

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL AND ITS CONNECTION WITH TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

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ABSTRACT

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The project will focus strategically on the issue of violence in Brazil and its international linkage, showing the dangerous perspectives for the future of the country if actions are not appropriately taken. Initially, the author shows the understanding of strategic thinking applied to the specific theme of violence. After that, the issue of violence is analyzed as it appears in Brazilian society nowadays and in which dimension it can affect the country presently and in the future.

International implications, and the linkage with transnational crimes, including terrorism, are observed, mainly in South American context, in order to understand the importance of the issue for the Southern Region and the necessity to develop integrated operations to face the problem. This paper also recommends viable actions to be implemented to transform the actual situation, involving preventive and repressive measures, in the internal and external context. Taking into account the strategic perspective proposed, actions offered are directed to the root of the problem in order to achieve truly transformation. Additionally, in this panorama, the convenience of Armed Forces participation, and in which dimension, is discussed.

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VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL AND ITS CONNECTION WITH TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

The rise of transnational organized crime in the last decades of the twentieth century was as unexpected as the end of the Cold War, if far less dramatic and abrupt. In some respects, however, the challenges posed to national and international governance and international security by criminal organizations could prove more enduring, more complex and, in some respects, more difficult to manage than the relationship of nuclear arms race era.

— Williams and Dimitri Vlassis

At the beginning of this new millennium the global community still lives in a period of uncertainties focused on the construction of a new order to realize planet-wide harmony and peaceful co-existence, and the opportunity to ensure the development and well-being of all nations. During the last century the South American Continent enjoyed an age of unprecedented peace and relative harmony. It begins the new millennium as the most demilitarized region on the planet.

In this context, Brazil has been living in an era characterized by extensive friendly relationships with all of the neighboring countries and has not engaged in an external conflict since the so-called "Paraguay War" in the middle of the nineteenth century. However, that climate of international peace cannot be considered a "true peace" when the domestic situation is taken into account. Violent internal criminal manifestations and crimes committed against individuals have reached unacceptable levels and immediate action must be taken to safeguard its citizens. This large-scale criminality compromises not only the present but also the future of the nation and currently represents one of the largest concerns of the community. Uncontrolled violence retards progress and can bring irreversible damage as it corrupts the major asset of the nation - its citizenry!

Brazil, a country favored with enormous potential and an abundance of natural resources, cannot condone institutional deviations that endanger the nation's current well-being and its future development. Action must be immediately taken to combat this threat. This paper will attempt to delineate the basis for the strategic planning necessary in order to attack this complex problem. Subsequently, it will outline the broad picture of the current violence, pointing out the exact dimensions of that violence and criminality which terrorizes Brazilian society.

Consonant with the national reality, the situation will be described in the world context with approximate focus on the South American Continent. Important illustrations such as the one of Colombia will be examined. With this perspective, and in juxtaposition with the theme of world

globalization, it will be made clear that nations are interacting with larger propinquity and, as a result, internal problems have a tendency to transpose borders with amazing speed. The danger of transnational crimes (terrorism is included) is part of the reality of the third millennium:

The world today is not that one of prosperity, understanding and peace that was the traditional look of the United States and of which most of the democratic nations dreamed for the planet when the last breath of the Cold War ended and when, in truth, one could think for the first time, that mankind would stop being man's wolf. Once again we have to put in doubt the human being's capacity to process the differences and to concur with the solutions.¹

A goal of this manuscript is to foster comprehension of the evolution of transnational crimes, the real danger of that menace in the new millennium and what the current situations are in some countries of South America, particularly those in close proximity to Brazil. Based on the knowledge of the reality of the violence, in national and international contexts, it will suggest steps needed to be implemented in order to turn around these adverse situations. Using a strategic focus, actions are suggested with the purpose of reaching the centers of gravity, the true root of the problems, so that a transformation can be initiated with durable results that will be impregnated in the national culture.

The participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces, in conjunction with other segments of national power is analyzed to understand its necessity in arriving at and implementing any permanent solution. Violence may be likened to a disease that, if it is not treated immediately and appropriately, can thoroughly contaminate the pillars that nourish and sustain the structure of the nation, in that it directly affects the electorate and the leadership.² Without a safe and secure populace a nation cannot exist. Without a government that institutes and enforces law and order and is capable of responding to the population's anxieties and fears, a country cannot expect to develop and attain desirable goals.

There is no time remaining for shortsighted vision. The future must be faced and enhanced by actions undertaken in the present. The wisdom of government will be, in part, judged by its past and current actions in fighting those cancers in society that threaten its very existence, attacking the sore spots that destroy its capacity to guarantee a grandiose future. Strategically, violence must be combated and the battle won before optimum future advancement of the country is possible.

STRATEGIC THOUGHT APPLIED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE VIOLENCE

Violence is a complex and widespread subject with direct correlations to public security and transnational organized crime. In the search for solutions to this scourge it is necessary to utilize strategic planning and develop actions with different yet related short, medium and long-

term goals. Only with a wide and comprehensive understanding of the issue can concrete plans of actions be proposed that will be effective and capable of producing desired results.

Among the objectives that Brazil should achieve by are two that stand out from the others: "Order and Progress" – they reflect the wording on the National Flag. The sequence of the words in the construction of that symbolic phrase permeates the psyche of the Brazilian nation and reflects its true priorities. The achievement of order assumes first place followed by the realization of progress and development that will lead to the well being of the nation as a whole.

The word "order" suggests the most wide-ranging definitions, beginning with administrative organization and leading to legality. It is impossible to conceive order without an organized, harmonically working social structure. Among the several internal factors that can disturb and even destabilize order are those directly related to violence and criminality. Order, therefore, needs to be assumed as a permanent national objective to be achieved and maintained. However, among the hurdles³ that must be surmounted is that of crime and violence. They currently occupy a prominent position and must be dealt with prior to attainment of the desired objectives of Order and Progress.

National Strategy is the art of preparing and applying National Power, overcoming hurdles, to accomplish and to maintain the Permanent National Objectives (PNO), in agreement with the established orientation furnished by National Policy.⁴ Strategic thought can be defined as the balance among resources (means), objectives (ends) and the conception or manners of performance (ways) to reach desired results.⁵ When the resources are scarce, as in Brazil, it is necessary to accept risks, selecting and prioritizing points of performance. Considering the disastrous implications of violence on order and on national progress, as well as its possible compromise of the future of the nation (as will be explained later in the thesis), this is undoubtedly one of the subjects that must be prioritized.

The levels of analysis of strategic thought can be focused on leaders, states, or international entities. In the present project, a deeper analysis is focused on the two latter factors, keeping in mind that it is from the interaction between the domestic political system and the international one that National Policy and Strategy will evolve.

Taken into account that interaction of internal and external factors as well as the potential of violence could lead to the exportation of internal threats across borders to other countries or regions, thus becoming transnational crimes, the line of strategic thought to be formulated will have a focus on cooperative security,⁶ in which world order is based on the interdependence of the individual states. Without cooperation among sovereign nations in combating transnational violence and crime there is little possibility of effective results.

Among the expected aspects for the 21st Century world of globalization, is the increased proximity and interaction among countries. A consequence of that phenomenon is that local actions begin to have regional or even global repercussions. The speed of information exchange and the ease of transcending national borders can favor positive actions of integration and united development. This could, however, also increase the export of internal problems, thus requiring international involvement in heretofore local affairs and which could lead to substantial changes in the foreign policies of the involved countries.

Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, in the latter-half of the nineteenth century, referring to the foreign policy, affirmed: "...what is called a policy? The only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the interest of our country one's guiding principle. We have no eternal allies and no permanent enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests is our duty to follow."⁷ In spite of the premise that in international relationships there are no friends or enemies, just interests, conflicting or consonant, on the subject of violence and of transnational crimes the consensus and the search for combined solutions are more easily reachable because the interests of different countries are usually congruent.

This paper's approach to such a complex and important subject for Brazil is to utilize a broad vision and to pinpoint strategic insight. Violence is a central theme in the totality of the world but it especially afflicts and finds broad repercussions and enormous disarray in the sub-developed and developing countries. It is necessary to remember that a significant number of countries are becoming more and more marginalized in international policy as the disparity between them and the ruling group steadily increases. The population of the world, 5.3 billion in 1990, is expected to exceed more than 10 billion in 2050, 85% of them concentrated in the Third World.

In beginning the study of violence, we need to remember that "whether in business or defense, the first steps to any strategic plan include a definition of objectives and an evaluation of the environment in which those objectives will be pursued."⁸ Thus, we now turn to an analysis of violence in its various manifestations.

THE SUBJECT OF VIOLENCE

GENERAL ASPECTS

Violence is a difficult and complex subject, with varied and wide definitions. In its essence violence is related to the abuse of force and to physical or moral constraint.⁹

Actually, violence is an intrinsic element of humanity's history and it has many times achieved maximum signs of disarray, with dramatic manifestations, particularly on the battlefield. Sigmund Freud believed that men are endowed with a basic instinct of aggression and affirmed that:

Man is not a gentle creature, friendly, desirous of love... strong doses of a desire for aggression should be computed as part of his instinctive gifts... any one that recalls the atrocities of the first migrations, the invasion of the Huns or of the so-called Genghis Khan's Mongols and Tamerlane, or the goal of Jerusalem for the Crusaders even, actually, the horrors of the last war, will have to lower their head in the face of the reality of this vision of man.¹⁰

However, this is a simplistic approach to explain such a complex phenomenon. External and circumstantial factors exercise great influence on human behavior and therefore exert direct influence over the statistics of violence. After comparing data with that of previous years, it can be verified that the great increase in violent actions and criminal practices in Argentina began after the economic crisis in that country in 2001 and 2002. Another example was published in the informative Newsletter of Resdal.¹¹ It happened in Uruguay on July 31, 2002 when at the peak of an economic crisis, with banks closed during the entire week, street sellers' groups that worked in public transportation buses were unable to sell their products because of a total lack of passengers' purchasing power and decided to assault and steal food from a supermarket located only a few blocks from the Uruguayan Parliament Building.

Reinforcing the theme of the influence of external factors on violent behavior is research accomplished by the Núcleo de Estudos da Violência (Center of Studies of Violence) at the Universidade de São Paulo (São Paulo University - Brazil), directed by sociologist Guaracy Mingardi. Statistics gathered from a study of 14 Police Districts that were located in some of the most violent neighborhoods in the southern area of São Paulo, verified that alcohol appeared as a prime cause in at least 41% of the homicides in the area.¹² Minor disagreements combined with the use of drugs or alcohol can easily progress into violent actions with tragic consequences. The same research revealed that banal reasons, such as discussions in a bar, in traffic or between neighbors were catalysts in 48.3% of deaths.

Several other indicators can be pointed to as generators or motivators of violent actions. It is undeniable, for instance that there is a strong connection between drugs and criminal practices or even unlawful behavior by otherwise law-abiding citizens. The trafficking and/or possession of weapons (legal or illegal) are another gauge of potential violence. Research in the United States verified that for each case of homicide in self-defense there were 43 suicides,

inter-family homicides or mortal accidents that occurred using firearms kept in the home for protection.¹³

A challenging approach to the subject of violence is its narrow bond with the so-called "economics of the crime." Gary S. Becker, a Professor at the University of Chicago in the United States, is a prominent representative of a line of thinkers that considers that there is a primordial factor in the ruling process of offending, to practice criminal or violent acts, the so-called "index return" or the "economy of the crime." According to Becker "the essence of the economic approach to crime is amazingly simple. It says that people decide whether to commit crime by comparing the benefits and costs of engaging in the crime."¹⁴ According to this line of thought, the practice of a criminal action basically depends on 3 factors: (1) The size of the "reward" proportionate to the crime; (2) The probability of being arrested and convicted; and (3) The rigidity of the punishment that could be received.

Becker, in his work published in 1995, attests that "for Great Britain, the data indicates that the probability of being caught, convicted, and send to prison for committing a crime is under two percent."¹⁵ Imagine the situation when that same subject is a resident of countries plagued with chronic structural problems and with a corrupted police and judiciary systems.

Leaving the identification of other indicators of violence for subsequent analysis, it is evident that defining violence is more complex and entails more than the fact of admitting that man is a violent being. Violence is a multi-faced phenomenon, of varied origins and motivations. When studied in more depth, several themes are also apparent that suggest that effective actions can be applied in order to drastically reduce the astonishing array of statistics on violence.

As it was previously noted, minor issues can be the fuses of violent actions of great consequence. Accordingly, it is easy to deduce that those isolated actions; originally small crimes, can be exposed to external influences, metamorphosed into group actions, and then become transformed into what is known as "organized crime." Those that indulge in that type of crime, particularly with the chances offered by the global world of the twenty-first century, easily find opportunities to transcend borders and establish international connections that adversely affect many countries. Such actions, generally know as transnational crimes, can achieve regional or worldwide prominence.

In a process of catastrophic evolution, the same individuals or groups that control organized crime can utilize terrorist actions in order to implement clandestine actions, forming alliances or merging with terrorist groups and thus gaining the capacity of local, regional or

universal operations. This process will be utilized to describe the current picture of violence in Brazil and then will expand to a global vision of organized crime, terrorism and violence.

VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL

General Aspects and Social Factors

Violence is one of the most relevant factors on the Brazilian scene. It is the second largest concern of the population and only the preservation of purchasing power surpasses its importance. In research conducted during the pre-election period for the Presidency of the Federative Republic of Brazil (June through October 2002), when questioned on the issues and priorities that should be immediately pursued by the next President, voters awarded first place to economics and second place to violence and public security.

It is very easy to understand the relevance of the subject of violence when comparing Brazilian crime statistics to those of other countries. One of the most definitive measures of criminality is to establish the number of murders per 100,000 people; Colombia - divided and plagued by civil war and narco-violence - leads South America in this category. Brazil and Bolivia follow it in second and third places, respectively. The following chart presents recent comparative data that demonstrates some of the dimensions of the problem in the Southern Hemisphere (Canada is listed only as an example):

Country	Incidence of homicides for 100.000 inhabitants
Argentina	18.2 (1998)
Brazil	25.91 (1998)
Bolivia	23.2 (1994)
Canada	2.0 (1994)
Chile	4.5 (1994)
Colombia	81.4 (1998)

Source: Almanaque Abril 2002

TABLE 1. INCIDENCE OF HOMICIDES FOR 100.000 INHABITANTS / COUNTRIES

The situation is actually more serious than it appears in the above chart when the phenomena is observed and tabulated in some of the larger urban centers in Brazil as indicated below:

City	Incidence of homicides for 100.000 inhabitants
Recife - PE	81.51
Vitória - ES	73.94
Cuiabá - MT	70.18
São Paulo - SP	59.28
Boa Vista - RR	53.98
Rio de Janeiro- RJ	52.68

Source: Almanaque Abril 2002

TABLE 2. INCIDENCE OF HOMICIDES FOR 100.000 INHABITANTS / CITIES

Using this approach it is noted that in some areas of the cities listed above there are more than 100 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants,¹⁶ making the population in those areas hostages of the criminal elements. This further generates other types of violence whose scope and numbers do not appear in official data such as psychological damage (fear) where the populace actually feel (with good reason) that they are not safe from violent actions, even inside their homes, businesses or places of worship.

Another factor, largely ignored, is the controversial and horrifying number of young people that are either victims or perpetrators of violent acts. According to the research of André Simões, "in Brazil, in 1980, 61.5% of deaths of males between the ages of 15 and 19 years of age were violent deaths; that percentile grew to 75.64%, in 1995. In the Northeast Area those values were even larger, reaching 67.85% and 79.6% respectively, for the analyzed period."¹⁷ One of the largest reasons for concern is that those young people involved in criminal acts are not in the job market and also are usually out of the educational system. For them, illicit revenue creates the false premise of easy money and makes it unlikely that they will ever return to (or live long enough for) legality and a normal life. In consequence, the greatest assets of the nation, its young people, are helping to compromise the progress and very future of the country.

Violence in Brazil became excessively worse during the last two decades of the past century. Between 1983 and 1994 the total homicides per 100,000 inhabitants grew approximately 194%, reaching unacceptable and compromising levels. Among the factors that collaborated in this trends the most significant were:

- Economic losses: drastic reductions in the growth rates of the economy, particularly in the beginning of the eighties, the so-called "lost decade," when the country registered negative growth rates and began an economic recession period;

- Aggravation of social differences: one of the largest and most sensitive issues in the Brazilian scenario. The inequality in the distribution of income was aggravated by the economic crisis of the period. Brazil ranks fourth in the world for the worst distribution of income, after Swaziland, Nicaragua and South Africa. According to data published by Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística - IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), the poorest 10% of the population have access to only 1% of the wealth generated in the country while the richest 10% of the population controls 46.7% of the economy;¹⁸

- Increase in the relative number of teenagers and young adults in the pyramid of ages: the demographic transition in the population trend of Brazil led to 42.20% of its population concentrated in the area of between 15 and 39 years of age by 1999;¹⁹

- Crisis in the public services: the globalization process, the execution of services of the public agencies by third party companies and the privatization of older state entities diminished the number of services in the public sector; and

- Migration to the cities: at the end of the 1960's, the urban population in Brazil composed 55.92% of the total population of the nation. Subsequently, migratory movements from the rural areas to the cities, particularly from the rural areas of the Northeast (poorest) to the urban centers of the Southeast (richest) and to the satellite cities of the Federal District, increased. Brazil began the new century with more than 81% of the population residing in urban areas. In most cases, a deficiency of urban housing structured to shelter the mass of new residents, as well as the lack of educational and professional training, disqualified many of these new residents for permanent employment. These factors also stimulated the formation of slums or "ghettos" in the cities and peripheral areas, which became nuclei of violence. As wrote Isaura Cesar:

The violence, although it is not the intent of the great urban centers, happens in them with larger intensity. The high demographic concentration, the heterogeneous composition of the population as well as the adverse social conditions characterized by poverty, unemployment, hunger, lack of qualifications for the job market, incentive for consumption, and lack of perspectives allow the increase of aggressiveness that ends by generating the most severe and intense forms of violence.²⁰

In spite of the uncontrolled increase in public violence that commenced in 1980, other violent manifestations of a more personal nature began to receive closer attention. They were studied in great depth, as were the circumstances surrounding domestic violence. A precursor of violence by itself, the latter is also a violence multiplier. Children that are raised in a violent atmosphere tend to reproduce that pattern of behavior in other environments, a process of transmission of assimilated values. Domestic violence is a universal reality. In the United

States, between 1973 and 1981, the Department of Justice registered 4.1 million cases of family violence, an average of 450,000 annual cases. In Brazil, due partly to the interaction of other factors, the phenomenon is more serious. Statistical data compiled by the Civil Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro indicate that approximately 70% of the homicides of children between the ages of one day to nine years were perpetuated by members of their own family.

The increase in violence, largely fostered by socially poor conditions in the peripheral areas of the cities, created fertile soil for the growth of marginal gangs and for establishment of so-called "organized crime." Organized crime, to maintain its various activities, requires continuing lucrative sources of income and constant recruitment of new personal. Personnel are easily found among the outlying areas of the cities. Most of the time they are abandoned by a state that does not offer essential basic services to the citizens. When seeking sources of increased income, organized crime finds support in the illegal trade of drugs.

As a consequence of the above-mentioned factors, two crucial problems arise. First, is that the majority of youngsters recruited by organized crime are paid with drugs. The need for continued maintenance of the addiction creates a dependent link difficult to break, and it doubly commits these young people to a lifetime involvement with drugs and crime. Research by UNESCO²¹ among young people from 10 to 24 years old reveals that 15% of the youths in Rio de Janeiro currently consume or in the past have consumed illicit drugs.

The second serious problem is that organized crime has the capacity to interact not only internally, but that it can establish international connections thus becoming transnational crime (a model that will be more deeply explored later in this paper). This transcending of borders makes possible a perverse circuit in the growth of violent actions, when small local manifestations can constantly develop until the point that they became international terrorism. The Washington Post printed that:

In the early 1990s, Brazil was mainly a transit point for illicit drugs produced elsewhere in South America. Now it's the world's second-largest consumer of cocaine after the United States, and that trade is overseen by cocaine 'commands' that have grown in wealth, power and sophistication. Today, they are equipped with automatic rifles, grenades and rocket launchers – arms sometimes newer and better than those of some Latin American armies.²²

Organized crime disputes on territorial and population domain. The acquisition of more and more sophisticated armaments is one of its trademarks and indicators of its presence. Brazil is the fifth largest manufacturer of firearms in the world, with 200,000 pieces/year and is the third largest exporter behind the United States and Germany. However, only half of the almost 5 million known existent weapons in Brazil are registered. A fraction of Brazil's weapons

exports goes to Paraguay and then is illegally returned to Brazil by international traffickers. Largely due to these factors, the percentage of crimes committed with firearms in the nation increased from 43.60% in 1980 to 59% in 1996 and the figures continue to reach astonishing numbers in cities like Rio de Janeiro, where 80% of crimes are committed with firearms.²³

The Police

In order to provide a broad vision of the subject of violence it is necessary to present a few statistics on those organizations directly involved with the area under discussion - the police, security and justice agencies. There are approximately 500,000 policemen in Brazil and added to that number (although without a direct connection) is an additional one million persons that are engaged in different sectors of private security. These staggering numbers are, in themselves, an indication of the absurd sums that are expended to combat criminality and violence. When analyzed, the relative data (see table below) demonstrates that Brazil currently possesses a balanced ratio in the number of policemen per inhabitants; but these numbers must be increased and are not numerically sufficient in order to control great sections of the country (compared to other countries with large territorial regions such as Australia, the United States and Canada).

Country	Number of inhabitants per policeperson
Germany	315
Australia	414
Belgium	276
Brazil	319
Great Britain	406
Canada	474
Spain	219
USA	393
France	258

Source: Almanaque Abril 2002

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF INHABITANTS PER POLICEPERSON

The numerical perspective indicated above is not the most important factor that should be noted, because other considerations need to be emphasized. The first of these is the problem of salaries. Each Federative State is responsible for the establishment of its own police force. As a consequence, there is an enormous disparity among existing salaries for basically the same work (but in different jurisdictions) and a consequent difficulty in the selection and training

of forces. In areas where wages are low, infiltration and influence of organized crime and the degree of corruption are more easily observed. Low wages and a deprivation of family necessities generate a need for additional income that is only too often provided by organized crime. In order to exist, it is imperative that the individual either changes professions or establishes a parallel activity that will complement income. The so-called "bico" (casual earnings) supplements actual salaries and of course provides a diversion of the policeperson from their primary duties of preserving the peace and enforcing law and order. Another consequence of the small emoluments paid to them is that individuals and their families tend to live in low income areas of the city which are the most violent regions and are the "domain of organized crime." This can rapidly result in an affiliation or a tacit understanding with crime figures in order to protect themselves, their families and their homes.

Another crucial problem is the poor organization and integration of actions by police entities. In Brazilian police agencies, investigation and apprehension are separate functions and as such are the responsibility of different branches of the force. Assignments, regulations and the proper chain of command are widely diversified and are segmented in and among the civil and military police, with no clear direction and accountability. Without a clearly delineated common purpose and an organization reinforced by proper training and strict supervision, the individual officers are easily affected by outside influences and personal problems that adversely influence performance, affect morale and cause serious resistance to changes or any attempts at unification.

One outgrowth of the dynamics of Brazilian criminality (as previously explained) is the high proportion of homicides of police officers that are committed with firearms. Current figures are that 0.24 Brazilian policemen are killed in the line of duty for each 100 habitants. In the United States of America, the numbers are 0.024 officers killed per 100 citizens. In other words, for each U.S. police officer killed in the line of duty, 10 Brazilian police officers suffered the same fate.²⁴

The Justice System

The subject of violence in Brazil cannot be fully comprehended without a brief overview of the Brazilian Justice System. The appalling operation of the system has a direct relationship to violence. A slowness in rendering judgment in cases and the small percentage of the serious infractions committed that come to final judgment and punishment serve as an incentive and stimulant to increased criminality. This is without factoring into consideration many more

controversial questions such as at what age does a minor reach majority or a full legal age? A great number of violent crimes are committed by minors 18 years of age or younger.

The relationship of the number of judges to the number of inhabitants served is one of the factors that contribute to the poor operation of the Brazilian system of justice. The United States has one judge for each 9,000 inhabitants while Germany has one judge for each 3,448 persons. Brazil's percentage is one judge for each 17,500 people.²⁵ These figures are without considering the fact that the initial judgment, for any cause, happens in a jurisdiction that has only one judge for each 26,400 inhabitants. The problem becomes worse in some of the poorest areas of the country, where the ratio of judge to citizens is more accentuated.

This dearth of judges delays the judicial process, generates flaws in the system and increases the inherent difficulties in obtaining access to justice. This largely occurs for the indigent portion of the population and contributes to that element seeking justice out of court by taking the matter into their own hands, thus further overburdening the justice system with efforts by the authorities attempting to prosecute them for their actions.

Final Comments

It has been succinctly emphasized above that the major signs of the complex and multi-faced phenomenon of violence in Brazil carry with them indicators of cause and effect. Close study of these indicators will provide data upon which measures can be implemented to attack all facets of the problem. It is also necessary that a strong emphasis be concentrated, with a strategic focus of effective transformation, on those actions that will attack and resolve the true root(s) of violent crime. This battle should begin immediately, on many fronts and involving many agencies of the government, because only by so doing will it be possible to ensure a worthy and promising future for the nation.

Lack of action and new initiatives to combat violence permits local criminal elements to expand both in size and unlawful activity, destabilizing large regions of the country as well as finally transcending national borders. Taking into account the population and territorial size of Brazil as well as its strategic weight in Latin America,²⁶ the latter premise poses a real danger to the entire Southern Hemisphere. In its edition of 25 October 2002, *The New York Times* published a report of a car packed with explosives prepared by members of organized crime and apprehended by the police. This vehicle was purportedly intended to be used as a bomb and was directed against the Stock Exchange in São Paulo, Brazil.²⁷ Such events are clear evidence of the dangerous contamination and capacity for escalation of small violent acts. If

unchecked, they can develop into incidents of transnational crimes bearing a terrorist stamp that easily transpose borders.

INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS - TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES

Globalization in the 21st Century is still far from being finished. The process is still a relatively new one that constantly needs to be corrected, changed, adapted and improved in order to minimize or eliminate possible dangerous or even disastrous end results. Several specialists have pointed out that although the benefits of globalization at present surpass its disadvantages, the dangers inherent in an interactive world ensure that there is an ever-present possibility that damage, in certain instances, could outweigh the benefit. An interactive world also ensures a more facilitated and rapid capability to spread damage, doing so most of the time with increased effects. These experts have also emphasized that the entire globalization process requires urgent correction, inasmuch as it allows a concentration of wealth for the few and economic damage for the many.

In the globalization universe, criminality easily crosses borders thus encouraging transnational crimes. According to Burton:

The symptoms of organizational failure have been a continuing part of history, but they seem now to be more than offsetting accompanying development benefits. In the past the means of violence were limited, and those that existed were not widely available. Behaviors were, consequently, more subject to control by authorities. Coerced compliance was to a large degree a reality. However, fuelled by developments in communications and the availability of modern weapons, violent behavior is now universal.²⁸

It is important to avoid confusing transnational crime with international crime. The United Nations (UN) considers transnational crimes as offenses whose inception, prevention and/or direct or indirect effect involve more than one country. The UN coined the concept of transnational crime in 1975 and although not having a judicial interpretation, many countries have accepted it. Phil Williams explains that:

The concept of transnational crime has gradually come to mean 'criminal activities extending into and violating the laws of several countries.' This is different from both international crimes (that is, crimes recognized as such by international law, such as war crimes) and local crimes that can be influenced by factors beyond the boundaries of the affected jurisdiction but are, in effect, limited to one jurisdiction.²⁹

Numerous criminologists discuss and argue that concept, attempting to define the categories of crimes to be labeled as transnational. The United Nations defines 18 categories of transnational crimes, as: (1) Illicit drug trafficking; (2) Money laundering; (3) Corruption and

bribery of public officials as defined in national legislation and of party officials and elected representatives as defined in national legislation; (4) Infiltration of legal business; (5) Fraudulent bankruptcy; (6) Insurance fraud; (7) Computer crime; (8) Theft of intellectual property; (9) Illicit traffic in arms; (10) Terrorist activities; (11) Aircraft hijacking; (12) Sea piracy; (13) Hijacking on land; (14) Trafficking in persons; (15) Trading in human body parts; (16) Theft of art and cultural objects; (17) Environmental crimes; and (18) Other offenses committed by organized criminal groups.

The following paragraphs will emphasize the most important particular items in the above list that currently have a direct connection or effect on Brazil or South America, while warning that many other items on the list now peripheral in nature may become urgent or even critical in the future.

Illicit Drug Trafficking

Narcotics constitute one of the largest problems in most, if not all, of the countries. There are drug producers, traffickers, consumers, launderers of drug money and those who receive most of the profits of illegal activities. A concept that has been developed by the Southern Command of the United States (SOUTHCOM) frames drugs in the context of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) due to the disastrous effects of their consumption by enormous numbers of people. It has been estimated that an annual global underground economy of more than 500 billion dollars is fueled by drug money.

The problem of drugs has a direct link with violence and criminality. The rate of homicides in Latin America is larger than in any other area of the world. That ratio grew from 8 homicides for 100,000 inhabitants in 1970, to 13 for 100,000 in the nineties. This drastic increase was largely due to drug-related activities in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. The problem assumes greater proportions because it drastically affects those of a younger age. In 1995 the rate of homicides among Colombian males between the ages of 20 to 24 was 294.4/100,000.

Most of the illegal drugs produced in Colombia are not for local consumption. They are largely exported to the United States and secondarily, to Europe. The illicit money garnered by these activities helps finance the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). That group has been fighting the legal government and devastating the country with violence and terrorist actions for almost half a century. Because of the violent internal situation in Colombia, a great concern exists on the part of neighboring countries that these criminal actions can easily cross borders and contaminate the entire region. The *Miami Herald* published an article affirming that "the largest rebel group in Colombia is extending its reach around South America, establishing

links with radicals in Peru and Bolivia and setting up a presence in a lawless area of Paraguay...³⁰

In Brazil, the danger of contamination from Colombian guerrilla groups and narco-traffickers is smaller when compared to other neighboring countries despite the fact that in 2002 a well-known criminal leader from Rio de Janeiro, with the nickname of Fernandinho Beira-Mar (Seaside Freddy), was arrested in Colombia in territory dominated by FARC. Beira-Mar was reportedly attempting to expand the illegal market in drugs and weapons between FARC and organized crime groups in Rio de Janeiro.³¹

Brazil has 1,664 Km of terrestrial borders with Colombia in the middle of the Amazon region, a difficult area to guard. Taking into account the characteristics of the Amazon region and the adversities of the jungle forest vegetation, the possibility of transferring the cultivation of drugs to Brazilian territory is considered to be remote. The largest dangers to Brazil are related to border problems; to the concern that chemical products that have been used by the Colombian government in fumigation and destruction of the fauna can contaminate the rivers of the Amazonian basin that flow to Brazil, thus damaging the environment; and the use of Brazilian national territory for transit of illegal drugs to other countries, facilitating local consumption and the formation of gangs linked to the drug cartels.³²

Money gained from illegal drug trafficking is one of the largest financial resources of criminal and terrorist groups. It is also troubling that the continuously expanding trade in drugs fuels another transnational crime – money laundering.

Money Laundering

Money laundering basically consists of transferring funds gained in illegal transactions to legitimate financial entities from where it can be legally extracted and then used as fresh or "new" money. For several reasons, this type of transnational crime is growing concern of several international organizations. The illegal drug market profits are between 400 to 500 billion dollars on an annual basis and this exerts a tremendous impact and influence on world markets. These funds, in turn, become the financial base and are utilized for the maintenance and on-going expenses of the largest criminal and terrorist groups.

So-called "Fiscal Paradises," because of their unique characteristics, present good conditions for successful development of money laundering practices. The triple border area of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay is noted as one of the most convenient regions for this purpose in South America. Populated by more than 600,000 people, favored by natural cross borders features which have been improved by the integration of the Common Market of the South Cone

(MERCOSUL),³³ it offers isolation and secrecy, facilitating money laundering in covert borders crossings.

Illicit Traffic in Arms

The illegal trade in arms has a narrow connection with the two items previously mentioned. Drugs provide the money to be laundered, which is then used to purchase arms, which are subsequently transported across borders to end-users. This underground commerce includes small caliber weapons up to and including nuclear material. In consequence, it has the capacity to involve small groups of individuals as well as governments. Logically, the more sophisticated the material to be smuggled the more restricted is the group or agency with execution capability.

Brazil is most concerned with small caliber weapons such as revolvers, pistols, sub-machine guns and their ammunition. The control and supervision of the purchase and use of firearms is precarious. As previously explained, there are a large number of weapons in circulation that are not registered and an increasingly large number of crimes committed where unregistered weapons are used in their commission. In studies published by the Institute of Religious Studies (ISER),³⁴ firearms were used in approximately 68% of the homicides in Rio de Janeiro. Recife is first place among Brazilian states in violent deaths by firearms. In 1998, the probability of a person being killed by a firearm in Recife was twelve times greater than in New York.³⁵ The same paper points out that between the years of 1979 and 2000 the mortality rate for firearm deaths went up 213%. The probability of being killed by firearms in Brazil was three times larger in 1998 than it was in 1979. In the same study by ISER, it made clear that most of the weapons used in crimes in country were manufactured in Brazil; 83% of the weapons apprehended by the police in Rio de Janeiro were produced by Brazilian industry and a great number of them were not legally obtained.

A fact that deserves more intensive investigation is that when analyzing the data on Brazilian exports of firearms, supplied by the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade, it is documented that in the period from 1989 to 2000, Paraguay was the third largest purchaser of Brazilian firearms, for a total of more than 35 million dollars. Among the countries of the Common Market of the South Cone (MERCOSUL), Paraguay was the largest buyer of firearms, ahead of Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. Paraguay is a small country, with about 6 million inhabitants and with a society predominantly rural in nature. It has not been involved in any war for almost seventy years. Traditionally, these facts do not lend themselves to a need for large numbers of firearms. It is very probable that most of these weapons are illegally returning to

Brazil (as well as sent to other neighboring countries) for use by organized crime. This illegal trade is significantly facilitated by the three-border triangle discussed previously and by the extensive land border that Brazil shares with Paraguay.

Corruption and Bribery of Public Officials

Public corruption currently existent in numerous countries at many levels of government has acquired a transnational characteristic as trade and economics became more global in nature. The more that bribery and corruption become commonplace, with ever more involvement of politicians as well as civil servants and members of the judiciary and police committing illegal acts, the more difficult it becomes to combat violence and criminality.³⁶

Corruption can rise in its pervasive influence to the point that it seriously hampers attempts to commit the government to recognizing and combating serious problems. At the very least, it hampers the government's ability to organize, control and supervise its minions. The public must be able to trust the inspector, administrator, police and judge, as well as their leaders, or instability might develop that could threaten the very existence of the state. That level of disarray would be thoroughly exploited by organized crime as well as terrorist groups, who use bribery and corruption to ensure their current existence as well as their future growth.

The positive evolution over the years of democratic government in Brazil is marked by milestones in the formation of that government and of the changes in antiquated processes that previously granted almost unlimited protection for corrupt officials.³⁷ Current laws must be further strengthened to fully rid the structure of corruption and criminality and to impose more severe penalties on those who violate their oaths of office in the performance of their duties as well as on those who attempt to corrupt those officials. According to historians, the Portuguese Royal Family upon arrival in Brazil in 1808 instituted what would become "public service," but in reality the public service only assisted the royal family and the elite. Employees without salary, they collected "tips" from others before rendering assistance. Of course the current reality is completely different and efforts have been and are being made to entirely eliminate this arcane practice.

Corruption is a noxious presence in the international realm and in the configuration of transnational crime. Countries that have little or no corruption in their own internal affairs may be tempted or even forced to use that method in negotiations with authorities, trading partners and institutions in corrupt countries. This, of course, only perpetuates the problem.

Terrorist Activities

After the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 that destroyed the World Trade Center and greatly damaged the Pentagon, terrorism has been preeminent among the headlines in the domestic and international news media. The countless declarations of a "war on terrorism" gave to the term "terrorism" credentials as an organization or institution to be combated, instead of a form of action or a criminal pattern. President George W. Bush, in the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002, declared that:

Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.

The majority of existing terrorist groups are of local origin. However, some groups have the willpower and capacity to export terror far beyond their national borders, transforming terrorism into transnational crime to be fought on a regional, and indeed, world-wide basis.

Regionally, the largest terrorist threats on the South American Continent are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) together with two other groups in that country, the United Self-Defense of Colombia (AUC) and the Army of National Liberation (ELN). Currently, the actions of those groups have only been local acts threatening the Colombian government and society, and putting at risk the survival of that nation. A major danger is that those factions may establish links with other groups such as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, with those engaged in the traffic of weapons and drugs in Bolivia and Paraguay, or even organized crime in Brazil. Brig. Gen. Galen Jackman, the U.S. Southern Command Director of Operations, in interviews reported in *The Miami Herald*, declared that "it is clear, based on the intelligence that we have, that they [the FARC] are involved with other terrorist organization in Latin America to facilitate those things that they need, primarily arms, ammunition, medical supplies, those types of things."³⁸

There still exists in the region great concern about the triple border area where approximately 25,000 Arabs or descendents of the original Arab immigrants are living. Although investigations by agencies of Brazilian intelligence have not detected the presence of any terrorist cell in Brazilian national territory, the Center of International Studies AGORA, referring to the subject of the Islamic terrorist threat in the triple border region affirms that "political corruption allows the multitude of criminal activities and illegal markets to overlap with the legitimate economic activities and Paraguay has been especially culpable in maintaining lax

security and border control in the area, helping to fuel a huge underground economy.³⁹

Further, in the same publication, it is stated that:

One 1999 report, however, did link al-Qaeda and the tri-border region. Agents from Argentina's Secretariat of State Intelligence (SIDE) passed on a report to the CIA and Mossad detailing the findings that operatives from al-Qaeda were in tri-border region and coordinating with extremist Shiite groups. The report also noted that several suspected terrorists and fugitives had passed through the area. Among them was Al-Sa'id Hasan Hussein Mokhless, an Egyptian accused of carrying out the 1997 Luxor massacre in Egypt...⁴⁰

Despite justifiable concern over the triple border area, Brazil feels comfortable with the situation because it does not shelter nor does it have a history of international terrorist groups active in its national territory. It frequently happens that organized crime utilizes terrorist practices, such as kidnapping and armed attacks or robberies on a small scale. These incidents are usually within the response capabilities of the State or National Police and they do not engender the local popular ideological support needed to transform their organizations into national or international terrorist groups.

However, the state must combat and eliminate the nuclei of organized crime as it exists in order, among other objectives, to curtail its evolution into an organization capable of performing terrorist actions, since "those who have worked in conflict situations with 'terrorists' and leaders of organizations involved in violence and crime plough aware of the influence of structural conditions and the way in which the peaceful protest situation tends to moves in the direction of threat and violence when no progress is made."⁴¹

Environmental Crimes

Environmental crime now receives more and more attention from international organizations. The Planet Earth, when one refers to the environment, is an entity where damage to one part can affect the whole. Brazil possesses one of the richest and most varied vegetation formations on the earth and has the second largest forested area in the world. It takes second place only to the conifer vegetation of the Russian Federation, with 7.6 million square kilometers.

The Amazon Forest, with an area of 5.5 million square kilometers, is the largest tropical forest in the world and 60% of it is in Brazil (3.5 million square kilometers). This represents 40% of the national territory. The diversity of trees in the Amazon Forest varies between 40 and 300 species per hectare, while in North America the variation is from 4 to 25. This biodiversity makes Brazil one of the main world focuses of "bio-piracy," the illegal trade of animals and

plants. Bio-piracy trafficking is a 10 billion-dollar annual worldwide business. Brazil is a major participant in that market with about 1 billion dollars in annual volume.⁴²

Brazil has one of the largest reserves of drinkable water on the planet, with 12% of the world volume of fresh water. Of the 7,050,000 square kilometers reserves in the Amazonian basin, the largest of the world, 3,904,392.8 square kilometers of the total resources are inside Brazil's domain.

Brazilians are proud of having preserved that patrimony, particularly because many other areas of the planet (including Atlantic Forest in Brazil) were destroyed. They are conscious of its potential and the need for systems of sustainable development, in conjunction with the preservation of the environment that must be created for the area in order to assist in its development. The country must be attentive and vigilant in preventing any damage or destruction to the fauna and flora on the land. This could be characterized as so-called environmental crime. The Amazonian Forest area is perceived by some as susceptible to international greed; it should be a center of attention for the country that will demand consistent and well-structured actions in order to preserve the national patrimony.

Final Comments

Among the 18 categories of transnational crimes defined by The United Nations, other than those explained above that affect the South American Continent and in particular Brazil, are some with smaller impact and/or emphasis. One of these "folkloric" cases generally described as "other offenses committed by organized criminal groups" are part of reality in South America, such as the case of the once President of Paraguay that used a car stolen from Brazil in his official fleet. This case of transnational crime happens due the linkage of gangs from both countries.

As one of the fruits born of violent actions and criminal practices, other problems have emerged in the region. The migratory process has greatly increased and that has led to large regional alterations. In spite of the fact that so far this process does not affect Brazil in great scale, *The Economist* published the following:

Argentina's hemorrhage is part of a new wave of migration from South America. Rather than to flee political oppression, most of these migrants leave because of lack of economic opportunity, or to escape crime and violence. Some 600.000 Colombians have left their country over the past three years, fleeing war and unemployment, for example. Ecuador has seen 500.000 leave between 1999 and 2001.⁴³

Another point should be noted with great concern. Violence, when it affects the government, damages democratic values. According to the observations of Paulo de Mesquita

based on research from Latinobarometro, only 48% of the people support democracy in Latin America, compared to 78% in the European Union. The same study indicates that 25% of the people are satisfied with democracy in Latin America, while that figure rises to 53% in the European Union.⁴⁴ Brazil is experiencing great maturity in its democratic development and that was confirmed during the last presidential election (October 2002) when a leftist party's candidate succeeded in becoming president in a totally transparent and legitimate process, but this situation is not a reality for many countries in the region.

The depiction of violence in Brazil and the world is a call to battle. It is necessary to develop plans and actions that can be rapidly implemented to protect the nation and the citizenry, as well as eliminate criminality and violence not only in Brazil but also in other countries that are affected.⁴⁵

REPRESSION VERSUS PREVENTION

After acquiring the understanding of how violence manifests itself in Brazil and in the world, particularly in South America, three points stand out. First, violence cannot be entirely eliminated, at least not in the foreseeable future. Second, in some societies (including Brazilian) violence has reached unacceptable and compromising levels that adversely affect daily life in many communities. Measures need to be urgently formulated and then rapidly implemented in order to successfully control and reverse an intolerable state of affairs. Third, taking into account all known intelligence on violence, several actions should be immediately implemented in efforts to contain the phenomenon.

If violence cannot be eliminated, what could be the tolerable state of violence? The form of violence changes with geography, places of occurrence and people, all of which can be prime variables in different areas of the country. For example, in the city of Sao Paulo, the number of homicides in diverse neighborhoods of the city ranges from 4 to 130 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, it is difficult to prepare plans based on a "standard" statistics. An illustrative example would be a subject's head being placed in an oven and the feet placed into a freezer, then trying to establish an average temperature - in spite of an ideal mean temperature, the subject is dead. A fair answer to the question is that an acceptable pattern can be found when all places studied present constantly decreasing indexes of violence. This would indicate that an index close to zero might be reached in an ideal situation. However, when the criminal situation is critical, as it is in many jurisdictions, it is necessary that not only must the crime tables demonstrate a shrinking pattern, they must clearly demonstrate a rapidly decreasing scale.

An acceptable pattern, without trying to establish a closed parameter for such a large subject, should contain at least three reference points in order to measure the scale of violence: (1) It does not commit the governance; (2) The populace does not feel insecure, as prisoners in the midst of freedom, or victims of "psychological violence" (the constant fear of being victimized); and (3) The classic indicators, particularly those in all areas of criminality, reflect low and rapidly decreasing levels.

Consequently, two basic types of actions can be adopted: repressive or preventive. In order to have a clear understanding of the difference between the two, an analogy utilizing the subject of health is illustrated. When a disease is already settled and it needs to be eliminated, the application of medications or use of the surgical process exemplifies repressive actions utilized for the patient. The usage of a vaccine in an attempt to avoid primary infection of the patient and thus preventing the disease exemplifies the field of preventive action.

REPRESSION

To repress violence is an imperative and emergent focus for Brazilian society, particularly for that portion of the population that resides in an urban environment. The reality of day-to-day living in such surroundings is proof positive that violence has reached completely unacceptable levels in urban centers such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Recife and the Federal District, among others.⁴⁶ In these areas, immediate actions to "treat the disease" must be implemented.

At the national level, repressive actions are basically undertaken by the State Police Forces as they seek to control criminality and the violence it engenders. Of course, the response of police with repressive actions, despite being necessary, is late and occurs after the fact. However these late actions do help to prevent future violence by inhibiting potential offenders and instilling a fear of being caught in the commission of a crime and the punishment that follows. It is imperative, however, that police actions be part of a judicial system that guarantees fair and impartial judgment and equitable punishment for transgressions.

PREVENTION

Prevention, in the strict sense of the word, is the act of preventing an action - it is a warning or an attempt to hamper or obstruct, a forethought or precaution.⁴⁷ Its basis is associated with that of impeding something that may happen, it avoids their occurrence or moderates their consequences. Considering the strategic line of thought on the subject of violence, preventive actions should be prioritized, acting on the root of the problem and providing a truly effective transformation of the phenomenon.

However, two points need to be clarified. The first is that preventive action, according to its own conception, has to be of continuous and durable application. It tends only to present significant results in the medium and long-term. Secondly, the urgency inherent in the treatment of critical situations demands priority for repressive actions, although repression and prevention are not exclusive. It is possible that preventive measures may be applied without support of repressive actions; however the opposite hypothesis - repressive action without the support of a preventive one applied simultaneously becomes innocuous in a short period of time or only transfers the situation to a neighboring community.

Another distinct advantage in utilization of preventive actions is the cost-benefit relationship. According to data from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the proportion is one for seven. That means, for each dollar spent in preventive measures it would be necessary to apply seven dollars in repressive actions to obtain similar results. "To vaccinate" is less expensive than "to treat," therefore, to prevent is more effective and less costly than to repress.

Prevention can be divided into three basic types: primary, secondary and tertiary. Although there are some small divergences among criminologists in the acceptance of those conceptions and some common points among the different types, the following paragraphs will illustrate the differences.

Primary Prevention

Primary prevention acts on the basic causes of the problem. It is the type that most closely approaches the true concept of prevention, acting first, on the origin of the trouble. Edinilsa de Souza stated that "the combat of violence shall focus mainly in the primary prevention, instead of simply taking care of violent actions, in other words, to observe patterns, risk factors and causes, to draw and to evaluate interventions and to implant effective local programs."⁴⁸

Primary prevention is fundamental and should be the major focus of effort in the array of actions needed to be implemented to reverse the current situation of violence in the nation. This factor needs to be more fully recognized by public administrators and specialists in the fields of public security, social programs and welfare. A clear acceptance still does not exist that motivators of violence go through the field of education, health, economy, social lacks, just to name a few, and, therefore, programs developed in those areas need to be altered and adjusted to achieve their full potentials to prevent violence.

Primary prevention acts over the motivation, changing the will to act violently and, working like that, in the root of the problem. It is the only one capable of offering true change.

Secondary Prevention

Action in the field of the secondary prevention is the one of simplest understanding, as it is usually related to the security apparatus of the state. The main focus of secondary prevention is on the localities where the majority of crimes occur, taking whatever action is necessary in order to reduce and finally eliminate criminal activity. One way this can be accomplished is by increased numbers and visibility of uniformed police in law enforcement saturation of the locale, thereby greatly inhibiting criminal activity and violent acts.

Secondary prevention, however, does not act on the will of the individual(s) or on whatever need they may have for commission of a crime. In the above example, it is probable that in the absence of the police, violence would occur. That presence, while inhibiting crime, may also generate the transference of that criminality to another area that is not so well protected.

Compared to the primary prevention, that acts on the generating cause of crime, secondary prevention does not present the same potential of behavioral transformation. At times it will motivate "competition" between the offender and law enforcement agents, transforming buildings located in violent areas into fortifications. Will it be that the best solution to being assaulted in a car is to transform it in an armored vehicle? There is no efficient solution if the motivation of the criminal has not been modified or changed.

Tertiary Prevention

Tertiary prevention assumes very peculiar characteristics because it is oriented towards those people that have already committed a crime in an effort to prevent backsliding. Its main focus is usually on prisons and targets the detainees or offenders on parole. It is a type of prevention strongly needed, since it attempts rehabilitation of those who have already committed violence. It is, however, difficult to be efficient in its application. The discriminatory posture of society towards criminals hampers efforts at rehabilitation.

ACTIONS TO BE DEVELOPED

It is necessary to observe that any society lives in a state of constant transformation and, in specific periods of history, the dynamics of that transformation may reach amazing speed. The era of globalization experienced this truth but has not been a useful aid in minimizing some sociological distortions that appeared at the beginning of the industrial era.

John Burton, considering the subject, affirms that: "with industrialization, it would seem, human intelligence has been used almost exclusively (with minor exceptions such as in planning some token help to the poor and their nations) to promote short term self-interest, rather than the long term interests of societies."⁴⁹

When observing violence, in that context of globalization, it cannot be faced with short-sightedness; it is necessary to observe with wide vision and to be able to fully comprehend the entire picture in order to develop truly efficient actions. Such actions, also, should be holistic, as:

Holism is a philosophy or a way of thinking that recognizes that the whole is greater than, and therefore different from, the sum of its parts. There are applied implications. In medicine, for example, holism would require the consideration of the whole person in the treatment of any specific symptoms and not just the treatment of these symptoms.⁵⁰

The first war of the new millennium is being conducted against an enemy not here-to-fore acknowledged in the context of war: terrorism - one of the most depraved ways to articulate violence. As a method of impeding escalation of terrorist activities and to reach an ultimate social transformation, the fight against terrorism must begin by preventing violence in its simplest form. In Brazil, as in the entire world, violence must be acknowledged as a strategic subject demanding broad and deep answers in all aspects of the subjects of repression and prevention.

ACTIONS IN THE DOMESTIC REALM

Violence in Brazil demands strategic actions with transforming proposals. Such understanding guides that the main block of actions addressed toward prevention, particularly primary prevention. It is necessary to change the future of violence in the country and such changes must be accomplished now. All changes of the future originate in the present; good seed in fertile soil will generate healthy fruit. Order, so emphasized by the Brazilian national motto, is necessary for progress and has to be enforced in a solid and lasting way through constructive actions of real change.

This premise does not mean that actions of repressive focus or even based on other fields of prevention (secondary and tertiary) are not necessary or do not deserve attention. Actually, in the current Brazilian reality, most of the actions to combat violence have been developed in the repressive field, with positive evolution. Integration of actions has been fostered by civilian and military police from different States of the Federation and at the national level. Also, there has been a basic behavioral change in the policies of business and of corporations that have

recognized the value of investments in prevention, largely in the secondary field. Police officers have been fostering societal integration and recognition in the performance of their duties, thus creating the image of a friendly police force that not only combats crime but also helps in preventing a criminal occurrence.

The focus now shifts to two items considered of extreme importance in anti-crime measures to be developed and expanded in Brazil: the prevalence of primary preventive actions and urgent action against organized crime.

Actions in the Field of Primary Prevention

The Brazilian Federal Government possesses a specific program of primary prevention called Plano de Integração e Acompanhamento de Programas Sociais de Prevenção da Violência Urbana – PIAPS⁵¹ (Plan of Integration and Attendance of Social Programs to Prevent Urban Violence). This Plan is still modest when compared with the dimension of the problems of violence. According General Alberto Cardoso, former Minister of the Institutional Security Cabinet during the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso from 1994 until 2002, and the person in charge of implementing the Plan, "the Program [PIAPS] is of prevention and understanding. We will apply the vaccine to avoid the future disease. We want to attack the roots of the violence."⁵²

Whatever plans are developed in this field, at least three basic fundamentals should be observed: (1) The involvement of society in general and primarily of the local communities; (2) The creation of a solid database; and (3) Specific actions designed to suppress the initiators of violence.

PARTICIPATION OF THE COMMUNITY

Although security is a duty of the state, it is the responsibility of all,⁵³ and a workable solution to violence is achieved only with the direct involvement of local communities that live with the problem on a day-to-day basis. When society is not motivated to say "it is enough," any anti-crime government action will not achieve desired results.

In the specific case of primary prevention, when the focus of action is social subjects, community participation is very important. Burton, exploring the subject of the violence, declared:

If a human needs element is to be included in decision-making, than it may be that there must be far less top-down decision-making, and far more community administration and policy-making. In practice, it is community-based authorities that are in the best position to introduce the required human perspective to social issues.⁵⁴

Thus, communities must be motivated for behavioral change to stop being only part of the problem, something cruelly imposed on them; communities must be part of the solution. This perspective has been explored in different countries as a way to prevent violence. According Lima Dantas, "historically, the political principle that gives sustentation to the North American public security is being of 'local control' (municipal districts and counties), through the formal and informal use of prevention and repression mechanisms for deviations of conduct."⁵⁵

DATABASE

Without a reliable database it is impossible to develop an efficient plan. Without solid data there can be no effective policy in combating violence and results cannot be evaluated in order to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of implemented programs. The Institute of Religious Studies (ISER) introduced a public declaration favoring information transparency in public security. According to the Institute "one of the reasons why it is difficult to apply efficient public security policies in Brazil is the traditional shortage of data, particularly of reliable data."⁵⁶

There are several factors that contribute to the traditional shortage of reliable data. One of them is the lack of systematization and uniformity in registering data. Distorted political and personal motivations lead some state governments to conceal data as a way to preserve a false image of success of their policies. Because of personal distrust in the system or in its administrators, some people do not report being victims of crimes.

In an attempt to obtain data as close as possible to the reality about the number of violent actions suffered by the population and not communicated to the government, appeared, in the United States, in the sixties, the so-called "victim research."

According to a recent "victim research" project conducted in Brazil:

It is difficult to know accurately the amount of crime that happens in a society. The ones that the governments have in their police registers are just an estimate of the crimes that really happened, an estimate that is known, beforehand, to be underestimated. The first North American victim research in 1966 discovered that the crimes reported were more than twice as large than the estimates produced by the official statistics. A British Crime Survey made calculations, at the beginning of the nineties, that, in England, there are four times more crimes than are reported to the police. The phenomenon of under-notification, although it can vary in degree from country to country, is something that affects the totality: in 20 countries researched by UNICRI (UN European Institute of Criminology) between 1988 and 1992 taking into account 10 different types of crimes, about 51% of the crimes were not communicated to the police.⁵⁷

As a result of this research conducted in Brazil it was verified, for instance, that reports of automobile robberies totaled approximately 96% of the actual number of cars stolen. This high statistic has several causes, the major one perceived to be the demand of insurance companies

for official documentation of the case prior to processing claims for reimbursement and issuing a compensatory settlement to the victim. Notification to authorities of physical aggression only occurred in 28% of the actual cases. Without correct up-to-date information, analyzing the total amount of reported crimes would lead to erroneous priorities for action. For example, when comparing 10 notifications of car robbery to 5 of physical aggression, it could indicate that a priority should be to concentrate available resources and actions against crimes involving auto theft. As a result of the research, when observing the notification percentage it is noted that the actual statistics in the period were that there were 10.4 robberies of automobiles compared to 17.8 distinct actions of physical aggression. Priorities would be adjusted to reflect the latter figures.

Research has been conducted in this area, but unfortunately in an incipient manner. The Federal Minister of Justice has been working closely with his counterparts in the states in order to create countrywide standard registration procedures for violence as a way to create an effective data base to ensure more effective action. Unfortunately, little has actually been done in that extremely important process.

MOTIVATIONS FOR VIOLENCE

Suppressing motivations for violence is the main focus of primary prevention. This is a field little explored, largely because existent data do not allow for a complete definition of all possible motivations. We will examine several motivations in the context of Brazilian social reality. This could serve as a reference for a wider study, on a worldwide basis, of motivational behavior leading to criminal manifestations which must be then dwelt with by proper authority.

a) Urban Chaos

This relates to the precarious conditions of urban housing, including the illegal occupation of urban land, formation of slum areas, poor or non-existent drinking water supplies, as well as the lack of and/or inadequacy of basic infrastructure and sanitation.

b) Economical Exclusion

The subject of economics has a direct implication and link with the occurrence of criminal and violent practices. Lima Dantas, when writing on the economy of the crime, affirms that:

According to the result of recent researches, the wages received by a young population show an interesting correlation with the indexes of crimes committed by individuals of that age group: larger the wages, smaller the amount of practiced crimes. According to such researches, the criminal behavior among youths is highly dependent of their potential earnings in legitimate activities. An increase of 10% in wages produces a reduction of from 6 to 9% in criminality among the young.⁵⁸

c) Leisure

The subject of leisure is directly related to a shortage of sport facilities, culture and recreation. The lack of those activities, particularly in the poorer communities, strongly motivates the practice of violent actions among teenagers. The energy that could be spent in healthy activities is instead released in practicing violent vandalism. Programs implemented to increase participation in sports activities and in the areas of culture and leisure have been effective in reducing crime indexes.

d) Failings of the Justice System

The difficulty of access to the justice system by a significant portion of the poorest segment of the population has been one of the great motivators for violence in Brazil. The inability to access the legal system to resolve conflicts leads to the search for personal solutions or the use of other organizations, usually criminal, to replace or redress losses. Impunity motivates violent action once the reward offered by crime increases and once the transgressor is at less risk.

The subjects of alternative punishment and of lowering the legal penal age for incarceration are being assiduously studied. Alternative punishment is part of the efforts to reduce prison populations and to offer a choice of milder punishment. Research done between the months of July and August of 2002 in the major cities of Brazil showed that 87.9% of Brazilians favor the reduction of the penal age from 18 to 16 years old.⁵⁹

e) Domestic Violence

This includes aggressive, constraining, incestuous or negligent intra-family behaviors, especially practiced against small children and adolescents. Domestic violence besides being by itself a violent action is also perpetuates of violence in the way that children created and living in that atmosphere tend to assimilate distorted values and easily reproduce them later as youths and adults.

f) Failures in Areas of Health Service

This is mainly related to the lack of and/or inadequacy of treatment centers, human resources and services in the health area that are focused on prevention and treatment, with special attention to psychic and psycho-social disturbances, drug dependence, alcoholism and malnutrition. A large portion of criminal activity is directly related to the usage and abuse of alcohol and illicit drugs. As previously noted, research conducted in São Paulo verified that in 41% of homicides alcohol appears as a primary cause of the aberrant behavior.⁶⁰

g) Incitement to Violence

Incitement to violence can take several forms and can only be reduced by the participation of society. One of the most common methods of this incitement, strongly appealing particularly to the younger generation, is through the media. Television programs are easily accessed in every environment and by all segments of the population. Governmental measures to control the media and thus the content of the programs are doomed to failure because of the "censorship" connotation that is no longer accepted by the populace. The mobilization of society, establishing limits on what is viewed inside their homes and an understanding by the media of what their own limits are in broadcasting provocative programs, offers the best perceived solution.

h) Failure of Education

In spite of the great effort spent during the last 10 years to reverse illiteracy, Brazil is still among the seven Latin-American nations with an illiteracy factor of more than 10%, together with the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti.

Education plays a fundamental role in the prevention of violence, not only for the cultural values that it infuses but also for its behavioral correction of the young, thereby assisting in the construction of character. It is a fundamental necessity to reinforce and add to the concept of violence prevention in schools and to heavily invest in training and preparation of the teachers so that they may be more competent to professionally assume a leading role.

The government should address these issues now. The primary prevention field is strategic and demands understanding and coordination among the three government branches of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary at the Federal, State and Municipal levels. They must bind together with civilian organized society and with the various communities they serve to pursue solutions for the serious problems that afflict the nation. Only the synergy of united effort will yield positive results in the primary prevention area.

Urgent Efforts Directed Against Organized Crime

One of the largest national threats of violence is directly related to "organized crime." Actually, they are individual criminals that attempt to organize themselves in groups to acquire territorial domain and control over portions of the resident population in order to enlarge the area in which to engage in their criminality.

The escalation of violence, starting with isolated actions and growing into the practice of specialized activities, is extremely dangerous. If not controlled in an efficient manner it can corrupt both the people and the government. These facts were confirmed when Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (CPI) do Narco-tráfico (Legislative Committee of Inquiry of the Drug

Traffic) established by the National Congress in the year 2000, proved the involvement of politicians, judges, policemen, lawyers and various entrepreneurs with organized gangs, particularly in the states of Acre, Maranhão, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

In the total, the CPI proposed the implication of 824 people supposedly involved with the crimes of drug trafficking, robbery and hijackings, money laundering, fiscal withholding, corruption, unjust enrichment, perjury and forfeiture. Among those are two former-governors (Orlei Cameli, from Acre, and Manoel Gomes de Barros, from Alagoas), two federal deputies and 15 state deputies...⁶¹

Actions needed to be developed in order to combat organized crime are essentially those of a repressive character and involve the Federal Police, Public Prosecution Service and the Police Forces of the Federated States. However, these actions, that will also reach communities controlled by organized crime, should be complemented by several current activities in the field of primary prevention. As stated by Dr. Louise I. Shelley, director of the Center of Transnational Crime and Corruption at the American University in Washington, D.C., "in some places, criminal groups provide food, provide gas, run the trade and mediate conflicts. They are de facto governments. But if you demonize them, you are not going to have the local community behind you."⁶² It is implied that a community's support can only be obtained with the replacement of these services by the state. That will be accomplished through methods of primary prevention.

It is necessary to act rapidly and with great determination against those organized groups that seek clandestine and illicit sources to finance their activities, particularly in the great urban centers of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. They must be immediately attacked and their sources of income and power completely eliminated and they themselves destroyed as functioning entities. Without taking the complete measures herein advocated these associations will remain much as festering sores on the public body, capable of rejuvenation and expansion until they threaten the very existence of the state and seriously compromise the ability and containment efforts of the government. This has and is now occurring in other countries in both South America and other regions of the world:

In South America, the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, controls lucrative coca fields that finance a terror campaign against the government. In the Philippines, the Abbu Sayyaf group kidnaps people to sustain its separatist dreams. In Sri Lanka, the violent Tamil Tigers have a fleet of stealthy vessels for smuggling contraband across the Indian Ocean. In Uzbekistan, heavily armed Islamic militants run a protection racket for opium traffickers. And before the fall of the Taliban, Al Qaeda was thought to profit from Afghanistan's thriving poppy trade.⁶³

ACTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL REALM

The actions to be developed are directly related with transnational crime. As Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis teach us: "the international community must elevate the struggle against transnational organized crime to one of its highest priorities in terms of both resource allocation and the development of appropriate strategies, and must do so in a sustained and consistent manner."⁶⁴

South America is characterized as one of the most peaceful areas of the globe, where bloody conflicts between neighbors have not occurred since the 1930s. One result of that happy state of affairs is that the Southern Hemisphere also stands out as one of the most demilitarized regions on earth.

However, other violent manifestations of great concern have arisen, particularly those related to transnational crimes. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, on the occasion of the Fifth Conference of Ministers of the Defense of America,⁶⁵ declared that "our hemisphere faces a number of old threats: drugs, organized crime, illegal arms trafficking, hostage-taking, piracy and money laundering, and new threats such as cyber-crime, and still-unknown terrorist threats which can emerge without warning."⁶⁶

These are the major areas to which international attention, in close cooperation with involved countries, must be directed. Brazilian participation in these efforts should be wide-ranging, however two actions should be matters of priority: aid to Colombia to assist in eradicating extremist groups that threaten regional stability, and active participation in efforts to combat transnational crimes in the area of the triple borders of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. According to the President of Chile, Ricardo Lagos, when addressing the situation in Colombia:

What happens is not a problem only of Colombia, it is a subject that affects the safety of all of our area and, in consequence, mandates the cooperation, measures and collaboration that we can add to the efforts that are being made by President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia. I believe that this is something that we should demand of each one of our governments.⁶⁷

The South American continent has to be preserved as an area of peace and as an example for the entire world. It is necessary to eliminate the risk that groups like those in Colombia could spread mayhem and terror throughout the whole region, transforming themselves in the process into a transnational terrorist organization with the capacity of becoming a global threat.

It is also essential to generate intense regional participation in eradication efforts in conjunction with the Colombian government's interests. The project of Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia - SIVAM (System of Surveillance of the Amazon),⁶⁸ can be of great assistance in

controlling the extensive strip of terrestrial border that divides Brazil and Colombia, providing valuable information for the control of the illegal drug traffic, a major source of income for the Colombian groups and Brazilian criminal gangs.

The second priority of the Brazilian government is the eradication of illegal activities in the area of the triple border surrounding of Foz do Iguacu (Iguazu Falls). There is no possibility of success of these efforts without the complete, united and dedicated intervention of the Brazilian, Argentinean and Paraguayan governments. Full participation of all of these countries is essential. The illegal trade in weapons demands an immediate priority effort directed towards preventing weapons manufactured in Brazil and legally exported to Paraguay returning clandestinely to organized crime groups in Brazil. Cooperative, united action between Brazil and Paraguay is necessary for effective control of these arms - eliminating not only the illegal traffic between the two countries but also a possible transfer of some of these arms to criminal groups in other countries such as Colombia.

An exemplary unified performance by the three Governments in the triple border area will also produce significant results in the reduction of the activities of several criminal groups. It will strangle one of their major sources of income, the laundering of illegal money. The natural conditions in the area, which facilitates illegal transition of borders, needs to be actively neutralized utilizing accurate intelligence data, increased personnel resources and strict training and supervision.

Brazil possesses half of the population and almost half of the Gross National Product (GNP) of the entire South America Continent. It also borders 10 of the 12 other countries. Such attributes impose on it a moral dedication and a responsibility to assume leadership in the conduct of those affairs that affect regional interest. Among them are poverty and criminality - they both need to be combated and reduced with a high priority, united effort, intelligent leadership and regional commitment.

A different way to approach the subject is through the invigoration and articulation of tasks to be carried out by the organizations responsible for hemispheric safety. Initiatives have been pursued in that sense and improvements can already be observed. According to Ambassador Roger F. Noriega, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), during a September 2002 Conference at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, D.C.:

Since 1995, the OAS has built an impressive record of achievement. Over 90 resolutions on regional arms control, demining, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, confidence – and security – building measures (CSBMs) and other aspects of defense and security policy have been adopted by consensus.

In addition, three conventions concerning illicit trafficking in firearms, transparency, and terrorism have also been adopted.⁶⁹

In spite of some true progress, a lot of new tasks must be accomplished. Again, the future and the opportunities are now, in the present. Each day is important. The future of Brazil and the rest of the South American continent demands precedence in strategic, integrated and strong actions to combat internal and transnational crime.

PARTICIPATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

According to the Constitution, the Brazilian Armed Forces are intended for the defense of the Country, to guarantee the constitutional powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, preserve law and order.⁷⁰

Complementary law regulates that particular article of the Constitution. The second paragraph of Article 15 establishes the precepts for the utilization of the Armed Forces in its legitimate role of guaranteeing law and order:

The use of the Armed Forces in the guarantee of law and order, for initiative of any constitutional powers, will happen in agreement with the guidelines of the President, after exhausting the capacity of the instruments destined to the preservation of the public order and security of the people and patrimony, related in the article 144 of the Federal Constitution.⁷¹

It is clear that mobilization of the Armed Forces to establish law and order will not occur until civil forces specifically designated for that task have failed. Historically, the Armed Forces, in particular the Brazilian Army, have exercised their role in law and order in total compliance with the expressed will of the Brazilian people. That outstanding characteristic is a historical fact. In order to achieve that reality, the Army Planning System (Sistema de Planejamento do Exército, SIPLEX-1), when defining the Army's additional missions to those already listed by the Federal Constitution, added that in conjunction with the other Armed Forces the Brazilian Army should cooperate in the national development and civil defense.⁷²

The Brazilian Terrestrial Force has been a constant presence in the historical process of national colonization since its establishment in 1648. It was responsible, together with other agencies of the government, for the security of Brazilian terrestrial borders, conducting pioneer tasks in the establishment and settlement of the southern and western boundaries. Today, as one of its priorities, the Army conducts similar work in the inhospitable Amazonian border area thereby guaranteeing the presence, surveillance and sovereignty of the national territory.

That participation in ancillary actions is not and cannot become the main role of the Brazilian Armed Forces. As alerted by Ambassador Marcos Côrtes:

In the case of the semi-developed countries, it is fundamental that they begin an urgently effective process of 'post-modernization' of their armed forces. That is necessary, among other reasons, to oppose the attempt of the developed countries to induce a 'new role' for their Armed Forces, trying to transform, in practice, the Army to Gendarmerie, the Navy to Coast Guard and the Air Force to Aerial Police.⁷³

To combat violence, both in its internal and transnational manifestations, is a continuing national priority. This involves the active participation of all levels of society in order to solve the problem. According to Argemiro Procópio "the intervention of the Army or the Armed Forces is not the magic word to solve the problems of violence and drugs. Education, discipline in schools, justice and agreement at home are."⁷⁴ However, the Brazilian Armed Forces, following their historical orientation, cannot be excluded from the process. As Larry Rohter recently wrote:

As voters here pick Brazil's president next Sunday, they can expect to have more than the usual election observers watching them. The governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro has asked that the soldiers who patrolled the streets here during the first round of voting on October 6 be deployed again to protect citizens from the threat that criminal gangs will interfere with election.⁷⁵

The Brazilian Armed Forces, especially the Army, can and will participate in that national endeavor, responding to the demands of society and to the orders of government authorities. The Army has, in fact, currently assumed roles in prevention efforts and in support of other agencies that are active in preventive activities. The Armed Forces efforts are particularly focused on the areas of intelligence, transport support, communications and, more specifically, on the surveillance of national borders and maritime areas in order to intercept and frustrate attempted clandestine aerial and nautical invasions of Brazilian territory.

External prevention efforts require a concept of regional cooperative security, with Brazil assuming a leadership role in the process.⁷⁶ The National Defense Policy (NDP), in its strategic guidance, establishes that actions of the Brazilian Armed Forces, based on their obligation to provide security for the Nation, should foster close relationships based on mutual trust and respect between Brazil and neighboring countries and to the international community in general.⁷⁷

Close attention is being paid to the subject of violence in South America and especially to the problems of Colombia, which have achieved notoriety throughout the world. The journalist Andres Oppenheimer recently stated that "the latest debate in Latin America diplomatic circles: whether to step up regional military cooperation – and perhaps even create a South American

military force – to help defeat Colombia’s drug-funded rebel groups and deal with similar internal threats in the future.”⁷⁸

The Brazilian Armed Forces, acting in support of Brazilian diplomacy, and in searching for a solution to such sensitive problem in the region, must be ready to take positive steps in conducting a multilateral solution for the serious situation in Colombia, as well as for other transnational crimes that threaten and destabilize regional security.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

According to research conducted by the World Economic Forum, Brazil is losing 40 billion dollars annually in direct foreign investment because of institutional problems such as corruption and criminality.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, this is not the largest damage caused by crime and violence in Brazil when also considering the societal injury to the population. A significant resource of the nation, the people is destroyed or deeply harmed by violence, impeding the construction of a healthy and prosperous Brazilian social structure.

This paper strongly asserts that there is no more room for temporary solutions. It is time for the study and implementation of an efficient strategy prioritizing resources (means), with the clear objective of reversing and transforming the current picture (ends). This plan must also emphasize the manner of performance (ways) in order to be truly effective. It is readily apparent that it is necessary to strike at the root of the problem and that actions should be prioritized in the field of primary prevention. In that way they assault and inhibit the major motivations that lead to crime and violence such as of the lack of work, low income, poor educational opportunities, the absence of good health facilities and poor living conditions, just to name a few.

In parallel, it is also necessary to immediately act against organized crime, recognizing it as one of the greatest threats to authority. It is necessary to reconcile actions in the field of prevention with a strong repressive apparatus in order to reestablish law and order and to permit the return to a normal life under a democratic system.

Actions should transcend borders and extinguish the raging flames of transnational crimes. The principal threat of the Colombian situation has to be embraced as an important regional threat that can only be solved with the cooperation of all neighboring countries. Again, Brazil must assume a leadership role in solving the problem. It is not acceptable that terrorist cells and groups be permitted to develop and function anywhere in South America, an area that reflects liberal values.

Consequently, it requires strong governmental determination and the full involvement of the people at all levels of society. The Brazilian Armed Forces, with their national presence and logistical and intelligence capabilities, are traditionally alert and submissive to the will of the people in carrying out their constitutional duty of defense of the homeland. They will be invaluable assets in that struggle.

A magic solution does not exist for such a complex problem. The strategic path of the process will unavoidably call for medium and long-term action. Now is the time to take the first step in that long walk - it is the hour to commence the building of a future of Order and Progress that is the Nation's heritage and that is so richly deserved. The people of Brazil love their country and are currently being held hostage by fear and insecurity caused by criminality throughout the land, particularly in the large cities. An end to this abuse can be achieved.

During the colonization period, people were attracted to the Americas in search of freedom. They built great cities and nations as one expression of that freedom. In the new millennium, Brazil is challenged to be the cradle of some of the greatest human virtues, which are, tolerance and understanding. Its destiny is to live in peace and harmony, where attitudes such as discrimination, violence and terrorism cannot be found.

WORD COUNT = 15,870.

ENDNOTES

¹ Marcela Donadío and Jayme Garreta, “Informes de Conjuntura. Governabilidad Democrática en America Latina”, Boletín RISDAL Año I, Número 6 (August/September 2002), 1.

² Leadership establishes the space of the exercise of the power and determines the margin of effectiveness that it will be exercised. It is, therefore, the capacity of the state to manage the public businesses, to arbitrate the conflicts and to assist the demands of the society.

³ Hurdles are obstacles of any order that hinder or impede the achievement and the maintenance of the national objectives.

⁴ Comando do Exército, Estratégia, Manual de Campanha C124-1 (Brasília,DF: EME, Janeiro 1988), 2-2.

⁵ This theory reflects Col Art Lykke and the Army War College's proposition for strategy.

⁶ The great strategic visions compete along four basic lines: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy. For more details see: Posen, Barry R., and Andrew L. Ross, International Security, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, Vol. 21, No 3, pp. 5-58.

⁷ Marcos Henrique C. Côrtes, A Defesa Nacional Diante do Pós-Modernismo Militar (Rio de Janeiro, RJ: ECEME, 2001), 4.

⁸ Michele A. Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001 Strategy – Driven Choices for Americas Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2001), 25.

⁹ The Brazilian Dictionary Globo Multimídia, Editora Globo, edition 1997, defines violence as: quality of what is violent; abuse of the force; tyranny; oppression; vehemence; duress or moral.

¹⁰ Richard E. Leakey, The Making of Mankind, Tradução de Norma Telles – 2a edição (São Paulo, SP: Melhoramentos, 1982), 219.

¹¹ Juan Rial, “Informes de Conjuntura. Governabilidad Democrática en America Latina”, Boletín RISDAL Año I, Número 6 (August/September 2002), 5-6.

¹² Extract of the research was published in the Magazine Época On-line, 23 September 2001, <<http://revistaepoca.globo.com/epoca/0,6993,EPT397991-1664,00.html>>. Accessed 23 September 2002.

¹³ André Geraldo de M. Simões, As Mortes por Causas Violentas no Rio de Janeiro e a Redução da Sobrevivência Masculina Durante o Período 1980/1991/1995 Monograph (Rio de Janeiro,RJ: Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2000), 30.

¹⁴ Gary S. Becker, “The Economics of Crime”, 1995; available from <<http://www.rich.frb.org/pubs/cross/crime/crime4.html>>; Internet; accessed 21 September 2002.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ In São Paulo, the incidence of homicides for 100.000 inhabitants in neighborhoods of the periphery, as Jardim Ângela, for instance, whose incidence is of 116.23, is 28 times larger than the one of a neighborhood of the wealthy area, like Moema, with an incidence of 4.11.

¹⁷ Simões, 23. In the same work the author highlights that in 1991, the violent deaths were responsible for 81.81% of the mortality among the youths from 15 to 19 and call the attention for the male group from 10 to 14, in which the external causes were responsible, in the same year, for 61.61% of the deaths.

¹⁸ For more details see www.ibge.org.br.

¹⁹ Data from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics).

²⁰ That idea was presented in the XI National Encounter of Population Studies, in Caxambu-MG, in 1998.

²¹ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) contributes to peace and security in the world by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science, culture and communication. More details can be found at www.unesco.org.

²² Anthony Faiola, “Brazilian Gangs Take Turf Wars Out of the Slums”, Washington Post Online 14 December 2002 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56053-2002Dec14.html>>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2002.

²³ Data from DATASUS (Health Ministry) and Civil Police of Rio de Janeiro.

²⁴ A more extensive study on the subject is: <consultoremsegpub@hotmail.com>. “Brasil & EUA: Policiais Mortos em 2001”, electronic mail message to Luiz Otavio Sales Bonfim <LuizBonfim@planalto.gov.br>. 06 October 2002.

²⁵ Almanaque Abril (São Paulo, SP: Editora Abril, 2002), 92.

²⁶ Brazil has half of the population of all South America and half of GNP, and Brazil has border with 10 of 12 countries in South America.

²⁷ The Associated Press, “Brazilian Police Thwart Bomb Plot”, The New York Times Online October 2002 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Brazil-Explosives.html>>; Internet; accessed 25 October 2002.

²⁸ John W. Burton, Violence Explained (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997), 7-8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

³⁰ Tim Johnson, “Colombian Rebel Groups Seen as Regional Danger”, The Miami Herald, available from <<http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/americas/4095966.html>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2002.

³¹ For more details see: Richard L. Millet, Colombia's Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2002.

³² Brazil in early nineties was mainly a transit point for illicit drugs but now it is the world's second-largest consumer of cocaine after the United States.

³³ MERCOSUL, Mercado Comum do Cone Sul (Southern Common Market) is the common market formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Second tier members include Bolivia and Chile.

³⁴ More information can be obtained at ISER home page <<http://www.iser.org.br>>.

³⁵ More deepened study on the subject can be found in the work produced by ISER in 2002 and published by the own Institute, entitled: Epidemiologia de Causas Externas – Dados para a Tomada de Decisões. Indicadores de Violência e Acidentes no Rio de Janeiro.

³⁶ For more details see the results of Legislative Committee of Inquiry published at Almanaque Abril (São Paulo, SP: Editora Abril, 2002), 83.

³⁷ An example of this improvement occurred in 1992 when President Fernando Collor de Melo suffered impeachment and was removed from office after only two years as executive.

³⁸ Johnson, 2.

³⁹ Jeffrey Fields, "Islamic Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Region", AGORA Centro de Estudios Internacionales AAL 098 (16 October 2002): 2.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁴¹ Burton, 27.

⁴² Almanaque Abril (São Paulo, SP: Editora Abril, 2002), 268.

⁴³ "The Americas: Making the Most of an Exodus; Emigration from Latin America", The Economist (23 de fevereiro de 2002 23 February 2002): 1 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 08 October 2002.

⁴⁴ Paulo de Mesquita, Crime, Violence and Democracy in Latin America, Posture Statement presented to the Integration in the Americas Conference, New Mexico: The University of New Mexico, 05 April 2002.

⁴⁵ According research developed by Amaury de Sousa among politicians, industrials, journalists, academics and union leaders two important political-strategic objectives for Brazil are: support democracy in South America (agreed by 67%) and assume a leadership position (agreed by 63%). For more details see: Amaury de Sousa, A Agenda Internacional do Brasil: Um Estudo sobre a Comunidade Brasileira de Política Externa; Centro Brasileiro de Relações Exteriores (CEBRI), 2001.

⁴⁶ In work developed by UNESCO, in 2000, called Map of the Violence, they were described as the four metropolitan areas (RM) most violent in Brazil: RM of São Paulo – SP, Rio de Janeiro – RJ, Vitória – ES and Recife – PE.

⁴⁷ In agreement with the Dicionário Globo Multimídia, of Publisher Globo, edition 1997.

⁴⁸ Edinilsa R. de Souza, "Homicídios no Brasil: O Grande Vilão da Saúde Pública na Década de 80", Cadernos de Saúde Pública do Rio de Janeiro, volume 10, suplemento 1 (1993).

⁴⁹ Burton, 14.

⁵⁰ Burton, 127.

⁵¹ Details on PIAPS can be found at the website www.presidencia.gov.br/piaps.

⁵² Words published in the spelling book of orientation of PIAPS, distributed by the team that conducted the Plan, in the year of 2001.

⁵³ The Constitution of Brazil, article 144, defines that "public security, the duty of the State, and the right and responsibility of all, is exercised to preserve the safety of persons and property..."

⁵⁴ Burton, 134-135.

⁵⁵ George Felipe de Lima Dantas, As Polícias Norte-Americanas, Monograph (Rockville, MY: Montgomery College, 1999), 1.

⁵⁶ The ISER manifesto can be found on the web page of the Institute in the internet, or directly on <http://www.iser.org.br/portug/manifesto.htm>; accessed 11 November 2002.

⁵⁷ The victim research was accomplished in 2002 in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife and Vitória, as part of the works developed by PIAPS (see endnote 51), and the result can be obtained through official site of the Program.

⁵⁸ George Felipe de Lima Dantas <consultoremsepub@hotmail.com>, "A Economia do Crime", electronic mail message to Luiz Otávio Sales Bonfim <LuizBonfim@planalto.gov.br>, 03 September 2002, 6.

⁵⁹ Milton da Rocha Filho, "Brasileiros Querem Julgar Menores como Adultos", O Estado de São Paulo 25 September 2002 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/editoriais/2002/09/25cid024.html>; Internet; accessed 24 September 2002.

⁶⁰ See endnote 12.

⁶¹ Almanaque Abril (São Paulo, SP: Editora Abril, 2002), 83.

⁶² James Dao, "The War in Terrorism Takes Aim at Crime" The New York Times (07 April 2002): 3 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 08 October 2002.

⁶³ Ibid., 1.

⁶⁴ Burton, 1.

⁶⁵ The V Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas began on 19 November 2002, in Santiago - Chile.

⁶⁶ Statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld during the V Conference of Defense Ministerial of the Americas, Santiago, Chile, 19 November 2002.

⁶⁷ Statement uttered by occasion of the opening session of the V Conference of Defense Ministerial of the Americas, on 19 November 2002, in Santiago - Chile.

⁶⁸ The Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia – SIVAM (System of Surveillance of the Amazon) was conceived by the Secretary of Strategic Studies of the Brazilian Presidency and has the purpose of caring for for the Amazon region. With SIVAM, the Amazon will be watched permanently, controlled and supervised. Information about SIVAM can be obtained on: www.sivam.gov.br.

⁶⁹ "U.S. Official on Hemispheric Security Architecture for the 21st Century", distributed by the Office of International Information Program, U.S. Department of State; electronic mail message from List Manager <Listmgr@pd.state.gov>, 24 September 2002, 2.

⁷⁰ Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution.

⁷¹ Complementary law number 97, 09 June 1999.

⁷² More information can be obtained through Brazilian Army official web page at www.exercito.gov.br.

⁷³ Côrtes, 23.

⁷⁴ Argemiro Procópio, O Brasil no Mundo das Drogas (Petrópolis, RJ: Editora Vozes, 1999), 136.

⁷⁵ Larry Rohter, "Ipanema Under Siege: Rio's Gangs Flex Harder", The New York Times, 20 October 2002 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/20weekinreview/20ROHT.html>>; Internet; accessed 21 October 2002.

⁷⁶ Interesting study on cooperative security for Americas can be found in a monograph by Col Joseph R. Núñez, A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas: Multilateral Cooperation, Liberal Peace, and Soft Power, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2002.

⁷⁷ Brazilian National Defense Policy. Brasília, DF: Imprensa Nacional, 1998, 9.

⁷⁸ Andres Oppenheimer, "Talk of a South American Military Forces Emerges", Miami Herald 03 October 2002 [journal on-line]; received via e-mail on 08 October 2002.

⁷⁹ Extract of the research was published in Folha de São Paulo: "Brasil Deixa de Receber US\$ 40 bi por Crime e Corrupção, diz Pesquisa", Folha Online November 2002 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www1.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u59220.shtml>>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2002.

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