

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

**NEW TERRORISM? A CASE STUDY OF *AL-QAIDA* AND
THE LEBANESE *HEZBOLLAH***

by

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December 2001

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2001	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Title (Mix case letters) New Terrorism? A Case Study of <i>Al-Qaida</i> and the Lebanese <i>Hezbollah</i>		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR (S) Edwin O. Rueda		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME (S) AND ADDRESS (ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME (S) AND ADDRESS (ES) N/A		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>In recent years, scholars have argued that the last decade of the 20th Century saw the emergence of a new type of terrorism distinct from that which the world had suffered since 1968. The argument presented in this thesis is that there is no such thing as new terrorism. In spite of a few terrorist "spectaculars" in the last decade, the evidence suggests that in organizational and ideological terms, terrorism has changed little in the last 20 years. The case studies of <i>Al-Qaida</i> and the Lebanese <i>Hezbollah</i> are used to support this argument.</p> <p>This thesis looks at key scholarly conceptualizations of new terrorism and applies these to <i>Al-Qaida</i> and the Lebanese <i>Hezbollah</i>. This study reveals that rather than conform to new terrorism, <i>Al-Qaida</i> can be better described as a traditional terrorist organization. Key similarities between <i>Al-Qaida</i> and the Lebanese <i>Hezbollah</i> show the continuity in international terrorism over the period of the last 20 years. This finding is important as the United States government ponders on the best approach in dealing with the current threat from <i>Al-Qaida</i> following the 11 September 2001 attacks.</p>			
14. SUBJECT TERMS <i>Al-Qaida</i> , <i>Hezbollah</i> , Terrorism, Osama bin Laden, Weapons of mass destruction.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 102
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

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*HEZBOLLAH***

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
and
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS**

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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

In recent years, scholars have argued that the last decade of the 20th Century saw the emergence of a new type of terrorism distinct from that which the world had suffered since 1968. The argument presented in this thesis is that there is no such thing as new terrorism. In spite of a few terrorist “spectaculars” in the last decade, the evidence suggests that in organizational and ideological terms, terrorism has changed little in the last 20 years. The case studies of *Al-Qaida* and the Lebanese *Hezbollah* are used to support this argument.

This thesis looks at key scholarly conceptualizations of new terrorism and applies these to *Al-Qaida* and the Lebanese *Hezbollah*. This study reveals that rather than conform to new terrorism, *Al-Qaida* can be better described as a traditional terrorist organization. Key similarities between *Al-Qaida* and the Lebanese *Hezbollah* show the continuity in international terrorism over the period of the last 20 years. This finding is important as the United States government ponders on the best approach in dealing with the current threat from *Al-Qaida* following the 11 September 2001 attacks.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although I am solely responsible for this project, it is certainly a product of many who helped in its creation.

I want to acknowledge the financial support that I received from Peter Lavoy, Ph.D., at the Naval Postgraduate School, that allowed me to interview key government officials who provided me with a keen insight into the United State's world of counterterrorism. I also want to specially thank Maria Rasmussen, Ph.D. and Glenn Robinson, Ph.D., at the Naval Postgraduate School. Their patience, guidance, direction, and overall assistance were instrumental in the creation of this work. I want to thank John Arquilla, Ph.D., at the Naval Postgraduate School, who provided the guidance at the outset of this work with regard to the general path that the project should take.

Special thanks goes to my father, Edwin Rueda, who spent the time and effort reading and editing this work. Last, and most important, I want to thank my lovely wife, Mayte. Her support, patience, and sacrifices were essential in the accomplishment of this project.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent years, scholars have argued that the last decade of the 20th Century saw the emergence of a new type of terrorism distinct from that which the world had suffered since 1968. The crux of this thesis is to argue against the emergence of new terrorism. This work challenges the idea that a new type of terrorism emerged in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. After an introduction and explanation of the characteristics of new terrorism, the case studies of *Al-Qaida* and the Lebanese *Hezbollah* are used to support the argument.

Chapter I looks at the concept of new terrorism. The goal is to introduce the phenomenon and to place the issue of international terrorism in the appropriate context and perspective before providing the case studies of *Al-Qaida* and the Lebanese *Hezbollah* (two groups that can be placed at opposite ends of the spectrum with relation to traditional and new terrorism).

The characteristics associated with the phenomenon of new terrorism are introduced. The chapter provides graphical representations of the statistical data on international terrorism for the period since 1980 (with a focus on international terrorism that targeted the United States). In the development of trends from the statistics events and circumstances that fall outside the statistical range and skew the final analysis are identified. In this analysis one can see how the apparent increase in the number of international terrorist-related casualties is solely associated to Osama bin Laden and his *Al-Qaida* organization.

To construct an argument against the emergence of a new type of terrorism this thesis relies on the case studies that are introduced in Chapters II and III. In looking at *Al-Qaida* in Chapter II, the goal is to show how characteristics of new terrorism do not fit the characteristics of *Al-Qaida*. In looking at *Hezbollah* in Chapter III, the goal is to show that although differences are apparent, the underlying similarities between the two groups are significant. There is a difference in intensity (as measured by the number of casualties associated with terror attacks), but not in the type of terrorism *per se*. Indeed, the

similarities between *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida* demonstrate continuity in the type of terrorism over the life span of both organizations.

Chapter II, therefore, examines *Al-Qaida*. Looking at the ideology and the objectives of the organization, the discussion focuses on the driving forces behind the movement and the long- and short-term objectives of *Al-Qaida*. A key point is the acknowledgement that Osama bin Laden and his organization approach short-term objectives rationally. This rationality stems from a unique perspective that combines present geopolitical and geostrategic situations to grander end-states tied to the organization's own interpretation of theological dogma.

Additionally, Chapter II analyzes the organizational structure of *Al-Qaida*. The organization's structure is that of a transnational organizational design (when looking at the organization globally). *Al-Qaida* also exhibits a hierarchical structure of functional divisions at the top echelon of the organizational pyramid. At the lower operational echelons of *Al-Qaida*, the structure is similar to the cellular design commonly associated with other terrorist organizations. Chapter II also concentrates on the issue of group dynamics and its influence on the effectiveness and success of the group, and on the weight that group dynamics can have on the organization's decision-making process.

Furthermore, Chapter II focuses on the issue of *Al-Qaida's* external support. Spanning from ideological support to the provision of material, manpower, and financial resources, the aid that *Al-Qaida* receives from external sources is the driving force of the organization. This section concludes that the concept of state-sponsorship of terrorism as an issue of the past is erroneous. Without the support of such states as Sudan and Afghanistan, among others, *Al-Qaida* is hard pressed to continue operations worldwide. Also essential, is the aid and support that the organization receives from groups and individuals. Although the links between these supporters and *Al-Qaida* are sometimes nebulous and hard to decipher, the networks are present, and indeed, key to the continuation of the organization.

Additionally, Chapter II discusses the topic of mass casualties in general and the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons by *Al-Qaida* in particular. *Al-Qaida* believes, from an ideological standpoint, in the rightfulness of

acquiring such non-conventional weapons. Evidence shows that *Al-Qaida* has pursued, and continues to pursue, the acquisition of a CBRN capability. Nevertheless, the use of these weapons by *Al-Qaida* is limited by the need for tacit approval from the organization's constituency.

The case study of the Lebanese *Hezbollah* in Chapter III supplies evidence to disprove the emergence of new terrorism in the 1990s. This particular chapter shows how *Hezbollah*, in the 1980s, exhibited some important characteristics of new terrorism. More important, this chapter demonstrates the similarities that exist between *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida*.

Chapter III analyzes the ideology and objectives of *Hezbollah*. It shows how the ideology of the group's leadership was influenced by their common experience in Najaf, Iraq. Furthermore, specific events led to the particular ideological zeal of the organization that incorporated the ideology of *jihad*, or holy war, and the concept of martyrdom in the defense of what the group perceived to be attacking foreign armies.

With relation to the organization's objectives, *Hezbollah's* short-term objectives adjusted to the particular geostrategic and/or geopolitical conditions in the region. Much in the same manner as *Al-Qaida*, the long-term objectives were grand and ideologically motivated. The short-term objectives, however, were limited to specific conditions in the region and in the international scene.

Additionally, Chapter III introduces the organizational design of *Hezbollah*. In its infancy, *Hezbollah* espoused some of the characteristics of new terrorism. In time, however, the organizational structure of *Hezbollah* formed into a clear hierarchy and command and control structure. The more mature and effective design of the organization resembles the organizational design and command and control structure of *Al-Qaida*. Overall, one can see two organizations that have a centralized decision-making body, but decentralize operational decisions to allow for tactical innovation and initiative.

Chapter III introduces some of the important sources of external support for *Hezbollah*. State support for *Hezbollah* was of utmost importance. However, because of the dependence on state support, the leadership of *Hezbollah* sought other sources of external aid. Eventually, *Hezbollah* sought alternate means of support to separate itself

from the control and influence of Iran and Syria. In this manner, the leadership of *Hezbollah* could more easily take decisions and actions that suited the organization and not an outside power. *Hezbollah*, therefore, sought after other means of support for the purpose of strategic and political survivability.

Finally, the case study of *Hezbollah* illustrates that attacks of mass casualty proportions did not begin with new terrorism. As with *Al-Qaida*, the operations of *Hezbollah* did not seek to achieve mass casualties. *Hezbollah* chose specific targets for particular political and/or strategic reasons. At the same time, though, the organization was not limited by the possibility of casualties. *Hezbollah* used religious motives and justifications to maintain operational flexibility. Although not an end in itself, both *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida* were not limited by the possibility of operations resulting in mass casualties.

In sum, there are significant similarities between *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida*, and international terrorism has remained constant throughout the life span of both organizations. Therefore, the lessons learned from the attempts to counter *Hezbollah* actions in the 1980s can be applied to the present problem facing by the United States with relation to *Al-Qaida*. The actions that the United States took in the 1980s against *Hezbollah* led to conditions that facilitated further terrorist activity against the United States. In addition, the decisions of the U.S. leadership led to a negative perception of the United States in the region of the Middle East. Perceptions that only added to the continuing fire in the region that was fueled by core problems from where extremism and terrorism emerged and expanded. The lessons learned from the actions (or inactions) of the United States during the crisis of the 1980s *vis-à-vis* *Hezbollah* activities serve as a guide in dealing with the present situation with *Al-Qaida*.

I. THE NATURE OF TERRORISM TODAY

A. INTRODUCTION

In recent years scholars have argued that the last decade of the 20th Century saw the emergence of a new type of terrorism (different from the terrorism that afflicted the world since 1968).¹ This thesis suggests that in fact there is no new terrorism. This thesis challenges the idea that a new type of international terrorism emerged in the early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

To set the background for the arguments that are made in this thesis, this chapter first defines terrorism. Second, it describes the concept of new terrorism. The analysis identifies the arguments that are made to support the existence of a new type of international terrorism and the specific characteristics that are associated with this phenomenon. The analysis also includes an introduction and description of specific trends that result from statistics on terrorism.

Subsequently, this thesis challenges the characteristics of new terrorism in the case studies of *Al-Qaida* and the *Hezbollah*² in Chapters II and III, respectively. The case study of *Al-Qaida* shows that most of the characteristics that are commonly associated with new terrorism do not apply to an organization that many believe to be the foremost new terrorist organization of today. Indeed, this work concludes that in contrasting the Lebanese *Hezbollah* (one of the most successful *traditional* terrorist organizations) and *Al-Qaida* (the driver behind the terminology of *new* terrorism), one can see distinctive similarities. These similarities show continuity in the type of terrorism over the last 20 years. Furthermore, as shown in Chapter IV, these similarities suggest that the lessons

¹ The year 1968 is generally used as the beginning of modern terrorism with the sustained campaign of aircraft hijackings by Palestinian groups [Jeffrey D. Simon, *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience With Terrorism* (Burlington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 97-98]. The terms terrorism and international terrorism are used interchangeably in this work. International terrorism focuses on attacks where perpetrators cross national borders, or where targets within a country are of an international nature—such as diplomatic facilities.

² Although there are several *Hezbollah* groups worldwide, the most notorious and successful is the group based in southern Lebanon. When speaking about *Hezbollah*, therefore, this work refers to the Lebanese *Hezbollah*.

learned from the U.S. response to the threat from the Lebanese *Hezbollah* in the 1980s are applicable to the current threat from *Al-Qaida*.

B. TERRORISM DEFINED

Neither scholars nor practitioners have managed to agree on a single accepted definition of terrorism. Counterterrorism efforts worldwide suffer because of definitional problems among nations, and even within nations, to agree on an all-encompassing definition of terrorism. The difficulty is such that some scholars believe that the search for a definition is futile.³ This work, however, combines the definition of terrorism provided by the U.S. Department of State with the characteristics stated by Schweitzer.⁴ The U.S. Department of State treats as terrorism “any violence perpetrated for political reasons by sub-national groups or secret state agents, often directed at noncombatant targets, and usually intended to influence an audience.”⁴ To augment this definition of terrorism, characteristics that are associated with terrorism and terrorists are introduced:

[t]errorism provokes a fear and insecurity deeper than any other form of violence, striking innocent victims randomly and without warning...terrorists attempt to discredit governments by demonstrating their inability to protect their citizens...terrorists use violence in an increasingly scattered way to express protest and rage.⁵

Five points surface from the definition of terrorism provided above. First, the definition applies today in the same manner that it applied twenty years ago. The definition itself shows how the phenomenon of terrorism does not change in kind and is continuous. Second, terrorism is a struggle for the achievement of political goals. Third,

³ Simon (p. 384) states that definitions of terrorism “lend themselves to contradictions, since they are usually influenced by ideological and political perceptions of the terrorist threat.” Simon (p. 384) further adds that “since the essence of terrorism is the effect that violent acts can have on various targets and audiences, it would make more sense to talk about terrorist-type tactics—which can be utilized by extremist groups, guerillas, criminals, or governments.”

⁴ *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998*, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 1999, p. vi.

⁵ Glenn E. Schweitzer with Carole C. Dorsch, *Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York and London: Plenum Trade, 1998), p. 32.

in terrorism the means that are used to achieve the political goals are of such nature that they can be described as severe crimes. Fourth, acts of terror are intended for an audience beyond the immediate victims of the act. Last, terror tactics are usually performed against noncombatants.⁶

These five points differentiate terrorism from other types of warfare. In addition, one more caveat of terrorism further differentiates acts of terror and actions committed by legitimate combatant groups. Terrorism occurs outside the bounds of recognized laws, rules of warfare, and codes of conduct. Bruce Hoffman states that throughout history although national armies have caused much greater death and destruction than “terrorists might ever aspire to bring about, there nonetheless is a fundamental qualitative difference between the two types of violence...even in war there are rules and accepted norms of behavior that prohibit the use of certain types of weapons, proscribe various tactics and outlaw attacks on specific categories of targets.”⁷ Some argue that acts of terror are legitimate because of the ultimate objectives that are sought. Terrorist acts, however, tend to meet this caveat of actions that fall outside the bounds of civilized rule and commonly accepted international law.

C. TRADITIONAL AND NEW TERRORISM COMPARED

This section describes the idea of new terrorism by establishing those characteristics that are associated with the concept. This section also introduces and analyzes some of the trends in terrorism that result from the statistics of terror attacks gathered in the last 20 years.

⁶ It is important to keep in mind that the term “noncombatant” is subjective. For example, the October 1983 attacks on the Multinational Peacekeeping Forces by Lebanese militias were termed acts of terror against noncombatants by the United States and France. For the militias, however, the forces were seen as military targets.

⁷ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 34. The lines here between warfare and terrorism are blurred. Many argue against the legitimacy of the strategic bombing campaign by the Allied forces over Germany in World War II, or the destruction of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with non-conventional weapons.

1. New Terrorism

The concept of new terrorism is based on the idea that the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created a situation that intrinsically changed the phenomenon of terrorism. The advent of new terrorism paralleled the emergence of Osama bin Laden in the international scene. Starting in the early 1990s some scholars promptly declared that the world was facing a new and significantly different type of terrorism.⁸

The characteristics that are associated with new terrorism are summarized in Table 1.1 and described below. These characteristics are compiled from the elements introduced by Hoffman and Laqueur, among others.⁹ There are nine characteristics of new terrorism that are grouped into three categories—ideology and objectives, organizational design, and external support. The sections in the case studies of Chapters II and III coincide with these three categories.

The first grouping of characteristics of new terrorism is ideology and objectives. This category has three elements: (1) there is little understanding of the goals and objectives of today's terrorists; (2) the use of terror tactics today is done more as an end in itself than as a means in the accomplishment of political objectives; and (3) terrorism today seeks to kill rather than to intimidate. The first characteristic is self-explanatory. The other two characteristics derive from the connection between religion and terrorism and between new terrorism and the achievement of mass casualties.

⁸ The first writing on new terrorism can be attributed to Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).

⁹ Bruce Hoffman, "Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism," in James M. Smith and William C. Thomas (eds.), *The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors* (Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001); Brian Jenkins, Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, *Countering The New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, 75:5, 1996, pp. 24-36; and Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<i>TRADITIONAL TERRORISM</i>	<i>NEW TERRORISM</i>
<i>Ideology and Objectives</i>	
Clear political objectives	Little understanding of their goals and objectives
Terrorism used as a means in the achievement of clear goals	The use of terrorism more as an end in itself
Attacks narrowly focused and limited in the number of casualties	A goal of destruction and mass killings fueled by religious apocalyptic concepts
<i>Organizational Design</i>	
Distinct and clear organizations	Amorphous, less distinctive organizations
Localized and limited in operational extent	Transnational in nature with no sanctuaries
Clear hierarchy and rigid command and control structure	No clear hierarchy and command and control structure
Centralized decision-making	Decentralized decision-making
Small number of members	A larger number of members
<i>External Support</i>	
Reliance on state-sponsorship	Little-to-no state sponsorship
No involvement with criminal activities	Involvement with criminal networks

Table 1.1. Characteristics of Traditional and New Terrorism

The connection between religion and terrorism is not a concept that is limited to new terrorism. In new terrorism, however, religion is coupled with apocalyptic and end-of-era elements. Some scholars argue that terrorist groups of today, by espousing religion, knocked down the barrier of rational thinking that limited the types of terror attacks that one could foresee. Without limitations modern terrorist groups are governed only by the concept of the total destruction and annihilation of those that they proclaim as the enemy. Walter Laqueur, for example, states that

[a]s human kind approaches the end of the second millennium of the Christian era, apocalyptic movements are on the rise. Most of the preachers of doom do not advocate violence ... Others, however, believe that the sooner the reign of the Antichrist is established, the sooner this corrupt world will be destroyed and the new heaven and earth foreseen by St. John in the Book of Revelation, Nostradamus, and a host of other prophets will be realized. Extremist millenarians would like to give history

a push, helping create world-ending havoc replete with universal war, famine, pestilence, and other scourges.¹⁰

Additionally, Paul Wilkinson comments that “where the perpetrators are motivated by religious fanaticism this also contributes to the increased propensity for mass-lethality indiscriminate attacks, because a bomber who believes he is carrying out the will of God, or Allah, in waging a ‘Holy War’ or Jihad against an evil enemy is unlikely to be inhibited by the prospect of causing large-scale carnage.”¹¹ New terrorist organizations, therefore, use acts of terror indiscriminately for the purpose of achieving mass casualties. Acts of terror are not carried out to satisfy grander political and/or strategic objectives. Actions are taken based on the idea of cleansing and annihilation with a focus on an apocalyptic religious ideology.

The second category of characteristics of new terrorism deals with organizational design. New terrorism has the following organizational characteristics: (1) organizations are amorphous and less distinct; (2) groups are transnational in nature and have no specific operational sanctuaries; (3) organizations are not hierarchical in nature and have a loose command and control structure; (4) organizations have decentralized decision-making; and (5) terrorist groups are composed of a large number of individuals.

The primary argument with regard to organizational design is that new terrorist organizations are less hierarchical in nature than traditional ones. The traditional concept of a strict command and control structure with “a leader or commander-in-chief at the top”¹² and a distinct hierarchy from the top to the bottom of the organization is no longer valid. Instead, new terrorist organizations are flatter in design and structured along the lines of a loose connection of networks. The network structures (some of which are described by Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini)¹³ are cells simultaneously tied to a central node but decentralized in control and execution. The concept of decentralization and lack

¹⁰ Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” p. 32.

¹¹ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (London and Portland: Frank Class, 2001), p. 50.

¹² Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism,” p. v.

¹³ John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in Brian Jenkins, Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, *Countering The New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999).

of a formal command and control is pushed further by Stephen Sloan in the concept that common loyalties and beliefs provide the glue that holds organizations together. In this manner a new terrorist group is viewed as

[a] small cell-like organization that is not as in the past a combat compartmentalized entity that is part of a larger clandestine hierarchy. This type of standalone, mini-terrorist group may operate within an environment of racial, ethnic, and anti-government hatred, for example, but it does not have specific organizational ties to a larger organization, a front group or a sector of the community.¹⁴

This new type of organizational design means that decision-making is decentralized to the lowest levels of the organization. With no hierarchical command and control structure, therefore, terrorist cells are autonomous and operate separate from a central command.

The third category of new terrorism focuses on external support. The following two elements make up this category: (1) new terrorist organizations no longer rely on nation states for significant sponsorship; and (2) terrorist organizations of today are intrinsically involved with criminal networks worldwide.

Arguments that support the end of state sponsorship of terrorism center on *Al-Qaida* and *Aum Shimrikyo*. In these two cases it is suggested that individual sponsors of terrorism replace state sponsorship. These groups are self-sufficient and have the ability to acquire military, financial, and manpower resources without the need to rely on the help or aid from nation states.¹⁵

Coupled with the concept of non-state support is the element of support from criminal organizations. Bruce Hoffman explains that the lack of reliance on state support leads terrorist organizations to look at other fronts for the resources they need to operate successfully. “With the lack of bases and lack of patrons, these groups are turning increasingly to crime and toward greater involvement with formal criminal links—not

¹⁴ Stephen Sloan, “The Changing Nature of Terrorism,” in James M. Smith and William C. Thomas (eds.), *The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors* (Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p.63.

¹⁵ See Gavin Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shimrikyo and Al Qaida,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 22, pp. 277-309, 1999.

only as a means to raise money to sustain operations but also as a means to increase patronage and increase their hold over transnational communities.”¹⁶ In contrast to traditional state support for terrorist organizations, new terrorist groups have different sources of support and do not rely on state support. They are more self-sufficient, they receive support from individuals and groups, and new terrorist organizations have links with criminal organizations that can provide the needed resources for the sustainment of operations.

2. Trends in Terrorism

This section now introduces trends in international terrorism evident in data collected since the early 1970s.¹⁷ Some of the characteristics of new terrorism that are mentioned in the previous section are conclusions based on these trends.

The point is made that the increase in the lethality of international terrorism is not a general trend.¹⁸ The increase in the lethality of terrorism is a result of the operations that are attributed to Osama bin Laden and his *Al-Qaida* organization. An increase in the number of casualties associated with *Al-Qaida* operations, however, does not equate to a change in the type of international terrorism.

This section looks at two issues. First, summarize some of the important trends that are associated with international terrorism. Particularly, to concentrate on the trends

¹⁶ Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism,” p. ix.

¹⁷ One should examine statistics on terrorism with a “grain of salt” for several reasons. For one, the statistics are based on the past, and therefore, poor indicators of the future. Although trends might show a decline in attacks and the lethality of attacks, for example, a single event can negate any previous study. Second, the statistics are based on a short view of terrorism, and ignore any trends in the phenomena that occurred before the 1970 timeframe. Last, statistics can be manipulated in such a manner that the same data can be used to support different arguments.

¹⁸ This notion is also introduced by Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Future,” in M. Taylor and John Horgan (eds.), *Terrorism and Political Violence: Special Issue on the Future of Terrorism*, 11 (4), pp. 56-57 in the following excerpt: “The statistics on which the seeming increased threat to life trend is based only on international terrorism, whereas most activity is domestic. The number of incidents in these statistics is small and therefore easily skewed by single events. The success or failure of a single bombing of an airliner can result in a 100 per cent change in the annual statistics of terrorism fatalities...Moreover, the ‘trend’ is inconsistent. There are fluctuations from year to year that can only be explained by regional or local political developments rather than by universal changes in the nature of terrorism...a closer look at the annual changes reveals that throughout the recent decade, for example, there were years in which not only the absolute number of fatalities but also the average number of casualties per incident dropped markedly.

that display the number of international terrorist attacks and the number of casualties. Second, take a look at international terrorist attacks that targeted the United States since 1980. The focus on this last set of statistics is also on the number of attacks and quantity of casualties.

The first set of statistics deals with the phenomenon of international terrorism since 1980. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display the total number of terrorist attacks of an international nature and the total number of casualties that resulted from these attacks, respectively. Both graphs are based on statistics presented by the U.S. Department of State in the yearly released *Patterns of Global Terrorism* publications.

There are three essential points to note from Figure 2.1, which depicts the total number of international terrorist attacks since 1980. The first is the downward trend in the total number of attacks (as depicted by the linear regression line in the graph). The




Figure 2.1. International Terrorist Attacks (1980-2000)¹⁹

¹⁹ *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000*, Department of State Publication, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 2001.




Figure 2.2. Total Casualties from International Terrorism (1980-2001)²⁰

highest number of attacks was recorded in 1987 with a total of 666 terrorist incidents, and the lowest occurred in 1998 with a total of 274 attacks. Second, one can see a steady increment in the number of attacks during the 1980s that is followed by a sharp decrease at the end of the decade. The third important trend, one that is also apparent in other graphs described below, is the cyclical nature of the graphical depiction. Particularly in the 1990s, the trend is for lulls in the number of attacks to be followed by an increase in terrorist actions.²¹

Figure 2.2 depicts the total number of casualties caused by international terrorist attacks. First, there is a general increase in the number of casualties as depicted by the linear regression line. This is evident in the sharp increase in the number of casualties for

²⁰ U.S. Department of State *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000*. The number of casualties for 2001 are estimated from figures related to the 11 September 2001 attacks (3248 deaths and an estimated twice the number of injured).

²¹ Note the lull in 1989 with 375 attacks and the spike in 1991 with 565 attacks, and the continuing trend with relative quiet periods in 1992, 1994, and 1998 followed by sudden increases in attacks in 1993, 1995, and 2000, respectively.

1995, 1998 (and 2001). Second, there is a decrease in the number of casualties after 1988 that lasts into the early 1990s. Last, note the cyclical connotations of the graph that are evident in the 1990s where relative lulls are followed by sharp increases in the numbers of casualties.

One of the principal activities that an analyst should do with statistical information is to check for unusual observations that hamper a regression output and skew a final graphical analysis of the data.²² Trends can be affected by one or two observations that fall outside the norm of the data. By taking out three events that fall outside the norm from among thousands of international terrorist incidents per year,²³ Figure 2.3 shows that the number of casualties generated by international terrorism in the 1980-2001 timeframe (with the exception of *Al-Qaida* operations) decreased.




Figure 2.3. Total Number of Casualties (1980-2001) – Without the Computation of Three *Al-Qaida* Attacks in 1993, 1998 and 2001²⁴

²² William L. Carlson and Betty Thorne, *Applied Statistical Methods for Business, Economics, and the Social Sciences* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 630.

²³9,613 attacks of terror occurred in the 20-year timeframe from 1980 to 2000.

²⁴U.S. Department of State *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000*. The three events that are not computed are the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 that caused 1,006 casualties, the attacks on the U.S.

Three attacks that are attributed to *Al-Qaida* are withdrawn from the calculation—the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in East Africa, and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Since the United States is the remaining superpower and the leader of the western world, it can be argued that any event of international terrorism affects the United States. However, concentrating solely on those attacks that targeted the United States can provide a better measure of the direct threat to the United States with regard to international terrorism. The following graphical interpretations of the statistics focus on the number of attacks and the number of casualties that can be associated with anti-U.S. terrorist activities.²⁵

Figure 2.4 displays the trend in the total number of anti-U.S. attacks between




Figure 2.4. Total Terrorist Attacks Against the United States (1980-2000)²⁶

Embassies in Africa in 1998 that caused 5,378 casualties, and the 9-1-1 attacks that resulted in an estimated 6500 casualties (3248 deaths and an estimated twice the number of injured).

²⁵ In the statistics, where able to decipher among individual incidents, this work includes all the casualties that resulted from the anti-U.S. attack and not only the American citizens that were casualties. For example, although the number of U.S. casualties in the Pan Am 103 incident was 189, the number of total casualties in the event—283—was used.

²⁶ For figures 2.4-2.7 the statistics from 1980 to 1988 were gathered using the comprehensive chronology of international terrorism events compiled by Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock, *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events Volumes I and II* (Ames: Iowa State

1980 and 2000. The trend is one of an increase (as shown by the linear regression line) in the number of terrorist attacks specifically targeted against the United States. One can see a steep increase in anti-U.S. attacks beginning after 1987 and reaching a zenith in 1991 before decreasing to more “normal” levels in 1994. This trend is the opposite from that depicted in Figure 2.1, which showed a general decrease in the total number of international terrorist attacks.

In looking at the data more closely one can see that there are a questionably high number of attacks on business related activities in Latin America during the 1990s. Figure 2.5 depicts the same data as that of Figure 2.4 with one exception: the attacks




Figure 2.5. Total Number of Anti-US Terrorist Attacks (1980-2000) – Without the Computation of the Attacks on the Oil Pipelines in Colombia

University Press, 1989). From 1989 to 2000, excluding 1990 and 1994, the data from the U.S. Department of State *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000* was used. For 1994 this thesis used the data from Bruce Hoffman and Donna Kim Hoffman, *The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997). No data was gathered for 1990. Because of the different sources used, and the manner in which they define international terrorism and anti-U.S. attacks, it is possible that there are some discrepancies in the statistics. But every attempt was made to minimize any discrepancy, and to create a continuous statistical picture.

against the multinational oil pipelines in Colombia are not included. This is done for two reasons. First, the trends on the overall anti-U.S. terrorism tendencies worldwide are skewed when considering the attacks on the oil pipelines.²⁷ Second, the attacks are a result of particular domestic problems facing the Colombian government in a situation paramount to a civil war. The attacks are performed to decrease the economic power of the Colombian government rather than for specific anti-U.S. considerations. By removing this data, the trends reverse and show a general decrease in the number of total anti-U.S. terror attacks in the last 20 years.

Figure 2.6 displays the number of casualties as a result of terror attacks against




Figure 2.6. Casualties Resulting from Terrorist Attacks Against the United States (1980-2001)

²⁷ The number of attacks against the multinational oil pipelines since 1988 was as follows: 152 (2000), 77 (1998), 90 (1997), 45 (1996), 70 (1995), 35 (1993), 50 (1992), 50 (1991), 23 (1989), and 58 (1988). This data was gathered from the U.S. Department of State *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2000*.

the United States. The graph includes non-American casualties that resulted in the anti-U.S. attack. For example, the attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania resulted in the deaths of 12 U.S. citizens. The graph, however, uses the total number of individuals killed in the attack (291) to compute the statistics of those killed in 1998.

There are three points to gather from this graphical interpretation. First, as depicted by the linear regression line, the trend in the last twenty years is of a substantial increase in the number of casualties. This is consistent with the previous interpretation of the total casualties world wide due to international terrorist attacks. Second, with the exception of the spikes depicted for 1993, 1998, and 2001, the number of casualties throughout the 20-year timeframe appears to be continuous. Last, the figure shows the cyclic component with an effect of repetitious high and low levels over the time period.

Trends regarding the concept of terrorism over a 20-year period and involving over 2000 events can be skewed by the results of three attacks that provide data with unusual observations. This refers to the casualties afflicted in three anti-U.S. terrorist attacks—the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing in 1993 (arguably planned and executed by *Al-Qaida*), the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (planned and executed by *Al-Qaida*), and the attacks on the WTC and Pentagon in 2001 (planned and executed by *Al-Qaida*). These three events of terrorism skew out of perspective the entire spectrum of anti-U.S. terrorist attacks since 1980.

Figure 2.7, displays a more general picture of the trends in international terrorist attacks targeted against the United States in the last two decades. In this graph (that does not involve *Al-Qaida* operations), one can see a decrease in the number of casualties from the high levels in the 1980s to more moderate and steady numbers throughout the 1990s. Another important trend is the cyclical nature of the graph where years of low casualties are followed by a high increase in the casualty levels.

Four points are gathered from the graphs depicted above. First, the 1980s saw a steady increase in the number of international terrorist attacks. This increase was followed by a sharp decrease in the number of attacks at the end of the decade that coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s the

trend was for a steady decrease in the number of terror attacks. The number of terror attacks targeted directly against the United States remained constant throughout the




Figure 2.7. Casualties Resulting from Terrorist Attacks Against the United States (1980-2001) – Without the Computation of Three *Al-Qaida* Attacks in 1993, 1998 and 2001²⁸

two decades (with the exception of a sharp increase in the number of anti-U.S. terror attacks during the 1988-1992 timeframe). It is apparent that the end of the Cold War had an affect on terrorism in general. During these first years of instability the United States was particularly targeted as the world settled into a new world order. In the 1990s the level of attacks normalized to more moderate numbers, as compared to the rest of the 20-year period.

Second, the trends that were displayed contained a cyclical element. This was evident in both the representation of the quantity of attacks and the number of casualties. The reasons for this pattern could lie in the introduction of counterterrorism measures by governments following years of high numbers of incidents and/or casualties. Subsequently, the level of attacks subsides and the number of casualties decreases.

²⁸ The three events that are not computed are the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993, the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Africa in 1998, and the 9-1-1 attacks.

Terrorist groups then either use other tactics and/or learn to cope with the counterterrorism measures instituted by the governments, and the levels of attacks and casualties increase once again.

Third, the lethality of international terrorism in general, and attacks of terror targeted against the United States in particular, over the last 20 years has increased solely as a result of the actions of *Al-Qaida*. The general trend when not involving operations attributed to *Al-Qaida* is one of a decrease in the number of terrorism-related casualties in the last decade. Terrorism in general is not more lethal. The lethality in the 1990s is not a general trend, but a phenomenon that can be ascribed to Osama bin Laden and his *Al-Qaida* organization.

The increase in the number of casualties from the operations of *Al-Qaida*, however, does not equate to a change in terrorism *per se*. Although the lethality of *Al-Qaida* operations is greater, the characteristics of the organization are similar to the characteristics associated with traditional terrorism.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter took a look at the concept of terrorism. The goal was to introduce the concept of new terrorism and to place the issue of international terrorism in the appropriate context and perspective before discussing in detail *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida* (two groups that can be placed at opposite sides of the spectrum *vis-à-vis* traditional and new terrorism).

This chapter introduced those characteristics that are commonly associated with new terrorism. It also provided graphical representations of the statistical data for the period since 1980 (with a particular focus on international terrorism that targeted the United States). The conclusion was that the general lethality of terrorism, as measured from the number of casualties since 1980, decreased. The trend of an increase in the lethality of international terrorist attacks was solely attributed to Osama bin Laden and his *Al-Qaida* organization.

The argument against the emergence of a new type of terrorism is not limited to a discussion of international terrorist-related casualties. Two case studies are introduced in the chapters that follow to establish this argument. In looking at *Al-Qaida* in Chapter II, the goal is to show how characteristics of new terrorism do not necessarily fit this organization. In looking at *Hezbollah* in Chapter III, this thesis introduces the significant similarities that are apparent between *Al-Qaida* and *Hezbollah*. These similarities display continuity in the type of terrorism over the lifespan of the two organizations.

II. CASE STUDY: *AL-QAIDA*²⁹

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is a case study of the *Al-Qaida* organization. The first section looks at the ideology and objectives of *Al-Qaida*. The second section identifies its organization, concentrating on the hierarchy of the group and the command and control structure of the organization. This section also analyzes the concept of group dynamics and the influence that it has on the organization's decision-making process. The third section analyzes *Al-Qaida's* resources and support base. The last section deals with *Al-Qaida's* intent to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

In this case study on *Al-Qaida* the following arguments are made. First, the ideology and objectives of *Al-Qaida* are known and well established. Furthermore, the objectives of *Al-Qaida* are pragmatic in nature and developed rationally in accordance to the group's perception of reality. Two, the use of terror tactics by *Al-Qaida* is a means to accomplish the organization's political goals. The use of terror tactics by this organization is not an end in itself, or merely used because of an apocalyptic ideology or religious zeal. Three, *Al-Qaida* is not an amorphous organization with little hierarchy. On the contrary, Osama bin Laden's organization has an established hierarchy and a centralized command and control structure. Last, state-sponsorship is not a thing of the past. Indeed, *Al-Qaida* was able to grow, and continues to survive, primarily because of the support that the organization obtains from nation states. The one organization that is commonly associated with the emergence of new terrorism in the 1990s does not meet several characteristics of new terrorism.

²⁹ *Al-Qaida* is the Arabic word for "the base." Also known by the name Islamic Army or Jihad Base.

B. IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES

This section focuses on the ideology and objectives of *Al-Qaida*. This analysis introduces three points. First, the ideology and goals of the organization are clear and well defined. Second, the objectives of *Al-Qaida* display rationality. The leadership of the organization has a particular perspective of reality and a pragmatic decision-making process that leads *Al-Qaida* to choose specific acts of violence—some of which are massive—to accomplish its political goals. Third, although religion and religious symbolism are extensively used by the organization, the underlying impetus for the use of terror is driven by geostrategic and geopolitical realities.

1. Ideology

The ideology of *Al-Qaida* is clear. A primary characteristic of new terrorism does not apply to this organization.³⁰ Bin Laden—the prime driver behind the compilation of the characteristics termed as new terrorism—has expressed his ideology and goals several times in an unmistakable manner.³¹ *Al-Qaida's* ideology was developed over time as the group adjusted to geopolitical and geostrategic activities. Walter Laqueur's statement that "new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population"³² is falsified by examining the stated objectives of *Al-Qaida*.

³⁰ Hoffman, "Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism," p. v, states that one of the key points when comparing traditional and new terrorism is that "...we knew what they [traditional terrorists] wanted. We may not have agreed with them. We may have found their aims and objectives heinous, objectionable, intolerable, but at the same time, at least we could understand what they were about. We knew what motivated them, what their aims were, how they dovetailed their actions to suit their agendas, and we had a sense of what they wanted...."

³¹ Such as the 1992 *fatwa* (religious decree) against the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia, the 1995 open letter to King Fahd that called for a campaign of guerilla attacks against the U.S., the 1996 statement in the *Nida'ul Islam* magazine where bin Laden stressed the deaths of weaker men, women, and children throughout the Muslim world, the 1996 Declaration of War against the US, the 1997 interview with CNN, the 1998 interview with ABC News, the 1998 *fatwa* to kill Americans world-wide, the 1998 declaration of the U.S. Army as an enemy of Islam, the 1998 interview with TIME Magazine, the 1999 declaration that all U.S. males should be killed, and the 2001 interview with the Arab-based MBC News.

³² Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, p. 81.

One event is of absolute importance to the ideology of *Al-Qaida*. The fight of the *mujahideen*—freedom fighters or holy warriors—in Afghanistan during their *jihad*³³ against the Soviet Army in the 1980s drove *Al-Qaida*'s ideology. In a matter of a decade, bin Laden managed to become an influential and popular leader within the Arab *mujahideen*. He supported and led the anti-Soviet struggle directly and indirectly in several phases of the fighting. It was in Afghanistan in the 1980s that Osama bin Laden networked with other influential Muslims in the Middle East to provide the fighters with the necessary requirements for a successful *jihad*. Bin Laden's time in Afghanistan also was important for solidifying his connections with other *mujahideen* who would later become important members in *Al-Qaida*'s struggle against the United States.

Three other factors deeply affected the ideology of *Al-Qaida*. First, the Gulf War (1990-1991) and the subsequent presence of American troops in the region were a direct cause in the creation of *Al-Qaida*'s anti-U.S. sentiment. Second, certain conditions in Saudi Arabia and the increased influence of the Sunni reform movements in the region aided in creating the conditions and support network that led to bin Laden's militant ideology in the 1990s. Last, the foreign policy of the United States provided the fuel for a volatile fire that led to the direct clash between the United States and *Al-Qaida*—the dual containment policy in the region of Southwest Asia and the continued perceived unlimited support for the State of Israel aided in the creation and sustainment of the Osama bin Laden phenomenon and his ideological zeal.

The references outlining the ideology and objectives of bin Laden are numerous.³⁴ But one need only look closely at four of them to gain a thorough and complete

³³ *Jihad* can be defined as "Striving. Holy war against non-believers. Sometimes interpreted as the struggle against one's own weakness." This definition is from Charles Lindholm, *The Islamic Middle East: An Historical Anthropology* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. xxii.

³⁴ See the following: Peter L. Bergen and F. Smyth, "Holy Warrior," *The New Republic*, v. 219, 31 August 1998, pp. 17-19; B. Lewis, "License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 77, November/December 1998, pp. 14-19; FAS Military Analysis Network, "*Al-Qaida*," [<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin.htm>], 24 October 2000; Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School, "Terrorist Group Profiles," [<http://web.nps.navy.mil/~library/tgp/qaida.htm>], 15 August 2001; The Terrorism Research Center, "Osama bin Ladin," [<http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/BinLadinTranscript.shtml>], 24 October 2000; Frontline, "Osama bin Laden v. the U.S.: Edicts and Statements," *Public Broadcasting Service*, [<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html>], 17 July 2001; Institute of Counterterrorism, "Al-Qa'ida (the Base)," [http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=74], 17 July 2001; Nida'Ul Islam, "Mujahid Usamah Bin Ladin Talks Exclusively to 'NIDA'UL ISLAM' About

understanding of who Osama bin Laden is, what he stands for, and what he views as the final end state for his organization.³⁵ The ideology of *Al-Qaida* is based on a level of rationality driven by the group's particular perception of their religion, the geostrategic realities of the world (with particular attention to the region of the Middle East), and the organization's evaluation of the players involved in the conflict.

From the onset of *Al-Qaida* in 1987, bin Laden's ideology was based on the establishment of a group that would fight a *jihad* outside the confines of Afghanistan. This ideology was centered upon the pursuit of a holy war against states that prevented the establishment of Islamic governments within their borders. Even at this early stage, bin Laden viewed the possible union of all Islamic governments throughout the Muslim world under the leadership of a *Khalifa*.³⁶ This was an idea comparable to the recreation of the Muslim empire as it stood 300 years ago³⁷ and with the purity of the first Caliphate³⁸ that was established after the death of the Prophet Mohammed.³⁹

The New Powder Keg in The Middle East," *Nida'ul Islam Magazine* [<http://www.islam.org.au/articles/15/LADIN.HTM>], 17 July 2001; One of the earliest anti-American statements in "Osama bin Ladin," *The Independent* [<http://menic.utexas.edu/menic/utaustin/course/oilcourse/mail/saudi/0007.html>], 17 July 2001; Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America* (Rocklin: Prima Publishing, 1999); and Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999).

³⁵ These four essential references are: Osama bin Muhammad bin Laden, *The Declaration of War* (23 August 1996); Emergency Net News Service, "Summary/Review of Reports Concerning Threats by Osama Bin Laden to Conduct Terrorist Operations Against the United States and/or her Allies - 23 Feb 98 to 16 Jun 98 (includes original February 'fatwa')," [<http://www.emergency.com/bladen98.htm>], 17 July 2001; John Miller, "Talking with Terror's Banker," *ABC News*, [http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/terror_980609.html], 17 July 2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation, "The indictment of bin Laden and associates in the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania," [<http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/eastafrica/summary.htm>], 17 July 2001; and the transcripts of the trial provided to the author in CD-ROM by FBI Special Agent Daniel Coleman.

³⁶ Also known as a *Caliph* – a deputy or ruler of the community of Islam [Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Southern District of New York Court Reporter's Office Daily Transcripts of the USA v. Usama bin Laden et al trial in the Southern District of New York* (Transcript # 126LBIN1, 24 April 2001).]

³⁷ Muslim lands in 1700 extended as far West as present Morocco and Senegal, throughout the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey, as far North as the Caspian Sea, throughout present Iran and South Asia, and as far east as Indonesia. See map in Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 274.

³⁸ "The first phase in the construction of the Caliphal regime was the period of the Rashidun in which the companions of the Prophet, Abu Bakr (632-34), 'Umar (634-44), 'Uthman (644-56), and Ali (656-61), ruled by virtue of their personal connection with the Prophet, and the religious and patriarchal authority derived from loyalty to Islam. The conquests made the Caliphs the military and administrative chiefs of the newly conquered lands. In this role they claimed to be deputies of God." Quoted from Lapidus, *A History*

The ideology of reuniting the Muslim world and of returning to the essence of the Rashidun Caliphate is not a new concept among the Islamic Fundamentalist mainstream. Such a concept has been proposed and advocated by influential Islamic scholars for several decades.⁴⁰ But an ideology that is important when looking at the phenomena of Osama bin Laden (not so much for the concept itself, but for his perception of the reality of the threat and belief that he can defeat that threat) is the concept of the *jihad*⁴¹ against the invading armies of a modern crusade.⁴² Osama bin Laden believes that the Muslim world is currently under the threat of invading Christian and Jewish armies that threaten the core and existence of Islam.

This ideology became increasingly evident after Osama bin Laden's *fatwa*⁴³ that was issued on 23 February 1998 where he made public the merger of *Al-Qaida* and other extremist Islamic organizations⁴⁴ under the banner of the *International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders*. In his proclamation, bin Laden stated that "the Arabian Peninsula has never—since God made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas—been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading armies in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations...all of this is happening at a

of Islamic Societies, pp. 54-55.

³⁹ Cable News Network, "Video Shows bin Laden urging Muslims To Prepare For Fighting," [<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/Europe/06/21/video.binladen/index.html>], 21 June 2001.

⁴⁰ See Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (The Mother Mosque Foundation, 1971).

⁴¹ "Unlike many nationalist movements in Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, or even Saudi Arabia, where jihad was launched for the good of the homeland, this particular jihad [in Afghanistan] was for Allah and geopolitics. The activists saw themselves as Muslim warriors, facing off with the intrusive atheism of the Soviet Union. Symbolically, the Soviet Union became atheism and the fight against occupation became a struggle against evil. In the process, jihad was semantically transformed; 'effort' came to mean 'violent struggle.' This drastically reduces the flexibility of the term jihad, and thus the doctrine, but it simultaneously unites the bloody reality of a protracted, ugly war with a divinely sanctioned fight between good and evil. The shift is of awesome importance: Bin Laden perceived the religious-symbolic system of Islam vs. Kufr as the cause and motivation behind the conflict in Afghanistan." Quoted from M. Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 191.

⁴² The "original" crusades became Christian holy wars against Muslims that were supported by the papacy. The first crusade with the aim of "liberating" the holy lands in Palestine began in 1095. The last crusades were fought throughout the Christian world in protection of their faith from 1305 to 1378. See Robin W. Winks, *A History of Civilization: Prehistory to 1715* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall), pp. 173-183.

⁴³ A *fatwa* is a legal opinion given by a religious scholar.

⁴⁴ The *Islamic Jihad*, the Egyptian *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya*, and the Pakistan *Ansar*, among others.

time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food.”⁴⁵ The concept of a holy war declared against the people of Islam, and the call for a *jihad* in the defense of their religion is stressed throughout his *fatwa*. Here Osama bin Laden claims that the “crimes and sins” committed by the Americans are a declaration of war on *Allah*, his messenger (Mohammed), and Muslims. Bin Laden pinpoints that the obligation is upon the people of Islam to defend the religion, stressing that “...as for the fighting to repulse, it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed...nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life.”⁴⁶ These elements become central to the ideology of defense against crusades that are aimed at the displacement and destruction of Islam. These concepts drive the idea of a *jihad* by the oppressed against the oppressors, and they aid in laying down an ideology and theological framework that form the basis for the development of the objectives of *Al-Qaida*.

2. Objectives

From the long-term perspective, bin Laden has from the outset espoused the idea of a return to the puritan concept of a Rashidun Caliphate and the establishment of Islamic governments throughout Muslim lands. But the short-term objectives are pragmatic in nature, rationally developed, and formulated within *Al-Qaida*'s perceived realities of the world and the particular situation in the specific region of concern. The objectives of *Al-Qaida* show an awareness of regional and global issues, and “especially how changes in each of these environments affects the situation of Muslims in diverse political, geographical, and operational contexts.”⁴⁷ Bin Laden's short-term objectives tend to adjust as the situation changes, and in response to the actions of those that he perceives to be a threat to his organization.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Emergency Net News Service, paragraph 6.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, paragraph 14.

⁴⁷ Magnus Ranstorp, “Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin Laden's Fatwa,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 21 June 1998, pp. 323.

⁴⁸ One should only look at the most recent Osama bin Laden appearance to ascertain this point. This

In 1987, at the beginning of *Al-Qaida*, Arabs fighting along side the Afghan *mujahideen* were closing down on the goal of expelling the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. The short-term objective of bin Laden at this time, in conjunction with two partners—Abu Hafs and Abu Abaida⁴⁹—was to create an organization to gather, unite, and guide the Arab *mujahideen* in the goal of fighting the Soviet invasion forces.⁵⁰ Anti-American fervor was already in existence at this early stage, but the first goal of *Al-Qaida* dealt directly with the geostrategic circumstances and realities of the situation in Afghanistan in the late 1980s.⁵¹

A defining factor in the development of *Al-Qaida* occurred in 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the consequent intervention of mostly western forces led by the United States. It is important to view this occurrence and the resultant changes in the objectives of bin Laden, however, within the context of three other events that exacerbated the conditions and ultimately led to the targeted anti-American sentiment. The first was the manner in which the Arab *mujahideen* were treated upon their return to their respective countries once the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan subsided and the need for these fighters ended. In many countries facing an upsurge of Islamic militant sentiment in the early 1990s (such as Egypt and Algeria), these battle-hardened holy warriors were treated as criminals, persecuted upon their arrival, or not allowed to return.⁵² In many ways, this was exemplified in the manner that the Saudi Arabian

appearance was a recorded message that was displayed after the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban government in Afghanistan began on October 2001. In the message, Osama bin Laden made mention of the issue in Kashmir. The topic of Kashmir is something that he had never previously mentioned. But understanding the centrality of Pakistan's role in the U.S.-led coalition, and the problematic situation of the Pakistani leadership in relation to Islamic movements in the region, the issue of Kashmir was harped upon for strategic reasons.

⁴⁹ At this point in time Osama bin Laden was less influential and responsible in the creation of *Al-Qaida* than Abu Hafs and Abu Abaida.

⁵⁰ Even as recent as 1990 and early 1991 members joining *Al-Qaida* took an oath to the organization in defense of Islam with the Russians and communism in mind. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcripts # 14O1BINF and 12F1BINF.

⁵¹ After the defeat of the Soviets, *Al-Qaida* began to pursue other goals. First, the organization began to help the anti-communist forces in Yemen fighting a civil war. Also evident was help that *Al-Qaida* began to provide anti-communist forces within Afghanistan in the early 1990s after the Soviets were defeated.

⁵² Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12E1BINF.

government dealt with Osama bin Laden upon his return to Saudi Arabia and in his efforts to use the Arab *mujahideen* in protecting the country from a possible Iraqi invasion.⁵³ The denial of recognition for years of *jihad* against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan had a negative affect in the view of these Arab *mujahideen vis-à-vis* some of the Arab nations (particularly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria) and galvanized a sentiment that was nurtured by bin Laden for years to come.

The second exacerbating factor developed in the early 1990s as the displaced and angered Arab *mujahideen* began to unite under the leadership of bin Laden in Sudan. At this time, the newly established National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Sudan opened its borders to all Muslims. In the early 1990s, the NIF attempted to consolidate its position within the country with the ultimate desire to expand Islam toward the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa.⁵⁴ In Sudan *Al-Qaida* developed and matured. The leadership of *Al-Qaida* launched numerous businesses that were used as front organizations in support of the more militant activities of the group. Furthermore, a third exacerbating element was tied to the Sudanese factor. Sudan's neighbor—Somalia—became the place where bin Laden began to actively pursue his offense against the western powers in general and the United States in particular.

⁵³ For Osama bin Laden the threat from Saddam Hussein to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was something that he predicted soon after his arrival from Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s. Bin Laden preached the possibility of an Iraqi invasion from what he believed to be the corrupt and deeply non-Islamic regime of Saddam Hussein (Bodansky, p. 29). In the late 1980s the Saudi leadership backed the regime of Hussein against Iran, which they considered to be the best of two evils, and the Saudi leadership, therefore, attempted to keep bin Laden's proclamations in check (Bodansky, p. 29). When Iraq moved into Kuwait in the summer of 1990 and threatened to continue south toward Saudi Arabia, bin Laden immediately planned for a contingent composed of his experienced and battle hardened *mujahideen* that could repel the possible Iraqi threat. In the days following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait "the young militant [bin Laden] barged into Saudi defense ministry offices with maps and flowcharts to demonstrate how the kingdom could defend itself against Iraqi aggression." (Reeve, p. 171) Bin Laden was directly ignored by a regime that he was beginning to see as ineffective, corrupt, and unappreciative of the efforts and sacrifices that he (and the *mujahideen*) endured during a better part of the 1980s. In turn, the Saudi regime began to see bin Laden as more of a problem and detriment, rather than an asset and a hero as he was viewed early upon his arrival from South Asia. This break in the relationship between the Saudi regime and Osama bin Laden had an important impact in the events of the 1990s, and his actions against the United States and its allies in the Middle East.

⁵⁴ F. Smyth, "Culture Clash – Bin Laden, Khartoum and the War Against the West," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, v. 010, 1 October 1998, p. 22.

A United States-led coalition under the name Operation Restore Hope⁵⁵ entered Somalia in December 1992. This coalition had a mandate from the United Nations (UN) to provide protection to humanitarian and other peacekeeping operations and to continue the work of UNISOM I that was established in April 1992.⁵⁶ For Osama bin Laden and his followers, however, the western-led operation⁵⁷ was a sign of the continuation and expansion of a western crusade. Bin Laden saw the peacekeeping forces in Somalia as a prolongation and extension of the situation in the Arabian Peninsula with western military involvement in Muslim lands. From Sudan, bin Laden issued one of his earliest anti-American *fatwas* calling the UN and United States involvement in Somalia a pretext to a future invasion of the Sudan and Africa.⁵⁸

Hence, one can see a transformation in the early 1990s in the objectives of *Al-Qaida* from a focus in the original fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to a conflict against the United States. Some specific factors augmented the displeasure of having western troops in the Arabian Peninsula and created the impetus to the 1996 *fatwa* by bin Laden that called on a war against the United States.

Osama bin Laden's Declaration of War was made public on 23 August 1996. This declaration, in conjunction with the *fatwa* that was issued on 23 February 1998, provided a complete insight into the objectives of *Al-Qaida*. Under the banner of defense against a "Zionist-Crusader" alliance, the declaration of war and the 1998 *fatwa* concentrated on three main points that led to specific objectives. One, and arguably the

⁵⁵ See United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Somalia II-UNOSOM II," [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2.htm], 17 July 2001, for information on the overall United Nations Operation (UNISOM II). See United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Somalia I-UNOSOM I," [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm], 17 July 2001, for details regarding Operation Restore Hope.

⁵⁶ United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Somalia II-UNOSOM II."

⁵⁷ According to United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Somalia I-UNOSOM I," the operation included personnel from several western and non-western nations: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, and Zimbabwe.

⁵⁸ According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 14NLBINF, in Somalia and in the Arabian Peninsula at the time of the U.S. involvement in Restore Hope one can see the first operations that can allegedly be tied to Osama bin Laden and *Al-Qaida*. Bin Laden acknowledged that he was responsible for the botched operation that was conducted by U.S. Army Rangers and Special Forces in Mogadishu on October 1993.

primary, the continuing American “occupation” of the land of the two holy places— Saudi Arabia. In the *fatwa* that was proclaimed in 1998, bin Laden wrote: “for more than seven years the United States is occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering the riches, overwhelming its rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples.”⁵⁹

The second and third main points dealt with the “spilling of Muslim blood” in Palestine and Iraq. Referring to the situation in Palestine, the 1998 religious decree by bin Laden stated that although the war and the occupation of the Arabian Peninsula was done for religious and economic purposes, they were also done to “serve the petty state of the Jews, to divert attention from their occupation of Jerusalem and their killing of Muslims in it.”⁶⁰ Last, in both the Declaration of War and the *fatwa* that bin Laden proclaimed in 1998, there was stress placed upon the plight of the Iraqi people. The 1998 *fatwa* stated that

[d]espite the immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people at the hands of the Crusader-Jewish alliance and in spite of the appalling number of dead, exceeding a million, the Americans, in spite of all of this, are trying once more to repeat this dreadful slaughter. It seems like the long blockade following after a fierce war, the dismemberment and the destruction are not enough for them. So they come again and destroy what remains of these people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.⁶¹

In the 1996 declaration of war, emphasis was placed on the number of children that had allegedly died in Iraq as a result of the United States-led sanctions against the country. Bin Laden in this matter stated that “more than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable aggression (sanction) imposed on Iraq and its nation...the children of Iraq are our children...you, the USA, together with the Saudi regime are responsible for the shedding of the blood of these innocent children.”⁶²

⁵⁹ Lewis, p. 15.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 16

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 17

⁶² Bin Laden, *The Declaration of War*, p. 10.

From these main points emerge the current short-term objectives of *Al-Qaida*. They are rational and embedded in the current geopolitical and geostrategic realities (or the organization's perception of these realities). For *Al-Qaida* the targeting of the United States will continue until the following goals are accomplished: (1) absolutely no United States presence in the Arabian Peninsula; (2) discontinuation of support for those nations perceived as enemies of Islam (i.e. Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Russia, India, Philippines); and (3) cessation of any influence preventing Muslims from establishing governments based on Islamic *Shari'a*⁶³ world-wide.⁶⁴

C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

This section identifies the hierarchy and command and control structure of *Al-Qaida*. It focuses on the structure of the group at the higher echelons to the creation of operational cells at the lower end of the organizational pyramid. It then explores group dynamics and decision-making within the group.

Three key points emerge in this section. One, *Al-Qaida* has a hierarchy with and strong command and control influence from the organization's leadership echelon. Two, the structure of the operational cells at the lower end of the hierarchical pyramid are analogous to cell formations that have been evident in multiple other terrorist organizations for several decades. Three, in *Al-Qaida* operational decision-making is centralized, while execution of tactical missions is decentralized. Consequently, this discussion challenges the characteristics of new terrorism that describe terrorist organizations as flat, amorphous, and lacking an established command and control hierarchy.

⁶³ According to Lindholm, p. xxvi, *Shari'a* signifies the 'path'—the total corpus of Muslim Law.

⁶⁴ These goals are those perceived by former *Al-Qaida* members and operators as mentioned in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 137LBIN1, 2001. It can be suggested that a fourth goal is the termination of all economic and political sanctions against Muslim countries in the Middle East—Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

1. Organizational Design

More than a mere network of autonomous operational cells, the transnational model of organizational structure can be applied to *Al-Qaida*. The underlying reason for establishing a transnational model is to exploit global and local business advantages while benefiting from technology, innovation, and functional control. The transnational model can be explained as follows:

Achieving coordination, a sense of participation and involvement by subsidiaries, and sharing of information, new technologies, and customers requires a complex and multidimensional form of structure. The transnational model is much more than just an organizational chart. It is a state of mind, a set of values, a shared desire to make a worldwide system work, and an idealized organization structure for effectively managing such a system. The following characteristics distinguish it... (1) ...operates on a principle of 'flexible centralization.' A transnational may centralize some functions in one country, some in other, yet decentralize still other functions among its many geographically dispersed operations; (2) subsidiary managers initiate strategy and innovations that become strategy for the corporation as a whole... managers at all levels in any country have authority to develop creative responses and initiate programs in response to emerging local trends, then disperse their innovations worldwide; (3) unification and coordination are achieved through corporate culture, shared vision and values, and management style rather than through vertical hierarchy; [and] (4) alliances are established with other company parts and with other companies.⁶⁵

This model does not negate a strong central leadership or a hierarchy, but it decentralizes operational execution and provides for flexibility and innovation at the lower echelons of the organization. Hierarchy and command and control are not annulled. Instead, a different approach is used to better manage and control the organization.

Figure 3.1 depicts the transnational nature of *Al-Qaida* and its organizational structure. Note the centrality of Afghanistan in the structure of the organization. The

⁶⁵ Richard L. Daft, *Organization Theory and Design* (Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing, 1998) pp. 269-270.

figure shows the importance that Afghanistan holds as the central component of the institution (more on Afghanistan's role in *Al-Qaida* is introduced in the next section).⁶⁶




Figure 3.1. Organizational Structure of *Al-Qaida*

⁶⁶ The centrality of Afghanistan is something that is currently questionable as the Taliban regime of the country was ousted from power by the U.S.-led coalition.


A second key point is the obvious global scope of the organization. But although there are operational cells spread worldwide, there are only a handful of countries that one can consider as significant hubs of support. Some nations like the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany become important hubs because of their liberal democratic nature, their large population of Muslims, and the readily available technology and means of communication. Other hubs, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, Philippines, and Lebanon are important because of the number, experience, and influence of militant Islamic groups and networks within their borders. Also evident in Figure 3.1 are the states where it is believed that the government, or at least higher echelons of the government, provides direct support to the organization. An important aspect of Figure 3.1 is that state support plays a leading role in the overall transnational structure of bin Laden's organization.

At the top of the organization the leadership of *Al-Qaida* is separated into functional divisions as represented in Figure 3.2. This represents a traditional hierarchical model. Osama bin Laden (the *emir*) is at the top of the organization surrounded by a *majlis al shura*—a governing council composed of 31 members.⁶⁷ This council is central to the decision-making process of the organization. Indeed, organizational decisions are made by the *majlis al-shura* and not by a single individual.⁶⁸ Under the *emir* and the *shura* council, there are five committees responsible for the functional aspects of *Al-Qaida*—the military, money and business, *fatwa*, Islamic study, and media reporting committees.⁶⁹ At this level of the organization, it is believed that the members of *Al-Qaida* have full knowledge of the immediate goals and operations of the rest of the

⁶⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12DLBINF.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Note from figure 3.2 that several of the leaders of the committees are also members of the *majlis al shura* (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1). Also note that some changes to the members of the military committee occurred in November 2001, with the reported death of Mohammed Atef (the military committee commander also known by his alias—Abu Hafs al Masry) by U.S. forces in Afghanistan.



**Shura* Council: Osama bin Laden, Abu Ubaidah al Bashiri, Abu Faraj al Yemeni, Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, Dr. Fahdl al Masry, Abu Burhan, Al Khabir, Abu Hafis al Masry, Abu Musab al Saudi, Izzildine, Abu Fahdl al Makkee, Qaricept al Jizaer, Khalifa al Muscat Omani, Saif al Liby, Abu Burhan al Iraqi.

Figure 3.2. Organizational Structure of *Al-Qaida's* leadership Echelon

organization.⁷⁰ Outside the inner circle, at the lower echelons of a pyramid structure, the knowledge of overall activities diminishes. At the lowest level, cells operate in much the same manner as terrorist cells have operated for decades—driven by the need for secrecy and specific operational requirements.⁷¹

The following analysis of the operational phases of a typical *Al-Qaida* operation supports the centrality of the leadership of *Al-Qaida* in the decision-making process. *Al-*

⁷⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12DLBINF.

⁷¹ Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” *Orbis*, 29:3, Fall 1985, p. 469, states that a dominant organizational design in terrorist groups is the cellular structure “in which decisions are made at the top of the pyramid and communicated downward to subordinate but compartmentalized units, with only the top echelon having any knowledge” of the overall mission.

Qaida operations are generally separated in four phases.⁷² The first phase deals with the collection of information on the place, time, type of target, and the means that are required to accomplish the mission. In the second phase, the leadership of the organization decides on whether or not to pursue the particular mission. At this point the *shura* council decides whether the tactical operation meets the overall objectives of the institution. Once the decision is made to continue the operation, the third phase is initiated to ensure that all the operational requirements and the logistic needs are gathered in support of the tactical endeavor. The last phase of the operation is the actual attack and is the place where all the cell members gather and attempt the tactical mission.⁷³

Except for the second phase of the mission, where the primary decision is made to continue or halt the operation, operational cells are autonomous in the preparation and accomplishment of their mission. Using the example of the 1998 American Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, *Al-Qaida* operational cells are composed of four sections—an intelligence section, an administrative section, a planning and preparation section, and an execution section.⁷⁴ The leader of the intelligence section is normally the head of the overall cell planning and executing the operation. This cell leader is normally not someone who “pulls the trigger” at the latter part of the tactical execution. Also, several members of the cell are on a “need-to-know basis” for operational security reasons. Particularly in attacks that are coordinated and simultaneous, it is likely that operators have no knowledge of other members, or even of other attacks that are planned as part of the overall operation.⁷⁵

The question surfaces of the influence and direct management that *Al-Qaida* leaders—Osama bin Laden and the *majlis al-shura*—have over the tactical operations. There are two possible answers to this question. One is that autonomous cells driven by the call of *Al-Qaida*'s ideology decide and execute their own operations. *Al-Qaida*'s leadership only remotely influences these self-governing cells, and the cells can tap into

⁷² Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12LKBINF.

⁷³ As in the case of the 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, the period of time from the initial phase to the accomplishment of the operation is measured in years.

⁷⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 137LBIN1.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

the grander organizational network for logistic, intelligence, financial, or other support.⁷⁶ The second, more realistic answer, is that *Al-Qaida*'s leadership does have a direct role in the operations that are carried out. This is deduced from the statement that was made by one of the government's key witnesses during the bombing trial of the United States Embassies in Africa:

Osama bin Laden is at the very top of *Al-Qaida* but that he has several military leaders directly under him, and that bin Laden provides the political objectives to these military leaders or these senior leaders, and that these people would then provide the instructions down, down lower to the lower chains of command...it wouldn't be normal for bin Laden to directly give instructions to someone like Azzam [member of operations cell in Kenya].⁷⁷

Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants might not pull the trigger, but are involved in each operation.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Interview between Kenneth Campbell, Office of Counterterrorism Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., and the author, 21 August 2001.

⁷⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 137LBIN1.

⁷⁸ The analogy to the military here is that of a division commander providing general guidance and support for actual operations that are conducted by more junior commanders at the lower levels of the chain of command. This analogy was provided in an interview between Thomas Kuster, Director, Counterterrorism Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., and the author, 20 August 2001.

2. The Organizational Perspective to Group Behavior⁷⁹

This section relies on the organizational perspective developed by Martha Crenshaw to arrive at an understanding of *Al-Qaida* as an institution. Martha Crenshaw explains that

the analysis suggests that acts of terrorism may be motivated by the imperative of organizational survival or the requirements of competition with rival terrorist groups. Terrorism is the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization, a decision-making process that links collectively held values and goals to perceptions of the environment. These organizational factors are especially useful in explaining how terrorist behavior can become self-sustaining regardless of objective success or failure and of changing conditions.⁸⁰

Decision-making within *Al-Qaida* appears to be influenced by the group dynamics of the organization.

The focus on the group dynamics of *Al-Qaida* is driven by this work's goal to assess the idea that new terrorist organizations choose acts of terror or escalate the acts of violence merely because of religious and/or apocalyptic reasons.⁸¹ A group dynamics analysis of *Al-Qaida* shows that the increase in the lethality and the scope of operations executed by the organization has more to do with internal conflict and organizational approach elements than with religious concepts.

Survivability of an organization is closely tied to the incentives that are provided by the leadership to the members of the group. Martha Crenshaw explains that although

⁷⁹ Two approaches are commonly held to explain the behavior of terrorist groups: the Instrumental Perspective and the Organizational Approach. This section concentrates on the latter of the two perspectives. The organizational approach is characterized by the following assumptions: "(1) The act of terrorism is the outcome of internal group dynamics; (2) individual members of an organization disagree over ends and means; (3) the resort to terrorism reflects the incentives leaders provide for followers and competition with rivals; (4) the motivations for participation in terrorism include personal need as much as ideological goals; (5) terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and unpredictable; (6) external pressure may strengthen group cohesion; rewards may create incentives to leave the group; (7) terrorism fails when the organization disintegrates; achieving long-term goals may not be desirable." Quoted from Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in David C. Rapoport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 26.

⁸⁰ Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," p. 473.

⁸¹ See Hoffman, "Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism;" Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism"; and Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*.

ideology plays a key role in the organization's establishment and maintenance, individual members rarely join and remain in an organization solely motivated by ideological commitment.⁸² Incentives for recruitment and retention are essential and the leadership of the organization "maintains their position by supplying various tangible and intangible incentives to members, rewards that may enhance or diminish the pursuit of the organization's public ends."⁸³ *Al-Qaida* recruits and maintains members in the organization through a mix of ideological measures and quantitative incentives. Indeed, as mentioned below, the failure of the leadership to provide adequate incentives to some of the members equated to organizational setbacks.

Attraction to *Al-Qaida* is influenced by the significant ideological connotations and religious symbolism of the group. Some members of the group stated that there was attraction to *Al-Qaida* because it represented the Muslim community in general rather than a specific group of people or ethnicity.⁸⁴ Many of the members believed that the leadership would make decisions that were correct in the view of Islam.⁸⁵ From the outset, however, the leadership understood that ideology itself could not be the lone glue holding the institution together. Veiled in secrecy, future members were informed of the underlying objective of *jihad* and sworn (by taking a *bayat*)⁸⁶ to the organization to follow, without question, the rules of *Al-Qaida* and all the *fatwas* proclaimed by the leadership of the group.⁸⁷ Any deviance from full compliance and obedience to the group would be met with reprisal. For example, in 1997 the organization believed that an important member of *Al-Qaida*—Abu Fahdl al Makkee, who was a key member of the money and business committee—was aiding the United States government. In that

⁸² Crenshaw, p. 471.

⁸³ Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," p. 19.

⁸⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12RLBINF.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ *Bayat* means a sworn alliance to the group and its leaders. *Bayat* was actually a pledge taken by the followers of Mohammed. It is usually given to the head of an Islamic state or the *Khalifa*—he leader of the Muslim community. The *bayat* also establishes a pledge from the leader to the people in providing for their needs. Information on *bayat* is provided in Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 1401BINF, 2001.

⁸⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1.

instance, it became widely understood that the organization would seek out and kill anyone suspected of being an informant against the group.⁸⁸

Dissatisfaction with the tangible incentives provided to *Al-Qaida* members showed the limitation of a solely ideological means for the retention of personnel and for keeping the organization together. Problems for *Al-Qaida* emerged in 1994-1995 when the organization started to have financial problems, and the salaries of some *Al-Qaida* members were significantly reduced.⁸⁹ These financial problems uncovered inequities in salaries between members. Egyptians in the organization were provided the highest amounts and there were tendencies for non-Egyptian members of the group to be treated as second-class citizens.⁹⁰ This inequality in the tangible incentives provided to the members of the organization led a prominent member of *Al-Qaida*—Jamel Ahmed Al-Fadl (a.k.a. Abu Bakr Sudani)—to steal \$110,000 from the organization and ultimately turn himself to the American authorities.⁹¹ This was an example of a highly ideological group failing to maintain faithfulness in important members of the organization because of the leadership's failure to provide and manage tangible incentives.

Internal conflict is another aspect of group dynamics that is important to consider when looking at Osama bin Laden's organization. Group dynamics and disagreements about particular operations and tactical means have had, and continue to have, a key influence on the decision-making process of the organization. The increase in the lethality of the attacks that *Al-Qaida* has performed and/or supported in the last ten years is a result of internal conflict within the organization. Taking into consideration the high price of exiting *Al-Qaida*—from possible direct targeting by the organization to persecution by foreign governments—the following statement by Martha Crenshaw is applicable to the analysis of bin Laden's group:

⁸⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 151LBIN1.

⁸⁹ According to the trial transcripts of the American Embassy bombings in Africa, informants stated that *Al-Qaida* members—when the organization was in Sudan—were earning up to \$1200 per month on top of their normal salaries earned from genuine business practices ran by the organization. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1.

⁹⁰ B. Weiser, "Trial Poked Holes in Image of Bin Laden's Terrorist Group," *The New York Times*, [<http://nytimes.com/2001/05/31/world/31TERR.html>], 31 May 2001.

⁹¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 127KBINF.

The dissatisfied terrorist may prefer changing the organization's political direction to departing in frustration. This effort may lead to 'creative innovation' under pressure. The combinations of high barrier of exit and dissatisfaction may thus encourage more violence. When members of a terrorist group lack the possibility of exit and are intensely loyal, the failure to achieve the organization's stated purpose may only make them strive harder.⁹²

Dissatisfaction within the organization—a split in the ideology and overall direction of the organization—first happened in *Al-Qaida* in the early 1990s. The first ideological split came in 1993-1994 when members of the organization began to question operational decisions that would lead to the death of innocent civilians. At the time of the split those leaders calling for a more extreme and wide definition of what the tactical targets could be (to include civilians) were on the losing end of the argument.⁹³ Another split occurred in 1993 when the blind Muslim preacher Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman⁹⁴ was arrested for involvement in a conspiracy to destroy the towers of the World Trade Center and other attacks in New York City in 1993.⁹⁵ The Egyptian members of *Al-Qaida*, who had considerable influence within the organization, wanted to immediately retaliate against the United States for the imprisonment of their religious leader.⁹⁶ In this particular case, the *majlis al shura* sided with Osama bin Laden who did not seek the retaliation that the Egyptian members demanded. This particular split was important, not only because of the significant influence of the Egyptian contingency in *Al-Qaida*, but because of the proven tendency of Egyptian Islamic militant groups to attempt mass killings of civilian targets to achieve their organizational goals.⁹⁷

⁹² Crenshaw, p. 24.

⁹³ In this example the Egyptian members of *Al-Qaida* were calling for more extreme measures, while the other members of the group (including bin Laden) espoused a less extreme view. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12KKBIN1.

⁹⁴ Sheikh Omar was the spiritual leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group.

⁹⁵ Reeve, p. 60.

⁹⁶ The members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad wanted to attack the American Embassy in Riyadh and several within *Al-Qaida* questioned the act of targeting a building that would lead to civilian and Muslim casualties. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 12KKBIN1.

⁹⁷ The *Gamaa Islamiya* (Egyptian Islamic Group) carried out the bloodiest attack in Egyptian history on 17 November 1997 with the slaughter of 58 tourists at the Valley of the Kings near Luxor. See K. Whitelaw, "Bin Laden Network," *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 125, 31 August 1998, p.51.

The influential Egyptian element within the organization remained part of *Al-Qaida* after significant splits over strategy. Subsequently, the Egyptian contingent began to fight from within the organization to influence the decision-makers toward operations more suited to their extreme beliefs. Hence the conclusion that the increased lethality of operations conducted by *Al-Qaida* was a result of ideological and strategic differences among the top leaders of the organization, particularly between the Egyptian and non-Egyptian members of the group.

Group dynamics are of importance when looking at *Al-Qaida*. The organization makes rational decisions based cost-benefits analysis. But the organizational approach to *Al-Qaida's* behavior provides an added insight into the group's actions. Such things as incentives and group dynamics are essential in the decision-making process of the organization, and the strategies that are formulated in the achievement of *Al-Qaida* objectives.

D. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

No organization can survive without resources. Whether it is ideological, manpower, material, or financial, *Al-Qaida* depends on support from different sources in its worldwide struggle. This section examines the different types of support that *Al-Qaida* received, and continues to receive, from states, organizations, and individuals.

1. State Support

One of the characteristics of new terrorism is that states have a minimal or non-existent involvement as sponsors of terrorism today. In the case of *Al-Qaida* many argue that Osama bin Laden's alleged fortune rules out the need for any support from outside sources.⁹⁸ This argument, however, is based on the idea that states and terrorist organizations have a reciprocal relationship solely based on financial needs. It ignores the

⁹⁸ Estimates vary from the \$200-\$300 million range down to \$2 million. Although his share of the Bin Laden Construction fortune was closer to the first figure, Osama bin Laden was estimated to have lost a significant portion of that amount in business transactions and projects that he pursued in Sudan, as well as through assets that were frozen by the U.S. government after the 1998 attacks on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

other tangible and intangible reasons for states to support groups that espouse and carry out asymmetric warfare against common enemies. With *Al-Qaida*, state support is existent and essential to the livelihood and success of the organization.

The following are connections between nation states and *Al-Qaida*: (1) states that provide safe havens for the organization; (2) nations that provide material and/or financial support; (3) countries that provide information to the group; and (4) states that make available training facilities and/or trainers to the group.⁹⁹

The most significant support provided to *Al-Qaida* in the last decade came from countries that provided, and continue to provide, safe havens to the organization. These countries, even under mounting international pressure,¹⁰⁰ allowed *Al-Qaida* and its members to function freely within their borders. More than any other aid from states, groups, or individuals, the support provided by Sudan until 1996 and Afghanistan to the present day was essential to the survival and growth of the organization.¹⁰¹

Al-Qaida transferred its activities to Sudan in 1990. In Sudan, *Al-Qaida* grew significantly. In Sudan, the organization's ideology and objectives shifted and were focused on a *jihad* against the United States. The first alleged *Al-Qaida* attacks against the United States occurred while the organization was in Sudan.¹⁰² As late as the Embassy attacks in Africa, bin Laden operatives worked and coordinated missions from safe havens in Sudan. During the six years under the protection of the Sudanese

⁹⁹ Seven nations provide support to *Al-Qaida*—Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and Chechnya. It can be argued that Somalia and Afghanistan do not meet the common definitions of a state. Chechnya is included in this list for simplification purposes because of its status somewhere between a group and an independent state.

¹⁰⁰ Sudan ultimately bowed to U.S. pressure and expelled Osama bin Laden in 1996, although elements and personnel related to him and *Al-Qaida* remained in Sudan.

¹⁰¹ The fluidity of the current situation in Afghanistan could change the importance of that country to the survival of *Al-Qaida*. With the end of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and therefore the termination of support for *Al-Qaida* within the country, the organization will be forced to seek another haven that provides freedom of action. The following are some of the possibilities: Chechnya, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Southern Philippines, or Indonesia.

¹⁰² This includes the following: the 1993 attack (or aid that was provided in the attack) of U.S. military forces in Mogadishu (Somalia), the 1993 attack on U.S. forces in Aden (Yemen), the 1993 attack on the WTC, the 1994 attempts to bomb bridges and the UN headquarters in New York, the 1994 attempt to destroy multiple airliners in flight, the 1994 attempt to assassinate president Clinton in Manila (the Philippines), the 1995 attempt to assassinate the Pope in Manila, and the 1996 attack on the U.S. military barracks in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia).

government, *Al-Qaida* launched genuine business enterprises.¹⁰³ These businesses granted income in support of the militant activities of the organization, provided a cover for the acquisition of explosives and weapons, allowed for the worldwide travel of operatives, and made possible the establishment of training facilities within the Sudan.¹⁰⁴ Also important was the aid that was provided by the Sudanese intelligence and military in *Al-Qaida's* pursuit of non-conventional weapons of mass destruction (discussed below). Sudan's support of *Al-Qaida* was unquestionable, and one of the primary reasons for the success of the organization during the early years of its existence.

Afghanistan's role is central to any discussion of Osama bin Laden and *Al-Qaida*. Not only for its participation in creating and shaping the organization, but also for the support that the country (more accurately stated the ruling Taliban government) provided *Al-Qaida* after it left Sudan in 1996. Just like Sudan was essential in nurturing an infant organization, Afghanistan's support helped in the growth of the institution. With complete freedom of movement and little limitations to its activities,¹⁰⁵ *Al-Qaida* established numerous training camps within Afghanistan and continued its activities worldwide. A clear sign of the vitality of the organization and evidence of Afghani support appeared in mid-2001 when a 100-minute videotape displayed the training capabilities of the organization (from terrorist training camps in Afghanistan) in a recruiting-type rendition of *Al-Qaida*.¹⁰⁶ The efforts by the United States (through diplomatic, economic, and military coercion) failed to persuade the Taliban regime to halt support for Osama bin Laden and his organization.

Not all the lines of support from nations to *Al-Qaida* are as clear as those that emanate from Afghanistan and Sudan. The lines are apparent, however, with two

¹⁰³ *Wadi al-Aqiq* (holding company), *al-Hijra* (construction company), *al-Themar al Mubarak* (agricultural company), *Ladin International* (investment company), *Taba Investments* (investment company), *Khartoum Tannery* (leather company), and *Qudarat Transport Company* (transportation company).

¹⁰⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "The indictment of bin Laden and associates in the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania."

¹⁰⁵ The Taliban claimed that Osama bin Laden was in virtual house arrest since 1998 and was prohibited from carrying out any actions or statements in support of his political objectives.

¹⁰⁶ Cable News Network, "Video Shows bin Laden urging Muslims To Prepare For Fighting."

traditional supporters of terrorism—Iraq and Iran. Although it is hard to find the connectivity between *Al-Qaida* and these nations’ leadership or decision-making bodies, there is evidence to suggest a connection between the organization and individuals or institutions within the government.¹⁰⁷

Arguments against an *Al-Qaida* cooperation with Iraq stem from what is believed to be Osama bin Laden’s distrust of the secular regime of Saddam Hussein and his *Ba’ath* Party. Bin Laden predicted as early as 1988 the future Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and he was one of the first individuals to volunteer the service of his battle hardened Arab *mujahideen* in defense of Saudi Arabia after the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.¹⁰⁸ But the dictum “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” makes for strange partners and pragmatism led Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to look at each other for support against their common struggle against the United States. According to Yossef Bodansky, some western officials began to make the Iraqi-*Al-Qaida* connection “noting that while Saddam Hussein lacked the capabilities to strike back at the West, the Islamists did have the capabilities and were eager to strike out...cooperation between Saddam Hussein and bin Laden would be the best approach for both of them.”¹⁰⁹

An example of this strategic alliance was the operation against the United States Navy at Aden, Yemen (that left 17 sailors dead and the destroyer USS Cole severely damaged). The following excerpt explained the possible Iraqi connection to the attack:

the first technical report came from the US military intelligence team, which comes under the command of the Fifth Fleet. This report noted that this was such a ‘massive operation’ and was so meticulously planned and executed that it would be difficult for any terrorist group to carry out without the planning of agencies belonging to countries...accusing finger at the Iraqi regime and blame Baghdad for planning the operation to blow up the Cole Destroyer...a group of Iraqi officers staying in Yemen themselves supervised the logistics and planning of the operation through coordination and cooperation with Yemeni military and security circles,

¹⁰⁷ There is also evidence of some connections between *Al-Qaida* and key members of the Royal Saudi family. See Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America* and Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism*.

¹⁰⁸ Frontline, “Osama bin Laden v. the U.S.: Edicts and Statements,” *Public Broadcasting Service*.

¹⁰⁹ Bodansky, p. 360-361.

which for their turn used extremist fundamentalist sides...the plan to blow up the destroyer [Cole] was prepared in Baghdad in a meeting attended by Qusay Husayn [Saddam Hussein's son] and the commander of the Iraqi forces in Yemen, who was recalled to his country early this month [October 2000].¹¹⁰

Another account also reported on an Iraqi deal with *Al-Qaida*, where the two parties discussed “cooperation and coordination between the Iraqi networks and the cells of the *Al-Qaida* organization...in carrying out a plan to strike at US interests in the Middle East in tandem with the escalation of the Palestinian intifadah.”¹¹¹

Iran is another possible player in the state sponsorship game with *Al-Qaida*. This country remains in the list of state sponsors published yearly by the United States Department of State.¹¹² Iran has undergone a significant shift in the last decade from the primary sponsor of terrorist groups in the Middle East, to a state that seeks to improve its relations with western nations. But important elements within the leadership of Iran still see the United States as a threat to the existence of the Islamic Republic.¹¹³ There is evidence to suggest ideological differences between *Shi'a* dominated Iran and the *Sunni* Islamic extremist groups (such as *Al-Qaida*) being set aside to deal with the common viewed nemesis to their existence—the United States.

The links between Iran and *Al-Qaida* are not clear, but the following selection from Bodansky¹¹⁴ shows the Iranian move in the mid 1990s to gain a leadership foothold among groups espousing *jihad* against the west (to include *Al-Qaida*):

¹¹⁰ R. Alam-al-Din, “Report Cites Sources on Iraq’s Responsibility for ‘USS Cole’ Explosion,” *Al-Watan al-Arabi* (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP20001027000147), 27 October 2000.

¹¹¹ R. Alam-al-Din, “Saddam Husayn’s Female Spies,” *Al-Watan al-Arabi* (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP20010317000181), 16 March 2001.

¹¹² *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000*, Department of State Publication, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 2001.

¹¹³ Important interest groups within Iran, such as the *Foundation of the Oppressed*, provide financial resources to extremist groups worldwide. These interest groups are politically powerful in Iran and can muster financial resources that account for 14% of the country’s GDP (Lecture by A. Goerishi Ph.D., Naval Postgraduate School, 20 November 2001).

¹¹⁴ It is necessary to take the writing of Bodansky (1999) with a grain of salt. This work references other sources to ascertain that the argument of an Iranian-*Al-Qaida* connection is taken seriously.

During 1995, while Iran and other nations sponsored a series of spectacular terrorist strikes throughout the Middle East, the Iranians thoroughly studied the role of intelligence and the organization of intelligence services required for contemporary operations. They also fully investigated the question of the human element, in particular theological motivation, as it pertained to the new generation of terrorists. Senior Iranian officers and officials conducted lengthy discussions with the leaders of the Islamic jihadist trends...the results were implemented in the first half of 1996 in the most profound change in Iranian intelligence since Khomeini's Islamic Revolution. The establishment of the Hizballah International reflected this new direction in state-sponsored international terrorism.¹¹⁵

Recent evidence of an Iranian-*Al-Qaida* surfaced during the investigation of the 1996 attack against the United States military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. According to the London *Al-Zaman* newspaper, "a Pakistani newspaper [revealed] the existence of links between fundamentalist Usamah Bin-Ladin...and the Iranian authorities, even stretching as far as Lebanese Hizballah...the newspaper *Awsaf*, which is published in Karachi, said the US officials, who are following up the Bin-Ladin case, have obtained documents that demonstrate the existence of links between Bin-Ladin and Iranian authorities."¹¹⁶ Information from the USS *Cole* investigation suggested that Ayatollah Khamenei's personal security service struck a deal with *Al-Qaida* for an operational partnership involving the targeting of American and Jewish interests worldwide.¹¹⁷

Information regarding Iranian-bin Laden coordination emerged during the trial of *Al-Qaida* members accused of the bombings of the American embassies in East Africa. As early as 1991, *Al-Qaida* leaders talked about the need to unite all Muslims, regardless of ideology or belief, against their common enemies. In 1992, Sheikh Nomani (a representative from the Iranian government) visited the offices of *Al-Qaida* in Khartoum, Sudan, to discuss cooperation between Iran and bin Laden's organization. This meeting

¹¹⁵ Bodansky, p. 153.

¹¹⁶ H. Munsir and Y. Azizi, "Pakistani Information: Bin-Ladin in Contact with Iranian Authorities," *Al-Zaman* (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP200101090000599), January 2001.

¹¹⁷ Ayatollah Khamenei is the spiritual leader of Iran and successor to the leader of the Iranian Revolution in 1979—Ayatollah Khomeini. DEBKA File, "Umar Suwayd, Binyamin Avraham, Adi Avitan, and Elhanan Tennebaum Handed Over to Bin-Ladin?" *DEBKA* (in Hebrew), (FBIS Document ID: GMP2001011800000617), January 2001.

was followed by the departure of a number of Arab *mujahideen* members of *Al-Qaida* to *Hezbollah* training camps in southern Lebanon.¹¹⁸

State-sponsorship is not just a characteristic of the past, but also a reality of the present. The type of state support received by bin Laden's organization in the 1990s was instrumental to the institution's survival and success. Support of *Al-Qaida*, however, is not limited to nation states. Independent organizations and individuals are also important in the support network of bin Laden and his organization.

2. Group and Individual Support

Groups working with *Al-Qaida* form the backbone of the organization. The creation of the *Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders* (that was fashioned in 1998 by Osama bin Laden) integrated organizations of strategic importance. Close associates of *Al-Qaida* spelled out in bin Laden's 1998 *fatwa* included *Gamaa Islamiya* (Egypt), *Egyptian al-Jihad* (Egypt), *Harakat ul-Ansar* (Pakistan), *Jamiat -e-Pakistan* (Pakistan), *Jihad Movement* (Bangladesh), and other smaller groups located in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Yemen.¹¹⁹ Among these groups the Egyptian connection with *Al-Qaida* was of utmost importance.¹²⁰ The leader of the *Egyptian Al-Jihad* organization, Ayman al-Zawahri, was a member of the *Al-Qaida's majlis al shura* from the onset of the organization and recent reports placed his position within *Al-Qaida* as co-equal to that held by Osama bin Laden.¹²¹ Also, the founders of the military wing of *Gamaa Islamiya*—Shawqki Al-Islambuli, Rifa'I Taha, Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim, and Mustafa

¹¹⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Southern District of New York Court Reporter's Office Daily Transcripts of the USA v. Usama bin Laden et al trial in the Southern District of New York*, Transcript # 126LBIN1.

¹¹⁹ The *Libyan Fight Group* (Libya), *Saif Islam Jannubi* (Yemen), *Talah e Fatah* (Egypt), *Jamaat e Jihal al Sari* (Syria), *Abu Ali Group* (Palestine/Jordan), and *Jamaat e Jihad* (Eritrea). From the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1.

¹²⁰ Members of *Al-Qaida* talked of *Gamaa Islamiya* as being "under" *Al-Qaida*, and *Egyptian Jihad* as being "within" the organization. From the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1.

¹²¹ M. Hamdi, "The New Al-Jihad Prepares to Escalate the Violence," *Al-Ahram al-Arabi* (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP20010219000118), 17 February 2001.

Hamza—forged a close relationship with Osama bin Laden that was initiated during years of fighting *jihad* against the Soviet Union.¹²²

Al-Qaida also maintains relations with important Islamic movements throughout the world. The connections tend to be influenced by the link between veterans of the Arab *mujahideen* who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. In Algeria, for example, there are connections between *Al-Qaida* and the *Groupes Islamiques Armés* (GIA). The last surviving member of the GIA made the following comment regarding ties with *Al-Qaida*:

There was a relationship with Usamah Bin Ladin and there are many Algerian Afghans in his organization. He offered to provide us with assistance and the amir of the group Jamal Zetouni asked me to go to Sudan and talk to Bin-Ladin and I did. In addition to the financial assistance, Bin-Ladin sent many men from his organization to join the armed action in Algeria.¹²³

The same type of connection is seen in Chechnya as Arab *mujahideen* fight alongside Chechen fighters in the conflict against Russia. Buildups of *mujahideen* forces loyal to bin Laden emerged at the outset of the second Chechnya war. A contingent of 400 Arab fighters was sent in May 2000 to supplement the “hundreds of Arabs and Afghans [that] were sent to Chechnya 1 ½ years ago.”¹²⁴ The importance of these *mujahideen* fighters within the Chechen forces is stressed in the following excerpt:

Bin Laden’s *mujahideen* activated Islamist units that constituted the elite strike forces of key Chechen commanders during the [first] war against Russia, who are now the leaders in Chechnya. Such forces include the soldiers of the Orthodox Caliphs, which served under now president Maskhadov; the Abd-al-Qadir Forces, which fought under former vice president Shamil Basaev; and the Islamic Liberation Party Forces, which

¹²² H.H. Diab, “Bin-Ladin Finances the Terrorists Who Have Been Making Threats to Croatia,” *Zagreb Vecernji List* (in Serbo-Croatian), (FBIS Document ID: EUP200101030003053), January 2001.

¹²³ U. Tazghart, “Sensational Information And Details Revealed For The First Time: Al-Majallah Holds An Exclusive Interview With The Last Surviving Founding Member Of The Algerian Armed Islamic Group,” *Al-Majallah* (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP20010117000133), 14 January 2001.

¹²⁴ Staff Writer, “Bin-Ladin Organization Military Instructor Says Gunmen Sent to Chechnya,” *ITAR-TASS*, (FBIS Document ID: CEP20000829000376), 29 August 2000.

answer to Salam Raduyev, Chechnya's extremist terrorist in whose 'territory' bin Laden was offered asylum.¹²⁵

This Arab *mujahideen* connection of fighters actively fighting the government (as in Algeria and Chechnya) expands the *Al-Qaida* network beyond terrorist cells scattered throughout the world.¹²⁶ It also provides these fighters with continued experience with combat operations against a determined and formidable foe. These elements increase the extremism and militant nature of *Al-Qaida*.

Fund raising is important when analyzing the support that is provided to *Al-Qaida*. Much of the fund raising done by Muslim groups worldwide is in support of ideological, social, and political reasons and not for the purpose of pursuing extremism or militancy. Nevertheless, financial resources from organizations and individuals that look genuine and non-violent can, and do, end up in the hands of *Al-Qaida*. Even though some of these fund-raising organizations publicly condemn the use of terror, the importance to the finance of terrorism is clear.

These groups and movements carry out the vast majority of political, social, cultural, and educational Islamic work, both in the Muslim world and among Muslim communities in the West. Therefore, they serve as the most important element in creating and preserving the 'Islamic atmosphere' that is used by more extremist and violent Islamist groups. They are in many cases a greenhouse for the emergence of violent groups and the preservation of worldviews of hostility toward the West or Western culture. The Islamist 'Terrorist Culture' can be sketched as a pyramid; at the base there is the large-scale activity of the Islamic social and non-violent groups: associations, institutes, and projects of all kinds. At the head of the pyramid there are the terrorist groups. In the middle there are various processes that refine certain social elements into hatred, revenge, the search for power and violence. This violence is in many cases indirectly financed by innocent elements.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Bodansky, pp. 385-386.

¹²⁶ Not limited to Algeria and Chechnya, but also evident in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Yemen, the Philippines and Kashmir.

¹²⁷ R. Paz, "Middle East Terrorist Groups Use of Western Front Companies To Finance Operations," *Herzliyya International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism*, (FBIS Document ID: GMP20001101000209), 23 October 2000.

The connections between Muslim fund-raising activities worldwide and direct financial support of *Al-Qaida* is significant. Bin Laden receives direct donations from wealthy individuals in the Middle East, and other clandestine supporters worldwide. *Al-Qaida* also benefits from numerous Muslim activities and institutions scattered throughout the Muslim and Western world.¹²⁸

States, groups, and individuals have had, and continue to have, a stake in the type of organization into which *Al-Qaida* developed. Osama bin Laden's organization is dependent on several sources of support. It is not a self-sufficient enterprise. The web and the network are large, and the links are solid and necessary for the continued livelihood of *Al-Qaida*.

This large web of support equates to a large number of constituents. Therefore, *Al-Qaida* is limited in the nature of activities that it can pursue. A large constituency means that players can have an influence in the decision-making process of the organization. *Al-Qaida* must conduct operations that maintain the substantial support from the important sectors of the organization's constituency. As an organization that is not self-sufficient, *Al-Qaida* is bounded by a constituency.¹²⁹ This limitation is important when analyzing the topic of CBRN weapons in the next section because *Al-Qaida* is limited in the weapons that it can use and the types of attacks that it can achieve because of the bounds that are placed on the organization by the need to keep its constituency together.

¹²⁸ Noting the importance of these activities worldwide the administration of George W. Bush pushed forward in October 2001 an active offense against these groups (and individuals) in the attempt to block their financial holdings and freeze their money assets worldwide. A similar, albeit less intensive, attempt targeting financial holdings was made by the administration of Bill Clinton in 1998.

¹²⁹ One might question this idea when considering the magnitude of the September 11, 2001 attacks. But recall the numerous celebrations in Palestine the day of the attack. The constituency of *Al-Qaida* saw the attacks in New York and Washington D.C. within the limits of possible action.

E. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION¹³⁰

The experts' traditional view of terror attacks resulting in mass casualties is that the terrorists' goals are not enhanced with the greater number of individuals that are killed. More important are the numbers of people that are influenced by the acts of terror.¹³¹ The question arises whether the following selection was made obsolete by the September 2001 attacks against the United States:¹³²

For the most part killing a few people is as effective for achieving group goals as is killing many. It also reflects a technological conservatism: a desire to maintain an element of proportionality and willingness to fulfill their threats; a fear of reprisals; a concern of possible backlash and decline in support by the group's constituency.¹³³

The purpose of this section is to analyze the state of *Al-Qaida's* CBRN capabilities. After the attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the barriers that were present against operations that would result in massive casualties might have ceased to exist. The 9-11 attacks possibly opened the floodgates of greater lethality and the likelihood of CBRN weapons' use in operations of terror. The only limitation now in the use of CBRN weapons is limited to the bounds that are placed on *Al-Qaida* by the constituency that it attempts to satisfy.

Decisions on operations by *Al-Qaida* are done for pragmatic reasons to achieve specific goals. Although the achievement of mass casualties is not an end-state, in the

¹³⁰ The term of weapons of mass destruction is used here in the broadest sense to include not only non conventional weapons—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN)—but also conventional weapons that can lead to mass casualties.

¹³¹ Consider, for example, the first case of bio-terror in the United States with the outbreak of Anthrax cases in October 2001. Although the number of casualties in this event was minimal (5 killed), the intimidation and terror that it produced nation wide was substantial.

¹³² In an interview between T. Kuster, Director, Counterterrorism Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., and the author, 20 August 2001, the belief is that the employment of weapons of mass destruction, if used, would be limited in nature so as to not lead to a full retaliation by the government. A Department of State interview at the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Washington, D.C., with the author, 21 August 2001 also echoed the same rational thinking limiting the use of WMD by *Al-Qaida*, but added that if these weapons were used they would be employed at a time and place to minimize casualties among Muslims.

¹³³ G. Cameron, "Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shimrikyo and Al Qaida," *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*, 20 June 1999, pp. 278-279.

concept of total warfare *Al-Qaida* is not limited operationally by the prospect of mass casualties. Operational decision-making is pragmatic in nature with an eye on the enemy and *Al-Qaida's* organizational end-states, and the use of CBRN weapons, therefore, needs to be looked at from this perspective.

Osama bin Laden made two statements during interviews with western journalists in 1998 where he stated his desire to seek non-conventional weapons. Bin Laden stated his belief in the use of non-conventional weapons as a rational means of total warfare. Asked by ABC News correspondent John Miller to clarify whom he believed was the target of his *fatwa*, bin Laden answered in the following manner:

Each action will solicit a similar reaction. We must use such punishment to keep your [United States] evil away from Muslims, Muslim children and women. American history does not distinguish between civilians and military, and not even women and children. They are the ones who used bombs against Nagasaki. Can these bombs distinguish between infants and military? America does not have a religion that will prevent it from destroying all people.

Your [United States] situation with Muslims in Palestine is shameful, if there is any shame left in America. In the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, a cooperation between Zionist and Christian forces, houses were demolished over the heads of children. Also, by testimony of relief workers in Iraq, the American led sanctions resulted in the death of over 1 million Iraqi children.

All of this was done in the name of American interests. We believe that the bigger thieves in the world and the terrorists are the Americans. The only way for us to fend off these assaults is to use similar means.¹³⁴

More targeted toward the use of CBRN weapons and the alleged acquisition of some of these weapons by *Al-Qaida*, bin Laden responded as follows during a December 1998 interview with ABC News producer Rahimullah Yousafzai:

In answer I would say that acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. To seek to possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons [chemical/nuclear], then this is an obligation I carried out and I thank God for enabling us to do that. And if I seek to acquire these

¹³⁴ John Miller, "Talking with Terror's Banker," *ABC News*.

weapons I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims. But how we could use these weapons if we possess them is up to us.¹³⁵

These two statements display *Al-Qaida's* intention to seek non-conventional weapons in the pursuit of the organization's objectives.

Al-Qaida's proliferation efforts are a means to achieve finite political objectives. The *Al-Qaida* leadership views these efforts as a defensive measure against an enemy that the organization believes has a history of indiscriminate targeting of military and civilian targets.¹³⁶ In the mind of bin Laden and his supporters, the 2001 attack on the WTC, besides the obvious symbolic value, can be equated to the attacks of the United States against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. *Al-Qaida's* leadership believes that an organization that fights a total war against an enemy that is viewed as a threat to its existence and way of life should not only acquire, but possibly also use, every means available to attain success and achieve survival. In this perception lies the danger of *Al-Qaida* with the use of weapons of mass destruction. Although limited by a constituency, if the organization's leadership views that its survival is at stake (and the survival of Muslims worldwide is in danger) the use of all means available becomes a viable option.

Al-Qaida attempts to acquire a CBRN capability can be traced to the early 1990s when the organization was in Sudan. According to an *Al-Qaida* member, on or about 1994 there was a coordination meeting between members of *Al-Qaida* and a Sudanese army officer to acquire chemical weapons at the facility of Hilat Koko.¹³⁷ The attempts in Sudan were not limited to chemical weapons, but also expanded into the search for nuclear fissile material. At the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, *Al-Qaida* members attempted to purchase Uranium with the help of a former Sudanese minister and

¹³⁵ R. Yousafzai, "Talking with Terror's Banker," *ABC News* [http://204.202.137.111/sections/world/DailyNews/transcript_binladen1_981228.html], 17 July 2001.

¹³⁶ Cameron, p. 278.

¹³⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 126LBIN1.

Sudanese army officer—Lieutenant Colonel Salah Abdel al Mobruk.¹³⁸ This fissile material was believed to have originated from South Africa and *Al-Qaida* paid \$1.5 million for the transaction.¹³⁹

The endeavors to acquire and/or make CBRN weapons were not limited to the organization's time in Sudan. *Al-Qaida* attempted to obtain weapons of mass destruction while in Afghanistan after 1996. In laboratories in Afghanistan, studies were made on the use of toxins, and the weaponization of chemical and biological materials.¹⁴⁰ The organization pursued the acquisition of VX nerve gas from outside sources.¹⁴¹ While in Afghanistan *Al-Qaida* also sought after fissile nuclear material from nations of the former Soviet Union. The connections here emanated from the relationship between *Al-Qaida* and Chechen fighters who had managed to acquire radiological/nuclear material.¹⁴²

The attempt to acquire non-conventional weapons was not limited to fissile material. *Al-Qaida* also sought to obtain ready-made nuclear weapons:

[...] reports indicate that an intelligence service of a European country has foiled an attempt to ship nuclear heads to Bin-Ladin and the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan. These nuclear heads, estimated at 20, came from nuclear arsenals in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and even Russia. The reports add that five Turkmenistan nuclear experts were middlemen in this deal.¹⁴³

A connection exists between the Russian Mafia, smuggling of nuclear weapons, and the production of opium and heroin by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Russian intelligence was under the belief that the Russian mafia entered into an alliance with the Taliban, where opium and heroin were used “in exchange for small nuclear weapons to be used for

¹³⁸ K. Resch, and M. Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden,” *CNS Reports*, [<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm>], 17 July 2001.

¹³⁹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transcript # 127KBINF. It turned out that the fissile material was a hoax and *Al-Qaida* lost the \$1.5 in the transaction.

¹⁴⁰ R. Leshem, “Obvious Danger,” *Yedi'ot Aharonot* (in Hebrew), (FBIS Document ID: GMP20000914000063), 14 July 2000.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² T. Avyerinos, “Russia and Illicit Trade,” *Elevtherotipia* (in Greek), (FBIS Document ID: GMP20010202000068), 2 February 2001.

¹⁴³ B. Abu-Stit, “Taliban, Bin-Ladin Said Trying To Acquire Nuclear Weapons From Russian Mafia,” *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (in Arabic), (FBIS Document ID: GMP200012250000042), 5 December 2000.

terrorist operations against targets in several areas.”¹⁴⁴ This links Russian criminal elements, drug smuggling in South Asia, and CBRN weapons/materiel acquisition by *Al-Qaida*.

Al-Qaida worked to acquire CBRN weapons from several sources. If these weapons are not currently available to them, *Al-Qaida* will continue to seek them. Additionally, the barriers that once might have limited the use of weapons of mass destruction came falling down when the WTC towers were toppled because of the magnitude of the event. Augmenting these two variables is the exacerbating factor that the *Al-Qaida* leadership perceives itself to be in a total war where the survival of Muslims throughout the world, and the organization, is at stake. One significant limitation in the use of CBRN weapons by *Al-Qaida* might come from the possible bounds that are set by the group’s constituency. Osama bin Laden and his organization are driven by the support that it receives from various stakeholders. Crossing the line into the use of CBRN weapons is a situation that could result in the overwhelming loss of support by the organization’s constituency.

F. CONCLUSION

Looking at the ideology and the objectives of *Al-Qaida*, the discussion focused on the driving force behind the movement and the long- and short-term objectives of *Al-Qaida*. Osama bin Laden and his organization approach short-term objectives rationally from a unique perspective that combines present geopolitical and geostrategic situations to grander end-states tied to the organization’s own interpretation of theological dogma.

Al-Qaida can be considered a hierarchical organization with a command and control structure that centralizes decision-making. Organizationally, *Al-Qaida* combines a transnational organizational design with a hierarchical structure of functional divisions at the leadership echelon. At the lower operational echelons of *Al-Qaida*, the structure is similar to the cellular design commonly associated with other terrorist organizations that allows for decentralized execution of tactical operations.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

The idea that state sponsorship of terrorism is an issue of the past is not apparent when analyzing *Al-Qaida*. Without the support Sudan and Afghanistan, among others, *Al-Qaida* would have been hard pressed to continue operations worldwide. Also significant is the aid and support that the organization receives from other groups and individuals. Although the links between the supporters and *Al-Qaida* are sometimes nebulous and hard to decipher, the networks are present, and indeed, key to the continuation of the organization. The significance of these numerous support links is that they establish a constituency that places an operational bound on the organization.

Al-Qaida believes, from an ideological standpoint, in the rightfulness of using non-conventional weapons to achieve its objectives. *Al-Qaida* has pursued, and continues to pursue, the acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The connection between non-conventional weapons and *Al-Qaida* can be made with the group's perception of an involvement in a total war where survival is at stake.

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III. CASE STUDY: *HEZBOLLAH*¹⁴⁵

A. INTRODUCTION

Hezbollah is one of the most successful terrorist organizations of the 20th Century. Through the use of terror tactics, the Lebanese *Hezbollah* managed to drive out of Lebanon the armies of two western powers—the United States and France. *Hezbollah* also managed to accomplish a feat that has eluded Arab countries for fifty years—defeating the Israeli military and forcing the pullout of Israel’s army from land that it had taken forcefully. Also, albeit indirectly, the tactics of *Hezbollah* forced an American administration into a quagmire between rhetoric and action that ultimately caused the U.S. great embarrassment and a loss of legitimacy.¹⁴⁶

Hezbollah falls within the definition of a traditional terrorist organization. *Hezbollah* is an organization with a clearly hierarchical and a command and control structure. It is guided by the clear political goals of resistance against an invading army, carrying out militant attacks focused on the armies of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the South Lebanon Army (SLA). *Hezbollah* is a terrorist organization substantially influenced and supported by state sponsorship from Iran and Syria.

This chapter continues to question the emergence of new terrorism. It shows that a traditional terrorist organization displayed some important elements of new terrorism in its early years. More significant, though, this chapter shows the similarities apparent when comparing *Al-Qaida* and *Hezbollah*. By showing the similarities between the premiere new terrorist organization of today—*Al-Qaida*—and a traditional terrorist organization of the 1980s—the Lebanese *Hezbollah*—one can demonstrate that terrorism has changed only marginally over the last 20 years. This chapter is organized to coincide with the three main categories used throughout this work to separate the characteristics of

¹⁴⁵ Also known as the Party of God, Islamic Jihad, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and the Revolutionary Justice Organization.

¹⁴⁶ Although publicly stating a policy of no-concessions and no-deals with terrorists, the Reagan administration ultimately traded military weapons with Iran for some of the hostages held by *Hezbollah* in Lebanon. Once the deal became public it led to the infamous Iran-Contra affair.

new terrorism: ideology and objectives, organizational structure, and external support. The last section of this chapter deals specifically with the issue of attacks that result in mass casualties.

B. IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES

For the Lebanese *Hezbollah*, political goals are clear, terror is used as a means to accomplish finite goals, and the achievement of casualties is not an objective in itself. Therefore, the ideology and objectives of *Hezbollah* fall within the characteristics of a traditional terrorism. Continuing the argument that questions the emergence of new terrorism in the 1990s, the goal in this section is to display similarities between the ideology and objectives of *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida*. This section looks in particular at the circumstances that led to the emergence of the group's ideology, and the development of organizational objectives that changed in response to geopolitical and geostrategic realities.

1. Ideology

Hezbollah emerged in the spring of 1983 as a result of preconditions and direct causes that ultimately mobilized some of the *Shi'i* minority in Lebanon into militant action.¹⁴⁷ Providing a comprehensive description of all the factors that led to the emergence of *Hezbollah* in Lebanon is not within the scope of this chapter.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, in the development of the group's ideology there were three issues of particular interest. One, the significant influence that a common experience in the Iraqi

¹⁴⁷ The terms *precondition* and *direct cause* were introduced in Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideology, Theologies, States of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). A precondition is an element in the environment—in that of the group or those it targets—that creates the necessary conditions and/or opportunities where terrorism can flourish. A direct cause is a precipitant that, in combination with preconditions, can add to the volatile mixture and lead to acts of terrorism.

¹⁴⁸ I refer the reader to Augustus R. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); and Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

city of Najaf had on the leadership of *Hezbollah*. Two, a particular set of events instigated the group's ideology and established the patterns for future extremism. Last, the importance of the concept of *jihad* and martyrdom as a key element of the organization's ideology.

Hezbollah's leadership experience in Najaf was crucial in the establishment of close bonds and, ultimately, in the development of the organization's extremist ideology. It was in this Iraqi city that the leaders of *Hezbollah* first established important relationships and created the circumstances for the subsequent development of the *Party of God's* ideological zeal.

In the early 1980s there were several groups of radical *Shi'i* spread throughout Lebanon. Ultimately, these separate groups united under the overarching umbrella of *Hezbollah*. All of these *Shi'i* organizations "could trace their origins to the activities during the 1960-70s of the Shi'a religious academies in the south of Iraq most notably in the Shi'a shrine city of Najaf."¹⁴⁹ In these decades, before the emergence of *Hezbollah*, the future leaders of the organization received their religious indoctrination in Najaf. It was during this time in Iraq that these future *Hezbollah* leaders were submitted to the radical and militant ideology that would consequently drive the organization.

The importance of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 cannot be overemphasized. The connection between the Islamic leaders in Iran and the clerics of *Hezbollah* is essential in understanding the ideological fervor and some of the strategic decisions that were made by *Hezbollah's* leadership. The period of the 1960s and 1970s in Najaf was of the utmost importance here. It was in Najaf between 1964 and 1978 that the future leader of the Islamic Revolution—Ayatollah Khomeini—was exiled and began to build a revolutionary following. It was in Najaf that Khomeini began to publicly denounce the Iranian monarchy and a possible Islamic Revolution.¹⁵⁰ Once the regime of the shah of Iran was removed in 1979, the Islamic Revolution became an enduring example to Lebanese clerics of what "a pious, well-organized, and motivated *umma*

¹⁴⁹ Ranstorp, p. 26.

¹⁵⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1993), p.11.

(Islamic community) could accomplish in the face of oppression and unjustness.”¹⁵¹ The commonly shared experience of Iranian and Lebanese clerics in Najaf during the 1960s and 1970s was a springboard in the rise of influential individuals and groups in both countries. Both the revolutionary spirit of the Iranian Revolution and the radical zeal of *Hezbollah* were launched from a common ground in Southern Iraq.

In the case of *Hezbollah* direct causes led to the establishment and growth of the organization. Four events preceded the creation of the organization and established the impetus for the specific ideology that *Hezbollah* adopted. Magnus Ranstorp describes these four events:

[F]irstly, the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978 became a focal point for the mobilisation and radicalisation of the Shi’a community. Secondly, Israel’s invasion of Southern Lebanon in 1978, with the consequent loss of Shi’i lives and destruction of their homes, revitalized Amal and reinforced the image of Israel as the enemy of Islam...[T]hirdly, the establishment of the Shi’a Islamic state in Iran...reverberated among the Shi’a community in Lebanon and provided them with an effective model for political action...[Lastly], the 1982 Israeli invasion became a seminal event...[and led] to the proliferation of a number of radical and militant Shi’a movements. These groups merged into the establishment of a main revolutionary Shi’a movement, the [*Hezbollah*], an organisational umbrella composed of a coalition of radical movements under the leadership of a small select group of Najaf-educated clergy.¹⁵²

The first three direct causes that led to the creation and active militancy of *Hezbollah* were important, but less significant than the last event.

The invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 and the consequent long-term occupation of Lebanese territory were the significant acts that led to the emergence of *Hezbollah* (and their militant activity that targeted the western powers in general and Israel in particular). Within a period of one year, with numerous miscalculations and wrong decisions, the IDF went from being perceived as an army of liberation to an army of occupation.¹⁵³ Hala Jaber stated that “the change in attitude occurred slowly as the

¹⁵¹ Norton, p. 56.

¹⁵² Ranstorp, pp. 29-30.

¹⁵³ Before the 1982 invasion, open warfare between Amal and the Palestinian Liberation Organization

[*Shi'i*] became aware that Israel was reluctant to leave Lebanon and appeared set on staying for a long period of time, despite having achieved its main objective of driving the Palestinians from the South.”¹⁵⁴ This intrusion of a foreign army set the stage for *Hezbollah's* potent anti-Israeli and anti-western ideology. The occupation of *Shi'i* communities in Southern Lebanon, and the perception of an armed offensive against the population in the region, aided in creating *Hezbollah's* radical interpretation of *jihad*.

The ideology of a *jihad* against “infidel and corrupt armies” of the west in the defense, not just of one’s own people but of all Muslims, became the driving force behind *Hezbollah*. Jaber explained the concept of *jihad* in the eyes of *Hezbollah*:

In [*Shi'a*] Islam, only the Twelfth Imam is permitted to lead an offensive *jihad* and the practice has therefore long been in abeyance. *Hezbollah's* *jihad* is defined as a defensive *jihad*: Islamic law dictates that when land has been confiscated or occupied by an outside force, Muslims are obliged to participate in armed struggle until the land is retrieved. In carrying out a *jihad*, *Hezbollah* is also relieving other Muslims of the responsibility to join the fight. It is every Muslim’s individual duty, *fard ayn*, to participate in a *jihad* unless a group like *Hezbollah* undertakes the struggle on their behalf as a collective duty, *fard kefaya*.¹⁵⁵

The notion of martyrdom was coupled with the concept of *jihad*. Martyrdom became an important signature element of the organization’s ideological zeal in the accomplishment of its objectives (and in the realization of a holy war against the armies of Israel and the west).

It is easy to relate the concept of martyrdom to *Hezbollah*. In addition to the continuous attacks of martyrdom by *Hezbollah* against the IDF and SLA forces in Southern Lebanon, evident in the memories of many were the suicide car bomb attacks on the American and French peacekeeping forces at Beirut in October 1983.¹⁵⁶ *Hezbollah*

(PLO) in southern Lebanon was a keen possibility. During the first weeks of the invasion, *Shi'i* in the south of Lebanon even aided the invading armies in pushing out the PLO. As Norton, p. 86, explains “[i]t is no overstatement to claim that many southern *Shi'i* welcomed the Israeli invasion.”

¹⁵⁴ Jaber, p. 15.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁵⁶ The concept of the suicide car bomb was an innovation in terror tactics developed by *Hezbollah*.

managed to combine the ideology of *jihad* and the spirit of martyrdom into a tactically, and some would argue strategically, effective military weapon. For the western mind, the concept of martyrdom was complicated, but for the members of *Hezbollah* the connotations were different. This is apparent in the following statement of a *Hezbollah* member:

You look at it with a Western mentality. You regard it as barbaric and unjustified. We, on the other hand, see it as another means of war, but one which is also harmonious with our religion and beliefs. Take, for example, the Israeli warplane or, better still, the American and British air power in the Gulf War. They dropped tons of bombs on their targets. The goal of their mission and the outcome of their deeds was to kill and damage enemy positions just like us, except our enemy is Israel. The only difference is that they had at their disposal state-of-the-art and top-of-the-range means and weaponry to achieve their aims. We have the minimum basics, but that does not bother us because we know that if and when required we also have ourselves to sacrifice. They get medals and titles for their feats of bravery and victories. We, on the other hand, do not seek material rewards, but heavenly ones in the hereafter. But in truth there is no difference between their attacks and ours. Both of us have one thing in common—to annihilate the enemy. The rest is mere logistics and differences in techniques. Whether one attacks by planes or by car bombs the objective is the same.¹⁵⁷

This shows an important connection between religion and ideology. This connection drove the ideological zeal of *Hezbollah* and was used as a weapon by the organization in the pursuit of *jihad* and in the accomplishment of organizational objectives.

The connection between terrorism and religion is not a concept of the 20th century.¹⁵⁸ The innovation is how *Hezbollah* managed to use religious ideology (particularly the concepts of *jihad* and martyrdom) to mobilize the fervor of the Lebanese population in the pursuit of objectives that were established as a response to strategic and

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 92-93.

¹⁵⁸ According to Simon, *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience With Terrorism*, the origins of terrorism can be traced back to the first century A.D. when, during the rule of the Roman Empire, Jewish *Zealots* and *Sicariis* used violence to achieve revolutionary goals against the ruling empire in Palestine. In the eleventh and thirteenth centuries the Order of the Assassins—an offshoot *Shi'a* Islamic sect established by Hassan Sabbah—spread terror and violence throughout the Middle East, and viewed their killings as a holy mission. See Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*.

political circumstances. The ideological zeal of *Hezbollah* was transformed into rational objectives that adjusted to the regional and international environment.

2. Objectives

Hezbollah displayed flexibility in adapting to regional conditions and rearranging short-term objectives to deal with the specific geostrategic and geopolitical environment. “Essence is one thing and pragmatism is something else...[o]nce within the fray of pluralist politics, the agenda of the [*Hezbollah*] seems less to concern absolutist ventures and more a policy of how to improve the life of the mundane and most temporal.”¹⁵⁹ Although wrapped in the veil of theological dogma and grand ideology of good versus evil, the short-term objectives of *Hezbollah* resulted from rational decisions based on the group’s perception of reality and the particular needs of the organization.

The long-term objectives of the organization remained steadfast from the onset of the group in the early 1980s. These were the grand strategic objectives based on ideological fervor and religious symbolism. These long-term objectives were summarized as follows: (1) to destroy the “Zionist entity;” (2) to ease the oppression and suffering of the Islamic community worldwide; (3) to defend Islam against the offense of the United States and the Soviet Union; (4) to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon; and (5) to create a coordinated and comprehensive movement involving all the revolutionary and liberation movements in the world.¹⁶⁰ In contrast to these long-term objectives, the shorter-term objectives, and the subsequent operational activities of *Hezbollah*, were immersed with pragmatism and an understanding of the regional and international political and strategic environment.

For example, the first objectives of the organization and the initial activities of *Hezbollah*, which originally brought the institution world recognition, dealt with the

¹⁵⁹ Mats Wärm, “Staying the Course: The ‘Lebanonization’ of Hizbullah,” Master thesis, Stockholm University, 1999.

¹⁶⁰ The objectives of *Hezbollah* were first publicly stated in a manifesto that was released on February 1985. Even the title of the manifesto demonstrated the idea of a grand strategy of defense against oppression: *Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World*. The full text of the manifesto can be found in Norton, pp. 167-87.

presence of foreign western military and non-military activities in Lebanon. Even as late as the end of the 1980s, *Hezbollah* called for the expulsion of “the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land.”¹⁶¹ This short-term objective was exemplified by the numerous operations against the United States and French governments in Lebanon and the Middle East throughout the 1980s. Although *Hezbollah*'s final end-states called for such matters as the annihilation of Israel, in reality, the extremist and militant activities of the 1980s dealt directly with the short-term perspective of ridding Lebanon from any influential foreign presence.

The short-term objectives and the operational actions of the organization demonstrated the convergence of internal and external influences on *Hezbollah*. For example, the 1983 attacks on the Multinational Forces in Beirut combined the needs of a young organization for enhancing and proving its militant ideology in the eyes of regional rival groups and the entire Lebanese population, with the geostrategic requirements and interests of Syria and Iran. This complicated web of influences, and the particular domestic and international aspects of the situation in the Middle East in the 1980s, was also exemplified by the hostage taking crises that swept Lebanon during this period of time. In addition to the specific needs of Iran and Syria, the decision of *Hezbollah* to take western hostages and the continuing struggle of resistance could be “seen as an instrument to enhance the movement’s popularity and credibility among the Shi’a community in a wider effort to achieve the implementation of an Islamic regime.”¹⁶² The hostage taking events of the 1980s showed the difficulty in differentiating between the immediate objective of expelling foreign influences from Lebanon, the particular strategic circumstances in the region, and specific rudiments of domestic politics. The objectives of *Hezbollah*, therefore, were affected by more than ideological zeal. The geopolitical and geostrategic environment in which *Hezbollah* lived increasingly affected the short-term objectives of the organization.

¹⁶¹ Institute of Counterterrorism, “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” [http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm], 17 July 2001.

¹⁶² Ranstorp, p. 57.

Another example of a short-term objective for *Hezbollah* emerged in the late 1980s. This objective dealt with the need to increase the organization's survivability and the hunt for greater popular support within Lebanon. After years of militancy and extremism, the group faced the reality of a complicated domestic political environment that was (and continues to be) significantly heterogeneous.¹⁶³ Pragmatism was further instituted as the group was forced to gain a larger constituency in Lebanon to remain competitive within the political environment of the country.¹⁶⁴ Beyond the continuation of militancy, *Hezbollah* established an extensive and effective social base in Lebanon while exploiting political capital for its continuing resistance in the south.¹⁶⁵ Remaining politically viable and increasing its survivability became an essential objective for *Hezbollah* starting in the late 1980s (and continuing throughout the 1990s).

Throughout the life of the organization, *Hezbollah* showed the flexibility to alter short-term objectives within the framework of longer-termed, grander, and more ideological end-states. Established under the premise of militancy and the pursuit of anti-western ideals, *Hezbollah* was forced to deal with a complicated political situation in Lebanon and the changing strategic realities in the region. Although maintaining the religious and ideological fervor that inspired activism in the 1980s, *Hezbollah* saw the need to establish itself as a legitimate and genuine political movement for the purposes of survival.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ The confessional system of government in Lebanon represents the following major divisions of the population in the country (in order of representative power within the government): Christian Maronites, Muslim *Sunni*, Muslim *Shi'a*, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Druze, and Armenians. See M.E. Yapp, *The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995* (London and New York: Longman, 1996).

¹⁶⁴ *Hezbollah* successfully participated in the Lebanese elections in 1992 and 1998.

¹⁶⁵ Norton, p. 101.

¹⁶⁶ This issue of survivability became a central argument as the Israeli Army retreated from Southern Lebanon in the summer of 2000. The issue of organizational survival became a central element as *Hezbollah* managed to succeed against Israel in Lebanon. The success of *Hezbollah* eliminated the group's primary *raison d'être*. And the flexibility of the organization was evident as *Hezbollah* began to look at the Palestinian cause as a new short-term objective for the organization—as seen by the rhetoric and increased coordination between *Hezbollah* and Palestinian groups in Israel.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

At the outset, *Hezbollah's* organization exhibited qualities that are associated with new terrorism. At an early stage, the *Party of God* had an amorphous and not well established organizational structure. *Hezbollah* did not have a clear hierarchy and could be considered an umbrella organization for different subordinate groups. With time, however, *Hezbollah* created a well-designed organizational structure with a clear hierarchy

The organizational structure of *Hezbollah* has officially been kept a secret throughout the history of the group.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, enough has been written on the subject to enable a good understanding of the group's organization and command and control structure.¹⁶⁸

Initially, *Hezbollah* was an umbrella agency for small groups and individuals that had turned to a more extreme and militant interpretation of resistance against the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. The first signs of *Hezbollah* as an organization appeared in early 1983. An official resistance movement, the Lebanese National Resistance (LNR), under the control of Amal began to slowly separate itself from the leadership of Amal in Beirut.¹⁶⁹ The LNR espoused a militant and revolutionary ideology.¹⁷⁰ It was not until 1985, however, that *Hezbollah* officially announced its existence and the creation of its military wing—the Islamic Resistance.

During the first years of *Hezbollah* as an organization (after 1985) the Islamic Resistance was given an autonomous mandate. The military wing of *Hezbollah*

¹⁶⁷ Jaber, p.119, explains that “the intelligence services [of the West] are still blaming Hezbollah as if it was one individual person. This is because no one yet has been able to come up with an accurate list of names or a break down as to whom was behind what and how the chain of command actually worked, and no one will ever be able to.”

¹⁶⁸ See Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* and Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance*.

¹⁶⁹ *Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya* known better by its acronym AMAL. A religious movement that was established in 1975 to mobilize the *Shi'a* community in Lebanon. Although religious at the outset Amal eventually turned more secular in nature, and therefore, some of the members began to openly oppose the movement. In time *Hezbollah* and Amal became each other's most significant immediate threat. See Norton (1987) for a comprehensive analysis of Amal.

¹⁷⁰ Jaber, p. 19.

performed operations without reliance on the leadership echelon.¹⁷¹ At this stage, decision-making in *Hezbollah* was decentralized. The *Party of God's* current secretary-general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, later explained the idea of an amorphous organization solely held together by the mere glue of ideology:

The main effort [at the beginning] went into mustering and attracting young men and setting up military camps where they could be trained and organised into small groups capable of carrying out resistance attacks against the occupying force. There were no institutions like now, no large organisation or specialised departments. There was only a group effort concentrating on two main issues. The first being the banding together of young men...the second effort was spreading the word among the people, first, in a bid to raise morale, and second to instill in them a sense of animosity towards the enemy, coupled with a spirit of resistance in the face of the occupying forces. This required us to use a language of indoctrination rather than realpolitik.¹⁷²

At the beginning, therefore, *Hezbollah* fit some key characteristics of new terrorism (with relation to organizational structure and design). Early in the life of *Hezbollah*, the organization was amorphous, it had an indistinct structure, it did not have a clear hierarchy, and decision-making was decentralized. Nevertheless, with time, and with the increasing need to better coordinate and control the decisions and the actions of the organization, *Hezbollah* matured into a more hierarchical and more effective institution.

At the top of *Hezbollah*, both in organizational structure and importance, was the *uluma*. This group of religious-politico leaders was the driving force behind the organization. It was in this group of élites where decision-making was centralized. The *uluma* was also the medium for coordination with outside sources. Magnus Ranstorp explained the importance and centrality of the *uluma* to *Hezbollah*:

[T]he central role of the *uluma* in [*Hezbollah*] concentrated all authority and powers to a small elite clerical group which ensure strict discipline and obedience by the followers to the rulings and orders of their religious leaders, whose decisions flow from the *uluma* down the entire community.

¹⁷¹ Jaber, p. 49.

¹⁷² Jaber, pp. 49-50.

In this structure, decisions made by the collective clerical [*Hezbollah*] leadership were reached through consensus and delegated...the manner in which a certain act is executed is left to the initiative of these followers under the guidance of the alim [Islamic scholar], as they carry out the actual reconnaissance and execution of the operation under local conditions and as it ensures operational secrecy and compartmentalization.¹⁷³

Having a central entity in the decision-making process was important. This centrality allowed for a focus of effort. Although cells at the lower echelon of the chain of command executed tactical operations, the centrality of a council of leaders allowed for operations to be conducted in support of the organization's overall objectives. Furthermore, this centrality provided for a body that coordinated with outside partners—whether states, organizations, and/or individuals—increasing the effectiveness of the group in reaching its objectives.

The specifics on the hierarchy of the *Party of God* are as follows. The *uluma* head the two decision-making bodies of *Hezbollah*—the *majlis al-shura* and the *majlis al-karar*. The *majlis al-shura*, composed of 12 religious leaders, is responsible for all operational matters and tactical decisions of the organization within Lebanon.¹⁷⁴ The *majlis al-karar* is responsible for all the strategic matters of *Hezbollah* and is composed of 12 members including the spiritual leader of the *Party of God*—currently, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah.¹⁷⁵ As the operational decision-making body of the organization, the *majlis al-shura* is further divided into functional committees—ideological, financial, military, political, judicial, informational, special security apparatus, and social affairs.¹⁷⁶ Jaber provides an added explanation of the hierarchy at the top levels of the organization:

Each member of the [*majlis al-shura*] has a specific portfolio and is expected to implement the council's decisions in his particular field. The [*majlis al-shura*] itself is divided into two parts: *shoura qarrar*, the

¹⁷³ Ranstorp, p. 41.

¹⁷⁴ Norton, p. 101.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Norton, p. 101.

decision-making council and *shoura tanfeed*, the executive council. The first body represents the leadership of *Hezbollah* which makes the decisions and the second is the body that executes its directives. The executive body, whose numbers vary according to the portfolios, has a limited scope of jurisdiction, which allows it and its members to be able to act on minor issues without having to refer to the higher council.¹⁷⁷

In 1989, a new council was established within *Hezbollah*—the *Politbureau*. The *Politbureau* is a supervisory element composed of 15 clerics in charge of recruitment, propaganda, and support services.¹⁷⁸ The organizational design of *Hezbollah* maintains flexibility of action, but benefits from the effectiveness and focus of effort created by a hierarchy. Overall, decision-making is centralized at the top of *Hezbollah* while operational execution is delegated to the lower echelons of the organization.

One last element is addressed regarding organizational design in relation to the concept of new terrorism. Some argue that new terrorist organizations, when compared with more traditional groups, have a larger number of members—numbered in the thousands rather than the tens or hundreds.¹⁷⁹ Some estimates place the numbers of actual fighters in the militant wing of *Hezbollah* close to 5,000.¹⁸⁰ Others suggest that the high numbers in the 1980s have presently decreased to 1,000.¹⁸¹ Magnus Ranstorp states that *Hezbollah's* “military strength [is] 2,500 in the Biq’a and 1,000 in Beirut but overall the movement can muster a standing reserve of over 25,000 men.”¹⁸² In other words, the argument that traditional terrorist organizations had a limited number of members does not hold when analyzing the structure of *Hezbollah*.

D. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

For *Hezbollah*, the support that it received from states, particularly Iran and Syria, almost became the *raison d’être* of the organization. The connection was of such

¹⁷⁷ Jaber, p. 66.

¹⁷⁸ Ranstorp, p. 42.

¹⁷⁹ Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism.”

¹⁸⁰ Jaber, p. 147.

¹⁸¹ FAS Military Analysis Network, “*Hezbollah*,” [http://www.fas.org], 1 October 2001.

¹⁸² Ranstorp, p. 67.

intensity, particularly in the 1980s, that some argued that *Hezbollah* was a mere proxy for Syria and Iran in their attempts to carry out their foreign policies by other, more ambiguous, means. The actual influence of Iran and Syria was not to such an extent, but the importance of state-support from Iran and Syria to the survival and success of *Hezbollah* cannot be questioned.

Keeping in mind the significance of state-sponsorship in the case of *Hezbollah*, and concentrating on the ongoing argument against the emergence of new terrorism, this section has the following goal. It shows that although state support was crucial to *Hezbollah*, the organization felt limited by it. To achieve a level of autonomy from state sponsorship, the *Party of God* sought out aid and support from other sources. The growth and success of *Hezbollah* brought with it the need to detach itself from any external sources that would limit the decisions and activities of the organization. This concept is introduced to challenge the argument of new terrorism that equates the end of the Cold War, and the rearrangement of nation-state priorities, with the end of state sponsorship of terrorism. For *Hezbollah*, the decrease in the influence of state-sponsors resulted from rational decisions by *Hezbollah's* leadership to minimize their attachment from the governments of Iran and Syria.

Both Iran and Syria had a significant impact on the decision-making process of *Hezbollah*.¹⁸³ The impact of Iran and Syria varied through time and was dependent on particular geostrategic and geopolitical circumstances. However, to see *Hezbollah* as a proxy element of Iran and Syria is erroneous. As Ranstorp mentions, “[*Hezbollah*] was not a monolithic body with total subservience to Iran but rather a coalition of clerics, who each had their own views and networks of followers as well as ties to Iran’s clerical establishment.”¹⁸⁴ The leadership of *Hezbollah* made decisions based on their own requirements and the needs of the organization. To achieve the needed level of autonomy, *Hezbollah* looked for other external sources of support.

¹⁸³ See Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (1997) for a comprehensive analysis of the impact of Iran and Syria on *Hezbollah*.

¹⁸⁴ Ranstorp, p. 43.

The establishment of external networks for support and resource acquisition was done for pragmatic reasons. Some of the efforts mirrored a characteristic of new terrorism—ties with criminal links. Links with other organizations worldwide were attempted for no particular ideological reasons. In 1987, an attempt was made to coordinate with the Irish Republic Army (IRA). In this particular case, *Hezbollah* was interested in “establishing a working relationship with the IRA through the supply of weapons, safe houses, and other assistance for its terrorist networks in Britain.”¹⁸⁵ Another example of *Hezbollah* seeking resources from criminal links was the organization’s involvement in drug trade. *Hezbollah* leadership encouraged the drug trade from hashish and opium that originated from the Biq’a valley (mainly for the financial benefits, but justified as a tool to weaken the enemies of Islam).¹⁸⁶ The tie between a traditional terrorist organization and criminal links was evident in the case of *Hezbollah*.

Money was one of *Hezbollah*’s most needed resources. In addition to the need for financial resources in the continuation of a resistance movement, *Hezbollah*’s social services in southern Lebanon were important measures that the group undertook to build a constituency.¹⁸⁷ Additionally, besides ideological zeal, *Hezbollah* succeeded in the recruitment of new personnel by the simple strategy of providing members of the organization with substantial, tangible financial rewards.¹⁸⁸ Therefore, in addition to the significant financial resources provided by Iran,¹⁸⁹ *Hezbollah* sought after other avenues of financial support.¹⁹⁰ In this effort, *Hezbollah* erected legitimate business corporations and established investment portfolios. The following excerpt provides an insight on the organization’s business activities:

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁸⁶ Ranstorp, p. 71.

¹⁸⁷ Norton, p. 101.

¹⁸⁸ Augustus R. Norton, “Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1999), p. 20.

¹⁸⁹ Estimated between \$60-80 million per year at the height of Iranian support of *Hezbollah* in the 1980s as stated by Ranstorp, 188.

¹⁹⁰ This is in addition to local sources of financial income. The most important of which is the *zakat*, or alms tax, that is required from every Muslim as a religious obligation according to Jaber, p. 152.

Hezbollah has entered into large-scale business operations by opening co-operative supermarkets in the suburbs and other areas of the country. It has revenue coming in from school fees, as well as bookshops, stationers, farms, fisheries, factories, and bakeries. It manufactures Islamic clothing, which it exports to the expatriate Lebanese Shiite community in Africa, the US and South America. The group has also entered the booming property market in Lebanon.¹⁹¹

Also, *Hezbollah* received a share of financial resources from individuals worldwide that were sympathetic to the cause of the organization. Individuals, many of them in the west, created venture companies that invested *Hezbollah* money in stocks and shares of commodities.¹⁹² *Hezbollah* managed to build a robust network of activities that provided the organization with substantial financial resources.

Hezbollah's need for state-sponsorship was pivotal in the growth and success of the organization. Without the extensive support from Iran and Syria, *Hezbollah* would not have achieved the level of success that it accomplished in the last 20 years. However, with the level of state sponsorship also came the need to find additional, or even alternate, means of external support. To establish independence from a hegemonic outside body, the leadership of *Hezbollah* looked at other sources for support. It established business and investment activities worldwide. *Hezbollah* also linked with criminal activities (drug trafficking and coordination with western terrorist organizations) to acquire the resources that the organization required. The changes in the type of support that the organization received had little to do with a transformation in terrorism *per se*. The organization made changes with regard to external support because of rational decisions on how to increase the survivability and effectiveness of the institution.

E. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

On 23 October 1983, an explosion rocked the headquarters building of the U.S. Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) located near the international airport at Beirut, Lebanon. After the dust cleared, 241 United States service members laid dead. This

¹⁹¹ Jaber, p. 87.

¹⁹² Ibid.

occasion marked at the time the greatest loss of American lives from a single event since the Second World War. Indeed, until 11 September 2001, no other terrorist attack had resulted in the loss of more American lives. With the use of simple explosives, and the tactical innovation of the suicide car bomb, *Hezbollah* managed to become one of the most lethal organizations to espouse tactics of terror. Years before the idea of new terrorism came into existence, *Hezbollah* managed to use religious zeal in the achievement of operations that resulted in a large number of casualties.

Hezbollah attempted auspicious operations, using tactics of terror as a means in the achievement of political objectives. The operations were carried out on focused targets that were, in the eyes of *Hezbollah*, justified. For the *Party of God* these targets emerged within the context of a defensive war and, therefore, were not limited in scope or by the possibility of mass casualties.

In a period of a little over 10 years—from 1983 to 1994—*Hezbollah* accomplished acts of terror globally that resulted in over 1400 casualties.¹⁹³ Behind the veil of religion, *Hezbollah* carried out these attacks, for the most part, on military and diplomatic targets in Lebanon.¹⁹⁴ Although the resulting casualties were at times massive, the underlying goal of the attacks was not the achievement of casualties for its own sake. The attacks were carried out on the specific targets for particular political reasons. The best example of this was the attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983. Although Iran and Syria provided support for this operation, *Hezbollah* chose the specific target.¹⁹⁵ For *Hezbollah* “the MNF barracks [was the] ideal choice: the Marines were military men and, in their view, should therefore pay the price for their country’s mistaken military actions

¹⁹³ These 1400 casualties include 571 people killed and injuries to some 860 individuals. This figure does not include attacks by *Hezbollah* on Israeli Defense Force units or attacks on Northern Israel. In addition, this casualty count does not take into consideration the numerous kidnapping incidents of the 1980s. The number does not include the 1996 attack on the U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (that some believe *Hezbollah*, among others, carried out). The casualty count was gathered from Mickolus, Sandler, and Murdock, *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events Volumes I and II* and *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992*.

¹⁹⁴ Some significant attacks were carried in other locations worldwide. Note the 1983 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait; the 1984 attack on a restaurant in Spain; the 1984 attack on a U.S. business office in Denmark; the 1985 Hijacking of TWA 847 in Greece, the 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina; and the 1994 attack on the IAMA building in Argentina.

¹⁹⁵ Jaber, p, 80.

in Lebanon.”¹⁹⁶ The same argument could be made for other *Hezbollah* operations such as the attack on the French paratroopers in 1983 (Lebanon), the attack on the French and American Embassies in 1983 (Lebanon), the attack on the U.S. Embassy in 1984 (Kuwait), the attack on the United States Embassy Annex in 1984 (Lebanon), and the attack on the Israeli Embassy in 1992 (Argentina).

An important element behind the attacks on western and Israeli interests dealt with religion. This connection is mentioned here because it can provide an insight into the rationality of *Hezbollah* in the process of establishing targets and the connection to mass casualties. *Hezbollah* used ideology and religion to justify particular attacks (or the means by which these attacks were performed). This concept was evident in *Hezbollah*'s justification for the death of Muslims in the achievement of their operations. Mindful of the possibility of Muslim deaths, *Hezbollah* sought after a religious decree that would justify such an occurrence. Jaber explained this concept in further detail:

Torn between their desire to attack...and their Islamic teaching and upbringing which condemned the killing of their fellow Muslims, the fighters realised that what they needed was not just a military decision, but a religious edict, *fatwa*, from a scholar. While the Quran abhors and strongly prohibits the killing of Muslims by fellow Muslims and warns of harsh punishments to those who commit such acts, *Hezbollah* defend their case by saying that certain areas in the Quran allow for interpretation and thus provide their fighters with scope for action that can be justified religiously. *Hezbollah*'s justification was that any action which constrains the enemy and foils their schemes is permissible in Islam, but also requires sanctioning by a scholar for it to fall within the Islamic laws.¹⁹⁷

Religion was used by *Hezbollah* to justify actions. Ultimately, the ends justified the means that were used. The process, however, was one of rationality and pragmatism that used religion for the purposes of enhancing operational capabilities.

Hezbollah used the power of religion as a tool within its inventory. It had less to do with the hate and fanaticism that arguably makes religious terrorist groups of today more lethal, volatile, and unpredictable (as Walter Laqueur espoused).¹⁹⁸ It was more

¹⁹⁶ Jaber, p. 82.

¹⁹⁷ Jaber, p. 89.

¹⁹⁸ Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism."

related to the rational use of every means available to carry out operational endeavors. This religious justification equated to less limits set on the group with relation to the types and numbers of casualties that an attack could achieve. Hence, in the use of religion to justify their actions, *Hezbollah* opened the gates that allowed for greater casualties.

This section stressed two points. First, that an organization in the 1980s and early 1990s carried out operations of significant magnitude—both as risky operations and in attacks that were grand in nature. Before the concept of new terrorism emerged, *Hezbollah* achieved operational success with several auspicious attacks (some of which resulted in the achievement of mass casualties). Second, this section stressed that the achievement of mass casualties was not an end state for *Hezbollah*. Specific targeting was achieved for particular purposes. Ultimately, the means that were used to achieve these ends were justified (whether the means resulted in a large number of casualties, or even the killing of fellow Muslims).

F. CONCLUSION

This chapter analyzed the ideology and objectives of *Hezbollah*. It showed how the ideology of the group's leadership was heavily influenced by their common experience in Najaf, Iraq. Furthermore, specific events led to the particular ideological zeal of the organization. The radical ideology incorporated the concept of *jihad*, or holy war, and the idea of martyrdom in the defense against attacking foreign armies.

Hezbollah's short-term objectives adjusted to the particular geostrategic and/or geopolitical conditions in the region. The long-term objectives were auspicious and ideologically motivated. The short-term objectives, however, were limited to the specific conditions in the region and in the international environment.

In its infancy, *Hezbollah* espoused organizational characteristics of new terrorism. In time, however, *Hezbollah* was shaped and arranged with a clear hierarchy and command and control structure. The organization emerged into a centralized decision-making body that decentralized operational decisions to allow for tactical innovation and initiative.

State support for *Hezbollah* was of utmost importance. However, because of the dependence on state support the leadership of *Hezbollah* looked at other means of external aid (to include links with criminal activities). *Hezbollah* sought alternate means of support to separate itself from the control and influence of Iran and Syria. In this manner, the leadership of *Hezbollah* could more easily take decisions and actions that suited the organization and not an outside power. Other means of support were sought for the purpose of strategic and political survivability.

The case study of *Hezbollah* shows that the idea of mass casualties and auspicious operations did not begin with the emergence of new terrorism. Both elements occurred with the massive operations that were carried out by *Hezbollah* in the 1980s and early 1990s. The operations of *Hezbollah* did not seek to achieve mass casualties. *Hezbollah* chose specific targets for particular political and/or strategic reasons. At the same time, though, the organization was not limited by the possibility of casualties. *Hezbollah* used religious symbols and justifications to acquire operational flexibility and to take away any restrictions from the killing of innocent individuals. Although with killing not an end in itself, *Hezbollah* was not limited by the possibility of operations resulting in mass casualties.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

On 11 September 2001, the United States was attacked in a manner that it had never before imagined.¹⁹⁹ In a few minutes, the attacks of terror on United States soil thrust the country into a new war on terrorism. But, is the threat itself any different today than it was in decades past?

At the heart of the matter is the need to understand whether the current threat to the United States from international terrorism is significantly different from the threats of terrorism that the United States faced in the past. In this frame of reference this work looked at two terrorist organizations—the Lebanese *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida*.

This chapter takes the elements identified in the case studies to answer the main question behind this work: is there such a thing as new terrorism? This chapter also takes a brief look at the lessons that can be deciphered from the manner in which the United States handled the threat from *Hezbollah* in the 1980s. In having found significant similarities between the case studies of *Al-Qaida* and *Hezbollah*, the lessons learned from the actions by the United States against the *Hezbollah* can lead to better decision-making with relation to the threat from *Al-Qaida*.

B. IS THERE SUCH A THING AS NEW TERRORISM?

In the last years of the 20th Century, noted scholars introduced the idea of new terrorism.²⁰⁰ The concept of new terrorism, led by the emergence of Osama bin Laden and his *Al-Qaida* organization, was built on the idea that in the early 1990s (after the end of the Cold War) international terrorism was transformed. The world no longer faced a threat from organizations that espoused tactics of terror for limited and clear political

¹⁹⁹ These attacks are commonly referred to as the “9-11 attacks.”

²⁰⁰ For example, see Hoffman, “Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism;” Jenkins, Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini, *Countering The New Terrorism*; and Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*.

goals, with distinct organizational structures, and primarily sponsored by nation states. On the contrary, new terrorist organizations were loosely networked groups, with no state-sponsorship, and a final end-state of wanton destruction and death fed by religiously motivated apocalyptic beliefs.

Three separate categories grouped nine characteristics that scholars associate with new terrorism. The category of ideology and objectives included the following characteristics: (1) there is little understanding of the goals and objectives; (2) the use of terror tactics is done as an end in itself rather than a means toward a political end; and (3) the act of wanton killing and destruction is achieved because of religiously driven apocalyptic notions.

The second category of new terrorism focused on organizational design. Here the characteristics were described in the following manner: (1) organizations are amorphous and less distinctive; (2) organizations lack a hierarchy and a clear command and control structure; (3) groups are transnational in nature and less reliant on particular sanctuaries of operation; and (4) organizations have a large number of members. The third category of new terrorism concentrated on the concept of external support. The characteristics of this category argued that new terrorist organizations (1) do not receive substantial support from nation states, and (2) have links to criminal groups and activities.

1. The Case Study of *Al-Qaida*

The magnitude of the attacks attributed to *Al-Qaida* in the last decade tends to drive individuals to automatically assign the organization a status of a new phenomenon in international terrorism. The argument of this work, however, is that *Al-Qaida* contains most of the characteristics of a traditional terrorist organization. The concept of new terrorism is challenged by the fact that *Al-Qaida* (the preeminent new terrorist organization of the 1990s and today) does not meet many of the characteristics that scholars assign to the concept of new terrorism.

In the category of ideology and objectives, Osama bin Laden and his *Al-Qaida* organization have clear and pronounced political objectives. Any argument that there is

little understanding of the goals and objectives of *Al-Qaida* disappears when one analyzes the *fatwas*, or religious declarations, that the group began to publicly release in 1996. An analysis of *Al-Qaida* shows that short-term objectives change and display flexibility with particular geostrategic and geopolitical developments. Although driven by ideological and religious elements, *Al-Qaida* cannot be considered an organization that pursues violence without a pragmatic and rational analysis of the current situation.

This falsifies the idea that *Al-Qaida*, as a new terrorist organization, has as its final end-state merciless killing and destruction. Rather than being driven by apocalyptic concepts and end-of-the-world end-states, *Al-Qaida*'s leadership displays a systematic and rational approach in their use of terror to achieve their political ends. *Al-Qaida* targets, although grand in nature, are limited and chosen for particular reasons. Although the limits on the group with relation to the achievement of civilian and military casualties are not readily apparent, the *raison d'être* for *Al-Qaida* is not killing for the sake of killing. *Al-Qaida* does not espouse tactics of terror as an end, but rather, as a means to accomplish its political goals.

A superficial look at *Al-Qaida* might lead one see the organization as a loose connection of networks with little hierarchy and an amorphous command and control structure. A detailed study of *Al-Qaida*, however, displays an organization with a clear command and control structure, and a hierarchy that is unambiguous and strictly adhered to at the top levels of the group. Although cells of operatives are spread worldwide and some questions can arise regarding their actual links with the leadership of *Al-Qaida*, the top levels of *Al-Qaida* are thoroughly and significantly involved in the decision-making process. The operational and tactical actions are decentralized to the cells performing the missions, but organizational decision-making is centralized at the top echelon of *Al-Qaida*.

The belief is that the traditional ties between terrorist organizations and nation states are severed with the emergence of new terrorism. It is suggested that organizations such as *Al-Qaida* do no longer need the support from states because of the magnitude of external support that the group receives from individuals and other institutions worldwide. A look at the external support that *Al-Qaida* receives, however, displays that

this concept of little-to-no state sponsorship fails to capture the full range of support that the organization receives.

Al-Qaida would have found difficulty to operate and to grow in influence without the key support from some states in the Middle East and South Asia. Nations such as Afghanistan and Sudan provided safe havens for the organization and its operatives, allowing for freedom of movement within their borders. States such as Iraq and Iran provided financial, weapons, and training resources to *Al-Qaida*. Additionally, the leadership echelons of some key countries in the Middle East, particularly Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, helped in the cause of *Al-Qaida* by ignoring some activities within their borders that ultimately supported the organization. The concept of external support provided by states was not something that decreased with the emergence of *Al-Qaida*. In contrast, state support was essential to *Al-Qaida's* growth and success.

2. The Case Study of *Hezbollah*

The description of *Hezbollah* as a traditional terrorist organization requires little justification. Founded in 1982 and pursuing its more grandiose terror attacks against westerners in the 1980s, *Hezbollah* was operational during the height of the Cold War, before the idea of new terrorism surfaced into existence. *Hezbollah* was an organization with a clear hierarchy and command and control structure. It was guided by the unambiguous political goals of resistance against an invading army. Additionally, it was influenced and supported by state sponsorship from Iran and Syria.

With the recognition of the Lebanese *Hezbollah* as a traditional terrorist group, the goal in the use of this organization as a case study was twofold. One, continue to challenge the emergence of a new type of terrorism in the 1990s by introducing some characteristics of *Hezbollah* that matched elements of new terrorism. Two, show the similarities between *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida*. In doing so, the goal was to display continuity in the concept of international terrorism over the last 20 years.

The similarities with *Al-Qaida* are significant when analyzing *Hezbollah*. The resemblance is evident in the categories of ideology and objectives and organizational design. Less apparent, but also visible, are similarities between *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida* with relation to external support.

Certain preconditions and direct causes led to the emergence of the organizations and their ensuing ideological zeal. For *Hezbollah*, three particular elements were essential in the creation and development of the organization. First, the common experience of *Hezbollah* and Iranian clerics at the city of Najaf, Iraq, during the 1960-70s. Second, the combination of four direct causes that pushed *Hezbollah* into existence and action: (1) the disappearance of *Amal's* Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978; (2) the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978; (3) the establishment of the *Shi'i* Islamic state in Iran in 1979; and (4) the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Third, the importance of religion in the justification of their ideology and the means that were used to achieve their cause (particularly in the use of the concepts of *jihad* and martyrdom).

Hezbollah (and *Al-Qaida*) both stated and made clear their political objectives. Both organizations were established and existed for specific purposes. Although the long-term objectives of both organizations were ideological and grand in nature, the short-term objectives were rational and focused within the specific conditions in the region. *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida* adapted to particular geostrategic and geopolitical situations and changed short-term objectives to maximize the group's success and survivability. *Hezbollah* interpreted its actions, and the use of terror tactics, as a means to achieve its goals. As with *Al-Qaida*, *Hezbollah* attempted grand operations. The objective, however, was not wanton killing and destruction. Missions were limited and focused in the pursuit of the organization's objectives. Religious and ideological connotations were used to justify operations that resulted in the death of those that the group considered innocent (civilians and Muslims). Therefore, as with *Al-Qaida*, the leadership of *Hezbollah* was not limited by the possibility of mass casualties or the death of innocent individuals, although indiscriminate killing was not an operational objective.

In its organizational structure, *Hezbollah* at first exhibited characteristics of new terrorism. *Hezbollah's* decision-making was decentralized; there was no clear hierarchy

or command and control structure; and the organization was amorphous and described better as a loose network of groups joined by a common ideology. In time, however, *Hezbollah* created a structure that allowed the organization to remain flexible, but with a hierarchy that focused the efforts and the strategies of the group. *Hezbollah* ultimately organized in a manner similar to *Al-Qaida*'s current organization.

A group of clerics, the *uluma* (composed of 30 or so members) conducted the decision-making of the organization at the strategic level. The *uluma*, separated under the three main leadership bodies—the *majlis al-shura*, the *majlis al-karar*, and the *Politbureau*—provided the focus of effort of the organization. Within the *majlis al-shura* there were separations by committees in the likeness of the functional divisions found in *Al-Qaida* (ideological, financial, military, political, judicial, informational, special security, and social affairs). At the lowest operational levels decision-making for specific missions was decentralized. Similar to the process within *Al-Qaida*, once the decision was made by the leadership to carry out an operation, the individual tactical cells had the flexibility to carry out operations as they saw necessary.

Differences between *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida vis-à-vis* state support were apparent because of the substantial influence of Iran and Syria on *Hezbollah*. For *Hezbollah*, the choice to seek out other means of support and to become less dependent on state sponsorship was a rational decision made to increase the organization's survivability. The separation by *Hezbollah* from Iran and Syria was not as a result of a change in the type terrorism. The separation from state-sponsorship was an organizational choice to increase the group's effectiveness and survivability.

This was evident as the organization sought alternate sources of financial support as the geostrategic and geopolitical circumstances shifted in the late 1980s. *Hezbollah* established links with criminal activities (coordinating with the Irish Republican Army and involvement in the drug trade). Additionally, legitimate business operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe, and investment portfolios in Europe and Asia brought with them substantial financial resources. Direct donations from wealthy individuals and fund raising organizations in the Middle East and the west also provided

resources that aided in the continuation and growth of *Hezbollah* and helped to detach the organization from Iran and Syria.

The case study of the *Party of God* made a connection between a traditional terrorist organization and *Al-Qaida*. Both organizations have similar characteristics. The similarities are noteworthy and they point to a common type of terrorism throughout the lifespan of both organizations.

C. LESSONS LEARNED

If the threat itself from international terrorism has not been significantly transformed, how should the United States deal with the present threat from *Al-Qaida*? The answer to this question is at the center of the debate as the United States government currently seeks to defeat international terrorism after the attacks of 11 September 2001. The answer to this question lies in the manner in which the United States dealt with the threat posed by *Hezbollah* in the 1980s.

By the end of 1985 *Hezbollah* had managed to perform acts of terrorism that the United States had never imagined could have occurred. The American embassy in Beirut was devastated by a car bomb attack in April 1983.²⁰¹ The U.S. and French Multinational Forces paid a heavy price in lives with a devastating attack in October 1983. The U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut was attacked in September 1984, and the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait was also attacked in 1984. Similar to the operations performed by *Al-Qaida* the targets were focused and limited in nature, but the consequences were significant. Just as with *Al-Qaida* attacks, the casualties were high but justified by the organization with a religious ideology of *jihad* and self-defense. Just like the attacks on 11 September 2001, the United States was thrown into a spin of war rhetoric, demonization of the perpetrators, and the declaration of ultimatums.

Analyzing how the United States dealt with the attacks in the 1980s by *Hezbollah* can provide indications as to the perception of terrorist organizations with relation to the counterterrorism activities of the United States government. The actions (or inactions) of

²⁰¹ This was the first time that a diplomatic station of the United States was attacked to such an extent.

the United States led to a continuation of terrorism in the region of the Middle East. Furthermore, the president of the United States and his administration were led into a circumstance where counterterrorism became the most important foreign policy objective for the nation.

With the attacks by *Hezbollah* in the early 1980s the United States became deeply involved in a terrorist trap.²⁰² As Jeffrey Simon explains:

[t]he lesson that the Shiite terrorists and their patrons in Iran and Syria gained from the Marine barracks bombing was the wide-ranging impact that well-timed and well-executed terrorist attack could have. By perpetrating a single, major terrorist event, extremists in Lebanon were able to affect other nation's foreign policies. The lesson for [President] Reagan and [Secretary of Defense] Weinberger was more personal. They, along with other members of the administration, were deeply scarred by the deaths of the Marines.²⁰³

An idea of warfare against the terrorist threat was ingrained in the U.S. administration. Through rhetoric in the aftermath of the attacks in Beirut, the United States began to see the threat from terrorism as a problem that had to be resolved through military means. Simon quoted the top counterterrorist official at the U.S. Department of State during the first years of the Reagan administration:

The previous [Reagan] administration, particularly in its early years, used far too much rhetoric in describing the battle against terrorists...I think there is a tendency in our politics in general to overuse rhetoric. It is a more general problem in that Americans, politicians, and sometimes even diplomats tend to describe situations as problems. And when you use the

²⁰² Simon, *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience With Terrorism*, p. 25, introduces the concept of the terrorist trap. It is the belief that terrorism can be eradicated or even controlled. Also augmented by the belief that we understand what the future might bring by looking at trends in terrorism. In Simon's words the reality of the matter is that terrorism "will not end, for terrorism has proven to be an enduring phenomenon for America and the world from the earliest days." Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 218, explains a concept similar to the terrorist trap in the following manner: "...a central lesson of counterterrorism is that *terrorism cannot be "defeated"*—only reduced, attenuated, and to some degree controlled. Individual terrorists or terrorist groups sometimes are defeated; terrorism as a whole never will be. Expectations must be kept realistic. Unrealistically high hopes for counterterrorism lead to impatience that in turn leads to sweeping (and thus perhaps satisfying) but not necessarily effective measures...such hopes also encourage despair when they cannot be achieved. Moreover, unrealistic striving for zero terrorist attacks would be no better for overall U.S. foreign policy interests than striving for zero unemployment would be for U.S. economic interests."

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

word *problem* you automatically imply a solution. There isn't a Middle East problem, there is a Middle East situation, and there isn't therefore going to be a solution to terrorist problems, there are only going to be ways to alleviate them.²⁰⁴

The United States became engulfed in attempting to use military force against an enemy that used asymmetrical means of warfare, that could not always be found, and that was involved in a grander (and more politically complicated) geostrategic and geopolitical maze.

Ultimately, the administration of president Reagan realized that the use of force was of limited value because of the particular strategic situation in the region (specifically with the involvement of Iran and Syria). The rhetoric of war became an empty promise, and the United States government took no substantial military actions following the attacks by the *Hezbollah* that were previously mentioned. The limits of the military option were evident as no action was taken even though the United States knew the source and location of the perpetrators.²⁰⁵ At the end of the ordeal in the early 1980s, the world saw the military forces of the United States redeployed from Beirut. The lasting effect on many in the region was of a superpower that could be attacked without fear of retaliation, or even defeated and its foreign policy affected by well-planned and executed attacks (a legacy that continued throughout the 1990s).²⁰⁶

This perception of the United States as a paper tiger led *Hezbollah*, and the regional powers (Iran and Syria), in the path of the hostage-taking spree that swept Lebanon in the remainder of the 1980s. Once again the United States used tough rhetoric that could not be backed by the use of force, or any other type of coercive diplomacy. The inflexibility of the government during the crisis ultimately led to the infamous Iran-Contra affair. Magnus Ranstorp explains the American position well when he states that

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 186.

²⁰⁵ Interview between an official, Office of Counterterrorism Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., and the author, 21 August 2001.

²⁰⁶ The non-retaliation for the destruction of Pan Am 103 over the skies of Scotland in 1988; the retreat of U.S. forces from Somalia after the death of 18 U.S. Army personnel in Mogadishu in October 1993; the limited attacks against Iraq after the attempted assassination of ex-president George Bush in 1994; the lack of retaliation in the 1996 attack on the Air Force barracks in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia), the limited attacks against *Al-Qaida* after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, and the lack of retaliation after the 2000 attack of the USS Cole in Aden (Yemen).

“...the American approach to the hostage-crisis has been a complete failure in terms of deviating from the principle of limited objectives in the crisis and limited means in the pursuit of these objectives...the problems for the U.S. policy makers were exacerbated by its own creation of unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved given the restrictions imposed by the crisis-environment.”²⁰⁷ At the end of the crisis, the government was politically weak, and its credibility shattered in the region of the Middle East (and even among its western allies). This increased the perception in the region of a paper tiger that could be manipulated and influenced by the targeted use of terror.

The following paragraphs look at six lessons that can be deciphered from the actions (and inactions) of the U.S. leadership in dealing with the attacks and the hostage taking events against the United States by *Hezbollah* in the 1980s. This work introduced the concept of the significant similarities between *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaida*, and the concept of continuity in the type of terrorism over the life of these two organizations. Hence, one can apply the lessons learned from the handling of the conflict with *Hezbollah* to the current situation with *Al-Qaida*.

The lessons learned from the attacks by *Hezbollah* against the United States in the early 1980s, and the hostage-taking crises of the 1980s, are as follows. First, *the rhetoric of war must be lessened or curtailed*. This type of rhetoric, as the Reagan administration encountered, only leads to the public’s high expectations for an immediate solution to the problem of terrorism. But the use of military force and coercive diplomacy is limited because of geostrategic and geopolitical constraints. Additionally, the concept of terrorism is not something that can be equated to a military campaign and resolved in a zero-sum game.²⁰⁸ The war rhetoric leads the country further into the terrorist trap.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Ranstorp, p. 197.

²⁰⁸ See Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet,” in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (eds.), *Terrorism and Political Violence: Special Issue on Western Responses to Terrorism*, 4:4, Winter 1992, pp. 315-321, for a discussion on the limitations of a “war-footing” against terrorism.

²⁰⁹ In the words of Pillar, p. 217, “[c]ounterterrorism, even though it shares some attributes with warfare, is not accurately represented by the metaphor of a war. Unlike most wars, it has neither a fixed set of enemies nor the prospect of coming to closure, be it through a “win” or some other type of denouement. Like the cold war, it requires long, patient, persistent effort, but unlike it, it will never conclude with the internal

Second, *action is imperative*. In dealing with the attacks and hostage-taking events by *Hezbollah*, the Reagan administration failed to match rhetoric with action. Because of questions regarding the need for absolute evidence behind the attacks, or reservations with regard to the possible repercussion of any military activities, the United States failed to act. In both cases, this lack of action (in conjunction with the war rhetoric) led to the continuation of attacks of terror against the United States and to the significant loss of influence and legitimacy in the Middle East.

Third, *have a grander view of the foreign policy objectives of the United States during the period of crisis*. In both of the situations mentioned above the U.S. leadership made decisions that negatively affected the position of the country as perceived by the powers in the region of the Middle East. The acts of terror were allowed, through the decisions of the United States government, to affect the grander U.S. foreign policy concerns worldwide in general, and in the region of the Middle East in particular. Subjugating the superpower status of the United States and the grander needs throughout the world in reaction to attacks of terror cannot not be allowed, and can only be controlled by the combination of rhetoric and actions of the U.S. president during the time of crisis.

Fourth, *keep flexibility in dealing with the predicament of terrorism*. Simply applying the concept of warfare, or maintaining a doctrine of non-concession and no-deals only limits the types of decisions that can ultimately be made. Counterterrorism requires flexibility, and an understanding that all options available should remain in the decision-making process.

Fifth, *understand that the issue of terrorism is something that cannot be resolved, but only curtailed*. The actions that were taken by the Reagan administration were aimed at a zero-sum game—either “they” win or “we” win. This only added to the sense of limitation in the decisions that could be taken, increased the idea of equating the problem of terrorism with a campaign of war, and supplemented the perception of the public that a solution to the problem was clear and attainable. At the end, this only increased the

collapse of an opponent. There will be victories and defeats, but not big, tide-turning victories. Counterterrorism is a fight and a struggle, but it is not a campaign with a beginning and an end.”

impact of the continuing acts of terror, and the perceived inability of the government to deal with the problem effectively (as in the case of the hostages).

Sixth, *seek out the root of the problem*. In the case of the attacks and the kidnappings that were conducted by *Hezbollah* early in the 1980s, the U.S. administration looked at ways to deal with the immediate crisis. After the attacks on the U.S. embassies and the Multinational Forces in Beirut, questions arose over force protection measures and military retaliation for the actions. After the kidnapping spree throughout the decade discussions centered on ways to ensure the return of the hostages and finding the means to prevent further kidnapping situations. Crelisten and Schmid classify response options as soft-line (addressing the root problems) and hard-line (military retribution and no-negotiations policy).²¹⁰ In focusing on the hard line approach, the Reagan administration ignored the soft line options, and curtailed the achievement of a long-term solution to the problem in the region. In concentrating on the short-term solutions of the situation the long-term implications of the actions and the underlying reasons for the problems were ignored or not addressed accordingly.

The lessons learned from the situations that resulted from *Hezbollah* actions in the 1980s can be applied directly to the present problem facing by the United States in relation to *Al-Qaida*. The actions that the United States took in the 1980s against *Hezbollah* led to conditions that facilitated further terrorist activity against the United States. Additionally, the decisions of the U.S. leadership led to a negative perception of the United States in the region of the Middle East. These perceptions only added to the continuing fire in the region that was fueled by root problems from where extremism and terrorism emerged and expanded. The six lessons learned that were provided above can serve as a guide in dealing with the current situation of the United States with relation to *Al-Qaida*.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 309.

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