a gate was under observation until the installation could provide new ones. Inventiveness and individual initiative can, for a short period, substitute for pending resources.

Coordinate Resources

The FP Committee integrates IP initiatives into installation resource planning. It is also the instrument to collect and prioritize installation resource planning data for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission. With all critical installation functions having a representative on the Committee it is possible to consider a wide range of possibilities. Furthermore, the inclusive nature of the Committee ensures initiatives will not become the domain of one or two specialized staff sections. Uncoordinated piecemeal requests for funds do not normally advance the program. A holistic approach will more likely save resources and sooner achieve the goal.

Over the long term, a strategy developed as stated above will assist in directing resources for the program. The Department of the Army provides some funds to Major Army Commands (MACOMs) for physical security and training through Management Decision Execution Programs (MDEPs) for Combating Terrorism. Other MDEPs can also resource WMD preparedness and material that have multiuse such as communications and medical equipment. To be competitive for those funds there must be a coherent long-term plan for their use at the installation level. In addition, the commander must leverage general base operating funds for FP WMD mitigation purposes.





FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM
Commanders need to take personal charge of their FP Program

Conduct Regular FP Committee Meetings

Regular meetings combined with command involvement and staff follow up will keep the installation preparedness program on track. The committee will update and evaluate the latest threat and make necessary adjustments to priorities and responsibilities. Furthermore, meetings present an opportunity to coordinate other installation activities that may not outwardly relate to WMD. Below are some considerations to ensure FP meetings remain a useful and reliable tool for IP initiatives.

- Schedule regular semi-annual meeting
- List meetings on long range training calendar
- Commander attends to direct agenda
- Develop meeting agenda
- Establish working groups for special projects
- Include representatives for local/state/federal/host nation emergency management and responder communities
- Include tenant organizations

A focused agenda helps keep the meeting and the IP strategy on track. The chart below suggests a meeting agenda. It must be adjusted to fit the needs and activities of the installation.

SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR FP MEETING
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• State the objective(s) and current phase of the IP strategy• Update threat assessment• Review progress on tasks assigned at the last meeting• Reports from assigned working groups• Review progress made in:<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Training- Exercises- Resources acquired, coordinated & distributed- Lessons learned• Review future events<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Near-term (approximately six months)- Guidance from higher headquarters- Confirmation of resources- Review coordination with outside agencies- Long range- Resource priorities- Strategy adjustments as necessary- WMD coordination & exercise planning• Summary by the commander<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Requirements from higher headquarters- Restate priorities of effort



United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM

Commanders provide intelligence support

Provide Intelligence Support

While the likelihood of a WMD incident may seem low, the consequences warrant WMD threat assessments. Identifying, understanding and assessing the WMD threats to your installation is a critical step in effective force protection operations. As with all assessments, intelligence is one of the building blocks to success. The nature and types of threats to Army installations worldwide vary widely with location, target vulnerability, site criticality and the level of hostile intent. AR 381-10, Intelligence Activities, outlines the authorities and restrictions in intelligence activities.

THREE ACTIONS TO PROVIDING SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT INCLUDE:

- Designate an Installation Intelligence Focal Point
- Establish an Installation Intelligence Fusion Cell
- Determine WMD Threats to the Installation and Advise the Commander

Designate an Installation Intelligence Focal Point

The commander should assign intelligence responsibility to a specific member of his staff. Whether it is the installation provost marshal, security manager, or S-2, a specific office must be designated as the focal point for installation intelligence collection and dissemination. He is an essential member of the FP committee and should be separate from your force protection manager. Some of his key duties are:

- Lead the installation intelligence fusion cell
- Serve as liaison with local, state, federal or host nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies [IAW AR 381-10]
- Include WMD vulnerabilities in the annual installation threat assessment
- Prepare intelligence portion of the installation FP or other response plans
- Provide installation Commander operational impacts of changing intelligence situation

Many installation intelligence officers are former military intelligence collectors and analysts and have tremendous experience; past experience will enhance intelligence assessments and recommendations. Commanders must also ensure their intelligence focal point is not overwhelmed with an excessive amount of other additional duties. Automation security, personnel security clearances, installation pass management and other additional duties can severely detract from this mission.



FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM
Commanders provide intelligence support

Establish an Installation Intelligence Fusion Cell

Using the installation intelligence officer as a base, form an installation focused intelligence fusion cell including representatives from these offices: Provost Marshall, Criminal Investigation Division Command, Counterintelligence, Local, State, Federal, and host nation law enforcement and intelligence agency representatives. If OCONUS, include supporting military intelligence detachments and Host Nation law enforcement and intelligence agency representatives. Meet often and disseminate information aggressively. Dissemination can be in the form of e-mail (classified and unclassified), spot reports, up, down and lateral coordination. Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPERNET) and INTELINK connectivity offer other useful capabilities. Installations should seek access to the nearest classified Internet source or other intelligence sources.

Determine the WMD Threats to the Installation and Advise the Commander

Your installation intelligence estimate MUST address the most likely WMD-type threat and means of delivery. As an example, the assessment might conclude the most likely WMD threat is a large, conventional improvised high explosive device. The lack of specific WMD threat requires some installations to use threat modelling and templating for all available intelligence and information sources to determine the most applicable WMD assessment for your installation.

A variety of information is available to assist in determining the WMD threats to your installation. Start with the Army Antiterrorism Operations and Intelligence Cell (ATOIC) located at HQDA ODCSOPs Law Enforcement Division. The ATOIC publishes daily and weekly intelligence updates/products and distributes them worldwide to Army installations. Local WMD threat information may also be available from local, state, federal, and host nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Pooling intelligence resources and developing joint threat assessments with nearby DoD installations and local and state law enforcement agencies will enhance intelligence collection/gathering.

Major Commands publish frequent threat assessments and updates that can serve as the benchmark for your installation oriented assessment. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) threat assessments and State Department travel warnings also provide useful information. Request installation focused analysis and products if needed, from your military intelligence collection manager.

For maximum effectiveness, focus on leading intelligence indicators versus giving the Commander and FP committee a history report.

However, the real key to determining the threats to your specific installation is coordination with local, state and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Also include your nearest CID Special Agent and Counterintelligence Agent. If OCONUS, host nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies are perhaps even more critical. Frequent information sharing within the intelligence fusion cell will solidify these critical partnerships which in turn will pay huge dividends in intelligence information. Often overlooked are the current assessments conducted by agencies such as the installation fire prevention and safety offices. These agencies have daily contact with units and identify and document mission risks and vulnerabilities that can impact a commander just as hard as an asymmetrical attack.




United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM

Commanders provide intelligence support

As new WMD intelligence information becomes available the installation functional area managers should advise the Commander on possible actions to be taken. Examples might include modifying your Random Antiterrorism Measures Program, reviewing the installation Priority Intelligence Requirements, changing OPORD planning assumptions, modifying the awareness program or even new strategies for resource allocations. Provide a threat assessment at every FP committee meeting. Discuss threats with committee members and seek their perspectives and input. Develop an installation focused intelligence estimate annually and update it frequently.





FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM
Commanders assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities

Commanders Assess and Reduce Critical Vulnerabilities

Identifying critical vulnerabilities to a WMD threat provides focus for applying installation resources to reduce those vulnerabilities and leads to a safer less likely target. From the installation assessment mentioned in Chapter 1 the Commander determines those functions that support his ability to accomplish the assigned installation mission. Coupling those functions with his inherent responsibility to protect people and property he then determines what possible WMD accident or incident might adversely affect his installation. Understanding his mission, knowing the threat and by calculating the available and required resources, the commander can proceed to the vulnerabilities of the installation. This process must be continuous and account for regular revalidation of vulnerabilities against the changing WMD threat.

KEY STEPS TO REDUCE AN INSTALLATION'S WMD VULNERABILITIES:

- Determine critical functions of the installation
- Identify WMD threats and assess vulnerabilities
- Mitigate WMD risks and vulnerabilities

Determine Critical Functions of the Installation

Critical functions for an installation are based on the installation's assigned mission. They are the installation's "center of gravity;" those functions upon which everything depends. A WMD directed at these functions could be a "warstopper." It could include entire systems such as information systems, power generation or transportation networks or it could be a single point through which all communications are funneled. It is also possible that the critical functions provide the resources for responding to a WMD incident and are frequently shared with the local community. Though international agreements might limit the commander's ability to influence the function, it does not change the requirement to protect a function and accomplish the assigned mission.

Critical functions for each Army installation are as different as their missions. As an example, if the installation mission is depot maintenance the critical function may involve a particular maintenance facility and its source of power generation. On the other hand if the mission is primarily a force projection one, a critical function could be an airfield, a seaport or lift operations. That being said there is some consistency. All installations, for example, include the requirement to protect people. This consideration may take a higher priority in a WMD threat environment. For example, schools, commissaries, and housing areas greatly expand the number of vulnerabilities and increase the commander's challenge to reduce them.





United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM

Commanders assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities

Identify Threats and Assess Vulnerabilities

The lamentable history of terrorism suggests that there is little consistency in target selection among terrorist elements. Natural disasters and accidents are likewise not selective in targeting. The potential of a WMD accident or a terrorist use of WMD must be included in the commander's vulnerability assessment. With that understanding, the commander's search for vulnerabilities begins with WMD threats to the installation and mission accomplishment mentioned above. Once identified and categorized according to priority, these functions provide the framework for addressing and reducing the vulnerability and improve the installation WMD response capability.

All installation functions are vulnerable to some method of attack. In the previous steps the commander identified critical functions and his other inherent responsibilities to protect personnel and property. Those together with the likely forms and methods of attack equal vulnerability. Some typical WMD vulnerabilities when taking into account the WMD environment, mission essential vulnerability areas (MEVA) and high risk targets (HRT) include:

- Power generation nodes
- Command and control facilities
- Water points
- Barracks/troop concentrations
- Housing areas, schools and hospitals
- Mobilization centers
- Sea/air ports of debarkation/embarkation

Force protection assessments and initiatives for WMD installation preparedness and response must also take into account that some vulnerabilities may be outside the wire of the installation itself and yet directly impact functions and missions. Many ports of embarkation are public facilities and some installations acquire power/water and telecommunication support from the local communities. These conditions must be included in the assessment to identify and establish WMD protective and mitigation requirements.

Mitigate WMD Risks and Vulnerabilities

The prioritized list of functions and their vulnerabilities, as determined by the installation commander and his staff, allows the commander to focus on each function in priority order. He must then ascertain the actions necessary to mitigate the vulnerability and to adequately respond to the WMD incident. Taking each function on the list the commander determines:

- What protection is necessary to reduce WMD vulnerabilities
- What resources are necessary to achieve that level of protection
- What resources are available to mitigate the consequences of a WMD incident
- What resources are available from local, state/federal/HN sources to support the mitigation of the consequences of a WMD incident.
- What coordination is necessary to mitigate risks.



FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM
Commanders assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities

An example often highlighted in installation vulnerability assessments is a public road or highway that is adjacent to or tranverses a military installation. The nature of a public road and potential proximity to facilities—airfields, family housing, barracks, etc, makes the installation vulnerable to a WMD attack or incident. The most certain solution to the problem is to close or limit access to the road or displace the installation's vulnerable function and facility. In most cases implementation of either solution is unrealistic. Options for WMD protection and incident response in this particular case require that high risk targets/incident sites are identified within WMD incident response plans and that emergency response resources are specifically allocated and packaged to address the possible scenarios. Coordination with appropriately trained community officials, police, and other emergency responder agencies can assist in improving protection and enhance response capabilities.

Once each vulnerability has been considered, the commander must develop a strategy that sequences the actions and resources essential to achieve the desired protection for all functions and necessary WMD mitigation response. The strategy should include a timeline that leads to the end state of WMD installation preparedness. A formal, exercised WMD incident response plan or annex forms a significant part of that end state. Some of the considerations when deciding how to sequence the timeline:

- Anticipated threat
- Current level of WMD protection
- Policies of the higher headquarters
- Agreements with community/host nation
- Results of most recent assessments/inspection(s)
- Anticipated resources (from assumptions)

As the commander considers the courses of action he conducts a risk analysis as described in chapter 1. In some cases there may be a temporary fix to reduce attendant risk until resources allow a more permanent solution. Examples include increased monitoring of the site or facility, temporary fencing and short-term adjustments to installation procedures to reduce activities at the designated site or ensure adequate emergency response assets are available

“A vulnerability assessment, prioritization of vulnerabilities and a systematic application of resources will, over a period of time, enhance installation protection.”

Just as the entire WMD installation preparedness program should be continually reevaluated for effectiveness, the command should evaluate and adjust protective and response measures to match the updated situation and threat. Periodically, Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) and MACOM teams provide an outside assessment of the installation's protection and preparation for a WMD incident. The FP committee should consider the findings along with its own internal assessment and make appropriate adjustments.



Commanders Increase AT/FP Awareness in Every Person—Soldier, DA Civilian and Family Member

Weapons of Mass Destruction awareness is arguably one of the most effective elements of any FP program. As the Army's AT/FP Installation Commanders Guide said, "The lesson is clear. The more we can inculcate WMD awareness in all personnel, the stronger FP programs will become." This can be no more true now as the U.S. Army remains highly visible and active in the ever-expanding global environment. The growing proliferation of threat groups makes a WMD incident more likely today than ever before. This necessitates a sustained awareness of WMD preparedness and emergency response requirements among soldiers, their family members, and DoD civilian employees.

TWO ESSENTIAL STEPS TO INCREASING WMD INCIDENT AWARENESS INCLUDE:

- Conduct / participate in the required FP training
- Use a multidimensional approach to increase and maintain awareness of the WMD threat

Conduct/Participate in Required FP Training

The Department of Defense has mandated AT/FP training requirements for all military personnel, DoD civilians, and their family members under specific circumstances. Army Regulation 525-13, Antiterrorism Force Protection, outlines the requirements for Level I (Individual Awareness), Level II (FP Officer), Level III (Bn/Bde Pre-Command Course Students) and Level IV (Installation Commanders-Colonel and Above with AT/FP responsibilities).

The Army's AT/FP Installation Commanders' Guide also provides an excellent one page summary of these required training levels, target audience and minimum training standard.

While the individual training is almost universally accepted as the cornerstone of the AT/FP awareness program, the Level II (AT/FP Officer) and Level IV (Installation Commander-Col and above) are often overlooked.

As the Commander's principal advisor on FP program management, the Level II training is an absolute imperative for all FP program managers. The Level II training greatly improves the effectiveness of the planning and management skills of both military or DoD civilian force protection officers. Commanders must get their FP managers to the Level II course as soon as possible. This facilitates enhancing the overall program and is also a requirement to provide the Level I individual instruction.

Often overlooked by Commanders is the Level IV training. The target audience is Installation Commanders and key staff, and senior civilian managers responsible for FP Installation Command and FP policy, planning and execution. Installation Commanders are inundated by requirements and this invaluable training is often put off or never attended. Commanders who have attended, leave with a much broader perspective of DoD and Army programs and initiatives designed to improve and enhance their installation FP programs. Installation Commanders should make the time to attend early in their command. It will significantly enhance their leadership effectiveness and demonstrate clear command interest and support.



FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM
Commanders increase AT/FP Awareness in every person

Use a Multi-Dimensional Approach to Increase and Maintain Awareness of the WMD Threat

Successful Commanders seek every opportunity and venue to promote greater WMD awareness and understanding. A combination of active and passive measures are often the most effective. Suggested ideas include:

- Incorporate FP briefings, including WMD preparedness, into newcomer briefs and installation orientations
- Discuss WMD threat and issues at community town hall meetings
- Use installation newspapers, cable television, electronic bulletin boards and websites
- Include force protection exercises in all quarterly training briefings
- Combine force protection actions (example: combine a random DWI screening with force protection 100% ID check and vehicle screening)
- Use Sergeant's Time to train on related tasks (example: personnel/vehicle search, manning a checkpoint, explosive detection, crowd control, emergency medical procedures, etc.) in a WMD environment
- Combine THREATCON and Road Conditions into single notice at installation access points
- Make available FP awareness information at high traffic areas such as near post exchanges, shopettes, theaters, libraries and hospitals
- Encourage local and host nation media coverage of force protection initiatives
- Provide installation FP and WMD threat, preparedness and response overviews to all incoming senior tenant and tactical commanders

“Successful Commanders seek every opportunity and venue to promote FP awareness.”

Maximizing the effectiveness of regulatory AT exercises, with a WMD scenario, can be obtained by a coordinated approach. Review and educate, with tenant units and Senior Tactical Commanders, the exercise regulatory requirements and installation benefits. Announce and promote the WMD exercise in advance stressing how the benefits for installation security are

significantly enhanced. Include Army Air Force Exchange System, Defense Commissary Agency, Morale, Welfare and Recreation Directors and Department of Defense Dependents Schools representatives in exercise planning to minimize normal activity disruption on the installation. Explain THREATCON levels and what they mean. Use multi-media approach to reach the entire population.

Use multiple venues such as installation newspapers, web sites, and command information bulletins to promote FP initiatives after the fact as well. This represents yet another opportunity to reinforce the Command's FP goals and program benefits and provide an additional deterrence effect.





FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM

Commanders must exercise, evaluation and assess WMD and AT/FP plans

Exercise, Evaluate and Assess WMD and AT/FP Plans

This chapter highlights those necessary considerations for a successful IP WMD exercise. An installation response plan must be exercised to ensure its validity—i.e., the components of the plan are executable and the resources are adequate/on hand/available. Before an exercise can occur, however, the commander must take steps to ensure success.

The exercise should:

- Begin with the most likely WMD threat as defined by the installation assessment, then exercise against the entire threat spectrum.
- Plan resources to thoroughly replicate a WMD scenario.
- Include participation with all associated tenant, community, host nation and other outside agencies (e.g. installation fire department/HAZMAT teams, military police, 911 system, State OEM, regional FEMA and FBI offices, etc.)
- Evaluate the installation's FP plan associated with responding to a WMD incident.
- Conduct After Action Reviews (AAR) at all levels of execution.
- Include a method for capturing lessons learned to ensure adjustments to the plan.



FOUR STAGES TO EVALUATING THE INSTALLATION PLAN:

- Determine Necessary Exercises and Resources
- Develop Criteria for Evaluation
- Execute the Plan
- Evaluate and Adjust the Plan

Determine necessary exercises and resources

As with any Army training the commander should make use of FM 25-101, BATTLE FOCUS TRAINING, to guide him in setting up a WMD incident exercise. The commander should schedule WMD scenario-driven exercises on the installation's long-range calendar well ahead of execution. The best forum for creating the exercise is the FP Committee. NOTE: While the FP committee may be key planners for a WMD incident exercise, the installations' operations staff element is critical for ensuring scheduling and coordinating resources.

The FP committee should also review the long-range training plans and schedules of the installation's units, organizations and tenants to identify opportunities in which a WMD scenario can be injected to maximize resources. As an example, hospitals are required to conduct mass casualty exercises annually. The installation could combine the WMD exercise with the mass casualty exercise and maximize the benefits and minimize the costs in money and manpower. The installation's master long-range calendar that recapitulates all training should afford numerous possibilities for evaluating the WMD incident response plan. Other possibilities include conducting WMD exercises that coincide with similar community exercises or coordinated with mobilization and tactical exercises of tenant units.



FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM
Commanders must exercise, evaluation and assess WMD and AT/FP plans

Advance planning and commander's guidance will allow sufficient time to include all installation functions and community activities necessary in an exercise. For an installation level exercise, the operations staff element will be the key planning proponent. It is important to include first responders early in the planning phase. In the case of OCONUS installations, advance planning will increase the likelihood of host nation participation. It also avoids unintended perceptions of unspecified incentives as the main reason for the exercise. As the installation community is brought into the exercise process, they will gain confidence through awareness that the installation can respond to a WMD event.

In the initial stages of planning for a WMD incident exercise, the commander may allow all staff members to participate in the exercise planning through to execution. However, as the installation plan evolves, initial exercises improve installation posture and the staff gains confidence the commander may decide to proceed to no-notice types of exercises. Since assumptions for most plans include the fact that WMD incidents occur without notice, it stands to reason that this is a critical aspect of the preparedness strategy that should eventually be exercised. The incremental enhancement of a WMD incident exercise in scope will also identify the peripheral disruptions to the installation's daily routine. Lessons learned will allow adequate planning for a full-scale exercise with minimal disruption to routine installation activities.

“Exercises are the best way to reinforce and refine your installation preparedness for weapons of mass destruction planning”

The commander must consider several facets of a WMD incident exercise when determining the date and size:

- Impacts on routine activities of the installation
- Costs associated with civilian overtime and WMD response specific material and equipment
- Availability of the community/host nation, tenants participation
- Effects on ongoing or anticipated operational missions

These types of considerations should be evaluated before the commander's decision to execute. The FP committee will be invaluable when collecting necessary information for the commander to make his decision.

Develop criteria for evaluation

An evaluation of installation preparedness is not limited to installation functions alone. The installation's effectiveness in conjunction with tenants, local, state and federal authorities and host nation agencies must also be evaluated. For that reason the criteria selected for evaluation are particularly critical. For example, first responders see action every day. It is their reports and actions that form the basis for the commander's decision to execute the WMD plan. As such, the task of reporting must be exercised and evaluated.

Some of the more salient features to be considered when developing the exercise include the differences among chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and conventional explosives. Each has its own peculiarities that require special attention. Naturally, the most likely threat should represent the primary focus of the exercise and resources distributed accordingly. The installation intelligence fusion cell, as discussed in chapter 2, can develop appropriate threat analysis and templates to cover the variety of possible WMD incidents.



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FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM

Commanders must exercise, evaluation and assess WMD and AT/FP plans

Training exercises should evaluate the entire spectrum of WMD. The commander should measure the likelihood of the threat and apply resources as necessary. It is the more subtle differences such as the casualties for a biological incident vice those of an explosive device that demand practical exercises across all of the WMD threats to an installation.

Execute the Plan

In principle, executing the plan for a WMD exercise is the same as any tactical exercise. However, the location and impact on otherwise routine activities make execution of a WMD exercise unusual and, at the same time, important. Just as an actual WMD incident would cause extraordinary confusion, so the execution of the exercise must include some stress to normal operations.

In execution, just as in planning, the exercise must include the entire community. As an example, if the portrayed WMD incident involves the dispersal of a chemical agent, those actions of the installation should replicate an appropriate response. That could include evaluating the downwind hazard, blocking roads, coordinating with the local community and moving residents to safe locations. All of these and other actions are inconvenient but necessary to fully test the installation's ability to react to a WMD incident. The situation challenges the commander to maintain order and calm during the execution of the exercise.

The installation should plan to notify the installation community before, during and after the exercise. Part of the significance of the exercise is that during execution residents are properly kept abreast of the situation. The initial notification procedures and continual updates to the community must be evaluated. They measure the command's ability to control the situation. In execution the WMD incident exercise must sufficiently replicate an actual WMD event. This is the only sure way to allow for effective evaluation of all functions.

Evaluate and Adjust the Plan

The commander should base the evaluation of an exercise upon the installation's WMD incident response plan. The exercise should accurately represent the most likely threat and measure all functions and their ability to respond to that threat. Each installation must draft its own evaluation criteria. The list at Annex C indicates considerations that should be covered by the evaluation.

The exercise evaluation itself should be such that written comments are kept as the exercise is conducted. Ideally, the evaluators will come from outside the installation. Potential sources for evaluators include tenant units, nearby installations, other service installations or civilians from the local emergency responder community. (See Chapter 7.) Barring all else, the evaluators should

come from within the installation. They should be trained in the criteria developed for the exercise and be familiar with the WMD incident response plan and objectives of the installation.

The installation will use the record and findings of the exercise to adjust and improve the installation plan for WMD response. A review of the results will allow the FP Committee to develop a strategy for improvements. The Committee should examine the timeline at every meeting to ensure the changes have been coordinated and are being incorporated into the plan. Following these adjustments the installation should plan the next exercise.





Commanders Maintain Installation Defenses IAW Threat Conditions

The DoD Threat Condition (THREATCON) system describes progressive levels of security measures for implementation in response to threats against property, personnel, information and critical resources. THREATCONs are mandated in DoD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Combatting Terrorism Program Standards. Based on the installation's threat environment, force protectors must consider templating WMD incident responses against each THREATCON level.

TWO TENETS OF A SUCCESSFUL INSTALLATION THREATCON SYSTEM INCLUDE:

- Understand the THREATCON system
- Increase THREATCON understanding at all levels of your installation / community population

Understand the THREATCON System

The THREATCON system is one of the key foundations for AT/FP planning and operations. Each THREATCON level is designed to produce a detection, assessment and response capability commensurate with the existing terrorist threat. Escalating THREATCONs should enhance these capabilities and send a clear signal of increased readiness.

Sustaining an increased THREATCON level can have a detrimental effect on unit readiness. As soon as appropriate, the commander should consider reducing the THREATCON level. The installation intelligence focal point, force protection manager and operations staff are key advisors to the commander in making THREATCON level decisions.

Installation Commanders and their FP committee members must clearly understand how THREATCON levels are implemented, up and down, and who has the authority to change them. MACOMs, Senior Tactical Commanders, organic, tenant and Reserve Component units and contract guards all have a key role in a successful THREATCON implementation program.

“A successful THREATCON system is based upon understanding and implementation.”



United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM *Commanders maintain installation defenses IAW threat conditions*

The commander must consider a variety of actions when a WMD threat is apparent. Other suggestions to consider in your installation FP plan for THREATCON implementation when the need for WMD incident protective measures are indicated include:

- Ensure you have an after hours, weekend and holiday notification plan for changing THREATCONs. When WMD threat is involved, the notification plan must alert the FP committee members and the installation's first responders such as the fire department, special medical teams, etc.
- Commanders should give particular attention to employing chemical, biological or radiological identification/detection equipment during implementation of higher THREATCON levels.
- Commanders should give particular attention to employing (or pre-positioning) PPE during implementation of higher THREATCON levels.
- Consider how changing THREATCONs may effect High Risk Personnel notification, lodging, transportation and visit planning
- Periodically review past Joint Staff, DA and MACOM AT/FP assessments for THREATCON measure effectiveness.
- Determine your installation manpower and other resource requirements to sustain THREATCONs for an extended time period. Determine what manpower options you have after your tenant units have deployed.
- Determine requirements and sufficiency of on-hand or local assets to implement all THREATCON measures.

Randomly implement various security measures from higher THREATCONs. A Random Antiterrorism Measures Program (RAMP) will increase FP alertness and awareness. RAMP will also make it harder for potential hostile elements to predict movement or activity at a given location. Assume your installation is under hostile surveillance. Place emphasis on detecting such activity.

Increase THREATCON Understanding at All Levels of Your Installation/Community Population

As mentioned earlier, the THREATCON system is one of the key foundations of a successful FP program, that also includes combatting terrorism, antiterrorism and similar security programs. However, it is often one of the least understood by those personnel not familiar with force protection.

Commanders have numerous opportunities to increase understanding of the THREATCON system and progressive levels of security measures. The FP portion of newcomer's briefings is an excellent way to educate new employees and family members early on. Handouts in welcome packets could also be made available. Use of installation websites, electronic bulletin boards, post newspapers and television are also excellent mediums. Handouts explaining THREATCON levels can be made available at installation "Retiree Days" to engage the local retiree and or overseas "ex-pat" communities.

Before, during and after antiterrorism exercises, with an integrated WMD scenario, are ideal opportunities to review THREATCON policies, procedures and measures with not only the installation staff but with the community populations. Encourage staffs, organic and tenant units to display THREATCON measures, what they mean and how they enhance the installation security posture. Reinforce the positive aspects of THREATCONs at every opportunity. Reduce the perception that THREATCON measures are a "hassle" by promoting the Command's message of an aggressive force protection program and the resulting increased security posture.



FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM

Commanders Create a civil/military partnership for WMD crisis response

Create Civil/Military Partnerships for Weapons of Mass Destruction Crisis Response

Army installations and communities around the world are, for the most part, integrated into a greater community structure. A WMD incident on or near an Army installation or facility will have a profound effect not only the installation but also the surrounding community. It is imperative Installation Commanders establish partnership relationships with Local, State, Federal or Host nation organizations and activities. This can be particularly challenging for OCONUS installations in that they may need to interact with multiple levels of host nation organizations simultaneously. Additionally, some installations have no response capability making these partnerships absolutely essential. Commanders must also be prepared to absorb the significant amount of Federal assistance (i.e., FBI/FEMA) or Host Nation assistance associated with a WMD incident.

THREE STEPS TO EFFECTIVE CIVIL/MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS INCLUDE:

- Establish relationships with local community or Host Nation
- Exchange WMD response capabilities information with local community or Host Nation
- Seek and leverage training opportunities at every opportunity

Establish Relationships with Local Community or Host Nation

Installation Commanders and force protection managers must meet and frequently interact with their civilian community counterparts. City managers, law enforcement officials, hospital directors, and fire chiefs are just a few of the key positions with whom to establish strong working relationships. Consider inviting some to join your FP committee.

OCONUS installations face different challenges due to language, culture, Status of Forces Agreements and historical relationships. Combine this with the fact that OCONUS installation responsibilities may overlap in the several host nation states, districts or prefectures. MACOMs can assist these installations by using foreign liaison officers to help Commanders bridge these gaps. Installation – host nation partnerships can and should complement the MACOM host nation engagement strategy.

Installation Commanders and installation staff must seek every opportunity and venue to engage their counterparts. Community orientations, installation activity days, civic community meetings, festivals and celebrations, force protection training exercises and similar events are just some of the possibilities.

***“Civil/military/
host nation
partnerships with
surrounding
communities are
essential to a
cohesive WMD
crisis response.”***



United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM

Commanders Create a civil/military partnership for WMD crisis response

Another advantage for CONUS Commanders having strong community relationships is that they and their staffs will have a greater understanding of how the civic authorities are organized to respond under federally mandated response guidelines.

Exchange WMD Response Capabilities Information with Local Community and Host Nation

Almost without exception, any WMD incident on or near an Army installation will quickly overwhelm that installation's ability to respond. Installation Commanders and staffs must meet with their civic counterparts and exchange WMD response capabilities information. This will be especially critical for law enforcement and other emergency first responders such as fire and medical. For years, Army hospitals have been effectively exchanging capabilities information routinely with their civilian medical care providers. Look to nearby military installations from other Services to leverage existing capabilities there also.

Installation Commanders will also want to discuss, with surrounding community leaders, community services to their installation and facilities. Power, water and emergency commercial telephone repair are some suggested topics. Consequently, installation commanders may want to include community utility representatives into the installation planning process. Memorandums of Agreement or Understanding are an important part of the overall installation WMD preparedness program. Other types of information that could be discussed are communications, first responder equipment and specialized training, chemical, radiological and biological detection and decontamination capabilities.

The Installation Staff Judge Advocate can advise the Installation Commander how to best formalize community relationships through possible Memorandums of Agreement or Understanding. In this regard, OCONUS installations should be sensitive to Host Nation customs in this area. Suddenly wanting to formalize long-standing support relationships with written formal agreements may offend some Host Nation communities. MACOM Political Advisors and International Activities staffs can greatly assist Commanders in this area.

Seek and Leverage Training Opportunities at Every Opportunity

The single most important thing an Installation Commander can do in this area is include the surrounding community or Host Nation leaders in his FP and Installation Preparedness for WMD exercises and activities. If practical, invite them to attend pre-exercise planning and rehearsal sessions. Consider inviting them to FP Committee meetings to coordinate the exercise. Likewise seek every opportunity, even if only as an observer, to interact with nearby communities as they exercise their own emergency response plans. Civilian airport disaster and hospital mass casualty exercises are excellent opportunities to interact. Consider planning installation WMD exercises to leverage military and civilian hospital mass casualty exercise requirements.

Civilian first responders also frequently exercise. Participation by the installation counterparts can be extremely beneficial. Approximately 200 communities within the United States, including Hawaii and Alaska participated in the Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP), a Congressionally mandated initiative designed to enhance US domestic response to WMD incidents. First responders formerly trained under DPP continue to be an outstanding source of information for installation Commanders.



Ensure First Responder and Consequence Management Capabilities

In a basic sense the challenge of installation preparedness can be broken down into two distinct parts. The first is everything that happens before a WMD incident, the pre-incident phase. That includes those force protection measures taken to deter or even defend against a possible terrorist event and those preparations necessary to respond effectively in the event of an incident. The second part of the program is those actions that take place when the event actually begins, the response phase. The challenge is to ensure the preparations in the "pre-incident phase" are sufficient for an effective "response phase." This chapter proposes steps that can increase the probability of that match.

THREE STEPS TO DETERMINING AND ACQUIRING NECESSARY CAPABILITIES ARE:

- Determine the necessary capabilities
- Acquire the necessary capabilities
- Evaluate and adjust the capabilities

Determine the Necessary Capabilities

Each installation must determine those capabilities necessary to confront the threat as presented by the installation threat assessment. That determination of personnel, equipment and functions is an integral part of the planning process. As an example, in the initial stages of a WMD incident, effective first responders (fire, police and emergency medical services), in concert with the installation EOC staffs, make a significant difference. Therefore, one required capability is trained and equipped first responders who work hand in hand with their trained installation staff. The requirement does not suggest that all installations will have their own organic capability. Moreover, in many cases, the costs of maintaining a complete first response capability to deal with a WMD incident will be prohibitive. The key to effective response is coordinated and exercised mutual aid agreements between the installation and local and state agencies.

During the strategy and planning sequence the installation staff determines those tasks necessary to accomplish the stated mission of responding to a WMD threat. The list of tasks then, in turn, translates into required capabilities. As an example, the task "the installation must be prepared to respond to a chemical attack," translates into the requirement for the capability of trained and protected responders, effective detection and monitoring capability, appropriate antidotes and possibly massive evacuation of casualties. In turn, the installation staff must train to successfully coordinate, monitor and document the actions associated with responding to the WMD incident.



United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

FORCE PROTECTION CRITICAL TASKS AT/FP PROGRAM

Commanders ensure responder consequence management capabilities

There is no all-inclusive checklist that a commander can use to guarantee success. Some necessary capabilities such as trained first responders are self-evident. Others are less so. It is possible, as an example, that communications among first responders on the installation is well tested. However, the possibility of damage to a central communications node includes the additional requirement of redundant systems for both installations and local community responders. That redundancy should be a part of the first responder capability considered by the commander. Additionally, communications system interoperability between the installation responders and local/state/federal/Host Nation response assets is critical. At Annex C there is a suggested list of planning considerations designed to give installation commanders an idea of the capabilities to consider when planning and exercising for a WMD incident. Installations should develop their own checklists to fit their unique situation mindful of redundancy and interoperability.

“The installation preparedness program depends on the installation’s ability to ascertain and acquire the necessary capabilities.”

Acquire the necessary capabilities

Some installations have most of the required first responders on their installation under the commander's control. More often, however, the installation commander must look elsewhere for assistance. There are various options for filling the need for a given capability. First, the commander can work with the local community or other service installations nearby for assistance and, within certain legal parameters, implement an MOU or MOA. Connectivity with the local community will also facilitate interoperability with state and regional federal incident response agencies and organizations. In a similar manner, working through foreign liaison elements, OCONUS commanders can coordinate for host nation providers. As a part of the commanders long range strategy, he may only need to fill a gap in response capability until the installation garners the requisite resources to fill the need without outside help. The key is that once a required need has been identified it must be accounted for in some manner.

Evaluate and Adjust the Capability

As emphasized in preceding chapters, installation commanders must plan ahead to evaluate the response capability determined during planning. That evaluation in the form of training and exercises should concentrate on ensuring the needed capability is trained and prepared for required employment in a WMD incident. Chapter five address exercises. The FP exercises should focus on evaluating the status of preparedness and identifying necessary improvements to consequence management functions. If the functions are borrowed from outside sources the long range planning should emphasize coordination so that the requisite agencies can also participate in the exercise. Capabilities determined in the process above establish the criteria for an installation mission-training plan. This plan focuses on standards used to measure WMD incident response capability.





CONCLUSION

Commanders charged with protecting Army installations and facilities around the world against Weapons of Mass Destruction face a challenging task. New technologies have made terrorism more lethal. New threats continue to emerge in the uncertain environment installation Commanders face daily.

The Antiterrorism/Force Protection Commanders' Guide, published in March 2000, outlined the "Eight Must Do" tasks for a successful AT/FP program. These tasks are fully endorsed by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and provided the essential foundation needed for AT/FP programs.

The Commanders' "Blueprint" is the follow on effort to the AT/FP Commanders' Guide. It provides a "Blueprint" for MACOMs and Commanders to build their own successful Installation Preparedness for WMD programs.

Joint Staff, DA and MACOM assessments have shown Commanders are struggling with their approach to Installation Preparedness to WMD. The Commanders' *Blueprint* makes Installation Preparedness for WMD more achievable immediately.

The Commanders direct interest and involvement remains the critical factor.

***“The Commanders’
Blueprint makes
Installation
Preparedness for
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immediately. The
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interest and
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the critical factor.”***





United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

ANNEX A- REFERENCES

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*****WMD preparedness and consequence management related web sites are available at the Installation Preparedness web-site at <http://www.doms.pentagon.mil> .***



ANNEX B- PLANNING PROCESS FOR A WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) INCIDENT

Develop the Plan

The responsibility for decisions, plans and supervision rests solely on the commander. Installation response plans for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are no different. For many years Army commanders have used a planning process known as the estimate of the situation. The estimate provides a framework for determining a plan of action for a particular situation. The process steps are the same for a tactical formation defending against an enemy offensive in combat as they are for an installation protecting itself from a terrorist attack. The same principle; the same logical sequence, using available information and experience, skillfully applied, will ensure an effective solution to the problem. The extraordinary circumstances common in preparation for and reacting to a WMD incident only make it more important that the installation commander use a proven procedure when developing his plan.

The purpose of this annex is to reiterate that time tested format and to highlight those elements unique to an WMD threat. Moreover, it offers ideas for completing the OPLAN derived from the estimate process. One of the advantages of developing a plan for a WMD threat is time. The process can be very deliberate and allows time to consider a situation in which many installation staffs have little experience.

All functions should be represented in the process. In that way the installation can be sure to consider all of the unusual characteristics associated with a WMD event.


As with any military operation, the process begins by determining the mission. Mission analysis is the determination of the specified tasks (mostly from higher authorities) and implied tasks (determined by the installation planners) to determine the essential task(s) that together make up the installation mission. For WMD planning the specified tasks are legion. Primarily derived from AR 525-13, Antiterrorism/ Force Protection; the "Antiterrorism and Force Protection, Installation Commander's Guide," MACOM and installation commander's guidance to garrisons also provide specified tasks. An analysis of those specified tasks will result in implied tasks. Implied tasks will primarily result from the unique circumstances of the installation having to do with its location, associated tenant units or possibly its role as a force projection platform. The chapters in this book and Annex C provide some ideas for determining those tasks.

Another part of mission analysis is determining limitations and assumptions. AR 525-13 and various legal documents provide many of the limitations imposed upon an installation. Often things related to

the installation and the adjacent community might well form a limitation on how the installation can operate in an AT environment and restrictions on mutual aid agreements. Limitations are important to the process in that they prescribe boundaries that the command must anticipate.

Installation staffs work hard to gather every relevant fact. Try as they might it is impossible to begin an operation with all desired information. Assumptions fill in the gaps where that information is not available and provide necessary detail to continue the planning process. They must be constantly reviewed for validity. There is always a danger of "assuming away" problems, particularly threat potential. Because of the dynamic and opportunistic nature of the threat, for WMD planning purposes, it is best to include all terrorist possibilities. The greater the time between planning and execution the greater the probability that facts will replace most assumptions.

Mission analysis concludes in the restated mission of the installation. Generally speaking there are three phases to the installation mission; deter the terrorist, react effectively in the event of an incident and return to normal operations as soon as possible after responding. Those concepts or other similar ones should suffice to initiate the planning process and provide a guide for more detailed planning.





United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

ANNEX B– PLANNING PROCESS FOR A WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) INCIDENT

The next step in the estimate process is collecting information and developing courses of action (COA). For a WMD mission it is largely a question of determining threat courses of action, determining friendly vulnerabilities and organizing installation assets appropriate to the situation. Because installations have limited resources at every level, the different courses of action depend upon how the installation allocates resources over time. Money and manpower limitations dictate creative orchestration of assets. The course of action should consider the assets allocation for each of the three phases of an incident: pre-incident, incident and post-incident. Tenant units can play an important role in COA development.

In the previous step the installation commander and staff developed a general course of action covering all three phases of a terrorist act. The next step is analyzing the COA.

This is wargaming. The commander should look at the various options for the threat and, arraying those against the various vulnerabilities, further develop the COA. Each phase will have its own considerations. It is important to begin considering the formation of ad hoc units to complete the various tasks determined during mission analysis. This wargaming will emphasize the need for coordination with outside agencies. Most installations will not have the necessary assets to accomplish the mission without MOU/MOAs with tenant and community organizations.

Once the COAs have been developed and analyzed the commander will compare and select one that seems to provide the best use of resources to accomplish the WMD mission within the parameters of the overall installation mission. In this type of mission the best would most likely be determined by the best allocation of limited assets. The dilemma for the commander is to continue the normal mission of the installation and, at the same time, accomplish the necessary tasks to deter and react to a WMD threat.

The Plan

The Blueprint gives the commander an idea of those things that must be considered in the process. All disciplines must be examined for their discrete contributions. With proper coordination adjacent communities can add resources to sparse or absent installation assets. Tenant units should also contribute to the installation effort. Their additional manpower and perhaps money can supplement installation assets where feasible. Coordination is key. The legitimate use of MOU/MOAs could mean the difference between success and failure in any phase of a WMD incident. Recent results from JSIVA visits suggest that installation commanders have great difficulty in developing feasible plans for combating the threat of terrorism. WMD oriented plans tend to be extremely long, complex and often confusing. There is a school of thought that installation plans for WMD incidents are unique in military planning, that the information portrayed cannot easily fit the traditional five-paragraph field order format. Today, as the Army's orientation focuses more often on operations other than war, a logical planning and execution sequence focusing on the commander and his subordinate elements is more important than ever. A logical planning sequence makes those unusual WMD oriented tasks all the more evident.

While the planning process must remain the same, there are some unusual challenges not often found in a tactical unit. First, the installation is formed of units and functions to support the various administrative purposes of its residents and tenant units. It is not, as a rule, formed for combat operations. Second, installation staffs vary widely in size and capability. Some installations are assigned a staff officer/civilian for every conceivable function while others have only a very few that cover multiple functions. Lastly, installation planners are often inexperienced in traditional planning procedures and view fill in the blank options as a welcome alternative. This guide is designed to assist the planner in formatting information necessary for a functional WMD plan that allows for the unique characteristics of their installation.

The following guide provides an annotated plan for WMD incident response based upon the traditional Army field order format in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. It highlights several of the atypical aspects of installation planning and suggests methods to address the planning requirement within a traditional framework.

1. SITUATION

a. General. This paragraph restates the installation mission and gives a general description of the problem of WMD and the installation/facility. The installation mission is important in that it provides a framework for the smaller task of force protection from a WMD incident. Within the context of the mission this paragraph should define the area of operations (normally the installation/facility) and the area of interest (the surrounding terrain/community).

b. Threat. In most cases this will require a separate annex. It should describe the nature of the potential threats and categorize them according to most likely and most dangerous without obviating any. The paragraph should also describe the likely avenues of approach and key/critical facilities. It must define vulnerabilities related to the potential threats. Based on threat assessments, the vulnerabilities might be those facilities that a terrorist could consider a High Value Target (HVT) and/or those things that would most cripple the installation's ability to accomplish its mission state in the previous paragraph. Typical targets include the headquarters, PX/commissary and barracks. Avenues of approach are often focused on those allowing vehicle access. However, other routes must be considered and not discarded automatically.

c. Friendly. Similar to a tactical OPORD, this should describe the missions of the various higher and adjacent units/posts/communities. In this case it should cover the actions of local law enforcement and the command relationships with other federal, state and local agencies that could have an influence on the terrorist WMD incident.

d. Attachments and Detachments. In the event of a WMD incident this should give the reader an idea of how and what kinds of assistance can be expected and when. The command and control relationships of those attachments are important. That is part of the required coordination and exercising before successful plan execution.

e. Assumptions. List those assumptions necessary to fill in facts that are not available. An example of some assumptions include "the threat not known until attack;" "Large events such as 4th of July celebrations could be a lightning rod for terrorists." This paragraph should not be used to assume away problems. More likely it will highlight problems that must be addressed in paragraph 3, such as "the public highway through the post will not be closed."



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ANNEX B– PLANNING PROCESS FOR A WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) INCIDENT

2. MISSION.

Short statement to indicate those tasks that must be accomplished by the installation to be successful. The amount of detail given in this paragraph should be sufficient to define the mission for the installation as a whole.

3. EXECUTION

a. Commander's Intent. This should serve to ensure a unity of purpose for installation activities. In the interest of organizing information the commander should emphasize his goals for the various phases of a terrorist act: pre-incident, incident and post incident. The commander's intent should clearly describe the commander's measure of success.

b. Concept of Operations. This paragraph must clarify the sequence of actions by phase. It should describe the objective and the main effort of the each phase. The main effort could be by unit or, more likely by function(s). It should be reasonably short; the specifics of the tasks will be covered in the subsequent paragraphs and annexes. Another way to address this paragraph could be to cover those basic concepts occurring in the event of an incident and leave the pre-incident and post-incident tasks for the later paragraphs.

c. Tasks to Subordinate Units. In a tactical plan these tasks are assigned by unit. For an installation this is arguably the most difficult paragraph. Since many installations have very few or no units assigned to it there is a tendency to task a function. Public affairs, transportation and logistics are commonly assigned responsibilities in this paragraph. This is not sufficient to ensure accountability for an assigned task. Even the smallest of installations or facilities must assign tasks to at least ad hoc units. "Public affairs" tasks may be the responsibility of the public affairs staff section or another named ad hoc group. They should not be assigned to the function of "public affairs." Assign tasks by phase so as not to confuse those incident related tasks with pre- or post-incident tasks. Smaller installations/facilities may have several functional areas (including public affairs) assigned to one ad hoc group. In that case the instructions/task could require coordination with external agencies for assistance. This may reference an MOA/MOU. Another difficulty for larger installations, is a staff section for the function for

routine operations but not enough people to handle the problem in a crisis. The plan then, must include the way the installation would cover the apparent shortage of manpower. This could be a request for assistance from another agency on the installation, coordination with the adjacent community or even help from a nearby DoD installation. Large or small, every installation must form capable and responsible units to accomplish the missions assigned.

d. Coordinating Instructions. This paragraph should include all tasks, coordination or limitations that pertain to two or more units. Try not to repeat those tasks already listed above. Things like time coordination, mutual responsibility for terrain, overlapping functional areas, associations and with the community, rules of engagement and reporting instructions are candidates for inclusion in "coordinating instructions." Since many of the units formed to combat the incident are ad hoc ones this paragraph may clarify how and where those units and/or individuals link up. It should reference an annex that details the task organization with emphasis on the incident phase.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

Installation orders tend to include almost all tasks in paragraph three and very few in paragraph four. As a rule, those functions that deal directly with the incident; law enforcement, emergency services, engineers and HAZMAT teams could reasonably go in paragraph three. In a traditional sense, they are the installation's combat forces. Those other functions designed to support the effort such as supply, contracting and public affairs should be placed in paragraph four. The placement of unit in a particular paragraph should be one in the interest of organizing and grouping related information in the most easily read and understood manner. Since one of the most difficult processes of a WMD environment is the timely support of logistic and administrative functions, this paragraph should clarify how the installation will succeed in this. In most cases there is sufficient information in this paragraph to warrant its own annex. Clarity, redundancy and coordination in all functional areas should be the goal. For smaller installations much of the success in these areas depend on a healthy relationship with the local community.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

In addition to the obvious clarification of the command sequence, this paragraph should focus on communications in the event of a WMD incident. It should include redundancy, working communications with the local community and locations for the command post and alternate CP and EOC. It should also discuss the locations for outside agencies arriving on site and their relationship to the installation command structure.

Annexes:

See FM 101-5 for discussion of possible annexes.



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ANNEX C, PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR WMD RESPONSE PLAN

Functions may be divided in any fashion that the commander finds most useful and effective. The below list is not a checklist for all capabilities required of an installation. Moreover, these planning considerations are indicative of some of the more prominent requirements that must be considered as minimum. These considerations reinforce proper planning procedures.

Command and Control

1. Unified command procedures and roles
2. EOC procedures
3. Reports standardized
4. Copies of plan in EOC
5. EOC commander designation
6. Sufficient primary and alternate EOC work spaces
7. Succession of command
8. Communications systems planned - redundant (First responders, community, host nation, higher headquarters, command elements, residents)

Health Services

1. MOUs/MOAs with local/state/Host Nation health service providers to support and augment unavailable or incomplete installation capability.
2. Mass casualty plan to include ground/air lift requirements
3. Necessary class VIII stockpiled
4. Effective communications
5. Pharmaceutical requirements and acquisitions.
6. Security of hospital during crisis
7. Decontamination site outside of hospital confines
8. Periodic water and food checks
9. MOUs/MOAs with other medical facilities to include bed space, pharmaceuticals, and transportation
10. Provide for animal control
11. Sustained care for the non-WMD incident patients
12. CBRNE contaminated waste disposal
13. Laboratory testing and handling of specimen samples
14. MOUs/MOAs with local/state/Host Nation medical laboratories for specimen testing
15. Mortuary affairs (autopsies, storage/transport of contaminated remains)
16. Veterinarian services
17. Medical Hotline

Logistics

1. Identify required/available alternate life support sources (water, food, shelter)
2. Graves registration
3. Barrier material stockpiled
4. Emergency services (transportation, environmental, utilities, etc.)
5. Plan for emergency supplies of Class I, III, IV, V, IX
6. Inter-service support agreements

7. Stock protective equipment
8. Heavy lift equipment
9. Facilities/staging areas for displaced operations and supporting/augmenting agencies/organizations.
10. Material/baggage holding areas

Acquisition

1. Identify requirements for emergency contracting (transport, communications, protective equipment, etc.)
2. Prepare for emergency contracting
3. Estimate emergency costs required to fill gaps in resources
4. ID sources for potential contracting

Resource Management

1. Coordinate with agencies for long term WMD budget estimate
2. Capture costs for reimbursement
3. Identify funding sources

Engineering

1. Emergency services respond plan
2. Establish MOUs/MOAs with local state and federal agencies
3. Assess, procure and maintain emergency assets
4. Temporary housing plan
5. Plan decontamination capability
6. HAZMAT response
7. Barrier plan and execution
8. Plan for structural evaluation
9. Plan for obstacle clearing

Operations

1. Threat assessment and vulnerability analysis
2. Plan, exercise, assess
3. Intelligence liaison support
4. Develop Operations Center procedures
5. Initiate agreements with tenant organizations (civilian and military)
6. Alert notification procedures
7. Establish reporting requirements
8. Review THREATCON measures
9. Synchronize response
10. Develop and initiate necessary security procedures
11. Identify and protect critical infrastructure
12. Identify alternate operations center
13. Maintain frequent weather updates
14. Prepare deception plan for deterrence
15. Plan for detection and monitoring
16. Coordinate for explosive ordinance capability

Information systems

1. Establish/evaluate information assurance program
2. Resolve communications compatibility concerns
3. Provide for and execute redundant communications
4. Plan and provide for additional communications equipment

5. Activate firewall protection plan
6. Develop emergency phone directory
7. Prepare for emergency configuration of local area networks

Personnel

1. Prepare casualty assistance plan
2. Provide for civilian employee assistance
3. Identify emergency shelters
4. Provide for Next of Kin (NOK) notification
5. Provide for family support center
6. Provide for crisis counseling
7. Identify linguists for emergency notifications and interviews

Special staff functions

Chaplain

1. Provide pastoral care
2. Provide for crisis counseling
3. Coordinate for sufficient pastoral assistance

Legal

1. Vet MOU/MOA Agreements
2. Prepare for claims processing

Public Affairs

1. Alert installation population to changes in security posture
2. Focus media attention installation preparedness
3. Joint media center operations, to include credentialing and access procedures
4. Prepare multi-language emergency public announcements
5. Capture historical data
6. Post-incident media operations

Provost marshal

1. Plan for installation traffic circulation
2. Protect identified individuals
3. Train police in first response responsibilities
4. Crime scene preservation and evidence collection

Foreign liaison

1. Coordinate for host nation support
2. Maintain update on host nation capabilities
3. Recommend community relations program

Safety

1. Provide guidance for protective posture/sheltering/evacuation of personnel
2. Conduct risk and vulnerability analysis of facilities and organizations with emphasis on high-risk operations and corrective actions.
3. Incorporate risk management techniques into first responder operations

Misc.

1. Redundant systems may be required in some areas.
2. Pre-incident exercises should provide an evaluation of the interoperability capability between procedures, systems, and equipment.



United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

ANNEX D- ARMY ANTITERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION AND INSTALLATION PREPAREDNESS FOR WMD

Installation preparedness for weapons for mass destruction will continue as a task for installation Commanders well into the future. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) deterrence and incident response involves all Army activities and more. The Blueprint suggests ways to inculcate all of those various initiatives into the installation Commander's program. Chapter 1 reflects the need to plan ahead and take advantage of all available resources. Chapter 7 indicates the significance of coordinating the installation response plan with the local, state, federal, and host nation authorities. Throughout, the Blueprint emphasizes the importance of including all an installation's functions and its association with the local community. In short, the Commander must think beyond the boundaries of his installation. Local, state, federal, and host nation activities represent his partners in WMD deterrence and incident response. In a tactical sense, the Commanders "area of operations" is the installation but just as importantly, his "area of interest" includes everything else that will effect the quality of his response to a WMD incident. The better he understands the possibilities the more effectively he will respond.

Often unknown to installation Commanders, the Department of the Army will effect much of the coordination that will result in improved installation response. Presidential Decision Directive 62 designated three sub-groups to coordinate national response to WMD. DOD and the Army are represented on all three. In


consequence management the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of State will coordinate efforts domestically and overseas respectively. Army routinely coordinates with them. DOD has established organizations such as Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams to assist in domestic response. The Army is an integral part of both planning and execution of these teams. In one sense, the Chief of Staff of the Army is the Army's force protection officer. As such, he and the Army staff coordinate with appropriate agencies and then issue guidance and distribute resources to MACOMs.

Unlike the Army staff, where the DCSOPS is the single staff action agent for IP for WMD, each MACOM has a unique role in the program. As examples, TRADOC writes and teaches doctrine, FORSCOM provides command and control for domestic WMD response, AMC maintains technical experts for both training and assistance in execution. This disparity in responsibilities and location demands lateral coordination to profit from the all initiatives. In addition, each MACOM is responsible for ensuring that their own installations receive the guidance and resources necessary to successfully complete the assigned mission. This includes the benefits the MACOM acquires from coordination with other MACOMs.

This process is consistent throughout domestic installations. Overseas installations are in the unusual position of receiving guidance from both the Army and the supported CINC. The Army provides the bulk of the resources but the installation must follow the direction of the operational commander. Should apparent differences arise between Army and CINC guidance, the MACOM must make every effort to reconcile the inconsistency. Regardless of the outcome the MACOM must provide cogent direction to its installations.

The installation can expect to receive guidance from the MACOM. It will also receive appropriate resources but only after it has effectively defined the installation requirements in regard to IP for WMD. As discussed in Chapter one, the installation is responsible for developing and anticipating requirements. Covering all installation functions as suggested in Annex C, the commander develops the long-range plan for IP. This plan translates into requests, requisitions, and priorities. It will define immediate needs. More importantly, the standing list of needs prepares the installation to quickly and effectively respond to unforeseen opportunities such as end of year funding. Furthermore, it allows the commander to look for other ways to fill the needs until such time as Army resources are available. Tenants, local community, and other Services installations in the vicinity can help cover gaps in requirements for the short term.


The attached diagrams give a snapshot of the vertical and horizontal coordination for IP for WMD as integrated in Army activities. It suggests that the installation commander is not alone. This structure, successfully leveraged, can lead to an installation well prepared for both WMD deterrence and incident response.





United States Army Installation Commanders' Blueprint

ANNEX D- ARMY ANTITERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION AND INSTALLATION PREPAREDNESS FOR WMD





ANNEX D- ARMY ACTIVITIES AND INSTALLATION PREPAREDNESS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

