Homeland Security and the Unified Command Plan

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Recent events have drawn into question the seams in responsibility that exist between the nations military Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) for defense of the contiguous States. Currently military Homeland Defense responsibilities for regional boundaries on land, sea, air, and for infrastructure are divided specifically between four CINCs and NORAD. Legal implications, interagency and State/local coordination and a unique supporting role are all new realities in the military's role of Homeland Security. A renewed look at the precepts of the military's organizational relationships and the existing adaptability inherently designed in existing organizational structures will show that sound UCP options exist for adapting to new missions while not requiring radical UCP changes or appointing a new CINC specifically for regional geographic responsibility of the lower 48 states.
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Abstract

Recent events have drawn into question the ‘seams’ in responsibility that exist between the nations military Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) for defense of the contiguous States.

Currently military Homeland Defense responsibilities for regional boundaries on land, sea, air, and for infrastructure are divided specifically between four CINCs and NORAD. Legal implications, interagency and State/local coordination and a unique supporting role are all new realities in the militaries role of Homeland Security. A renewed look at the precepts of the military’s organizational relationships and the existing adaptability inherently designed in existing organizational structures will show that sound UCP options exist for adapting to new missions while not requiring radical UCP changes or appointing a new CINC specifically for regional geographic responsibility of the lower 48 states.
Homeland Security and the Unified Command Plan

Recent events have drawn into question ‘seams’ of responsibility that exists between the nation’s military Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) for defense of the contiguous States.

Current Department of Defense (DoD) and military organizations responsible for homeland defense include the Secretary of the Army as the DOD’s executive agent for agency coordination, commander U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) with responsibility for land and maritime defense of the continental states and provider of military assistance to civil authorities, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for aerospace defense, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) for their geographic areas of responsibility, and the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) for computer infrastructure information defense.¹ Many²³⁴⁵ have speculated that a CINC will be given the military warfighting leadership responsibility for the United States as the current Unified Command Plan (UCP)⁶ does not assign a CINC regional responsibility for the lower 48 States. While events may accelerate the decision to create a CINC with sole geographic responsibility for the United States, strategic objectives for homeland defense must first be reflected in a coherent and comprehensive national military strategy relative to the ability of military power to achieve those objectives that support the national strategy. A balanced and comprehensive review of all threats to the nation’s vital interests must be reflected in the

⁶ Unified Command Plan, Extracts from, Joint Military Operations Department (NWC2021A), (Newport RI: U.S. Naval War College, September 1999).
national military strategy and subsequent command structure with capabilities balanced across those missions and responsibilities that military power is uniquely able to accomplish. Any substantive changes to command structure and assigned missions that are initiated without regard for a comprehensive military strategy that compliments and supports national strategy, or which is incompatible with the military’s purpose, functions or roles will be inefficient at best. Legal implications, interagency, state and local coordination, and a unique supporting role are all new realities in the military’s task of homeland security and have direct implications on organizational structure and functions. A renewed look at the precepts of the military’s organizational relationships and the existing adaptability inherently designed in existing organizational structures will show that sound UCP options exist for adapting to new missions while not requiring the creation of a tenth unified command specifically assigned to regional geographic responsibility of the lower 48 states.

**Unified Command Plan**

The U.S. military’s combatant commanders (CINCs) head the unified commands and are the senior warfighting leaders. The UCP delineates to CINC their missions, responsibilities, force structure, and for geographic combatant commanders their geographic area of responsibility (AOR). The Unified Command Plan was developed from the benefits that the military realized by unity of effort through unity of command in World War II. While unity of effort and unity of command are central precepts to the Unified Command Plan, how that unity is realized conceptually has varied. Historically there has been a philosophical schism between functional and geographic orientations. After World War II the Army wanted commands organized by forces or functions with more centralized control and structure, while the Navy advocated geographic responsibilities as a loosely coordinated DOD structure
would foster service autonomy and flexibility for the commander. The Army foresaw keeping forces centrally organized with a coordinated response to need, while the Navy lived and experienced continual response to geographic hot spots around the globe. The first Unified Command Plan in 1946 identified and authorized seven geographic unified commands allowing the commanders to coordinate and command multi-service forces and their capabilities into the missions required for their specific Area Of Responsibility (AOR). The Unified Command Plan has incrementally evolved based on threats, needs, abilities, capabilities and the leaders that have implemented it.

Following changes in the international environment and the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 the Unified Command Plan experienced major changes creating a hybrid structure with the addition of functional commands that exist today. ‘Goldwater-Nichols readjusted the balance of power between the Services and the Joint warfighting structure. As a result, the CINCs find themselves with a greater influence in DOD decision-making. Although they still maintain a near-term focus, CINCs have a much greater say in the shape of future capabilities through their interaction with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process.’

The current Unified Command Plan (Table 1) is organized with five regional commands and four functional commands. Unified commands are assigned missions that are broad and ongoing which are organizationally structured under a single commander who has forces that are made up of two or more services. Functional commands are designed to execute a

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particular mission that is not assigned to a specific region but global in nature, while regional commanders are assigned primarily for supporting national military strategy through accomplishing and controlling overall military actions within a specified region.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unified Commands</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command Name</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Forces Command*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>Southern Command</td>
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<td>Space Command</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation Command</td>
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*JFCOM has geographic and functional responsibilities.

The UCP command hierarchy (Fig. 1) runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) assistance and advice. Unified commanders can adopt a command structure best suited to accomplish the command’s assigned missions. Multiple variations of unified command relationships are depicted simultaneously in figure (1). Common sub-organizational variations include implementing a subordinate unified command, Joint Task Force (JTF), functional component or a service component. Standing Joint Task Forces and sub-unified commands are created primarily to assist the CINC so that span of control is manageable for a specific task or function and allows for a senior flag officer to have direct management and oversight.
Fig. 1. Source: Joint Publication 0-2, p. I-7.
The current geographic assignments of the regional CINCs are depicted in figure (2).

Unified commander responsibilities go beyond controlling military forces; interagency coordination, military to military liaison, and political military relationships all ultimately contribute to a cooperative and collective effort with other agencies and countries to most efficiently employ national powers toward defined objectives. While the majority of the globe is covered the current Unified Command Plan leaves unassigned areas of the former Soviet Union, Canada, Mexico and the United States.

Under United States Code Title 10 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is required to “review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command.”\textsuperscript{10} Unified Command Plan review parallels the

\textsuperscript{10} General Military Law. U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 161
quadrennial defense review (QDR) ensuring that force structures and strategy are analyzed and revised in conjunction with command structure revisions.

**Unified Command Plan Issues**

The Unified Command Plan has evolved incrementally since its inception as threats, national interests, strategies and capabilities have changed. Opinions vary on the required essential criteria for designating a unified command and on how the UCP should be structured; “one might also make the case that a unified combatant command should be for warfighters, or those directly executing rather than supporting military forces in conflicts and contingencies.”¹¹ Many far-reaching proposals have been fielded regarding the reorganization of the Unified Commands ranging from a UCP reduction that assigns only three ‘super CINCs’¹² to an incremental realignment of functions and boundaries among the existing unified commands. Central to the issue of the UCP structure is whether the plan should be based on regional, functional, or objective based command assignments. If the UCP structure is hybrid and contains more than one conceptual orientation it is difficult to limit the number of commands and meet all regional and major functional needs while also effectively delineating responsibilities that cross both functional and regional boundaries.

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Public law required specific issues be addressed in the last UCP assessment:

The CJCS shall consider … the following matters:

(1) Whether there exists an adequate distribution of threats, mission requirements, and responsibilities for geographic areas among the regional unified combatant commands.

(2) Whether reductions in the overall force structure of the Armed Forces permit the United States to better execute its warfighting plans through fewer or differently configured unified combatant commands, including –
   (A) a total of five or fewer commands, all of which are regional;
   (B) a total of three commands consisting of an eastward-oriented command, a westward-oriented command, and a central command;
   (C) a purely functional command structure, involving (for example) a first theater command, a second theater command, a logistics command, a special contingencies command, and a strategic command; or
   (D) any other command structure or configuration the Chairman finds appropriate.

(3) Whether any missions, staff, facilities, equipment, training programs, or other assets or activities of the unified combatant commands are redundant.

(4) Whether warfighting requirements are adequate to justify the current functional commands.

(5) Whether the exclusion of certain nations from the Areas of Responsibility of the unified combatant commands presents difficulties with respect to the achievement of United States national security objectives in those areas.¹³

Structurally the current UCP is a hybrid of commands based upon regional and functional missions. In general, the geographic assignments (fig.2) have at times been an issue as highlighted by Loren:

Geographic boundaries between unified commands, drawn along crisis lines during the Cold War, complicate the coordination of U.S. military activities aimed at attenuating regional problems. For example: …

…The UCP fragments responsibility for Latin America and the Caribbean among three CINCs.

Geographic boundaries established by the UCP are at variance with the regional office boundaries of the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and State Department, which complicates the coordination and implementation of national security policy and strategy. There are strong arguments for maintaining some variation in the organization of the respective departments, but the shift to a more

regionally focused strategy suggests an even greater need for alignments that promote synergistic interagency cooperation.¹⁴

Loren’s assessment does not dismiss the concept of regional assignments in the UCP however it does question the current boundaries and their effectiveness with regard to regional issues, cultural and physical boundaries and other agency regional boundary divisions. Issues of global geographic assignment are beyond this scope of discussion however the regional boundaries and missions adjoining and within the contiguous states are specifically pertinent, especially when attempting to develop a Unified Command Plan that is now focused on also accomplishing the task of Homeland Security.

A regional UCP orientation is designed to allow a commander to evaluate regional issues, tensions and possible conflicts and plan accordingly. Regional assignments also allow for the unified commander to coordinate all aspects of U.S. military force within the AOR and develop military and political relationships with countries in the region as well as other U.S. governmental agencies and representatives. Regional commanders are expected to gain expertise and the ‘big picture’ of their AOR, effectively coordinating with all aspects of national power when each is most effective. Functional commands are designated for missions that are vital to military strategy and are based on objectives that do not structurally fall within a specific region. A functionally based UCP could be difficult when conflict arises because multiple functions must be executed collectively and in coordination to accomplish the mission, the question is identifying which function is in command and which functions are subordinate. A purely functional orientation contradicts the concept of unity of command, as functions by their definition are unique and separate by nature. Under paragraph 2(C) above Congress charged CJCS to assess the possibility of assessing the

feasibility of a purely functional UCP orientation with an example that is a hybrid of both objective and functional based orientations. It is extremely difficult to divide the militaries forces specifically along functional lines for the purpose of command and then execute collectively under a UCP that is based on unity of effort across functional capabilities, the concept smacks of a return to service parochialism. Functionally structured command orientations also beg the question of “who’s in charge here?” when a conflict arises somewhere in the world and US interests are affected. Advocates of ‘warfighting only CINCs’ contend that functional commands should be subordinated to regional CINCs as supporting elements. While regional ‘warfighting’ only CINCs may appear logical or intuitive such a structure detracts from the concentration of effort realized by a unified command providing vital military functions. I would argue that the Strategic Command is a global vice regional warfighting CINC, executing a mission that is enormously vital to national security interests and as such warrants the oversight and unity of effort that a unified commander provides from force training, weapon systems development, mission execution, leadership interaction and coordination, and most important of all to plan for war.

Subordinating the nations nuclear strategic forces and mission to a unified commander that has a region of the world to concentrate on would detract from the strategic forces overall efficiency and effectiveness, especially since nuclear forces are intended for the defense of the United States from a nuclear attack. Looking forward the same argument could probably be said for SPACECOM, especially when including computer infrastructure information defense and warfare. STRATCOM and SPACECOM are distinctive in that their responsibilities, when executed, are not based on the support of external forces and as such allows for effective unity of command within the organization making them uniquely suited
as unified commands. However, the argument could be made that their roles and missions are similar enough to integrate them into one unified command vice the current two.

Assessing homeland security from a comprehensive view with respect to current and future missions, STRATCOM and SPACECOM (NORAD included) will inevitably become more important in accomplishing the overall objective to defend America from all enemies through all possible mediums.

In 1990, then General Colin Powell advocated a dramatic realignment of the UCP structure recommending that the existing ten Unified Commands be replaced by six (Strategic, Contingency, Transportation, Americas, Atlantic and Pacific)\(^\text{15}\). In hindsight Gen. Powell’s recommendation proved insightful, as an Americas CINC would have responsibility for homeland security as well as regional responsibility, which would allow for security coordination with neighboring countries. The remainder of the globe would fall under the responsibility of two regional CINCs. The vitally important strategic mission would have a unified commander, as would the functional transportation command. A contingency commander would fulfill the missions of SOCOM with one unified commander providing special operations and joint forces globally. With STRATCOM and SPACECOM providing global functions uniquely suited to homeland basing with missions that cross a broad technical range that are interrelated they could be more easily fused under one unified commander.

An objective based structure (first theater command, second theater command, logistics command, special contingencies command, strategic command) would limit the regional expertise and coordinated theater specific planning that regional commander’s accomplish.

While there are many good arguments intuitively and intellectually for changing the UCP
based upon a universal construct of criteria based upon objectives which are oriented functionally or regionally, I would argue that there are too many benefits from keeping a hybrid UCP orientation based on regions and major vital functions or objectives versus a purely regional or functional structure.

Beyond the regional boundaries and structural issue, current UCP concerns appear to lie in the expanding roles of JFCOM as highlighted in a report for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century:

> The emerging role of United States Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force Trainer, Integrator, and Provider is seen by many as a challenge to traditional Service Title 10 roles. There appears to be a growing parochialism among the Unified Commands and the potential for future bureaucratic conflict among the CINCs is likely for several reasons:
> JFCOM’s expanding role in Joint Experimentation and Joint requirements has caused some concern in the other unified commands as well as in the Services. There remains an undercurrent among the Unified Command staffs that JFCOM’s responsibilities, especially as the integrator, invade the command prerogatives of the functional and geographic CINCs, who believe it is their responsibility to conduct training within their own commands.  

**Government Agencies and Homeland Security**

“It is a sad, but very real fact, that no amount of organizational surgery could have forced agencies to focus on the terrorist threats as much as the actions of nineteen individuals did on September 11.”

Whatever form or structure that the UCP takes, one fact is absolute; the military commanders that assume roles and responsibilities for homeland security will have to coordinate with a myriad of other agencies that are currently in a state of flux themselves. Due to the relevance

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of interagency coordination and the role that the military will perform in homeland security, organizational structures cannot be developed without evaluating the overall system that they will be incorporated into. Of utmost importance is the military commander’s ability to organize the command to effectively operate in the interagency environment. Unlike traditional regional CINCs the military command responsible for homeland security will have to coordinate with no less than 70 organizations as depicted in figure 3.

By executive order the President directed the newly established Homeland Security Council and Office of Homeland Security to “ensure the adequacy of the national strategy for detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States”.

The Office of Homeland Security is also directed to ensure preparedness for terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. Preparedness is to be facilitated by the Office of Homeland Security through training and domestic exercises and simulations coordinated with all levels of local, state, and national entities. The Office of Homeland Security is also charged with terrorist prevention through coordinating security improvements to United States borders, territorial waters and airspace.

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19 Ibid
Fig. 3
Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the DODs executive agent for homeland security to ensure coordinated efforts with the Office of Homeland Security and other agencies with related responsibilities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is generally the lead agency for crisis management while Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is normally the lead agency for consequence management. Joint Forces Command has a 90-member Homeland Security Directorate to integrate civil support and homeland defense support efforts and Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) to coordinate and provide military support to lead agencies in consequence management following a weapon of mass destruction incident. The DOD is attempting to consolidate into a single organization responsibility for homeland security and the myriad of issues, functions and responsibilities that permeate the Department of Defense. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century strongly recommended consolidation of a number of federal agencies, including particularly the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the three border-control agencies (US Coast Guard, Border Patrol, immigration) as the core of a new National Homeland Security Agency.

**Future of the Unified Command Plan and Homeland Security**

Since terrorism is not confined to a state, nation or culture it is impossible, by historical principals, to defeat. Due to the character of terrorism and its asymmetric nature a perfect defense is also impossible. Identifying and defining the capabilities and threats posed by terrorism is extremely difficult in traditional military terms, which relates directly to the difficulty in developing an effective operational plan to counter its threats, capabilities, and the possible consequences. The most probable national strategic objective for terrorism could be stated as; do not allow terrorism to pose a credible threat to national interests. This
objective can only be realized through the management or attempted control of terrorism and its consequences and will only be achievable through active and efficient coordination between the military, government agencies, state and local authorities and international cooperation.

Aspects and restraints of the homeland security mission include its scope, legality and the role that the military will fulfill. In the foreseeable future all domestic homeland security operations assessed against the possible range of military operations (Fig 4) would fall under noncombat, Military Operations Other Than War.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Military Operations & General US Goals & Representative Examples \\
\hline
War & Fight & Large Scale Combat Operations, Attack / Defend / Blockade \\
\hline
OOMBAT & Deter War & Peace Enforcement, Counterterrorism \\
\hline
NOCOM & Resolve Conflict & Show of Force/Raid/Strike, Peacekeeping/NEO \\
\hline
NOCOM & Other Than War & Nation Assistance, Counterinsurgency \\
\hline
NOCOM & Military Operations & Promote Peace & Support, US Civil Authorities \\
\hline
COMBAT & Non & Freedom of Navigation, Counterdrug \\
\hline
COMBAT & Non & Humanitarian Assistance \\
\hline
COMBAT & Non & Protection of Shipping, US Civil Support \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Fig. 4 - Joint Pub 3-07, p. I-2

\textsuperscript{20} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995).
Legally, active armed forces are not allowed to enforce domestic law as stated in Title 18:

“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned”. While the active forces are severely limited in their ability to execute domestic operations, the National Guard is not. The Guard’s heritage is based on homeland defense and their ties to the state thereby making their role in homeland security much greater than the active armed forces. Initial response and active security enforcement is most readily accomplished by the first responder’s, or local law enforcement, followed by state agencies and/or the FBI for crisis management and FEMA for consequence management. While active military forces are excluded from enforcement activities, consequence and certain crisis management functions are permitted. Those functions that the military is uniquely qualified to provide and that are authorized by law can be executed when requested by a lead agency. Specifically, JFCOM-CS (Joint Forces Command – Civil Support) has Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response teams that support agency requests for consequence management. Historically the military’s active mission relative to terrorism has been in the role of counterterrorism by engaging terrorist organizations on foreign soil. Active military operations for homeland security will only support domestic tasks or missions when called upon by another agency for support. Regardless of their role in domestic operations the military will always be a supporting effort to another agency as lead.

21 U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 67, Section 1385. “Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus.”
One of the most pressing issues for homeland security is “Clarifying the roles and missions for use of the military for providing critical and appropriate emergency response and law enforcement related support to civilian authorities.”  

While most CINC's have some interagency coordination within their respective AORs, a CINC given geographic responsibility for the United States will be forced to dedicate a major effort to this task and the role will be in a supporting function, not as lead or through parallel efforts. Designating a Homeland Security CINC would facilitate unity of command and clear responsibility for homeland security. Under unity of command “all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose”. Unity of effort “requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure”. A Homeland Security CINC would be a supporting command to other agencies, complicating the normal supporting/supported command relationship. Any CINC supporting the Homeland Security CINC would be supporting a CINC who in turn would be supporting a lead agency by request.

Any changes in the UCP should be accomplished systematically based on criteria universally essential to any proposed organizational plan as suggested by Charles Robb: Start by “developing essential criteria for unified commands, then identifying what type of structure best satisfies them. Such a structure should, at a minimum: effectively execute national military strategy, maintain a logical and unambiguous chain of command, minimize duplication (except to enhance wartime survivability and endurance), balance responsibilities

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evenly across commands, provide clear objectives and a manageable span of control for each command, prove cost-effective, flexible, and adaptable." While a total redesign of the Unified Command Plan may not be warranted Robb identified a mechanism that is adequate for evaluating recommendations and alternatives.

Given the assumed strategic objectives for homeland security, legal restraints and interagency issues I recommend that a regional unified commander, an Americas Command, be given geographic regional responsibility for the contiguous states and territorial waters, Canada, and Mexico with the specific mission of facilitating the military’s role in homeland security. An assessment should also be made on the ramifications of including Central and South America in the Americas Command. Difficulty lies in defining a cultural or natural boundary between Mexico and Central America, the Caribbean and Puerto Rico, Haiti, Dominican Republic and South America. Due to this region’s proximately to the southern states and increasing trade initiatives these countries will become ever more important for security reasons. If there is going to be unity of command and effort for homeland security within the military and across agencies then a difficult assessment of the costs and benefits of including this region under the command of an America CINC should be closely assessed.

Currently SOUTHCOM has regional responsibility for these areas and has developed interagency relationships and coordination for the region. Duplication of these efforts would be inefficient and impractical. A CINC of the Americas would require the Americas Unified Commander to develop rapport with not only Canada and Mexico militarily and politically but also help facilitate unity across a range of border and tri-nation security issues through interagency working group inputs.

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Three readily identifiable UCP options exist to assign military responsibility for Homeland Security; (1) assign a new regional unified command responsibilities for the geographic region of North America, (2) assign a new functional CINC with responsibility for Homeland Security objectives and mission capabilities for interagency support without assigning the contiguous states as a regional responsibility, and finally my recommendation would be to (3) realign JFCOM’s AOR to include the contiguous states and specifically assign the homeland security mission.

The recommendation would be to rename JFCOM the America Command (or any other name) and assign JFCOM the geographic assignment of the lower 48 states. This action would require restructuring many of JFCOM’s current missions and responsibilities to other unified commands. There are some drawbacks but many advantages to this approach. First, JFCOM is strategically located close to Washington DC and is already performing the majority of the military’s homeland security missions with a Homeland Security Directorate and Joint Task Force-Civil Support. Second, JFCOM would be operationally ready in the shortest amount of time. JFCOM would not require the resources and duplication that a new command would entail. I advocate that reorganization of the current UCP boundaries and the roles and functions of JFCOM could greatly reduce redundancy, clearly delineate unity of command and responsibilities for homeland security, and facilitate effective interagency organization. The Hart-Rudman commission identified that “a span of control problem looms. JFCOM’s portfolio is becoming too diverse, over-populated, and lacking in focus”. 25 JFCOM’s current responsibilities that could be restructured include NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), U.S. Forces Azores, and the Iceland Defense Force.

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Joint Forces training could be shifted to the services through the JCS while Joint force integration and the role as joint force provider could be facilitated through the America Command. JFCOM’s background in standardization, headquarters training, etc. would be strong supporting functions for homeland security interagency planning and programming and would ensure commonality of interagency crisis operations center C4I systems and military-interagency interoperability. Arguably, SPACECOM and NORAD could continue to execute functional homeland security missions that are unique to aerospace command and control without a duplication of effort with the America Command.

While the breadth of JFCOM responsibilities would still be large, the homeland security role could be managed through a subordinate unified CINC with a standing Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) coordinating interagency efforts. These actions would allow the America Command to initiate an organization that would have tasks and responsibilities which would parallel other agencies and facilitate interoperability. This recommended UCP change facilitates execution of the military’s mission in homeland security while designating a unified commander for unity of command and effort.

**CONCLUSION**

Concerns and fears have become reality and the axiom ‘not if – but when’ is no longer speculative. Over the past decade Americans have suspected and had increasingly shown concern for the safety and security of our citizenry against acts of terrorists. On September 11th suspicions became real and were seared into the American public conscious. These emotional circumstances have forced a renewed call for tangible actions against terrorism and in the defense of America and her citizens. Inevitably the military is looked upon to respond to this renewed call for protection and the expectation is for a rationale, articulate
and coordinated response. While the military is charged broadly “to deter and defeat threats of organized violence to our country”\textsuperscript{26} it’s infrastructure and organization has evolved primarily around a symmetrical threat, which terrorists are not.

While speculation is strong that events will provide the catalyst to assign geographic responsibility for contiguous states to a CINC, I would argue that restructuring current missions and Areas Of Responsibility among the current unified commands will allow the military to accomplish the regional, functional and strategic objectives of homeland security. Moreover, I would argue that the cost relative to the questionable effectiveness and benefits of directing to much of the military’s resources to the defense of terrorist actions could deter attention from threats that could seriously endanger our most vital national interest, our way of life.

“We must always be mindful that the primary mission of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened.”\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{27} Ibid
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