THESIS

MAKING FRIENDS AND ENEMIES: NORTH KOREA’S STRATAGEM FOR ECONOMIC GAIN

by

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March 2003

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Chinese imperialism, Japanese occupation, and the sustained involvement of United States in the southern half of the peninsula, have created a strong sense of nationalism in North Korea that has shaped its ideological principle Juche or “self-reliance.” This policy has evolved to benefit the North Korean regime. First, it was a tool used to disengage from Chinese and Soviet influences. Then, it became a principle that the DPRK used to “make friends” and seek legitimacy. Later, the DPRK concentrated on its military capabilities, conventional and nuclear. The result was a regime that was willing and able to sell weapons and technology to the highest bidder. In more recent years, Juche has further evolved, becoming a tool for economic terrorism. The 1994 nuclear crisis, the 1998 Taepodong firing, the suspected nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri, and the 2002 disclosure of WMDs are crises exploited by the DPRK for economic gain. The current situation, together with Pyongyang's record of proliferating WMD technology, poses a clear and present danger to U.S. national security. This thesis explores previous U.S policy attempts and failures, examines challenges faced by the current administration, and explores options for short term and long-term resolution of instability on the Korean peninsula.
MAKING FRIENDS AND ENEMIES: NORTH KOREA’S STRATAGEM FOR ECONOMIC GAIN

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ABSTRACT

Chinese imperialism, Japanese occupation, and the sustained involvement of United States in the southern half of the peninsula, have created a strong sense of nationalism in North Korea that has shaped its ideological principle Juche or “self-reliance.” This policy has evolved to benefit the North Korean regime. First, it was a tool used to disengage from Chinese and Soviet influences. Then, it became a principle that the DPRK used to “make friends” and seek legitimacy. Later, the DPRK concentrated on its military capabilities, conventional and nuclear. The result was a regime that was willing and able to sell weapons and technology to the highest bidder. In more recent years, Juche has further evolved, becoming a tool for economic terrorism.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush described the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a member of the “Axis of Evil.” This thesis takes the position the leaders of the DPRK are cunning, determined, and somewhat desperate. In order to combat the DPRK’s manipulative stratagem for economic gain, the United States and other major players in the Asia-Pacific region need join together and take a united and inflexible approach in their policies towards North Korea. This thesis will analyze historical patterns, geographical and geopolitical environment, and the entangled relationships of the DPRK, the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to a lesser extent, Russia, to propose a new path to stability on the Korean peninsula – a Multilateral Asia Security Coalition.

B. METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses both historical and comparative methodologies. First, the thesis focuses on information about historical relationships regarding North Korea. This relationship information is used later in the thesis to outline how Japan, the United States, the PRC and the ROK can maximize their relationships in this time of upheaval on the Korean peninsula. Second, information regarding past crises on the peninsula is outlined, and parallels are drawn to the current crisis with North Korea. The thesis then uses both the relationship and past crisis information to outline what steps should be taken to alleviate the crisis and to prevent history from further repeating itself.

C. LIMITATIONS

This thesis makes two assumptions about Kim Jong Il. First, it takes him at his word, that his regime sees the United States as a legitimate threat to his national security. And second, it assumes that Kim Jong Il is willing to work to get his country out of the
desperate economic situation that it is in. Also, it is not within the scope of this thesis to provide detailed information about the domestic political systems in the Asian countries but instead, those issues with a direct impact on regional security and/or U.S. policy will be outlined.

D. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

Chapter I: This chapter will provide the purpose of this thesis, methodology, limitations of space and subject matter, chapter summaries, and an overview of how the subject matter is relevant to the United States.

Chapter II: In order to understand the economic, political and security issues that North Korean leaders face today, it is necessary to understand how their current environment evolved. This chapter will provide a look at some of the formative events in pre-occupied and occupied Korea, and provide a brief background on the Korean War, the various alliances and relationships had by the soon-to-be North Korea, and the Soviet-American tug-of war that caused the country to be divided.

Chapter III: In several ways, the Cold War affected the way the DPRK conducts its business today. Section one is entitled “Born of Necessity – the Juche Ideology” and outlines how, during the Cold War, the DPRK formed alliances primarily with the Soviet Union and China. Post Korean War tensions between these two countries ensued and it was during this period that the leaders of the DPRK developed the policy of Juché. Based on the principle of self-reliance, Juché is still touted by the North Korean government as official policy. This section will discuss how Juché has evolved over time. It will show that Juché was first used in an attempt at Cold War neutrality, then as a tool for legitimacy, as a tool for national defense, and currently how North Korean policymakers have modified the meaning of Juché and have used it as a tool for profit.

Chapter IV: This chapter is the main focus for the thesis. It will outline how the DPRK’s policies have evolved into what can be called economic terrorism. It will discuss how the DPRK has utilized nuclear proliferation in an attempt to extort money from the international community. It will discuss the Crisis of 1994 and the advent of the
Agreed Framework and KEDO, the Kumchang-Ri incident, the launch of the Taepo Dong missile over Japan and most recently, the disclosure that Pyongyang possesses weapons of mass destruction. The thesis will outline how each of these crises were carefully calculated and executed by Pyongyang – all for economic gain.

Chapter V: This chapter will outline the policies that the United States has attempted to pursue regarding the DPRK. It will discuss the threat that the Kim Jong Il regime poses, and how it continues to make demands in order to gain economic concessions from the United States.

Chapter VI: The primary recommendation of this thesis will focus on Japan, the ROK, the United States, China and Russia, forming a security coalition. This coalition should employ firm methods to stop North Korea’s “exploitation for profit” schemes. This chapter will look at the relationships the DPRK has with its neighbors and sets the stage for each’s position in the Asia Security Coalition (ASC). The chapter will discuss the role of the U.S. in providing increased security to the DPRK, via gradual military disengagement from the peninsula. It will then briefly outline the DPRK’s previous relationships with, and the economic role each of the members of the ASC will play. Finally this chapter will contain concluding statements.

E. RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES

Long before President Bush’s State of the Union address, U.S. policymakers considered the Korean peninsula a highly volatile area. Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has displayed antagonistic policies and actions that have threatened regional stability. This thesis proposes that the North Korean threat was born of their Juché ideology and economic desperation. A strong argument exists that the regime is the “bully” of the East, manipulating its neighbors in order to extort money from them. In addition, threats to United States’ national security from Southwest Asia, and the potential for North Korean support to these enemies require a reassessment of, and plans for, future U.S. policy and a continued military presence in South Korea.
II. NORTHERN KOREA TO THE DPRK: A BRIEF HISTORY

A. PRE-DIVISION AND COLONIAL LEGACY

1. Chinese Influence

Well before the birth of Christ, the Chinese had a presence in Korea. The Koreans had a historical bond with, and considered themselves “little brothers” to the Chinese. Among other things, social structure and government were “borrowed” and “adapted” from China. The influence that China had on early Korea is indicated by the fact that it has been called a “Chinese type of state,” with Chinese influences in all parts of Korean culture and civilization.\(^1\) Chinese civilization had a lasting impact on Korea’s religion and government. Confucianism became a major aspect of Korean society. Personal and professional relationships were formed based on Confucian hierarchy. In addition, the Chinese political and civil service examination systems were incorporated into Korean society. The Koreans, however, had fought for thousands of years to escape Chinese imperialism, so it was important for them to consider these adaptations distinctly “Korean.” It was this sense of Korean nationalism that was present during, and further promoted by the Japanese occupation.\(^2\)

2. The Occupation

Unlike the legacy of modernization that the Japanese left on Taiwan, it was a legacy of colonialism that was more prevalent in Korea. While economic growth had occurred during the occupation, to most Koreans any benefits had gone to the Japanese.\(^3\) In addition, the atrocities that the Japanese committed against the Korean people were unbearable. In the Japanese version of colonialism, there was no attempt to integrate the Korean people’s culture into Japanese colonial society, rather there was a deliberate attempt to erase Korean religion and culture, and literally to beat the Koreans into submission.

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\(^2\) Ibid, 907.

\(^3\) Ibid, 149.
The colonial period also “brought forth an entirely new set of Korean political leaders spawned by both the resistance to and the opportunities of Japanese colonialism.”4 In 1919 a group of intellectuals petitioned for independence from Japan and touched off mass protests that continued for months. These protesters, as well as another group of armed resisters in the 1930s, were fiercely put down by the Japanese, causing many younger Koreans to become militant opponents of colonial rule, and furthering the Korean sense of nationalism.5 Police repression of this kind made it impossible for radical groups to exist for any length of time. Some Korean militants went into exile in China and the Soviet Union and founded early communist and nationalist resistance groups. Other nationalist and communist leaders, including members of guerrilla insurgent groups, were jailed in the early 1930s, but were released back to Korea at the end of World War II. It was from this environment that Kim Il Sung entered the Korean picture. Kim became what the Japanese considered one of the most effective and dangerous of the guerillas, and resisting the Japanese became the legitimating doctrine of what would become North Korea.6

Today, North Koreans claim that Kim Il Sung alone led the anti-Japanese movement which ultimately defeated the Japanese, while South Koreans claim that North Korea’s former ruler simply stole the name of a revered patriot. Regardless, Kim Il Sung had become what the Japanese considered one of the most effective and dangerous of guerrillas. Resisting the Japanese became the “main legitimating doctrine of North Korea: North Koreans trace the origin of their army, leadership, and ideology back to this resistance.”7 For the next fifty years, the top North Korean leaders were made up of a group of these men who had fought the Japanese.

In the 1940s, while the Japanese were concentrating on their war effort, there was a labor shortage throughout the Korean colony. It was during this period that a minority


NOTE: While these Country Studies are used extensively throughout this thesis, the bibliography for the country study is thorough and diverse. It includes well-published authors on Korean issues such as Bruce Cumings, Robert Scalapino, and Nicholas Eberstadt.

5 Fairbank, 909.

6 “Country Study: North Korea.”

7 Ibid.
of Koreans became trained in government, local administration, police and judicial work, economic planning agencies, banks, and the like. This advancement became a divisive factor in the country, however, because this period was also the harshest of Japanese rule, a harshness that Koreans still remember with great bitterness. Korean culture continued to be repressed; Shinto, the Japanese state religion attempted to replace the Korean version of Confucian values; and the Korean elite were required to speak Japanese and take Japanese names. The majority suffered badly at the precise time that a minority was doing well which created a stigma on the latter that was never lost. In fact, the treatment of collaborators became a sensitive and sometimes violent issue during the years immediately following liberation.8

For the most part, when the colonial system ended in 1945, many of the Koreans who were displaced during the occupation were not the same when they returned to their villages. Many had ill feelings towards those who had remained at home, while they had suffered material and status losses, had often come into contact with new ideologies, and had seen a broader world beyond the villages. It was this group of disgruntled people that were left in the early post-World War II period, prostrate to the plans of the United States and the Soviet Union.9

B. THE KOREAN WAR (RUSSO-AMERICAN TUG-OF-WAR)

In 1943 at the Cairo Conference – China, the United States and Great Britain showed concern for Korea. In their communiqué, they described themselves as: “mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea” and stated that they were “determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”10

In 1945, the removal of Japanese forces from Korea opened up a power vacuum, which the Russians and Americans filled. The Russians wanted to take control of setting up a government for Korea. The United States, however, did not want to allow the

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Soviets so much influence and was more concerned about letting the Koreans establish their own government. The two countries decided to split up Korea temporarily until the government was setup. Officials in the United States chose the 38th parallel as the dividing line. The Soviets entered the country first and stopped at the agreed line, which indicated that they had no intentions of reneging on their side of the agreement.11

1. Politics on the Peninsula

After the occupation, Koreans wanted to solve their own problems and they resented insinuations by the Soviets and Americans that they were not ready for self-government. The general consensus, however, was that the Koreans were not prepared for independence and state building. Since the Japanese had ruled with such an iron fist, when Korea was divided up between the United States and Soviet Union, the northern Koreans were vulnerable to the heavy-handed Soviet system that was imposed on them. This new system, at least, put Koreans in charge of Koreans, which they saw as an improvement. From 1947 to 1948, North Korea was under relative Soviet dominance – relative because Koreans were still representative in their own government.12

In 1947, the UN General Assembly recognized Korea's claim to independence and prepared to establish a government and withdraw occupation forces. A year later, in 1948, the UN supervised the election of a national assembly, which was held in May 1948. The Soviet Union objected to the UN resolution and refused to admit the UN into the Soviet-controlled zone in the north. It became increasingly clear that two separate regimes would be established on the peninsula.13

In the south political leaders felt they had two choices; either to pursue independence at the price of indefinite division, or postpone independence until the U.S. and USSR could resolve their differences. Syngman Rhee had campaigned for the former. Two major opposition players, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, opposed separate elections in the south, and instead hoped to resolve the issue by holding talks with their

northern counterparts. In April 1948, the two Kims went to Pyongyang, and indeed boycotted the elections a month later to show their sincerity.

Since the opposition was not participating in the elections, Syngman Rhee was left with the decisive advantage. In May of 1948, the National Assembly adopted a constitution, which set up a presidential form of government. First Rhee became head of the new assembly and shortly thereafter, when the Republic of Korea (ROK) was proclaimed, Rhee became president. Despite the attempts at negotiation by the Kims, four days after the ROK was established, communist authorities shut off power to the south from one of the few power plants in the country. Within less than a month, the communists set up their own regime, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Premier Kim Il Sung, claimed authority over the entire country according to the results of elections conducted in the north and of underground elections that were allegedly held in the south.

With the northern regime in place, the Soviets withdrew their occupation troops. With the southern government established, the United States no longer felt compelled to continue their occupation and by June 1949, had withdrawn their forces except for a few military advisers; Korea had been placed outside the United States’ defense perimeter.

2. The War

When the country was split, North Korea had a historical relationship with China and a more contemporary relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the two communist powers had an “alliance” with each other, it was obvious that there was distrust between them. It was in this environment that the North Koreans found themselves at the onset of the Korean War. Before the DPRK was established, northern Koreans had been careful to remain friendly with both China and Russia, while not alienating either. Despite their differences, however, in 1950, both Mao and Stalin gave Kim Il-Sung the go-ahead to seek to reunify Korea by force. It seemed that North Korea

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Cumings, 235.
17 “Country study: South Korea.”
18 Ibid.
was prepared to do so as well. A top-secret text from 1947, later captured by Americans during the war, showed that one-fifth of the country’s total budget went to defense.\footnote{Cumings, 421.}

Although Soviet troops had been removed from the North, the Soviet Union played a major part in the war. It was the Soviets who were responsible for establishing and arming the Kim regime right up to late Spring 1950. It is possible that Stalin may have even approved Kim’s war plans with a view to increasing the Soviet influence over China.\footnote{Yahuda, 26.} Another motivating factor besides Soviet support was a deep-seated resentment of the enemy. The officer corps of the South Korean army during the Rhee period was dominated by Koreans with experience in the Japanese army. At least in part, the Korean War became a matter of Japanese-trained military officers fighting “Japanese-spawned resistance leaders.”\footnote{“Country study: North Korea.”}

Despite these motivating factors, within a month of the start of the invasion, North Korean forces seized all but a small corner of southeastern Korea near Pusan. Heavy Air Force bombing coupled with resistance by combined U.S. and South Korean forces in this area prevented Kim Il Sung from reunifying the peninsula. In addition, General MacArthur landed at Inchon, and severed the lines of communication and supply between the North Korean army and the north. The army collapsed, and combined forces forced Kim Il Sung’s seriously damaged army northward.

There is no indication that the Civil War-torn Chinese were directly involved in preparations for the Korean War, or that they intended to become involved in it. When UN forces chased Kim’s army across the 38th parallel and headed for the Chinese border, however, that changed. “What was seen by the UN as a move towards uniting Korea, was perceived by Mao as a threat to China’s security and the survival of his newly established revolutionary regime.”\footnote{Yahuda, 27.}

During the Chinese Civil War, Kim Il Sung sent tens of thousands of Korean soldiers to fight for Mao in Manchuria. At the end of 1948, at the same time the Soviets

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Cumings, 421.}
\item \footnote{Yahuda, 26.}
\item \footnote{“Country study: North Korea.”}
\item \footnote{Yahuda, 27.}
\end{itemize}
were withdrawing their troops, the Koreans were coming home. They brought with them new military training and field experience and also bonds with the Chinese. It was these bonds, which would eventually see-saw North Korea towards China during the Sino-Soviet split. When Kim’s regime was “nearly extinguished” in 1950, the Soviet Union did little to help, instead, “China picked up the pieces.” The North Koreans, with the help of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, pushed United States and South Korean forces out of North Korea within a month. The strength of the powerful Chinese army and the North Koreans turned out to be quite a match for the United States/South Korean combined force. Physically, by the time the armistice was signed in 1953, the North had endured three years of bombing attacks that left few modern buildings standing – again the Soviets offered little in the way of aid. After a prolonged struggle, the war ended in a stalemate and cease-fire, and the United States was forced to realize the reality of two Koreas.

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23 Cumings, 236.
24 “Country study: North Korea.”
III. THE DPRK AND THE EVOLUTION OF JUCHE

A. BORN OF NECESSITY - THE JUCHE IDEOLOGY

When the Korean War was over, it seemed to the rest of the world that the Sino-Soviet alliance was strengthened. In reality, tensions began to build between the two countries because Mao Tse-Tung felt that Joseph Stalin had reneged on promises to support him more directly in Korea. As the Cold War progressed and Sino-Soviet interests split, so did their relations. These relations deteriorated quickly when the Chinese became discontent with Nikita Khrushchev and his policies. Mao believed the new Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence with the West was a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. Levels of Soviet aid decreased markedly, and there was only feeble Soviet support for China in its disputes with Taiwan and India. Against Khrushchev’s wishes, “China embarked on a nuclear arms program, declaring in 1960 that nuclear war could defeat imperialism.” After 1960, the relationship between the “moderate” Soviet Union and “militant” China degenerated into “a schism in the world communist movement…” and their relations with Moscow or Beijing divided communist parties around the world.

After the signing of the truce that ended the Korean War, the North Koreans were disappointed in the Soviet Union for not providing greater assistance to the war effort. To the Soviets, Korea was strategically important as a buffer to Japanese rearmament. So, in a gesture of good will, the Soviets gave Kim Il Sung enough aid to give the economy a boost. This was not enough to garner North Korean support. The North Koreans were, however, impressed with the Chinese military support they had received. This support, and the bonds the Northern Koreans had made with the Chinese communist

26 “Country study: North Korea.”
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
30 “Country study: North Korea.”
31 Scalapino, 19.
army, coupled with the historical bonds that the two countries shared, made it relatively easy for the North Koreans to side with the Chinese during the split. Because of North Korean support for the Chinese, the Soviet Union stopped economic aid to North Korea in the early 1960s. Similar to the Soviet government’s other diplomatic and military relations, this cessation of aid see-sawed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as leaders vied for support against the Chinese.

It was not until the 1980s that North Korea began a tilt in diplomacy back toward the Soviet Union. When they did, it was in response to the Soviets providing quite a bit of financial aid. When Mikhail Gorbachev took over the administration, however, Soviet/DPRK relations were not as warm. He cut back Soviet aid to the DPRK, and criticized the North Koreans for unwise spending of the aid they received.

In addition, China-DPRK relations took a drastic turn in the 1980s. At first, China stood at a distance and encouraged Kim Il Sung to engage in talks with Seoul and Washington. Then Chinese leaders reached out to Seoul, and by the end of the decade, were engaging in more trade with South Korea than with the North. With both of their Cold War allies turning elsewhere, the DPRK looked elsewhere for support.

In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, more than 90 percent of DPRK trade was conducted bilaterally, mostly with the Soviets and with China. The economic dependence on, and subsequent loss of economic support from, the Soviets facilitated Kim’s creation of the Juché (literally “self-reliance”) policy. After Stalin’s death in 1953, and following the Soviet secession of aid, Kim Il Sung needed a way to further disengage from Soviet influence – thus the policy of Juché was born.

B. A TOOL FOR DISENGAGEMENT

Kim Il Sung described Juché as "the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one’s own powers, believing in one’s own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.” Born of necessity, this principle was eagerly

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32 Cumings, 424.
33 Ibid, 462.
34 “Country study: North Korea.”
adopted by a people who had endured forced rule from outsiders for so long. Not only did this principle help North Koreans formulate plans to cope with their economic difficulties, it also helped Pyongyang maintain an “equidistant diplomacy toward Beijing and Moscow, while the two allies were engaged in disputes.”35 The Juché philosophy evolved almost into a form of religious doctrine, so that “Juché has come to permeate all aspects of North Korea life, and it seems to have taken hold of the thought processes and belief systems of the people.”36 Even a conservative estimate suggests that it is possible that over one-quarter of the general population have developed unwavering faith in Juché. 37

Juché, however, did not dictate specific policy. In the years since its inception, the Juché ideology has evolved. At first, it was used as a reactionary tool to save face and to disengage when a relationship has been terminated. Besides helping deal with the loss of aid from the Soviets, for example, Juché was used as an instrument to breed nationalism that served as a basis for regime legitimacy, established North Korea’s superiority over South Korea, and further promoted anti-foreign ideas.38

Later, Juché evolved into more of a “world view” with human-centered philosophical notions at its foundation, 39 not unlike national solipsism. This allowed North Korea to reach out to other countries in the world and to foster economic relationships with them.

Most recently, the ideology has been used to justify policies of self-sufficiency and national self-defense.40 Most times however, Juché is used to support any policy that results in economic gain, through policies that range from isolation to globalization. In

35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid, 38.
40 This premise will be further explored in subsequent sections.
contrast to Marx, for example, Kim Il-Sung said that man's “subjective will to achieve” is the determining factor in deciding history, including economic development.  

C. A TOOL FOR LEGITIMACY (MAKING FRIENDS)

After the Korean War, South Korea continued to hope for a reunified Korea under Seoul-based leadership. Because of postwar financial difficulties and the cessation of Soviet aid, President Park Chung Hee reached out to Kim Il Sung, offering aid in return for the abolition of the Juché policy. To Kim, this was not an option, the ideology was the cornerstone of his legitimacy in the country. Thus he refused to form an official relationship with the ROK. Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that South Korea was playing the “legitimize my government, undermine yours” game with the DPRK. When the DPRK first supported, and later formally joined the non-aligned movement (NAM), its official purpose was to reach out to other countries to build relationships, and to gain international recognition. In addition, Kim was harvesting a new crop of financial resources. As these relationships were forming, North Korea’s stance became more revolutionary in nature. Kim Il Sung professed to be the leader of the non-aligned movement, making it his mission in life to “lead the world in the struggle against imperialism.”

Within North Korea, Kim Il Sung made an important adjustment in the ideology by incorporating another principle into it – that of “national solipsism.” This principle is based on the assumption that the world tends toward Korea, with all eyes on Kim Il Sung. In addition, it projects the idea that Korea is the center of the world and that it has a responsibility to “export” Juché, especially to Third World countries that the North Koreans think are ready for it. Inherent in the adoption of these interlocked principles is the fact that North Korea needed to establish relationships with other countries with the ultimate “official” goal: the export of Juché.

41 Park, 12-14.
43 “Country study: North Korea.”
44 Ibid.
In Latin America, although they invited political and cultural exchanges with many countries, the DPRK focused on building political and social relations with communist Cuba; a symbol of the communist triumph over the United States.\textsuperscript{45} In Africa, the DPRK focused its relations on the states of West Africa. After a political visit in 1961, North Korea entered trade, cultural and other relations with Mali; consular relations with the United Arab Republic, Morocco and Ghana; and formed diplomatic relations with Guinea, Mali and Algeria. Romanian-North Korean relations began to develop during the Cold War. These two countries had come from a similar background of dependence on the Soviet Union, forming a bond through mutual admiration. Right in line with the exportation of Juché, in 1964 a statement was issued by the Romanian “Central Committee” declaring the right of Romania and all other nations to “develop national policies in the light of their own interests and domestic requirements.”\textsuperscript{46}

Another relationship worth mentioning was that between North Korea and Burma. Quite possibly as a result of the DPRK’s export of independence-based ideology, the Burmese army led the Revolutionary Council in overthrowing the government and setting up a socialist system.\textsuperscript{47} In the 1960s, the Burmese Revolutionary Council published their economic policies in a statement known as “The Burmese Way to Socialism” – quite reminiscent of Marxism-Leninism and Korean Juché.\textsuperscript{48} High-level visits had been exchanged and Burma supported North Korea’s position in the UN. In 1983, that relationship ended when North Korean military officials detonated a bomb at a wreath-laying ceremony in a Rangoon national cemetery in an attempt to assassinate the South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan. The blast killed seventeen South Koreans, including four cabinet members, and four Burmese at the revered site.

\textsuperscript{45} Kihl, 48.
\textsuperscript{46} “Country study: North Korea.”
\textsuperscript{47} David Joel Steinberg, Editor, \textit{In Search of Southeast Asia: a Modern History} (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 399.
\textsuperscript{48} Steinberg, 400.
D.  A TOOL FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE (MAKING ENEMIES)

Juché declares that man creates his own destiny and must be self-sufficient. If this principle is applied to explaining the Japanese occupation of the peninsula, Korea had only itself to blame for not being able to ward off the invaders. In addition, the loss of the Korean War then, would also be the fault of the leaders of North Korea. While these statements oversimplify the principle, and would not likely be accepted by leaders of either of the Koreas, they illustrate the environment Kim Il Sung came from when he contemplated the national security of the DPRK. Kim Il Sung could no longer rely on the Soviets and the Chinese for full military support and he definitely perceived a physical threat to the security of his country. With the Japanese subdued, the Chinese historical allies and the Soviets embroiled in a Cold War, the major threat was from the United States on the southern border. Kim Il Sung thus created a Juché-based defense plan – a plan that has not only allowed North Korea to be defensive and free from invasion, but to be offensive as well – viewed as a threat to other nations.

1.  Conventional Weapons

While much emphasis has been placed on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the United States, its assets and other countries in Northeast Asia have much to fear from North Korea’s conventional forces. North Korea is “renowned, and in some circles infamous, as a military power, devoting about 30 percent of its budget to national defense.” Based on the ratio of its population and its economy to its military spending, North Korea is the most militarized nation on earth.

While its economy has continued to deflate, the DPRK has continued to upgrade its military capabilities. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the North devoted an estimated 15 to 20 percent of its economy to its military. In a steady buildup between 1971 and 1972, the result was a force of 680,000 ground troops (about one out of every twenty citizens), and more than double the number of South Korea’s tanks and artillery.


\[50\] Ibid, 147.

pieces. It was the threat posed by this conventional force, coupled with the discovery of North Korean-built tunnels under the DMZ, that caused President Carter and his administration to drop its program of U.S. troop withdrawal. Another such buildup was conducted in 1995-1996, quite possibly the result of witnessing U.S. military power during the Gulf War.

In 1994, the United States intelligence sources focused seriously on the DPRK due to the nuclear proliferation crisis that resulted in the Agreed Framework. Although information on North Korea’s military capabilities is not in great supply, a full investigation was conducted on the military capability of Pyongyang in 1994. According to this report, and other more current sources, a picture may be drawn of the current capabilities of the DPRK’s military.

The North Korean Armed Forces are more than one million strong and consist of the People's Armed Forces, the regular armed forces; the People's Security Guards, a paramilitary force; and civilian forces including the Workers and Farmers Red Guards and the Young Red Guards. This force is broken down into the Army, Navy and Air Forces.

a. ARMY (KNA)

The DPRK’s KNA is one million strong, with millions more in militias. There are thought to be “enormous military bases and arsenals built deep underground, subway stations with gigantic blast doors recessed into the walls, a dictator who sleeps in a different place every night for security reasons, and round the clock vigils for trouble along the DMZ.”

The KNA is armed 2,500 multiple rocket launchers, and more than 10,000 surface to air missiles. There are more than 6,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and

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52 Oberdorfer, 102.
53 Olsen, 149.
54 The Crisis and subsequent agreement are discussed fully in chapter 4.
56 Cumings, 396.
over 11,000 pieces of artillery. In addition, the DPRK has several types of missiles and vehicle delivery systems. Among these, North Korea has deployed more than three hundred No Dong – “x” medium-range missiles able to hit the main Japanese Islands and Okinawa, and close to one thousand short-range SCUD B and C missiles which are able to hit South Korea and which are equipped to carry chemical warheads. The DPRK’s No Dong 1 and 2 missiles have a range of 1,300 to 2,000 km. In addition, North Korea is believed to have Taepo Dong – “x” and “2” ICBMs, which, at a maximum range of 6,200 miles, could reach as far East as Chicago, Illinois.

The DPRK also has a highly trained Special Operations Force (SOF) made up of 22 brigades and 7 independent battalions that have five basic missions: conducting reconnaissance, performing combat operations in concert with conventional operations, establishing a second front in the enemy's rear area, countering the Combined Forces Command special operations in North Korean rear areas, and maintaining internal security. North Korea classifies its special operations units as reconnaissance, light infantry, or sniper.

b. NAVY (NKN)

In the past, the North Korean Navy has primarily been a coastal defense force. In 1992, the brown-water navy was also capable of “conducting inshore defensive operations, submarine operations against merchant shipping and unsophisticated naval combatants, offensive and defensive mining operations, and conventional raids.”

Current estimates put North Korea's fleet at approximately 430 combat vessels (Patrol craft, guided missile boats, torpedo boats, fire support craft), 40


61 Ibid.


63 Ibid.

64 “North Korea Military Guide - Korean People’s Army.”
submarines (15 midgets), and 340 support craft (landing craft, hovercraft).65 As with the ground forces, 60% of the vessels are stationed near the demarcation line.66

The NKN's most capable weapons system is the guided-missile patrol boat – approximately 43 in the fleet – equipped with the SS-N-2A STYX antiship missile.67 Though they are small and limited to coastal operations or calm seas, they have a capability to quickly respond to Combined Forces Command (CFC) shipping approaching the coast.68 The Navy has 19 fast-attack missile craft. In addition it has 12 OSA-1 guided-missile patrol boats, and 10 DPRK versions called the SOJU, which are all equipped with four CSS-N-1 missile launchers. Their missiles have a maximum range of 25 nautical miles and carry radar or infrared homing seekers.69

While the navy seldom operates outside the North Korean military exclusion zone (extending about fifty kilometers off North Korea's coast), the navy has conducted numerous submarine and other seaborne infiltration attempts into South Korea. In addition, clashes with the South Korean navy, and harassment of South Korean fishing boats, such as a week-long confrontation in June 1999, occur to this day.70


66 Ibid.

67 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, “North Korea Country Handbook.”

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

c. AIR FORCE (KNAF)

The DPRK’s Air Force consists of six divisions (103,000); 3 for combat (fighter/bomber regiments), 2 for transport and helicopter, and one devoted exclusively for training; and 92,000 personnel. Although DPRK air-bases are located throughout the country, the majority are in the southern provinces. In the event of a ground attack on its aircraft, Pyongyang has the capability to protect combat aircraft in hardened shelters.

Most of the KNA’s 1670 aircraft are obsolete, with only sixty modern aircraft (MiG-23, 29). Most are old Soviet aircraft (MiG-19, MiG-21, IL-28, SU-7, SU-25) and about 320 can be considered “ancient” (MiG-15, MiG-17). According to estimates 820 are support aircraft and helicopters. Of most concern, however, is the “300 AN-2.” Flying at 100 mph at low altitudes, radar detection is very difficult, and its “transport of Special Forces troopers deep behind the lines is a very definite threat.”

2. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Although North Korea signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, it has been identified as a “leading violator of the international treaty that bans germ warfare.” In 1994, the DPRK had an estimated 250 tons of biological and chemical weapons.

As of 2002, according to South Korea’s Defense Ministry, North Korea has a stockpile of 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons including nerve, blister and choking agents. In addition to this reserve, officials believe the DPRK is capable of producing about 4,500 tons of chemical weapons every year. By comparison, Russia had 40,000 tons of chemical weapons when the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty went into effect, and the United States had 30,000 tons before it began to dismantle its reserves.

Pyongyang’s army also has biological weapons. Information was released in the early 1990s that indicated applied military biotechnology work was going on at numerous

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71 “North Korea Military Guide - The KPA Troops and Equipment.”
72 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, “North Korea Country Handbook.”
73 “North Korea Military Guide – The KPA Troops and Equipment.”
74 Ibid.
75 Congressional Record “McCain (and others) amendment No. 1331.”
North Korean medical institutes and universities dealing with pathogens such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. It is now believed that there are at least 13 different lethal germs and viruses in their bio-weapons arsenal.

The DPRK is capable of adding approximately 1 ton of biological weapons to their stockpile annually. According to John Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, the U.S. government believes that “North Korea has one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on earth.” Just as with their chemical agents, North Korea has a munitions production infrastructure which enables the weaponization of agents. It is possible that the DPRK already has biological weapons available for military use.

The simple production of a biochemical agent does not always translate into an effective chemical or biological weapon however; its effectiveness also depends on quality of production, means of dispersal and intended target. The fact that North Korea has produced and deployed long-range ballistic missiles and that these missiles are capable of reaching the United States, coupled with the fact that the missiles can be fitted with biochemical warheads, make these weapons a serious threat. As a matter of fact, the DPRK has at least 17 different types of vehicles that can be used to dispense nerve gases. These vehicles include ballistic missiles, aircraft, artillery projectiles and other unconventional weapons.

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80 Lee.

81 Ibid.

82 “State Official Details Threat of Chemical, Biological Warfare.”
3. Nuclear Weapons

The North Korean nuclear program began during the Cold War as a “response to a security challenge – dealing with United States’ and, potentially, South Korean nuclear threats without being able to count on the consistent support of either China or the Soviet Union.” After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung asked China for assistance in developing a nuclear weapons program. After making several requests – all of which were denied, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, like its national ideology, became “self-reliant.” Among the members of its group of nuclear weapons designers were an engineer, a chemist, and physicist from the pre-Korean-War South; and two North Koreans who were trained in nuclear physics at Moscow University.

In 1982, U.S. intelligence sources identified the construction of what would become a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Concerned, U.S. leaders urged Moscow to intervene, and to convince North Korean officials to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1985, Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko agreed to provide four light water reactors if North Korea joined the NPT. In 1986 however, evidence of detonations on the riverbanks near Yongbyon, led to the conclusion that the reactor was being used for development of nuclear weapons. In 1987 the construction of what seemed to be a plutonium reprocessing plant was discovered and reinforced these suspicions.

The North Koreans’ drive for nuclear weapons continued as construction began on a second and far more powerful reactor in 1988. Despite the signed NPT agreement, North Korea refused to let International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into the country as long as the U.S. had nuclear weapons in place in South Korea – an argument that the U.S. found difficult to deal with until the end of the Cold War.

83 Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (St Martin’s Press, NY), 182.
85 Oberdorfer, 253.
86 Reese, 132.
87 Oberdorfer, 255.
As of 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency estimates that North Korea has two nuclear weapons and, if it reprocesses its stockpile of spent nuclear fuel into weapons-grade plutonium, could build five or six more in a six-month period. This thesis will explore North Korean nuclear proliferation issues more thoroughly in Chapter 4.

E. A TOOL FOR PROFIT

Although the North Korean quest for legitimacy was a driving force, it was not an end in itself. Not by accident, the Juche-based relationships that the DPRK formed with the non-aligned states became very beneficial financially. In the mid-1970s and 1980s, the DPRK became a significant actor in international arms trafficking. According to estimates by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) between 1981 and 1989, mostly in trade for oil with Iran for the Iran-Iraq war, North Korea exported almost $4 billion in weaponry. This weaponry accounted for as much as 40 percent of all Iranian arms imports during the war with Iraq. North Korea also sold Chinese missiles and SCUD rockets to the Middle East.

In the early 1970s, in further attempts to “gain legitimacy” in the international community, the DPRK began trading with non-communist countries such as Japan, Sweden and numerous others in Western Europe. In fact, Pyongyang incurred billions of dollars worth of debt resulting from massive purchases of capital goods. It appeared that North Korean leaders were making a serious effort to become global trading partners.

When the ideas of the “Nixon Doctrine” were announced in mid-1969, that indicated that “Asians should provide the manpower for their own wars – the United States appeared to be moving toward disengagement.” As tensions about North Korea eased, and in keeping with the “Doctrine,” the administration withdrew a division of United States soldiers from South Korea. In response, North Korea virtually halted their

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90 Cumings, 462.

91 “Country Study: North Korea.”

92 Oberdorfer, 13.
attempts at infiltration and significantly reduced the defense budget in 1971. Soon after, in 1972, the Koreas held high-level talks. These talks between the director of the ROK’s Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) commonly referred to as the “Korean CIA,” and Kim Il Sung's younger brother, Kim Young Ju, resulted in President Park Chung Hee’s July fourth announcement that both sides would seek peaceful reunification. In keeping with Juche principles, they agreed that this transition would take place peacefully, independent of outside forces, and with the intention of creating a “national unity.”

In the late 1970s, when Carter began talking of withdrawing U.S. forces from the peninsula Kim Il Sung, excited about the prospect of a unified Korea (but more so for financial reasons), turned to the United States. Kim promised that he was “knocking on the American door, wanted diplomatic relations and trade, and would not interfere with American business interests in the South once Korea was reunified.” Kim even went so far as to refer to Carter as “a man of justice.” At the same time, North Korea’s rapid and extensive upgrade of its army was discovered and talks fell apart. In the meantime, the prices of North Korea's natural resources, specifically minerals, declined sharply because of a worldwide recession that lowered demand. Combined with a sharp decline in foreign exchange reserves, North Korea was left further in a debt crisis. After first suspending, and then attempting to reschedule payments, North Korea defaulted on its foreign debt payment.

Because of this default, and because of the recently de-railed relationship with the United States, the North Koreans found it increasingly difficult to obtain credit from the West and were forced again to look to the NAM for help. Under these circumstances Kim appealed to the NAM when he said, “The present situation urgently demands that the non-aligned countries wage the struggle to establish a new international economic order by achieving economic independence and realizing south-south cooperation, along

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94 Ibid.

95 Cumings, 460.

96 Ibid.

97 “Country Study: North Korea.”
with the struggle to check and frustrate the aggressive and belligerent policy of the imperialists and preserve peace and security in the world.”

In the late 1980s Pyongyang turned again to the Soviet Union. Kim Il Sung visited Moscow twice and, in return, the Soviets upgraded the North Korean Air Force with Mig 23s. In keeping with the Sino-Soviet tug-of-war China, having developed relations with the United States, intervened in order to “reduce tensions in Korea.” As a result of careful posturing with the Soviets and China, by the end of the Cold War, the DPRK was conducting almost 83 percent of its total trade with its largest creditors: the Soviet Union, China, and with a new trading partner – Japan. It was under these economic circumstances that the North Koreans entered the post-Cold War environment.

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98 Cumings, 460.
99 Ibid.
100 “Country Study: North Korea.”
IV. ECONOMIC TERRORISM: THE DPRK’S POST-COLD WAR STRATAGEM FOR ECONOMIC GAIN

Armed with a sufficient arsenal to both export and use to their own ends, North Korea could soon be blackmailing South Korea, Japan and even the United States into providing sufficient aid and diplomatic concessions in order to sustain their crumbling regime and earning hard currency from its nuclear sales abroad.

- Senator John McCain - 1994[^101]

At the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union and the PRC, the DPRK’s greatest benefactors, began to look toward the West for diplomatic and economic inclusion. Not only did they turn away from the DPRK but also, adding insult to injury, each developed somewhat normal relations with South Korea. The DPRK’s failing economy compounded by a series of natural disasters left North Korea desperate for economic and humanitarian aid, but with a regime that was steadfast in its “self-reliant” ideology.

The regime clearly fears that reforming the economy will bring an influx of new ideas and cultural influences that will erode its authority.[^102] Thus the DPRK’s leaders had to develop a way to receive the aid they need, while minimizing external influences. The result is a system, devised by Kim Il Sung and perpetuated by his son, that can be called “economic terrorism”: a series of threats followed by demands for monetary compensation.

A. SHIFT TOWARD THE WEST

The Soviet Union had economic problems of its own, so it began reaching out to South Korea among others for trade even before the end of the Cold War. When he became aware that the Soviets’ were developing relations with the ROK, Kim Il Jong demanded an explanation. The new Soviet policy became very clear in 1988 when the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee responded frankly:


The USSR, to solve its economic problems, is interested in new partners. South Korea possesses technology and products that can be of use, especially in the Far Eastern regions of our state. As is well known, South Korea maintains commercial links with almost all countries in the world, including such socialist states as the People’s Republic of China. The opening up of direct economic contacts between the Soviet Union and South Korea will also benefit peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.  

While the Soviets went on to say that they had no intention of rushing into these economic ties, nor developing political ones with South Korea, Pyongyang’s trust was betrayed.

As previously discussed, the relationship between China and North Korea was historically based and very close. Even after a shift in Beijing’s foreign policy in 1971-1972, Chinese leaders maintained close ties with the DPRK. The Chinese viewed North Korea as an “important ideological client and ally on China’s border.” Kim Il Sung gave a vivid description of DPRK-China relations when he called it, “an invincible force that no one can ever break…It will last as long as the mountains and rivers to (sic) the two countries exist.”

However, by 1990 Beijing was conducting seven times more trade with South Korea than it was with the North. This amount of trade called for increased relations on the political front. China saw increased diplomatic relations with the ROK as an internal political victory; believing that the ROK would be forced to end its official support of Taiwan. Also, since the Sino-Soviet dispute ended with the Cold War, China was no longer concerned about pushing North Korea away toward the Soviets.

In 1991, much like the Soviet policy announcement, China dealt the DPRK a severe blow when, despite North Korea’s opposition, it refused to veto South Korea’s entry into the United Nations. Even worse, China had been the DPRK’s only hope of

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103 Quoted in Oberdorfer, 203.
104 Oberdorfer, 230-231.
105 Ibid, 321.
106 Ibid.
preventing the ROK’s admission since Gorbachev had already pledged his support to Seoul. The loss of Pyongyang’s closest allies simply reinforced to Kim Jong Il the necessity of Juché. The DPRK was forced to look internally for ways to provide physical protection, to generate revenue, and to make itself known to the international community.

B. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The North Korean quest for aid in building a nuclear program began in response to nuclear threats from the United States and South Korea. During the Korean War, whether or not it would have, the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons on North Korea. After the war, the United States positioned tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. In spite of the fact that the United States pledged to keep South Korea under the nuclear umbrella, President Park of South Korea wanted to neutralize the conventional threat from the North and build its own nuclear program. In response to the Nixon Doctrine’s requirement that regional states take increased responsibility for their security, South Korea (until the United States quashed the idea) began discussions with the French to obtain a reprocessing facility.108

After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung asked China and the Soviet Union for assistance in developing a nuclear weapons program of its own. In 1964, after China had successfully tested its atomic bomb, Kim Il Sung sent a delegation to ask China to help its little brother for assistance in developing a nuclear program. The Chinese denied this request on the basis that the program would be too costly and was not necessary since North Korea was such a small country.109 In 1974, after the DPRK’s weapons program had begun, North Korea made a second request for aid from China. This request was also refused.110

In the meantime, the DPRK made several requests for aid from the Soviet Union. In 1965, the Soviets refused to assist Pyongyang in providing nuclear weapons technology, but agreed to assist the North in developing a peaceful nuclear energy

108 Reese, 42.
109 Oberdorfer, 252.
110 Ibid, 253.
program for electric power generation – a research reactor at Yongbyon.\textsuperscript{111} The Soviets provided this reactor under the condition that it be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).\textsuperscript{112} In addition, the Soviets agreed to train North Koreans in nuclear engineering at Soviet universities.

Precisely when the North Koreans began to build the Soviet-backed facility is not known. As early as 1982, however, U.S. intelligence sources identified the construction of the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon that would be capable of producing enough plutonium for up to six weapons per year.\textsuperscript{113} In 1985, at the behest of Washington, Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko agreed to provide four light water reactors if North Korea joined the NPT, which they did in December, 1985.\textsuperscript{114}

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States (sic) parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA. Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States (sic) parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.\textsuperscript{115}

By 1987, North Korean officials had still not completed documentation of the country’s facilities. The situation was compounded by a mistake in documentation by the IAEA. The IAEA had provided incorrect documents “relating to inspections of specific sites rather than general facilities.”\textsuperscript{116}

Despite his endorsement of the agreement, apparently Kim Il Sung had no intention of terminating his indigenous nuclear program. Between 1983 and 1987, near the site of the reactor, evidence of nuclear detonations were discovered on the riverbanks, which led to the conclusion that the reactor there was being used for development of

\textsuperscript{111} Harrison, 198.
\textsuperscript{112} Reese, 42.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 44.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, 42.
\textsuperscript{115} “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” UN Department of Disarmament affairs [online] <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/>
\textsuperscript{116} Reese, 43.
nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{117} In 1987 the construction of what seemed to be a plutonium reprocessing plant was discovered and reinforced these suspicions.\textsuperscript{118}

The North Korean drive for nuclear weapons continued as construction began on a second and far more powerful 50 megawatt reactor in 1987, which was rumored to be able to produce enough plutonium for up to 30 weapons per year.\textsuperscript{119} Adding to the severity of the situation 1989, the containment vessel of the Yongbyon reactor was shut down long enough, by CIA estimates, for four thousand fuel rods to be replaced. The spent fuel rods would yield enough plutonium for one, or maybe two nuclear bombs.\textsuperscript{120}

Despite the signed NPT agreement, North Korean officials refused to let the IAEA inspectors into the country. Part of their rationale was an extension granted to the DPRK because of paperwork issues – the fault of the IAEA. There is little evidence however that the DPRK planned to let inspectors into the country. Relations between the DPRK and the Soviet Union were waning. The Soviets’ had growing economic difficulties, so it seemed that production of the light water reactors (the reason the DPRK signed the treaty in the first place) would never come to fruition.\textsuperscript{121}

Another reason the Kim regime refused to allow inspectors into the country, or to stop its attempts at nuclear proliferation was because the U.S. had nuclear weapons in place in South Korea – an argument that the U.S. found difficult to counter until the end of the Cold War. Partially in response to the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation, in 1991 President George H. W. Bush announced the removal of all ground and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula.\textsuperscript{122} Although the United States still promised to provide an umbrella of nuclear protection for South Korea,\textsuperscript{123} Bush also decided “to

\textsuperscript{117} Oberdorfer, 250.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Reese, 44.
\textsuperscript{120} Oberdorfer, 306.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, 255.
\textsuperscript{122} Harrison, 200.
\textsuperscript{123} Reese, 44.
permit North Koreans to inspect the U.S. base at Kunsan where the nuclear weapons had been stored, to meet another of North Korea’s demands.”124

While the United States’ policy of nuclear weapons retraction was not limited to the Korean peninsula, Kim Il Sung viewed this move as a United States concession to its demands. In this environment, the DPRK agreed to the “December Accords” with South Korea which resulted in the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North,” also known as the “Basic Agreement.”

Although the Basic Agreement did not address nuclear issues, several days later, the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” was negotiated and entered into force in February 1992. Under this nuclear accord, Seoul and Pyongyang “pledged not to ‘test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons’ and not to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” In addition, they agreed to reciprocal inspections to be arranged and implemented by a Joint Nuclear Control Commission.” 125 The motivation behind the agreement became obvious in March 1992, when the IAEA director visited North Korea for the first time. Kim Il Sung promised to abandon his nuclear reprocessing efforts...in return for light water reactors.126

It was not long after that the United States realized that Pyongyang was less than forthcoming with information related to its nuclear activities. In May the DPRK announced to the IAEA that it had produced 90 grams of plutonium experimentally.127 After initial inspections the IAEA found that a random sample of nuclear waste did not match any of the disclosed separated plutonium, and concluded that more plutonium was

124 Oberdorfer, 261.
127 Reese, 47.
produced. From this and other information, U.S. intelligence sources believed North Korea had enough plutonium for possibly two weapons.

In December 1992, IAEA director Hans Blix requested inspections of two undeclared nuclear-related sites that intelligence reports had identified as nuclear waste sites. North Korean officials refused to permit the IAEA to conduct the inspections, as per the NPT, stating that an inspection of “non-nuclear military facilities ‘might jeopardize the supreme interests’ of the DPRK.” Director Blix met with North Korean officials in Vienna where he stated that for the first time in its history, the IAEA was prepared to initiate a “special inspection” which would be attempted despite North Korean objections. The DPRK’s continued refusal to allow IAEA inspectors into these two sites marked the beginning of a crisis on the peninsula, unparalleled since the Korean War.

C. CRISIS OF 1994: ADVENT OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND KEDO

1. The Pre-Crisis

In February, 1993 the IAEA’s continued insistence upon inspecting the DPRK’s suspected nuclear waste sites, led North Korea to announce its intention to withdraw from the NPT. In response, the IAEA declared a formal censure on North Korea and referred Pyongyang’s violations to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In May, the UNSC passed a resolution asking North Korea to allow IAEA inspections, but

128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Oberdorfer, 276
131 Ibid.
133 Congressional Record “McCain (and others) amendment No. 1331."
134 Ibid.
Pyongyang rejected this request and continued to refuse IAEA personnel access to any of its sites.135

The UNSC then prepared to seek sanctions against North Korea. Under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council’s options ranged from severing diplomatic relations and communication lines, to taking military action.136 Before they could impose sanctions, however, the DPRK announced that it was ready to initiate talks with the United States.137

The June negotiations were attended by Robert Gallucci, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for politico-military affairs, and Kang Sok Ju, the DPRK’s Deputy Foreign Minister, and focused on what security assurances the United States could provide in return for a decision by North Korea to remain in the NPT. On the eve of the North Koreans’ threatened withdrawal, an agreement was made to continue official dialogue, to provide security assurances by the U.S. to the DPRK, and in return, the DPRK would remain in the NPT.138

In July 1993, Pyongyang offered to give up their nuclear program if the international community would provide LWRs. The expense involved in such an endeavor, coupled with the fact that more energy could be produced using non-nuclear fuels, made the suggestion seem ludicrous. However, the Clinton administration acknowledged the offer and agreed to consider it, as long as Pyongyang agreed to cooperate with the IAEA.139

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135 Ibid.
137 Oberdorfer, 283.
2. The Crisis of 1994

Talks between the United States and North Korea continued until January 1994, when Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis announced that “North Korea agreed to inspections of seven declared nuclear-related sites.”140 By March, however, the North Koreans would still not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct essential activities during its inspection. Under the NPT’s Safeguards Agreement, the DPRK had two major responsibilities. First, Pyongyang was obliged to allow IAEA inspectors freedom to verify that all its nuclear activities have been duly declared. Second, the DPRK must show that that none of their nuclear activities have been used for the production or development of nuclear weapons.141

The importance of the inspections, was to alleviate the ambiguity in intelligence reports about how much plutonium the DPRK could have processed from the reactor. If the IAEA were allowed to sample rods from the reactor core, they could identify how many fuel rods were removed and identify how much plutonium may have been produced.142 Since the Agency was unable to certify that the North was not diverting or producing nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, the IAEA’s Board then officially concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance.143 While the DPRK withdrew its membership from the IAEA, its obligations under the safeguards agreement remained “binding, and in force.”144

The North threatened again to withdraw from the NPT. North-South Korean relations were halted, and tensions ran high on the Korean Peninsula, as the confrontation between North Korea and the United States deepened. The United States’ main objectives were to have North Korea fully comply with its obligations under the NPT and

140 Congressional Record “McCain (and others) amendment No. 1331.”
142 Oberdorfer, 308.
to ensure a de-nuclearized Korean peninsula. This objective was presented to Congress, as were the concessions that the United States was willing to make to North Korea.

The United States must clearly communicate its firm resolve to compel North Korea to comply with the inspections required under the NPT and has instead offered to cancel 1994 Team Spirit joint military exercises with South Korea; indications are that numerous other concessions, such as diplomatic recognition and economic assistance, are also being considered.145

Again diplomatic avenues were taken, and the matter was referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Again, the Council threatened sanctions against the DPRK. This time, however, Pyongyang responded by stating that it would consider the imposing of sanctions, as a “declaration of war.”146

Tensions continued to rise, and military leaders prepared for armed conflict. The United States-South Korean Joint Operations Command devised “Operations Plan 5027,” which provided U.S. troop reinforcements to the Republic of Korea in the event of “external armed attack.”147 Offensively, in response to the North Korean SCUD missile threat, the Joint ROK –U.S. Defense Commander had Patriot missiles deployed to the peninsula to “deter the threat of offensive weapons.”148 Several military strategies were put on the table before the Clinton administration, including destruction of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Finally, in the event that the UNSC imposed sanctions, the U.S. Armed Forces made preparations to deploy additional troops to South Korea.149

To make matters worse, North Korea began removing spent fuel from its 5-megawatt reactor, and announced that they were expelling IAEA inspectors who were

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145 Congressional Record “McCain (and others) amendment No. 1331”
monitoring the fuel to prevent its use for bomb production.\textsuperscript{150} Things looked dismal for a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

\textbf{3. The Carter Conference}

Former President Jimmy Carter, concerned about the growing potential for military conflict, contacted President Clinton. The President agreed to send Robert Gallucci to fully brief Mr. Carter on the North Korea situation. After confirming the seriousness of the circumstances, Mr. Carter notified the President of his intentions to visit Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{151} Before the visit, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake informed the former President that his official capacity was limited – that he was to go, as Carter described later, “‘without any clear instructions or official endorsement.’”\textsuperscript{152}

During the visit, Kim Il Sung stated he was willing to freeze the DPRK’s nuclear program; to allow the inspectors to remain in place, and continue monitoring; and to discuss dismantling the reactors and reprocessing plant, if their aged reactors could be replaced with modern and safer ones. Kim’s one other request was for a ‘U.S. guarantee that there will be no nuclear attack against his country.’”\textsuperscript{153}

Jimmy Carter believed he had achieved “everything we needed,” but the administration was not as impressed with the results of the meetings.\textsuperscript{154} Mr. Carter had simply gotten a series of general promises from Kim. In addition, he had promised that the United States would provide a package of benefits in return. Not only were important details missing from the agreement, there was some question as to the sincerity of Kim’s administration actually initiating a freeze. For example, when Mr. Carter met with First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju to confirm the freeze, Kang “tended to deviate in his position from what Kim Il Sung had committed to do.” It was not until the former President asked him if he “had a different policy from his ‘Great Leader,’” that he would back down.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Oberdorfer, 318
\textsuperscript{152} Sigal, Leon V.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
What appeared to some as an immediate fix to dire straits, however, was met with quite a bit of criticism from others, including the Clinton administration. Based solely on Kim’s general assurances, Carter appeared live via CNN, boasting of his accomplishments at the same time condemning the United States’ hard-lined position. Not only did he condemn the proposed sanctions, he flat-out misrepresented fact when he stated that the Clinton administration had “stopped the sanctions activity in the United Nations.”

Despite single-handedly destroying President Clinton’s North Korean foreign policy, the former President made what some see as major accomplishments. Without providing details, he promised that the United States would reward North Korea for ceasing its nuclear program. He also paved the way for renewed South-North talks. Unfortunately, Kim Il Sung died suddenly of a heart attack on July 8, 1994, halting plans for a first ever South-North presidential summit, and turning leadership over to his son Kim Jong Il.

While relations quickly deteriorated between North and South Korea, the United States continued to press forward with talks. In August, an “Agreed Statement” between the U.S and the DPRK outlined the commitments each was willing to make. In addition to addressing the nuclear issue, the two participants agreed to “establish diplomatic representation in each other’s capitals and reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.” Finally, an “Agreed Framework” was signed between the U.S. and North Korea, ending the series of negotiations, which had lasted for almost two years.

156 Mazarr, 163.
157 Ibid, 163.
158 Ibid,166.
159 Ibid, 168.
4. **The Agreement**

On October 21, 1994, in Geneva Switzerland, North Korea and the U.S. signed a four-page Agreed Framework. The agreement contained four provisions. The first provision states that the United States was to head an international consortium to replace North Korea’s graphite reactors with light water reactors capable of generating 2,000 megawatts of energy. Under this provision, the project was to be initiated immediately upon signing and was to be completed by 2003. The United States pledged to offset proposed energy shortages by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to the DPRK. In return for these concessions, the DPRK pledged to freeze its graphite reactors and related facilities. During the freeze the DPRK was to allow the IAEA to monitor the freeze, and promised to fully cooperate with the monitors. In addition, North Korea was to dismantle its reactors and related facilities upon completion of the LWRs. Very importantly, the United States and the DPRK were to work together to store previously spent fuel during the LWR project, and to dispose of that fuel to prevent its reprocessing by the DPRK.

The second provision set up by the agreement was for the United States and North Korea to work toward normalization of political and economic relations. Both sides agreed to drop barriers to trade, to open liaison offices in each’s capitals and to eventually “upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level.”

The third provision makes assurances for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. First, the United States was to formally assure the DPRK that nuclear weapons would not be used against it. Second, the DPRK would consistently implement the “North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Third, the DPRK was to conduct North – South dialogue under the new spirit of peace and cooperation promoted by the Agreed Framework.

Finally, the fourth provision set up the future of the DPRK in the Non-proliferation Treaty. The DPRK pledged to remain a part of the treaty and to allow implementation of the safeguards set forth in the NPT. The DPRK also agreed to have

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161 This section is derived directly from the primary document “The Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea,” KEDO [online] <http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf>
the IAEA conduct routine inspections of facilities not covered under the freeze. And finally, once a significant portion of the reactor was completed, before the critical nuclear components were to be delivered, the DPRK was to provide full disclosure of, and to be subject to an IAEA inspection verifying all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Due to the sheer value of the concessions made by the United States through the Agreed Framework, communist North Korea rose to first place as the recipient of the most U.S. aid in Asia. In return, while the DPRK appeared forthcoming with its promises and disclosures during the drafting of the agreement, it would not take long before the motives and sincerity with which the DPRK entered into this unparalleled agreement, would seriously come into question.

5. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

In support of the goals set forth by the Agreed Framework, KEDO was established on March 15, 1995. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization to manage the issues of the LWRs and fuel-oil.

In June officials met to discuss the details of the project, and it appeared as the project got underway that things would go smoothly. Even when North Korean officials found out that the South Korean Electric Power Corporation was the prime contractor for the reactor project, the North Korean Foreign Minister, Kim Young-nam, shrugged it off saying, “What KEDO does is the internal matter of the United States and we do not feel it is necessary to interfere and do not care a bit.”

Before work on the LWR project could even begin, however, issues continued to arise which seriously delayed the construction of the reactors. The more serious problems began on September 18, 1996 when a North Korean spy submarine came aground on the shores of South Korea. More than twenty commandos came ashore, eleven of whom apparently killed each other to avoid capture and several of whom were killed by South Korean authorities. In response, South Korea demanded that the North

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163 Oberdorfer, 368.
164 “7 More North Koreans Shot Dead in South” September 19, 1996, CNN [online]
apologize for the situation and make assurances that it would not happen again. If Pyongyang did not, Seoul threatened, the KEDO program would be suspended – as would all other forms of aid. The situation worsened when South Korea postponed the arrival of KEDO project construction workers to North Korea until the safety of all workers was guaranteed by the DPRK. The DPRK then accused the United States and the ROK of breaking the Agreed Framework and threatened to re-start its nuclear program. Finally, in January after weeks of negotiations, the DPRK expressed “deep regret” for the situation and vowed to prevent further incidents.

While the submarine incident was heating up, in October 1996, based on a report by Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA, that North Korea and Iraq were not allowing inspectors sufficient access to their nuclear programs, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution urging both to comply with the safeguards agreement.

Finally a groundbreaking ceremony was held on August 19, 1997 and things again appeared to be on track for the LWR program. Since then, the DPRK has continued to take actions that have halted work on the reactors and have prevented completion of the project. Mi Ae Geoum, Public Affairs Officer for KEDO outlines some of the delays that KEDO has experienced during construction:

The LWR project is a complex and unprecedented engineering project. Its implementation has been affected by a variety of factors. The most dramatic incident was the DPRK test launch of a Taepo Dong missile in 1998. At that time, KEDO suspended all LWR activities for four months, until the DPRK Government apologized for the incident. In the course of nearly eight years, KEDO has also experienced delays during negotiations with the DPRK government in establishing technical policies and procedures, particularly on the supply of laborers at the construction site.

“Apart from DPRK interventions,” Geoum states that other construction-related issues often present in an engineering project of this magnitude have contributed to

166 Ibid.
167 Ibid, 27.
delays in the completion of the project, such as “the change of the vendor of the steam turbines and generators since the Turnkey contract for the Light-Water Reactor project went into effect in February 2000.” “The completion of the project,” she effectively points out, “ultimately depends on the timely fulfillment of commitments on both sides.”

D. TAEPO DONG INCIDENT

On April 17, 1998, the U.S. Department of State announced sanctions against North Korea for violating the Arms Export Control Chapter of US Code, Title 22 and the Export Administration Act of 1979 by engaging in missile technology proliferation. Two months later, despite warnings from the United States, North Korea declared its intention to continue to develop, test, and deploy missiles. Pyongyang insisted that the development was both a means of countering a perceived U.S. military threat, and a means of generating foreign currency. North Korean officials stated, if the United States was concerned about North Korean missiles, that the DPRK would terminate missile sales if the U.S. would lift its economic embargo, and would compensate the DPRK $500 million annually for lost profits.

On August 31, North Korea test-fired a missile over Japan, and again it appeared that North Korea was looking for economic gain. During the test-fire, the first stage of the rocket separated 300km east of the launch site. The second stage continued over the main Japanese Island, Honshu, and crashed into the Pacific Ocean 330km east of the Japanese city of Hachinohe. Although there was a third stage, it failed, making the total distance that the missile traveled approximately 1,380km.

168 Mi Ae Geoum, E-mail to the author, October 5, 2002
169 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
174 Bermudez, Joseph, “North Koreans Test Two Stage IRBM over Japan,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 9
North Korea claimed that it launched the multistage rocket, and successfully put a satellite into orbit for the “peaceful exploration of space.” 175 While the satellite did not make it into orbit, it was the launch itself that infuriated the United States and Japan for several reasons. First was a simple issue of safety. The DPRK had conducted the test-launch without prior notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the launch area affected 180 daily flights between North America and Asia. 176

Another concern was related to the technology of the missile itself and the threat that it posed to the international community. The U.S. had anticipated a test-launch, but the presence of a third-stage was a surprise. 177 The test-flight also allowed the North Koreans to prove their ability to fire a Medium Range ICBM with multi-stage separation. This meant that the DPRK now had the ability to deliver several hundred-kilogram payloads about two thousand kilometers, posing “a threat to U.S. allies and interests in the region.” 178 Although the third-stage failed during the test-flight, when the North Koreans resolved the cause of the failure, they would be able to use the three-stage configuration as a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 km. According to studies, if this third-stage technology were applied to the Taepo Dong-2 armed with a light payload, this missile could reach anywhere in the United States. 179

The final serious concern about the launch was that for a price, the Taepo Dong technology “could find its way into sensitive conflict zones with destabilizing consequences.” 180 This fear was based on the fact that North Korea had formerly supplied Nodong technology to Iran and Pakistan, the latter of which directly resulted in

September 1998.

175 Shinn.
176 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
a nuclear arms race with India. By its own admission, “exports [were] driving North Korean missile developments.”\textsuperscript{181}

In September, 1999 the United States and North Korea made a vaguely-worded agreement for a moratorium on missile launches, wherein the United States agreed to “suspend restrictions on certain categories of non-military trade, financial transactions, travel, and diplomatic contacts with North Korea.” Secretary of Defense, William Perry noted that the U.S policy of “normalization of relations with Pyongyang was the best path for heading off North Korea's missile and nuclear programs.”\textsuperscript{182}

In February 2000, however, a Central Intelligence Agency official in charge of strategic and nuclear issues reportedly told members of Congress that North Korea appeared to be “continuing its ballistic missile program and selling technology to other nations despite a well-publicized [and self imposed] testing moratorium.”\textsuperscript{183} As this thesis will further discuss, the North Koreans kept a similar charade going with its nuclear weapons program.

E. KUMCHANG-RI

While Pyongyang was keeping the United States engaged in talks about missile proliferation, Kim Jong Il was engaged in other forms of “gamesmanship.” In August 1999, reports surfaced that spy satellites photographed an extensive work site at Kumchang-ri, 25 miles northeast of Yongbyon. The photographs showed thousands of North Korean workers at the new site who appeared to be burrowing into the mountainside.\textsuperscript{184} Later, an underground facility was discovered that was suspected of being used for nuclear weapons development.\textsuperscript{185} In response to the United States’ inquiry, a spokesman from the DPRK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the DPRK decided to “allow a one-time visit to the Kumchang-ri project as an exception if

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{183} Shinn
\textsuperscript{185} The Unification Environment and Relations Between South and North Korea: 1991-2000, (Korea
the United States gives the DPRK either 300 million U.S. dollars in cash or other economic benefit of an appropriate form equivalent to that amount in compensation for its slandering and insulting the DPRK.”

The United States’ response was that “any compensation for the inspection of the facilities is unthinkable, but [the United States] can consider the support of food on the humanitarian standpoint if North Korea shows sincerity toward the inspection.” Under the final agreement the United States was to provide 601,000 tons of food to the DPRK. Ultimately, the delegation did not find any evidence of weapons development at the facilities.

In retrospect, it certainly was not a problem that the United States provided food aid to a country whose population was starving. However, the problem lies in the circumstances under which the aid was supplied. Once again, the United States made concessions under the threat of nuclear weapons development by North Korea – still a seemingly “rogue nation.”

Once the Kumchang-ri issue was settled, officials from the United States and North Korea met in Pyongyang to discuss missile proliferation yet again. The United States requested that the DPRK suspend the launch, development and exportation of missiles. These talks failed, however, when North Korea again asked for financial compensation.

F. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE DISCLOSURE

The most recent event in North Korea’s game of economic terrorism is its disclosure in October, 2002 that it has weapons of mass destruction. According to the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the most widely used definition of "weapons of mass destruction" in official U.S. documents is "nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons." As discussed previously, North Korea has capabilities in all three of these areas. What would provoke Kim’s regime to make this disclosure? In this case,

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187 Korea Institute for National Unification, 86.

188 Ibid, 87.
many people are baffled by Kim Jong Il’s seemingly irrational actions. While he has been called crazy; numerous sources have pointed out that he just might be “crazy like a fox.” This thesis suggests that when the inspectors began to close in, instead of waiting to get caught, Kim Jong Il wanted to appear to have the upper hand.

August 2002, saw the groundbreaking ceremony for the North Korean LWR facilities finally come to fruition. At the ceremony, however, Ambassador Charles Pritchard, the U.S. representative to KEDO, requested some tangible progress by the DPRK. According to a schedule provided to the DPRK, KEDO would complete a significant portion of the project and would deliver key nuclear components in mid-2005. According to the 1994 negotiations, before the deliveries would be made, the DPRK would have to come into full compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA pointed out that even with full cooperation from the DPRK, it would take 3-4 years to “verify the completeness and correctness of North Korea’s initial safeguards declaration.” As such, the Ambassador insisted that the DPRK would have to begin immediate cooperation with the IAEA in order to reach the 2005 deadline.

In September 2002, South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong urged North Korea to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. He pointed out that the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” was a key challenge to the peace process between the Koreas. Choi said in a statement to the UN General Assembly that, “It is now essential that the full cooperation with the International IAEA begin without further delay for the implementation of safeguards requirements.”

It was this continued pressure to comply with inspectors, which led the North Koreans to make a bold disclosure. In early October 2002, the United States and North Korea met in Pyongyang for the first high-level talks in years. James Kelly, assistant

189 On the other hand, Nicholas Eberstadt argues that Kim Jong Il is simply mirroring his father’s policies. See “Evil, Yes. Genius, No: North Korea’s Dear Leader employs some hapless tricks—taken straight from his dad,” January 27,2003, Time [online] <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501030127-409633,00.html>

190 For a complete description of the safeguards requirements, see Chapter 4, Section C-2


secretary of state for Asian affairs met with Kang Suk Ju, “the equivalent of Kim’s right-hand man.” During these talks, Kelly told officials that the United States knows North Korea has “different technology’ from that used prior to 1994,” referring to Uranium enrichment, and that it has generated “enough plutonium for at least two nuclear weapons.” In response, Kang pointed out that President Bush had called the DPRK a member of the axis of evil, and that U.S. troops are deployed to the Korean peninsula, and said something akin to: “Of course, we have a nuclear program.”

While the admission came as a surprise to the Bush administration, and to the American public, in retrospect it was probably the only thing that North Korea could do in the situation. The DPRK did not comply with the safeguards agreements, and it was only a matter of time before inspectors verified the new nuclear program. North Koreans had two choices; either get caught and have “egg on their faces,” or “save face” by making the admission in a casual statement and by blaming the United States.

The timing of the disclosure was a key factor in the official response by the United States, or lack thereof. Preoccupied with the same issue of WMD proliferation in Iraq, for days George W. Bush did not comment publicly on North Korea’s exposé. There was even some skepticism at first. Was it possible that Kang Suk Ju had intentionally misled the United States, in order to gauge its response? Subsequent statements from Pyongyang urged the United States to conduct bilateral talks directly with North Korean officials.

Since 1994, IAEA activities were limited to monitoring the "freeze" at Yongbyon. Accordingly, in October 2002, IAEA Director General, Dr. ElBaradei made it clear that the IAEA does not have a complete picture of the nuclear activities in the DPRK. Ultimately, the Bush Administration concluded that the DPRK had violated the Agreed Framework (AF) and issued a statement that the United States would not hold talks

194 Ibid.
196 “IAEA Concerned about Possible DPRK Uranium Enrichment Programme: Seeking Clarification from DPRK and USA,” October 17, 2002, IAEA [online]
directly with Pyongyang. On November 14, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
requested that KEDO stop shipments of fuel oil provided for under the AF. KEDO 
agreed and made a statement that “North Korea must promptly eliminate its nuclear 
weapons program in a visible and verifiable manner.” “Future shipments,” it said, “will 
depend on North Korea’s concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly 
enriched uranium program.”

Ironically, officials in Pyongyang accused the U.S. of violating the Agreed 
Framework. In their typical showmanship style, they announced their intentions to restart 
their nuclear facilities. At the end of December, the IAEA reported that “seals have 
been cut and surveillance equipment impeded” at three facilities at the Yongbyong 
reactor “including the associated spent fuel pond, the fuel rod fabrication plant and the 
reprocessing facility.” IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky, in a BBC interview, 
reported that inspectors watched North Koreans move 400 fresh fuel rods to the 
reactor. After they were allowed to observe these actions, on December 31, IAEA 
monitors were expelled from North Korea.

Although the DPRK asserts that restarting the reactor is for energy producing 
purposes only, the 5 Megawatt reactor at Yongbyon would only produce enough 
electricity to power about five large American office buildings, less than that produced by 
the non-nuclear fuels provided by KEDO. In contrast, if the DPRK cooperated fully with 
the construction of the LWRs, those reactors would produce 2,000 Megawatts of 
power. In light of these facts, there is little doubt that the DPRK intends to re-process 
the spent fuel rods for nuclear proliferation purposes. On February 5, the North Koreans 
announced that they had resumed “normal operations” at Yongbyon. While they still

http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/P_release/2002/prn0216.html


201 Oberdorfer, 289.
insisted that the reactor was being used only to produce electricity, they added the vaguely threatening phrase “for the present stage.” In addition, the self-imposed moratorium on missile testing and launching was obviously suspended on February 25, 2003 when the DPRK once again launched a missile into the Sea of Japan. Corresponding with the inauguration of the South Korean President, Roh Moo Hyun, the launch of the short-range “KN-01” anti-ship missile was seen as another attempt to increase tension over the North’s nuclear arms program.

So the question remains, what does North Korea want from this situation? Interviews with North Korean defectors, Eastern European diplomats, and people who know Kim Jong Il describe him as a “clever, ruthless leader who lives an opulent life and delights in geopolitical gamesmanship.” The scathing comments that President Bush has made about Kim Jong Il and his regime have certainly incited Kim to engage in this gamesmanship. It is not unlikely that Kim enjoys watching President Bush lash out, and then back off, in response to his actions.

In the worst-case scenario, the DPRK is preparing nuclear weapons with which to threaten the U.S. directly, or to sell to its adversaries. In the best-case scenario, the DPRK wants to force the United States into normalizing relations, at the same time protecting itself from a nuclear threat. Either way, this thesis argues that the current situation is similar to past situations spawned by Kim’s threats, and the reason is simple: the DPRK needs money.

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V. U.S. POLICY RE NORTH KOREA: AIMS AND ATTEMPTS

A. THE GAMESMANSHP OF KIM JONG IL

Since the early nineties North Korean leaders attempted to deceive the world regarding their nuclear weapons production and capability. They sat across treaty tables with the U.S. and its allies “selling” non-proliferation, all the while continuing to proliferate nuclear weapons. The current Bush Administration has come under fire for being aggressively anti-North Korean, and is being blamed for strong North Korean reactions such as the re-start of the Yongbyon reactor. There is evidence, however, that the seemingly random and antagonistic actions and rhetoric which characterize North Korean policy are not new, but have been fairly consistent since the end of the Cold War.

The North Korean regime has shown repeatedly that when it has financial need, it will make threats in order to procure funding in one form or another from the U.S. and its allies – thus engaging in what can be called economic terrorism. These threats have included perpetuating suspicions of nuclear weapons development by: reneging on the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1993 and by refusing inspections at Kumchag-ri; launching the Taepo Dong missile over Japan in 1998; and most recently, admitting possession of WMD, restarting the reactor at Yongbyon and pulling out of the NPT.

Another thing that remains constant is the timing of the DPRK’s threats. These threats are made when the North Koreans perceive that their adversaries are at their most vulnerable. Sometimes this means that tensions with North Korea are already dangerously high, other times it means that the adversary is preoccupied with other situations i.e. the U.S. with Iraq. It is during these times that Pyongyang engages their negotiating strategy, what Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for

205 This chapter is designed to provide an overview of why the U.S. needs a definitive North Korea policy, outline some of the policies that have been tried and failed and to discuss some of the challenges that a new policy would have to overcome. Specific material presented in this chapter without footnotes, has been documented in footnoted citations in the previous chapters.


Security and Sustainable Development, aptly describes as: “...go[ing] to the brink and beyond – with fire-breathing rhetoric - and retrieve the situation only at the last minute.”

In the middle of the 1994 crisis for example, Pyongyang insisted that imposing sanctions against North Korea would be a “declaration of war.” On September 11, 2001, a day of crisis for American national security, North Korea threatened to proceed with missile testing. In November 2002, when talks with Japan slowed, the DPRK threatened to “reconsider” its self-imposed moratorium on missile launches. On December 31, 2002, the day that IAEA inspectors left the country, North Korean officials threatened to withdraw from the NPT. In the last few months Pyongyang has issued a series of threats, including one to "destroy the earth" if the U.S. resorted to nuclear war against it, and has made statements that it would win a nuclear war against the United States. This threatening rhetoric is not new either. In 1994, a North Korean official stated his South Korean counterpart would “burn in a sea of fire,” and in 1998, the vice-minister of the People’s Armed Forces threatened to “blow up the territory of the United States as a whole.”

One thing that has changed, however, is that the Kim regime is no longer relying solely on empty threats to get results, he is backing up those threats with actions. As early as February 2000, the DPRK threatened to restart their reactors if the United States

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did not provide financial “compensation” for delays in the completion of the first KEDO LWR. Since Kim’s threats did not yield results, he is using timing, coupled with action to achieve his goals. The introduction of “action” into the DPRK’s game of economic terrorism makes the stakes even higher. It seems that while Kim Jong Il’s policies are driven by the rules of a game that he has devised, the United States and its allies, must trod carefully to prevent him from crossing the line from economic terrorism into full-fledged military action. All the while, the aim of U.S. policies must be to counter the short-term and long-term threats posed by the DPRK.

B. THE THREAT

Despite the fact that the DPRK has a long history of barking rhetoric during crisis-type situations, there is a very real threat from North Korea – a threat that should be taken seriously. There are three factors that make the situation so precarious: capability, ideology and desperation.

1. Capability

As was discussed in detail in Chapter III, the fact that North Korea has produced chemical, biological and presumably nuclear weapons, and has deployed long-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States, make these weapons a threat to the United States’ national security.

Through their Army, Air Force and Navy, the North Koreans have the military capability to strike out across the demilitarized zone by air, by land and by sea. And, while the DPRK has grown weaker militarily and economically, some believe the North has focused on improving its ability to inflict a “tremendous -- if short-lived -- artillery attack on the South Korean capital.”

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216 Note that the reactor was not initially scheduled to be completed for three more years.
217 For specific information on the DPRK’s military capabilities, see Chapter III, Section D.
2. **Ideology**

In addition to the direct military threat, there are two sets of North Korean ideological principles, which are not mutually exclusive and are equally dangerous to the United States. These are: alliance building with countries that oppose U.S. policy, and an extremist form of national solipsism.

In the past, North Korea has aligned itself with countries in the Middle East, such as Iran, Libya, and Syria, that have opposed U.S. policy in the region or have hosted terrorist organizations. Some observers see Pyongyang’s motive as building alliances with countries that oppose U.S. global influence. For example, in 1979 North Korea supported the Islamic revolution in Iran, which overthrew the Shah, a key U.S. ally. And, as was previously discussed, North Korea has sought to earn currency from sales of arms and technology to Middle Eastern countries. As recently as December 10, 2002, a shipment of a dozen SCUD missiles was intercepted on its way from North Korea to Yemen.

The second North Korean ideology that poses perhaps the greatest threat to the U.S. and its allies is based the idea of national solipsism previously discussed in Chapter III. Kim Jong il not only believes that North Korea is at the center of the world, he also believes that he is the most powerful leader in the world. This is why unification talks have failed between North and South Korea. Kim Jong il has “…vowed ‘complete liberation of the peninsula,’ a task left ‘half-done’ by Kim Il-sung. He is apparently determined to become ‘the president of a unified Korea’ through armed force.”

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220 Ibid.

221 Ibid.


224 See Eberstadt, Chapter 2. There are those, however, who believe that real progress has been made toward reunification, for example see: Harrison, Part II and III.

revelation was made by prominent defector Hwang Jang-yop that outlines Kim Jong Il’s frighteningly plausible plans to bring this fantasy to fruition:

The North will commence its offensive after fabricating an ‘invasion north’ by its commando units in ROK uniforms. Artillery bombardment will leave Seoul in ruins in five or six minutes, and then armored forces will launch a general offensive along the DMZ, occupying Pusan and the entire southern half of the peninsula before reinforcement by U.S. Pacific forces. U.S. intervention will be countered by threats of missile attacks on several Japanese cities, including Tokyo, thus stalling reinforcement by U.S. forces until occupation is complete. 226

3. Desperation

The continuing economic crisis that North Korea faces is another cause for genuine concern about tensions on the peninsula. Besides ideological reasons for the leaders of the DPRK to sell weaponry to nations that oppose the U.S. and its policies, the weapons trade itself is extremely lucrative for them. In addition, since economic reasons drive Kim Jong Il’s tactics, there is danger that the weaker North Korea becomes, the less willing it is to bargain. David Sanger points out, “While that may seem counterintuitive, the North Koreans usually get tougher as they get cornered. In cultural terms, they may be more willing to accept risks in a situation of desperation.” 227

Whether it is for security, ideological, or desperation reasons that North Korea continues to proliferate nuclear weapons, it poses one final and more long term threat that is based on the “domino effect.” The director of U.S. central intelligence, George J. Tenet, argues that North Korea’s nuclear program, combined with the weakening of international controls would encourage other nations to “follow suit.”228 He stated that these nations may conclude that engaging in nuclear weapons proliferation provides the best way to deter threats from more powerful nations, especially when their neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so.229

226 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
C. COUNTERING THE THREAT: ATTEMPTS AT DIPLOMACY

1. The Clinton Administration: Post-Framework Policies

Chapters III and IV touched on how the U.S. conducted its foreign policy with the DPRK specifically during the crisis of 1994. Jimmy Carter’s negotiation of the Agreed Framework managed to stave off military confrontation, which can always be seen as a victory. Arguably, since officials in the United States and North Korea find themselves in essentially the same position that they did at the beginning of that crisis, the appeasement policies the United States adopted were a patch and not a solution.

Prior to 1998, the United States had a policy of “indefinite conventional deterrence” and it was this policy that facilitated the 1994 Agreed Framework. In 1998, the bravado of the Taepo Dong launch prompted the Clinton administration to review that policy. In October, Secretary of Defense William Perry and his deputy advisor, Ashton B. Carter, were charged with the task. Immediately they realized that there had been three major changes that could seriously affect the U.S./DPRK policy. First, was the death of Kim Il Sung and assumption of leadership by Kim Jong Il. This new leadership was different from that with which the Agreed Framework was negotiated. In addition, the North Korean economy had collapsed; industrial and food production had dropped; and between floods and droughts, the country was experiencing widespread famines so bad that ten percent of the population had died from starvation or related illnesses.

The second issue facing the policy review team was the continued question of the country’s nuclear program. Although the Kumchang-ri incident did not yield proof that the North Koreans were engaging in nuclear related activities, questions remained. Ashton Carter emphasized, “To create weapons of mass destruction, DPRK officials

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232 Ibid.
simply needed to take fuel at Yongbyon and undertake a short reprocessing campaign to produce the amount of plutonium needed for several nuclear bombs.” This process, he pointed out, could be started “at any time, and with only a few days notice.” 233

The third issue was related to former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s “Engagement Policy” toward North Korea. A major ally of the United States and host to 37,000 U.S. troops, South Korea was considered paramount to accomplishing U.S. security objectives on the peninsula.234 With these issues in mind, the team considered several options.

The following discussion of the policies considered and rejected, and the final chosen strategy is derived from the team’s final report: “Review of the United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations.” 235 From the beginning, the review team rejected the idea of an “American policy” and sought to consult South Korean President Kim, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi. The team then evaluated several options, the first being to undermine the DPRK with a “pressure” approach designed to “hasten the demise of the Kim Jong Il regime.” Due to lack of internal resistance and because of such strict governmental restraints, a policy of this sort would take longer than it would take for the DPRK to develop its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This policy of pressure, the team concluded, could be more harmful to the citizens of North Korea than to the government, and was not generally supported by the international participants needed to make the option work.

Another policy that was ultimately rejected by the team was to “Reform the DPRK” politically and economically. Like the previous option, reformation would take more time than national security could allow. In addition, a policy with the goal of establishing democracy and market reform would clearly require DPRK cooperation, but would be seen by Pyongyang as more like undermining than reforming.

233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
A third policy that was considered was that of “status quo.” While it served U.S. security interests, it did not allow for DPRK-led changes beyond our control, namely the re-start of the Yongbyon facilities and a renewed nuclear crisis on the peninsula.

Another policy was considered, that of “buying our objectives.” This option addressed the major concern of economic terrorism that is perpetrated by the DPRK. This option was flatly rejected because:

Such a policy of trading material compensation for security would only encourage the DPRK to further blackmail, and would encourage proliferators worldwide to engage in similar blackmail. Such a strategy would not, and should not, be supported by the Congress, which controls the U.S. government’s purse strings. 236

Finally the team decided on a “Comprehensive and Integrated Approach: A Two-Path Strategy.” The first path of the joint strategy was to seek “complete and verifiable assurances” that: the DPRK did not have a nuclear weapons program; that testing, production and deployment of missiles did not exceed set parameters; and that all export sales of such missiles and associated parts and technology were ceased. This path, the team believed, would lead to a stable security situation on the peninsula, but it was based solely on complete cooperation from the leaders of the DPRK. Thus, “prudence” dictated that a second path also be devised, also in coordination with other Asian leaders.

In the event that North Korea failed to comply with the first path and a threat ensued, “…the United States and its allies would have to take other steps to assure their security and contain the threat.” The review team asserted that the U.S. and its allies should make every effort to maintain the Agreed Framework and to avoid direct conflict, but they also insisted that they should take “firm and measured steps” to persuade the DPRK to return to the first path. “The North Korea Policy Review was Clinton administration policy, adopted in toto by the administration.” 237

236 Ibid.
2. The Bush Administration: Continued Attempts

When George W. Bush took office in January, 2001, he tasked the U.S. State Department to perform a similar review of the North Korea policy in conjunction with South Korea and Japan. In the meantime, the Bush administration said, they would not negotiate with the North Koreans. In June, the policy review was completed and the President issued a statement outlining his new Korea policy. He directed his national security team to undertake “serious discussions” with North Korea in areas such as: improving implementation of the Agreed Framework; verifying constraints on North Korea's missile programs and bans on its missile exports; and adopting a “less threatening conventional military posture.” Bush further stated that the United States’ objective was to develop a “constructive relationship” wherein the United States would encourage issues of North-South reconciliation; peace on the Korean peninsula; and greater regional stability. The policy would “offer North Korea the opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of its desire for improved relations,” Bush said, and if North Korea were to respond affirmatively and take “appropriate action,” the United States’ pledged to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.

Highly characteristic of the North Korean negotiation strategy (which will be discussed at length in the next section), Pyongyang responded to the proposed discussions by blaming the United States for economic losses from the delay of the LWR project, and demanding financial compensation. A spokesman for the DPRK stated, “We cannot but evaluate the U.S. proposal as unilateral and conditional in its nature and hostile in its intentions. The U.S.-proposed agenda concerns our nuclear, missile and conventional armaments and this all is nothing but an attempt to disarm us.”

Despite the belligerent remarks, North Korean officials allegedly met with U.S. officials at an unpublicized meeting in New York on July 13, 2003 to discuss

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239 Ibid.

240 For the full text of the statement see: “Bush: Broad Agenda for North Korea Talks.”

Washington's policy. Pyongyang was interested in whether or not the Bush team would issue a statement of no hostile intentions, as the Clinton Administration had. The discussion suggested that North Korea was willing to negotiate. First, however, Pyongyang was looking for the U.S. to make a concession to get it to the bargaining table.

During his July trip to Asia, and even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, Secretary of State Colin Powell continuously restated that U.S. policy was to support a second North-South summit, and that the administration was “ready to meet with the North Koreans without any preconditions.” In the next few months, however, United States national security interests demanded an evaluation of terrorist states around the world. In January 2002, during his State of the Union address, George W. Bush said, “North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.” He then said of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea:

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.

Independently these statements are indeed factual, and illustrate the administration’s concern over proliferation by potential terrorists. Somehow, however, many in the international community, and of course in the DPRK, drew from these words, the advent of a new U.S.-North Korea foreign policy. In the wake of the media frenzy following the address, George Bush met with South Korean President Kim Dae-


243 Ibid.

244 Powell, Colin L., “Remarks With Foreign Minister Han Song-su of South Korea After Their Meeting (1135 hrs)” September 18, 2001, State Department [online] <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/4937.htm>

Jung reiterating his desire to have unconditional talks with North Korea, but added that he did “not yet receive a response from that country.”

In April 2002, in a memorandum to Secretary of State Powell, George W. Bush described what he believed to be “significant progress on eliminating the North Korean ballistic missile threat, including further missile tests and its ballistic missile exports.” In addition, he stated that “the parties to the Agreed Framework have taken and continue to take demonstrable steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and that “North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework.” While it is probable that the president had information to the contrary, the statements made in this memorandum served to show good-faith toward North Korea and to procure $95 million for KEDO for “nonproliferation efforts on the peninsula.”

Also in April, the Republic of Korea special envoy’s visit to North Korea yielded what seemed to be very optimistic results. The delegation reported North Korea’s willingness to resume dialogue with the United States and Japan, as well as its decision to resume consultations with KEDO. They expressed their support for the continued implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework including construction of the LWR project.

Again the U.S. reinforced its commitment to the Agreed Framework on August 7, 2002, at the concrete pouring ceremony for the light water reactor (previously discussed in Chapter 4). This time, however, Ambassador Pritchard, stated that it did not make sense for either KEDO or the DPRK to “push forward to completion of a significant

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248 Ibid.

249 Ibid.


251 Ibid.
portion of the first reactor just to stop work for years if the DPRK only then begins to deliver on their safeguards obligations.”252

These remarks (and the $95 million) indicated an earnest attempt by the Bush administration to facilitate implementation of the Framework by both parties. This was assuming, however, that both parties had intentions of implementing the agreement in the first place. At this ground-breaking, North Korea was called to verify that all its nuclear activities were declared, and that none of these activities were used for the production or development of nuclear weapons.253 The problem was, North Korea could not comply with either provision; two months later Pyongyang admitted that among other WMD programs, it had a secret nuclear program.

After this disclosure, the United States took a justifiably less amiable approach to North Korean foreign policy. Coining the phrase “tailored containment” the President declared that “the threat of growing isolation was the best way to force North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions.”254 The American plan included threats of economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council, American military interception of missile shipments to deprive the North of money from weapon sales, and a call to North Korea's neighbors to reduce economic ties to Pyongyang.255

The administration held to its refusal to negotiate directly with the DPRK, insisting it would not negotiate with North Korea until it abandons its nuclear weapons programs.256 Senior administration officials indicated that the U.S. would be willing to hold low-level talks “if North Korea had something constructive to say” but that “there would be no deal-making.”257

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253 “IAEA Seeking to Verify Restart of Un safeguarded Facility in North Korea.”


255 Ibid.


257 Ibid.
Information provided by Hwang Jang-yop, personal aid to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s Juche teacher, who defected to the South in 1997, underscores the possibility that North Korea was seeking provocation by the United States to “up the ante,” at the same time the U.S. is involved in preparations for war with Iraq. Hwang stated, “It is the firm and invariable policy of North Korea to wage war. However, I believe that if it breaks out, it will be full-scale, although the North may be able to touch off a provocation.258 As for when North Korea will provoke a war, it will take into consideration both the international situation and the domestic one.”259

Throughout the early months of 2003 President Bush remained optimistic that there would be a peaceful resolution to the current Korea conflict. He stated, “it’s a diplomatic issue, not a military issue, and we're working all fronts.”260 The administration even softened its resolve about meeting with North Korean officials, but “only about the obligations that already exist under the 1994 framework.” According to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, “We're not going to provide any quid pro quos for North Korea to live up to its existing obligations.”261 The administration does say, however, it would maintain a “robust military deterrent in the region even as it seeks a diplomatic solution to the impasse.”262

D. BLOCKED ATTEMPTS: NORTH KOREAN DEMANDS

The question remains then, what does North Korea ultimately want from this situation? Since the beginning of this latest power struggle, the DPRK asked for two things: direct talks and a treaty of non-aggression with the United States.

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The primary reason that U.S. officials will not conduct bilateral discussions with the DPRK is that if they do, the talks will certainly fail. The reason...a heretofore irreconcilable difference in negotiating styles and expectations. Korean War commander General Matthew B. Ridgway indicated his frustration with the North Korean negotiating style when he said, “Sometimes the repetition of points already made, the oratorical flourishes, the tiresome vituperation were nearly enough to make men welcome a return to battle.”263

Chuck Downs, a defense and national security specialist may have the key to understanding North Korea’s negotiating strategy. First of all, he says, even the fundamental purpose of the negotiation itself is viewed differently by Pyongyang. Whereas Americans negotiate in order to reach an agreement, it seems that the North Korean objective is to gain concessions and benefits merely in the process of agreeing to talk. Once at the negotiating table, North Koreans have a series of conflicting techniques that they use to intimidate and manipulate their opponents. Among other tactics, they alternate between using insults and flattery. They will stall and delay or demand immediate action. They portray themselves as strong and deserving of prerogatives, or as victims seeking reparations. Either they wait for opponents to “tip their hands,” or insist on being first to present demands and accusations. They play external forces against each other, or feign internal issues over negotiating authority.264

As if this dichotomy of technique were not difficult enough to work with, Downs points out that North Korea has adopted other hallmark traits to their negotiating style. When North Korean officials agree to hold talks with an opposing party such as the United States, they often set preconditions for the talks, create incidents to redirect attention of the parties, put opponents on the defensive, load the agenda with foregone conclusions or re-negotiate previously tabled provisions, and reverse accusations made by their opponents. 265 A statement by Ken Quinones, former North Korean Affairs officer for the U.S. State Department, illustrates the confusing, numerous steps policymakers must go through before negotiations with North Korean officials can begin.

263 Downs, 3.
264 Ibid, 11.
265 Ibid.
He was referring to the Secretary of State deciding not to attend “negotiations set up for preconditions for negotiations.”266 This indicates that even to have a negotiation with North Korean officials, one must first negotiate pre-conditions for the negotiations.

Another cause for negotiation failure is that North Koreans insist on negotiating their objectives first. While this in itself is not uncommon, the opposing parties (i.e. the U.S.) are left with little bargaining power. While Westerners view “concessions” as a normal part of the bargaining process, North Koreans view them as “giving up one’s right or privilege to others,” so after they have met their objectives, they have no reason or desire to concede to any demands.267

The second of the DPRK’s demands being refused, is that the U.S. provide North Korea with a treaty of non-aggression. The DPRK insists that they have continued their nuclear program because of the threat of nuclear force from the United States. There are some that believe this explanation for the DPRK’s continued proliferation,268 but it seems that this excuse is more of Pyongyang’s rhetoric. While President George W. Bush has made several inflammatory statements regarding North Korea, that does not change the fact that tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the peninsula and from Pacific aircraft carriers in 1991, and that after 1993, U.S. military exercises in South Korea dropped scenarios of nuclear weapons use.

In addition, Secretary of State Colin Powell has repeatedly stated that the United States does not plan to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.269 This can be viewed as the closest thing to a “formal assurance” to Pyongyang that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against it.270 Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, explained that

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267 Downs, 10.

268 Harrison, Chapter 16.


270 The United States, under the Agreed Framework should provide formal assurances to the DPRK that it will not use nuclear weapons against it. Herein lies another problem with the Agreed Framework being negotiated out of the scope of formal U.S. policy. When this agreement was made, the U.S. had already pledged to provide a nuclear umbrella over Japan and the ROK so they would not need to proliferate nuclear weapons for themselves. This umbrella policy did not discount the use of nuclear weapons against the DPRK in the event that it attacked South Korea.
the United States maintains a nuclear umbrella policy to reassure U.S. “friends and allies that we have and will have the kind of capability necessary to provide a nuclear umbrella over them,” thereby, “dissuading them from thinking they need nuclear weapons.”

This does not mean that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against Korea in any case, however. A classified plan called the Nuclear Posture Review was presented to congress on January 8, 2002. This document outlines a contingency plan to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, to include North Korea, and which called for developing new nuclear weapons that would be better suited for striking targets such as those in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya. In an official statement, Secretary of State Powell insisted that “we should not get all carried away with some sense that the United States is planning to use nuclear weapons in some contingency that is coming up in the near future. It is not the case.” He also stated that “What the Pentagon has done with this study is sound, military, conceptual planning, and the president will take that planning and he will give his directions on how to proceed.”

Just because the United States makes plans in the event that a war happens, does not mean that it intends to go to war. National security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, indicated that the report was in keeping with the United States’ nuclear umbrella deterrent policy. “No one should be surprised that the United States worries a great deal about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the only way to deter such a use is to be clear that it would be met with a devastating response,” she said, “That is the basis of this report.” The report itself indicates that the plan is of a defensive nature, rather an offensive one and says the Pentagon should be prepared to use nuclear weapons in an Arab-Israeli conflict, in a war between China and Taiwan, or in an attack from North Korea on the south.

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271 In this same statement Mr. Rumsfeld was discussing the United States planned reduction of warheads to a range of 1,700-2,200 in conjunction with the same reduction by the former Soviet Union. This indicates that the U.S. itself is not conducting a nuclear buildup, but has every intent to continue to reduce its post-Cold War nuclear stockpile. See: Porth, Jacquelyn S., “Rumsfeld: U.S. Will Continue to Provide Allies with Nuclear Umbrella,” United States Embassy, Tokyo, Japan [online] <http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhse1540.html>


273 Ibid.
Although Kim Jong Il appears to enjoy games of brinksmanship, the DPRK because of its military capability, its anti-U.S. ideology and its desperate economic situation poses a serious threat to the United States, its assets and its allies. Although the United States has maintained policies which uphold its responsibilities under the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has show blatant disregard for said agreement. The fact that the DPRK has continued its WMD programs as an incentive, coupled with its recent demands to meet unilaterally with the United States, indicates that the DPRK wants to get its former financier back to the negotiating table. Hindsight, however, has allowed U.S. policymakers to see how they have been previously manipulated during negotiations, and enabled them to formulate a policy that insists on multilateral talks. It is in this environment that steps can be taken to stop this new bout of economic terrorism and set the stage for implementing policies for long-term peace.
VI. CREATING LONGTERM STABILITY: RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OVERCOMING TENSIONS OF 2003

Before the United States can begin to apply a long-term solution for the Korean peninsula, the recent nuclear-related tensions between Washington and Pyongyang must be alleviated. This section is not intended to provide a thorough analysis of every option, instead, it is intended to outline a few ways that the United States can, from this point, move toward its ultimate policy goal: peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

This section will outline three possible options for the United States in pursuit of its mid-term goal of neutralizing the North Korean nuclear threat: maintain a policy of calculated indifference, conduct a military strike, or positively engage North Korea.

1. Calculated Indifference

The White House is currently implementing a series of policies that can be called “calculated indifference” toward North Korea. While this course is one of perceived inaction, a maintaining of the status quo as it were, it should not be confused with having “no policy.”

a. The Pros

Under this policy, the administration continues to refuse bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang insisting instead on multilateral talks. The ensuing battle between Pyongyang’s repeated requests and Washington’s repeated denials bought the United States time as it geared up for military action in Iraq. With the Washington issue unresolved, it is not likely that Kim Jong Il will be taking any drastic action regarding his nuclear proliferation, such as beginning plutonium reprocessing; if he did, he would not have much negotiating power at the table.

In addition, the U.S. is standing firm on its policy of “not negotiating with terrorists.” President Bush can show that his administration will not give in to Kim Jong Il’s economic terrorism any longer. By not going to the negotiating table, the United States will not make concessions that will ultimately be used to fund Pyongyang’s military and WMD programs.
The “calculated” aspect of this policy is being kept low-key. While publicly the United States continues to deny bilateral talks, Secretary of State Powell reported, “we have a number of diplomatic initiatives underway, some of them very, very quietly underway to see if we cannot get a multilateral dialog started.”

This statement does not mean that the U.S. is holding “secret talks” with Pyongyang, as one overzealous journalist reported. It is more likely that Secretary Powell’s statement indicated that the U.S. is negotiating terms for help from other powers in the region such as Japan, China, Russia, or South Korea. In addition, by not getting directly involved in the situation, the United States is giving these other nations in the region, who also have a great security interest, the opportunity to deal directly with North Korea. In the best-case scenario, the U.S. may be able to work through other nations to persuade North Korea to enter into multilateral dialogue. If so, the door would be open to conduct long-term multilateral agreements, thus transitioning into a long-term solution for stability on the peninsula. Certainly this is what the administration is seeking through these policies.

b. The Cons

The problem with this policy is that it can swing hard either way. The alternative outcome is that the DPRK will escalate tensions. If the United States continues to ignore the DPRK’s requests for bilateral negotiations, the DPRK will continue to step up its antagonistic actions. Donald Gregg, U.S. ambassador to South Korea in the first Bush administration, said, “If you push Koreans into a corner and don’t talk to them, they’ll behave worse and worse.”

Already North Korea has launched anti-ship missiles into the Sea of Japan in a show of bravado, ultimately saying to the world, “look at us, we have launch capability for our weapons.”

John Steinbruner, Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Academic Advisor at the Carnegie Corporation of New York, expressed his concerns that “There is

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275 The article goes on to say that an American citizen not representing the Bush Administration was present during a meeting with Japanese and North Korean officials. For full text go to “U.S., N. Korea ‘held secret talks,’” March 5, 2003, CNN [online] <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/03/05/nkorea.talks/index.html>

considerable danger that an interaction between the U.S. procedural rule – do not reinforce blackmail – and the DPRK procedural rule of response in kind might produce a violent confrontation that neither side intends or expects.”

If North Korea does escalate their actions, depending on how far they go, other regional powers may have to get involved and military action may ensue. On a positive note here, unlike the situation in Iraq where the U.S. is being portrayed as the “bully,” North Korea will be seen as the antagonist, opening the way for international support of the U.S. in a regional conflict.

2. Military Strike  

The North Koreans’ initiated their latest barrage of threat-with-action under the assumption that the United States would concede to its demands. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in response to the DPRK’s timing, warned North Korea that the United States could “fight and win two regional conflicts.” He also directed Pyongyang not to become “‘emboldened’ by the U.S. administration’s immediate focus on Iraq.”

While critics continue to highlight the similarities between the situations in Iraq and in North Korea, going so far as to say that North Korea poses the more immediate threat, the Bush administration does not plan to attack the DPRK. Colin Powell draws major distinctions between the two exigencies. U.S. intelligence officials, he says, believe that while North Korea has possessed WMD for some time, it has never used these weapons, nor threatened to use them. Saddam Hussein on the other hand, has used

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280 Ibid.

281 As of March 13, 2003, an NBC6.net public opinion poll showed that 31% of its respondents believe that North Korea poses a bigger threat to the U.S. than Iraq, while 12% believe that Iraq poses a greater threat than North Korea. NBC6.net [online] <http://www.nbc6.net/news/1725779/detail.html>

chemical weapons before. In addition, Hussein has “demonstrated far more evil intent, seeking to dominate the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{282}

While the United States denies planning an attack, this does not mean that they do not have a plan of attack. During the 1994 crisis, a plan was formulated to destroy the facilities at Yongbyon…a plan that could be used toward the same ends today. The objective of the strikes would be to “irreparably damage the facilities and surrounding support structures, including power plants”\textsuperscript{283} thus eliminating the immediate nuclear threat.

High-performance aircraft or Tomahawk cruise missiles could be used to damage the DPRK’s nuclear facilities. Because the facilities are heavily reinforced, cruise missiles would not completely destroy them, but could damage them severely enough to be effective. While strikes using high-performance aircraft could completely eliminate the facilities, heavy air defenses surrounding them would cause a great risk to American pilots.\textsuperscript{284}

One concern about attacking the facilities is the release of radiation that could conceivably make its way to South Korea. If precision targeting was used, it could damage the facilities without destroying them, and would cause little or no radiation release. Since the reactor has just recently been restarted, the new fuel load would yield minimal radiation release. In addition, strikes could be targeted in such a way as to cause the building to implode without seriously damaging the fuel rods in the core.\textsuperscript{285}

As far as the reprocessing facility, even if a few rods were stored there, a precision strike on the building would not release a significant release of radiation.


\textsuperscript{284} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{285} Ibid.
Again, with precision targeting, a building implosion would yield virtually no radiation release. 286

a. The Pros

These carefully conducted strikes on the facilities at Yongbyon, and any other sites thought to be nuclear facilities would drastically reduce North Korea’s ability to sell nuclear weapons, to use them to extort concessions from the United States, or to use them to conquer the peninsula.

b. The Cons

One major problem with this option is that for these same reasons, Pyongyang’s nuclear program constitutes the economic and strategic lifeblood for the DPRK. Not only would Pyongyang do what it deemed necessary to protect these assets, in response to attacks like these, it is more likely than not that North Korea would conduct retaliatory attacks on Seoul. It is also possible that Kim Jong Il would take this opportunity to conduct a counter-attack, and attempt to overtake the South, which would cause serious destruction and major loss of Korean and American lives.

Another problem with this option is that unless the DPRK makes serious and verifiable threats, the United States would not get support for such an attack from regional powers; Japan, China, South Korea and Russia have all asked the United States to pursue diplomatic avenues with North Korea. 287

The most serious problem with this approach is that since 1994 when this strike plan was first presented, the DPRK has built more nuclear related facilities and the United States does not know where they are. While strikes at Yongbyon would cripple plutonium enrichment and reprocessing, the United States CIA “knows North Korea is

286 Ibid.


building a uranium-enrichment plant but doesn’t know where, according to two senior intelligence officials.”

It does not appear that these gaps in intelligence will be overcome in the near future either. The installation of underground fiber-optic cables for military communications, and the scarcity of human intelligence are just two of the hindrances to U.S. intelligence gathering efforts.

3. Engagement

International officials continue to urge the United States to engage North Korea. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says China wants the United States and North Korea to hold direct talks; and in Moscow, the Foreign Ministry called for direct Washington-Pyongyang dialogue. Not only have Asian countries asked for a diplomatic strategy, North Korea has opened the door for a policy like this, by making repeated requests for direct talks with Washington. In fact, North Korean officials suggest that the current situation, which they view as a crisis, “would lead to armed conflict unless the United States agreed to one-on-one talks.”

There are several U.S. policymakers who are proponents of a policy of engagement toward North Korea. Senate minority leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota, for example, “scolded Mr. Bush for playing down the threat from North Korea and urged him to ‘immediately engage the North Koreans in direct talks.’” Donald Gregg, U.S. ambassador to South Korea in the first Bush administration, believes that “immediate direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang are necessary to stem North Korea's development of nuclear weapons.”

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289 The author believes that the interception of an Air Force RC-135S “Cobra Ball” spy plane on March 2, by North Korean fighters and the ensuing cessation of intelligence collecting flights by the U.S. was specifically designed to mask the movement of nuclear materials or delivery systems within the DPRK.


a. The Pros

Undeniably this approach could alleviate the current tensions in North Korea. First of all, it would placate Kim Jong Il to have the President yield to his demands for negotiations. For an approach like this to work, American officials would have to assume, or pretend to assume, that the North Korean fear of a nuclear attack by the United States is genuine. Washington would thus have to meet with Pyongyang and be prepared to enter into a new non-aggression treaty. Based on the way the Kim Jong Il regime does business, Pyongyang would insist upon negotiating its demands first. Based on past experiences with the DPRK, U.S. policymakers must be willing to provide some hefty aid packages as well. In the best-case scenario, the United States would walk away in essentially the same position that it was in after signing the Agreed Framework: North Korea would freeze its current WMD programs amid hope for further normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang – paving the way for a long-term peace option to be implemented.

b. The Cons

While this is a viable option, it would be a costly one for the United States literally and figuratively. First of all, unless the United States was willing to meet every demand that the DPRK made, the process could drag on for years. The North Koreans, after being denied a particular demand are prone to leaving the negotiating table. If they did stay throughout negotiations, it is uncertain at this point what the North Koreans plan to ask for. Based on their demands that the U.S. reimburse them for electricity lost during the LWR project, it is certain to be of great financial cost to the U.S.

294 Scott Snyder, Korea Representative, Asia Foundation, 2000, for example, states “During the Geneva negotiations, Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, responding in outrage to an insistent American demand, slammed down his briefing book and stood up to leave the negotiating table. The only problem was that Kang had no place to go: this negotiating session happened to be at North Korea’s own mission!” “Negotiating on the Edge: Patterns in North Korea’s Diplomatic Style,” World Affairs Magazine, Summer 2000, [online] <http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2393/1_163/64426448/p11/article.jhtml?term=%22North+Korea +%22+%2B2Bconflict>

“North Korea has been known to walk out of negotiations with Japan before.” See, Unattributed, “N Korea ‘will not end nuclear programme,’” October 29, 2002, BBC News [online] <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2370345.stm>
Although the U.S. would be in the same position it was in 1994, i.e. having alleviated tensions and avoided a crisis; the U.S. would be in the same position it was in 1994, i.e. having found only a short-term fix to the North Korea problem. The DPRK would continue to terrorize the United States every time it needed financial aid, and even if Pyongyang agreed to dismantle its current programs, it would just start another covert weapons program with that aid.

4. A Calculated Effort

It is very important, no matter how the administration decides to handle the current North Korea situation, that the United States continue to react with calm and calculation. Democratic opponents describe President Bush as not responding strongly enough to the Korea situation, and as downplaying a serious threat. Others argue that the Bush administration does not have a specific North Korea policy, and that North Korea is being allowed to drive U.S. policy. The truth is that North Korea always creates crisis situations to drive policy, and relies on the subsequent re-actions and sense of urgency to get their opponents, unprepared, to the negotiating table. This time the administration is being very careful not to over-react to North Korea’s antagonism. Secretary of State Colin Powell agreed: “We're prepared to talk to them, but what we can't find ourselves in the position of doing is essentially panicking at their activities and their demands.”

295 “Democrats are pressing the Bush administration to begin direct talks immediately. They say that while the administration has been paralyzed by indecision and distracted by Iraq, the threat posed by North Korea has spiraled.” Guggenheim, Ken, “U.S. Officials Nix Direct N. Korea Talks,” March 10, 2003, Washington Post [online] <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4292-2003Mar10.html.>


B. LONG TERM SOLUTIONS

Politicians, scholars and the general public have many opinions about “what to do next” with regard to North Korea. In light of North Korea’s nuclear program and because of Kim Jong Il’s quest for capital and regional bargaining power, status quo diplomacy or attempts at previously used policies will not achieve U.S. national security goals. Some people believe that diplomacy is the answer, while others argue that military action is necessary. This section will explore some of these options and outline their strengths and weaknesses, keeping in mind the ultimate goal for future U.S. policy toward the DPRK: how do we counter the North Korean threat, and how do we stop the DPRK’s economic terrorism once and for all?

1. Reunification

Because of Kim Jong Il’s strict sense of self-preservation, the only way for reunification to be a viable option is for U.S. policymakers to support both North and South Korea in a joint peninsular reunification effort. This approach would enable the United States to build upon the progress made heretofore between the two Koreas. There have been numerous publications, which analyze and outline this approach as a feasible way to restore stability and peace to the peninsula. The best scenario to present, however, is one based on the formulas for joint unification previously proposed by each of the Koreas.

a. Federation or Confederation

In the 1980s North Korea presented an outline for reunification. The DPRK insisted that the Koreas adopt a federation system, which they call the “Koryo

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299 Among these sources are:


Robert Dujarric, (Editor), Korean Unification and After: U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea (Hudson Institute, 2000)


300 Merriam-Webster defines Federation as “a compact between political units that surrender their individual sovereignty to a central authority but retain limited residuary powers of government.” Merriam
Federation System.” This proposal suggested that the two Koreas form a federation, but maintain two governments. The federal government, however, would be responsible for exercising diplomatic and military sovereignty. Under this approach, the two countries would immediately implement the federation with no transition period. In addition, the DPRK made two demands, that the National Security Act be abolished and that American forces be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula.

South Korea rejected the North Korean approach primarily because fundamental differences in each nation’s systems would prevent immediate mutual assimilation, so it was necessary, they argued, to have a phase-in approach. On September 11, 1989 South Korea proposed unification under a confederation system which they call the “National Community Unification Formula.” This formula is based on a phase-in process. The first objective is to create a partnership between the two governments, maintaining the existing “two systems and two governments” on the peninsula, but working toward ultimate unification. Under this program, a “‘consultative body’ would be created which includes an inter-Korean summit, cabinet meeting, joint committee by area and combined legislative conference.”

The primary objectives of this system are: to work toward political and economic integration; social and cultural unity through cultural exchanges; military integration; institutional consolidation, by improving laws presently injurious to unification, and preparation of a unification constitution; and the creation of an international environment favorable for unification through international cooperation.


302 Merriam-Webster defines Confederation as “a league or compact for mutual support or common action.” Merriam Webster [online] <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=federal>


304 Ibid.

305 Ibid.

306 Ibid.
The fact that South Korea included the possibility for reforming “laws counter to the unification process,” may have satisfied the North Korean appeal for National Security law abolition.

During the North-South summit in 1991, with these issues in mind, North Korea proposed an updated unification plan that combined elements from the North and South’s original proposals. The formula called for “permanent peace and co-prosperity through mutual cooperation.”\(^{307}\) This time Pyongyang suggested that this “loose form of federation” should be phased in while keeping the two systems and governments intact. Under this revised proposal, both countries would continue to have diplomatic and military sovereignty. This interim period, they suggested, would be used to strengthen inter-Korean relations and work toward ultimate unification. This same proposal was presented at the June 2000 summit.\(^{308}\)

A combined project, perhaps similar to this, which addresses the needs of both Koreas, is likely to have the most success. The inter-Korean summit and subsequent South-North Joint Declaration have been described as an “historic breakthrough in the common pursuit of peace, mutual prosperity and reunification.”\(^{309}\) President Kim Dae-jung and North Korea's Kim Jong-il concurred on many fundamental issues included in the joint declaration, specifically on the “independent reunification of the Korean Peninsula.”\(^{310}\)


\(^{308}\) In 2000, however, South Korean officials, attempted to pass this off as a new achievement on the road to reunification when they reported that “President Kim Dae-jung and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il agreed to call the formula proposed by the South "confederation", and the system suggested by the North a "loose form of federation," the presidential spokesman said. The North has so far insisted on the federal system under which the central government is responsible for diplomatic and military affairs.” See “Unification plan calls for both Koreas remaining responsible for diplomatic, defense matters,” June 15, 2000, Korea.net [online] <http://www.korea.net/>


\(^{310}\) Ibid.
b. **The U.S. role**

While both Koreas have agreed that they want reunification to be independent of outside forces, the United States, as well as other nations in the region, will have a role to play in the process. There are two main roles for the United States in the reunification process. The first is to simply act as a supportive observer – supportive towards both the North and the South. The primary role for the United States, however, would be the gradual withdrawal and removal of U.S. troops from the peninsula.

c. **The Withdrawal**


In the memorandum, the DPRK states that U.S. presence poses a threat to the North and is preventing unification. Selig Harrison, director of the Center for International Policy’s Asia Project, agrees. He insists that “in its present form, the U.S. military presence sustains a climate of indefinite confrontation.”\footnote{Harrison, 109.}

Not only is a plan such as this possible, the United States has already made contingencies toward and statements supporting such a plan. For example, the United States “already has plans in motion to consolidate bases and will phase out dozens of its 95 installations by 2011.”\footnote{Greimel, Hans, “Pro-U.S. rallies draw crowds in S. Korea,” February 22, 2003, Guardian Unlimited [online] <http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-2425924,00.html>}

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, also showed a “readiness to readjust one of the cornerstones of U.S. military policy in South Korea.”\footnote{Efron, Sonni and Mark Magnier, “Rumsfeld May Withdraw Some Troops From South Korea” February 14, 2003, The Salt Lake Tribune [online] <http://www.sltrib.com/2003/Feb/02142003/nation_w/29438.asp>}

He told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he “might consider withdrawing some of the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea,” and that he would “like to see some U.S. forces pulled away from their forward deployments in Seoul and along the [DMZ].”\footnote{Ibid.}
d. A Ready Environment

The environment is ripe for the U.S. to pursue a policy like this. In the last few years, there has been a steady increase in the number of anti-U.S. protests in South Korea. This is partially due to the fact that U.S. military facilities sit right in the middle of the densely populated South Korean capital and spill into its suburbs.316

Most of the protests were peaceful, but took a drastic turn in June 2002, when two South Korean girls were struck and killed by an American armored vehicle. In September protestors abducted an uninvolved American soldier and took him to a candlelight vigil for the girls that became an anti-U.S. protest.317 In November of that same year, protestors threw firebombs at a U.S. military facility.318 Political analysts say that South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun, a “reform-minded liberal often critical of U.S. policy, benefited from the anti-American sentiment to win the December 19 [2002] election against his pro-U.S. conservative opponent.”319

In addition, to anti-U.S. sentiments, the United States’ withdrawal could lessen the threat to its Korean-based assets. Derek Mitchell, a Korean security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, states that there is an increased threat of attack on U.S. bases in South Korea by missiles or other weaponry by North Korea or other adversaries.320

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld described a scenario that would fit perfectly into a reunification plan:

316 Alvin Magid, Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany, Interview, October 2003.
317 Brian Alexander, “Assault on USFK Soldiers,” e-mail to the author, September 17, 2002.
I'd like to see a number of our forces move away from the Seoul area and from the area near the DMZ and be more oriented toward an air hub and a sea hub, with the ability to reinforce so there's still a strong deterrent, and possibly, with our improved capabilities of moving people, some of those forces come back home. 321

This approach is best for several reasons. First of all, since North Korea has such a formidable army, some South Koreans fear that a “relocation of U.S. troops would weaken defenses against a hostile North Korea.” 322 A gradual withdrawal, however, could be formulated to coincide with progress made in the phases of a joint confederation. In the meantime, the pullback would show that the United States is taking a non-threatening stance towards North Korea.

There are people, both on the peninsula and in the U.S, who believe that a U.S. military presence on the peninsula is necessary. 323 According to Selig Harrison, those people are making several assumptions. 324 The first, is that if the U.S. leaves the peninsula, a power vacuum will open up and China, Japan and Russia will vie for domination of the peninsula. A second is that a unified Korea will seek a military alliance with a neighbor, such as China. And a third is that a unified Korea would pursue its own nuclear capability. Other skeptics are worried that the removal could mean South Korea would have to spend more on its own defense. 325 Each of these arguments could be countered by U.S. support for a unified Korea, which would adopt the position of a neutral, nuclear-free buffer state. 326

321 Ibid.


324 Harrison, 347.


326 Harrison, 288, 347.
e. The Asian Reaction

For North Korea, both its security concerns and economic issues would be addressed by reunification and U.S. military withdrawal. With U.S. troops pulling away from the DMZ, and with a formal reunification support policy, North Korea would see that the United States has no intention of becoming an aggressive threat. Long-term, as a neutral buffer state, Korea would prevent the need for a nuclear arms race in the region.

In addition, Kim Jong Il’s economic concerns could be alleviated. Although the South Korean economy is not the strongest it has been, eventually reunification would lead to the industrial south having access to plentiful natural resources in the north. The result would be an industrial Korea that could become a formidable trading partner with, among other countries, China, Japan and Russia.

In a scholarly paper, Seong Ok Yoo, writes that Hideshi Takesada, a Japanese Northeast Asian security expert outlined how Korean unification would be positive. Economically speaking, he says, the economies of Japan and the unified Korea would be mutually complementary. Militarily speaking, Japan believes a unified Korea would reduce its military for the sake of economic development, allowing Japan to reduce its defense costs. In addition, Japan “no longer having an unpredictable North Korea on its coast” would allow redirection of its forces. Even better, a neutral Korea would prevent a potential nuclear arms race, a priority for the Japanese. Politically

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327 For opposing views, see “Great Power Interests in Korean Reunification,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) [online] <http://www.csis.org/polmil/KoreaGPInterests.pdf>


330 “Widespread revulsion against nuclear weapons in Japan in response to the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has forced the Japanese government to announce the three non-nuclear principles that Japan "will not manufacture or possess nuclear weapons or allow their introduction into" Japan and that Japan will adhere to the NPT and the CTBT," See Morton H. Halperin, The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance <http://www.nautilus.org/library/security/papers/US-Japan-4.html>

speaking, Korean unification “would mean the emergence of three poles: China, the unified Korea, and Japan. Cooperation and exchange among these three poles would be the basis of ‘a Northeast Asian version of the European Union.’”\textsuperscript{331}

The Chinese have expressed concerns that a weak North Korean regime might implode leading to the “sudden emergence on China’s border of a unified Korea allied to the United States” and might “also lead to a massive flow of North Korean refugees into China.”\textsuperscript{332} “Beijing's top priority is to preserve the North Korean state as a buffer between China and the U.S. sphere of influence in Northeast Asia”\textsuperscript{333} If a gradual, peaceful unification were to occur, and the result was a neutral non-nuclear buffer state devoid of U.S. presence, China would have nothing to fear for its security.

For the Russians, an independent unified Korea would serve as a buffer to the expansion of Chinese regional power.\textsuperscript{334} Political scientist Alvin Z. Rubenstein concludes: “of the involved powers – China, Japan, the United States and Russia – Russia has the least to lose politically, militarily, or economically from unification.” Indeed, Russia’s energy and raw materials markets would compliment an industrial Korea.\textsuperscript{335}

\textit{f. Impediments to Reunification}

A policy of supporting reunification and gradual troop withdrawal appears to work well towards achieving the United States’ goal of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The reunification itself would help alleviate regional fears of a rogue nuclear North Korea and lead to a productive regional economic partner. The reduction of U.S. forces would quell North Korea’s fear of an American attack and China’s fear of a Chinese/American-controlled Korean border, in the event of a North Korean collapse.

\textsuperscript{331} Yoo.


\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.


There are several significant impediments to Korean unification, however, that will make a peaceful reunification next to impossible.\textsuperscript{336} One fundamental flaw in any policy that seeks Korean reunification is: there is little indication that North Korea intends to peacefully unify. First of all, there is a fundamental difference between the unification proposals of the two Koreas. While South Korea proposes a Confederation with a consultative body, the North Koreans propose a “loose form of Federation.” What is conspicuously lacking from their plan, however, is the identification of who will run this “federal” government.

Concerns to this effect were voiced by representatives of the Grand National Party who criticized Kim Dae Jung and “denounced the government’s inter-Korean policy as appeasing or accommodating the North Korean common-front unification strategy, aimed at communize (sic) the whole Korean peninsula by force.”\textsuperscript{337} They were not too far off-base according to the North Korean defector presented earlier, Mr. Hwang, who states “unification by use of force is the only method Kim Jong-il considers feasible. While the junior Kim acknowledges economic disparities, North Korea believes it has enough power to guarantee unification by force, barring intervention from the United States.”\textsuperscript{338}

During the June 2000 summit, it did not seem logical when “the North’s Kim told South Korean President Kim Dae-jung that U.S. troops might be able to stay even after eventual unification of the Koreas.”\textsuperscript{339} Previously the North had “steadfastly demanded a U.S. troop withdrawal as a precondition for reconciliation.”\textsuperscript{340} After the historic summit, inter-Korean relations began to quickly thaw, leading many critics to

\textsuperscript{336} For a discussion of some of these issues see, Gerrit Gong, “What If Korea Unifies,” Updated July 2000, WorldLink [online] \textltt{http://www.worldlink.co.uk/stories/storyReader$291}\textgreater \\
\textsuperscript{337} “Ideological Clash Over NK Policy” editorial, November 15, 2000, The Korea Times [online] \textltt{http://www.hankooki.com/kt_op/200011/a20001115173851481138.htm}\textgreater \\
\textsuperscript{339} Jeremy Kirk, “Albright: U.S., Japan, South Korea must present united front,” October 27, 2000, Stars and Stripes \textltt{http://www.pstripes.com/ed102700c.html}\textgreater \\
\textsuperscript{340} Ibid.

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wonder if North Korea’s diplomacy was simply a tactic to obtain economic assistance and reduce the U.S. troop presence in South Korea.”

Not surprisingly then, on August 4, 2001, during a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a complete reversal, “the DPRK reiterated its position that the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea ‘will endure no delay and is a pressing problem’ in the interests of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.” Did North Korea make such a radical reversal in their policy toward U.S. troop withdrawal within the year?

A more likely scenario is that the North Korean policies regarding both reunification efforts and U.S. troop withdrawal disclosed at the 2000 North-South Korean summit were simply propaganda. In keeping with this thesis’ assertion that North Koreans will do anything for money, it was revealed that Pyongyang received a hefty sum of money from Seoul, widely thought by its critics to be a bribe for the 2000 summit.

In 1998, Japan's New Japan Trading Company facilitated a meeting between Hyundai chairman Jung Mong Hyun and North Korean officials at a “Beijing Secret Meeting.” The South Korean National Intelligence Agency (NIA) “coached Hyundai behind the scenes” since Hyundai's opening up to North Korea was in line with NIA’s new policy of accommodation. During subsequent meetings, Hyundai agreed to pay North Korea $500 million dollars for exclusive rights for the “Seven Mega Projects”

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which included ventures in tourism, railroads, communication, ship scrapping, electronics, the Imjin River dam, and Kaesong industrial park.\textsuperscript{344}

Shortly thereafter, the North’s agreement to participate in the summit was made public, strategically, days before the South Korean general election of April 13, 2000. Interestingly, North Korea requested the date of the summit be pushed back a day and stated that the reason for the delay was that North Korea had received only $400 million and $100 million was still outstanding.\textsuperscript{345} All of these circumstances suggest that the Hyundai $500 Million Payment was at least partially a summit bribe.

More convincingly, however, was the admission by Kim Dae Jung that the South Korean government secretly paid $200 of the $500 million to Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{346} The secret money transfer was made in violation of South Korea's National Security Law, which designates the North a "traitor regime," and was made without official approval by the unification ministry.\textsuperscript{347} Although President Kim denies the money was a payoff for the summit agreement, he said he provided the illegal cash payments because he wanted to “secure peace on the peninsula and promote national interest.”\textsuperscript{348}

It is not unlikely, given the circumstances, that part of the payment provided by Seoul was for a previously arranged summit script for Pyongyang to deliver… a script that was designed to make the two Koreas appear closer to reunification than ever before, and to create a false sense of success of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy. In addition, this evidence fosters doubt that any of North Korea’s previous steps towards reunification were sincere and not simply purchased.

Pyongyang, in its search for economic support, has everything to gain from the Sunshine policy, which critics view as overly conciliatory.\textsuperscript{349} Even the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{344} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{345} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{349} For a summary, see Rinn-Sup Shinn, “South Korea: ‘Sunshine Policy’ and Its Political
\end{itemize}
definition of Seoul’s policy states that the policy supports “the funneling of economic assistance and diplomatic favors from the South to the North, hoping to eventually soften North Korea's stances in the course of promoting peace and cooperation on the Korean peninsula.”

It is not likely that North Korea’s reunification stance will soften so long as it continues to be rewarded for steps forward and steps backward.

It is evident that when the North begins raising tensions, the South counters with concessions. It seems then, that all Pyongyang has to do every once in a while is make a few well-placed statements or agree to a few well-publicized events in the name of reunification. For their trouble, they continue to get paid. Although it is not as pronounced as with the United States because of the conciliatory nature of South Korean policy, South Korea it seems, is just another victim of North Korea’s economic terrorism.

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352 Shortly after this headline appeared: “N Korea postpones family reunions,” BBC News online, October 12, 2001, March 18, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1594781.stm>, this statement was made: “North and South Korea have agreed to hold a new round of family reunions next month” with this caveat...“There was also agreement for a second round of economic talks...” See “Koreas agree new family reunions,” BBC News online November 13, 2001, BBC News [online] <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1653432.stm>

353 The list of inter-Korean relations includes only the summit meeting and links to six different “reunions of separated families.” There have also been joint sporting events and a joint Trade Union “May Day” rally and marathon race is scheduled on May 1, 2003. See “Inter-Korean Relations” on Korea.net [online] <http://www.korea.net/issue/sn/issue.html>
2. **Regime Change**

A second policy option for the United States to remove the threat posed by the Kim Jong Il regime, is to remove Kim Jong Il from power. Not only is there reason to do so because “nuclear weapons, missile exports and support for terrorism are horrors Kim Jong Il inflicts on the outside world,” but also because like every good dictator, his treatment of his own people is a “bloody record of starvation and murder.”

Traditionally there are several ways that a regime change can come about. Internal factions can rise up and take over the government, overthrowing the regime; diplomatic measures from external forces can cause the collapse of the current government; or the regime can be overthrown by force.

   **a. Internal Factions**

The first possibility is that internal dissenters can band together to overthrow the government. The “Great Leader,” however, in his steadfast and somewhat manic desire to preserve his regime, rounds up everyone who even hints at dissent. Some 200,000 political prisoners are incarcerated in North Korean Gulags, or slave labor camps. “Entire families, including grandchildren, are incarcerated for even the most bland political statements, and forced abortions are carried out on pregnant women so that another generation of political dissidents will be ‘eradicated.’”

Even within the Kim Jong Il Regime, there is speculation that there are “very few officials who work honestly for the regime out of genuine loyalty,” rather, “most of them are pretending to be loyal to the regime out of the need to protect...”


355 Ibid.

themselves and their families.”358 Kim Jong Il, it seems, has made sure that there is really no viable opposition in North Korea.

b. External Diplomatic

Another regime change tactic is based on diplomatic efforts, usually by pressure or sanctions, designed to strangle the government into collapse. The 2002/2003 nuclear issue has been forwarded to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and one of their options in dealing with this situation is the imposition of sanctions on North Korea. One problem with this tactic when dealing with the Kim Jong Il regime, is that the North Korean economy is already in shambles. Chuck Downs points out, “there are limits to economic sanctions, without a doubt, because the economy of North Korea is in such bad shape after 50 years of their brand of socialism, that it’s hard to actually have an impact that makes it any worse.”359 In addition, it is widely thought that sanctions “afflict a country’s ordinary citizens, often without affecting the ruling elite.”360

It is widely known that North Korea would rather arm its military and develop its nuclear weapons program than to feed its people, and Kim Jong Il has not personally suffered from the famines and collapsed economy. While millions of North Koreans starved to death, “The Great Leader,” and all those close to him, live in the lap of luxury. In 1994 for example, at $630 per bottle, “Hennessy confirmed that Kim was its single biggest buyer of cognac for two years running.” In 1998, “a Mercedes-Benz representative was taken aback when Kim ordered 200 Class S Mercedeses (sic) at $100,000 apiece; the $20 million price tag was one fifth of the aid promised to North Korea that year by the United Nations.”361 In 1999, two Italian chefs and special ovens were flown into Pyongyang to provide pizza to Kim Jong Il and his cohorts.362 Currently


Jim Jong Il has gold, mined by slave labor, and more than $4 billion dollars in Swiss bank accounts. Since the economy is so bad, and since it is obvious that Kim Jong Il is the last in the country to suffer, economic sanctions designed to collapse the economy will not suffice to oust the leader.

The second problem with imposing sanctions against Kim Jong Il, is that since 1994, he has stated repeatedly that any sanctions imposed by the UNSC would be “a declaration of war.” This warning, the fact that the regime can continue to exist while its population dies off, and the fact that there are no internal dissidents willing to risk incarceration, and most likely death, to overthrow the government leaves only one possibility for executing a regime change – U.S. military action.

c. Military Action

While U.S. policymakers insist that they have no plans to attack North Korea, the situation is prime for Washington to do just that. The United States is setting the example in Iraq - a regime change by force, caused by a dictator’s continued refusal to disarm his country of WMD.

Secretary of Defense Colin Powell has stated that “no military option's been taken off the table, although we have no intention of attacking North Korea as a nation.” Like the military strikes on Baghdad, there is no need to attack North Korea as a nation; the U.S. would simply conduct strikes designed to eradicate the Kim Jong Il regime.


364 See below for discussion of armed conflict options.


The United States already has 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea, and approximately 100,000 in nearby Japan.\textsuperscript{366} The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the destroyer USS Lassen and guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam, that are in South Korea for Exercise Foal Eagle, an annually scheduled joint and combined training exercise, could be utilized in a strike on the North.\textsuperscript{367}

In addition, 24 long-range bombers have been sent to Guam as a deterrent to possible North Korean aggression.\textsuperscript{368} Utilizing these assets as well as those currently employed in the conflict with Iraq, the United States could conduct an attack on Pyongyang and attempt to destroy the Kim Jong Il regime.

d. Impediments to Regime Change

While most plausible for dealing with the Kim Jong Il regime, this military action option is extremely dangerous, and as of now, poses risks that U.S. policymakers are not willing to take. First of all, since there is no outward show of opposition to Kim Jong Il, the United States and its allies would be hard-pressed to find a suitable replacement for Kim Jong Il. In addition, there is some concern that the collapse of the regime would pose the threat of “loose nukes” falling into the hands of warlords or internal factions.\textsuperscript{369}

The most dangerous aspect of conducting strikes on Kim Jong Il, is the regime’s apparent willingness to strike back. We know that the DPRK has chemical, biological, and likely nuclear weapons, and the means by which to deploy them. Since there is a such a gap in U.S. intelligence-gathering ability, however, we do not know how many nuclear weapons the DPRK has, or where they are. In this case U.S. is unable to conduct strikes to neutralize these threats.


\textsuperscript{368} David Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Threats and Responses: Nuclear Standoff; U.S. Sending 2 Dozen Bombers In Easy Range of North Koreans,” March 5, 2003, New York Times, Late Edition - Final, Section A, Page 1, Column 1

North Korea has long-range artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, mostly protected in underground facilities, within striking distance of metropolitan Seoul. According to a former Combined Forces Command commander, without moving, these weapons systems are capable of delivering up to 500,000 rounds per hour for several hours. The most likely scenario is that if Pyongyang came under attack, Kim Jong Il would order a strike on Seoul and the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in and near it in a confrontation Senator Richard Lugar says, “would be devastating.” Of course Pyongyang has verbally targeted the U.S. itself. Reportedly, the communist party's newspaper, the Workers' Daily, declared that “the army and people of the DPRK are fully ready to mercilessly strike the bulwark of U.S. imperialist aggressors’ - implying that they could hit targets in the U.S.”

*e. The Asian Reaction*

Another impediment to this option is that barring an outright pre-emptive attack by the DPRK, the countries in Asia would not support United States military action in North Korea. Besides, or perhaps because of, the obvious fact that South Korea would likely be the first target, South Korean President Roh has not given up on the former administration’s Sunshine Policy. “After his election, Roh said he would not go along with the United States, his country's No. 1 ally, if Washington planned to attack the North because of its nuclear development.” The fear of reprisal on Seoul for a U.S.-led attack was underscored by Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan’s statements in Washington, that many young South Koreans "favored a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons over its collapse, which could trigger a war on the Korean Peninsula.”

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373 Recent statements from Pyongyang have suggested just that. See: Watts, Jonathan “N Korea threatens US with first strike: Pyongyang asserts right to pre-emptive attack as tensions rise over American build-up,” February 6, 2003, The Guardian [online] <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4599574,00.html>


375 Ibid.
Korea has continuously made pleas saying the United States needs to do more to resolve the dispute over North Korea’s nuclear programs, adding that direct U.S.-North Korea talks would do much to ease tensions.376

The Japanese government has not spoken out openly against U.S. policy, nor warned of its lack of support in a conflict. Japan, however, is not any more eager for armed conflict to come to the peninsula since it is also in range of North Korean missile strikes. Instead of taking the South Korean position of speaking out against the U.S., Tokyo has used its recent warming of relations to address Pyongyang. In 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Kim Jong-il signed a joint declaration at a summit in Pyongyang. Under this summit, Mr Kim vowed to extend the 1999 moratorium on ballistic missile testing apologized for kidnapping Japanese citizens during the Cold War. Of course, in return, Japan vowed to provide the North with economic aid when the two countries normalized diplomatic ties.377

At the outset of tensions, Tokyo urged the regime to reopen talks with the IAEA and to dismantle its nuclear program.378 More recently, Japanese officials warned North Korea that long-range missile launches or other provocative acts by North Korea could terminate efforts to improve bilateral ties and cost the North billions of dollars in economic aid from Tokyo.379 While Japan is eager to pursue a diplomatic solution, it is preparing for worst-case scenarios. Possibly fearing pre-emptive strikes, Japan has considered deploying two destroyers near North Korea to detect missile launches.380 In addition, Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, taking a defensive posture, warned North


Korea that it would launch counter attacks if it had evidence Pyongyang was preparing to launch ballistic missiles.\(^{381}\)

Like Japan, from the outset Russia has been trying to use its leverage and urge North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA.\(^{382}\) Also like Japan, Russia is concerned about Pyongyang’s reaction to any armed conflict. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s “personal judgment is that the potential threat stemming from that part of the world can potentially outweigh what we are witnessing in Iraq”\(^{383}\) What Russia really wants is for the situation to “revert to the status quo as it was a few months ago,” he said. “We reject any attempts to exert military pressure on a sovereign state.”\(^{384}\)

Mr. Ivanov, made it know that Russia’s position was to “advocate a nuclear free status of the Korean peninsula and further dialogue between North and South Korea.”\(^{385}\) He went on to say, that he believes the situation is “mainly an issue between the United States and the (North), but other countries also have a major interest in the situation.” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said it was a time for “quiet diplomacy” and added that it “is important to refrain from loud statements and from further antagonism of the sides.”\(^{386}\)

China certainly has a vested interest in persuading the United States to pursue non-confrontational avenues with North Korea. During the similar nuclear crisis of 1994, one of the reasons that the United States wanted to avoid armed conflict is because they did not want to see Chinese military intervention. Under the China-North Korea Friendship Treaty signed in 1961, in the event that North Korea was “cornered” as a result of an invasion by the U.S. and the ROK, China pledged to send 50,000 and


\(^{384}\) Ibid.


75,000 soldiers, as well as approximately 10,000 rapid deployment troops to North Korea.\footnote{\textquoteleft\textquoteright North Korea Nuclear Crisis February 1993 - June 1994\textquoteright Global Security Online, last modified December 28, 2002, March 22, 2003, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dprk_nuke.htm>}

Today, however, Beijing has made no secret of the fact it does not want to be drawn by the Kim regime -- which is despised by many cadres -- into a military conflagration. Chinese President Hu Jingtao is prepared for the worst-case scenario as shown by his formation of the “Leading Group on the North Korean Crisis” (LGNKC).\footnote{Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China looks ahead to Korea crisis,” March 18, 2003, CNN [online] <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/03/18/willy.column/>}

One of China’s main fears in the event of a U.S.-DPRK conflict is manifest by the fact that “Beijing has moved additional troops and the para-military People's Armed Police to its northeastern border with North Korea partly as a precaution against the influx of refugees.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Several Generals from the People’s Liberation Army of China have urged the Chinese leadership to “accede to Kim's demands for help against possible U.S. attacks,” but the LGNKc has not yet decided whether or not to provide military hardware to Pyongyang. Instead, it is hoping that diplomacy will resolve the conflict.\footnote{Ibid.}

3. Building a Multilateral “Asia Security” Coalition

President George W. Bush is right in refusing to negotiate directly with Pyongyang during U.S.-North Korea tensions of 2003. When the U.S. deals directly with North Korea, the U.S. does not fare very well. In addition, little progress is made toward long-term peace. Perhaps this is due to wide cultural gaps, perhaps because of the North Korean proficiency at manipulation, or perhaps it is because of the long-standing hatred of the U.S. by the successive Kim regimes. Either way, if parties in the North Korean sphere of influence work with North Korea, the situation can much more easily be rectified. In the last section it became apparent that none of the countries surrounding

\begin{flushright} 387  \hspace{1cm} 388  \hspace{1cm} 389  \hspace{1cm} 390  \end{flushright}
North Korea have any desire to see armed conflict; each has made statements desiring diplomatic solutions. It is obvious then that Senator Lugar hit on something when he said, “our strategy now has to be one of multilateral engagement” with other nations, such as Japan, China, Russia, which have a stake in continued peace on the Korean peninsula.391

Reunification of the Korean peninsula is not likely to happen in the near future. There does not seem to be a peaceful way to conduct a regime change in the DPRK. The way to create long-term peace and stability on the peninsula is through the formation of a multilateral “Asia Security” coalition (ASC), and through the systematic application of diplomatic measures. The ASC would preferably be made up of the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Russia. Along the same lines as the Truman Doctrine, this policy would put the onus of Asian Security on Asia. The United States, while it would be an active participant, would adopt a less prominent role in Korean affairs. In addition, the DPRK’s historic relationships, such as those with China and the former Soviet Union, can be exploited; and those that are more recent such as those with the ROK and Japan, can be nurtured.

In order to provide for long-term security on the Korean peninsula, the ASC would adopt a two-fold strategy for dealing with the DPRK – U.S. military disengagement, and economic engagement.

a. U.S. Military Disengagement

According to Kim Jong Il, his regime continues to proliferate weapons of mass destruction because he is concerned about his nation’s security – specifically from attacks by the United States. An “Asia security” coalition (ASC) would address this concern by first, supporting the staged disengagement of U.S. troops from the peninsula; and second, by filling a possible power vacuum by ensuring a stable security environment for the peninsula.

As was outlined in the U.S. Role section of the Reunification option, the disengagement of the U.S. from the peninsula is possible. The environment is ripe due to

increased South Korean protests of U.S. presence, and plans have been outlined by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Building on this plan, in his book *Korean Endgame*, Selig Harrison, Director of the National Security Program at the Center for International Policy, goes into great detail outlining a gradual reduction of U.S. forces that could be adopted by the ASC.392

The first step for the ASC is to negotiate the “pullback of forward-deployed North Korean forces with an offensive capability, especially heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and armor, out of artillery range of Seoul.” In return, CFC forces would also pull back from their forward positions. Since the pullback would be asymmetrical, Washington and Seoul, through the ASC would “negotiate the removal of weapons systems regarded by Pyongyang as offensive.” 393 This could include a partial withdrawal of forces from the peninsula, at first to be retained nearby in Japan, Guam and/or Hawaii to maximize security. In addition, “command, control, targeting and intelligence facilities must be retained in South Korea by the U.S.” 394 Once the immediate threat assumedly posed by the U.S. is neutralized, the DPRK’s nuclear and missile threats could be negotiated with further U.S. troop withdrawal over time.395 Not only would a gradual disengagement prevent the threat of a North Korean attack, it would also give the South time to enhance its military capabilities and to replace U.S. forces. Partially to ensure regional security and the interest that the United States has in the region, the CFC would be replaced by joint U.S. - Japanese forces in Japan.396 While some would argue that U.S. disengagement would be equivalent to the “world's Sole Superpower” yielding to blackmail, Bill Taylor has it right when he calls it “diplomacy in pursuit of U.S. and international interests in peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” 397

392 Note: It is important that any troop reduction or removal be gradual. It is unwise to assume that North Korea would not take the opportunity to try to reunify the peninsula by force if U.S. troops were to quickly disengage from the peninsula. It is likely that Kim Jong Il’s plans for such an act are at least partially behind Pyongyang’s continued insistence on U.S. troop withdrawal.

393 Harrison, 191

394 Ibid.

395 This nuclear/missile threat would also be alleviated by the ASC through an economic phase. See below.

396 Harrison, 191

Since the DPRK has called for a treaty of non-aggression with the United States, the second phase for peninsular security would be for the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan, to cancel corresponding unilateral security agreements with both Seoul and Pyongyang. Instead, the ASC would provide a multilateral non-aggression agreement to both South and North Korea. In this agreement, however, the ASC would pledge to provide military support to either, in the event of an attack by the other, in an attempt to unify by force. In addition, to alleviate concerns that a power vacuum would open up on the peninsula, the ASC would provide an agreement that bars the introduction of foreign military forces into the peninsula.

One last measure for Korean physical security, is the formal recognition by the ASC for both Koreas to exist. While the ASC would be supportive of the eventual reunification of the country, it would agree to leave the matter to be negotiated strictly by the Koreas.

b. Economic Engagement

According to this thesis, economics, not national security is the primary driving force behind Pyongyang’s actions. Specifically, the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation efforts are part of a plan to extort capital from the U.S. and its allies, to keep the dying regime afloat. Providing economic security to Pyongyang will go a long way to bringing security to the peninsula. This security, however, is the responsibility of not just one, but all of the nations of the ASC.

i. Japan’s Role

One of the most important relationships that North Korea has with Japan is an economic one. With the end of the Cold War and the Russians and Chinese turning away from the DPRK, North Korea looked toward Japan to provide economic assistance. While historically there were numerous causes for disagreement: the amount of reparations requested by the DPRK for occupation damages; Japan’s

398 In comparison, Selig Harrison proposes a nuclear free, neutral buffer state. The author does not believe this is a viable option in the near future due to the inherent militaristic nature of the North Korean nation.

399 Harrison, 192

400 In addition, leaders in Pyongyang were trying to put a wedge between South Korea and Japan.
insistence that North Korea had kidnapped Japanese citizens; and Japan’s demand that
North Korea resolve its differences with South Korea over nuclear inspections; Japan and
North Korea finally appear to have gotten past these issues.

Tokyo’s Chief Cabinet secretary Aoki Mikio announced that,  
“Tokyo is restarting talks with Pyongyang because diplomatic ties are essential for
stability across the region.” 401 While those particular talks ended early with the Japanese
delegation leaving North Korea over the colonial reparations issue, it would not be long
before those issues would finally be put to rest.

In September 2002, an historical summit was conducted between
Kim Jong Il and Japanese prime minister Koizumi Junichiro. 402 During the
unprecedented summit, Mr. Kim made a startling admission that North Korean
commandos had indeed kidnapped several Japanese citizens, expressed a sincere apology
to his counterpart, and promised that it would not happen again. Mr. Kim’s apology
remained conspicuously absent from the subsequent DPRK-Japan Pyongyang agreement.
Mr. Koizumi’s sincere apology for the fact that Japan had inflicted damage and sufferings
upon the Korean people during its colonial rule over Korea – the first time such an
official apology was made – was, however, written into the agreement. Tokyo also
promised to render economic cooperation to Pyongyang in the form of grants, low-
interest long-term loans and humanitarian aid and to “provide loans and credit through
the International Cooperation Bank of Japan, etc. from the viewpoint of aiding non-
governmental economic activities in the period both sides think appropriate after the
normalization of diplomatic ties.” 403 In return, Pyongyang made a carefully worded
pledge to “observe all the international agreements for a comprehensive solution to the
nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula,” and the DPRK pledged to extend its moratorium
on missile tests beyond 2003. 404

401 Unattributed, “Pyongyang to Set Talks with Tokyo,” 1999, The Peoples Korea Homepage [online]
<http://www.korea-np.co.jp:pk/133th_issue/2000030902.htm>

402 See Unattributed, “First DPRK-Japan Summit Makes Breakthrough in Changing Long-Hostility
into Normalcy,” September 2002, The People’s Korea Homepage – Archives [online] < http://www.korea-
np.co.jp/pk/>

403 Unattributed, “DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration Published,” September 18, 2002, People’s

404 Ibid.
While it appears that tensions are on the rise between Japan and the DPRK instead, it just might be that the banter between Japan and the DPRK is promoting a new sense of respect for Japan by the DPRK, and is serving to set limits. Recently Tokyo has warned North Korea that it will take pre-emptive military action if Pyongyang plans to launch a missile attack against Japan. On the other hand, Tokyo has been very careful to point out that so far Pyongyang has not yet violated the 2002 historic joint declaration with North Korea, which opened talks towards the normalization of ties. It is this continued respect for the 2002 agreement, coupled with the fact that currently Japan conducts $370 million dollars in trade annually with the DPRK, that sets Japan up to be a major economic link between the ASC and North Korea.

ii. South Korea’s Role

South Korea is currently a significant trading partner to the DPRK. Most of the ROK’s $350 million annual trade with its northern neighbor is from sending textiles to North Korea and buying back finished clothes. In addition to this current trade, South Korean President Roh has stated on numerous occasions that he is interested in continuing to pursue the engagement policies set up by his predecessor.

It appears that South Korea is already well on its way to fulfilling the economic aid to North Korea that being a member state of the ASC would require. Despite the current situation on the peninsula, throughout March 2003, South Korea has continued to pledge economic support for the North. For example, inter-Korean trade has already increased fifty-eight percent from 2002. The ROK also agreed to provide 1.3 million tons of rice to North Korea, in addition to more than $19 million it has promised.

405 Herbert Goldhamer, a RAND psychologists who attended the Korean War armistice negotiations states that “when negotiators have been able to hold firm and back up their words with military action, North Korea has always yielded.” See Downs, p. 9.


through various humanitarian aid projects. In addition, plans have been made to reconnect the North-South Korean railroad by April, 2003.

iii. Russia’s Role

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has been preoccupied with building its own economy. This fact is highlighted by the fact that between 1992 and 2000, Russian-North Korean bilateral trade dropped from $600 million to $105 million a year. In the last several years, however, Russia has looked toward warming its economic relations with the DPRK. In July 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang and negotiated the DPRK-Russia Joint Declaration. In the declaration, among other things, the two nations pledged to “actively develop trade, economic and scientific and technological ties between the two sides and create legal, financial and economic conditions favourable (sic) for this.” Again in 2001, the two leaders reconfirmed their commitments when Kim Jong Il traveled to Moscow to meet with President Putin.

In 2002, Alexander Yakovenko, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that Russia is greatly interested in implementing multilateral economic projects with North Korea, specifically he said, their greatest hopes were pinned on working towards linking the two countries via Russia's Trans-Siberian Railroad. While Russia still does not have the capital to make major investments in

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North Korea, the historical economic relationship and renewed diplomacy between Moscow and Pyongyang will facilitate even diplomacy in the ASC.

**iv.  China’s Role**

China also has a serious economic interest in Pyongyang for both political and economic reasons. As the North's most important trading partner, China’s trade with North Korea hit more than $700 million in 2002, up 30 percent over 2001. In addition, China provides ninety percent of the North’s energy. With the recent cutoff of U.S. fuel supplies to Pyongyang, China is now believed to supply about 70 percent of the North's oil, experts said, and China has also doubled its sales of grain and vegetables.

In recent months, however, Chinese officials have refused to get directly involved in the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation issue. One senior Chinese official explained that there is an internal struggle between younger Chinese officials who believe China should take a greater role in international affairs and more conservative officials who believe China should focus on economic development, and should prop up the North Korean government no matter what. The latter concern is based on fears that the North's sputtering economy could lead to a regime collapse, and subsequent absorption of the DPRK into South Korea. This, Chinese officials fear, would bring the South Koreans and their American allies up to China’s border. They are also concerned that this would force South Korea, which has invested billions in China, to devote all its resources to absorbing the North.

The formation of the ASC would allow for the younger Chinese to realize their goal of an increased international role. As well, the diminished threat and disengagement of the United States would pacify the more conservative officials.

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418 Pomfret

419 Ibid.

420 Ibid.
would set the stage for the role that China would play in providing economic assistance to the DPRK to prevent regime collapse.\textsuperscript{421}

\textbf{v. \textit{The United States’ Role}}

Since the main objective is to return responsibility for North Korea back to its Asian neighbors, it is these countries that will provide the majority of economic support to the nation. While the United States would disengage militarily, and for the most part politically, from the peninsula, it would still have an economic role to play as a member of the ASC. Since 1995, the United States has provided more than $500 million in food and other commodities to North Korea - up to 350,000 metric tons of food each year.\textsuperscript{422} Just in food alone, the U.S. has contributed nearly 2 million metric tons since 1995.\textsuperscript{423}

Not only has the United States provided approximately 3.3 million barrels of fuel oil to the DPRK under the Agreed Framework, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have provided alternate energy sources to villages in the DPRK.\textsuperscript{424} In addition, such NGOs have provided immeasurable medical and humanitarian aid to the people of the DPRK.\textsuperscript{425} As an ASC member, the United States would continue to contribute to the North Korean economy by supporting these same humanitarian aid programs, and by continuing to provide food and energy.

\textbf{vi. \textit{North Korea’s Role}}

All of this economic aid and security must come at a price, to be paid by Pyongyang. There are several responsibilities that North Korea as part of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{421} There is still concern that regime collapse would yield an influx of North Korean refugees into China.
  \item \textsuperscript{423} Unattributed, “Humanitarian Aid to North Korea: Background,” March 24, 2003, Friends Committee on National Legislation [online] <http://www.fcnl.org/issues/int/sup/nkorea_aid324-03.htm>
\end{itemize}
ASC would have to meet. First is to end its nuclear proliferation efforts and to dismantle its current nuclear projects. With its security concerns alleviated, this should not be a problem for the Kim regime. Second, the DPRK must address humanitarian issues and must work toward real and tangible economic reform in the country. Since Kim Jong Il has appeared to be sincere in negotiating treaties, but has continued to violate them, in order for this multilateral approach to work, Kim Jong Il must comply with the ASC. This means everything from allowing full inspections of nuclear facilities, to allowing verification of humanitarian aid recipients. There is really no reason the DPRK would refuse to cooperate with the ASC. With trade and economic support through the combined efforts of the Asian economic giants, North Korea could build a viable economy, thereby strengthening the country and legitimizing the Kim Jong Il regime.

C. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Even while attempting to keep their national Juché ideology intact, North Korean leaders have manipulated it to serve their own goals. History suggests that when the leaders of the DPRK became desperate for economic aid, they first attempted to make lucrative alliances. When that approach fell short of the DPRK’s economic goals, they turned to more drastic measures and began threatening the security of the region i.e.: selling missiles and technology, effecting the crisis of 1994, and proliferating WMD.

The United States’ post-framework policies continued to support the Agreed Framework and to give North Korea the benefit of the doubt even when it was not fulfilling its obligations. It turns out that the DPRK has continued to ensure that these bilateral agreements contain loopholes. Despite the fact that he dismisses these tactics as the actions of a “good negotiator,” Selig S. Harrison points out that in the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement and 1999 missile-testing moratorium, for example, the DPRK’s leaders put the onus on the United States for assuring DPRK compliance. They used conditional phrases such as if the United States “fully normalized relations” and made “formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”426 Therefore, in such agreements, the regime did not actually relinquish the option of resuming its nuclear and missile programs...which it has done.”427

426 Harrison, 201.
427 Ibid.
So while the current Bush administration at first attempted to pursue a constructive relationship with Pyongyang, the lack of good faith negotiations and disclosure of its treaty violations and proliferation activities, quickly ended the unilateral relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK. These facts coupled with its continued organized militarism has caused President George W. Bush to identify the DPRK as a rogue state, making it, along with Iraq and Iran, an international pariah.

So far the DPRK’s threats have been more bark than bite, because the United States has paid heavy ransoms to the Kim regimes for security in Asia. But, in light of the fact that the DPRK possesses chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means by which to deploy them, every threat should be taken seriously. Another impending threat to United States national security is not necessarily from North Korea itself, but rather from its customers. There is evidence that when negotiations fail and economic aid ceases from Asia and the West, the DPRK turns to other nations such as Iraq for income, namely by exporting weapons. We must not rule out the possibility that behind the North Korean disclosure of WMD capability is a veiled threat to the U.S. that it would provide such weapons to enemies of the United States – possibly the leaders of the Arab world who are engaging in anti-American acts of terrorism.

Eliminating both the imminent and long-term conventional and WMD threat posed by the DPRK should be the priority of U.S.-North Korean policy. The DPRK WMD issue, especially in view of the rise of the international threat of terrorism, presents a clear and present danger to U.S. vital interests, its assets, and its allies in the region. Because this climate of threat exists, and the fact that the DPRK continues to show scorn for its bilateral relationship with the United States, Washington must convince its regional allies, and those with economic and security interests in the region, to take a more active role. China, Japan, the ROK, and Russia need to join the United States in creating a security coalition that would serve to provide the DPRK a more secure national environment and to help bolster its economy through trade and diplomacy, thereby creating stability on the peninsula.

The Asia Security Coalition would meet Kim Jong Il’s current demands for security assurances and provide a way for the country to become economically viable.
For North Korea, it is a win-win situation. In order for such an option to work on the other hand, this coalition as a whole must adopt a less conciliatory, more firm stance towards the DPRK, with regard to holding the North to its responsibilities. While the primary responsibility for the United States would be gradual disengagement from the peninsula, U.S. policymakers, through the ASC, should make some long-term demands. A “gamesman” who prides himself at getting something for nothing, Kim Jong Il must be forced to disarm, to cease his WMD proliferation programs and to better the living conditions of the North Korean people.

Barring a peaceful regime change, diplomacy is the best option for working to attain long-term peace on the peninsula, and United States policymakers should certainly do their best to make it work.
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