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COMBATting TERRORISM:
A GUIDE FOR U. S. NAVAL FORCES AFLOAT

by

Hubert Lee Broughton, II

December 1985

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Combatting Terrorism:
A Guide for U. S. Naval Forces Afloat

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., University of West Florida, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The United States Navy's forces afloat do not have a single source document that addresses anti-terrorism and counterterrorism. The increase in terrorism world-wide has stimulated the concern that vulnerable maritime vessels will become terrorist targets. U. S. Navy ships in a restricted maneuvering situation, at anchor in a harbor, or moored pierside may offer an attractive target to a terrorist group. To deal with this potential terrorist threat, personnel manning U. S. Navy ships must be educated in the fundamentals of terrorism; the ships' security program must be evaluated and modified accordingly; various watches, sentries, and teams must be trained in new anti- and counter-terrorist procedures; and contingency plans must be developed to deal with potential terrorist incidents. This study provides a guide for the development of effective anti-terrorist and counterterrorist programs for any ship type in the U. S. Navy.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The term terrorism is commonly used in today's vocabulary. However, an understanding of the term, its implications, and its complexities eludes most people. It seems that the American people are becoming more and more insensitive to terrorism from having been exposed to reports on terrorist activities on an almost daily basis. Also, because terrorist incidents seldom occur in the United States and, thus, few Americans are directly affected by such activities, there is little genuine concern or interest in terrorism in this country. Therefore, even though terrorism is a commonly used term in the United States, not very many people really understand all that it represents.

The early literature on terrorism appears to be limited to mere accounts of various terrorist incidents. The later literature, however, attempts to understand the particulars surrounding such acts. Countless articles and books on the psychological, philosophical, and sociological aspects of terrorism have been published, resulting in ongoing debates on the subject. Even so, it has only been recently that the students of terrorism have begun to utilize this wealth of information in an effort to formulate an active strategy aimed at deterring terrorist attacks.

Governments and industries have launched programs to facilitate and improve anti-terrorist and counterterrorist techniques. In a similar manner, the United States Navy's forces afloat must also seek measures to deter terrorism. Countless and varied accounts of violent terrorist acts have shown that nothing and no one is immune.

The increase in terrorism world-wide has stimulated the concern that maritime vessels may become the targets of terrorist attacks. The marine environment, by its natural design, exposes ships to many vulnerable situations that are very conducive to terrorist attacks. Some examples of these situations are: when a ship is in a restricted maneuvering situation such as entering a harbor, transiting straits, narrow channels, or canals; when a ship is at anchor; or when a ship is moored pierside or in a nest. The sinking of a ship resulting in the blocking of a harbor entrance would have high political value for the terrorist. The vulnerability of many ships in such situations can be diminished or avoided by an alert, knowledgeable, and offensive (as opposed to reactionary) security force. An overt protective program may, in and of itself, act as a deterrent against the occurrence of a terrorist act.

Simply stated, the problem is that there currently is no consolidated guide regarding anti-terrorism and counterterrorist planning for the United States Navy's forces afloat. The entire chain of command, from theater commanders to

battle group commanders, promulgate statements and policies in a variety of operation orders that address terrorism. Likewise, the Department of Defense and all the services have issued various instructions for the protection of personnel abroad and the security of installations. But there is no single tool available that addresses education, training, security, intelligence, or reporting procedures for terrorists incidents. Therefore, a guide incorporating the necessary information on terrorism with suggestions as to how to deter and combat it must be developed for the safety of personnel and the protection of property aboard all U. S. Navy ships.

The intent of this guide is twofold. First, the fundamentals of terrorism must be formulated and presented to U. S. Naval personnel through a systematic education program. Secondly, once the fundamentals of terrorism are fully understood, security programs on U. S. Navy vessels must be analyzed and improved accordingly to harden them against terrorist action. Both elements of such an anti-terrorist effort must be universally implemented by U. S. naval forces afloat in such a way that the the development of counterterrorist techniques tailored to each ship type will naturally follow.

The current physical security program for U. S. naval forces afloat will provide the principal guidelines on how to combat threats to a ship. What will enhance this program

is the training and mental conditioning required to recognize and deal with terrorism as a new menace employing unconventional techniques. Efforts must be made to maintain a high degree of alertness which will strengthen the physical security program and deter terrorist attacks.

In keeping with these concepts, this study will first take advantage of the available knowledge on terrorism and present the fundamental structure of revolutionary movements, which represents the core of an educational program for personnel assigned to forces afloat. Then, some suggested areas for improvement of shipboard physical security will be addressed to stimulate a command's analysis of its own internal security. Hopefully, the discussion will encourage the analysis of port security plans for ships and the contingency plan apparatus both on board and in the chain of command. The discussion should also stimulate an investigation into the agreements or treaties with host countries in the fleet of operations and a close examination of the limitations provided by the chain of command in the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

As an example, a cursory glance at the following routine shipboard evolution may provide one instance that exposes some inherent weaknesses in the current security mindset:

United States Navy ships have been pulling into a certain Italian port for years and any casual observer may easily notice the routine times of the changing of the watch, not just the quarterdeck watch, but all the watches (the armed rover, some interior watches that report to the

Officer of the Deck, and the topside security). At 0345 (the standard time to turn over the watch) on a misty morning, tired men are going off watch, not fully alert men are coming on watch, and most of these personnel are gathered on the quarterdeck conducting a turnover. This may be a very pregnable opportunity in the eyes of a casual observer, despite the security program.

Again, the objective of this guide is not to entertain the idea that the Navy's ships have inadequate security plans, but rather to improve the existing program by stimulating and encouraging individual commands to exercise their prerogative and flexibility. Efforts to tap the ingenuity of the crew and to focus enthusiasm on personnel awareness and target hardening will deter terrorist acts against U. S. naval units and ships' companies and will lend more credibility to anti-terrorist measures.

II. FUNDAMENTALS OF TERRORISM

Finding the solution to a problem is much easier when the problem is approached with a prior knowledge of its particular structure. Likewise, the military planner should have a thorough understanding of the threat he is facing before deciding what tactics should be used to combat it. This same approach is also very useful in the formulation of a solution to the problem of protecting ships against potential terrorist incidents. As suggested in the Introduction to this paper, a systematic program must be established to acquaint ships' personnel with the basics of terrorism so that they may become more familiar with the threat.

A wide spectrum of professionals from the academic and medical worlds have explored and investigated terrorism in great detail. However, only recently has a concerted effort been made by governments and industries to apply this information in a practical way for the purpose of combating terrorism.

A fundamental terrorist strategy is the exploitation of the element of surprise. The terrorist decides when and where an attack will occur. The use of surprise, together with imagination and concentrated effort, have thus far made it possible for most terrorists to evade the efforts made to

neutralize or eliminate them. The unpredictability and ingenuity employed by terrorists has made it imperative for commands that are developing effective anti- and counter-terrorist measures to view terrorism through the eyes of the terrorist.

The foundation for the discussion of the fundamentals of terrorism will be laid by using the old familiar strategy of pursuing the what, who, how, why, where, and when of the issue.

A. THE DEFINITION (WHAT)

The first step in analyzing the problem is to attempt to define contemporary terrorism: what is it? There is no widely accepted or precise definition and, as has been alluded to earlier, there is a divergence of opinion and continual debate concerning exactly what terrorism entails. The following probe for a suitable concept of terrorism will demonstrate some of this controversy.

The establishment of a useful definition of terrorism is greatly helped by using a chronological approach. A 1939 study [Ref. 1: pp. 383-396] found that the word "terrorism" is derived from the Latin "terror" which originally meant physical trembling. Later "terror" came to include the emotional state of fear. Thus "terrorism" literally means "system of terror." That same study concluded that "terrorism is a method of action by which an agent tends to

produce terror in order to impose his domination." [Ref. 2: p. 383]

The 1948 edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines terrorism "as a term used to describe the method or the theory behind the method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence." [Ref. 3: p. 383]

The 1960's produced some variations on the last theme, describing terrorism as "the threat or the use of violence for political ends," [Ref. 4: p. 384] "a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence," [Ref. 5: p. 384] and describing a siege of terror as "the attempt to destroy an authority system by creating extreme fear through systematic violence." [Ref. 6: p. 384]

The orderly analysis of these and many other definitions brings to light certain consistent properties of terrorism:

- "(1) Terrorism is part of a revolutionary [political] strategy--a method used by insurgents to seize political power from an existing government.
- "(2) Terrorism is manifested in acts of socially and politically unacceptable violence.
- "(3) There is a consistent pattern of symbolic or representative selection of the victims or objects of the act of terrorism.
- "(4) The revolutionary movement deliberately intends those actions to create a psychological effect on specific groups and thereby to change their political behavior and attitudes." [Ref. 1: p. 385]

In summary, the common denominator of terrorism is violence for which there are some identifiable characteristics:

- "(1) Use of illegal violence in a systematic campaign.
- "(2) Symbolic representation in target selection.
- "(3) Acts conducted for maximum publicity value.
- "(4) Nonrecognition of neutrals or noncombatants.
- "(5) Often directed at civilians.
- "(6) Waged outside normal rules of conflict.
- "(7) Usually waged by non-government groups.
- "(8) Fear used as a persuasive weapon.
- "(9) Committed for political goals." [Ref. 7: pp. 3-4]

In the context of a U. S. Naval ship being a terrorist target, most of the above characteristics are cause for concern.

The U. S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as ". . . the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for ideological purposes."

[Ref. 8: p. 12]

1. Terrorism: A New Dimension of Warfare?

The search for a niche for terrorism within the spectrum of conflict is the subject of wide debate today. The character that contemporary international terrorism has developed in recent years suggests that it may belong at the low end of the spectrum of non-nuclear armed conflict. For the purposes of this discussion, non-nuclear armed conflict consists of conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.¹

¹Concepts were borrowed from Brian Michael Jenkins' "New Modes of Conflict" (Rand Corporation, June 1983). See this study for detailed development of the concept of terrorism as a mode of conflict.

The present discord in Lebanon serves as a good example of the coexistence of the three elements of armed conflict. Guerrillas and terrorists as well as participants from regular armies and private militias are engaged in Lebanon's civil war. The terrorists may be sponsored by states, political organizations, religious factions, or other terrorist groups. Conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism are interrelated and can be employed in varying degrees with varying combinations. The options include employing all three elements concurrently, separately, or interchangeably.

Of the three elements of armed conflict, terrorism has become more prevalent in the eighties due, primarily, to the fact that terrorists are militarily weak and, secondarily, to the prohibitive cost of conventional warfare. Many countries lacking military strength may also engage in some form of terrorism because they are unwilling, as well as unable, to challenge a militarily superior nation, such as the United States, in open armed conflict. In addition to the mere expense of modern weaponry, the sophistication of today's weapons requires costly personnel training and the impact of public opinion on armaments also contributes to the high cost in many instances. Because of its relative inexpensiveness, many nation-states resort to terrorism as a cheap means of waging war. Thus, modern terrorism, as an

instrument of conflict, has emerged as an effective alternative to conventional warfare.

While Lebanon serves as an example of the use of terrorism as well as conventional and guerrilla warfare in an armed conflict within a country, it is important to note that terrorism also spills over the boundaries of nations. It is not confined to national frontiers.² According to Brian Jenkins "terrorist activity cannot be isolated from other modes of armed conflict among nations or within other nations, but can be seen as another dimension of warfare." [Ref. 10: p. 51] In counterpoint, even though terrorism may be considered another dimension of warfare, it has been effectively handled by police and criminal justice systems in many countries, West Germany, for example.

In view of the above conclusion that terrorism is "another dimension of warfare," it becomes necessary for U. S. forces afloat to devise a new set of military requirements. A naval ship represents an investment made by the United States designed for military action at one end of the conflict spectrum, conventional warfare. The investment manifests itself in expensive, sophisticated technology and

²Taking into account the character of the war in Lebanon, in which state-sponsored terrorism coexists with conventional and guerrilla warfare, the Long Commission (which investigated the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut) concluded that the Department of Defense's definition of terrorism was inadequate and "should be expanded to include states." [Ref. 9: p. 123]

highly trained personnel geared to missions of varying dimensions of modern warfare, such as anti-air (AAW) or anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The challenge to the commanding officer of a U. S. ship is to mold these assets, both personnel and equipment, to conform with, and thus be more effective against, the potential threat at the other end of the conflict spectrum, modern contemporary terrorism.

Whether deployed in a third world conflict or making a port call in a Western European country, the commanding officer and crew of a naval unit must mentally and physically adapt to the new breadth of the spectrum of conflict. In this regard, forces afloat must develop and maintain the capability to deal with terrorism as well as conventional and guerrilla warfare.

2. Categories of Terrorism

Terrorism is divided into categories based on the location and the perpetrators of the act. These categories are international, transnational, domestic, and state terrorism. "International terrorism is an action initiated by an individual or group controlled by a nation-state that occurs outside that state. Transnational terrorism is an action in the international arena initiated by an individual or group that is not controlled by a nation-state. Domestic terrorism is an action initiated by an individual or group of nationals within its own nation-state. Finally, state

terrorism consists of actions conducted by a nation-state within its own borders." [Ref. 11: p. 2]

3. The Legal Aspects

Many members of the world community have for some time recognized the lack of a legal framework for dealing with international terrorists. In 1937, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism convened to address terrorism of an international character. "The aims of the Convention were to create mandatory rules of municipal criminal law against terrorism and to make terrorism an extraditable crime." [Ref. 12: p. 264] Only one country ratified the Convention and it never came into force.

The 1937 Convention and other attempts to codify terrorism have encountered two major obstacles: "first, the dubious states of wars of national liberation and secondly, the highly treasured right of states to grant asylum to political offenders." [Ref. 13: p. 96] Both of these items are enmeshed in the lack of consensus regarding an acceptable definition of terrorism, which was discussed earlier.

Although there has been no success in obtaining a universal agreement concerning the legal controls of international terrorism, many nations have adopted a policy which deals with particular types of terrorist incidents. Bilateral and multilateral agreements have been made to prevent specific kinds of terrorist acts without addressing a definition of terrorism. The Hague convention against hijacking

and the Montreal convention against aircraft sabotage are the most notable and widely accepted of such agreements. Conventions of this nature deal with specific terrorist tactics that endanger human rights and the interests of the international community as a whole and require "signatory states to either prosecute or extradite offenders found in their territory." [Ref. 14: p. 93] While these efforts are not universal in nature, they do provide a starting point for further legal steps.

Whereas international terrorism does not yet fall under any world-wide legal authority, there is a legal precedent for war. The laws of war are based on the theory that man can come together and work together in a rational manner. War is generally viewed as an armed conflict between regular forces attached to the apparatus of states. The laws of war go to great lengths to identify the forces or combatants, limit the scope of violence, and protect noncombatants. During a war violence is permissible and the killing of the enemy is referred to as excusable homicide. The laws of war seek to measure the appropriateness and proportionality of violence in an effort to reduce it. The classical view of war involves conventional forces geared to a certain concept of conflict among rational men, as sketched above, and also interprets an act of violence as an act of war. Thus, even though they are acts of violence, terrorist acts are not clearly covered by the laws of war

because they do not fit the classical concept of war in that they are not considered to be rational or conventional by governments.

How do the ideas pertaining to the legal aspects of war and international terrorism relate to a naval ship? Without delving into the historical development of the application of international law to a nation's armed vessels, the following simply sketches the accepted conclusions. Sovereignty is associated with naval vessels. A sovereign's public instrumentalities (naval vessels) are immune to foreign control without the sovereign's consent [Ref. 15: p. 73].

The point to be made here is that the nature of the international environment has changed and the concept of war is in a stage of metamorphosis. A fresh look at armed conflict and its participants is in order with respect to the laws of war. In this light, terrorism has entered the gray area between an unlawful criminal act and an unlawful act of war [Ref. 16: p. 42]. International forces are dealing with the matter but results are far over the horizon. The first hurdle to overcome is a definition agreed on by all parties which appropriately incorporates all of the categories of terrorism discussed earlier. In the interim, support is lent to the Long Commission Report that "the DOD definition needs to incorporate the reality that sovereign

states may use terrorism directly or through surrogates."

[Ref. 13: p. 43]

B. A TERRORIST PROFILE (WHO)

Thus far it has been observed that counterterrorist efforts are dealing with revolutionary groups that conduct acts of violence on symbolic targets to change political behavior and attitudes. This investigation will continue by analyzing the perpetrators.

1. Individuals

What is the makeup of a terrorist? One study conducted in the late seventies by Russell and Miller [Ref. 17: pp. 21-34] turned away from the trend of focusing on the mechanics of terrorism and researched eighteen terrorist groups in an attempt to examine the individuals involved in terrorist activities. Factors motivating the terrorists' actions were analyzed to see if there were any common characteristics. While their research only skimmed the surface of a new approach to studying terrorists, it is generally consistent with more recent investigations and provides some interesting insights into terrorism.

The following profile addresses the physical makeup and backgrounds of terrorist individuals. The cadre of membership consists primarily of single men between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-four. The leadership age bracket is around thirty-five to fifty. Women are used

predominantly in support roles such as intelligence collectors, couriers, nurses, and in the maintenance of safe houses. There have been exceptions to the last generalization but practical experience has proven that women are more effective in a supportive role. The terrorist individual tends to be well educated, having some university training or holding an undergraduate or graduate degree. This would account for the primary place of recruitment being the university campus. The leadership as well tends to be highly educated. The terrorist individual generally comes from an affluent middle to upper middle class family. His political philosophy tends to be one of anarchism, Marxism-Leninism, or nationalism. [Ref. 17: p. 32]

While some of the above trends vary slightly between geographical or cultural areas of the world, the generalizations for these ideological and social revolutionary groups seem to be accurate: single men between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-four coming from affluent middle to upper class families with some university education. "They are not usually the lunatic fringe of some radical movement, wantonly throwing bombs and committing random acts of violence against some ill defined establishment. Nor are they from the downtrodden, deprived, and uneducated socioeconomic classes." [Ref. 18: p. 193]

One study did note that there was a distinction between the members of nationalist separatist groups

compared to ideological and social revolutionary groups. The formers' membership, especially the rank and file, tended to be young people but from lower class backgrounds. [Ref. 19: p. 124] Nevertheless, the higher education of the leaders gave them the "confidence and skills to carry out their activities." [Ref. 20: p. 318]

2. Organization

There is a characteristic compartmentalized structure within the terrorist organization that is employed by the vast majority of currently active terrorist movements. "The optimum size [of a political movement] appears to be between 1500 and 2500 operatives, and the minimum for a viable terrorist cell is four or five members." [Ref. 21: p. 112] A cascading effect in all directions from the terrorist hierarchy to the cell through branches, regions, districts, or columns compliments the nature of terrorist strategy and tactics. Generally, only one member of each cell is assigned as leader and link man with the higher echelon or with other cells [Ref. 20: p. 312]. The singular link man enhances security by ensuring that few members are fully aware of the scope of the links or the identity of different cell members. Often the members within a cell are long time friends.

In order to preserve the integrity of the organization and maintain tight security, the terrorist group uses several cautious techniques to relay information within the

group. The use of dead drops is one such method. In a dead drop, a location such as an airport locker is selected for the purpose of exchanging a message without the sender or receiver meeting. Another method uses cut-outs, members of the organization whose only job is to deliver or collect messages. [Ref. 22: p. 134]

Such controlled organization and communications makes it easier to achieve secrecy and surprise and to evade capture and surveillance by security forces. The members of the cell itself are given the minimum necessary information about the organization to help prevent infiltration and to ensure that if captured, they are of little value during interrogation.

C. TECHNIQUE (HOW)

The "how" question is the most straightforward and deals with the terrorist act itself. There are countless examples of these acts--assassinations, hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings, to name a few. The significance is that the act is the heart of the matter. Terrorism is the technique employed in pursuit of the ultimate goal of the terrorist and must be challenged. In order to determine the possible threats to ships it is necessary to focus on the spectrum of terrorist actions.

There are several computer data bases of terrorist incidents compiled by various agencies of the government and

several private firms.³ These data bases consist of various the terrorist group, the act committed, the date, the location, the target, and the success status. The following is a common list of incidents monitored [Ref. 11: p. 7]:

| | |
|------------------|-----------------------|
| Assassination | Armed attack |
| Letter bombs | Hijacking |
| Incendiary bombs | Sniping |
| Explosive bombs | Barricade and hostage |
| Kidnapping | Break-in/theft |
| | Other (eg., shootout) |

The following discussion is provided to demonstrate various means of analyzing the data. The data being reviewed are an example from Shultz tabulated from 1968 to 1978. An analysis of the geographical distribution of incidents shows that western Europe suffers the greatest number of incidents and the Middle East/North Africa the third most. Their combined total is slightly more than fifty per cent.

Another interesting analysis is to ascertain if certain incidents are more prevalent in certain geographical areas. The breakdown shows that assassination, barricade-hostage incidents, and all three categories of bombings listed above are dominant in Western Europe. Armed attacks and hijackings are dominant in the Middle East/North Africa. In the incendiary and explosive bombs category Western Europe ranks first and the Middle East/North Africa third and together

³For example, Edward Mickolus' data base, International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE).

they account for more than fifty per cent of all the bombings world-wide. A review of the list of incidents by geographical area shows that either Western Europe or the Middle East/North Africa dominate all but one category, kidnapping (Latin America dominates this category).

"The specific types of people targeted are usually those at the top of industrial, governmental, or military/police hierarchies (judges, politicians, military/police personnel, corporate executives)." [Ref. 23: p. 12] In view of this, it would be useful to analyze terrorist targets, specifically U. S. citizens or property. U. S. military officials or property account for only about sixteen per cent of the attacks. Other categories of U. S. targets analyzed were U. S. diplomatic officials, other government officials, U. S. business executives, U. S. private citizens, and their respective properties.

Of all the types of attacks on U. S. citizens, incendiary and explosive bombings were the most prevalent, accounting for over seventy per cent of the incidents. Western Europe and the Middle East/North Africa were the predominant locations for these bombings. The manner in which the bombings are executed may consist of a car bomb, a truck-load of dynamite, a suitcase bomb, or a variety of other imaginative methods.

"What the above evidence suggests is that over the last decade the international system has experienced a

significant proliferation of terrorist incidents." [Ref. 11: p. 15] One study conducted in 1979 stated "that terrorists, with minor exceptions . . . have not been 'terribly' creative to date. The potential, yet untapped, for this operational creativity lies in modern technology." [Ref. 23: p. 13] The common technology of communications and transportation alone offer the terrorist increased intelligence gathering capability and mobilization.

1. Use of Weapons Technology

Examples of the use of modern technology coupled with terrorist ingenuity against maritime targets is provided below. Some of the actions recorded to date include hijackings, ships destroyed by mines and bombs, and attacks with bazookas. Further instances involve limpet mines attached by scuba divers, rockets fired from small speed boats, and an explosives-filled freighter armed with 122 mm rockets [Ref. 21: p. 4].

One journalist reported that Colonel Qadaffi of Libya had obtained some remotely controlled boats from Sweden [Ref. 25: p. 237]. These boats are capable of speeds up to thirty knots and of control from distances of twenty nautical miles. A unique threat to a ship's safety is definitely presented if one or more of these boats were to be configured with explosives and targeted against a ship in open water or in confined straits. A precedent for this technique has been successfully employed against the Spanish

navy. The Basques "used an explosives-filled, radio-controlled model boat to damage" [Ref. 24: p. 5] a destroyer while it was moored in Santander, Spain.

The example of the attack with bazookas occurred in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb when Palestinian terrorists attacked an oil tanker from a speed boat firing ten bazooka shells [Ref. 24: p. 9]. Details of the type of bazooka and the type of speed boat employed were not enumerated. However, it is assumed that the bazooka was an RPG-7.

The military-industrial complex worldwide is making advances in weaponry at an alarming rate. Because of this progress "large numbers of these new weapons will quickly become obsolete and disposed of through arms dealers and other avenues." [Ref. 22: p. 27] Man-portable weaponry, other than personal weapons such as rifles and pistols, has expanded the scope of the threat. "Of particular concern are precision-guided munitions (PGM's)." [Ref. 26: p. 12] The SA-7 and RPG-7 are two examples.

The SA-7 is a shoulder launched surface to air missile with a range of nearly two nautical miles and an infrared heat seeking guidance system [Ref. 27: p. 151]. It has been employed in several locations. One example involved terrorists positioned on a balcony near Rome's international airport with an SA-7 targeting an Israeli airliner [Ref. 28: p. 142].

The RPG-7 is a portable rocket/grenade launcher produced by the Soviets. It has a range of about 1000 yards and can pierce armor up to 12.6 inches in thickness [Ref. 27: p. 151]. Two examples serve to describe the potential use of this weapon by terrorists. The first involved an attack on an airliner at a Paris international airport [Ref. 17: p. 316]. The second involved an attack on a U. S. Army general in Germany while traveling in his automobile.

These types of weapons are abundant and many are shuttled into Europe through a pipeline from the Middle East [Ref. 29: p. 64]. Presumably, more sophisticated weapons already in the hands of some organizations in the Middle East could be supplied in the future. The arsenal available to these groups may even include mines. The 1984 mining of the Red Sea serves as a grim reminder.

From July to September 1984 the world's interest was captivated by a series of mining incidents in the Red Sea. A multinational mine countermeasures force responded to the crisis at the request of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and assisted them by sweeping portions of the Red Sea for mines to ensure the safe navigation of international maritime traffic. Nineteen merchant ships suffered varying degrees of damage from the mines. The mine that was recovered was found to be Soviet-made and, while there is no conclusive evidence as to whom the culprit was, the circumstances point to Libya's involvement [Ref. 30: pp. 95-116].

2. Modus Operandi

Training camps have been established in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Terrorist groups from Germany, Italy, Spain, and many other countries throughout the world have received training in these camps. Training is provided by Soviet, Cuban, and East German instructors as well as experienced members of such groups as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). [Ref. 31: p. 43] The training includes the handling of explosives, the use of infantry weapons, bridge demolition and minelaying, the arranging of ambushes, and information gathering [Ref. 29: p. 68].

An analysis of each group's activities shows that in most cases a particular faction prefers certain techniques over others. For example, the Red Brigade (RB) in Italy prefers kidnapping and sabotage while the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) involves itself primarily in hijackings. This suggests that an analysis of activities indigenous to the area of operations may enable the command to focus on certain aspects of security and target hardening prior to arriving in port. Sources of this type of information will be addressed later.

3. Execution

The type of operation to be mounted will dictate the amount of preparation required. The placement of a suitcase bomb in a train station may not require the detailed

planning necessary for a kidnapping. However, relative to the theme of this study, it is assumed that the provisions for an attack against a naval unit would entail some detailed preparation.

As with any military operation, the level of competency of the individual is a key factor in the operation's success. For this reason, terrorist groups and their sponsors place a lot of emphasis on the training of the individual. The training of terrorists generalized earlier will be elaborated on at this point. The personal account of the training of a Japanese Red Army member in Lebanon will be used as an example.

The training was described as that expected in any military organization. The initial phase consisted of a course of physical fitness. Further instruction, lasting eight weeks, included bomb construction, detonator handling, pistol and rifle training, and grenade usage. [Ref. 27: p. 66]. Other courses such as how to use disguises were also provided. More sophisticated instruction, including the employment of anti-aircraft missiles, naval training, and flight instruction, is available at some Libyan camps [Ref. 31: p. 42]. Special training for particular operations is also available.

The terrorist operation from conception to execution resembles a military campaign. There is strong evidence of detailed planning in the early stages supported by extensive

intelligence gathering. A balance among objectives, skills, and available resources is sought. A search for the target's weak points is conducted. Finally, an assessment of the risk involved is calculated. Once a plan has been adopted, a dry run may be enacted to correct any flaws.

One element of contemporary terrorism that tends to complicate anti- and counter terrorist measures is the cooperation that exists among many different terrorist groups. Such cooperation is evident in the training discussed earlier as well as in the transfer of weapons. There is also a technology transfer among terrorists. One tactic employed by one group may show up employed by another group geographically removed. The techniques that have proven successful have been emulated by others. [Ref. 26: p. 6]

Cooperation can include joint operations such as the Carlos-led attack on the OPEC ministers in Vienna, which included Palestinian, West German, and Venezuelan operatives [Ref. 28: p. 145]. Another example of cooperation are attacks by proxy where one group carries out attacks for another group's cause [Ref. 10: p. 317]. Here it can be surmised that groups whose activities have never included U. S. military targets may initiate an attack by proxy or as a payment to a benefactor that provides support in the way of training and arms.

In summary, the effectiveness of a terrorist attack relies on the fundamental element of surprise. Terrorist

operations can be characterized as being relatively simple but well planned and orchestrated. Terrorist acts are distinguished by ingenuity and resourcefulness. The time and place of an attack are decided upon by the terrorists involved and a tremendous amount of effort is concentrated on making this tactic successful. Thus, a terrorist attack will usually be carefully planned, rehearsed to perfection, and executed flawlessly.

The above discussion is intended to give the commanding officer of a naval vessel an appreciation of the nature of terrorist attacks. He is encouraged to scrutinize his ship's security measures through the eyes of a terrorist. First, the commanding officer is urged to look at his ship's security measures from the inside and, then, to stand back and look at the security plan from the outside, being constantly alert for weak spots.

D. MOTIVATION (WHY)

The fourth area of analysis addresses the why question: what are the goals, motivations, and strategies of terrorism. According to the definition of terrorism accepted for the intent of this study, the motivation behind a terrorist act is considered to be primarily oriented towards political goals as part of a revolutionary strategy. In this regard, political terrorists can be divided into five categories.

The first category consists of a group of people within a country who consider themselves to be an ethnic minority and seek to establish a separate state. Such groups are commonly referred to as separatist movements. The second category of political terrorists, the nationalists, are similar to the separatists but enjoy a larger following and have more resources at their disposal. The third category is ideological and may be made up of either right or left wing factions. The fourth is the issue-oriented group that seeks changes in the existing government. A fifth category uses terrorism to a political end as a pretext for sociopathic behavior. This last group is very uncommon. [Ref. 11: p. 4; Ref. 20: p. 312; Ref. 23: p. 31]

The orientations enumerated above may also be looked upon as ultimate goals. In pursuing these goals, intermediate goals are established as stepping stones to the ultimate objective. One example of an intermediate goal is establishing recognition of the movement.

In pursuing the intermediate goals, subgoals are established that are of a tactical (short term) or strategic (long term) nature. Subgoals of a tactical character may be publicity, funding, prisoner exchange, or damage. A strategic subgoal may be undermining the will of the government which erodes over time due to the successful achievement of the terrorists' short term subgoals.

The methods (kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, etc.) used by terrorists to achieve tactical, or short-term, sub-goals have the greatest impact on the public. A classic example is the hostage and barricade incident at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. The Black September terrorist group took and held eleven Israeli athletes hostage in a dormitory of the Olympic Village. The terrorists demanded the release of 200 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel in exchange for the eleven athletes. Their demands were not met and a rescue attempt was made resulting in the massacre of the eleven Israeli athletes by the Black September terrorists. Even though one tactical subgoal, the release of the 200 Palestinian prisoners in Israel, was not realized, a second tactical subgoal, the focusing of public attention on the Palestinian cause, succeeded tremendously.

In pursuing an objective, a terrorist organization must decide what will best suit the aim--destruction or disruption. For example, if the goal is money, then kidnapping for ransom may be selected. If the goal is to obtain the release of prisoners, then a hijacking may be planned. If the goal is to get publicity, then a bombing, assassination, or attack on a ship may be chosen. Once the terrorist group has determined the nature of the goal and the method to be used to reach that goal, it then begins a search for an appropriate target. In the mind of a terrorist these

actions are a means to an end. The "calculated tactics are to rivet attention and create alarm." [Ref. 26: p. 5]

From the point of view of the target group, the fundamental purpose behind terrorist attacks may be generalized as fear. Terrorist activities create a psychological effect on the target group with possible intentions of changing their political behavior and attitudes. "Terrorism's value to revolutionary movements is not proportional to its expense, but to its psychological effectiveness." [Ref. 1: p. 387] The psychological condition has been termed extreme fear or anxiety and is created largely by the unpredictability of terrorist acts [Ref. 1: p. 389]. The fear and anxiety are generated by the fact "that terrorists may recognize no ethical or humanitarian limits to their use of violence: any means are permissible and everyone (including civilians, women, children, and neutrals) is expendable in the interests of 'revolution,' 'justice,' or 'liberation.'" [Ref. 21: p. 100]

The principles of operation in the strategic framework of modern terrorism may be said to have developed with the growth of modern revolution. Targets are hit with the intent of producing maximum psychological impact. To this end the element of surprise and a concentration of force are the fundamental advantages possessed by the weak, developing revolutionary movement. The effectiveness for the terrorist rests in the symbolism of the act and the publicity

received, both of which are enhanced by the element of surprise.

The strategy involves a method of fighting that will stalemate the opponent's superior forces and raise his expense to an unacceptable level. Therefore, methods of exploiting technology are devised, such as hijacking aircraft and taking advantage of the electronic news media.

Anti-terrorist efforts must focus on the techniques used in the execution of a terrorist operation. If the designer of a ship's security shield against a terrorist incident possesses a good understanding of the various techniques employed by terrorists, then the effectiveness of that shield will be greatly enhanced. Again, it must be emphasized that the designer of the anti-terrorist shield analyze the security scheme through the eyes of the terrorist.

E. THE REMAINING QUESTIONS (WHERE AND WHEN)

Studies have analyzed where and when terrorist incidents have occurred and have attempted to predict where and when they will happen next. For the most part, these attempts have been unsatisfactory because of the random nature of terrorist incidents as part of a strategy to induce general fear and uneasiness. All is not lost though. Studies have proven helpful by compiling valuable information regarding what types of events to guard against, what style particular groups employ, and what targets are attacked.

Security specialists have used this information to devise various methods for protection of establishments and personnel. Some corporations track terrorist activities and provide businesses with regional threat assessments. Efforts have been made in the psychological community to provide training in hostage incidents. People are taught how to behave as hostages if abducted and negotiators are trained to deal with the abductors.

The single most important ingredient for predicting terrorist incidents is information. This vital information is, however, extremely hard to get because of the cellular organization of terrorist groups which limits information flow within the group, the covert nature of the operations which are shrouded in secrecy, and the tactics employed which are usually executed by surprise. Thus extraordinary measures are being taken to expand the human intelligence capacity of today's countermeasure efforts.

Another way of neutralizing terrorist efforts is to closely monitor the activities of groups world-wide and maintain a finger on the pulse of the political climate in each country. This can provide a threat assessment for a particular area and lend support to a command's anti-terrorist posture. One such effort is being achieved by the Navy Anti-terrorist Alert Center (ATAC).

The ATAC has recently been organized within the Naval Investigative Service Headquarters to provide a fusion

center for worldwide "all sources" intelligence regarding terrorist activities. A threat analysis branch uses the information to provide threat assessments.

The "all sources" intelligence is collected from various sources including national and service intelligence agencies and foreign news searches. The volume of information being reviewed often exceeds 1600 messages in a twenty-four hour period. Watch teams are in communication with other agencies via computer link to compare analyses and evaluations of key information and sensitive data. The primary worldwide field network associated with ATAC is the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).

The results of the analysis and assessment are several products distributed by message: summaries, advisories, warning reports, supplements, and tailored reports. All products are available to the fleet as required. Table 1 shows the periodicity of promulgation of these products.*

TABLE 1 PERIODICITY OF ATAC PRODUCTS

| <u>PRODUCT</u> | <u>PROMULGATED</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|
| Summaries | Daily |
| Advisories | As required |
| Warning reports | As required |
| Supplements | As required |
| Tailored reports | On request |

*Information provided by ATAC, Washington, D. C.

How does one get an ATAC message? There are two methods dependent on the fleet of operation. For Mediterranean operations CINCUSNAVEUR will request ATAC support for a ship based on the ship's schedule. In WESTPAC units must request a threat assessment in the LOGREQ. In either case, ATAC support will be oriented from the grass roots level, that is, the closest NIS office will initiate the support as they are more familiar with the local conditions. Finally, tailored support can be requested for short notice schedule changes or major fleet exercises requiring threat assessments. Requests should be submitted to DIRNAVINSERV, Washington, D. C. or through the local NIS office.

The ATAC products will provide a threat assessment based on risk indicators from low to high in five increments: low, low/medium, medium, medium/high, and high as shown in Table 2.⁹ The question then raised is, what should a ship do for any one of the above indicators?

The choices available cover a wide spectrum from business as usual to getting underway. The ship's current conditions, whether at sea, at anchor, or alongside a pier, will also help determine the best strategy for dealing with the threat. Table 3 is a hierarchical spectrum of possible actions to be taken with each threat level, with the

⁹Information provided by ATAC, Washington, D. C.

TABLE 2 NAVY ANTI-TERRORIST ALERT CENTER
 TERRORISM THREAT LEVELS

| | |
|------------------|--|
| LOW | Terrorist group capability does not exist or exists without any known intent to target DON. No credible reporting of planned operations. Local security forces have any threat under control. |
| LOW-TO-MODERATE | Terrorist group capability to strike soft targets exists--none against hard targets. No recent anti-DON activity. Unsubstantiated reports of planned attacks in near future. Local security have general control of situation but group still capable. |
| MODERATE | Capability exists to strike soft and possibly hard targets. Stated intent to attack U. S./DON/NATO assets with some demonstrated capability in past. |
| MODERATE-TO-HIGH | Capability exists to hit soft and probably hard targets. stated intent to attack U. S./DON/NATO targets with recent successful OPS. History of anti-U. S. actions. Credible reporting of planned attacks in near future. Local security not able to prevent or detect planned attacks. |
| HIGH | Capability exists to hit any U. S./DON/NATO target in area. Stated and recently demonstrated threat to attack these targets exists. Reliable reporting indicates threat is imminent. No further warning expected. Local security not able to prevent or detect planned attacks. |

understanding that each command must establish its own doctrine and incorporate it into watch training.

Prior to making a port visit, a port security plan should be drawn up taking into consideration the threat assessment and other factors such as the berthing

assignment. The fleet commander may ask for such a plan by message prior to entering port.

One way to ascertain the current status of terrorist activities and draw up tailored port security plans is by developing an anti-terrorist billet. A suggestion toward this end would be to couple the duties of an "anti-terrorist officer" with those of the intelligence officer on board. In this capacity the officer can aid in port security planning and work with the security officer to ensure that the proper precautions are taken in each port commensurate with the type of threat.

TABLE 3 THREAT LEVEL--RESPONSE

| POSSIBLE ACTION | THREAT LEVEL |
|--|--------------|
| Business as usual | LOW |
| Notify chain of command | LOW/MEDIUM |
| Call NIS for update | MEDIUM |
| No uniforms ashore | |
| Upgrade material conditions | |
| No large parties ashore | |
| All visitors removed | |
| Cancel visit ship | |
| Set steaming watch | MEDIUM/HIGH |
| Cars removed from pier | |
| Pier sentry doubled | |
| Topside security reinforced | |
| Request bomb sniffing dogs to check deliveries | |
| Sand-filled dump trucks placed on pier | |
| Armed watches load weapons | HIGH |
| Small boats recovered | |
| Ships engines made ready | |
| Hotel services broken | |
| Secure liberty | |
| Execute recall | |
| Get underway | |

Post visit reports could prove beneficial to the ATAC if information regarding questionable activities or people has been observed. The crew's training in terrorist profiles and activities may produce useful intelligence if a feedback program is used and information is solicited on a daily basis or immediately following a port visit. A review of post visit reports prior to transmission with this in mind may add valuable information to the ATAC data base. If appropriate, add DIRNAVINSERV as an information addressee.

Another valuable source of information at the command's finger tips is the port directory classified supplement issued by the fleet intelligence centers. This publication, updated regularly, provides descriptions of groups, activities, and a general assessment of capabilities. It will prove to be a beneficial tool for crew briefings prior to entering port.

At this point, the fundamentals of design and execution of terrorist operations have been presented. Such information should provide personnel with the first step to tailoring a security program against terrorist attacks. The core of the anti-terrorist plan is understanding the threat. The nucleus of the command's security efforts is its personnel. "No hardware, however expensive, can rival the eyes, ears, hands, and brains of man." [Ref. 32: p. 144] To this end the challenge is to maintain a high degree of alertness and anticipation among the personnel.

III. SECURITY SYSTEMS AND SUGGESTIONS

The increase in terrorism world-wide has led some authorities on the subject to speculate that terrorists may attack maritime targets. This includes off-shore oil rigs, merchant vessels, luxury liners, and naval units.

The research conducted on this thesis has not uncovered any terrorist attacks on U. S. naval vessels. The reason for this is perhaps due to the deterrence exemplified by a warship's formidable presence. With the increase in technology available to the terrorist and the imagination demonstrated by many terrorist incidents, however, it would definitely be advantageous for the U. S. Navy to hone the skills of its security forces and alert its crews to the potential terrorist threat. Other navies have not had the same good fortune as the U. S. and have experienced terrorist attacks for common terrorist reasons: to make a point, gain publicity, symbolically achieve a victory, etc. Terrorist attacks against U. S. personnel and properties are increasing and this type of embarrassing incident successfully carried out against a U. S. Navy ship would certainly be a victory for a terrorist group.

What follows are some suggestions for tailoring the Navy's security practices already in force in order to decrease the vulnerability of a naval ship. The suggestions

are not all-encompassing but are intended to point out some areas that could use improvement. Hopefully these ideas will help to generate a thorough analysis of in-house procedures for each ship.

The suggestions offered are based on a Spruance class destroyer hull design and crew manning.* For other ship types, the spirit of the suggestion should be considered and the techniques applied as appropriate. For all ship types the desire is to encourage analysis of current security procedures and to tap the ingenuity inherent in all commands.

The intent, restated, is not to suggest that the U. S. Navy does not have a good security system for forces afloat or that it needs a new one, but rather to review current security design, evaluate vulnerable points in the defensive shield, and to suggest ways of improving it. One starting point is with a review of current security guidance in force.

In the armed forces, it is traditional for the percolation and expansion of guidance to be disseminated by means of instructions. In keeping with this tradition, the Department of Defense at the top echelon of the hierarchy

*A Spruance class destroyer is a 563 foot, 7300 ton ship with a manning of approximately 300 crew and officers. The same basic hull design and propulsion configuration is used in the Kidd class guided missile destroyer and the Ticonderoga Aegis cruiser.

has provided broad guidance regarding security. As this guidance cascades down the pyramid of the chain of command, the security concepts involved become more detailed and expansive.

The Department of Defense has provided policy for the security of property and given certain military commanders authority to promulgate regulations based on the Internal Security Act of 1950. This directive specifically cites the commanding officers of all naval ships as having authority to prepare, post, and enforce security orders and regulations to safeguard property from loss, destruction, or sabotage [Ref. 33: p. 1]. The Secretary of the Navy has endorsed this policy and issued the applicable instructions for action by commanding officers [Ref. 34].

The specifics of security are contained in the Standard Organization and Regulations Manual of the U. S. Navy (SORM) [Ref. 35]. These details are part of every naval unit's routine security program. More specific instructions for nuclear capable ships are contained in the Naval Nuclear Weapons Security Manual [Ref. 36].

A. INPORT SECURITY

The universal application of inport security measures provides for a sounding and security patrol (tasked to monitor the water level in certain unmanned spaces), an anti-sneak/anti-swimmer attack watch, a quarterdeck watch, a

gangway watch (when required), security patrols, a cold iron watch (tasked to monitor the status of main machinery spaces when the engineering plant is secured), pier security, fore-castle and fantail sentries, and a signal watch. Additionally, instructions establish provisions for a self-defense force. The specific requirements for a nuclear capable ship are in addition to those mentioned above and addressed in a separate and more detailed instruction.

B. THE QUARTERDECK

In a historical sense, physical security starts at the quarterdeck. The Officer of the Deck (OOD) in port is charged with carrying out the routine of the ship and attending to the gangway(s). The OOD's watch monitors the movement of personnel across the brow and authorizes access to or permission to depart the ship. Likewise, the contents of all items carried aboard must be inspected. The OOD generally has a petty officer of the watch (armed) and a messenger as a minimum for assistance. He may also be assisted by a junior officer of the deck or others under instruction. The task of identifying all personnel and checking everything coming on board can prove to be an unmanageable task, especially when the quarterdeck is overwhelmed by a large crowd (some of which require escorts). This situation is aggravated by the limited size of most

quarterdecks and can lead to confusion, distract the OOD from his duties, and dull his alertness.

Suggestion: Set the gangway watch and conduct identification checks, issue appropriate access badges, organize escorts, and inspect items being carried aboard from the pier rather than on the quarterdeck. During times of heavy traffic, this gangway watch can be augmented by the messenger. Overall, this will reduce confusion and congestion on the quarterdeck, allow for another layer of security, and maintain alertness on the quarterdeck.

According to the SORM, the remaining patrol, watches, and sentries are charged with the following responsibilities in discharging their duties:

1. Maintaining continuous patrols.
2. Checking classified storage.
3. Being alert for evidence of sabotage, thievery, and fire hazards.
4. Checking security of weapons magazines.
5. Obtaining periodic soundings of designated tanks and spaces.
6. Periodically inspecting damage control closures.
7. Reporting to the OOD at prescribed intervals.

C. SOUNDING AND SECURITY PATROLS

Specifically, the sounding and security patrol (unarmed) fulfills two important jobs. First, the patrol, which is continuous, follows irregular routes throughout the ship to sound specific tanks and voids to ensure they are "dry." Secondly, the patrol is charged with being constantly alert for any irregularities effecting the physical security of

the ship. The patrol is usually confined to the interior of the ship and must report to the OOD hourly.

Suggestion: This job is usually considered a tedious task and is at the bottom of certain rate qualification processes. Consequently, it is many times given to an inexperienced, new individual while "more important" positions are filled by more senior personnel. In the process of ship and job indoctrination, the importance of the patrol must be emphasized with a genuine regard for understanding the impact the individual has over many peoples' lives and millions of dollars of equipment. The development of an acute sense for spotting irregularities, calmly reacting to them, and reporting them to the OOD in a timely fashion may, in part, be accomplished through the first part of this handbook--education.

D. ANTI-SNEAK/ANTI-SWIMMER ATTACK BILL

The anti-sneak/anti-swimmer attack watch is posted at the discretion of the commanding officer. The number of topside watches and positions are recommended by the operations and executive officers. The anti-sneak/anti-swimmer watch is charged with watching for swimmers and, if deemed necessary, discharging hand grenades in the water against swimmers. The watch can be supplemented by a picket boat crew and sonar can be manned (if the ship is so configured) and activated randomly. Both techniques have proven very

effective in discouraging swimmers from approaching the ship. Other measures call for turning over the screws and cycling the rudder as a deterrent against swimmers. All of these defenses could prove expedient given adequate intelligence to coordinate and execute them.

E. FORECASTLE AND FANTAIL WATCH/PIER SENTRY

One watch, required overseas, that would facilitate the detection of an attack by swimmers is the fore-castle and fantail watch. This watch, when required in the continental United States (CONUS), is normally posted from dusk to dawn but is continuous when in port overseas. The watch standers are armed with a rifle and thirty rounds and issued a police whistle and flashlight. The watch is posted on the fore-castle and the fantail and charged with preventing unauthorized persons from approaching or coming aboard. In the event unidentified personnel do approach, the appropriate challenge would be issued and assistance called for by using the whistle.

In addition to the fore-castle and fantail watch, a pier security patrol, similarly armed, is charged with patrolling the portion of the pier between the bow and stern of the ship. Besides preventing unauthorized access, the patrolman shall also prevent loitering on the pier near the ship.

Suggestion: A more effective position from which the forecastle and fantail watch could perform their duties against a threat from sea or from the pier is from the 04 level forward and aft. When moored pierside this would increase the height of eye for searching seaward and provide a better field of fire both to seaward and towards the pier. The inspection of the stem and stern of the ship would then be provided by the pier sentry since the view from the 04 level is obstructed.

Flexible modifications to the watch manning proposed above can be easily undertaken for other mooring configurations. For example:

1. If at anchor, the pier sentry should be reassigned to patrol the weatherdecks while the forecastle and fantail watch remain on the 04 level.
2. If in a Med moor (stern to the pier with the bow secured by anchors), an armed gangway watch can substitute for the pier sentry allowing the pier sentry to patrol the weatherdecks and the 04 level watches to remain topside.
3. If in a Med moor with two or more ships in a nest, the senior officer present should coordinate a combination of the patrols and sentries among the nested ships to provide the same coverage. For example, if three ships are moored in a nest, one pier sentry can cover all three. The outboard ships can provide the 04 level watches and the middle ship in the nest can provide the main deck patrol which inspects all anchor chains.

The 04 level also has other advantages. For example, the 04 level forward provides signal lights that can be used to illuminate the area. There is also room for the placement of a night observation device to improve investigating

capabilities. Both watches should be outfitted with portable radios so that they can communicate with the OOD and between themselves to verify or check potential targets. The roving patrol can check on each man every half hour while making his rounds and report the status to the OOD.

Suggestion: When "Med lights" or other lighting decorations are installed on the lifelines, they should be lowered to approximately one foot below the main deck to prevent blinding or ruining of night vision. This placement of the lights would also improve visibility on the surface of the water in the immediate vicinity of the ship. Another alternative that could be used with "Med lights" is to shield the lights from the ship. This alternative, however, may prove ineffective and be more trouble than it is worth.

F. FIRE FIGHTING TEAMS

In the event the ship is the focus of demonstrations which might escalate to riot proportions, fire fighting teams could be called out to help allay the violence. The firefighting teams could use water jets to discourage the mob's advancement. High pressure and cold water may halt the attackers or, at least, cause confusion among them and slow their advancement. In this capacity, hose teams from the fire fighting squads must be trained to report to certain locations topside to flake and charge hoses and to use them as a deterrent against poorly armed attackers. There

may be situations where the use of firehoses would be more proportional to the control of poorly armed attackers than more forceful means.

G. SECURITY PATROL/SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

The provisions for an armed, roving security patrol on non-nuclear capable ships should be in effect to augment the sounding and security patrol. Specifically, the patrolman is charged with concentrating on the security of classified stowage, restricted spaces, small arms, and ammunition stowage. During his random patrols he reports to the OOD at least every half hour. In the event of an alert, he is available to provide an armed escort for the command duty officer.

The self-defense force is available to be called away to augment the normal watch and other security personnel. The responsibility of the self-defense force is to provide a surge capability for reacting to emergency security situations on board ship and pierside. Its organization is based on the size of the ship's complement, using a ratio of one thirteen-man squad (squad leader plus three four-man teams) per two hundred crew members.

Suggestion: The self-defense force squads could benefit significantly from training at a Marine Corps or Army facility. Methods for advancing towards the threat, designating targets, and coordinating firing on target could be valuable

lessons. Likewise, the use of ammunitions relative to the circumstances can be learned.

H. NUCLEAR CAPABLE SHIPS' SECURITY

On nuclear capable ships, a security alert team (SAT), back-up alert force (BAF), and a reserve force are provided to augment the roving patrol for security violations [Ref. 36: pp. 1-8].

The roving patrol is assigned similar duties to those on non-nuclear capable ships and additionally must inspect magazines, launchers, and designated equipment while on patrol. He also reports to the OOD at least every half hour.

The SAT consists of a minimum of two security force personnel, in addition to those on watch at established security posts, capable of immediate response to any irregularity as a reinforcing element in a minimum of five minutes. They are assigned specific stations.

The BAF consists of a minimum of three security force members in addition to those on watch, those at established sentry posts, and the SAT. The BAF must be capable of responding in a minimum of ten minutes and are also assigned specific stations.

The reserve force consists of a minimum of ten members of the security force capable of responding in a minimum of

fifteen minutes to support other on-duty security force personnel.

A timely response to a surprise terrorist attack is critical. "Timely" in the terrorist scenario is defined in terms of seconds. The five minute response time allowed the SAT would probably be inadequate in a terrorist situation but is significant for reinforcing security personnel on watch. The first line of defense aboard a ship lies with the personnel on watch. Because of the very real possibility of an armed attack against a naval vessel, it is important to allow personnel on watch to carry loaded weapons whenever the ship is in a high threat or potentially hostile environment. It may also be prudent to consider assigning armed men (in a relaxed posture in a designated space onboard ship) capable of responding to an alarm in one minute or less to support the personnel on watch.

I. DURESS SYSTEM

Onboard ship, a duress system allows an individual under duress to covertly make his predicament known to others on the ship. In the event of a terrorist attack the duress system will activate a security alert without revealing to the attacker that his presence is known. For example, if the roving patrol does not check in with the OOD in person precisely thirty minutes after his previous report, the OOD, as a matter of course, will sound a security alert using the

announcing system and will activate the appropriate alarms. If the roving patrol can convince his assailant that he must call in to the OOD to avoid an alert, he can tip the OOD that all is not secure. The fact that the roving patrol called in and did not report to the OOD in person would immediately indicate to the OOD that there was a problem. In response to the tip, the OOD can alert the ship to a security breach by using a code word over the announcing system rather than the security alarm system which overtly signals a breach of security.

Under the circumstances where an OOD observes suspicious activity in the vicinity of a ship and wants to alert the ship and activate the security team off watch, he could use a duress system. By simply using a code word on the announcing system the ship and security teams could be alerted unaware to the terrorist.

J. ARMED WATCHES, PATROLS, AND SENTRIES

The SORM specifies that pistols shall be carried unloaded at all times by the quarterdeck watch and that the forecastle and fantail security watches ordinarily shall not have their weapons loaded [Ref. 35: pp. 6-49, 6-50]. There are situations, however, in which carrying an unloaded weapon could prove to be a fatal mistake. For this reason, modification of the above orders should be given strong consideration.

The terrorist advantage of surprise is notorious. The split second reaction to a surprise attack required by a naval watchstander dictates that his weapon must be loaded.

Suggestion: When the threat level of a ship's environment approaches the high mark, armed watchstanders should carry their weapons loaded. Small arms and security training must emphasize when the conditions dictate the loading of weapons and under whose order it is to be done. The element of safety afforded by carrying unloaded weapons must be sacrificed in the interest of protecting personnel and property from a surprise terrorist attack. An extensive training program in the use of various weapons can greatly diminish the chance of an accident occurring with loaded weapons.

To preclude an incident similar to the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut (October of 1983) from happening against a ship in port, the commanding officers of U. S. Navy ships must have "explicit authority to respond quickly to acts defined as hostile." [Ref. 9: p. 47] The on-scene commander must have the "guidance and the flexibility he requires to defend his force." [Ref. 9: p. 47] The first step toward this end is to authorize sentries to carry loaded weapons when the environment dictates that it is necessary.

IV. SHIPS' VULNERABILITIES

When considering terrorist attacks, a ship is certainly more vulnerable in restricted water than on the high seas. But even in open water units may be exposed to remotely controlled explosives-laden boats, armed and manned speed boats, ultra-light aircraft with explosives, or mini-sub. These situations are more appropriately handled by the combat systems doctrine.

As a ship approaches shore, it becomes more vulnerable because of the restrictions on its maneuvering capabilities. The conditions presented below are limited to entering port and either mooring pierside (or in a nest) or going to an anchorage.

A. ENTERING PORT

The following hypothetical scenario can be used to illustrate at least one set of possible terrorist actions:

Well in advance of entering port, the special sea and anchor detail is set. During this process, systems are checked and all is made ready to moor alongside a pier. Meanwhile, the excitement of going on liberty spreads among the crew. The line handlers man their stations on deck and centralized communications are established with the bridge. The men fall into ranks as the ship nears the breakwater. Several small boats are around and one speed boat with an attractive female in the bow, well tanned and wearing a skimpy white bikini, passes slowly down the port side close aboard just prior to the ship making the breakwater. Most of the men's attention is focused on her. As the bow clears the breakwater, a loud explosion is heard

and felt just forward of amidships on the starboard side. A small boat laden with explosives just rammed the ship.

This is one scenario, melodramatic, but nonetheless possible. The preliminary conditions are realistic and have undoubtedly been experienced by many. There are countless other potential scenarios which are left up to the imagination of the terrorist who is planning them and the ship that is defending against them.

Suggestions:

1. During the setting of the special sea and anchor detail, increase the material condition below decks by setting modified zebra.
2. Have M-60 machine gun stations on each bridge wing armed and place gunners' mates just inside the skin of the ship ready to man them.
3. Request that a pilot or military liaison officer meet the ship prior to entering confining waters. These men can be available to warn off suspected small boats in the native language either with a bull horn or via the announcing system.
4. Launch the motor whale boat or gig and have it proceed into port ahead of the ship, alert for potential problems. Consideration may be given to using a helicopter, if embarked, for surveillance.
5. Ensure that each deck station has assigned designated personnel who are constantly alert for suspicious activities. The gunners mate assigned forward and aft should be armed to provide support from the weather decks.
6. Call away a squad of at least five security force personnel armed with shotguns, rifles, and pistols, and protected with helmets and flack jackets, to stand-by on the main deck just inside the skin of the ship.
7. Man at least one repair party, preferably the centrally located repair five station, ready to respond to damage or act as a repel border team with a hose topside.

8. Alert the shipping tracker in CIC to report any radar contacts proceeding faster than ten knots with a CPA closer than five hundred yards inside the harbor.

Many of these considerations and others could be applied to a unit transiting a canal or a narrow strait.

B. INPORT

1. Mail

While in port after being at sea for two weeks or more a large amount of mail is often received on board. In their impatience to go on liberty, the postal clerk and yeoman may hastily sort the official mail, tearing it open without systematically examining it. Because letter bombs are also a threat, the yeomen, personnelmen, and postal clerk(s) should be provided training in recognition of letter bombs. Other than recognition, there are some common-sense questions that should be asked such as: Why is the ship receiving this letter/package? Has it been tampered with? Table 4 provides a letter bomb recognition check list for personnel to use when sorting mail [Ref. 37: p. G-7].

2. Stores

Another area for concern is the loading of stores. When fresh vegetables and fruits are received, the senior medical corpsman on board goes out and inspects the produce prior to loading by the dockside working party. His inspection, however, is for medical purposes and does not include a search for bombs. The master-at-arms should be

TABLE 4 MAIL BOMB RECOGNITION CHECKLIST

WEIGHT

- Weight unevenly distributed.
- Heavier than usual for its size.
- Heavier than usual for its class.

THICKNESS

- For medium size envelopes, the thickness of a small book.
- Not uniform or with bulges.
- For large envelopes, bulkiness, an inch or more in thickness.

ADDRESS

- No return address.
- Poorly typed or handwritten address.
- Handprinted.
- Title for the executive incorrect.
- Addressed to a high ranking executive by name, title, or department.

RIGIDITY

- Greater than normal, particularly along its center length.

STAMPS

- More than enough postage.

POSTMARK

- Foreign.
- From an unusual city or town.

WRITING

- Foreign writing style
- Misspelled words.
- Marked air mail, registered, certified, or special delivery.
- Marked personal, confidential, private,

ENVELOPE

- Peculiar odor.
- Inner sealed encloser.
- Excessive sealing material.
- Oil stains.
- Springiness.
- Wires, string, or foil sticking out or attached.

- Ink stains.

trained to recognize bombs and how to conduct a search for them. It would be easy to conceal a bomb in a head of lettuce, for example, and get it aboard. Likewise, a larger bomb could be easily hidden in a crate of vegetables. All items, not just produce, should be inspected for signs of tampering and then loaded on board. The use of a portable metal detector would assist in ensuring a thorough investigation.

3. Changing the Watch

Another potential area of vulnerability exists when watches are changed. Normally, all watches are turned over within a ten to fifteen minute period and the watch standers are not in the frame of mind to devote one hundred per cent attention to the task. There is somewhat of a settling-in and a gearing-up period to tackle the chore at hand. In order to diminish this vulnerable period, the command's watch turnover could be done in a cycle covering forty-five minutes to one hour. For example, the topside sentries could change the watch at a quarter past the hour, the roving patrols and petty officer of the watch could relieve at half past the hour, and the OOD and other watches could relieve at a quarter to the hour. Furthermore, this cycle could be shifted every other day or every third day, as it too can reflect an observable pattern or routine.

4. Bombs

One final suggestion addresses the common technique of "suitcase bombs." A bomb could be placed in a briefcase, suitcase, small box, garbage receptacle, car, truck, or many other potential containers, and left unattended on the pier in the proximity of a ship. All personnel should be aware of the technique, especially the watch standers. When spotted, every effort should be made to identify the container and have it removed.

V. CRISIS MANAGEMENT/LEADERSHIP AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

There are certain circumstances surrounding an event which characterize that event as a crisis. A crisis may be described as a situation in which reaction time to the situation is short, the stakes involved are high, and there is no previously prepared plan to deal with the situation. A casualty in the engineering spaces on a ship would invoke, for example, a crisis if casualty control procedures had not been developed to deal with the incident. The consequence of such a crisis would most probably be over-reactive leadership to remedy the cause of the potential crisis situation throughout the fleet. A primary goal of this paper is to stimulate the development of shipboard contingency plans dealing with terrorist incidents and, in doing so, avoid the over-reactive leadership style associated with a crisis.

This study encourages the training and education of a ship's crew regarding the fundamentals of terrorism and the analysis of the security procedures in the face of a terrorist threat. The adjustment of the security system and training of personnel to deter a terrorist threat are also emphasized and represent a large part of effective counter-terrorist techniques. All of the above efforts are related to the internal shipboard part of a contingency plan. Contingency planning must also consider the actors and

forces external to the ship that are set in motion by a terrorist incident. All in all, a contingency plan should prevent a situation from being elevated to a crisis level and provide a tool to help deal effectively with the circumstances. The following are some items external to the ship that the commanding officer should be aware of when formulating contingency plans dealing with terrorist incidents.

A. U. S. POLICY

One pre-requisite to counterterrorist contingency planning is a full understanding of U. S. policy regarding terrorist incidents. First is the no-concessions policy of the U. S. government, "meaning that the United States will offer no ransom nor release prisoners in return for the lives of hostages held by terrorists." [Ref. 38: p. 5] Secondly, the government will "take all possible lawful measures to resolve the incident and to bring to justice the perpetrators of the crime." [Ref. 39: p. 2] To this end the United States has obtained a number of bilateral international agreements that address extradition of terrorists. Third and key to the second resolve, is the policy that "the host nation is responsible for the protection of U. S. personnel and installations against terrorist attacks." [Ref. 40: p. 79]

B. TREATIES AND LAW

The commanding officer of a U. S. Navy ship bears the responsibility for protection of personnel and property aboard his ship [Ref. 34: p. 2]. He must, therefore, have a complete understanding of the authority vested in him to take the appropriate counterterrorist measures in keeping with U. S. policy, treaties of cooperation with other nations, and both domestic and international law.

In addition to U. S. policy, another area that may influence the counterterrorist contingency plan developed by a U. S. naval command concerns agreements with the host government for dealing with terrorist incidents against U. S. citizens that occur within the host nation. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) have been reached with many governments. Supplementary Agreements have been reached with some countries which expand the allowances provided for in the SOFA. The specifics of these agreements should be obtained through the chain of command from the unified commander.

The following discussion concerns a U. S. Navy warship inport in a foreign country. "While in a foreign port a warship is not subject to any interference by the authorities of the receiving state." [Ref. 41: p. 107]. The commanding officer has the responsibility and authority to protect the ship and its personnel from a terrorist attack. Countering a terrorist attack onboard the ship with the use

of force to protect the ship and personnel is clearly legal, as was discussed in Chapter II.

Engaging a terrorist in the vicinity of a ship is also legal but with two stipulations. First, according to U. S. policy the host nation is responsible for the protection of U. S. personnel and property against terrorist attacks. If the host nation's authorities are not present, or if they are present but are, in the judgement of the commanding officer of the ship involved, not responding adequately to the threat, then the commanding officer can instruct the ship's personnel to engage the terrorist(s). Secondly, the terrorist threat must present a life-endangering situation before the commanding officer of the ship can order the use of force to engage the terrorist(s) and even then, it must be ordered only as a last resort.

The following example will help clarify the points made above.

A U. S. Navy ship is inport in a foreign country. The terrorist threat levels in this particular port have been rising and are now considered to be high. A vehicle breaks through a barrier checkpoint on the pier and is heading at high speed toward the ship which is moored pierside. There are no barriers or other obstacles available to stop the vehicle before it reaches the ship. Host country authorities are not present. The captain of the ship judges the vehicle to represent a life-endangering threat to the ship, since by breaking through the barrier checkpoint on the pier it has committed a hostile act. The commanding officer, therefore, instructs the ship's personnel to use the minimum force required to protect themselves and the ship.

C. CHAIN OF COMMAND

Today's military chain of command is straightforward but can be complicated as naval units switch operational commanders. For example, when units deploy overseas they "chop" from one fleet commander to another when they cross theater boundaries on deployment. The maintenance of many administrative ties with the "parent" command (the squadron or group commander in home port) while deployed is routine. The situation of a terrorist incident should be viewed as an operational concern. Including the "parent" command in operational message traffic while deployed, however, is a touchy subject and, as a rule, is not usually done. The inclusion of "parent" commands in all message traffic related to a terrorist incident should, however, be viewed as an exception to the "rule" of exclusion from operational traffic. The primary reason for this break from the rule is that no command in the United States is going to be more familiar with the physical status of a unit than the "parent" command and no command is in a better position to provide that time-critical information to decision makers in Washington, D. C. than the "parent" command. Hence, the "parent" command should be included in all terrorist related message traffic involving a naval unit.

D. REPORTING

In the event of a terrorist incident involving U. S. military personnel or property overseas, three channels of communications are activated to deal with such an incident. These three channels are the military, the diplomatic, and the host nation systems. These channels are most probably activated with the submission of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE message (an operational report providing information on an incident of national interest) by the command. Provisions for writing such messages are found in the Joint Reporting Structure [Refs. 42 and 43]. Specific details for particular reports should be investigated through the chain of command for the area of operations. A working knowledge of how reports and responses travel through the chain of command, both military and diplomatic, is necessary in order to have an effective contingency plan for a terrorist incident.

Overseas the unified commander, for example USCINCEUR (United States Commander in Chief Europe), is tasked with the "coordination of all local policies and measures to protect DOD personnel abroad from terrorist attacks." The unified commander will also "serve as the DOD point of contact with U. S. Embassies and host country officials on matters regarding such policies and measures." This system is the military channel for dealing with terrorist incidents. [Ref. 8: p. 3]

The diplomatic channel links the unified commander with the State Department via the U. S. ambassador. In the national crisis management process, the State Department is assigned as the "lead agency" for overseas terrorist incidents [Ref. 38: p. 6]. This remains the case unless a military option is adopted in which case the DOD will take the lead. When an incident is reported a task force is convened in the operations center of the State Department and remains activated twenty-four hours a day until the situation is resolved.

Concurrently, a third system is activated. This is the host nation system which links Washington and the host nation government via the representative ambassador.

While all avenues are being pursued to resolve the problem at hand, information flow to the local military commander originates with the National Command Authority, and is passed through the State Department, to the local ambassador, to the unified commander, and ultimately to the commanding officer.

E. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

One area of caution in the development of contingency plans for handling terrorist incidents, addresses the news media. As discussed earlier, the publicity associated with terrorist incidents can be staggering and is often a sizeable part of the reason for the act. Onboard ship, the

public affairs officer (PAO) must be thoroughly familiar with the theater guidelines on any release of information. Since the position of PAO is usually a collateral duty onboard ship, assistance from a larger command with a dedicated PAO (one whose primary duty is public affairs) should be solicited as quickly as possible as U. S. national interests and host nation sensitivities could be placed in a precarious balance under the conditions of a terrorist incident. The events that followed the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship in October 1985 serves as an example of a terrorist incident that greatly strained U. S. relations with other nations, in this case, Egypt and Italy.

F. INITIAL RESPONSE

In the event the preventive anti-terrorist measures employed by a naval unit fail and a terrorist incident occurs, the contingency plan should be activated. The success of the initial response to a terrorist incident will be measured by the quality of the contingency plan and will be dependent on the amount of training devoted to that plan.

G. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are defined in The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as "directives issued by competent authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate

and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered." [Ref. 44: p. 298]

In most peacetime scenarios where conflict is possible, the use of force is controlled. The use of force is normally limited to self-defense against a hostile threat in response to a hostile act. The ROE will also specify which command has authority to declare a force hostile. Because there is such a short time available to respond to a terrorist attack and because there are so many different interpretations given to the ROE throughout the chain of command, the subject of the ROE should be viewed with concern by commanding officers.

Whether in port or at sea, if a rising tension situation exists the environment must be closely monitored for changes. If a threat cannot be avoided, for example by getting underway, then improving self-defense must be initiated. This means that small arms weapons are loaded, gun ammunition is brought up to the loader drum, and/or missiles are placed in assembly; the appropriate upgrade in readiness is essential because when the terrorist strikes there is no time to load weapons, let alone request that a force be declared hostile by higher authority. Armed forces must react in self-defense with split-second timing to protect the ship and its personnel.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The commanding officers of the ships in today's U. S. Navy are not provided with a guide for the development of anti- and counterterrorist programs. This paper represents a tool that can be used in the preparation of such programs and which is flexible for adaptation to all ship types.

Central to the success of both anti-terrorist and counterterrorist efforts is a well informed sailor. The education of the crew in the fundamentals of terrorism is therefore emphasized as the initial step to handling terrorism. The following quote stresses the importance of understanding the terrorist as the foundation for dealing with terrorists. "The first essential for living with terrorism is to understand it; to understand how terrorists work, and why; to understand the anatomy of their operations and their weapons and techniques; to understand the technical and tactical methods available for the defense against them." [Ref. 32: p. 15]

The fundamentals of terrorism are set forth in this study in such a way that they may be extracted from the text and presented to the crew in a series of lesson plans. Two proposed schedules for educating the crew in the fundamentals of terrorism are delineated in Appendix A. These schedules suggest two approaches to training the crew:

first, during normal working hours and, second, by duty section.

After becoming familiar with the idiosyncrasies of the terrorist, the commanding officer is now armed with the required information necessary for developing a security plan tailored for his ship to deter the terrorist threat. Suggestions for the improvement of security procedures, such as relocating the forecastle and fantail watch to the 04 level on a destroyer, are given in the text. Also brought out in this paper are insights into several vulnerable situations encountered by a ship that are conducive to terrorist attacks, including, for example restricted maneuverability when entering port. The proposals set forth for modifications to security procedures and the examination of vulnerable situations should be useful but are not all-inclusive. The modification of security systems that apply to a destroyer in combatting terrorism do not necessarily apply to an aircraft carrier. The intent is for each ship to expand on the above ideas and develop improvements in security that are best suited to the ship's particular type and mission.

In addition to education and security adjustments, the commanding officer must also consider what steps to follow in the event of a terrorist attack. The commander's preparation of contingency plans is essential to upgrade the readiness posture of a ship as the terrorist threat level

increases. Pre-planned responses to rising tension scenarios must be delineated, for example, securing liberty and making preparations for getting underway in a high threat level environment. The authority and responsibility of the commanding officer, United States policy towards terrorism, the rules of engagement in effect, and reporting requirements in the event of attack are some of the considerations addressed in the text that are intended to assist the commanding officer in developing contingency plans.

Terrorist incidents have become a significant part of the contemporary threat environment for U. S. armed forces overseas and the possibility of a terrorist act against a U. S. naval vessel seems far more likely today than in the past. It has been a long-standing tradition in the U. S. Surface Navy that the commanding officers of naval ships train their officers and crew to anticipate adverse situations, to expect the unexpected. Firefighting teams are, for example, exercised daily and the self defense force is exercised periodically so that if an adverse and unexpected situation arises they will be fully prepared to deal with it. In today's Navy, however, they must also think the unthinkable. A whole new set of questions must be added to the mental checklist of a watchstander in order for him to anticipate a bizarre terrorist incident and react in a timely and decisive manner.

APPENDIX A
PROPOSED ANTI-TERRORIST TRAINING PLAN

In order to develop any kind of effective anti-terrorist and counterterrorist programs for U. S. Navy ships, the fundamentals of terrorism must be learned by all members of ships' company. There are a variety of ways in which the information can be presented.

The U. S. Navy could develop a presentation on video cassette that could be distributed to the fleet and presented over each ship's closed circuit television (CCTV) system. A less expensive, but similar, approach might be to distribute the video cassette presentation to all destroyer squadron commanders, group commanders, and forward deployed units for loaning to ships as required.

If a formal Navy presentation on video cassette is not available, the CCTV system on each ship could be used to pre-record lesson plans for later presentation or to present lesson plans live.

Whether a CCTV system is installed on a ship or not, the command may prefer to present the material in person. In either case, using the CCTV or live presentations, there are several approaches that could be used to accomplish the anti- and counterterrorist training program.

The diversity in size of the ships and crews within the U. S. Navy dictates that several different approaches to anti-terrorist training are required. The number of duty sections and the different sizes of divisions and departments on a naval unit vary widely from a small frigate to an aircraft carrier. Consequently, there are many different schemes that could be used in the development of an anti-terrorist training program on board a ship. Each commanding officer must decide which training scheme is best suited to his ship's characteristics. This appendix discusses two of the many possible anti-terrorist training schemes: first, training the entire crew during normal working hours and, second, training by duty section.

Prior to commencing any type of training regimen, one or two assigned officers must review the training material and then prepare a one week course of instruction to the wardroom and chief petty officers' mess. The basic information can be delivered in five twenty to forty minute sessions. The short period of time allotted to each training session is designed to maintain the attention span of those attending and to allow time for questions and discussion.

The decision must then be made on who will present the material and how he will make that presentation. One way, as mentioned, is to present the material during normal training hours by division or department. Each division officer or

leading chief petty officer is recommended to present the material to his respective division.

A second way of implementing the training is to teach the crew by duty section. In this method, the command duty officer, duty weapons department officer, or leading chief in the duty section may be selected to present the material. Another possible candidate who may be selected for presenting the material to a duty section is the individual designated for security training of that duty section. The actual training of each duty section might be conducted just prior to eight o'clock reports and before movie call. No matter what anti-terrorist training scheme is chosen, the five lesson fundamental indoctrination is scheduled at one lesson per week so as not to unduly tax the regular training schedule.

While the training of the crew in anti-terrorist and counterterrorist techniques is in progress, an analysis of current security measures by the executive officer, senior watch officer, security manager, and other designated personnel must be conducted. This analysis should involve the examination of current security procedures in the interest of introducing modifications that will deter terrorist attacks. This review should not be limited only to the areas exemplified in Chapter IV but should stimulate the investigation of all areas of concern dependent on ship type and mission.

After the education of the crew and the concurrent review of security procedures, suggested changes should be closely examined, experimented with, refined, implemented, and, if proven successful, incorporated into both instructions and security training. One must remember that inport watches, such as the quarterdeck watch and the fore-castle/fantail watch, are not the only areas of concern. Yeomen and postal clerks must have separate training in mail-bomb recognition. The master-at-arms force must have training in bomb recognition for inspecting stores. If the command elects to make changes to the sea and anchor detail manning for entering port, then the appropriate bill must be changed and training conducted. Other areas requiring new training may surface as a result of the command's review of the ship's anti-terrorist posture. Consequently, the proposed training programs may very well take longer than the suggested ten weeks. Avoiding over-reactive crisis management, exercising a command's flexibility, and respecting the commanding officer's prerogative are built into the proposed training schemes. The training schedules outlined in this appendix merely serve as examples that may help each individual ship get started on its own training system.

The anti- and counterterrorist education program should also be incorporated into the indoctrination of new crew members. Watches should be exercised periodically in counterterrorist procedures as part of the daily drill

and the implementation of the security directives is designed to last ten weeks.

TABLE 6 PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR TRAINING
BY DUTY SECTION

| WEEK(S) | TRAINING |
|---------|--|
| 1 | Wardroom/CPD's introduction to program |
| 2-8 | Duty section training and concurrent security review |
| 9-10 | Security team training |

Example Schedule for Five Duty Sections:

| WEEK | DUTY SECTION | | | | |
|------|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 1 | (Wardroom and CPD training) | | | | |
| 2 | M | T | W | Th | F |
| 3 | S | S | M | T | W |
| 4 | Th | F | S | S | M |
| 5 | T | W | Th | F | S |
| 6 | S | M | T | W | Th |
| 7 | F | S | S | M | T |
| 8 | W | Th | F | S | S |
| 9 | (Duty section security team training) | | | | |
| 10 | (Duty section security team training) | | | | |

Explanation: Training would be conducted each day of the week listed vertically for Duty Section 1. No training would be conducted for Duty Section 1 in the third or sixth week as those duty days fall on a weekend.

APPENDIX B
PERSONAL PROTECTION

The elements of personal protection should be incorporated into the educational presentations on the fundamentals of terrorism. After each person has a grasp of how terrorists operate, think, and plan, he can apply the knowledge to a personal protection plan, particularly when ashore. Before addressing the principles of personal protection, two psychological factors must be aired to make the reader aware of the influence American culture has on how he may perceive the effects of a violent situation. Douglas Derrer has cited these two factors as denial and organizational dependency [Ref. 18: p. 195].

A. DENIAL

Two expressions of denial are common: "It'll never happen to me" and "I'm not important enough." Regarding the first, remember that no one is immune to terrorist acts. Avoiding the issue makes one more vulnerable. This applies to both the individual and the command. The effects of such an attitude not only endanger anti-terrorist efforts but also avoids the crucial issue of contingency planning.

The second misconception, "I'm not important enough," is a serious fallacy. Terrorist do not limit their attacks to

high ranking people. Enlisted personnel have been the victims of terrorist attacks in Puerto Rico, Turkey, Greece, and Germany. Overcoming denial and learning everything one can to avoid terrorists is an important step to survival.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL DEPENDENCY

The protective umbrella of the ship cannot provide security for the individual when faced with a terrorist incident while on liberty. If confronted with a terrorist incident while ashore on liberty, the individual must rely on his own knowledge and resources to counter the threat.

C. THE PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL PROTECTION

The strategy of personal protection is avoidance. The principles of this strategy are: be alert, be unpredictable, and keep a low profile. These principles are built on the understanding and knowledge of terrorist methods. The following list provides many suggestions for the application of these three principles of protection [Ref. 19: pp. 195-198; Ref. 45: p. 3-11].

1. When going on liberty, avoid going alone. Travel in small groups--there is safety in numbers.
2. Attempt to blend into your surroundings. Don't be conspicuous. Do not wear uniforms on liberty. Leave clothing that is clearly American at home, for example, cowboy hats, cowboy belt buckles, and boots.
3. Avoid routine and be unpredictable. Use different routes and times of movement. Travel on busy, well lit, well-traveled streets. Avoid dangerous areas placed off limits to the crew.

4. Avoid showing off material wealth. Remember to blend with the local people.
5. The command should provide the crew with cards listing emergency telephone numbers: the quarterdeck, military police, fire department, hospital, and local police.
6. Avoid civil disturbances and disputes with local citizens.
7. Be sensitive to the possibility of surveillance. Do not hesitate to report suspicious activities to the chain of command or to authorities.

Again, all of the suggestions listed above can be summarized in three short phrases and applied to most situations: be alert, be unpredictable, and keep a low profile.

APPENDIX C
HOSTAGE SURVIVAL

As mentioned in the discussion of personal protection, knowing what can happen in a hostage situation and how to best survive such an experience is something all military personnel should be exposed to. Likewise, as with personal protection, the psychological factor of denial must be overcome. Most people simply ignore the potential problem. All personnel must face the problem and plan accordingly.

Specific guidance for all situations is impossible. The following list of some specific "do's and don'ts" to be complied with in a hostage situation were consolidated from several sources and will be of assistance in most situation [Ref. 11: p. 112; Ref. 37: p. I-11].

1. Do be correct and polite to the terrorists.
2. Do build human relationships. Identify those captors with whom you can communicate and attempt to establish a relationship with one or more of them. Do not debate or argue but try to discuss neutral issues.
3. Do talk in a normal voice. Avoid whispering when talking to other hostages, or raising your voice when talking to a terrorist.
4. Control yourself, your time, and your environment. Maintain personal hygiene and exercise regularly, if you can. Try to establish a daily routine and keep your mind occupied. Part of your daily routine should be housekeeping.
5. Do remember that negotiations and rescue plans are in progress for your benefit.

6. Do obey terrorist orders or commands.
7. Do be alert for signs or signals from outside rescue attempts.
8. Do be a role model. If the victim is calm, the terrorists will also be calm.
9. Do ask for permission to communicate with the local U. S. Embassy or other U. S. government representatives, your commander, or family, preferably in the order stated.
10. Do not attempt escape unless the opportunity presents itself during the initial abduction stage. Thereafter, escape should only be attempted as a last resort.
11. Do not anticipate early release. Many terrorist abductions last for months. Prepare yourself mentally for an extended captivity.
12. Do not complain, act belligerently, or be uncooperative when dealing with the terrorists or other hostages.
13. Do not deliberately turn your back to a terrorist.
14. Do not refuse any favors offered by the terrorists.
15. Do not worry about your family.
16. Do not hesitate to answer questions about yourself. Military members are authorized and encouraged to give name, rank, service number, date of birth, and those circumstances leading to their detention.

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