A DYNAMIC NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
CREATING SYNERGY BETWEEN STRATEGY, FORCES, AND RESOURCES

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THERESA L. BARTON
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited

USAWC CLASS OF 2002
Senior Service Fellow

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
A DYNAMIC NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
CREATING SYNERGY BETWEEN STRATEGY, FORCES, AND RESOURCES

by

LTC Theresa L. Barton
U. S. Army

Dr. Conrad Crane
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
Over the past fifty years Congress has continually increased its oversight of defense policy and management. The latest Act, the National Defense Reorganization Act of 1997, was to be the avenue for ensuring that the Armed Forces were adequately structured to meet America's national security interests. This process, otherwise known as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), has failed to meet that objective. A significant mismatch continues between strategy, forces, and resources. Given the increased demand on limited resources coupled with the new war on terrorism, it is extremely important that Congress address this mismatch. How can Congress ensure an adequate match between strategy, forces, and resources? Although there are certainly some impediments to this based on the United States constitutional system, Congress can start by revising its national security legislation. The legislation must stipulate a new national security strategy process that includes who, what, and when. The Executive Branch has to be held accountable for producing an overarching strategy by which all those responsible for providing the means can produce a viable strategy and corresponding budget. If done correctly, this process should provide the proper checks and balances to help Congress effectively and efficiently resource America's national security.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** .............................................................................................................................................. iii

**PREFACE** .................................................................................................................................................. vii

**LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS** ....................................................................................................................... ix

**A DYNAMIC NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:**

CREATING SYNERGY BETWEEN STRATEGY, FORCES, AND RESOURCES ............................................. 1

**THE STRUCTURE OF THE SYSTEM** ......................................................................................................... 2

  EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY ........................................................................................................................... 3

  CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY .................................................................................................................. 6

**IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY** ............................................................................................. 7

**PROVIDING THE MISSING LINKS** .............................................................................................................. 9

  A FUNCTIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ................................................................................... 10

  NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GUIDANCE ......................................................................................... 13

  ACHIEVING BALANCE ............................................................................................................................... 14

  OBTAINING RESOURCES .......................................................................................................................... 14

**APPLYING THE PROCESS** ....................................................................................................................... 15

  A VITAL INTEREST ...................................................................................................................................... 16

  THREATS .................................................................................................................................................. 16

  MEETING THE THREAT .............................................................................................................................. 16

  CALCULATING FORCE STRUCTURE .......................................................................................................... 17

**CONCLUSION** .......................................................................................................................................... 19

**ENDNOTES** ............................................................................................................................................. 21

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ....................................................................................................................................... 27
PREFACE

A perusal of the national security literature indicates minimal studies in the area of matching strategy to resources. If America is to continue its leading edge, we must figure out how to efficiently and effectively utilize finite resources for meeting national security objectives. After over 20 years in the service of our country, I have been in units that were highly resourced while others were not, even though some of these units were on the “fighting” lines. In an attempt to begin some debate on how to fix the problem of inadequate or maybe misutilized resources, I began this project. My hopes are that this only begins the debate and that someone will soon find a suitable solution.

This paper is only a small portion of my absolutely wonderful professional and personal experiences I had during my Army War College Fellowship at the Hoover Institution.

I would like to thank the numerous Senior Fellows at Hoover who provided me great insight on a number of issues, some of which actually pertained to this paper. As the head of the Fellows, Dr. Thomas Henriksen provided innumerable advice and mentorship.

My colleagues and fellow national security fellows provided me encouragement and worthy advice. I would especially like to thank from the State Department, Sheila Gwaltney, from the U.S. Air Force, Lt. Col Norm Brozenick, and from the U.S. Navy, CDR Mike Hall. They truly helped make this writing experience a good one.

The keen wisdom and advice offered by Dr. Conrad Crane is deeply appreciated.

Although I fully acknowledge the advice and wisdom of others, all the ill-conceived ideas are my own. These views do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. NON-INTERACTIVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESOURCE PROCESS .......... 3
FIGURE 2. INTERACTIVE NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS ......................................... 10
A DYNAMIC NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
CREATING SYNERGY BETWEEN STRATEGY, FORCES, AND RESOURCES

American power and influence have been decisive factors for democracy and security throughout the last half-century. However, after more than two years of serious effort, this Commission has concluded that without significant reforms, American power and influence cannot be sustained. To be of long-term benefit to us and to others, that power and influence must be disciplined by strategy, defined as the systematic determination of the proper relationship of ends to means in support of American principles, interests, and national purpose.

— Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman

As 11 September 2001 so graphically portrayed, the United States cannot take its geographic position or hegemony for granted any longer. America's borders are not secure; there are threats in the world that cannot only destroy America's homeland but also its power and influence abroad. Increasing the defense budget by $48 billion will not suffice, especially in the light of competing demands for finite resources. Congress cannot meet the threat by continuing business as usual. A more efficient and effective way of providing for our nation's defense must be developed. It is time for America's leaders to bring all elements of national power together, both military and civilian. They must provide an integrated conceptual framework that defines the relationship between goals and instruments of power and among the instruments of national power themselves.¹ Given the cost of military forces, the strategy must harness all instruments of power and ensure they work in concert toward stated objectives. What America requires is a new national security process that ensures a match between strategy, forces, and resources.²

How can the two branches of government responsible for national security ensure an adequate match between strategy and resources? To begin with, the President, with his top security advisors, should provide an operational National Security Strategy (NSS) and a National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG) that links strategies to resources.³ No longer can the NSS be as ambiguous as "deny sanctuary to U.S. enemies anywhere on Earth."⁴ Not only is it impossible to build a force given this overarching objective, ensuring proper resources to meet such an objective is even less likely. Congress should enact legislation that requires yearly submission of an operational NSS that spells out specific tasks to the national security Departments and Agencies. The legislation would also mandate the NSPG and require that it be submitted with the President's budget. Finally, Congress should also streamline its budget process.⁵
The President's FY 03 budget includes $379 billion for defense, a $48 billion increase in the defense budget. Is America spending too much on defense or not enough? Given President Bush's budget request, it would seem as if America is not spending enough on defense. However, as Stan Crock notes, "the way to figure out if the U.S. is spending what it should on defense is to determine the threats, what is required to address them, and what it will cost to support that strategy." An analysis of the NSS, the NSPG, and the subordinate strategies will provide Congress the necessary information to answer the questions addressed above. Congress will see the connection between the Departments' and Agencies' strategies and the corresponding force structures. This level of analysis provides Congress with all the pieces of the puzzle to make the hard choices. It also provides the Executive Branch with the details to argue its case.

Ensuring America's security into the future does not require a complete restructuring of the current national security system; however, some adjustments are necessary. By describing the current process along with the inherent impediments, the stage will be set for examining a new process. By mapping out this new process and then implementing it, one will see that by developing an operational strategy and providing a mechanism for integrating the strategy into the budget system, synergy will follow.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SYSTEM

The decentralization that characterizes the U.S. constitutional system is most evident when dealing with issues of national security. The constitution clearly puts authority for America's security in both the executive and legislative branch. This creates in Richard Neustadt's phrase, "a government of separated institutions sharing power." The executive branch is responsible for formulating national security policy and implementing it, but without congressional appropriations it does not have the resources necessary to carry out its strategy. The process currently in place to deal with this divided power is convoluted and focuses on how much is being spent rather than the what for, why, and how well. As Figure 1 depicts there is no linkage between the NSS and the budgetary process.
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Through constitutional authority and his institutional position as chief executive, the president is responsible for a national security strategy and a national security system that will translate that strategy into an effective national security policy. The National Security Act of 1947, subsequent amendments, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Congressional rules, and a host of Presidential, Department and Agency directives created the current national security organizations and structures. Although these structures adequately met the Soviet threat and the Cold War world, they are inadequate for today's world. As currently organized these structures impede the president's ability to create effective national security policy.

The President's principal forum for discussing and formulating national security policy is the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is the vehicle by which the President receives a full range of advice from his most senior advisors and the heads of the Agencies responsible for defense and foreign policy. The NSC was actually established to enable the Services and other Departments and Agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. The findings from the Hart-Rudman Commission indicate that cooperation does occur but mostly during crises. The small size of the NSC staff, coupled with numerous issues in the foreign policy arena, forces the NSC to focus more on crisis management than long-term strategic objectives. This is troublesome because the agency
responsible for developing America's security strategy is not appropriately focused on the nation's long-term interests.

A key document developed annually by the NSC is the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS reflects the President's interests, goals, and objectives in the national security arena. It is developed through both formal and informal coordinating processes with 25 Departments and Agencies. During the coordination process, the Departments and Agencies often try to "game" their input for budget purposes, as opposed to offering substantive comments on the strategy itself.

Since the NSC is technically structured for coordination as opposed to operations, the key document derived from this Council provides broad direction to the various components of the U.S. government. Although the latest issue of the NSS, "A National Security Strategy for a Global Age" provides a vision, its goals are far too broad to effectively translate into specific Departmental or Agency missions. For instance, how does one translate the goal of promoting democracy abroad? Instead of providing interagency guidance that directs how the strategy should be implemented, each Department and Agency receives the NSS and develops its own strategy in isolation. Admittedly there is some ad hoc coordination; however, this tends to occur at lower levels and on specific issues as opposed to the overarching strategy.

Of greater concern, however, is the fact that there is no process or document that links the NSS to Executive Branch resource allocation decisions. According to the Hart-Rudman commission, "The National Security Strategy is too broad and general to serve as a planning and programming document that illuminates Administration strategy and directs programming to ensure that strategic objectives are satisfied." Even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admits that the processes involved do not connect. "We can perfectly compare all the war risks between North Korea and Iraq and this and that, and it does not connect to all the people risks, it doesn't connect to the modernization risks, it doesn't connect to the transformation risks." How does Congress ensure that allocated resources are actually supporting the National Security Strategy? Under the present system there is no way to match strategy and resources. Not only are strategies independently developed so are the Department and Agency budgets.

Even if there was a link between the NSS and budget plans, the current NSS is not a strategy by which a logical linkage could occur. The last NSS was published in 2000, and as stated by the Hart-Rudman commission, "...it is a political statement, an executive branch 'wish list' of policies." Although due annually, Congress has not received this administration's NSS. This means that all the Departments and Agencies responsible for a piece of the security puzzle
submitted their budget proposals absent specific guidance of their role in ensuring America's security.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is charted to provide the President advice on the best uses of government resources. Essentially, OMB issues guidance to the Executive Branch Departments and Agencies by which they prepare their budgets and submit to OMB for review. The guidance, if not directly from the President, is based on OMB's own analysis of the Administration's goals and policies in light of changes in the strategic environment and the Administration's success in obtaining funds for critical programs. It is important to note that OMB conducts the analysis without other Executive Departments or Agencies. The Departments and Agencies do not become formally involved until budgets are submitted and OMB conducts a series of hearings. At this time, the Departments present their side of the case and OMB presents its own. With the exception of the Department of Defense (DoD), these hearings may last only hours or at the most days.

Given the size and complexity of the DoD budget, OMB is more formally and informally involved with DoD's budget process. Additionally, given DoD's more structured budget process, OMB staff members not only become involved in internal DoD issue reviews but also in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. This early intervention allows for quick resolution of conflict and the opportunity to keep a rather cumbersome process from being repeated again at the OMB review level. Although OMB spends more time with the DoD budget process it still ensures that all Department budget figures are correct and that they correspond with the President's defense and national security policies. OMB conducts no cross-functional reviews that involve more than one Department. So although national security objectives certainly cross Departments, there is no mechanism to ensure integration and thus effective coordination of resources.

Even though OMB compartmentalizes the Departments' and Agencies' budgets, it does allow for appeals. During an appeal, the Department or Agency prepares and presents its case to the OMB Director. Appeals involving national security are usually resolved through compromise. When this is not possible, the President decides. These cases are usually rare and it is the only time the President becomes personally involved in the budget process.

Following the appeals process, final adjustments are made to the budget based on the latest predictions and forecasts, including inflation and employment figures. The President's Budget is then submitted to Congress. OMB continues to play a role by tracking the budget through the congressional process and by exchanging information with the Congressional Budget Office.
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY

The authority for congressional oversight of national security derives from specific constitutional powers. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that

The Congress shall have power... [to] raise and support Armies; to provide and maintain a Navy, [and to] make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces..., [and to] make all Laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

The Constitution clearly provides Congress authority over issues of organizing the national defense. In the past 50 years, Congressional oversight has increased dramatically regarding defense policy and management. While a great deal of lawmakers' time is spent on issues related to DoD, Congress also influences other Departments and Agencies involved in national security by its power over the purse. Since Section 9 of the Constitution does not allow money to be drawn from the Treasury without appropriations made by law, no amount of national security can be resourced without congressional approval.18

Before the Authorization and Appropriating Committees begin their work, the budget Committee of each house of Congress produces a Budget Resolution. The Budget Resolution sets ultimate ceilings on spending for Authorizing and Appropriating Committees. This tells each Committee and Subcommittee how much money they may authorize or appropriate. OMB presents the President's budget to the Budget Committees in writing and in oral testimony. These Committees also receive other views, such as those provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). After analyzing the budget, CBO makes recommendations and provides alternative economic estimates and forecasts. Other Congressional committees also are involved in providing comments on the budget. At the end of these reviews and hearings, the Budget Committee drafts the Budget Resolution. Once both chambers adopt the resolution, Authorizing and Appropriating Committees conduct their mark-ups and draft their resolution.19

Both Committees begin work after receiving the President's budget; however, they do not mark up legislation until after the Budget Resolution is passed. Hearings and investigations are held in both the Authorizing and Appropriating Committees; in fact, they often call the same witnesses. The results from the Authorizing Committees are the basis for appropriations. Traditionally, however, the Appropriation Committees finish before the Authorizing Committees.20 This should beg the question of why there are two separate committees.

Further perpetuating congressional inefficiency is that the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations committees each have at least 13 subcommittees that concentrate
mostly on program funding and not on deliberating policy and strategy. The members tend to look at the budget in terms of organizational values and view themselves as independent entities. Given the immense size of the defense budget, it is no wonder Congress gets deeply involved in DoD spending. Bruce Russett has found a strong correlation between the defense-related payroll on weapons spending in a state and congressional voting practices. Instead of concentrating on whether the defense program is necessary for national security, the attention is all too often on what that program will do or not do for a Senator or Congressman's constituency. As Robert Art notes, "Congress continues, that is, to look mostly at the details of defense spending, but rarely at the big picture."

What is lacking is a mechanism that allows Congress to move beyond asking how much a program costs to more pointed questions such as, how this program supports the national security. Although this is supposedly the goal of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), there are two basic problems with the QDR. First, it discusses only Department of Defense plans to defend America. Congress does not request anything like the QDR from the other Executive Agencies and Departments responsible for a piece of the security puzzle. Second, neither of the QDRs that have been produced so far provide the analytical detail that is necessary to show what current force structure and weapons are required to defend America's security. Without looking at the big picture -- both ends and means -- Congress cannot provide effective nor efficient resources for this nation's defense. Additionally, Congress should review its own role in national security policy. Does a defense program really have to be voted on eighteen times each year by an array of committees and subcommittees? Is there really a need for both an authorizing and appropriating committee?

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

What are the implications of not having an overarching strategic framework guiding U. S. national security policymaking and resource allocation? Although there are numerous implications, the foremost is compartmentalized and reactive policy rather than an integrated and anticipatory one. Implications on the budget side are the risks of spending too much versus not spending enough and the inability to show the public that the nation's dollars are being spent efficiently and effectively towards the nation's security. With competing demands for the nation's limited resources, Congress needs a way of ensuring spending is targeted appropriately.

Planning without clear goals and priorities is like traveling in a foreign land without a map. One wastes time, energy, and resources trying to figure out how to navigate to the selected destination. Planning becomes based on ad hoc, undisciplined analyses of which way the road
ahead leads. It is no wonder academicians and journalists continue to complain that the Armed Forces are structured to fight old threats as opposed to new ones. Without a new road map, one tends to follow the same old road or become lost on a new one. This goes for all the Departments and Agencies involved in America’s security—all appear structured to continue fighting the Cold War.

If there are no set goals or priorities for each Department responsible for a piece of the security puzzle, how are plans established and integrated to ensure all are working towards the common goal of the nation’s defense? The answer is simple—it doesn’t happen, at least not in terms of long term planning. Although the National Security Council is responsible for coordinating national security and foreign policy, the coordination only occurs in times of national crises. During “normal” operations, each Department works within its own channels to formulate a strategy for fulfilling their role in the security process. Even when there are clearly crosscutting issues between Departments or Agencies, there is no formal linkage to bring the two together. In essence, the State Department could be planning on downplaying a certain region, while the Treasury Department is trying to build ties with that region for economic reasons. Or on the opposite side, they could both be trying to build up the same region but yet because planning tends to be stove-piped there is no coordination either on the plan or the resourcing of the plan. Thus we have inefficient use of time and dollars.

Another problem associated with compartmentalization or stove piping is an inefficient use of America’s instruments of national power. A lack of clear goals and priorities results in either the job not getting done or an uneven distribution of the job. What we see on the national security arena is that DoD assumes the preponderance of planning for this nation’s defense. Given it is the defense department, this may seem acceptable, but there is a grave problem with this approach. First, as Clausewitz says, the military is suppose to be an extension of politics, so this implies that there are other instruments of power besides the military. The previous Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, said it even better, “The military is the hammer in our policy toolbox, but not every problem is a nail.”26 In order to stop treating every problem as a nail and overusing our hammer, there must be a mechanism in place that ensures all instruments of national power are being utilized and integrated when necessary. The same goes for determining allocations.

As discussed previously, the budget process is extremely convoluted and inefficient. Each Department and Agency incorporates different processes to build their budget. OMBs’ review of the budget is conducted in a stove-piped, department by department manner. In essence the same compartmentalization takes place in Congress. Once on the Hill,
Committees that focus on the Departments and Agencies over which they have jurisdiction examine the corresponding portion of the budget. There is no real analysis for determining whether funding or not funding a program will promote the national security. Nor is there any document that provides the big picture of how the resources are actually going to be spent to ensure the safeguard of America's vital interests.

Although Congress receives the NSS, the document does not provide Congress the necessary information to tie strategy to requested resources. Without this clear linkage, Congress resources bits and pieces of the 'defense' budget based more on domestic concerns than on national security issues. Lacking a document or even analysis that shows the linkage, the Executive Branch has a difficult time arguing its case. A good example of this is when President Bush announced his plans to seek $48 billion more for the Pentagon for FY 03. If Congress approves the request, the total defense budget would approach 4% of gross domestic product. The argument is that the Pentagon needs this because of insufficient defense spending over the past 10 years. If the money is not allocated what will happen? Will America's security be at risk? Or yet, what if it is funded? Is money being squandered needlessly on defense as opposed to domestic ills? The only way to really answer these questions with any clarity is by spelling out a national strategy that links means to ends. The public will not be satisfied nor can we ensure the right force structure without a clear road map to the future.

PROVIDING THE MISSING LINKS

The first missing link that must be resurrected is a functional strategy. As concluded by the Hart-Rudman commission, "strategy should once again drive the design and implementation of U. S. national security policies." The commission recommended that the President personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and that process should be linked to the allocation of resources throughout the government. Granted a great recommendation, but how do we get from the current process to a new one? Do we start with developing a grand strategy? A number of national security scholars argue that it is impossible to formulate a grand strategy in a democratic system of government. On the contrary, it may be difficult but it is certainly not impossible. If there is to ever be any synergy between strategy and resources, the first step must be to develop an operational strategy that clearly defines means and ends. Instead of simply creating a new document, the NSC should revitalize the NSS by utilizing the grand strategy process. The final product would be an operational NSS that specifies tasks to the national security Departments and Agencies and allows for the identification of overlap and gaps in the strategy.
Once an operational NSS is complete, the NSC should develop a National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG) in order for the applicable Departments and Agencies to develop their strategies and budgets. The NSPG, similar to the Defense Planning Guidance but on a larger scale, will prioritize the objectives spelled out in the NSS and establish policies that provide the Departments and Agencies guidance for planning for peacetime, crises, and wartime strategies. To provide the necessary linkage between each Department and Agency’s missions and the budget, the NSPG will dictate the criteria and assumptions for structuring forces and establish priorities for committing resources for modernization, readiness, and sustainability initiatives.31

In order to go beyond simply saying it is necessary to develop an operational NSS and a NSPG, the next section of this paper will illustrate the process. The ultimate goal of the process is to provide synergy between strategy, forces, and resources. Continuing the same old national security process will make America’s war on terrorism an extremely costly endeavor. By institutionalizing a new process, like the one shown in Figure 2, Congress can see all the pieces of the puzzle and determine whether sufficient resources are allocated to ensure America’s national security.

![Figure 2: Interactive National Security Process](image-2)

**FIGURE 2. INTERACTIVE NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS**

A FUNCTIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

It is easier to produce a broad and general NSS than it is to go through the long analytical process required to produce a strategy that matches means to ends. However, without this level of specificity, there is no assurance that America is efficiently or effectively utilizing its
elements of national power. An operational NSS provides each Department and Agency with specific tasks and identifies crosscutting issues and gaps. Arriving at such a detailed NSS requires leaders to go through the grand strategy process and then document it using the NSS. Additionally, it provides the necessary guidance for producing the National Security Planning Guidance.

The Hart-Rudman commission specifically states that its members took a broad view of national security, but yet they provide no formal definition. It is imperative that a formal definition is set forth. With that in mind, the definition of grand strategy that should be followed is the one offered by B. H. Liddell Hart. In keeping with Clausewitz’s observation that war is a “continuation of policy by other means,” Liddell Hart sees grand strategy as being concerned with peace as much as with war. It is about the evolution and integration of policies that should operate for decades. Simply put, grand strategy is about the balancing of ends and means, both in peacetime and wartime. By utilizing this definition we see the critical importance of managing national resources; the vital role of diplomacy; the issue of national morale and political culture in regards to their willingness to support the purposes and the burdens of the cost of defense in peacetime. The crux of grand strategy lies in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements of national power for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term best interests. This is an art as well as a science that takes time, interaction, and constant updating.

Formulating grand strategy is a difficult endeavor because it must embrace political and diplomatic, technological, and even cultural and moral factors. The grand strategy must be inclusive of all elements of national power, matching means and ends, relating them to commitments and diplomacy, and ensuring that they work in harmony. In essence, grand strategy should not only integrate the various instruments of national power but must also regulate their use. It is an integrated conceptual framework that defines the relationship among goals and instruments, and among the instruments themselves. As shown during America’s current battle against terrorism, it is possible to formulate a strategy that combines all instruments of national power. It is time to institutionalize that process in order to preserve America’s long-term interests.

Illustrating the process of developing a grand strategy will show how it provides the first crucial step in providing an integrated framework between America’s security needs and its limited resources. Perhaps the most controversial but yet most important part of developing a grand strategy is reconciling how security is achieved. In other words, the leadership must determine how it views the world—their worldview. If the leadership decides security is
obtained through isolationism versus balance of power or economic security, the vital interests stemming from these competing views are going to be different. For instance, under isolationism U. S. security is guaranteed by our assured destruction capability; therefore, we have no vital interests beyond our borders. Under balance of power, we are concerned about actual and potential military power, principally those areas of the world that have the capability to threaten U. S. security. Our vital interest is in balancing against these countries. Economic security sees economic capability usurping military capability. America’s security is dependent upon overseas sources of wealth, as such access to certain markets becomes a vital interest.34 Once the leaders decide on a worldview, they can begin to develop a grand strategy that focuses on the following: What are America’s vital interests? What are the threats to these interests? And, how can we defend against these threats?

The core of any grand strategic analysis is the proper identification of vital interests. These vital interests must clearly relate to the security of the United States.35 There must be a logical link that leads from the vital interest to a security threat to the homeland. Second, in protecting a vital interest, the use of force cannot be ruled out.36 Once vital interests are identified, the threats to these interests must be determined. In analyzing the threat it is important to evaluate the danger the threat poses, the probability of occurrence, and the warning and reaction time for defending the interests. A thorough analysis of the threat is essential for efficiently and effectively determining the last step of matching means to ends—protecting the vital interests. If the threat is relatively small, will diplomacy suffice? Or, if the threat is large but the probability of occurrence is slim, will diplomacy combined with forward presence suffice? In selecting the instrument of power, the leaders identify the specific function of that instrument and how it corresponds to the mission at hand. For instance, the selected instrument of power is the military. With a defined mission, force structure is determined by the military strategy chosen to execute the mission. Formulating the force structure involves determining the type, size, and location. The emphasis is on the types of units—their capability to either defend or deter.

As stated previously, in order to constitute a vital interest, we must be willing to use force to protect it. This does not mean that a force structure has to be built to defend every vital interest. The leaders must determine priorities and risks when meeting means and ends. Each Department or Agency responsible for that designated instrument of power should determine the mission and then the appropriate structure for meeting that mission. The structure should be capabilities-based as opposed to pure numbers of people or dollars.
Formulating grand strategy is a process. Once the leaders complete it, their guidance should be transmitted to the responsible Departments and Agencies, as well as Congress and the public, via the National Security Strategy (NSS).\textsuperscript{37} With the grand strategy process complete, the National Security Council can produce a NSS that provides direction and priorities to each of the Departments and Agencies responsible for national security. Once the Departments and Agencies receive their tasks, they would translate the tasks into their own strategy. For instance, the Department of Defense develops a national military strategy; State Department develops an international strategic plan; Treasury Department develops an economic strategy plan, and so on. Each of these strategies should provide the basic guidelines and framework for decisions on personnel levels, programs, and hardware necessary for the development of operational plans to meet the mission. In order to achieve this level of specificity, however, the Departments and Agencies require budget guidance along with the NSS.

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GUIDANCE

While serving the nation’s security goals, the strategies should also be consistent with fiscal constraints. After completing the NSS, the NSC would issue a National Security Planning Guidance. An example of how to do this is by looking at the Department of Defense. DoD provides a Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) that provides directions for the services as they develop their portion of the national military strategy.\textsuperscript{38} In theory, the DPG reflects the President’s prioritized National Security Objectives from the National Security Strategy and establishes policies that provide the Services guidance for planning for peacetime, crises, and wartime strategies.\textsuperscript{39} Although the direction provided by the DPG is at a macro level, it is a good yardstick for making programming and budgeting decisions. There is no reason a similar document cannot be issued by the NSC while placing primary responsibility and authority for program development and execution with the national security Departments and Agencies. As noted by the Hart-Rudman Commission, this would provide a more disciplined and prioritized national security resource allocation process.\textsuperscript{40} It would provide an integration mechanism between the NSS and the budget process.

The NSPG must prioritize the President’s national security goals and objectives. In order to effectively and efficiently match strategy to resources, the guidance must be specific enough to clearly indicate where the priorities lie. For instance, a vital interest is homeland security. The NSS will lay out the tasks to the appropriate Departments and Agencies responsible for this mission. It will not, however, specify how to achieve the end. The NSPG will provide this direction either at a macro or more specific level. At the macro level the goal may be
information superiority and call for improvements in all national security Departments' and Agencies' network architecture. Specific direction may actually call for transitioning to a certain type of network terminal in order to ensure compatibility. The criticality of the NSPG is the linkage with the NSS and the ability to establish clear goals and set priorities.

ACHIEVING BALANCE

The critical linchpin in this entire process is the NSC. A robust NSC is required to develop a grand strategy and translate it into an operational NSS. Critical to the process is timing. There must be sufficient time for the Departments and Agencies as well as NSC to analyze the strategies and fill in gaps or address overlapping issues. If not addressed, the budget requests run a high risk of being skewed thus leading to misappropriation of resources.

OMB should provide early input to the NSC for developing the NSPG. With an institutionalized NSPG, OMB can then ensure correct figures and consistency with the NSS and the NSPG. OMB should be the Executive Branch's final check to ensure that all gaps have been filled and that all overlapping issues have been addressed. The President's budget should not be sent to Congress until these issues are reconciled. This final step is crucial given that OMB receives budgets from all Executive Departments, including some that have no identified role in the National Security Strategy. Given OMB's extended role, a timely budget calls for early OMB participation in all Departments dealing with national security. OMB must be involved from the start if it is to ensure consistency and proper prioritization within each Department budget. This early OMB intervention will reduce the need for each Department and Agency to defend their budgets. For instance, when DoD presents its budget to support a military force structure of 10/8 Divisions (AD/Res.), 46/38 Squadrons (AD/Res.), 12 Aircraft Carriers, 108/8 Surface Combatants (AD/Res.), and 3/1 Marine Expeditionary Forces (AD/Res.) OMB can look at the strategies and understand why DoD is asking for this force structure.

OBTAINING RESOURCES

Ideally, this paper would explain how each Department and Agency develops its own strategy from the NSS. An illustration of one Department, especially one as robust as DoD, should suffice to drive home the point that without specific guidance from the top, there will never be a match between strategy, forces, and resources. So, with a strategy in hand, and a force structure developed from that strategy, the next step is to get the necessary resources to support the force structure.

As the Executive Branch needs to revise its national strategy process, Congress must revamp the budget process. The procedures presently in place are too fragmented and tend to
focus on program funding rather than deliberating policy and strategy. Congress has continually mandated changes within the Executive Branch regarding national security policy. Unfortunately there is no one to mandate change within Congress. There has been no reform to its structure since 1949. The budget process is further convoluted by having both authorizing and appropriating committees.

In order to decrease the process of developing a budget and allow more time to focus on the substance, Congress should merge committees. The Constitution only requires that all expenditures of public funds be appropriated by law; there is no requirement for a separate committee to authorize.\textsuperscript{41} Efficiency is gained by authorizing and appropriating within the same bill. The existing system duplicates efforts and focuses too much attention on hearings and investigations that have little to do with whether the requested dollars correlate with national security.

Streamlining the budget process to focus on ensuring appropriated resources meet the national security objectives would be a huge improvement. However without legislating some changes in the Executive Branch, reducing the budget bureaucracy alone will not guarantee synergy between strategy, forces, and resources. Congress cannot properly resource if the planning document is so broad that there is no way to match means to ends. Therefore, Congress should mandate that the National Security Strategy be submitted on an annual basis.\textsuperscript{42} This new mandate should not only include repercussions for failure to submit but also spell out what is expected in the NSS. Instead of a broad overarching view, like “Engagement and Enlargement”, the NSS should depict the grand strategy process. As discussed previously, the NSS should indicate what means will meet specific ends.

Congress should also mandate submission of a National Security Planning Guidance. The NSPG should be submitted with the President’s budget. Additionally, all Departments and Agencies tasked with supporting national security should have their strategies available for congressional budget investigations and hearings. It is only by having all the pieces of the puzzle that Congress can be held accountable for efficiently and effectively resourcing America’s national security. An inability to analyze specific national security goals and objectives within a given budget expenditure means Congress cannot choose efficiently between competing social objectives. By mandating the process as outlined above, Congress can provide synergy between strategy, forces, and resources.

**APPLYING THE PROCESS**

Ideally to depict synergy between an operationalized NSS and resources, vital interests and threats would be identified, then the means would be matched to ends, and then an
analysis would be provided of how each of the instruments of power should be structured to counter that threat. That exercise is beyond the scope of this paper; however, in an effort to show the utility of an operationalized NSS and a NSPG, the following section provides a case study.

A VITAL INTEREST

A perusal of history indicates that the U. S. views the world through both economic security and balance of power. After all, without economic security, America cannot keep adversaries from rising up against her. With this in mind, the next step is to identify vital interests that correspond with these complementary views. Without going through a complete analysis, most would agree that access to critical raw materials is important for U.S. economic security. Without continued access to Saudi Arabian oil, global economies could suffer. Ensuring access to the oil prevents direct competition over other sources of oil. For instance, if Japan and Europe lose access to Saudi oil there will be strong competition for alternate sources. This competition will raise frictions among vital U.S. trading partners and could possibly lead to open conflict. Thus, Saudi Arabia with its control over 250 billion barrels of oil, is a vital interest for the U.S.

THREATS

The next step is to determine the threat to Saudi oil exports. An obvious threat that we have already seen is regional hegemony when Saddam Hussein attempted local dominance. Another potential threat is when the great powers compete with each other for global hegemony. Internal or regional instability could create a threat. Saudi Arabia is also threatened by nuclear proliferation. This includes the existence of nuclear weapons in Israel and the potential for Iraq and Iran to acquire them. These threats now must be evaluated in terms of their probability. Obviously probability is subjective, but history and intelligent reports can provide an assessment of likelihood. However, for Saudi Arabia all of these threats are likely; none can be dismissed or taken lightly. Lastly, threats must be evaluated based on warning time and reaction time required to defend against the threat. Unfortunately, the warning and reaction time for the threats to Saudi Arabia is generally short.

MEETING THE THREAT

The important question now is what means will America utilize to meet the end of protecting its vital interest of Saudi Arabia? For illustrative purposes, all instruments of national power will play a role in meeting the threats to Saudi Arabia. The President, in consultation with his national security advisors, assigns the mission of defending Saudi Arabia against regional
hegemony and proliferation to the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The intelligence community receives the mission of providing warnings of any instability in the region, as well as, information on proliferation. Department of Treasury is responsible for monitoring the oil market. These missions obviously overlap and require coordination between the Departments and Agencies to ensure balance. Presently, there is no tie in at the national level to integrate what DoD does to defend Saudi Arabia versus what Department of State or say Treasury is doing. Each Department builds their plan and subsequent budget to support that plan in isolation. The present process lacks a mechanism for coordinating and deconflicting strategies. If the threat is going to be met efficiently and effectively, the current process must allow for linkage and balance between all those responsible for providing for this nation's security.

Once the Departments and Agencies receive the NSS and the National Security Planning Guidance, they can develop their respective strategies. With specific tasks identified in an operational NSS, the national security Departments and Agencies can clearly define who has what task, where there is overlap and possibly any gaps. By establishing priorities and giving macro and specific direction in the NSPG, the Departments and Agencies will be able to actually link their strategies to their budget requests. Continuing with the example of Saudi Arabia, all Departments designated to secure this vital interest must now develop a strategy to meet that end. This is no longer done in isolation or without planning guidance, the NSS and the NSPG are guides for aiding the Departments and Agencies in their determination of forces and equipment necessary to carry out the mission. Using DoD as an example, it was given the mission of defending Saudi Arabia against regional hegemony and proliferation. With guidance from the NSS, NSPG, and the DPG, the Services determine the strategy necessary to complete the mission. The mission coupled with the strategy, determine the type of military capability required. Specific capabilities are associated with particular types of military units.

CALCULATING FORCE STRUCTURE

The purpose of this section is to highlight the fact that force structure can flow from an analysis of vital interests and threats to those interests. In applying the methodology broadly to produce force requirements, there are a number of questions that follow. The foremost question has to be identification of the mission. After determining the mission, what function does military force play in defending that mission? Next, what military capability best accomplishes that function? A specific military strategy and a specific type of unit should flow from the preceding question. The final result should be a recommended U.S. force posture. But, remember given
the revitalized NSS and the NSPG, this analysis will entail the roles of the other national security Departments and Agencies in the region.

Continuing with the illustration of developing force structure, the mission for the military with respect to the vital interest of Saudi Arabia is to defend the oil fields against a conventional hegemonic threat. An intelligence analysis of the area would indicate that the potential threats come from Iraq or Iran. There are two strategies the military can choose from in order to meet its mission, deterrence or denial. If the U.S. military can produce a credible threat then deterrence prevails over a denial strategy. However, armed with nuclear weapons, Iraq and Iran present a much more dangerous threat. Either country could quickly seize the vital Saudi oil fields using conventional forces and then defend them with nuclear weapons. Protecting against this threat would require extended nuclear deterrence. Without nuclear weapons in the region, the military could easily utilize a deterrence strategy; however, the arrival of an adversary’s nuclear weapons calls for a much more robust strategy. A denial strategy with its robust defense would prevent any initial seizure of territory. This implies that U.S. ground forces must be stationed in Saudi Arabia.

History shows that the U.S. has the potential to field overwhelming conventional forces against either Iran or Iraq, but in order to meet the denial strategy there has to be a large enough force in theater to deny Iran or Iraq access to the oil fields in the first place. A corps headquarters with corps support units and one heavy division could be stationed in Saudi Arabia to provide the required defense. To quickly react to any attacks, two additional divisions would preposition equipment in Saudi Arabia with CONUS based troops flown in upon warnings of attack. Given the size of Iran or Iraq’s conventional forces, three U.S. heavy divisions create a highly capable force for denial of any territorial gains. Tackling the nuclear threat requires more force structure. The most desirable for political reasons would be to provide sea based nuclear weapons. Using the carrier battle group as a unit of account for naval forces, the requirements for theater nuclear weapons would add one carrier battle group to the defense of Saudi Arabia.51

The U.S. force structure to defend Saudi Arabia comprises one Corps Headquarters with support units, one Armor Division, two Heavy Divisions (CONUS-based), and one Carrier Battle Group. Although each of these units has a general organization, each can be modified to fit the mission. In order to ensure proper modification and efficiency of resources, the military has to assess the area to see what is available and also understand what the other Departments and Agencies will be bringing to the table. Does the Army need to bring a large intelligence cell or can it feed off of what comes from Department of State and U.S. Intelligence Agencies?
same applies to resources. Does the Army need Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's) or will the CIA employ its aerial vehicles? Addressing these questions requires the national security Departments and Agencies to work together, but they can only do this if they understand each other's tasks. An operational NSS, a NSPG, and a robust NSC that ensures linkage and addresses any gaps should result in effective and efficient coverage of U.S. vital interests.

CONCLUSION

America can ill-afford its war on terrorism without institutionalizing a new national security process. Strategy must drive the design and implementation of U.S. national security policies. A strategy that simply states objectives is insufficient for efficiently and effectively meeting U.S. national security objectives. Broad, overarching views do not provide the specifics required for developing military, state, treasury and intelligence strategies. However, a strategy based on a worldview and then translated into means and ends does provide the necessary tools for each national security Department and Agency to develop the strategies to support U.S. national security. Additionally, a grand strategy translated into a National Security Strategy provides the basis for ensuring linkage between Departments and Agencies. It also becomes the basis for a National Security Planning Document by which Departments and Agencies can develop strategies and budgets to support their strategies. In turn, well-developed budgets, based on a NSS that spells out means and ends, becomes a solid document by which to build the President's budget. Without this level of strategic analysis, it is impossible for OMB or Congress to ascertain budget priorities.

A grand strategy translated into a means and ends NSS, not only provides a logical road map for creating a national strategy planning document, it also enhances efficiency. By establishing clear means to meet ends, responsibilities are identified and appropriate Departments and Agencies can work together to ensure efficiency of effort. A grand strategy also provides focus and serves as a rally point for the American public. Done correctly, newspaper headlines should no longer read "An Indefensible Budget." The Executive Branch will have the documents to argue its case. And more importantly, Congress will have a document by which to ensure synergy between strategy, forces, and resources.

Providing synergy between strategy, forces, and resources is absolutely essential. It is time to stop arguing about the difficulties and get to work. As 11 September showed, America can no longer sit on its laurels. There must be an operational strategy to ensure America's security into the future. The NSC is the cornerstone in this whole process. By performing its statutory role of writing a NSS and one specific enough to provide the applicable Departments and Agencies guidance to write their own strategies the rest should follow.

Word Count = 8,013
ENDNOTES


3 The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (hereafter called the Hart-Rudman commission) suggests that the President personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and that process should be linked to the allocation of resources throughout the government. Although there is a note about utilizing something like the Defense Planning Guidance, the commission fails to go into any details of how to link this to the overall strategy – they never close the loop. My intent is to try to develop this and then close the loop between strategy and resource allocation. See U.S. Department of State, *Executive Summary of U.S. Commission on National Security Report*, Available from <http://usinfor.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01013102.htm>. Internet. Accessed 17 October 2001.

4 See J. Michael Waller, “Command Performance,” *Insight Magazine*, March 4, 2002. Available from https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?doc_url=/Feb2002/e200202/command.htm. Internet. Accessed 12 February 2002. Before 11 September, President Bush had settled on a defense strategy and force structure. Secretary of Defense Rumsfield explains it based on reaching six “transformational” objectives: (1) Protect the U.S. homeland and bases overseas; (2) Project and sustain U.S. power around the world; (3) Deny sanctuary to U.S. enemies anywhere on Earth; (4) Protect U.S. information technology to allow different kinds of U.S. forces to communicate with one another; and (5) Fight jointly; and (6) maintain “unhindered access to space and protect our space assets from enemy attack. I don’t think we could build a force big enough to do all of this.

5 This was a definitive finding of the Hart-Rudman commission. I will elaborate on the finding later in the paper.


The first draft is filtered through the NSC and then sent out to the Departments of Commerce, Energy, Interior, Labor, Transportation, Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, State and Treasury, CJCS, the FBI, CIA, DEA, EPA, FEMA, and NASA. It is also coordinated through CEA, CEQ, NEC, OMB, ONDCP, OSTP, and USTR.


The Hart-Rudman Commission suggests exploring something like the President approved Contingency Planning Guidance used by DoD. This would allow for interagency coordination. However, instead of creating another layer of work, a more efficient use of time and energy would be to operationalize the NSS. See U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Addenda.

Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the National Defense University on 31 January. One of the students asked about transforming the budget system. Rumsfeld began with telling a story about sitting in on a briefing sometime in mid-October 2001, when some folks started explaining what was happening—"...it starts with the presidential guidance, and then it comes to the Secretary of Defense guidance, and then it goes down to the CINC, and then it’s worked on, and then it proceeds all the way out to the other end, and here’s what we’re presenting today." Rumsfeld asked, "When did the president give that guidance?" And it was 24 months ago. It was another president. Then he said, "When did the Secretary of Defense give that guidance?" And it was 18 months ago. It was a different Secretary of Defense. What Rumsfeld was highlighting was that the process is so slow and disconnected by the time the guidance is received it is too late – it has nothing to do with what is going on at the present. See United States Department of Defense. "Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on 21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces," National Defense University, Washington D.C., 31 January 2002. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2002.

Although the OMB guidance should come from the President, there is no process in place to ensure this occurs. Without formal guidance, the Departments utilize informal channels to determine a funding range. See U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Addenda

Authorizing and Appropriating Committees conduct their work simultaneously. Appropriation Committees appropriate funds based on programs and amounts authorized by the Authorizing Committees. The Authorizing Committees establish ceilings while the Appropriating Committees provide actual funding.

Constitution, art. I, sec. 8.

Authorizing and Appropriating Committees conduct their work simultaneously.


22 Ibid.


25 The QDR was formulated using the Defense Planning Guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense as opposed to formal guidance from the President of the United States. A document designed to show how the Armed Forces are adequately structured to meet America’s national security interests was developed without having a clear idea of those interests.


27 Crock.


29 Ibid.


31 Force is broadly defined here to indicate the building blocks of each applicable Department or Agency. For instance in the military we usually talk Divisions, Battle Carrier Groups, Wings, etc.; whereas, in the Department of State forces can indicate how many embassies or consulates. Additionally, all national security Departments and Agencies must continue to modernize and be prepared in time of crises, all while sustaining what they have already developed.

For an extremely provocative discussion of how world-views must be reconciled before developing a grand strategy, see Paul Zimmerman, "Developing a Grand Strategy," Qualifying Paper, University of Chicago, June 1993. Paul's thesis states that failure to fully reconcile the logic of each world-view results in a grand strategy that is internally inconsistent. Trying to establish priorities among interests is impossible under such circumstances. Thus, his analysis begins with an evaluation of competing world-views, the corresponding interests, the threats to those interests, and then the force requirements to meet the threats. My application of the process utilizes Paul's analysis of Saudi Arabia. Although a great thesis, Paul fails to account for other instruments of power in his analysis. Defense of vital interests fall completely upon the military. I certainly agree that the military must be ready to protect a vital interest; however, the most efficient and effective use of resources is to develop a strategy that involves the use of all instruments of national power.

Although there are many other interests, including humanitarian interests, ideological interests, cultural interests, and even historical interests, these are not necessarily a security threat to the U.S. homeland nor is use of force appropriate in trying to defend them.

The intent here is certainly not to negate the other instruments of national power, but to highlight the fact that if it is a vital interest, we must be willing to go to war over it.

Grand Strategy if done properly is enduring. Although the leadership obviously changes, the view of the world pretty much stays the same, thus the vital interests remain unchanged. With the world continually changing, the threat to vital interests is likely to change and so should the means to protect the interests. Without a doubt, a grand strategy must keep up with a changing world; however, the entire process should not have to be repeated with every administration. Yearly adjustments to changing threats and changes in means would be depicted in the yearly National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy depicts the grand strategy process while also adhering to the nation's more near term interests.

The DPG is also used to put together the QDR and of course, the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

Since the 2001 DPG was formulated without a NSS, the guidance stemming from the document is not as specific or detailed as it could have been had there been stated priorities and objectives from the President.


Combining authorizations and appropriations is a recommendation of the Hart-Rudman commission. See U. S. Department of State, Executive Summary of U. S. Commission on National Security Report.

As mentioned early, Congress has already mandated that a NSS be turned in yearly by 1 June. The current Administration has yet to turn in a NSS. Although President Bush's State of the Union address provides some goals and objectives, this is an overarching view that is useless for matching the right means to ends.
Debatable since the end of the Cold War has been how to develop strategy without a threat. Prior to America’s war on terrorism, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld changed the force structure model from a threat based to capabilities based. His argument is that if we don’t know where the threat is coming from we can at least focus on the capabilities that exist in the world – chemical, biological, nuclear capabilities – and since we don’t know where the threat will come from or when, we can figure out the capabilities we need to meet that threat. Certainly beyond the scope of this paper to argue against the logic of a capabilities vs. threat based strategy, suffice it to say the events of 11 September certainly have provided a clear threat. For the Honorable Rumsfeld’s discussion on a capability based strategy, see United States Department of Defense, “Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Jim Lehrer, PBS Newsmaker,” available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2002.

Although there are surely many who would argue this point, the actual view is not critical to my argument, more important is actually formulating a view before ascertaining vital interests.

As Zimmerman notes in his analysis, both times are important because the U.S. may have very little warning time, but can react at its leisure to the threat.

Granted the missions would probably be much more comprehensive, but the provided missions only serve to move to the next step in the process.

Naturally, in formulating the national military strategy, the strategy for individual missions is not completed in total isolation; DoD must look at all their missions in order to develop the right strategy and force structure to support that strategy.

A deterrence strategy has the primary goal of preventing conflict; it is a strategy to avoid war. Demonstrations of resolve and commitment (credibility) play a major role. A denial strategy, by contrast, is primarily focused on prevailing in conflict; it is first and foremost a warfighting strategy.


Although it took a much larger force to fight Desert Storm, the mission was different. Desert Storm was an offensive mission; the illustration is a defensive mission.

The “carrier battle group methodology” does have its limitations, but these limitations do not distract from the fact that an efficient and effective force structure can be generated when the right information flows from the top down.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


