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AN ARMY "RESERVE COMPONENTS TRANSFORMATION" STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

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The Army reserve components need a "transformation" strategy. "Army Transformation" is underway, focused on sustaining the Legacy Force during transformation, building an Interim Force, and ultimate conversion to an Objective Force. While the "Army Transformation" strategy incorporates the reserve components generally, there is little specific focus on reserve transformation.

The Army National Guard currently has 55% of the Army's combat forces, and together with the Army Reserve, 63% of the Army's combat support units and 68% of its combat service support units. To ensure that "Army Transformation" contributes a land component to the "Total Force" that is relevant, responsive, dominant, and capable of helping meet our national security needs in the volatile and uncertain environment of the 21st Century, an Army "Reserve Components Transformation" must proceed apace with "Army Transformation." A "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy should include initiatives to update, revise and realign the roles and missions of the Guard and Reserve, and to ensure technological and doctrinal advances, and other imperatives necessary for citizen-soldiers to remain a vital asset of "The Army" and America's joint forces.
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AN ARMY "RESERVE COMPONENTS TRANSFORMATION" STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

A CALL FOR AN ARMY "RESERVE COMPONENTS TRANSFORMATION" STRATEGY

America's military, if not certainly the US Army, is faced with a time of great challenge and opportunity, replete with evolutionary, if not revolutionary change. The end of the Cold War and the "Soviet Threat" have given rise to the need to define a new defense strategy in recognition of "America's extraordinary role in international politics and the consequent ambiguity and uncertainty of the circumstances in which the United States will use its military power." There is an explosion in technological innovation, and globalization of economics. Our national interests as the world's only "superpower" have drawn the United States into myriad and escalating tensions and conflicts worldwide.

These are but some of the conditions that spawned a multifaceted "Army Transformation" initiative, unveiled in October 1999. The objects of this endeavor, simply stated, are to proactively ensure the Army's continued relevance, dominance and responsiveness in the wide range of traditional and evolving military roles demanded by our National Security Strategy, across the full spectrum of future threats of uncertain nature.

This is a tall order. It amounts to "our most significant effort to change The Army in 100 years." Despite vexing technological, fiscal and other challenges, "Army Transformation" is off and running, with a strategy focused on three major pathways: sustaining the Legacy Force during transformation, building a vanguard Interim Force, and ultimate conversion to a future Objective Force. While the "Army Transformation" strategy incorporates the reserves generally, there is little specific focus on reserve component transformation.

However, we must seize the opportunity to undertake a focused, parallel transformation of the Army reserve components. This is essential if the reserves are to remain relevant, integral components of "The Army."

The time is also ripe to revisit the time-honored, but miscued, "Total Force" policy, initiated by the Department of Defense in the 1970s. This policy, born of dissatisfaction "with both the military and political ramifications of the decision not to mobilize the reserves" during the Vietnam War, ostensibly was designed to "ensure reserve participation in future conflicts." Under the policy, there has been increased but misplaced heavy reliance on reserve support units, particularly as first responders.
Moreover, there is a trend toward “[e]xtensive non-crisis deployment of the Guard [and Reserve that] threatens the nation’s foundational dependence on the citizen-soldier.” Since 1989, there has been a 300% increase in military deployments, in an era that has also seen a 40% decrease in force structure throughout the Army. This has led to significantly increased reliance on reserve components in virtually all deployments, and regular resort to the reserves to relieve the pressure on an overloaded active component. “This amplified use of the reserves for peacetime deployments is hurting recruitment and retention.”

“It may well be that the increased use of the Guard in the post-cold-war world has made it harder to attract people,” warned Charles Cragin, Assistant Secretary of Defense. That same concern is echoed by Major Jerry Mendez, a citizen-soldier deployed to Bosnia: “The repercussions are more severe than people think. People are going to have to choose between military service and family. Guess what they are going to choose? That is why the Guard is losing quality people.”

“On the other hand, Guard and Reserve personnel have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to meet any challenge[,]” “These citizen-soldiers are great Americans, only too willing to serve their country, and most would be ashamed to question their deployment.” As acknowledged by the Department of Defense,

[The bottom line is that we cannot overuse our reservists without seeing a corresponding increase in attrition and a decline in readiness. In the end, we must strike a balance, so that we create a Total Force that is appropriately sized for missions and staffed with people who want to serve but who do not find the burdens of that service so onerous they leave.”

An Army "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy should also include a reassessment and revision of certain roles and missions of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR). Updating and changing roles and missions of its reserve components will better serve “The Army” during and after transformation, in preparing to meet our national security needs in the 21st Century.

Change, of course, is nothing new for the reserve components. Throughout history, change is one of the constants that have helped maintain the essential duality of our American military tradition, with its fundamental reliance on citizen-soldiers. Implementation of the Total Force policy, albeit not without some strain between the active and reserve components, is indicative of such change. Debates, past and present, about reserve component roles, and whether we need both an ARNG and USAR, have also helped focus on the importance of the reserves in our military structure.

However, it serves no purpose here to revisit those concerns, skepticisms, or outright parochial interests that have chaffed at the seams of active and reserve relations in the past.
Nor, for that matter, is it helpful to re-address issues aired in past efforts to merge portions of the Guard and Reserve, or to do away with one or the other component entirely. Instead, the suggestions here for a "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy attempt to avoid "stovepipe" arguments that distort a necessary "horizontal" view of issues; in some respects, issues that transcend strictly Army concerns. In a "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy, as in any military transformation strategy,

[greater emphasis should be placed on experimenting with a variety of military systems, operational concepts, and force structures. The goal would be to identify those that are capable of solving the challenges that emerge or that are capable of exploiting opportunities — our asymmetric advantage — and to eliminate those which are not.]

What is needed now, perhaps more than ever, is a willingness to think bold thoughts and take bold steps, without lingering over sentimentalisms or similar restraints on innovation. "[E]motion has never led to sound national defense policies — indeed, it has led to the retention of many unsound military policies." Moreover, "because the Army as an institution has tended toward gradual evolution rather than more rapid change, the inertia of tradition has been difficult to overcome." But,

[evolution has reached its zenith; the current systems, policies, and programs have given all that they possibly can to the national defense. What is need now is the implementation of revolutionary ideas. To quote former Department of Defense official James L. Gould: "As is true of all large organizations, the Guard and Reserve will achieve their full national defense potential only if opportunities for innovation are periodically and systematically examined. This presupposes an environment in which even 'unthinkable thoughts' are addressed so that innovative proposals, which are once conceptually and practically sound, can be developed for review by senior policy makers."

This paper offers one perspective from which to view a "Reserve Components Transformation." It is not intended to provide any degree of prescriptive details for the measures suggested; that is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the intent is that the ideas, even those "out of the box," will engender further honest thinking and discussion.

No doubt many will disagree with the [author's] conclusions; certainly, those conclusions [that] are controversial and politically volatile. Realizing the stakes, however, the disagreement hopefully will foster spirited debate and not blind defensive volleys, and [the author's] contribution will have been to provide food for thought rather than targets for the political rifle range. After all, when we shoot on that range we shoot only at ourselves, and there are no winners.

The goal here is that "Army Transformation" move forward in full recognition and consideration of the role of the reserve components in the "The Army."
It is said that there are no new ideas under the sun; we only see them for the first time today. That may be true of this paper. It is an effort to focus . . . on what the writer perceives to be the most critical issues and how to confront them. Let the discussions begin and an agenda be adopted.29

OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED ARMY "RESERVE COMPONENTS TRANSFORMATION"

Despite superficial allure in the idea of merging what at first blush seem to be redundant Army reserve components,30 the ARNG and USAR both have continued efficacy as separate reserve components in the "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy proposed here. However, there are some significant changes suggested for each.

Various constitutional provisions vest both Congress and the states with power over the National Guard.31 As the constitutionally based organized militia32 of the several states, the National Guard has unique "dual-mission" state responsibilities that cannot be met with a "federal" reserve component.33 Conversely, particularly as advocated here, there are roles and missions for the USAR beyond the jurisdictional, if not practical purview of a force under the peacetime command of a state governor.

However, there are redundant capabilities in the reserve component force structures, elimination of which would serve to enhance readiness and facilitate "Army Transformation." A unique force structure for each component would focus issues of active and reserve force mix, eliminate or reduce parochial concerns between the two reserve components, and enhance their respective lobbying efforts before Congress and other venues.

With these ideas in mind, as well as preservation and leveraging of the core competencies of both the ARNG and USAR, this paper advocates the following allocation of Army reserve component roles and missions:

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
- All reserve combat forces
- All reserve combat support and combat service support, except psychological operations and civil affairs units, and medical services at corps and above (hospitals, medical groups and medical brigades)
- All reserve homeland security missions, including specialized weapons of mass destruction response and countermeasure units (in addition to civil support teams)

ARMY RESERVE
- All training and training support (formerly "exercise") brigades and divisions, and all institutional training under TASS,34 to include Joint Professional Military Education for reserve components of all services
• All medical services at corps and above, expanded into a joint medical reserve for all services
• A joint peace operations reserve force, including all Army reserve psychological operations and civil affairs units
• All garrison support units, and installation management of selected federal properties
• Responsibility for integration of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) into their assigned agencies, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members into active and reserve Army units, and management of retired reserves

AN ARMY NATIONAL GUARD "TRANSFORMATION" STRATEGY

Combat Units

The preponderance of Army combat power, 55%, is in the Guard. Currently, this includes eight divisions and fifteen enhanced separate brigades. To enhance readiness, and facilitate transformation, all Army reserve combat units should be in the Guard. To ensure relevance, these units should be transformed on the same schedule as active component combat units.

The ARNG has responsibility now for all Army reserve combat arms units (Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery), as well as the only reserve Armored Cavalry, Infantry Scout, and Air Defense Artillery units, and reserve Special Forces. The USAR has one aviation brigade and two attack helicopter battalions. For the sake of continuity of training, equipping and manning, these units should be consolidated in the ARNG force structure, with its nine aviation brigades and thirteen attack helicopter battalions. The USAR also has fourteen combat heavy engineer battalions, and twenty-five combat engineer battalions, which, for the same reasons, should be consolidated in the ARNG, with its fourteen combat heavy engineer battalions, and forty-six combat engineer battalions.

The ARNG combat forces are part of what is known as the "Legacy Force," under the vernacular of "Army Transformation."

The term legacy force centers on the major weapons systems that the Army has in its inventory today, principally the Army’s primary ground combat vehicles, the M1 Abrams tanks and M2 / M3 Bradley fighting vehicles, and armored fire-support and combat-support vehicles. This is popularly known as the heavy force, comprising the Army’s mechanized infantry and armored divisions.
As "Army Transformation" progresses, through development of the Interim Force and initial fielding of the Objective Force, the Legacy Force will "hold down the fort." The Chief of Staff has said:

As we [go through transformation], we must sustain portions of The Army as we know it today - - a legacy force - - to guarantee our warfighting readiness in the event that an adversary miscalculates. We will recapitalize selected formations - - from the active and reserve components - - of key armored and aviation systems, as well as enhance light force lethality and survivability. \[44\]

The initial steps toward development of the doctrine and systems that will ultimately define the Objective Force have already begun.\[45\] The Army is building two initial Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) that will "enhance capability for operational deployment to meet worldwide requirements" during transformation, and "validate an organizational and operational model for [the] Interim Force."\[46\] After validation of the initial BCTs, the Army will field up to eight BCTs that will comprise the Interim Force.\[47\] This Interim Force, which will be expanded to include an interim division, will include "at least one National Guard brigade."\[48\]

So far, so good – the ARNG is included in recapitalization of the Legacy Force, and is to be given a bit part in the Interim Force. But, the devil is in the details of the Objective Force transition schedule:

Based on current planning assumptions, from the time the Army begins the transition to objective brigade combat teams (OBCTs) in fiscal years 2008-2010:

- Brigades that do not belong to the [active component] counterattack corps\[49\] will make the transition to OBCTs within a 10-year period.
- Counterattack corps brigades will make the transition to OBCTs within 15 years.
- Army National Guard brigades will make the transition to OBCTs within 21 years.
- The six to eight planned interim brigade combat teams will make the transition within 30 years.\[50\]

In this "strategy," with the exception of one interim BCT, the ARNG is left out of transformation to the Object Force for up to 30 years – 6 years behind transition of the last of the active Legacy Force, and up to 11 years behind transition of the bulk of the active force. This is the wrong strategy – or no strategy at all – and threatens to leave ARNG combat units behind as a new breed of "hollow force," doggedly preparing to fight the last war, while future war fighting focus is, or should be changing.
The objective should be to have – and no less important, to be seen to have – a decisive edge over any major competitor, most likely China. To remain dominant over China, the United States must not only shift its attention to the Pacific but must also start thinking in entirely new ways about technology, logistics, and operations. For nearly half a century, the American military organized itself to fight a short, extremely intense battle in Europe from large, fixed bases dispersed over relatively short distances. Whatever a future war in Asia will look like, that will not be it.51

As the Objective Force takes shape, and as active component forces transition, ARNG combat forces should mirror the active force, with a mix of units similarly equipped and trained. Otherwise, ARNG combat power risks becoming irrelevant. In a major conflict, with active component Objective Forces and ARNG Legacy Forces, combatant commanders will be hard pressed to effectively integrate reserve combat power when and where necessary to sustain and win the fight, and to ensure continued support of the national will.52

There is a risk that if the wrong transformation path is chosen (or if no attempt is made at transformation), it will prove difficult, if not impossible, for the Pentagon to buy its way out of mistakes. It is also important to begin the transformation process soon. It is no exaggeration to say that . . . the US military 20 years hence is already being formed and limited by decisions being made today.53

Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units

Today, 63% of the Army’s combat support, and 69% of its combat service support is embedded in the reserves. The ARNG and USAR share this responsibility in varying measure.54 However, to streamline transformation support and logistic initiatives, all reserve support functions should be consolidated in the ARNG, except medical services at corps and above, and psychological operations and civil affairs units (discussed below under USAR transformation).

Current redundancy in support roles has produced duplicative administrative headquarters in the ARNG and USAR. Four Army Reserve Commands, eleven subordinate Regional Support Commands, three Regional Support Groups, and thirty-seven other specialized commands55 perform essentially the same functions as State Area Commands, Troop Commands, and other ARNG headquarters. Levels of equipping and training are sometimes disparate, depending upon policies, program emphasis and funding success of the respective components.

These and other problems would be mitigated if the ARNG assumed responsibility for all reserve support functions, with the limited exceptions identified. While this may require provision of some ARNG maintenance and other logistic support for USAR units, which could be accomplished under interservice agreements, a unique force structure for the ARNG and USAR
would eliminate or reduce disruptive and unproductive parochialism, and would narrow the issues on reserve component force structure mix, and other hard choices that lie ahead.  

Perhaps most importantly, consolidation of the reserve support role will enhance "Army Transformation." Development of Object Force doctrine and systems will drive a significant change in the way the Army sustains its war fighting effort. The Chief of Staff has said The Army will "aggressively reduce the size of our deployed support footprints - - both combat support and combat service support." This transformation in logistics will require not only changes in doctrine and training, but also a "divestment strategy . . . to retire or forego capabilities that are a poor fit . . . and to swap legacy capabilities for transformational ones." All of this is best accomplished under a single component's roof.

Finally, consolidation of the majority of support functions in the ARNG will improve the ability of state governors to respond to natural disasters and domestic disturbances. Personnel and equipment in the USAR are federal assets that are only available when mobilized. In addition, unity of control would enhance unity of effort in utilization of Army reserve component units that are dual missioned to perform homeland security (discussed below under Homeland Security).

Homeland Security

Defense of America's homeland is the sleeping giant of national security concerns as the 21st Century dawns. As one of the most free and open societies in the world, the US is also among the most vulnerable to terrorism. The security of our society and our citizens must be a primary concern. The emergence of new threats that have both the means and the incentive to strike at our homeland necessitates a heightened degree of readiness by our national security structures to defend against such attacks and to minimize and contain the harm they might cause.

America's status as the sole remaining superpower, and our policy of engagement world wide, have caused state actors and others disaffected by our actions to resort to asymmetric terrorist attacks on our forces, citizens and property abroad, and increasingly on American citizens and property at home. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, typical of terrorist attacks of the last decade, were "wanton, indiscriminate acts" designed to achieve their objectives "by killing and maiming as many people as possible." "This trend toward more destructive terrorist acts is particularly alarming due to the increasing accessibility of weapons of mass destruction."
Strategies to guard against such threats, respond to such attacks, and coordinate and control responders, are matters receiving considerable attention around the country, and at the highest levels of government.\textsuperscript{66} Responding agencies will include local, state and federal, civilian as well as military.

Homeland security is a uniquely appropriate mission for the National Guard. The Guard is a “forward deployed force for responding to domestic disasters,” with 3200 armories in 2700 communities around the country.\textsuperscript{67}

In many states, the Adjutant General is also responsible for state emergency management. This “dual hat” is often the key to a timely and effective response. Additionally, the Guard, as a state controlled and directed asset, has the ability to get to the disaster event well before other federal assets could respond. . . . [T]he Reserves are part of our federal force and do not report to the governors. Therefore, while they have similar kinds of capabilities, . . . they are part of the federal response and cannot be engaged until there is a federally declared emergency.\textsuperscript{68}

The ARNG has positioned itself to assume a lead domestic role in national missile defense, if and when such systems are fielded.\textsuperscript{69} The ARNG has also stood up a number of specially trained and equipped WMD- Civil Support Teams (CST\textsubscript{s}), designed to assist civil authorities in response to chemical, biological or nuclear incidents.\textsuperscript{70}

Other WMD consequence management missions, such as physical security for critical infrastructure, support to law enforcement, and even providing temporary shelter or food, are especially appropriate for the Guard. These are typical of state missions performed by the Guard in disaster relief and civil disturbance control. “Dual-missioning” for homeland security in such tasks is “supportable within the existing [Guard] force structure . . . requiring little additional training, equipment, or preparation.”\textsuperscript{71} If USAR support units are transferred to the ARNG, as suggested above, these units would be also “dual -missioned,” giving additional first response capabilities to the states, and providing an added measure of unity of effort through unity of command.

But even this is not enough. In addition to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons detection capabilities provided by CST\textsubscript{s}, other WMD response tasks, such as mass chemical decontamination and mass casualty treatment, require specialized training and equipment. Some chemical and medical units currently in the USAR may be capable of performing such tasks. However, they are all apportioned to overseas theaters in the event of a major theater war, and remissioning them to focus on homeland security is likely to present an unacceptably high risk to the theater commander.\textsuperscript{72}
The solution is to stand up additional units, or restructure some existing units for these specialized homeland security tasks. There will likely need to be “bill payers,” however, as end strength limitations will almost assuredly mean a “zero sum game” in force structure modifications. As support requirements are pared down in response to transformation initiatives, additional force structure may become available for such missions. However, in the interim, tough choices will have to be made – another argument for consolidating the majority of reserve support forces in a single component.

**Aging Personnel**

A characteristic of all reserve components is that on average their personnel tend to be older than active component personnel. While the Reserve Forces Policy Board has stated this differential in age is insignificant, the potential impact on unit readiness is certainly open to debate.

In combat arms units, physical qualities are at a premium, and older soldiers simply cannot keep up. A tank commander depends on his reflexes to identify and hit targets. An infantry platoon sergeant needs the strength and stamina to lead his soldiers on forced marches carrying a full combat load on his back. Even more senior leaders must be capable of the physical vigor to “lead by example.” In some cases, these positions in reserve component units are filled by soldiers in their mid- to late forties. Some noncommissioned officers in the Georgia Army National Guard’s 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), mobilized for Desert Storm, were well over fifty; the brigade’s command sergeant major was fifty-four, and another senior noncommissioned officer was fifty-eight.

A former state adjutant general has argued:

Active units should consist of younger soldiers than are found in the Guard, and they should be fit and ready to go on short notice. Guard units are particularly adapted for heavy forces [that will “follow on” after the “Active Army of light and medium forces . . . make the entry and establish the lodgment”]. Heavy unit personnel can be older and do not have to meet the physical demands of lighter forces.

The merits of the contention that personnel in heavy forces need not meet the same physical standards as soldiers in lighter combat forces is questionable. Moreover, as the basis for any policy on future force structure mix between active and reserve combat units it is short sighted at best. It does not take into account that, on whatever transformation timeline it comes to the Guard, the Objective Force will be lighter, and more agile than anything in the heavy forces today – and the physical demands for combat soldiers in the Objective Force will be the same for all components.
The better reasoned argument, supported by some empirical evidence, is that soldiers in their forties and fifties, although they are not too old to contribute to the Army, are too old to be counted on to serve effectively in leadership positions in combat units.

This is not an unmanageable problem, however. Transferring between units, and changing military occupational specialties (MOS) is nothing new in the Guard. The "aging sabers" could transfer to any number of administrative or other noncombatant billets, if and when they are unable to keep up with the "young bucks" in combat units. This would include assignment as "guest" instructors or "subject matter experts" for institutional training conducted by the USAR, as advocated below.

**AN ARMY RESERVE "TRANSFORMATION" STRATEGY**

**Training Units**

The USAR has long focused on training readiness as one of its core competencies. Today, USAR training brigades and divisions (institutional training and training support), along with its regional training centers and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) support, provide professional military skills and leadership training for soldiers throughout the Army, and for cadets at institutions throughout the country. This training capability is critical not only to meet the Army's ongoing training requirements, but also for rapid expansion of the Army's training base in the event of a large-scale mobilization.

In the 1990's, under the auspices of TRADOC, institutional training responsibilities in the Army reserve components was divided up amongst the ARNG and USAR under what is known as TASS, "The Army School System." Despite the laudatory objective of ensuring that all active and reserve component training is conducted under the same curricula and standards, TASS is an incredibly complicated scheme that has seen no end of parochial and pragmatic difficulties associated with its tri-component, cross-jurisdictional tenets. Sometimes simpler is better, an axiom that the architects of TASS appear to have ignored.

The USAR should assume full responsibility for all institutional training under a revamped TASS. This includes all OCS, NCOES, MOS and other specialty courses, i.e. TAITC (The Army Instructor Trainer Course), and SGL (Small Group Leader). The USAR is capable of fielding a full spectrum, exportable cadre of certified instructors, augmented with subject matter experts (SMEs) as "guest instructors," drawn from both reserve and active components, who could utilize Army and reserve component regional training centers, or home station armories.
and local training areas, to conduct courses when and where needed. With local assistants, USAR instructors could also take full advantage of the growing network of distance education facilities, when appropriate for the courses being taught.

This would reduce the cost of maintaining what are often under utilized or excess training cadres in both reserve components, and would better serve the training needs of each. It would also provide enhanced opportunities for AC/RC "integration" by directly involving active duty SMEs in the training of reserve component soldiers.

Under this revised TASS program, the USAR could take a leading role in developing and offering a reserve component Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), not only for the Army reserve components, but also for reserve components of all services.

While there is a professional military education program to prepare AC personnel for service in joint assignments, a similar program for RC personnel does not exist. As a result, many RC personnel who serve in joint assignments begin those duties less prepared than is desirable. While RC personnel in joint billets do receive some on-the-job training in joint assignments once they arrive, these experiences rarely provide a solid or standardized foundation in the fundamentals of joint operations.85

**Joint Medical Service Reserves**

"The Army Reserve traces its origins to the creation of the Medical Reserve Corps in 1908."86 Today, the USAR has eight medical groups (73% of the Army total), six medical brigades (85% of the Army total), and thirty-one hospitals (77% of the Army total).87 The ARNG has no medical service units at this level.88

Medical services are one of a number of "enablers" of combat power that truly are "service-immaterial." Doctors, nurses, and other health care specialists and technicians perform the same duties regardless of the color of their uniform, or that of their patients.

Medical service reserve capabilities at and above the level of Army corps, Navy fleet, and Air Force wing, should be consolidated into a single, joint reserve force.89 Medical services at this level will almost invariably be provided in a joint environment. Economies of scale alone support such a move in this highly specialized, professional arena. With little, if any, additional effort, medical service personnel could be cross-trained to deliver their professional skills in any service-centric environment that circumstances might dictate.

**Joint Peace Operations Reserve Forces**

The trend toward protracted involvement of US military forces in multiple peace operations around the world has been the bane of the active Army, and may ultimately prove to be the
Achilles heel of the Army reserve components. Even if the new administration embraces a policy of decreased involvement in future peace operations, such missions will likely remain part of the spectrum of operations the military must be prepared to execute when US interests dictate. It is time to remedy our current peace operation woes, and build an appropriate force for future peace operations. The USAR should play a central role in this "transformation."

From the active component perspective, the main complaint is that peace operations are not the business of fighting and winning our nation's wars, for which our soldiers are trained, and that deployment on peace operations erodes individual war fighting skills and unit readiness. The very nature of peacekeeping operations often demands lengthy involvement, measured in years, if not decades. Coupled with the number of peace operations in which the United States is involved at any given time, this translates into multiple deployments for US forces, which erodes their quality of life, in addition to readiness.

To alleviate strain on the active component, reserves have been called up in ever increasing numbers to perform peace operations around the world. Thousands of reservists, for example, have already been called to serve in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia. A recently announced five-year rotation plan for SFOR has ARNG division headquarters deploying to command six of the next eight six-month SFOR rotations, with six of the Guard's enhanced separate brigades and elements of two other ARNG divisions slated to participate in the next four rotations; similar deployments are possible in the four rotations thereafter.

While some reserve leaders herald such deployments, and many individual reservists volunteer for such duty, the stress on both employer–employee and family relations threatens to take its toll. Some view this as the harbinger of the demise of the reserves, with a precipitous decline of manpower in the offing. Reality is probably not that grim; nevertheless, we should address the problem before any dire consequences befall.

Peace operations run the gamut from peacekeeping on one end of the spectrum, which entails monitoring an established peace between previously combatant factions, to peace enforcement (or peace making) at the other end of the spectrum, where two or more factions are actively engaged in armed conflict, where the object is to bring about a cessation of hostilities by force of arms. Along the spectrum lie variations of the extremes, such as where a peace treaty exists, but some or all of the parties, or factions thereof, have yet to lay down (or have taken back up) their arms.

A successful peace operation often is measured by the ability to create a stable environment, to achieve support for that process by the local population or
government, and to assist that population or government to assume control of its own future. 99

Peace enforcement, as described above, is a true military mission, requiring combat forces for successful execution. Even a fractured peace, depending upon the level of hostilities, may require combat forces to restore the peace. The requirements of any particular operation are situation dependant, and likely change as the mission evolves. 100

In any event, when peace is initiated or restored, peace operations usually involve some combination of the following functions:

- Monitoring compliance with the terms of peace agreement
- Law enforcement (where civil authority is yet to be restored)
- Humanitarian assistance, including food, medical support and shelter
- Refugee repatriation, possibly involving protective measures
- Reestablishment of infrastructure
- Reestablishment of civil authority and institutions (nation building)
- Security of peace keepers

Many of these functions can, and perhaps should be performed by other than military personnel, such as nation building – where the expertise resides primarily in agencies outside the military. Humanitarian assistance is often provided by non-governmental and international organizations. Many of the other functions, while often performed by military units with the requisite skills and equipment, i.e. transportation, supply, and engineer units, need not necessarily be accomplished by the military. Certain express or implied functions, such as security, psychological operations, civil affairs and public affairs, are best left to specially trained military personnel.

The active component should remain the primary, initial force for peace operations, particularly those involving peace enforcement. However, as early as possible, there should be hand-off to a reserve peace operations force. 101

Reservists can fill the gap between initial stability/security operations by conventional military forces and the assumption of longer term civil government and other operations by public and private organizations – including local, regional and international groups. 102

The USAR should assume lead responsibility for such missions. Under a USAR headquarters akin to a standing joint task force or functional command, a peace force capable of flexible mission tailoring and rotational assignments should be built around a "core" of specially comprised, trained and equipped brigade-sized peace operation units. 103 These "core"
units could be task organized as required with other reserve units, to include USAR psychological operations and civil affairs units, ARNG combat and support units, and reserve units of other services with needed capabilities.

The brigade sized "reserve" peace operations units should be manned similar to traditional reserve units, with a cadre of full-time, permanently assigned USAR personnel, but with the balance of unit personnel drawn from active component units of all services. The active soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines would be "dual-assigned" to the USAR units for peacekeeping contingencies. These active component members would "drill" with their peacekeeping unit on a periodic basis for specialized training.

By limiting active personnel from any company or equivalent size unit to one or two individuals, the impact on active units would be negligible. The assignment "tour" to the peacekeeping reserve unit should be for a minimum of three years, preferably four, in order to ensure adequate training time and availability for deployment. Actual deployments should be limited to one six month rotation out of every eighteen months, to minimize time away from the individual's active component unit and normal military occupation, and family. In one three-year tour in the peace force "reserve" under this schedule, an individual would likely be deployed no more than twice.

The number and size of peace force reserve brigades necessary to meet the nation's peacekeeping obligations will depend upon the direction taken in articulating a peacekeeping strategy for the military. For example, fewer and smaller units would suffice if the policy were to only conduct such operations in a collation environment. If the policy were to significantly limit the circumstances under which we would become involved in such missions, fewer units would be required.

If it were anticipated that there would be up to three on-going missions at any given time, a total force structure of nine brigades would be needed under the deployment schedule suggested above. Brigades of approximately 2,300 personnel each, counting full-time USAR cadre personnel, could be supported with a 1.5% personnel contribution from each of the four services, or about 2 out of every 134 individuals. Only one set of equipment would be necessary for any given operation, as rotations could fall in on equipment already in theater.

An active component obligation to support continuing peace operations in this fashion would help alleviate operations tempo burdens, and lessen concern over negative impacts on unit war fighting readiness. It would also reduce reserve component concerns over purported ill effects of mobilizations for extended peacekeeping missions.
REVISITING THE FORCE STRUCTURE MIX OF SUPPORT UNITS IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS

The force structure mix in the Army's "Total Force" today is fundamentally flawed when certain essential support functions are embedded heavily, if not exclusively, in the reserve components. The time it takes to mobilize and deploy reserve units is the issue here. This could prove to be a critical detriment to force tailoring for combatant commanders, particularly as "Army Transformation" moves to being able to put a combat brigade on the ground in theater, anywhere in the world, within ninety six hours, a division within five days, and five divisions within thirty days.

The current force structure mismatch is particularly apparent in early enablers of the lodgment phase of any major campaign, such as port handlers in terminal battalions, of which 50% are in the reserves, or air traffic control units, also with nearly 50% in the reserves. Reliance on other units found almost, if not entirely within the reserve components, could also delay early operations, depending upon the threat, the level of conflict, the geopolitical nature of the contingency, the physical or environmental characteristics of the theater or area of operations, or the capabilities of the host nation (if there is one). These types of units include:

- Chemical brigades – 100% in the reserves
- Chemical battalions – 75% in the reserves
- Water supply battalions – 100% in the reserves
- Petroleum support battalions – 92% in the reserves
- Psychological operations units – 81% in the reserves
- Civil affairs units – 97% in the reserves
- Public affairs units – 82% in the reserves

The time it takes to make the political decision to call up reserve forces could induce considerable delay, in and of itself. Once that decision is made, the time it takes to mobilize and put a reserve unit in theater varies considerably. A key variable is whether the unit will be transported to the theater by air or sea.

In a study of mobilization and train-up times for Army reserve component support units, the Rand Corporation, using data from Operation Desert Shield, determined that most units could be mobilized, trained and validated for deployment, and at an air port of embarkation within 13 – 24 days, depending upon the size of the unit. The availability of airlift assets was not considered in the study, however, and may render illusory predictions of relatively rapid deployment of reserve units by air. As Army combat platforms are lightened to make them air deployable, Air Force strategic lift capabilities will almost certainly be in short supply in the early
stages of campaign deployment. Reserve support units may spend as much time waiting at the airport as they did getting there.

The Rand study found that reserve support units deploying by sea could typically have their equipment at the seaport in 18 days, and could complete their training and validation for deployment in 24 – 29 days after call-up. Again, this is only the time it takes to get equipment and personnel to the dock, and does not account for the availability of sealift assets, or time in transit.

The mix of active and reserve support units must be reexamined, and readjusted where units critical to the early stages of deployment are overly embedded in the reserves. That force structure analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper, should be undertaken in consideration of capabilities to perform required missions. A unit unable to get to the theater in a timely fashion, particularly in a little- or no-warning scenario, is not mission capable. The active – reserve force mix should not require commanders to rely on such units for mission accomplishment.

When the "Total Force" policy was implemented in response to the Vietnam experience, it was the Chief of Staff's intent that reservists be integrated so deeply in the force structure that, as a practical matter, no future President would be able to employ any significant military force without calling up the reserves. The "Total Force" policy was never meant to preclude the President from effectively employing military forces. Interpretation and application of the policy should reflect the realities of the force projection military we have become, rather than the forward deployed military we once were.

IMPLICATIONS OF FISCAL AND MANPOWER RESTRAINTS ON AN ARMY "RESERVE COMPONENTS TRANSFORMATION" STRATEGY

None of the foregoing proposals for an Army "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy were made in light of any detailed consideration of fiscal or end strength impacts. Such analysis would be outside the scope of this paper. However, a working assumption is that any program in the military today, even the ambitious tenets of "Army Transformation," must be considered in light of "zero-sum" budget and manpower restraints.

The new administration may seek higher levels of military funding, as has been suggested, but any increase is likely to be insufficient to make up for current program deficits. Likewise, the new administration may totally revamp the structure of the Army, along with the rest of the military, "but it would not necessarily be larger." Therefore, proposals here requiring increased funding will likely have to compete for limited defense dollars along with
other Army programs, and any requiring increased manning will likely have to find their own "bill payers."

Nevertheless, some general observations can be made about these proposals. Transfer of USAR support functions will require transfer of the force structure in those units to the ARNG (with no change to the end strength of the Army reserve components), but should net a surplus of administrative control billets in the USAR. These positions could help "fund" command and control, and cadre requirements for the proposed joint peace operations reserve force, the bulk of the force structure of which will come from "dual missioned" active component soldiers. Only a slight increase in funds would be required for training and equipping this force.

A joint medical services reserve will not require additional manning, and may eliminate some administrative positions service-wide. Economies of scale in joint operations will result in additional savings. The same principles will apply to reduce overall cost of a single reserve component institutional training base under a revamped TASS.

Finally, the proposed specialized homeland security forces will impose some additional funding requirements for equipment and training, and will require additional force structure in the ARNG, at least until there is a draw down in the levels of combat and combat service support in the transition to the Objective Force. Hopefully it will not take a catastrophic WMD incident on American soil to convince Congress to fund such needs.

CONCLUSION

The Army reserve components need a transformation strategy. "Army Transformation" is underway, with little attention being given in the process to the ARNG or USAR. In order to ensure that "Army Transformation" produces a land force component of the "Total Force" that is relevant, responsive, dominant, and capable of meeting our national security needs in the volatile and uncertain environment of the 21st Century, an Army "Reserve Components Transformation" must progress apace with "Army Transformation." A "Reserve Components Transformation" strategy should include initiatives to update, revise and realign the roles and missions of the ARNG and USAR, and to ensure technological advances and other imperatives necessary for citizen-soldiers to remain a vital part of "The Army" and America's joint forces.
ENDNOTES


4 See, ibid., 28:

Today, the science and technology (S&T) community is working hard to develop answers to questions we have asked: How do we reduce armored volume in combat vehicles while increasing survivability? How do we increase deployability without sacrificing survivability and lethality? How do we reduce in-theater support requirements and thereby reduce demands on strategic lift? These and other questions guide a major S&T effort to develop technologies that will give the Objective Force its desired characteristics — responsiveness, agility, versatility, deployability, lethality, survivability and sustainability.

In the meantime, the Army is working to "validate an organizational and operational model for the Interim Force," ibid, and to find funding for its expensive transformation endeavors.

Given current funding trends, we estimate that The Army has identified funding for approximately half of the additional costs associated with transformation.


Retired lieutenant general Bill Carter . . . says the biggest hurdle for the Army’s makeover isn’t developing high-tech guns or persuading crusty old tank soldiers to embrace change. It’s the $60 billion cost . . . [which] is competing with a long wish list of other expensive new weapons, from a national missile defense system to tilt-engine helicopters for the Marines.

Dave Moniz, "Overhaul of Army Puts a Premium on Speed," USA Today, 16 January 2001, p. 2A.


6 See, for example, Louis Caldera and Eric K. Shinseki, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2001, Posture Statement presented to the 106th Cong., 2d

7 Army Chief of Staff, GEN Eric K. Shenseki has pronounced:

Today, I declare that we are The Army - - totally integrated, with a unity of purpose - - no longer the total army, no longer the one army. We are The Army, and we will march into the 21st century as The Army. We acknowledge our components and their unique strengths. But we are The Army, and will work to structure ourselves accordingly.


In practice if not policy, the Army is not one integrated service but three separate entities: the Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. Each of these components maintains its own separate bureaucracy, each is separately funded, and each has its own parochial interests.


9 Jacobs, 2.


[D]uring his tenure as Army Chief of Staff in the early 1970s, Gen. Creighton Abrams had set out to integrate the army’s active and reserve components in a way that would ensure reserve participation in future conflicts.

In 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger summarized the goal of the policy in this way:
We can no longer consider reserve forces as merely forces in reserve. Instead, they have to be an integral part of the total force. They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the professionalism of the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen soldier.


The Army has “significantly increased its use of reserve component forces to conduct current missions[,]” Mark E. Vinson, “Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness,” Parameters (Summer 2000), 26.

[A] smaller active force has led the Army to rely on reserve forces to pick up some of the increased mission load in order to relieve active-force deployment tempo.


In striking contrast to Cold War levels of contributory support, today’s reserve forces are providing some 12 to 13 million mandays of support to the active component on an annual basis – a thirteen-fold rise and equivalent to the addition of some 35,000 personnel to the active component endstrength, or two Army divisions.

Cusker, 6.


Of course, the increasing frequency and duration of deployment presents challenges to our National Guard and Reserve units, employers, soldiers, and families.

The Army reserve components are among the nation’s most venerable institutions, rich with legacies dating from early colonial times. The relatively simple militia of the seventeenth century, however, has gone through complex changes in institutional relationships, conditions of membership, and roles and missions. This evolution has produced a contemporary reserve that bears little resemblance to its antecedents.


[21] This is not meant to downplay the significance of the problem, however.

The Army has suffered from a destructive disunity among its components, specifically between the active Army and the National Guard. This rift serves neither the Army nor the country well...[and] must be healed[.]


[22] In the 1960s, for example, “Congress thwarted efforts by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to merge Army Reserve and National Guard components.” Binkin and Kaufman, 32. “The basic concept of the proposed reorganization envisioned that all paid drill units of the USAR required by contingency plans would be transferred to the Army National Guard.” Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1966), 3. Although estimates of the reduction in the total number of paid reservists under McNamara’s plan vary, defeat of his proposal is mainly attributed to the fact that his approach to implementing the plan was seen as a “challenge[ to] the authority of Congress to establish policy for the Armed Forces” and to Congressional concern that “the ever increasing American military commitment in Vietnam could not be reconciled with a reduction in reserve forces. William F. Levantosser, Defense Manpower: Management of the Reserve Components (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1967), 10-13.

[23] See, for example, Coffman, 975 (Emory Upton’s argument in the 1870s that “the militia should be maintained merely as state troops with local missions”), 978 (War Department proposal to the same effect, following World War I), and 979-80 (Lesley J. McNair’s recommendation to George Marshall during World War II “That the National Guard be dispensed with as a component of the Army of the United States.”).
In 1947, James Forrestal, the secretary of defense, appointed a board to study the nation's reserves. Named for its chairman, Gordon Gray, an assistant secretary of the Army, the Gray Board concluded that the dual status of the National Guard was detrimental to national security and stated that "the National Guard must be directly under Federal control." The Gray Board recommended merging the National Guard with the Organized Reserve Corps, and Secretary Forrestal concurred. . . . [However,] Congress, harkening to the Guard and its states' rights message, quashed the merger proposal.


In hindsight, one of the more amusing calls for federalization of the National Guard came from a Lieutenant General, who warned:

The National Guard must be broken loose from state control; present military operations are of such violent nature that they must be under centralized control. . . . Election of a Communist governor in some states looms as a sinister possibility. Such a governor would have all of the power of sovereignty exercised by his state government which, in most states, far exceeds the power of the President. Such a situation might lead to civil war. This is not a fantastic thought; it is a timely warning.

Raymond S. McLain, "Comments on Certain Aspects of the National Guard Considered Worthy of National War College Committee Study," 8 August 1951, 28-29.

24 National Defense Panel, 57.

25 Jacobs, 25 (emphasis in original).

26 Ibid., 2-3.


28 Jacobs, 25.


30 We have a "patchwork of reserve components . . . [b]urdened with mysterious redundancies (Why, for instance, do we require both an Army Reserve and an Army National Guard . . . ?) . . . " James L. Lacy, "Whither the All-Volunteer Force?" Yale Law & Policy Review 5 (Fall / Winter 1986): 67-68; quoted in Jacobs, 105.

31 Article I, Section 8, U.S. Constitution:
Clause 14, giving Congress power “To provide for the calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrection and repel Invasions.”

Clause 15, giving Congress power “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, [but] reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”


32 The organized militia, or National Guard, is not to be confused with the volunteer “state defense” forces found in about half of the states, and called by a variety of names, to include “militia, state Guard, Guard-reserve, or defense force,” that serve as a backup force in the event the National Guard is mobilized. These forces are exclusively under the control of the state governor, and may not be called or ordered into federal service. See, ibid., 38.


35 As there are no proposed changes in either of these last two categories, neither will be addressed further.

36 “Combat Units” as referred to here are those Army units “directly involved in the conduct of actual fighting[,]” and include:

- Infantry
- Armor
- Field Artillery
- Air Defense Artillery
- Aviation
- Special Operations (some units – special forces, rangers, special operations aviation)
- Engineers (some units – e.g., divisional combat engineers)


37 See National Guard Bureau, “America’s Total Army,” PowerPoint slide 34 in The National Guard: American’s At Their Best, An Overview; available from
38 FY 2001 Reserve Components Handbook, 23, 31 (Chart 1 – ARNG Contributions to the Total Army). However, by FY2009, under the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS), 12 ARNG combat brigades will be converted to combat support and combat service support units. *Ibid.*, 27.

When the ARDS is completed, the ARNG [combat force structure] will consist of three divisions as presently configured; three divisions that have an eSB [enhanced separate brigade] (which displaces a maneuver brigade in the division); two AC/ARNG integrated divisions, one each at Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Carson, Colorado (each having three eSBs); two composite divisions formed by reconfiguring two existing ARNG divisions; and six stand-alone composite brigades.


39 1999 Reserve Forces Policy Board Report, 8 (Table 1-1, “Army National Guard and Army Reserve Contributions to The Army”).


41 *Ibid.*, for numbers of units.

42 *Ibid.*, for numbers of units.


48 Ellis, 127.

49 See *Hooah Guide to Army Transformation*, 13:

The Army envisions an active-Army “counterattack corps” (III Corps) consisting of three heavy divisions and one armored cavalry regiment to be the fully modernized legacy force, thus providing the heavy force capable of decisive
victory in a major theater war through the period anticipated for Army Transformation.

50 Ibid.

51 Cohen, 45.

52 See Jacobs, 89:

Although there were certainly factors other than the reserve component mobilization that contributed to the popular support of the Persian Gulf war, the fact that communities throughout the United States were affected by the mobilization of their reserve component units without doubt helped sustain the nation's patriotic fervor. As it was designed to do, the Total Force Policy ensured that the Vietnam experience did not recur on the home front.


54 The ARNG today provides 46% of the Army's combat support, and 32% of its combat service support. FY 2001 Reserve Components Handbook, 31 (Chart 1 – ARNG Contributions to the Total Army). See also NGB, “America's Total Army.” The USAR today provides 17% of the Army's combat support, and 37% of its combat service support. Ibid. However, these ARNG support unit percentages will increase (and the USAR support unit percentages will decrease), and the percentage of ARNG combat units will decrease, as ARDS is implemented. See endnote 38, above.


56 It has been said, not without some degree of truth, that

the reserve components have tunnel vision – each is intensely parochial and protective of its own turf, so much so that they often lose sight of the forest for the trees and are quick to discern (or to make up, as the case may be) "threats" from both the Regular Army and the other reserve component to their roles within the defense establishment[.]

Jacobs, 48

57 Shinseki, Eisenhower Luncheon Address, 3.


"Homeland security," sometimes referred to as "homeland defense," is an evolving term that incorporates a vast array of nontraditional security challenges under the umbrella of threats to the continental United States. Threats as diverse as disruptions of commercial computer networks to terrorism, to use of weapons of mass destruction, and a variety of public health responses, are all included within the homeland security concept.


With just months left in his tenure as Secretary of Defense, William Cohen was quoted as saying "We have yet to begin the debate on homeland defense[,]" yet he called "map[ping] a strategy to guard against the threat of terrorist or cyber attack ... the greatest national security challenges the country may face in the 21st century." Gail Kaufman, "Cohen Stresses The Need For Homeland Defense," InsideDefense.com, 3 October 2000.


Ibid., 44.

Ibid.

See, e.g., Holzer (reporting on the recommendations of "three [recent] high-level commissions" that addressed homeland security).

Embry, 192.

Ibid., 194.


Originally, there were ARNG 10 WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs), located in alignment with the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions in California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. In FY 2000, Congress authorized an additional 17 CSTs. Those CSTs will be established in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California (creating a second team), Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Virginia. In FY 2001, Congress authorized another five teams. Team locations have not yet been determined.


The [22 member] CSTs are organized into six functional areas – administration and logistics, command, communications, medical, operations, and survey. . . The bulk of the CST mission lies with the survey team members who would enter a contaminated area to gather air, soil, and other samples for on-site evaluation by the nuclear science medical officer and various laboratories across the United States by way of electronic transmission (reachback).


73 Jacobs, 85.


75 Jacobs, 85 (footnoted citation omitted).

76 Sajer, 4.


78 Jacobs, 85. Of course, the observation here being limited to leadership positions is a reflection of the fact that reserve component soldiers have *usually* (although not always) been promoted into such positions by the time they reach their mid- to late forties.

79 Indeed, ADRS envisions such personnel reassignment and retraining on a grand scale. See Veronee, *supra*.


83 See TR 350-18.

84 These assessments are borne of the author's personnel experience as commander of an ARNG general studies battalion under TASS, and as a TASS regimental executive officer.

85 Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, 27.


87 1999 Reserve Forces Policy Board Report, 8 (Table 1-1, “Army National Guard and Army Reserve Contributions to The Army”).

88 Ibid.


90 See Cohen, 46 (“Republicans insist that they would walk away from all peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions[.]”). See also Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld, Bush Agenda Overlap Little,” Washington Post, 11 January 2000, sec. A, p. A4 (Defense Secretary “Rumsfeld is probably even more opposed to sending U.S. troops on peacekeeping missions than is Bush – 'I've concluded over a period of years that the U.S. isn't a good peacekeeper,' Rumsfeld said . . . .”).

91 “[P]eacekeeping operations . . . are likely to represent an enduring requirement.” Kosiak, et al., 5. The same can be said for continued military involvement in what have been described as “transnational security issues,” which “are nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation's inhabitants.” Paul J. Smith, “Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the Military?” Parameters (Autumn 2000), 78, 90.

92 See, e.g., Smith, 88-89.


94 See, e.g., Vinson, 26.


97 See, e.g., Cusker, 4, 6

98 See note 15, above, and accompanying text.
In military parlance, this is sometimes called “mission creep.” In peacekeeping, this is likely nothing more than resistance to the inevitable evolution of requirements the military was reluctant to undertake in the first place.

See, ibid., 78. Some suggest the Army’s new interim Combat Brigade Teams should be oriented toward peacekeeping operations, see Kosiak, et al., 5, while others suggest a separately organized and trained active component “Small Scale Contingency Corps.” See Vinson, 30. The nature of any new active component force structure for such missions, or whether task organizing existing units is the right answer, see William T. Johnsen, Force Planning Considerations for Army XXI (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 18 February 1998), 18-22, is beyond the scope of this paper. In any event, reserve components should be sized and shaped to provide the forces that are needed later in a contingency, such as augmenting and reinforcing forces, or follow-on rotation forces for extended contingencies. These units should be modular in design to facilitate rapid tailoring into force packages for a wide variety smaller-scale contingencies.

Vinson, 30.

Brigade-sized units appear to be optimum for force tailoring for peacekeeping contingencies. See Kosiak, et al., 5 (recommending “six so-called interim brigades . . . along with a like number of National Guard brigades” be oriented to peacekeeping operations). See also, United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi Report") (New York: August 2000):

Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements Systems (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations.


1999 Reserve Forces Policy Board Report, 8 (Table 1-1, “Army National Guard and Army Reserve Contributions to The Army”).

Ibid.


Ibid., xii-xiii,36.

Duncan, 225-26.


Embry, Ellen. "Evolving Roles and Missions for the Reserve Components in Responding to Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction." In "... to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense ..." Papers From The Conference on Homeland


McLain, Raymond S. “Comments on Certain Aspects of the National Guard Considered Worthy of National War College Committee Study.” 8 August 1951.


U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 8.


