

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE ADDITION OF A HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD REQUIRES AN  
INCREASE IN FORCE STRUCTURE.**

by

Colonel Keith W. Corbett  
United States Army

Colonel Dale Nagy  
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## ABSTRACT

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Events on September 11, 2001, changed many aspects of the domestic security environment. Those changes will ultimately redefine the military role in domestic security, which will subsequently affect Army missions. The National Guard has played a major role in most every conflict our country has been engaged. The war on terrorism is no different. The National Guard must play a key role in homeland security, but not be excluded from other missions as part of the Total Force. The Defense Department needs to examine the structure of the National Guard and increase the end strength in a manner that will allow the National Guard to continue its role in Homeland Security, Major Theater Conflict, and Small Scale Contingencies.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....iii

PREFACE.....vii

THE ADDITION OF A HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD REQUIRES AN INCREASE IN FORCE STRUCTURE.....1

**THE THREAT** ..... 1

**THE RESPONSE**..... 2

**PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE**..... 2

**NUNN-LUGER-DOMENICI ACT**..... 3

**QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW** ..... 4

**HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION** ..... 5

**NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**..... 6

**UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN**..... 7

    CINC NORTH'S CHALLENGES ..... 8

    CINC NORTH'S VALUE-ADDED..... 9

**DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY**..... 10

**POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS** ..... 12

**ASSIGN HOMELAND SECURITY TO THE NATIONAL GUARD**..... 13

**DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN TERRITORY**..... 14

**AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE**..... 14

**WMD DEFENSE AND RESPONSE**..... 15

**INFORMATION ASSURANCE**..... 16

**CIVIL SUPPORT** ..... 16

**SHOULD HOMELAND SECURITY BE THE ONLY MISSION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD?** ..... 17

**RECOMMENDATION**..... 20

**CONCLUSION**..... 20

ENDNOTES.....	21
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	25

## PREFACE

I would like to thank Colonel Dale Nagy, my faculty advisor, for his support and guidance in the development of this paper. His candor and honesty helped me focus on the subject and remain on task leading to the completion of a finished product. A special appreciation is extended to the library staff for their willingness to answer every question raised. Their knowledge and willingness to be of assistance made the research for this project enjoyable. A special thanks is extended to my wife Roxie whose patience and understanding throughout this project helped me remain focused.



## THE ADDITION OF A HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD REQUIRES AN INCREASE IN FORCE STRUCTURE.

The National Guard has proven its ability to respond when needed to defend the sovereign territory. Within hours of the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, and the crash in Pennsylvania, Army National Guard Soldiers were there-some in federal, and some in a state status. The first military support to the Pentagon came from Maryland's 115<sup>th</sup> Military Police Battalion. When the World Trade Center was attacked, Governor George Pataki's first orders were to his New York National Guardsmen. By the evening of September 11, some 1,500 New York City-based Guard personnel were on Ground Zero, with an additional 1,500 en route from upstate.<sup>1</sup> America's Guard members are always first responders in a national emergency. These citizen-soldiers are well prepared to respond when the homeland is under attack

It is imperative the Department of Defense consider increasing the size of the Army National Guard to deal with the current demands upon the military and future force structure. The Army National Guard has played a crucial role in every military conflict and is poised to continue serving as part of the Total Force Policy. The Army National Guard can continue to serve in major theater conflict, peacekeeping missions and take the lead in the homeland security mission, but only if the strength is increased significantly.

### THE THREAT

The threat environment has changed dramatically since the end of the cold war. An increase in China's nuclear arsenal, recent re-energizing of North Korea's nuclear program and continued instability between Pakistan and India coupled with the demands of peace keeping operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan have placed unbearable demands upon the military. The Army National Guard has played and must continue to play a key role in this conventional role.

Terrorism and acts of open hostility towards ones enemy has been occurring since man has learned to record events for posterity. The difference today is the specified nature towards our country, on our homeland against civilians by an enemy that claims attacking America is a religious duty.

"Hostility toward America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded for it by God. To call us Enemy No. 1 or 2 does not hurt us. Osama bin Laden is confident that the Islamic nation will carry out its duty. I am confident Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America. But how we could use these weapons if we possess them is up to us."<sup>2</sup>

## **THE RESPONSE**

President Bush and other key leaders understand their responsibility to ensure American's are safe and that the responsible party is contained or destroyed so the terrible acts of 11 September 2001 are not repeated.

A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America.<sup>3</sup>

Before the September 11, 2001 attack on America, our leaders thought they understood the threat towards our nation. America's unrivaled military superiority meant that potential enemies, whether nations or terrorist groups that choose to attack us will be more likely to resort to terror instead of conventional military assault. Moreover, easy access to sophisticated technology meant that the destructive power available to terrorists is greater than ever. President Clinton understood the threat and attempted to deter such terrorist attacks by promulgating two Presidential Decision Directives to meet these challenges.

## **PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE**

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 dictates the policy that our nation will follow in dealing with terrorist attacks and the role of government agencies in reducing vulnerabilities to terrorism. "It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks."<sup>4</sup>

PDD 39 identified a number of government agencies that must be involved in domestic preparedness. The DoD was assigned a disproportionate amount of domestic consequence management responsibilities. This is due to the national security threat of WMD terrorism and the historical reliance on the military to solve complex domestic issues. The military will deal with consequence management tasks such as treating victims of the attack, searching for survivors, ensuring the containment of victims who are infected or exposed and cleaning up the attack area.<sup>5</sup>

PDD 62 created a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat. It reinforces the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from apprehension and prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the heart of America's economy.<sup>6</sup> A Government Accounting Office study found that PDD 62 failed at deterring terrorism because it sought to integrate government policies and programs and did not direct agency activities.

PDD 39 and PDD 62 combined with the Nunn-Lugar Domenici amendment initiated training first-responders--firefighters, police, emergency medical technicians, and the National Guard.

### **NUNN-LUGER-DOMENICI ACT**

Public Law 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, Title XIV was passed by Congress in September 1996. It was called the Defense Against WMD, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) legislation. The NLD legislation required DoD to enact a training program for civilian personnel of federal, state, and local agencies regarding emergency response to a use or threatened use of WMD related material. It specified that the Reserve Components (RC) would carry out the program. In addition, it requires developing and maintaining a domestic rapid response team composed of members of the armed forces and DoD employees who are capable of aiding federal, state, and local officials in detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of WME containing chemical, biological, or related material.<sup>7</sup> This is an excellent mission for the National Guard as many of the guard members are living in the community and are first responders in time of a crisis.

In accord with the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, DoD was assigned the lead role in a federal interagency mission to develop an Emergency Response Assistance Program. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) as the DoD Executive Agent for program implementation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment [ASA (I&E)] exercises program oversight. The Director of Military Support (SOMS) serves as the staff action agency.<sup>8</sup> This program is an extension of the state mission performed by the National Guard in time of a national disaster.

NLD Act stipulated training of first responders to deal directly with WMD terrorist incidents. DoD conducted a Defense Planning and Training Program in FY 97 to provide training to state and local "first responders." Under the NLD, an Interagency Senior Interagency Coordinating

Group (SICG), chaired by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), provides overall program direction, thereby ensuring coordinated federal agency support to state and local response authorities. DoD is represented on the SICG by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) and the Director of Military Support (DOMS). Other SICG participants include the FBI, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Department of Energy (DOE).<sup>9</sup> The Army tasked the National Guard to fill the role of Civil Support Teams (CST). They are the best choice for this tasking as they bring trained members able to respond quickly in an emergency. Funding has been held up which would enable the CSTs to train local law enforcement, fire department, and other emergency service personnel.

As part of the program, the military specifically was tasked to "develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team composed of members of the armed forces... capable of aiding federal, state and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment, disassembly, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological, or related material."<sup>10</sup> The challenge at hand was to design measures that adequately train first-responders and protect citizens without crossing the delicate line that separates military assistance from a state of marshal law.<sup>11</sup>

The Army National Guard, operating in its traditional civilian assistance role, can be a unique and invaluable asset in a WMD emergency. Local understanding of the community combined with training with other federal response teams makes the Guard the front-line defender of choice in WMD consequence management.<sup>12</sup> The National Guard has already established CSTs to deal with consequence management. The role of CSTs will be discussed at a later point in the paper. Initial funding for the teams combined with political pressure for placing the teams in key congressional members states and reluctance on the part of the Regular Army to place the teams in the National Guard resulted in delays in standing up the teams.

#### **QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW**

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also defines the role of the U.S. Army in combating terrorism. The 2001 QDR states, "The highest priority of the U.S. Military is to defend the Nation from all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders, as appropriate under U.S. Law."<sup>13</sup>

## **HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION**

The Hart-Rudman further specified the anti-terrorism role of the Department of Defense, specifically the Army, must greatly increase and refine its role in supporting homeland defense and security, while not sacrificing its ability to support national security.<sup>14</sup> The Hart-Rudman Commission noted this when they wrote, "The DoD, which has placed its highest priority on preparing for major theatre war, should pay far more attention to the homeland security mission."<sup>15</sup> There are several options for consideration that could enhance the Army's ability to better support homeland defense and civil support. These options require that DoD first refine the Army's mission, identify the tasks required for training in order to support those requirements.<sup>16</sup> The Army must identify who will respond and what tasks are required to deter and defeat terrorism. This is a prudent analysis based upon the established threat, and supports the Hart-Rudman Commission's findings that the probability of two major coincident wars is a remote possibility and unlikely in the future.<sup>17</sup> The Commission also concluded that:

The United States requires a new triad of prevention, protection, and response. Failure to prevent mass-casualty attacks against the American homeland will jeopardize not only American lives but U.S. foreign policy. It would undermine support for U.S. international leadership and for many of our personal freedoms, as well. Indeed, the abrupt undermining of U.S. power and prestige is the worst thing that could happen to the structure of global peace in the next quarter century, and nothing is more likely to produce it than devastating attacks on American soil.<sup>18</sup>

The Army has studied the nature and scope of its possible Homeland Security (HLS) roles in considerable depth over the past two years. In fact, the Army HLS Strategic Planning guidance DRAFT (September 10, 2001) served as a vehicle both for bringing together much of the literature and thinking concerning this issue and for providing a foundation for further study. The Army's "HLS Taxonomy" -a viable framework for its HLS missions-evolved from this document and from input obtained in a series of ensuing workshops.<sup>19</sup> The taxonomy is reflected in Annex H of the Army's Modernization Plan and lays out the following HLS mission areas.<sup>20</sup>

- Homeland Defense:
  - Defense of Sovereign Territory (Land and Maritime defense).
  - Air and Missile Defense
  - Information Assurance
  - WMD Defense and Response

- Civil Support:
  - Disaster Response
  - Civil Disturbance Response
  - Support to Special Events

The National Guard is the logical element of the U.S. armed forces to act as the lead military agency homeland defense and civil support. Many Army National Guard units have state support missions for which they train involving the elements found within homeland defense and civil support. The Guard has not only been trained, but has been tested in the tasks outlined. The qualities the National Guard brings to each of these elements will be discussed later in this paper.

DoD must continue to examine the roles and responsibilities of its active and reserve forces to ensure they are properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide for the defense of the United States. An examination of Army doctrine and vision will help determine the requirements of the active and reserve forces. A strategy in which the Army National Guard must play a critical role.

## **NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

The National Military Strategy of the United States establishes the role of the military in executing the Defense Strategy and achieving overarching national security objectives. The objectives are to defend the United States homeland, promote security and deter aggression, win the Nation's wars, and ensure military superiority. The Defense Strategy directs effort to Defend the Nation and Ensure a Viable Peace.<sup>21</sup>

To achieve these objectives, military forces will jointly conduct multiple, simultaneous, and synchronized operations to protect the U.S. homeland and interests abroad, prevent conflict and unwarmed attacks, and prevail against adversaries in a wide range of possible contingencies. Combatant commanders will tailor their activities to accomplish specific regional goals in support of a global strategy, and integrate regional and other actions to achieve national objectives.<sup>22</sup> Combatant Commanders have come to rely upon the Army National Guard to augment their combat and peacekeeping capabilities. To maintain this crucial function, the Army National Guard will need to increase its end strength.

The Defense Strategy also recognizes enduring requirements that will shape the size and structure of the Armed Forces for the foreseeable future. In particular, it describes a broad range of military requirements and defines a new force-sizing construct that takes into account the number, scope, and concurrency of the tasks actually assigned to the military. This construct explicitly calls for the force to be sized for defense of the U.S. homeland, forward

deterrence, overlapping warfighting missions in more than one region, and multiple lesser contingency operations.<sup>23</sup>

A safe and secure homeland is the first priority of the Nation and is fundamental to the successful execution of the National Military Strategy. It also assures allies and friends of our Nation's ability to project power globally and honor security commitments while demonstrating to potential adversaries that attempts at aggression or coercion will not succeed. Properly planned and coordinated, actions taken to maintain a secure homeland also serve to protect and advance other US interests abroad and the mutual interests of our allies and friends.

US Armed Forces, including the US Coast Guard, are an essential element of an integrated national effort to assure the security of the homeland. Military forces perform roles in two distinct but interrelated areas - homeland defense and support to civil authorities. They defend the homeland by conducting simultaneous and synchronized actions across the full range of military operations to protect US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external attacks and aggression.<sup>24</sup>

#### **UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN**

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) provides final guidance for the DoD/ U.S. Army and its support on the war on terrorism. Under the plan, all combatant command commanders are responsible for:

Deterring attacks against the United States, its territories, possessions and bases, and employing appropriate force should deterrence fail.

On 1 October 2002, the Commander U.S. Northern Command was established as the commander of a combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander's mission. Its Area of Responsibility (AOR) will encompass the 48 contiguous state, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water to approximately 500 nautical miles. It will have homeland security as its primary mission, but like the other geographic combatant commands it will also have regional strategic missions to fulfill.<sup>25</sup>

USNORTHCOM's responsibilities will include:

- Providing military assistance to US civil authorities, including consequence management operations in response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) incidents, military support to civil authorities, military assistance for civil disturbances, and other civil support, authorized by the President or Secretary of Defense.
- Providing technical advice and assistance to supported combatant commanders conducting consequence management operations in response to CBRNE incidents outside CONUS.

- Planning for the binational Canada-US land and maritime defense of the Canada - US region.<sup>26</sup>
- Consequently, NORTHCOM will primarily act as a ready reserve and, when directed, provide support to appropriate federal agencies. While NORTHCOM has sole responsibility for CS, the HLD mission extends well beyond it to all CINCs.

## COMBATANT COMMANDER NORTH'S CHALLENGES

The Combatant Commander North faces an immense challenge-he must defend the richest, most open, most developed nation on earth. Heretofore, no HLS study has pulled all of the aspects of that challenge together into one document, even though such a step is a prerequisite to the development of a comprehensive strategy. Thus, this report offers a brief description of the realities behind such terms as territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure.

In short, Combatant Commander North's Challenge looks like this:

- 3.1 million square miles of territory (contiguous U.S.only).
- 95,000 miles of open shoreline.
- 3.5 million nautical miles (U.S. Maritime Zone).
- 9,500 miles of land borders.
- 286 million people.

Moreover, the United States is an open society. In 2000 calendar year, the volume of traffic that flowed through U.S. borders exceeded that of any other nation:

- 489 million people.
- 138.5 million trucks and autos.
- 7.5 million (maritime) cargo containers-1 container every 20 seconds.
- 2.2 million rail cars.
- 289,000 aircraft.
- 211,000 sea vessels.

Furthermore, the United States must remain an open society, as a matter of vital economic interest:

- \$8.8 billion goods pass through the U.S. entry points per day
- \$737 billion in trade was brought through U.S. seaports in 2000.

- U.S. produces 19% of world's energy; but consumes 25%.
- U.S. produces 30-50% of world's foodstuffs.
- Volume of U.S. trade doubled 1990-2000.

The above data suggests that any strategy involving the closing of the U.S. borders or disrupting the flow of people and goods through them would adversely affect the United States' and the world's economies.<sup>27</sup>

#### COMBATANT COMMANDER NORTH'S VALUE-ADDED

It challenges and restraints notwithstanding, NORTHCOM can bring a certain amount of "value-added" to the HLS challenge at the strategic level:

- It offers a *clear military chain of command*, President-SECDEF-Combatant Commander, for HLS and other strategic concerns within the AOR,
- It can develop an integrated *theater strategy* and provide a framework for expanding hemispheric military cooperation and security, especially with Canada and Mexico,
- It can provide *unity of effort* in the execution of military operations in theater, establishing resource priorities based on NCA guidance.
  - Most important, it offers a HQs capable of applying the campaign planning process to HLS and other missions, which can in turn facilitate interagency cooperation and clarify military requirements for HLS and other missions within the AOR.<sup>28</sup>

Major General H. Steven Blum, Chief of Staff for United States Northern Command emphasized the importance of the National Guard when planning for defense of the homeland.

He stated, " This is a joint, unified, regional command with the responsibility to deter and defeat any threats or attacks against the United States. Every other combatant commander has a similar mission statement. But there's a semicolon in our mission, that says we also provide military support to civil authorities when authorized by the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States."

"It's that piece after the semicolon that makes the National Guard as essential element of Northern Command. The Army and Air National Guards of the United States will handle that mission. And, frankly, much of the homeland defense piece will also be handled by the Army and Air National Guard. So the National Guard is a key player in the strategic execution of the Northern Command's missions."

General Blum continued, "Most of the people in this command structure are active duty officers with very limited or, in some cases, no experience in this area whatsoever. They are great officer and military experts, but they do not have the practical experience and know how to bring the military assistance to civil authorities and the civil support arenas. The National Guard brings that missing piece to the information set that is necessary for General Eberhardt to accomplish his mission."<sup>29</sup>

Within the DoD, the overarching concept of homeland security has emerged and continues to grow. Before DoD addresses the concept, a definition must be agreed upon to focus the effort of all elements of national power. DoD's current HLS definition addresses the responsibility by dividing HLS tasks into two categories, homeland defense and civil support. These two categories have been the foundation of the National Guard for over 377 years, tasks in which the Guard has refined and excelled.

### **DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY**

Within DoD, an overarching concept called HLS is emerging and is defined as, "The prevention, deterrence, and pre-emption of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies." This definition encompasses a wide range of tasks performed by organizations from all elements of national power. The National Guard is well prepared to carry out the mission of homeland defense and civil support, but only if an increase in the end strength is realized.

Homeland defense is defined as "the prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against direct attacks aimed at U.S. territory, population, and infrastructure. Homeland defense is a proactive concept that attempts to deter, defeat or mitigate the threat to the homeland."<sup>30</sup> Four mission areas are assigned to homeland defense: defense of sovereign territory, air and missile defense, information assurance, and defense against and response to weapons of mass destruction. These mission areas are well suited for the National Guard.

Civil Support is defined as DoD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and designated law enforcement and other activities. It is further defined as what the Defense Department does to help secure, defend, and protect people, facilities, and systems that the department does not own or need.<sup>31</sup>

The Defense Department term military support to civil authorities is defined as:

Those activities and measures taken by the DoD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of

resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies.<sup>32</sup>

Military support to civil authorities is part of a broader area, military assistance to civil authorities:

DoD activities and measure covered under [military support to civil authorities] (natural and manmade disasters...) plus DoD assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement.<sup>33</sup>

To remain uniform, military support to civil authorities means placing Defense Department resources, primarily military units, in support of federal government agencies (such as FEMA) or states and localities. Most of the civil support is provide for the response phase of consequence management, although some civil support may take place for preparation and mitigation.

Military personnel standing guard at the location of terrorist attacks, providing additional security at airports, and augmenting the Border Patrol are civil support. Defense Department forces for civil support may be classifies into three categories:

- Dedicated civil support units and personnel will perform only civil support tasks and will not be used for military operations overseas.
- Temporary civil support units and personnel may be diverted to perform civil support missions temporarily but will be required to maintain readiness for military operations overseas and may be reclaimed from civil support operations when needed elsewhere.
- Urgent civil support may be provided by all Defense Department units and personnel to assist in response operations "to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions."<sup>34</sup> In effect, base commanders may coordinate informally with local authorities and respond immediately to requests for support without prior approval of higher headquarters. This may be done for a short time only, and the units and personnel must retain readiness for their primary duties.<sup>35</sup>

Defense of our homeland is nothing new for the National Guard-it's in the Guard's constitutional charter. However, the changing nature of warfare has also changed both the nature and the importance of this essential mission, making it much more challenging than it was even during the cold war. Meeting these new challenges demands new creative thinking and a willingness to accept new responsibilities. The Army National Guard is fully capable of both. The National Guard first began defending our nation as the militia over 377 years ago. The same dedication exhibited by the early guard has been displayed every time the guard is called upon to defend freedom. The National Guard has been a crucial element of the total

force and based upon their performance, will be relied upon whenever called to duty. America can not afford to enter a crisis or conflict without the National Guard.

## **POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS**

With the development of the Department of HLS and conflicts around the world, what if any role can or will the Army play in HLS?

Important for defining the Army functions within homeland defense, Field Manual 1 states, "The Army also plays an essential role in defending both our Nation and our allies. Through its full range of capabilities, including national and theater missile defense, the Army's presence, at home and abroad, is a certain signal of America's commitment."<sup>36</sup>

Further, Field Manual 1 indicates that DoD's concept of civil support is an Army function with the following statement:

As part of an interagency and joint team, the Army provides unique capabilities to support civil authorities in domestic and international contingencies. This competency includes homeland security and defense. Prompt Army assistance to civil authorities and agencies is often a decisive element in disaster relief or crisis resolution. The Army will assure all available support is provided until civil authority is reestablished or civilian relief agencies can assume the mission.<sup>37</sup>

The Army supports homeland defense by providing highly trained personnel and equipment needed to meet the demands of national land and sea defense, critical infrastructure protection and missile defense. Active Army units support these needs on a mission by mission basis. Usually, the Army National Guard will provide the bulk of the resources needed to meet the daily security needs of our government. State Governors can employ the Army National Guard to support the states security needs under Title 32 of the U.S. Code. Since 11 September, the Guard has been in action supporting these security needs in air and sea ports as well as other directed critical events and infrastructure. The Army National Guard's ability to respond to these needs provides both state and national leadership flexibility to support the multitude of critical sites within our country during times of emergency.<sup>38</sup>

The Army National Guard is the primary resource provider for civil support missions. A significant mission of the Army National Guard is supporting state and territorial governors by carrying out a full spectrum of tasks authorized in state law.

The Army National Guard must be included in the list of solutions for homeland security. The Army National Guard is trained and equipped, providing a full range of options when needed. Statutory requirements outline the role of the National Guard in homeland security. It

is crucial that the Army National Guard be included in every discussion involving homeland security.

### **ASSIGN HOMELAND SECURITY TO THE NATIONAL GUARD**

A number of senators have called upon the Department of Defense to designate HLS as a mission for the National Guard. Former Senator Gary Hart, who was co-chairman of the commission that studied the terrorist threat, (The Hart-Rudman Commission and the Homeland Defense), said the White House should act now to designate the National Guard as the arm of the military that would respond to terrorist strikes in the United States. "What George Bush ought to do is call the 50 adjutant generals into the White House and say, 'Right now you work for the 50 governors; you don't work for me. But there may come a time when you will work for me, and I want you to make homeland security the primary mission--not your only mission, but your primary mission,' " Hart said.<sup>39</sup> One can ask the question, where if at all, does the National Guard fit into homeland security? The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, often referred to as the Hart-Rudman Report, which was written following the Hart-Rudman Commission, begins to answer this question. The report urges that the "National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission" (emphasis added). The report does not state that homeland security should be the primary mission of the National Guard. Thus, it implies that the homeland security role for the Guard is as important as its overseas combat roles but should not replace them.<sup>40</sup>

The National Guard is the logical element of the U.S. armed forces to act as the lead military agency for homeland security. By law and tradition, the Guard connects local communities to the federal government. Units are located in every American community, and they have the capabilities, legal authority, and structure to respond to attacks on the homeland. The Army National Guard maintains over 3,000 armories around the nation. The close relationship between the National Guard and their locales must be leveraged to ensure that local Guard units are prepared to respond to attacks and that they help to train other first responders in their communities.<sup>41</sup>

Joint Pub 3-26 states that National Guard forces are collectively referred to as Reserve Component Forces and are not only required to fight and win the nation's wars, but also are integral to the accomplishment of peacetime missions and conflict prevention. They are an integral part of the homeland security operational force.

The State National Guard is the next responder to State/local capabilities in response to CS incidents. Working under the control of the governor, actions are closely coordinated with

any DOD assets committed in response to the same or related incidents as well as with other agencies. State National Guard capabilities closely parallel their active component counterparts and are normally the first responder for military type support to a CS incident.

National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (WMD CSTs) are crucial when emergencies occur. Joint Pub 3-26 states for WMD response situations, the National Guard, operating under Title 32, may well be the incident first responder. This response will consist of Active Guard Reserve soldiers and airmen organized into WMD CSTs. Their mission is to deploy to an incident site to assess a suspected NBC or radiological event in support of a local incident commander such as a fire chief or police chief. These teams also advise civilian responders regarding the appropriate action and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite arrival of additional State and Federal assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate greater property damage. These teams, as a National Guard asset, have a State mission but may be federalized and deployed in support of an Lead Federal Agency (LFA) during a CBRNE incident.

Earlier in the paper, the Army's role in Homeland Security was outlined. The role was divided into two areas, Homeland Defense and CS. The National Guard supports homeland defense by providing highly trained professionals and equipment needed to meet the Demands of national defense, critical infrastructure protection, and missile defense.

#### **DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN TERRITORY**

The Army National Guard is well staffed and prepared to undertake these missions. National Guard units already train and have been exercised in supporting civil authorities. The National Guard is capable and ready to assume the duties listed under Homeland Defense.

There is little doubt the National Guard is well prepared to respond when needed. The quick response and professional manner in which the guard performed their mission on September 11 and the days that followed would lead one to ask, should homeland security be the only mission of the National Guard?

#### **AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE**

In April 1998, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen issued the Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance, which directed the Department to conduct the Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study. The study concluded that if the United States deploys a limited national missile defense system, the Reserve Component may be able to participate significantly. The report identified that because the elements would be ground-based and would

have regularly programmed activities, staffing such a system with a significant number of Reserve Component personnel appeared feasible.<sup>42</sup>

National Missile Defense is easily classified as a Homeland Defense mission and both the National Guard and the Active Army recognize that the Guard should play a role in this mission. The 207<sup>th</sup> Infantry Group (Alaska Scouts) has a major role in staffing and securing the facilities of the first site located in Alaska. The North Dakota Army Guard is preparing to play a similar role for the second site located in their State and any subsequent locations will likely be staffed with Guardsmen as well.<sup>43</sup>

## **WMD DEFENSE AND RESPONSE**

A 2002 report by the Council on Foreign Relations concludes that the National Guard will play a critical role when the next catastrophic terror happens on American Soil, and it must be well trained and equipped. The report recommends an aggressive approach to revamping the capabilities of National Guard units designated to respond to domestic terrorist attacks. In order for the National Guard to accomplish this mission, the Task Force recommends that congress triple the number of WMD-CSTs from twenty-two to sixty-six teams, develop capabilities so that response times are reduced, and develop training programs in order to develop response capabilities for the range of WMD threats in urban environments.<sup>44</sup>

The National Guard currently has Thirty-two CSTs to respond to attacks of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The 2003 Department of Defense budget funds twenty-three more teams. The twenty-two member teams are specially trained and possess highly-technical equipment capable of detecting and classifying a nuclear, biological, or chemical contaminant. Each team is comprised of the following: Team Commander, Deputy Commander, Operations Team, Administration/Logistics Team, Communications Team, Medical Team, and Survey Team. The role of the team is to support the incident commander and are not trained to become the lead agency in the event of a WMD attack. CSTs are designed to conduct the following:

- Assess Situations: This includes reconnaissance of a possible WMD situation. The collection of air and other physical samples for the purpose of identification.
- Advise Civilian Responders: This includes mitigation recommendations and efforts, medical response, and hazard identification.
- Facilitate: This includes assisting in expediting the request and arrival of additional state and federal resources to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage.<sup>45</sup>

## **INFORMATION ASSURANCE**

The National Guard will play a major role in assuring that communications and control networks are protected from information warfare and can remain operational at all times. The strength of the National Guard is its members. The women and men that comprise the traditional soldier role work in banks, high-tech computer operations, and education. They understand the complex nature of the networks and are best able to be called upon to ensure the networks are protected.

The difficulties of establishing such a system are clear. First, industry holds its information assurance information very close for reasons of security, privacy, and competition. Imagine the response if an FBI special agent walked into the offices of an international banking corporation headquartered in New York and offered to "help" the corporation defend itself against foreign attack. An active component "Information Corps" officer would likely meet a similar, skeptical response.

Suppose, however, that corporation's vice president for information assurance were asked to allow several of his own key personnel to join a special Information Defense National Guard unit with the sole mission of defending the U.S. national information infrastructure, of which his corporation was a key part. The advantages here are obvious. The corporation would have full trust and confidence in its own personnel, who would receive additional training and perhaps software, etc., at government expense and would be linked to a national information defense early warning and command and control system.<sup>46</sup>

## **CIVIL SUPPORT**

Civil support tasks fall into four main groups: maintaining law and order; securing people, facilities, and operational boundaries; controlling crowds; and providing or managing logistical support.

While serving in a state status, the Guard provides military support to civil authorities, when required. The National Guard's unique federal-state status enables the Guard to be the primary provider of Military Support to Civil Authorities for natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, and other events requiring military assistance. ...The National Guard may be employed in support of the lead federal agency after a hostile event to save lives, to prevent human suffering, and to mitigate property loss. In unusual circumstances, the National Guard may assist with civil order in conjunction with state and local law-enforcement authorities.<sup>47</sup>

Due to its state disaster response mission (in which it works closely with public safety and medical agencies), its close ties with communities throughout the country, and its members who

work in the civilian economy, the National Guard is already well prepared to take on this mission. The Guard has proved itself every time it has been called upon for support. The full range of options provided by the Army National Guard makes it an invaluable resource for HLS. Many supporters of the National Guard feel that HLS should be the only mission of the National Guard. They feel by returning the National Guard to its original role as a militia, we are meeting the intent of the Constitution.

### **SHOULD HOMELAND SECURITY BE THE ONLY MISSION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD?**

The Army National Guard is well qualified to accomplish the missions under Homeland Security. Some critics believe because of new emerging requirements for homeland security, it is time to focus the Guard on its traditional militia mission.

- To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.
- A power of the U.S. Congress according to Section 8, Article I, the Constitution of the United States of American

They believe sustained terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland would quickly overwhelm first responders and require unique military skills, such as logistics, physical security, chemical units, and population control that only the Army could provide. Because of this anticipated increase in requirements, they write, "The United States should restore the militia to its original, constitutional role of homeland security to provide the large numbers of trained, armed, and disciplined military units that are needed to deal with terrorist attacks on America."<sup>48</sup> But the National Guard is no longer the militia. In accordance with the Total Force policy, the National Guard is funded, organized, trained and equipped by the Federal Government to wage war overseas.<sup>49</sup>

On May 1, 2001, Lieutenant General Russ Davis, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, testified before Congress and addressed the role of the National Guard today and the future.

The first is that the National Guard may lead on certain homeland security mission areas, we must not separate the National Guard from our traditional warfighting missions. Second, from its inception, the National Guard has always had a federal and state mission. We have always accepted and executed our responsibilities for either of these missions, but we must grant the same stature to the defense of the homeland, as the support we provide to combatant commanders.<sup>50</sup>

General Creighton Abrams understood the need to mobilize the Guard, and the shortcoming by not mobilizing the Guard for the Vietnam War. He believed when the Guard goes to war, America goes to war. He believed that failure to mobilize the Guard for Vietnam was a policy failure by the U.S. Government because we failed to engage the American people. In order to have the American support, the Guard must be called. His "Total Army" approach fostered even greater dependence on the reserve component by the active force.

Throughout the Cold War, the Total Force and Total Army concepts served the nation well. Deployments were held in check, and military force was used to support the overarching strategy of containing the Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup>

National Guard soldiers have been involved in every major war. Today, National Guard troops are deployed around the globe, defending freedom with their engagement in the varied and numerous operations. Supporting Operation Noble Eagle here on the home front are 1,727 ARNG soldiers. National Guard soldiers are in Afghanistan supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. They have a continued, even increasing presence in peacekeeping operations in Southwest Asia involved with Operation Desert Spring. In Germany, Italy and Belgium, soldiers are working on Task Force Santa Fe. The National Guard has taken over the Multinational Force and Observer mission in the Sinai. The 29<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Light) (Maryland Army National Guard) successfully completed their tour in Bosnia and were replaced by the 28<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division from the Pennsylvania Army National Guard.<sup>52</sup>

The Army National Guard is designed and trained to provide immediate and primary augmentation of the Army for military operations overseas. The Guard provides 41% of the strength of the expeditionary Army. The Army National Guard provides eight divisions and 17 brigade combat teams to the Army's combat power. The Guard is a lean organization, with 315,000 personnel in the expeditionary Army.<sup>53</sup>

The National Guard has always been crucial in planning for a Major Theater War (MTW). When the United States proclaimed to NATO that it would provide 10 divisions in 10 days, III Corps took the promise seriously and began the preparation for this monumental undertaking. Upon III Corps's departure for Europe, Army National Guard divisions would fall in on Fort Hood the equipment left behind. When ready, they too, would move forward to Europe.<sup>54</sup> For the purposes of war planning, I Corps was aligned with heavy National Guard Divisions. It participated in deliberate planning in the context of a Korean War scenario and was advertised as a Pacific contingency corps.<sup>55</sup>

The Balkans operations have represented one of the success stories of Active and Reserve integration for the Army. The deployment of a large contingent of the 49<sup>th</sup> Armored

Division of the Texas Army National Guard in March 2000 represented the largest activation of the National Guard since the Korean War, and was one of the few times in Army history when a Guard unit commanded active duty forces.<sup>56</sup>

The reserve components have been central to all Army peace operations, in large part because a high proportion of the type of combat support and combat service support units that are needed for these activities are in the reserves.<sup>57</sup>

This is only the beginning of a long-term commitment to homeland defense, which only adds to the existing responsibilities for consequence management. If these missions remain with the reserve component, that will seriously compromise their ability to support a major theater war. If more of the reserve component is committed to duties at home, deployment schedules for the Balkans could also be affected, increasing the burden on active forces for peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo.<sup>58</sup>

What would the impact of assuming a sole mission of homeland security be upon the readiness of the National Guard in the event they are needed for a MTW?

There's no question that Army National Guard units will take on homeland-security responsibilities, said COL Jim Barrineau, director of the Army Guard's Force Management Division. But Army Guard units should still "be structured so they can accomplish the full range of normal Army missions. We are not going to have units out there that can only do homeland security stuff."<sup>59</sup>

Major General Philip Killey agrees, "The thing that makes the Guard an essential force for homeland security is the war-fighting mission it is trained for now," Killey, South Dakota adjutant general and chairman of the Strategic Planning Committee of the Adjutants General Association. Killey said, "Ninety percent of what we are doing today will take care of homeland security threats."

Wartime dependence on the Army National Guard will not change. Nor does expanding the Guard's responsibilities to include Homeland Security mean that its mission with the active forces during times of general war would change. The Guard's contributions to America's war strategy must reflect the evolving threats to the homeland. Now that the homeland has been turned into a theater of war, Guard units must be available to protect the homeland, while supporting world-wide engagements. The continual reliance upon the Guard means changes will have to be made to the force structure of the Guard.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

Current estimates range from 50,000 to 150,000 National Guard members that will be needed for homeland security.<sup>60</sup> Add to this number, the estimate the United States will require 250,000 soldiers for a war with Iraq. During the 1991 war with Iraq, the Army National Guard provided 86,000 troops. Currently, 10,000 troops are working operations in Afghanistan, of which one-fourth are Army National Guard soldiers. Take into account the 2,000 National Guard soldiers conducting IFOR operations, and the additional 780 assigned to MFO Sinai, and the 80,000 National Guard called to duty as a result of September 11, 2001, and one finds that the Guard is committed.

Army National Guard force structure would need to be modified to support anticipated homeland security and wartime needs. The only answer is to increase the authorized number of the National Guard from 350,000 to at least 426,000, the end strength of the National Guard prior to the bottom up review.

## **CONCLUSION**

Army Guard units are fully capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of military missions from state active duty missions to homeland security missions and major combat operations. They must not be habitually relegated to only homeland security operations. It is imperative the National Guard continue combat operations to ensure honing of critical wartime skills, the same skills necessary for homeland security. The emphasis is on homeland security should not be at the exclusion of other missions as a part of the Total Force.

When the President wants to do more with less, relying on the National Guard provides an escape clause for the draft and a cost-effective force multiplier for a shrinking military. Still today, National Guard combat power is one-fifth the cost of active forces.

It is true that in 2003 the United States can not go to war without the National Guard, nor can the federal standing Army carry the burden of peacetime readiness alone. The Defense Department must examine the structure of the Army National Guard and end strength.

WORD COUNT = 7,958

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>3</sup> George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, 11 Sep 2001

<sup>4</sup> William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 39 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 21, 1995)

<sup>5</sup> Aaron Weiss, "When Terror Strikes, Who Should Respond?" Parameters (Autumn 2001, 117

<sup>6</sup> William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 62 (Washington, D.C. : The White House, May 22, 1998)

<sup>7</sup> Edwin C. Domingo, U.S. Army Reserve Roles: Consequence Management in Support of Homeland Security, Strategic Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, March 20, 2002), 5

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 5

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Weiss, 120

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 122

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 128

<sup>13</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 20, 2001), 18.

<sup>14</sup> Richard C. Townes, The U.S. Army's Role in Homeland Security: What Changes are needed, Strategic Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002), 8

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, Road Map for National Security Imperative for Change, 15 February 2001, 23.

<sup>16</sup> Townes, 10

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., iii

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 2

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 14

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 10

<sup>28</sup> Echevarria, 13

<sup>29</sup> Bob Haskell, "Homeland Defender-General Blum, " \* October 2002; available from <<http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm>>; Internet; accessed 15 December 2002.

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<sup>31</sup> Townes, 1

<sup>32</sup> William Cohen, Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, Feb. 18, 1997), Enclosure 2, Definitions.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 4

<sup>35</sup> John R. Brinkerhoff, " The Changing of the Guard: Evolutionary Alternatives for America's National Guard," Journal of Homeland Security, ( May 2002): 10-11.

<sup>36</sup> Zac Northup, " Before and After," National Guard Review, (Fall 2001): 9-12

<sup>37</sup> Donahue, 7

<sup>38</sup> Townes, 9

<sup>39</sup> Bill Miller, "National Guard Awaits Its Niche in the Homeland Security Plan." Washington Post, August 11, 2002, Sec. A, p.12.

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<sup>44</sup> Congress, Council on Foreign Relations Report, 110<sup>th</sup> Congress

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<sup>46</sup> Edwards, 8.

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<sup>52</sup> Schultz, 108

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<sup>56</sup> Steven Metz, The American Army in the Balkans, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, 17.

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<sup>58</sup> Conrad C. Crane, *Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While Pursuing a Global War Against Terrorism*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, 13

<sup>59</sup> William Matthews, "The Price of Success," National Guard, September 2002, 41

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

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