



Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/20 1

Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)

(Effective 29 December 1991)

¹This directive supersedes DCID 1/20, effective 20 July 1987.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, minimum security policy is herewith established for assignment and travel of U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants, and employees of government contractors who have access to SCI.

1. Definitions

*a. Hazardous Travel--*Travel to, through, or within countries that pose a threat to SCI and/or SCI-indoctrinated personnel.

Hazardous travel includes:

1. Travel to, through, or within:

a. Countries listed in the annex to this directive.

b. Combat zones.

c. Other areas in which the threat to US SCI-indoctrinated personnel from foreign intelligence services, terrorist or narcotics groups, or indigenous groups active in promoting insurgency, war, or civil disturbance, or other acts of aggression, is such that the physical safety and security of personnel and SCI

cannot be reasonably ensured.

2. Travel or visits to diplomatic or trade missions of countries listed in the annex to this directive.
3. Travel on transportation carriers owned or controlled by a country listed in the annex to this directive.

b. Defensive Security Briefings--Formal advisories that alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, exploitation, provocation, capture, or entrapment. These briefings, based on actual experience when available, include information on courses of action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personnel consequences and advise of passive and active measures that personnel should take to avoid becoming targets or inadvertent victims as a consequence of hazardous travel.

c. Narcotics Group--A collection of individuals banded together with an interest in producing, selling, distributing, and transporting illicit narcotic substances across international borders.

d. Official Travel--Travel performed at the direction of the US Government.

e. Risk of Capture Briefings--Advisories that alert personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and that offer suggested courses of action they should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include instructions/advice for courses of action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal consequences. Also, the Risk-of-Capture Briefing will advise of passive and active measures that personnel should take to avoid becoming targets or inadvertent victims as a consequence of hazardous travel.

f. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs)--The heads of organizations within the Intelligence Community, as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their designated representatives.

g. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)--Classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes that is required to be handled exclusively within formal access control systems established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

h. Terrorism--Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually to influence an audience.

i. Unofficial Travel--Travel undertaken by an individual without official, fiscal, or other obligations on the part of the US Government.

2. Purpose

This policy is based on the need to protect SCI and SCI-indoctrinated personnel from the intelligence/counterintelligence threat as a consequence of hazardous travel. A listing of countries considered to present such threat(s) to SCI-indoctrinated personnel assigned to or traveling through these countries provides an essential baseline for SOICs responsible for rendering guidance to SCI-indoctrinated travelers and ensuring these travelers meet the requirements of this directive.

3. Policy

Persons granted access to SCI incur a special security obligation, and, with the exception of official travel, are discouraged from traveling to countries listed in the annex. SCI-indoctrinated travelers must be alerted to the risks associated with hazardous travel. Failure

to comply with the following provisions may result in the withdrawal of approval for continued access to SCI and may be considered in determining whether to grant future SCI access approvals.

a. Official Travel. SCI-indoctrinated personnel performing official hazardous travel shall:

1. Submit, in advance, an itinerary.
2. Receive a Defensive Security Briefing and/or Risk-of-Capture Briefing.
3. Report any unusual incidents.

b. Unofficial Travel. All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to, through, or within countries listed in the annex must:

1. Be advised that such travel without cognizant SOIC approval may result in the withdrawal of approval for continued access to SCI.
2. Submit, in advance, an itinerary.
3. Request and receive a Defensive Security Briefing and/or Risk-of-Capture Briefing.
4. Report any unusual incidents.

c. Previous Access. Persons whose access to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded at the time of debriefing of their continuing obligation to protect SCI and advised of the risks associated with hazardous travel. At the discretion of the SOIC, debriefed individuals may be afforded additional advisories.

4. Responsibilities

a. Periodically, the Director of Central Intelligence will ensure that a list of countries identified as posing a security risk to SCI is updated and disseminated to the SOICs. This list will serve as an essential baseline for SOICs to meet their

responsibilities under this directive.

1. The Community Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Office, Intelligence Community Staff (CCISCMO/ICS), or its successor organization, will coordinate required support including source material for the annex. CCISCMO will also maintain all records concerned with the preparation of the directive and its annex.

2. The DCI Security Forum, or its successor organization, will act as executive agent for the establishment and maintenance of a methodology to adjudicate placement/removal of countries on this list, at least annually ensuring its accuracy.

b. SOICs shall:

1. In reviewing proposed unofficial hazardous travel and deciding whether to retain or withdraw SCI access(es) for travelers, consider the agency's / department's unique mission objectives; levels of sources, methods, and techniques being protected; variations in workforce profiles; and current threat assessments.

2. Issue implementing directives concerning travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies to countries listed in the annex. Such directives will include the overall policy, definitions, and criteria set forth herein, and will:

- a. Inform personnel of DCID 1/20P requirements at the time of initial indoctrination.

- b. Remind personnel annually of the policy set

forth in paragraph 3 of this directive.

c. Ensure Defensive Security Briefings and/or Risk-of-Capture Briefings are presented to personnel of the departments or agencies who will officially or unofficially undertake hazardous travel, with consideration given to the relative protection enjoyed by US personnel having diplomatic status.

d. Establish positive programs for the collection of information reported under the provisions of paragraph 4c(3) and (4), below.

e. Establish regular channels of communication to both subordinate elements and the National Foreign Intelligence Board to ensure rapid dissemination of information on changing conditions in countries in which travel may become hazardous.

f. Extend implementation of protective measures in this directive to other countries or areas in which the cognizant SOIC perceives a threat to SCI.

g. Ensure that recommendations for changes to the annex are made to CCISCMO/ICS with justification for addition or deletion of countries.

h. Provide persons considering travel with the latest information pertaining to the situation in the country(ies) to which they are considering travel.

3. Establish and maintain a file on travel dates and

countries for SCI-indoctrinated personnel while in their employ. This information should be retained for two years after the individual is debriefed.

4. Rapidly disseminate changes to this directive, and/or its annex.

c. Travelers, official and unofficial, will:

1. Submit, in advance, to an official specified by the cognizant SOIC, an itinerary with details as best known.
2. Prior to travel, receive a Defensive Security and/or Risk-of-Capture Briefing from an official specified by their cognizant SOIC.
3. Immediately contact the nearest United States Diplomatic Facility if they are detained or subjected to harassment and provocation while traveling.
4. On return from travel, report to the cognizant security official any unusual incidents, including incidents of potential security concern, encountered during such travel.

5. Classification

This directive is UNCLASSIFIED.

Annex: Rescinded

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