

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SECURE BORDERS: AN ARRIVAL ZONE COUNTERDRUG NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas T. Smith
United States Army

Dr. Conrad C. Crane
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No.
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Secure Borders: An Arrival Zone Counterdrug National Security Strategy Unclassified			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Smith, Thomas T. ; Author			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA17013-5050			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
		Same as Report (SAR)	42	Rife, Dave RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil	
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number DSN		
				Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18	

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Thomas T. Smith
TITLE: Secure Borders: An Arrival Zone Counterdrug National Security Strategy
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 14 November 2002 PAGES: 42 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The emergence of the narco-terrorist nexus has significant implications for the national security environment of the United States. The present focus on counterterrorism and the current debate on governmental reorganization and Homeland Security offer a unique opportunity to reevaluate and reprioritize our counterdrug national security strategy and policies.

This paper traces the history of counterdrug strategy in the United States National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy from 1987 to the present within an analytical framework in terms of classical economics and Jominian spatial organization: Supply side and demand side; source zone, transit zone, arrival zone, domestic zone, and fiscal zone approaches.

The current counterdrug National Security Strategy is a demand side domestic zone strategy, a supply side arrival zone strategy weakened by priority to free trade, and a multilateral, multinational source and transit zone supply side strategy focused primarily on Colombia. This analysis concludes that the ends, ways and means of the present strategy are not effective for the long term and leave the nation immediately vulnerable in the short term. The simple fact is that the United States does not have secure borders, or even marginal control of its border.

This analysis produces five specific recommendations for a change in strategy. The first is to adopt a new rational approach of protracted threat management rather than an ideological war to be won. Secondly it calls for a shift to a supply-side arrival zone priority and for setting a strategic endstate of secure borders as fundamental to national security. Third, the Homeland Defense reorganization centralizes control of multitudinous security agencies toward a common threat strategy, priority of effort, and intelligence picture, but in its current form is flawed because it does not include the 9,000 agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Fourth, this analysis recommends lifting or lessening the severe prohibition on the use of military intelligence assets within the United States by Executive Order 12333. Fifth, in recognition of the clear narco-terrorist-insurgency nexus in Colombia, this paper recommends a change in the that source zone effort by lifting the current counterdrug only restrictions on all U.S. military aid, equipment and training provided to the Colombian Army.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
SECURE BORDERS: AN ARRIVAL ZONE COUNTERDRUG NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY	1
COUNTERDRUG POLICY NATIONAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK.....	2
THE EVOLUTION OF COUNTERDRUG NATIONAL STRATEGIES.....	3
REORGANIZATION AND HOMELAND SECURITY.....	8
FISCAL ZONE.....	10
SOURCE ZONE.....	10
TRANSIT ZONE.....	13
DOMESTIC ZONE.....	14
ARRIVAL ZONE.....	17
CONCLUSION.....	21
ENDNOTES	23
BIBLIOGRAPHY	31

SECURE BORDERS: AN ARRIVAL ZONE COUNTERDRUG NATIONAL SECURITY

On 2 September 2002, almost one year after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, an AP news release reported that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) announced illegal drug trade and smuggling in the United States was supporting terrorist organizations in the Middle East.¹ Thirty-four days previously, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft gave a speech announcing the "shocking" insight that the United States government had determined, "about one-third of foreign terrorist organizations are trafficking in narcotics on a large scale."²

This narco-terror nexus generated considerable excitement in the press, but is not a new phenomenon. Scholars have written of this link between terrorists, insurgencies and the illegal drug trade at least since the mid-1980s and President Reagan even made reference to the link in the first national security strategy published in 1987.³

The emerging recognition of a clearly identified narco-terrorist nexus, with perhaps even stronger interrelationships than previously considered, presents an opportunity to reassess our National Security Strategy (NSS) and ask if it makes sense to combat illegal narcotics, terrorists and cross-border crime in a multitude of separate, often competing, federal agencies and spheres of bureaucracy. The counterdrug national strategy should complement, or in effect be a supporting strategy, to the Homeland Security Strategy.

Reinforcing this need for reassessment is emerging evidence that the U.S. counterdrug war is probably a failing national security strategy, we are losing rather than winning the war. Although there is some indication that drug use among teenagers is slightly down, counterdrug data mustered by Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and by the DEA demonstrate that at best, after a serious fifteen-year effort, the U.S. has a few victories at the margins, but no dramatically measurable success at the center of the issue. A DEA representative recently testified before Congress that drug smuggling on the Southwestern border was at "record levels."⁴

Before outlining the current national security strategy on illegal drug trafficking and making several recommendations for change it is useful to put the present strategy in context, first by presenting the current theoretical construct of the counterdrug framework, and secondly by a brief historiographical treatment of the evolution of counterdrug strategies adopted by previous administrations and officially expressed as part of the national security strategy report and the published national military strategy.

COUNTERDRUG POLICY NATIONAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The current framework of counterdrug policy is couched in terms of classical economics and Jominian spatial organization: supply side and demand side, source zone, transit zone, arrival zone, domestic zone, and I would add fiscal zone. Right out of economic philosopher Adam Smith's law of supply and demand in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), supply side refers to the physical availability of illegal drugs and efforts to reduce that quantity, while demand side refers to the market for drugs and the programs to reduce the number of customers or marketplace consumption. The supply side - demand side counterdrug issue was introduced by President George Bush's national security strategy of 1990. The military theorist Henri Jomini, in his *Summary of the Art of War* (1838) introduced the concept of strategic division into zones of operation and the idea of concentration on that one zone that would be more important or decisive to achieve an objective. Over time the counterdrug framework has evolved into a Jominian division of zones. The source zone is any geographic area that produces illegal drugs such as Colombia, Mexico or Afghanistan. The first use of the source zone idea in the NSS was from President Bush's report of 1990, while his report of 1993 introduced the idea of a transit zone. The transit zone is any air, land or sea space over which drugs travel enroute to the borders of the United States. The Caribbean Sea and Mexico, for example, are both transit zones, as is the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific Ocean. The arrival zone is generally considered the

FIGURE 1: A FRAMEWORK OF COUNTERDRUG NATIONAL STRATEGY

SUPPLY SIDE		DEMAND SIDE	
The physical availability of illegal drugs		The domestic market for illegal drugs or marketplace consumption	
SOURCE ZONE	Any geographic area that produces illegal drugs such as Colombia or Afghanistan.		
TRANSIT ZONE	The air, land or sea space in which drugs travel enroute to the borders of the United States such as The Caribbean Sea, Mexico, Gulf of Mexico, Canada, Pacific Ocean, Great Lakes.		
ARRIVAL ZONE	The U.S. border and its near adjacent areas, also includes international airports that are the terminus for non-stop international flights.		
DOMESTIC ZONE	The home area within the United States.		
FISCAL ZONE	The Multi-dimensional spectrum of illegal money laundering and smuggling, global financial networks and clandestine banking operations.		

U.S. border and its near adjacent areas. However, the arrival zone could also include international airports such as Dallas-Fort Worth that are the terminus for non-stop international flights. The arrival zone concept has not been included in any NSS but entered the framework of discussion in the 2000 annual report of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The domestic zone is simply the home area within the United States and was first brought into the NSS in 1994 by President William J. Clinton. While not a common term in current counterdrug parlance, for purposes of this analysis I offer an additional zone, the fiscal zone, which is the multi-dimensional spectrum of illegal money laundering and smuggling, global financial networks, and clandestine banking operations.⁵

THE EVOLUTION OF COUNTERDRUG NATIONAL STRATEGIES

The historiography of the evolution of counterdrug strategies adopted by previous administrations and expressed in the National Security Strategy begins in 1986. Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 required the President to begin submitting an annual National Security Strategy report with the annual budget.⁶ In 1987 President Reagan submitted the first NSS report. Reagan simply listed drug trafficking as a critical global problem impacting U.S. interests because it was a factor in destabilizing weak governments. As mentioned earlier, Reagan did make a direct link between Latin American drug traffickers and insurgents, noting they were "often in collusion" and were a serious threat to democratic governments in the Southern hemisphere. On a more subtle note, this first NSS makes a link between drug trafficking and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in that the illegal wealth generated by the drug trade creates an instability that becomes the "breeding ground" for LIC, or what today we would call Stability Operations.⁷

Counterdrug strategy remained well on the margins of the Cold War focus of President Reagan's NSS of 1988, but the report did list "the increasing linkages between international terrorists and narcotics traffickers" as a principal threat to U.S. interests. Placing both as a high priority for U.S. intelligence policy, Reagan's counterdrug strategy was a bilateral effort to assist Asia and Latin American with interdiction and eradication.⁸ In current counterdrug parlance Reagan's policy was supply side, source zone focused.

Although there was not a NSS Report for 1989, President George Bush's NSS of 1990 reflected a substantial shift of attention on drugs. While the central focus of the NSS dealt with the collapse of Soviet power, counterdrug policy moved well in from the margins, becoming a core issue. Bush's new strategy had two radically new elements. First, the NSS identified the international illegal drug trade as a "major threat to our national security," and a direct threat to

the most fundamental of U.S. interests – survival (ends) as a free nation because it undermined national values and negatively affected the economy. Bush's ways or how was to "reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States." The second radical element was the means - the "resources and expertise" of the Department of Defense in support of controlling the U.S. border, the military operating in "coordination" with law enforcement and the Department of State. This 1990 NSS actually framed the issue as a supply-demand problem and Bush continued Reagan's assistance strategy for source zone countries. Bush's counterdrug NSS was a supply-side strategy focused on source zones, transit zones and the arrival zone or border, with little attention to the domestic zone and the demand side.⁹

There was not a published National Military Strategy until 1992 but President Bush's military initiative began upon assuming office in 1989. He immediately put the Department of Defense in the counterdrug business. In November of 1989 counterdrug Joint Task Force Six formed at Fort Bliss, Texas under Headquarters Fifth Army and had a mission focus on the Southwestern border states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. Under the direction of U.S. Commander in Chief Atlantic, counterdrug Joint Task Force Four formed at Key West, Florida on 22 February 1989 with a mission area focused in the Caribbean and South America. Eventually by 1994 Joint Task Force Four would evolve into an eight-agency Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF East).¹⁰

In his NSS of 1991 Bush pursued the same basic counterdrug strategy but added a few new wrinkles. He uses the term "Narco-Terrorist" and refined the ways to reduce the flow of drugs by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combating international traffickers, and reducing demand at home, although the latter had no discussion of means.¹¹ There was not an NSS of 1992 but in that year General Colin L. Powell as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff published the first *National Military Strategy*. Powell's ends and ways are exactly nested concepts from Bush's 1991 NSS – reduce the flow of illegal drugs by reduction in production, interdiction, and by reducing domestic demand. Powell includes counterdrug operations in his section on "Forward Presence Operations." The way was an "attack" on drug flow at the source and transit zones through the means of enhanced military detection and monitoring capabilities and military assistance to source nations. Within the United States the military would support, "as permitted by law," federal, state and local agencies. Interestingly Chairman Powell concludes the counterdrug section with the acknowledgement of a long term requirement. "This mission will require the sustained employment of properly trained and equipped forces for the foreseeable future."¹²

The next and final Bush NSS in 1993 announced the counterdrug strategic goal was to "identify, disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately destroy the drug trafficking organizations" supplying the U.S. market using a multilateral, international effort in the source and transit zones. Interestingly, significant attention was given for the first time to the demand side in which Bush called for a unified federal, state and local effort in a values driven program of education, prevention, and treatment.¹³

Although he declared his counterdrug strategy "a new approach" President Clinton's 1994 NSS was simply a refinement of Bush's 1993 move toward greater emphasis on the demand side, and Reagan's earlier source zone aid concept, which Clinton called engagement. What was truly new was that Clinton pushed the counterdrug issue well away from Bush's ideological framework of a core threat to national security out again to the margins as a problem with "security implications" for American policy. While heralding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) the NSS makes no mention of its enormous impact on arrival zone counterdrug interdiction at the border. Indeed, insiders have reported that both the Bush and Clinton administrations systematically ignored the drug trafficking factor in the NAFTA equation.¹⁴

President Clinton's 1995 NSS was essentially a repeat of the previous year with little or no change from its demand side focus. In 1995 Chairman Powell's successor on the Joint Chiefs, General John M. Shalikashvili, published his first NMS *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*. Selective is the operative word of the title when it came to a counterdrug strategy. "Drug lords" are briefly mentioned in the list of transnational dangers and the short section on Peacetime Engagement has a tiny paragraph devoted to counterdrug and counterterrorism in which the end is to halt the flow of illegal drugs, the way is military cooperation with law enforcement and the means is literally "all means authorized by the President and Congress." The Andean source zone, the Mexican transit zone, illegal drugs and even terrorism are exiled to the remotest margins of this strategy.¹⁵

President Clinton's NSS of 1996 added an entirely new and extremely effective means to the counterdrug strategy - he went after the money, the fiscal zone. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act directly attacked the financial system of the drug lords by freezing or seizing their assets, barring U.S. persons from conducting financial transactions with them, and setting the legal conditions to combat money laundering.¹⁶ By 1997 the demand-side debate had considerable influence in counterdrug circles and Clinton's NSS for that year called for a more balanced focus to reduce both demand and supply.¹⁷

General Shalikashvili's 1997 NMS, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now:...*, notes the "continued blurring of the distinction" between insurgencies, terrorism, drug cartels and other transnational threats. This NMS appears to lean a bit forward of the NSS in its reference to a drug-terror-insurgency nexus, although it is careful to keep counterdrug operations in the hinterland of policy focus. Again citing means authorized by the President or Congress, the NMS points out the "unique military capabilities" available to support domestic authorities in combating the indirect and direct threat of illegal drug trafficking.¹⁸

Clinton's 1998 NSS brought the counterdrug issue back from the margins as he identified international drug trafficking as a serious transnational threat to U.S. interests and "the most powerful and dangerous organized crime groups the United States has ever confronted..." The source zone and transit zone way was an international cooperative effort to strengthen democratic institutions, eradicate crops and introduce alternative crop development in drug producing countries. The arrival zone way at the border was tougher interdiction and the means were more inspectors to thwart attempts to exploit NAFTA's free trade avenues for smuggling. In the domestic zone the endstate was to cut drug availability by one-half over the next decade and the way was demand side - expanded prevention, improved treatment and a major anti-drug media campaign.¹⁹

The NSS of 1999 set a refined goal of cutting drug use and availability in the United States by one-half in eight years, by the year 2007, and to reduce by twenty-five percent the domestic consequences of use and trafficking. The way was a simultaneous domestic zone demand side approach of prevention and education coupled with better intelligence and interdiction in the arrival, transit and source zones. These efforts were to be synchronized with a fiscal zone attack on money-laundering and illegal financial support networks. Stating "our strategy recognizes that the most effective counterdrug operations are mounted at the source" the 1999 NSS outlined a transnational hemispheric approach called the Multilateral Counterdrug Alliance through the Organization of American States (OAS) which was essentially a multinational agreement to coordinate extradition, money seizures, eradication, alternate crops, and interdiction efforts. A separate bilateral source zone initiative called Plan Colombia was that country's plan to increase stability, security and democracy, and to eliminate the drug trade in three years. In addition the strategy put forward bilateral interdiction agreements in the transit zone with Caribbean countries and with Mexico. Unlike the NSS of 1998 the 1999 NSS did not address the impact of NAFTA on interdiction efforts in the arrival zone.²⁰

The NSS of 2000 had few changes except \$1.3 billion for Plan Colombia, therefore Clinton's 1998 NSS remains the current basic strategy as reflected in the first George W. Bush

2002 National Security Strategy and the 2002 National Drug Control Strategy published by the ONDCP, although the specific goal of fifty percent demand reduction by 2007 has been softened to a more generic endstate without an attached metric. The strategy is clearly a domestic zone demand side solution. The current national priorities are: first, prevention education and community action; secondly treatment programs; and thirdly, "Disrupting the Market" which is funding for Andean region source zone programs and a request for additional funds for arrival zone border interdiction and prosecution.²¹

The NSS of 2002 does not address the counterdrug issue as a distinct threat to U.S. core values, but instead places the discussion within the context of regional conflicts, in this case the Andean nations. While this NSS does make a direct link between terrorism, insurgency and drug trafficking, it limits the linkage to within Colombia, rather than a general transnational trend. There is no specific mention of Plan Colombia, but the current NSS echoes the 1999 NSS in a multilateral hemispheric approach through the Organization of American States (OAS) to "cut-off" source zone drug trafficking, defeat terrorists, and strengthen Andean democratic institutions. The only mention of Mexico in a counterdrug context is in passing as a coalition partner, not as the major drug transit zone that it has become.²²

The draft version of the 2002 national military strategy echoes the 2002 NSS link between drug trafficking, insurgency and terrorism but in a much broader manner. Its discussion of "Actors of Strategic Significance," includes terrorists, "narco-insurgents" and narco-traffickers with "emerging cooperative links" as coalitions of non-state actors threatening regional stability with global consequences, "that pose direct threats to US national security interests." These non-state actors, as described by the NMS are, "Flat, networked, intent-based cellular organizations...capable of centralized planning and decentralized execution" with global communication and rapid mobility. In a direct connection between U.S. regional interests the NMS also makes a probable link of Middle Eastern Terrorists financing operations by drug trafficking in South America. It is clear in this case the national military strategy is far in front of the national security strategy in the counterdrug arena.²³

In summary the current counterdrug national security strategy is a demand side domestic zone strategy, a supply side arrival zone strategy weakened by priority to NAFTA free trade, and a multilateral, multinational source and transit zone supply side strategy focused primarily on Colombia.

What is needed is a change in approach to the drug problem and a new crafting of the ends-ways-means in the National Security Strategy. The approach should recognize that framing the issues around such concepts as winning is an unachievable goal and a more

rational approach is to pursue an endstate of minimum damage, or to use a health model of effective management rather than to try and cure the incurable.²⁴

By taking a more rational approach in recognizing that illegal drug smuggling is a very long term, perhaps even permanent condition rather than a winnable war, and by accepting the fact of a common nexus between the drug trade, terrorism, organized crime, and even destabilizing insurgencies, we can develop a more effective national security strategy, one that would focus all national strategies of any niche problem on a common and core issue, our general national security.

The next NSS should reflect two key changes to current counterdrug national security strategy. First under the foundation of Homeland Security it should outline an entire reorganization and centralization of those agencies that address terrorism, illegal drugs, illegal immigration, illegal commercial smuggling and international crime. Secondly it should shift the main counterdrug effort to an arrival zone strategy and present a strategic endstate of secure borders as primary to an important supporting effort to national security as a whole.

REORGANIZATION AND HOMELAND SECURITY

Currently there are fifty federal agencies dividing a counterdrug budget of seventeen billion dollars.²⁵ These are a multitude of agencies with niche interests, compartmentalized intelligence and separate additional funding lines: terrorism for the FBI, illegal drugs for the ONDCP and DEA; illegal immigration for the U.S. Border Patrol; drugs and contraband at the ports for U.S. Customs; illegal contraband and immigration for the U.S. Coast Guard and so on. The result is unshared intelligence, limited focus, interagency competition, operations often at cross purposes and a decentralized effort toward threats that share more commonality than uniqueness. A supra-agency is probably not the best solution, but centralized control of multi-agency priorities, budgets, manpower, and intelligence under the Department of Homeland Security would create both gestalt and an economy of scale for protracted and effective threat management, especially at the arrival zone.

The Office of Homeland Security released a basic plan for reorganization in July 2002 but it has yet to be approved by Congress. The plan is solid, particularly in the organizational consolidation of the multitude of agencies, functional niches, and separate intelligence cells it will fuse: the Immigration and Naturalization Service to include the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency and the federal activities protecting information, communications, technology, computer security and infrastructure. The

organizational aspects of the plan fall short because it does not consolidate under Homeland Security the assets of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) with its billion dollar budget and 9,000 staff and agents. Within the realization of a counterdrug-counterterrorism nexus it is less than efficient to let an agency of such investigative and intelligence resources operate under the luxury of a niche focus. Shared intelligence is a critical aspect to Homeland Security and the DEA in particular has a reputation for a reluctance to share information with any other agencies, federal, state or local, partly out of concern for agent safety, but more importantly to protect a budget based on seizure performance. Consolidating the DEA within the Department of Homeland security would give additional resources and intelligence to the centralized security effort as well as improve intelligence sharing.²⁶

An in-depth discussion of the future role of Department of Defense (DoD) in Homeland Security, or more properly the Homeland Defense and Support to Civil Authority aspects of Homeland Security, are beyond the scope of this paper. However, several key issues are important to consider as they relate to the counterdrug-counterterrorism nexus. The military has very effective intelligence enabling capabilities, and has the potential to provide very effective support to law enforcement.

These capabilities are in the collection arena, as in surveillance, reconnaissance, and signals intercept, as well as the intellectual realm of analytical expertise and methodologies. By training law enforcement intelligence is generally oriented toward criminal consequences, i.e. what exactly happened and who did it, while military intelligence, because of its operational nature, is focused on predictive analysis – what is the enemy capability, location, and likely course of action. Military predictive intelligence analysis is critical to both counterterrorism and counterdrug operations and should be employed directly and taught to law enforcement. However, military intelligence support to Homeland Security faces one minor restriction, *Posse Comitatus*, and one severe obstacle, Executive Order 12333. *Posse Comitatus*, the 1877 law forbidding active duty military personnel from exercising police powers is not particularly significant to military intelligence support to Homeland Security, unless perhaps if military intelligence personnel were requested to physically search cars or suspects at the border. A more critical handicap is Executive Order 12333 of 1976 and 1982 which forbids U.S. military intelligence personnel from collecting or keeping data on U.S. persons, a U.S. person being anyone on the soil of the United States, illegally or not. To provide effective military intelligence support and training to law enforcement involved in Homeland Security the intelligence restrictions in EO 12333 need a complete legal review and revision.²⁷

Although the center of gravity should be the arrival zone, a single-zone counterdrug strategy would be ineffective. The fiscal zone, source zone, transit zone and domestic zone also require simultaneous and synchronized campaigns and programs. Before presenting the case for a priority of effort in the arrival zone it is useful to provide a thumbnail sketch of the current state of affairs in the other zones.

FISCAL ZONE

The fiscal zone is the multi-dimensional spectrum of illegal money laundering and smuggling through global financial networks and clandestine banking operations. As mentioned earlier President Clinton's 1996 International Emergency Economic Powers Act began to attack the fiscal system of drug traffickers, freezing and seizing their assets and barring U.S. persons from conducting business with them. This was followed by the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Act of 1998 from which the Treasury and Justice Departments developed the 1999 National Money Laundering Strategy (NMLS) and began to coordinate and concentrate federal efforts into a zone approach by building a very sophisticated investigative and analytical multi-agency system centered on the Money Laundering Coordination Center. In its first full year of operation in 1999 the strategy resulted in the seizure of over eighty million dollars in illegal drug money.²⁸

The ability to go after the fiscal resources supporting illegal clandestine operators such as drug traffickers or terrorists was strengthened further by the financial aspects of Title III of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 in the International Money-Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorists Financing Act (Public Law 107-56). The next step should be to provide a mechanism to search for loopholes and to examine how the financial system can be circumvented. Additionally, oversight responsibility should be assigned to try and fuse fiscally focused counterdrug money intelligence with counterterrorism financing intelligence. The fiscal zone is an important exponent in weakening the threat ability to operate, but it is a supporting effort, is not decisive and does not address our primary vulnerabilities.²⁹

SOURCE ZONE

The United Nations special representative to Afghanistan recently confirmed the failure of President Hamid Karzai's poppy eradication program which began in April 2002. The previous Taliban regime had succeeded in ending most of the opium production in the country, traditionally the source zone for the majority of the world's opium, most of which goes to Europe as heroin after lab refinement in Pakistan, Turkey, Tajikistan and Russia. The United Nation's

report estimated this year Afghanistan produced about 2,500 tons of opium. In the failed incentive the Karzai government offered growers \$500 per acre for crop substitution to replace the average poppy grower's earnings of \$6,400 per acre. Although Afghanistan is a source zone, because its principal market is Europe it is not a vital U.S. interest, but more of a supporting effort.³⁰

For the United States the most strategically important source zone is in the Western hemisphere. Nearly ninety percent of the cocaine and the majority of the heroin crossing the arrival zone into the United States originate in a single source zone country – Colombia. While the NSS of 2002 does not mention Plan Colombia it does outline a strategy to help Colombia build its institutions and regain its sovereignty in the cocaine producing southern areas of *Zona Despoja* now controlled by 18,000 FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*) and 3,000 ELN (*Ejercito Liberacion Nacional*) insurgents. U.S. efforts are based on Plan Colombia and the \$1.3 billion committed to the plan in the NSS of 2000. The U.S. portion is just part of an overall \$7.5 billion over five years of which \$4 billion will come from Colombia itself and \$3.5 will come from the international community, a community that has of yet to embrace the plan.³¹

The 1999 Plan Colombia is a Colombian-authored five-year strategic concept, primarily political and economic, rather than a military strategy. The plan assumes that the poor economic stability of the country, twenty percent unemployment, and general governmental corruption set the conditions for the FARC insurgency and terrorist's attacks. The inability of the government to provide security has generated the right-wing paramilitary self defense forces or *autodefensas* of about 6,000 members of which the AUC, or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, is the most significant. The plan also assumes if the guerrillas seek peace or lose their ability to operate, the need for paramilitary forces will be reduced. Since much of the guerrilla war chest is filled by drug trafficking profits, if the government can eradicate the crops, provide alternative crop sources, and interdict drug movement it will shrink the FARC war funds to the point where they cannot continue operations. The major points of the plan include a negotiated peace, human rights and judicial reform, economic restructuring and development, an anti-corruption campaign, education and health improvements, modernization of the armed forces and police, and expanded counternarcotics operations.³²

Critics of Plan Colombia point out a number of flaws in its basic assumptions, as well as the restrictions imposed by its aid sources. It is likely that only one half of FARC's operating funds come from drug trafficking. The rest result from guerrilla imposed local taxes and extortion, therefore the guerrillas could continue operations without drug profits. Secondly, the right wing paramilitary *autodefensas* are also heavily involved in the drug trade. In fact the key leaders of

the paramilitary AUC have been indicted in U.S. courts for drug trafficking in the United States and the U.S. Justice Department has requested their extradition from Colombia. Thirdly, Colombia's cocaine production has increased 126 percent to over 500 metric tons since 1995 while neighboring Peru and Bolivia have successfully used alternative crop development to reduced cocaine crops by sixty-two percent and seventy percent respectively. These countries have a great concern that if put under military pressure FARC will simply displace into their territories and resume drug production. And finally, about sixty-one percent of U.S. aid is military in nature and that aid has very restrictive limits. Nearly all U.S. aid must be directly connected to counterdrug rather than counterinsurgency programs. For example the eighteen Black Hawk and thirty Huey helicopters provided for Colombia, which could be a significant force-multiplier for Colombian Army counterinsurgency mobility, are strictly confined to counterdrug operations. Likewise similar restrictions apply to the training by U.S. trainers, primarily Special Forces, which is capped at 400 soldiers.³³

Shortly after the terrorists attacks of 11 September 2001 FARC leader Jorge Briceno was caught on tape promising to attack Americans "wherever they may be." In 2001 the Colombian police arrested three Irish Republican Army (IRA) trainers sent to train FARC members in urban terrorism. The U.S. State Department and U.S. Congressional committees are exploring the links between FARC and Middle East terrorist groups evidenced by the fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah have established offices in Colombia. Given FARC's expansive drug network and distribution connections in the United States it does not take a leap of imagination to assume that FARC's potential to be a direct threat to the U.S. is growing and that FARC has both intent and opportunity. In light of this threat this author recommends a reexamination of current counterdrug restrictions placed on U.S. aid and training to Colombian officials. Counterdrug operations and the counterinsurgency campaign in Colombia are inexorably linked and to try and compartmentalize them into separate spheres is wishful thinking. Lifting those restrictions would allow the Colombian Army to take advantage of force-multipliers such as U.S. helicopters in their counterinsurgency fight as well as broaden their professional training. At the same time the U.S. needs to increase intelligence sharing, now carefully restricted, as well as significantly increase our troop cap to allow an increase in the training programs. The current situation in Colombia is a source of danger to U.S. national security and interests and any policy that severely hamstrings that effort is a half-measure. Is this another slippery slope to Vietnam? Possibly, but with one certain difference, you can not walk from Hanoi to Los Angeles.³⁴

The weakness of national governments and enforcement power in the primary source zone countries of Afghanistan and Colombia, as well as the likelihood of a very protracted failure of Plan Colombia does not generate confidence in an effective long term source zone strategy.

TRANSIT ZONE

In theory the transit zone can be anywhere in the world in which illegal drugs transit from a source zone to the U.S. border. In the interest of brevity this section will primarily focus on the key transit zones from Colombia as they are most important: the Caribbean Sea – Gulf of Mexico maritime route and the land route across Mexico.

The Department of Defense has the lead in attempting to disrupt maritime and air smuggling in the Caribbean and Pacific transit zone, of which eighty-five percent is by boat. The Caribbean Corridor accounts for about forty-two percent of South American cocaine that is transported to the U.S. through Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Cuba, and Haiti and the Mexican Coast. Currently Haiti is an increasingly significant point as the opportunities of successful smuggling are created by its political instability, corruption and lack of enforcement. The Bahamas also is a critical staging area as drugs, or illegal persons, can be easily transferred to pleasure craft, go-fast boats and fishing vessels for the eighty-mile trip to the Florida coast. The Caribbean-Gulf of Mexico is over a million square mile operating area. The major effort in this AOR in 1999-2000 was “Operation Frontier Shield” which seized eighteen vessels, triple from the seizures the previous year, but somewhat less than the ONDCP estimated one-thousand smuggling events in the AOR for the year. A study sponsored by ONDCP in 2000 conducted detailed interviews with captured maritime smugglers and produced several important conclusions. Smugglers were confident of their planning and ability to evade arrest in the maritime environment because they were difficult to spot and had more sophisticated equipment than law enforcement. Secondly, smugglers considered the risk of a two percent interdiction rate simply the cost of doing business.³⁵

Fifty-three percent of the cocaine moving through all transit zones travels via the Mexico/Central American Corridor, the principal avenues of approach being the Pan American Highway and Mexican coastal ports. Currently there are fifty major drug trafficking organizations operating in Mexico, the United States being almost entirely dependent on cooperative efforts with the Mexican government and military for interdiction in this transit zone. Although the Mexican government in 2000 seized eighteen metric tons of cocaine and 1,619 metric tons of marijuana, all interdiction efforts in this transit zone are plagued by a long history of government and military corruption in a country where drug trafficking income equals that of the oil or tourist

industry. In 1997 for example the senior Mexican counterdrug chief, GEN Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, was himself jailed for conspiracy with a drug trafficker. In another well-known example in 1999 Mexican soldiers stole cocaine from a seized shipment they were supposed to be guarding for incineration.³⁶

President Vicente Fox has taken a new tough stance on drug traffickers, his administration arresting more than 10,000 in his first two years. Fox's war on corruption has also produced some improvement, particularly in the arrest of senior military officers, the Mexican Army being notoriously involved in the drug trade. The Mexican Army is the principal counterdrug force for the country, demonstrating a lack of public confidence in dysfunctional federal and state law enforcement agencies long ago undermined by drug money. Fox's government jailed three generals in the past year along with several subordinate officers for corruption with illegal drug organizations. The Mexican government started a drug testing program for its army, and the U.S. and Mexico have developed a counterdrug training program in the United States for Mexican officers. Fox's efforts are in the right direction, but it is not going to produce anytime soon a culture that is serious about stopping drug transiting to the United States.³⁷

The transit zone strategy also involves teaching and equipping transit zone police, strengthening democratic institutions and multilateral cooperation and assistance to eliminate safe havens. Given time to develop this may be a good supporting endeavor. In 1999 all transit zone cocaine seizures amounted to seventy-eight metric tons. This represents about twenty-two percent of the estimated 350 tons of cocaine the DEA estimates entered the United States. We need to continue this effort and upgrade the capabilities and programs applied to the transit zone, but a success rate of twenty-two percent is not decisive, furthermore it does not provide or greatly contribute to the general security of our nation.³⁸

DOMESTIC ZONE

Since 1993-1994 the White House, under both Presidents Bush and Clinton, began shifting the national strategy priority of counterdrug efforts toward reducing the demand for drugs, a market-oriented approach emphasizing an education campaign as a prevention measure and a treatment program for drug users. The demand side emphasis has continued to build until 2002 when it is unequivocally stated as the first priority for a counterdrug strategy by the Bush administration's Office of National Drug Control Policy.³⁹

Although the domestic zone demand side program is the stated priority, the means do not demonstrate it as a main effort. The current strategy allocates only forty-one percent of the FY02 \$10.9 billion drug control budget to demand side programs, the majority of the funds going

to supply side enforcement. In the proposed addition of \$449 million in FY03 only one-quarter is added to the demand side. The Clinton strategic goal of reducing demand by fifty percent by 2007 has been quietly taken off the table. The current strategic objective or ends is simply to reduce demand and the education-prevention-treatment ways is translated to means by nine major programs such as Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program, Drug-Free Communities Program, Parents Drug Corps, Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program and Substance Abuse and Prevention Block Grant.⁴⁰

The difficulty of the demand side strategy is quantification of its success rate. Columbia University's National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse reports for 2002 two-thirds of teenagers surveyed say their schools are drug free, up from forty-five percent in 2000. The DEA reports the purity of cocaine has dropped nine percent over the past few years, indicating slightly less available so it is cut with more base material. The ONDCP, *2002 Final Report on the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy: Performance Measures of Effectiveness* with data through 2000 flatly admits that most of the program goals to meet the fifty percent demand reduction are "off track" meaning they will not or can not be met, which explains why the quantitative ends were dropped by the Bush administration. The *2002 Final Report* indicates the levels of cocaine, heroin and most other drug use have remained relatively constant, but the number of chronic users has decreased slightly. Crack use, according to the figures, has dropped almost fifty percent since 1999. It reports there is no reliable method of assessing domestic production of marijuana or methamphetamine or domestic drug trafficker success rates. ONDCP data for 2002 indicates total domestic expenditures on illicit drugs declined six percent since 1997, from \$68 million to \$65 million, while the availability of cocaine in the United States dropped six percent from 275 metric tons to 259 metric tons. The numbers do appear to be down slightly, but the entire issue is very difficult to measure with any degree of confidence.⁴¹

The domestic zone also has a supply-side, from plantations and labs to street dealers. Federal, state and local law enforcement seized 6,600 clandestine drug labs in 2000, most producing methamphetamine. Domestic marijuana plantations are also big business. In 1998, the last year data is available, the federal government destroyed about thirteen million plants in its eradication program. In response to editorial criticism that the war on drugs is needlessly and wastefully jailing thousands of petty users, the ONDCP *2002 National Drug Control Strategy* makes a point of combating "the notion that the federal criminal justice system is causing the arrest of legions of small-time drug offenders...." and reports in 2000 there were just 232 federal prosecutions for serious drugs. This is disingenuous at best. For example, the DEA reported 30,644 arrests for 2001. Most of the cases are turned over to local or state courts, so naturally

they are not counted as federal prosecutions. In 2001 the state and local courts on the Southwest border went into open rebellion and threatened to stop taking federal cases because they were overloading the systems without reimbursement to the local taxpayer. This led to program inclusion in the *2002 National Drug Control Strategy* of fifty million dollars for the Southwest Border Drug Prosecution Initiative to reimburse the local courts for the drug bust burden placed on the courts by case referrals by U.S. Attorneys.⁴²

In any discussion of the domestic zone one invariably has to address the issue of decriminalization or even legalization of drugs. One approach would lessen the penalties for possession or use, the other would remove them all together. The issue usually revolves around marijuana rather than the harder drugs. In a number of European countries such as Belgium, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom drug use is not a criminal offense but rather incurs administrative sanctions such as loss of a driver's license. However, those same countries have actually stiffened their penalties for drug trafficking, ranging from seven years to life depending on quantity and type drug. Although there is some localized discussion and even local political action toward legalization or decriminalization in the United States there appears little national political will for such a movement as most polls and study commissions have discovered. Certainly as long as there is an ideological base for the drug war the issue is one of values and surrendering those values, as well as one of cost-benefit analysis to the public welfare. It is not the purpose of this paper to detail the debate on legalization or decriminalization, the issue is raised only to point out that neither of those will enter into the practical calculus of strategic solutions anytime in the near future.⁴³

By ONDCP data and by its own admission the domestic zone demand side counterdrug national strategy has not been particularly effective in winning the war on drugs. However, if one transcends the ideological perspective and applies the earlier mentioned health model of effective management rather than curing the incurable, it may be fair to say the demand side strategy has had some positive impact on management of the disease. That aside, the most elementary fact is that none of the elements of the domestic zone strategy make a significant contribution to the requirement for national security in the new threat environment. The domestic zone demand side counterdrug national strategy is a niche approach that is a luxury for the foreseeable future. We have entered a period in our history that compels all strategic solutions and resources of any nature to make a direct contribution toward the more critical national security strategic endstate to prevent attacks against the United States and the Homeland Security national security priority of reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism.⁴⁴

ARRIVAL ZONE

The shift from a demand side counterdrug strategy to a supply-side arrival zone strategy of secure borders carries the strategy well beyond a drug nexus to one of general national security as well as counterterrorism. It is geographical or place oriented, almost Jominian. Terrorism, illegal drugs, illegal immigration, contraband or international crime share common clandestine characteristics, and often common pathways, in the broad expanse of source zones, transit zones, and even the domestic zone. These threats also often share a common, fairly limited, geographic decisive point, the U.S. border or arrival zone.

The Canadian government announcement that it was considering relaxing or decriminalizing its marijuana laws brought an immediate backlash from the White House and threats that tougher U.S. inspections as a result would disrupt the one billion dollar daily trade between the countries. Canada has a large Islamic population, more than fifty radical Islamic groups, and the majority of illegal entries from Islamic countries come from that transit zone, 245 arrests in 2001 compared to 90 at the Southern border according to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). It is also worth noting that the 4000-mile northern border is just as porous as the Mexican border and the ease with which Canadian documents can be obtained perhaps make it even more dangerous when it comes to counterterrorism. The radical Islamic Millennium bomber, for example, was captured at the Canadian border before he could carry out plans to attack the Los Angeles airport. Terrorists and drug runners are very adaptable and if and when the Northern border becomes secure they can fairly easily switch clandestine efforts to the south. There is considerably less corruption in Canada, thus the job of transforming the border will be faster and more efficient than in the Southwest and it is the in the Southwest where we will face the most difficult task. The Canadian border in general has considerably less drug flow than the Southwest. By ONDCP and DEA estimates sixty-nine percent of source zone cocaine produce actually arrived at the U.S. border and sixty-five percent of that crosses the Southwest border with Mexico. While there is illegal drug and people traffic across the Canadian border, Canada as a transit zone has more effective law enforcement than Mexico. The priority of arrival zone effort should go to the Southwest border.⁴⁵

The simple fact is that the United States does not have secure borders, or even marginal control of its border. The requirements for control are an effective political and law enforcement structure, as well as physical capabilities. There are many border pockets where corruption deeply erodes the basic foundation of political governance and enforcement of the law. The current state of the border, especially in the Southwest, transcends illegal drug smuggling and immigration. The issue is one of national sovereignty, as well as a form of insurgency. Foreign

drug money and foreign drug traffickers influence local leaders and law enforcement to the point where in some regions Mexican drug dealers form a sort of shadow government with extraordinary illegal influence and powers of corruption. In the Lower Rio Grande Valley, an impoverished and densely populated region on the South Texas border, in the last few years a county judge, county clerk, three county sheriffs, two police chiefs, four police officers, and four jail officials have been convicted of drug corruption related charges such as trafficking, money laundering, and bribery or conspiracy to allow drug loads to pass. A common characteristic of the population of the Lower Rio Grande Valley is a lack of public confidence in police forces and public distrust in the integrity of government.⁴⁶

As for physical control of the border it is practically non-existent except in a few selected urban areas. The Southwest border is generally considered a no-man's-land. "No one seems to understand," observes one Texas rancher on the Rio Grande, "There isn't a border anymore." Drug runners and illegal aliens come across South Texas ranches in such numbers that the 100-mile stretch of Dimmit, Maverick, and Zavala counties is called the DMZ by locals. Eight years ago the Border Patrol averaged 50,000 annual apprehensions of illegal immigrants in this sector. The numbers are now approaching 250,000. Drug traffickers from Mexico purchase ranches on both sides of the Rio Grande to facilitate smuggling, often using intimidation and violence against landowners who do not want to sell out. The area around Douglas, Arizona is no different, with ranchers and farmers near the border virtually fortified behind fences, spot lights and mean dogs, and all are heavily armed when they leave their homes.⁴⁷

This situation in the sparsely settled areas between the Ports of Entry (POE) has developed precisely because selected POEs have been hardened to the point where it has driven smuggling to the hinterland. Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, El Paso, and Laredo has all but ended casual smuggling and illegal crossing in these urban areas. Dozens of infrared cameras, towers and floodlights, very high and tough steel matting fences, hundreds of computer linked remote ground sensors, Forward Looking Infra Red (FLIR) cameras and scopes on helicopters, sniffer dogs, giant X-Ray machines, computerized license plate readers, digitized facial recognition technology and double or tripling federal manpower has unquestionably been effective against all but the most professional, sophisticated and daring smugglers of contraband and people. Operation Gatekeeper proves the point that serious and effective control of the border is possible at focused points. The area between those focused points or POEs does not require the same level of sophisticated inspection; it requires control in depth and area denial to canalize all traffic through the POEs.⁴⁸

Currently the traffic, legal and illegal, in the arrival zone border simply overwhelms the resources and capabilities of the federal government. Current entry figures of U.S. borders are sixty million people - 675,000 on aircraft, and six million by sea and land. Nine million shipping containers arrive at Ports of Entry, 90,000 passengers visit on ships, and 116 million vehicles cross the land border. On the Southwest border with Mexico in 2000 NAFTA traffic reached 293 million people, eighty-nine million cars, four and one-half million trucks, and 572,000 railcars. In 2000 on the Mexican border law enforcement seized nineteen tons of cocaine, a half ton of heroin, nearly two tons of methamphetamine, and one thousand one-hundred tons of marijuana.⁴⁹

Focusing on the Southwestern Border as a priority, the national security strategy should reflect a permanent long term program to develop a secure border in the interest of our national security. Secure borders defined means positive control in that no person, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft enters the United States without the proper authorization and inspection if needed. Realists with border experience will immediately understand this is a man-on-the-moon proposition, it is not a question of if it can be done, the question is do we have the political will to do so. The strategy acknowledges the scope of such a daunting task, but it should be the unequivocal goal. The "smart borders" initiative presented in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (2002) is a start point, and point of departure with the understanding that "smart borders" and secure borders are not synonymous. A careful reading of the "smart borders" concept reveals the tension between the need to expedite free trade and a basic security provided by leveraging technology, for example biometric identification visas. In the calculus of "smart borders" NAFTA, commerce and free trade are the principle exponents, not security as presented in the concepts of an "increasingly transparent" border and "non-intrusive inspection technologies." These are excellent technologies to employ, but the smart border concept falls short of what is truly required.⁵⁰

In the beginning positive control of the borders will have a negative impact on the North American Free Trade Agreement and will slow the movement of truck and rail cargo from Mexico and Canada. However, with the mass employment of current technology such as large cargo X-ray machines combined with existing drug, radiation and explosives detectors as well as increased manpower of the U.S Customs Service, an acceptable rate of flow can be achieved at the Ports of Entry (POE). The POEs are relatively easy to control. The problem is forcing all the traffic to use the POEs and be denied the area between the POEs, the sparsely settled two thousand mile line with few barriers and little law enforcement.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the itemized material requirements of a secure border, but it is useful to present at least a brief discussion of some detail to give the reader a clear picture of the challenges and possibilities. Undermanned and under-resourced, the U.S. Border Patrol has responsibility for the vast areas between the POEs. Although the Border Patrol manpower authorization was doubled to 10,000 in 1994 it is still under-strength and should be doubled again, recognizing it will take four or five years to properly train an agent. The strategy calls for additional funding for a long- term professional training program for Border Patrol officers, similar to the U.S. Army's Non-Commissioned Officer Education System. The current means of the U.S. Border Patrol is the equivalent of tasking a low-tech motorized infantry division the mission to block infiltration on a 6,000 mile front. As a force multiplier the U.S. Border patrol should be resourced with the latest of high-end technology instead of the military cast-offs they currently employ.

Secure borders do not require a massive linear physical barrier, except in a few select points. For the most part it should be a technological barrier, surveillance and sensors in great depth to provide law enforcement exact intelligence on the location, rate of movement, and direction of illegal intruders. Sparse terrain and vast distances to link up with roads and towns characterize ninety percent of the Southwestern border. If law enforcement has proper manpower and intelligence the apprehension of intruders is not particularly difficult. The point of the technological barrier is to improve the probability of capture. Once the probably of capture reaches a high risk stage, and if punitive consequences are sure to follow, the casual illegal traffic will nearly cease. With far lesser innocent or casual traffic, the probability of intercepting the dangerous intruder or determined drug smuggler will increase exponentially. Significantly raising the risk of apprehension between the POEs becomes in effect an area denial operation.

Of particular importance to a technical barrier are limited-visibility capabilities, most of which currently exist but are not resourced for the Border Patrol. Long range thermal imaging devices, microwave or satellite up-link sensor networks, improved rotary-winged aviation, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), all-source intelligence systems, and improved ground mobility would be technological factors greatly improving the current capability of the U.S. Border Patrol, our true front line defense in the concept of secure borders.

Until such time as the Border Patrol achieves the capabilities it needs the United States should continue to use select U.S. military units in a general support role of border security, especially intelligence analysts and aviation reconnaissance. Rather than being considered a training distracter, many experienced commanders consider the border mission to be an

excellent training opportunity with unique and rewarding challenges toward their war-time requirements.⁵¹

The "No Man's Land" border of the current situation acts as an economic safety valve for the population of Mexico. Many of the three million illegal aliens currently in the U.S. are economic refugees and the money returned home is critical to the Mexican economy. It is possible that closing this illegal safety valve will create instability in Mexico, perhaps even another revolution. Unquestionably NAFTA has been an economic boon but the Mexican economy is still fragile. In tandem with secure borders the U.S. should lift the current Union supported labor restrictions and grant special status to Mexican workers in a return to the old guest-worker or "Bracero" program. Unlike the often exploited illegals, these now legal aliens with biometric visas would have protected working rights and conditions, would pay taxes, would fill the menial labor void, but would retain their Mexican citizenship. In time, as the Mexican economy improves, the need to leave Mexico for financial gain will diminish as opportunities grow, thus causing a natural decrease in the guest-worker density.⁵²

A secure border concept, and even a smart border concept, can not be a unilateral effort but will require the cooperation of both Mexico and Canada. The first step would be for Mexico to take measures to control its own Southern border with Guatemala and Belize. Under President Fox Mexico has taken recent steps to try and control illegal migration, setting up special enforcement units and even declaring some traditional crossing areas off-limits (*zonas de exclusion*). The arrival zone strategy should call for formal bilateral agreements, as well as the funding necessary to improve our neighbor's side of the border.⁵³

CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined a conceptual framework for a counterdrug national strategy and traced the history of counterdrug strategy in the United States national security strategy from its first report in 1987 to the present. An analysis of current strategy indicates the ends, ways and means of the strategy are not effective for the long term. In recognition of the clear narco-terrorist-insurgency nexus in Colombia this paper recommends a change in that source zone effort by lifting the current counterdrug-only restrictions on all U.S. military aid, equipment and training provided to the Colombian Army. This paper calls for a new counterdrug rational approach of protracted threat management rather than an ideological war to be won, and a shift from a domestic zone demand side strategy to one that places priority on the supply side arrival zone. The new strategy takes advantage of the Homeland Security initiative and centralizes control of multitudinous security agencies toward a common threat strategy, priority of effort,

and an effective intelligence picture. It specifically recommends the resources of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency be placed under the Department of Homeland Security and calls for a legal review of Executive Order 12333 that places severe restrictions on domestic use of military intelligence. The span of control of the Department of Homeland Security should form the nucleus of the means by which the United States achieves secure borders and thus greater national security. Recognizing a growing narco-terrorism nexus the arrival zone counterdrug national strategy should in effect be a supporting strategy for Homeland Security. With priority to the Southwest, the development of a secure border will require significant improvement in the manpower and resources of the U.S. Border Patrol, continued military support, and the application of technological solutions. Secure borders will also require a serious bilateral effort with Canada and Mexico.

The national security strategic endstate is to “prevent attacks against us and our friends.” The Homeland Security national security priority is to “reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism.” We have entered an era demanding synchronization of all strategic solutions and resources that contribute toward this great challenge and we can no longer afford niche interests and compartmentalized efforts.⁵⁴

Word Count: 9,407

ENDNOTES

¹John Solomon, "Drugs Funded Terror Groups: U.S. Ring Supported Hezbollah, Feds Say," *Harrisburg (PA) Patriot News*, 2 September 2002, sec. A1, p.1.

²Josh Meyer, "Drug Trade Funding Terror Groups' Actions, U.S. Says; Crime: Federal Data Offer 'Shocking' Insight Into Links Between Two Threats, Ashcroft Says," *The Los Angeles Times*, 31 July 2002, sec. A, p. A.18.

³For recent articles on the terrorist-drug link see for example U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Director Asa Hutchinson Speech 'Narco-Terror: The International Connection Between Drugs and Terror,'" 2 April 2002; available from <http://www.dea.gov/speeches/s040202.html>; Internet; accessed 14 Sept. 2002; Michael Catanzaro, "South America's Drug-Terror Link," *The American Enterprise* 13 (June, 2002): 50-51; Cynthia Tucker, "Drug War's End Could Provide Anti-Terror Ammo," *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 23 June 2002, sec. E, p. E10; Susan Schmidt, "DEA to Bolster Presence Along Mexican Border, in Central Asia," *The Washington Post*, 10 August 2002, sec. A, p. A11. For past scholarship on the link between terrorism, insurgency and illegal drug trafficking see Rensselaer W. Lee, III, "The Latin American Drug Connection," *Foreign Policy* 61 (Winter 85/86): 142-143; Steven Wisotsky, *Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 163-164; Scott B. McDonald, *Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama* (New York: Praeger and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1989), 27-35; Rensselaer W. Lee, III, *The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA, 1992), 12-14. On the 1987 Narco-Terrorism link in the NSS see Ronald Reagan, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1987), 14, 34.

⁴U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "DEA Congressional Testimony, Statement by Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Washington, D.C., 29 March 2001," available from <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct032901.html>; Internet; accessed 14 Sept. 2002, quote 1; Patrick Jonsson, "Drugs Becoming A Rarer Sight in Schools; For the First Time, More Than Half of US Teenagers Say Their Schools Are Drug-free," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 21 August 2002, p. 2; Robert Patrick, "The Nation: Annual Teen Drug Study Finds Mixed Results," *The Los Angeles Times*, 21 August 2002, sec. A, p. A8; U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Drug Trafficking In the United States," 2001 Report; available from <http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intell/01020/index.html>; Internet; accessed 14 Sept. 2002.

⁵George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 1990), 7; Antoine Henri Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War in Roots of Strategy*. Book 2. Ed. J.D. Hittle (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 461, 472-473; Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (1990), 29; George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1993), 19; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *National Drug Control Strategy, 2000 Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2000), 74; William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 1994), 9.

⁶Office of the White House Press Secretary, "National Security Strategy Report Fact Sheet," January 28, 1987 as attached to Ronald Reagan, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1987).

⁷Reagan, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (1987), 5, 7, quote 14, second quote 34.

⁸Ronald Reagan, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1988), quote 6, 22, 26, 29, 31, 34.

⁹George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 1990), quote 7, second quote 2, third quote 28, 3, 12-13, 18, 23, 28-29.

¹⁰Joint Interagency Task Force East, "Fact Sheet," available from <http://www.jiatfe.org/cg/factsheet.html>; Internet, accessed 6 October 2002, 1; Joint Task Force Six, "Joint Task Force Six History," available from <http://www-jtf6.bliss.army.mil/html/history.htm>; Internet, accessed 6 October 2002, 1.

¹¹George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, August 1991), quote 8, 2-4, 8, 17.

¹²Colin L. Powell, *National Military Strategy, 1992* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), 5, first quote 14, second, third and fourth quote 15.

¹³George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1993), quote 19, 13, 18.

¹⁴William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 1994), quote 9, second quote 6, 1, 6-7, 9, 14. On NAFTA and the drug trafficking factor see Sebastian Rotella, *Twilight On the Line: Underworlds and Politics at the U.S.-Mexico Border* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998), 41-42.

¹⁵William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1995), 11; John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective*

Engagement (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), quote 3, second quote 9.

¹⁶William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996), 6, 12, 13, 15, 17-18.

¹⁷William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy For A New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997), 10-11. For good examples of demand side arguments see Steven Wisotsky, *Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 212-213; Rensselaer W. Lee, III, *The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA, 1992), 238-239; Peter H. Smith, "The Political Economy of Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy Options," and Mathea Falco, "Policies and Prospects for Demand Reduction," in *Drug Policy in the Americas*, ed. Peter H. Smith (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 1-21, 217-222; James M. Van Wert, "International Narcotics Control: Bush's 'Other War' – Are We Winning or Losing," in *War On Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy*, eds. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 21-38; Kevin Jack Riley, *Snow Job?: The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, A Rand Study, 1996), 267-284.

¹⁸John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 6, quote 9, second quote 17.

¹⁹William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy For A New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998), quote 6, 14, 16-19, 48-49.

²⁰William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy For A New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999), 14-15, 39-40;

²¹William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy For A Global Age* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000), 25-26; George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 10; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002 National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2002); available from <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/03ndsc/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 Sept. 2002, 1-16, quote 1.

²²George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), quote 10.

²³DRAFT Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002), first quote 4, all other quotes 5.

²⁴For a more detailed discussion of this concept see Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, *The Search for Rational Drug Control* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xi, 3.

²⁵Office of National Drug Control Policy, *Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999* (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, August 2001), 5.

²⁶Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy For Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 2002), 22, 31; Daniel W. Fisk, "Top Priorities for Improving Intelligence and Law Enforcement Capabilities," In *Defending the American Homeland* Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer III and Edwin Meese III, 53-74. (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2002); Available from

<http://www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/project.cfm>; Internet. accessed 22 Oct. 2002; U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "DEA Fact Sheet,"; available from <http://www.dea.gov/pubs/factsheet/factsheet2002.html>; Internet; accessed 14 Sept. 2002.

²⁷Note Executive Order 12333 of U.S. Code 50 covers a wide range of prohibitions from assassination to intelligence collection. Danna R. Dillon, "Breaking Down Intelligence Barriers For Homeland Security," Heritage Foundation Report No.1536, 10 April 2002 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2002), 1-6; available from <http://www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/project.cfm>; Internet; accessed 22 Oct. 2002; Fisk, "Top Priorities for Improving Intelligence and Law Enforcement Capabilities," 53-74; Tyler J. Harden, "Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order 12,333: A Small Step in Clarifying Current Law," *Military Law Review* 172 (June 2002): 1-39;

²⁸Office of National Drug Control Policy. *National Drug Control Strategy, 2000 Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2000), 69-70.

²⁹Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy For Homeland Security* (2002), 49; Fisk, "Top Priorities for Improving Intelligence and Law Enforcement Capabilities," 55, 72, 74.

³⁰Scott Baldauf, "Poppies Bloom in Afgan Fields, Again," *The Christian Science Monitor* 21 August 2002, p. 1; Associated Press, "UN: Afghanistan Churns Out Opium," *Carlisle (PA) The Sentinel*, 17 Oct. 2002, sec. A, p. A1.

³¹Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002 National Drug Control Strategy*, 5; U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet: State Dept. on U.S. Counternarcotics Goals in Colombia, 14

August 2002," *Washington File*, U.S. Department of State, International Information Program; available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/02092404.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 Oct. 2002; Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)*, 10; Clinton, *A National Security Strategy For A Global Age*, 55; Wisotsky, *Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs*, 163; Gabriel Marcella, "Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives," in Department of National Security and Strategy, *Readings; Volume II: War, National Security Policy & Strategy*, (Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003), 376-398; Maria Cristina Caballero, "Is Colombia Doomed to Repeat Its Past?," *New York Times*, 10 August 2002, p. 15; T. Christian Miller, "Colombia's Drug War Attracts Dubious Ally," *The Los Angeles Times*, 19 August 2002, sec. A, p. A1.

³²Andres Pastrana, "Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State," (1999). Text available from United States Institute of Peace Library at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plancolombia/101999.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 Oct. 2002; Marcella, "Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives," 382, 400-403; Caballero, "Is Colombia Doomed to Repeat Its Past?," 15; Miller, "Colombia's Drug War Attracts Dubious Ally," A1;

³³Eric Green, "Justice Depart. Indicts Colombian AUC Leaders on Drug Charges," *Washington File*, U.S. Department of State, International Information Program; available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/Colombia/02092404.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 Oct. 2002; Ecumenical Human Rights Commission of Ecuador, "Plan Colombia and It's Consequences in Ecuador," 16 March 2001, Information Network of the Americas; available from http://www.Colombiareport.org/plancolombia_ecuador.htm; Internet; accessed 14 Oct. 2002; Marcella, "Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives," 378-379, 387; Caballero, "Is Colombia Doomed to Repeat Its Past?," 15; Miller, "Colombia's Drug War Attracts Dubious Ally," A1; "U.S. Adopting New Strategy in Colombia," *Army Times*, 14 October 2002, 5; Steven Dudley, "War in Colombia's Oil Fields," *The Nation* 275 (No. 5, 5 August 2002): 28-31; Marc Cooper, "Plan Colombia: Wrong Issue, Wrong Enemy, Wrong Country," *The Nation* 272 (No. 11, 19 March 2001): 11-18.

³⁴U.S. Department of State, "Text: Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 – Latin America Overview, 30 April 2001," *Washington File*, U.S. Department of State, International Information Program; available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/terror2000.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 Oct. 2002; Catanzaro, "South America's Drug-Terror Link," quote 50; "U.S. Adopting New Strategy in Colombia," *Army Times* (14 October 2002), 5; Cooper, "Plan Colombia: Wrong Issue, Wrong Enemy, Wrong Country," 18.

³⁵U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Drug Trafficking In the United States," 2001 Report, 4; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *National Drug Control Strategy, 2000 Annual Report*, 74; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999*, 21, 59-60, 80, 147.

³⁶Office of National Drug Control Policy, *Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999*, 59, 72; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002 National Drug Control Strategy*, 52 Table 44, 54 Table 46; Amparo Trejo, "Mexican Drug Lords Seeking New Cartel: Sources Detail Meeting of 5 Major Groups," *The Washington Post*, 9 April 2001, sec. A, p. A12; Mary Beth Sheridan, "Mexico Investigating Soldiers in Cocaine Theft," *The Los Angeles Times*, 30 Oct. 1999, sec. A, p. 3; Associated Press, "Mexican Soldiers May Have Drug Ties," *Carlisle (PA) The Sentinel*, 15 Oct. 2002, sec. A, p. A3.

³⁷James F. Smith, "General Accused of Aiding Drug Cartel; Mexico," *The Los Angeles Times*, 6 April 2001, sec. A, p. A4; Trejo, "Mexican Drug Lords Seeking New Cartel," A1; Sheridan, "Mexico Investigating Soldiers in Cocaine Theft," 3; Tim Weiner, "Mexico's Image Is Buffed and Tarnished With Military Drug Arrests," *New York Times*, 7 April 2001, sec. A, p. A7; "Antidrug Strides in Mexico," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 July 2002, p.8; "Mexican Cartel Survives Losses, Official Says," *New York Times*, 12 June 2002, sec. A, p. A15; Gretchen Peters, "US, Mexico Finally Drug-war Allies; President Vicente Fox's Unprecedented Cooperation With US Yields Big Blows to Latin Narcotraffickers," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 July 2002, p.1

³⁸*National Drug Control Strategy, 2000 Annual Report*, 77-78, 146.

³⁹Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (1993), 19; Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (1994), 9; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002 National Drug Control Strategy*, 1-5.

⁴⁰Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002 National Drug Control Strategy*, 24.

⁴¹Robert Patrick, "Annual Teen Drug Study Finds Mixed Results: Most Schools Are Free of Illegal Substances, But Pot is Easier To Buy Than Liquor, Students Say," *The Los Angeles Times*, 21 August 2002, sec. A, p. A8.; Patrik Jonsson, "Drugs Becoming Rarer Sight In Schools," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 August 2002, p.2; Schmidt, "DEA to Bolster Presence Along Mexican Border, in Central Asia," A11; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002 Final Report on the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy: Performance Measures of Effectiveness*, (February 2002); available from <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/02pme/pmepdf/PME.pdf>, Internet; accessed 27 Oct. 2002, quote ix, 6, 13, 15, 21; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002*

National Drug Control Strategy, 41 table 1, 42 table 32. For a good cautionary tale on reliable drug data see Jonathan P. Caulkins, "Measurement and Analysis of Drug Problems and Drug Control Efforts," National Criminal Justice Reform Center, 2000; available from http://ncjrs.org/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04h.pdf; Internet; accessed 27 Oct. 2002.

⁴²U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Drug Trafficking In the United States," 10; *National Drug Control Strategy, 2000 Annual Report*, 143 table 44; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002 National Drug Control Strategy*, 13, quote 17; U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "DEA Fact Sheet," 8.; Jim Yardley, "Expanded Border Policing Clogs the courts and Jails," *New York Times*, 1 July 2000, sec. A, p. A7. For a typical editorial on the abuse of the war on drugs see Tucker, "Drug War's End Could Provide Anti-Terror Ammo," E10.

⁴³U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Drug Intelligence Brief: The Changing Face of European Drug Policy, April 2002,,"; available from <http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intell/02023/02023.html>; Internet; accessed 14 Sept. 2002. For a detailed discussion of legalization and decriminalization see Zimring and Hawkins, *The Search for Rational Drug Control*, 13-21, 82-110.

⁴⁴Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), 1; Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy For Homeland Security*, vii.

⁴⁵Robert S. Leiken, "Enchilada Lite: A Post-9/11 Mexican Migration Agreement," Center of Immigration Studies, available from <http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/leiken.html>; Internet, accessed September 4, 2002, 4-5; Associated Press, "Canada Considers Easing Pot Laws," *Carlisle (PA)The Sentinel*, 15 Oct. 2002, sec. A, p. A6; Office of National Drug Control Policy, *2002 Final Report on the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy: Performance Measures of Effectiveness*, 24; U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "DEA Congressional Testimony... 29 March 2001, 1; National Drug Intelligence Center, "United States-Canada Border Drug Threat Assessment, December 2001, Document 2002-R0423-001," available from <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/794/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 Oct. 2002.

⁴⁶Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, "Press Release, 21 January 1998, [On Law Enforcement Drug Corruption]," p.1; available from [Http://www.fbi.gov/pressre198/police.html](http://www.fbi.gov/pressre198/police.html); Internet; accessed 22 Oct. 2002; Alison Gregor, "Reform Group Wants Starr County Cleaned," *San Antonio TX Express-News* 12 February 2001, sec. A, p. 1A; Madeline Baro, "Starr County Convictions Add to South Texas Corruption Reputation," *Abilene TX Reporter News*, 8 March 1998, p.1; available from <http://www.reporter-news.com/1998/texas/starr0308.html>; Internet; accessed 22 Oct. 2002.

⁴⁷The author's personal experience of growing up on the border at Del Rio, Texas, and three years, 1997-2000, as a counterdrug team chief at JTF-6, Fort Bliss, Texas. See also Katherine McIntire Peters, "No Man's Land," *Government Executive* 34 (July 2002): 7; Rotella, *Twilight On the Line*, 125-126, 217; Pamela Colloff, "The Battle for the Border," *Texas Monthly* 29 (April 2001): quote 97, 96-103, 162-169; Pamela Colloff, "The Last Stand," *Reader's Digest* (August 2001), 125-133.

⁴⁸Peters, "No Man's Land," 2, 4.

⁴⁹U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "DEA Congressional Testimony... 29 March 2001," 1-2; U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Drug Trafficking In the United States," 2001 Report, 2.

⁵⁰Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy For Homeland Security* (2002), all quotes 22.

⁵¹ The leaders and officers of the Fourth Aviation Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division, Fort Hood Texas have a great deal of experience flying counterdrug support missions for the U.S. border Patrol and consider the missions to be excellent training and preparation for many of their METL tasks. COL Craig K. Madden, former commander Fourth Aviation Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division, Fort Hood Texas, interviewed by author, 28 Oct. 2002, Carlisle Barracks, PA; LTC-P Peter R. Mansoor, former commander 1/10 Cavalry Squadron, Fourth Aviation Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division, Fort Hood Texas, interviewed by author, 29 Oct. 2002, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

⁵²Leiken, "Enchilada Lite," 1, 6, 15.

⁵³ibid., 20-21

⁵⁴Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), first quote 1; Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy For Homeland Security*, second quote vii.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "Antidrug Strides in Mexico." *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 July 2002, p.8.
- Associated Press. "UN: Afghanistan Churns Out Opium." *Carlisle (PA) The Sentinel*, 17 Oct. 2002, sec. A, p. A1.
- _____. "Mexican Soldiers May Have Drug Ties." *Carlisle (PA) The Sentinel*, 15 Oct. 2002, sec. A, p. A3.
- Baldauf, Scott. "Poppies Bloom in Afgan Fields, Again." *The Christian Science Monitor* 21 (August 2002): 1.
- Baro, Madeline. "Starr County Convictions Add to South Texas Corruption Reputation." *Abilene TX Reporter News*. 8 March 1998, p.1. Available from <http://www.reporternews.com/1998/texas/starr0308.html>. Internet. Accessed 22 Oct. 2002.
- Bush, George. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 1990.
- _____. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, August 1991.
- _____. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1993.
- Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.
- Caballero, Maria Cristina. "Is Colombia Doomed to Repeat Its Past?." *New York Times*, 10 August 2002, sec. A, p. 15.
- Catanzaro, Michael. "South America's Drug-Terror Link." *The American Enterprise* 13 (June 2002): 50-51.
- Caulkins, Jonathan P. "Measurement and Analysis of Drug Problems and Drug Control Efforts." National Criminal Justice Reform Center, 2000. Available from http://ncjrs.org/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04h.pdf. Internet. Accessed 27 Oct. 2002.
- Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 1994.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1995.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy For A New Century* Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997.

- _____. *A National Security Strategy For A New Century*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy For A New Century*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy For A Global Age*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000.
- Colloff, Pamela. "The Battle for the Border." *Texas Monthly* 29 (April 2001): 96-103, 162-169.
- _____. "The Last Stand," *Reader's Digest* (August 2001): 125-133.
- Cooper, Marc. "Plan Colombia: Wrong Issue, Wrong Enemy, Wrong Country." *The Nation* 272 (No. 11, 19 March 2001): 11-18.
- Dillon, Danna R. "Breaking Down Intelligence Barriers For Homeland Security." Heritage Foundation Report No.1536. 10 April 2002. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2002. Available from <http://www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/project.cfm>. Internet. Accessed 22 Oct. 2002.
- Dudley, Steven. "War in Colombia's Oil Fields." *The Nation* 275 (No. 5, 5 August 2002): 28-31.
- Ecumenical Human Rights Commission of Ecuador, "Plan Colombia and It's Consequences in Ecuador." 16 March 2001. Information Network of the Americas. Available from http://www.colombiareport.org/plancolombia_ecuador.htm. Internet. Accessed 14 Oct. 2002.
- Falco, Mathea, "Policies and Prospects for Demand Reduction." In *Drug Policy in the Americas*. ed. Peter H. Smith, 217-222. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, "Press Release, 21 January 1998, [On Law Enforcement Drug Corruption]." Available from <http://www.fbi.gov/pressre198/police.html>. Internet. Accessed 22 Oct. 2002.
- Fisk, Daniel W. "Top Priorities for Improving Intelligence and Law Enforcement Capabilities." In *Defending the American Homeland*. Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer III and Edwin Meese III, 53-74. Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2002. Available from <http://www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/project.cfm>. Internet. Accessed 22 Oct. 2002.
- Green, Eric. "Justice Depart. Indicts Colombian AUC Leaders on Drug Charges." *Washington File*. U.S. Department of State, International Information Program. Available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/02092404.htm>. Internet. Accessed 14 Oct. 2002.
- Gregor, Alison. "Reform Group Wants Starr County Cleaned." *San Antonio TX Express-News*, 12 February 2001, sec. A, p. 1A.
- Harden, Tyler J. "Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order 12,333: A Small

Step in Clarifying Current Law." *Military Law Review* 172 (June 2002): 1-39.

Joint Interagency Task Force East, "Fact Sheet." Available from <http://www.jiatfe.org/cg/factsheet.html>. Internet. Accessed 6 October 2002.

Joint Task Force Six, "Joint Task Force Six History." Available from <http://www-jtf6.bliss.army.mil/html/history.htm>. Internet. Accessed 6 October 2002.

Jomini, Antoine Henri. *Summary of the Art of War in Roots of Strategy*. Book 2. Ed. J.D. Hittle. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987.

Jonsson, Patrick. "Drugs Becoming A Rarer Sight in Schools; For the First Time, More Than Half of US Teenagers Say Their Schools Are Drug-free." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 21 August 2002, p.2.

Lee, Rensselaer W. III. *The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA, 1992.

_____. "The Latin American Drug Connection." *Foreign Policy* 61 (Winter 85/86): 142-143.

Leiken, Robert S. "Enchilada Lite: A Post-9/11 Mexican Migration Agreement." Center of Immigration Studies. Available from <http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/leiken.html>. Internet. Accessed September 4, 2002.

Madden, COL Craig K., former commander Fourth Aviation Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division, Fort Hood Texas. Interviewed by author, 28 Oct. 2002, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Mansoor, LTC-P Peter R., former commander 1/10 Cavalry Squadron, Fourth Aviation Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division, Fort Hood Texas. Interviewed by author, 29 Oct. 2002, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Marcella, Gabriel. "Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives." in Department of National Security and Strategy. *Readings; Volume II: War, National Security Policy & Strategy*. Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003, 376-398.

McDonald, Scott B. *Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama*. New York: Praeger and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1989.

Meyer, Josh. "Drug Trade Funding Terror Groups' Actions, U.S. Says; Crime: Federal Data Offer 'Shocking' Insight Into Links Between Two Threats, Ashcroft Says." *The Los Angeles Times*, 31 July 2002, sec. A, p. A18.

"Mexican Cartel Survives Losses, Official Says." *New York Times*, 12 June 2002, sec. A, p. A15.

Miller, T. Christian. "Colombia's Drug War Attracts Dubious Ally." *The Los Angeles Times*, 19 August 2002, sec. A, p. A1.

National Drug Intelligence Center. "United States-Canada Border Drug Threat Assessment, December 2001, Document 2002-R0423-001." Available from <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/794/index.htm>. Internet. Accessed 27 Oct. 2002.

Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. "National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Draft." Washington D.C.: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002.

Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy For Homeland Security*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 2002.

Office of National Drug Control Policy. *National Drug Control Strategy, 2000 Annual Report*. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2000.

_____, *2002 National Drug Control Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2002. Available from <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/03ndsc/index.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 Sept. 2002.

_____. *Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999*. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, August 2001.

_____. *2002 Final Report on the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy: Performance Measures of Effectiveness*, (February 2002). Available from <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/02pme/pmepdf/PME.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 27 Oct. 2002.

Office of the White House Press Secretary. "National Security Strategy Report Fact Sheet." January 28, 1987 as attached to Ronald Reagan, *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1987.

Pastrana, Andres. "Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State." (1999). Text available from United States Institute of Peace Library at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plancolombia/101999.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 Oct. 2002.

Patrick, Robert. "Annual Teen Drug Study Finds Mixed Results: Most Schools Are Free of Illegal Substances, But Pot is Easier To Buy Than Liquor, Students Say." *The Los Angeles Times*, 21 August 2002, sec. A, p. A8.

Peters, Gretchen. "US, Mexico Finally Drug-war Allies; President Vicente Fox's Unprecedented Cooperation With US Yields Big Blows to Latin Narcotraffickers." *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 July 2002, p. 1.

- Peters, Katherine McIntire. "No Man's Land." *Government Executive* 34 (July 2002): 22-31.
- Powell, Colin L. *National Military Strategy, 1992*. Washington D.C.: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992.
- Reagan, Ronald. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1987.
- _____. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1988.
- Riley, Kevin Jack. *Snow Job?: The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, A Rand Study, 1996.
- Rotella, Sebastian. *Twilight On the Line: Underworlds and Politics at the U.S.-Mexico Border*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998.
- Schmidt, Susan. "DEA to Bolster Presence Along Mexican Border, in Central Asia." *The Washington Post*, 10 August 2002, sec. A, p. A11.
- Shalikashvili, John M. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*. Washington D.C.: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995.
- Sheridan, Mary Beth. "Mexico Investigating Soldiers in Cocaine Theft." *The Los Angeles Times*, 30 Oct. 1999, sec. A, p. 3.
- Smith, James F. "General Accused of Aiding Drug Cartel; Mexico." *The Los Angeles Times*, 6 April 2001, sec. A, p. A4.
- Smith, Peter H. "The Political Economy of Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy Options." In *Drug Policy in the Americas*. ed. Peter H. Smith, 1-21. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.
- Solomon, John. "Drugs Funded Terror Groups: U.S. Ring Supported Hezbollah, Feds Say." *Harrisburg (PA) Patriot News*, 2 September 2002, sec. A1, p.1.
- Trejo, Amparo. "Mexican Drug Lords Seeking New Cartel: Sources Detail Meeting of 5 Major Groups." *The Washington Post*, 9 April 2001, sec. A, p. A12.
- Tucker, Cynthia. "Drug War's End Could Provide Anti-Terror Ammo." *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 23 June 2002, sec. E, p. E10.
- "U.S. Adopting New Strategy in Colombia." *Army Times*, 14 October 2002, p. 5.
- U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet: State Dept. on U.S. Counternarcotics Goals in Colombia, 14 August 2002." *Washington File*. U.S. Department of State, International Information Program. Available from

- <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/02092404.htm>. Internet. Accessed 14 Oct. 2002.
- _____. "Text: Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 – Latin America Overview, 30 April 2001." *Washington File*. U.S. Department of State, International Information Program. Available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/terror2000.htm>. Internet. Accessed 14 Oct. 2002.
- U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. "DEA Congressional Testimony, Statement by Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Washington, D.C." 29 March 2001. Available from <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngtrtest/ct032901.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 Sept. 2002.
- _____. "Drug Trafficking In the United States." 2001 Report. Available from <http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intell/01020/index.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 Sept. 2002.
- _____. "DEA Fact Sheet." Available from <http://www.dea.gov/pubs/factsheet/factsheet2002.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 Sept. 2002.
- _____. "Director Asa Hutchinson Speech 'Narco-Terror: The International Connection Between Drugs and Terror,'" 2 April 2002; Available from <http://www.dea.gov/speeches/s040202.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 Sept. 2002.
- _____. "Drug Intelligence Brief: The Changing Face of European Drug Policy, April 2002." Available from <http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intell/02023/02023.html>. Internet. Accessed 14 Sept. 2002.
- Van Wert, James M. "International Narcotics Control: Bush's 'Other War' – Are We Winning or Losing." In *War On Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy*, eds. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block, 21-38. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.
- Weiner, Tim. "Mexico's Image Is Buffed and Tarnished With Military Drug Arrests." *New York Times*, 7 April 2001, sec. A, p. A7.
- Wisotsky, Steven. *Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986.
- Yardley, Jim. "Expanded Border Policing Clogs the courts and Jails." *New York Times*, 1 July 2000, sec. A, p. A7.
- Zimring, Franklin E. and Gordon Hawkins. *The Search for Rational Drug Control*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.