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**Center for
Army
Analysis**

HOMELAND SECURITY INITIATIVE

JUNE 2001



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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) This report documents the Homeland Security Initiative (HLSI), conducted by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) for Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (DAMO-SS). The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of HLSI, to include a summary of insights gained from the two issues workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game conducted as part of HLSI. The intent of HLSI was to provide the Army with a working definition of Homeland Security (HLS) and a better understanding of its roles and responsibilities in supporting Homeland Security.			
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HOMELAND SECURITY INITIATIVE (HLSI)

SUMMARY

THE PROJECT PURPOSE was to provide the Army with a working definition of Homeland Security (HLS) and a better understanding of Army roles and responsibilities in supporting Homeland Security. This report includes a summary of insights gained from two issues workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game conducted as part of the Homeland Security Initiative (HLSI).

THE PROJECT SPONSOR was Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, (ODCSOPS) Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (DAMO-SS).

THE PROJECT OBJECTIVES were to:

- (1) Develop a working definition for Homeland Security (HLS)
- (2) Identify Army support roles and responsibilities in HLS and examine interfaces with Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the commanders in chief (CINCs), and the Federal civil community
- (3) Identify Army-unique preparedness and response capabilities that can be leveraged for HLS
- (4) Provide a road map for Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support (DTLOMS) development to support the Army's role in HLS
- (5) Identify the challenges the Army faces in responding to the HLS requirement

THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT was to examine the Army's strategy in support of the evolving HLS mission out to the 2010 timeframe.

THE MAIN ASSUMPTION used in this project was the Army is primarily supporting other lead federal agencies in Homeland Security with a few exceptions.

THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are:

- (1) The following working definition for HLS was developed:

Active and passive measures taken to protect the population, area, and infrastructure of the United States, its possessions, and territories by:

- Deterring, defending against, and mitigating the effects of threats, disasters, and attacks;
- Supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and

- Helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.

(2) Key mission areas identified as falling under the Homeland Security “umbrella” are National Missile Defense (NMD), Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Crisis and Consequence Management, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Information Protection Operations, Border Control Operations, and Support to Continuity of Government Operations.

(3) For several reasons depicted in this report, the HLS definition and identification of mission areas promotes an “all-hazards” approach to Homeland Security, to include natural as well as manmade disasters.

(4) The Department of Defense (DOD) must work closely with the civil sector in planning its support for HLS.

(5) DOD must address internal organizational issues in supporting HLS.

(6) The Army must further examine its capability to support HLS, especially the availability of specialty units in conjunction with a major theater war or multiple simultaneous homeland incidents.

(7) The Army should leverage the use of current capabilities and units in support of HLS.

THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION is to develop Army Homeland Security Strategic Planning Guidance using the insights gained from HLSI as its foundation.

THE PROJECT EFFORT was conducted by Mr. Greg Andreozzi, Conflict Analysis Center, Center for Army Analysis (CAA).

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, Center for Army Analysis, ATTN: CSCA-CA, 6001 Goethals Road, Suite 102, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230.

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1.3 Outline

The outline followed in this report is shown below.

- | Background
- | Game Plan
- | Political-Military Gaming Methodology
- | HLSI Analytical Architecture
- | LEXINGTON 2000 Game Concept and Organization
- | Homeland Security Initiative Key Insights
- | Homeland Security Army Strategic Plan Workshop Overview

A glossary of acronyms is provided.

1.4 Background

	[REDACTED]
<input type="checkbox"/> Work Plan approved by Dir/CAA and DDir/DAMO-SS	23 Nov 98
<input type="checkbox"/> HLSI Working Group Established	1 Dec 98
<input type="checkbox"/> HLSI RESPONSE 99 Issues Workshop	24-25 Feb 99
<input type="checkbox"/> IPRs for Dir/CAA and DDir/DAMO-SS	17, 24 Feb 00
<input type="checkbox"/> Information Briefings for Deputy Director of Military Support (Dep DOMS) and Special Asst. for Military Support/OSA	25 Feb, 2 Mar 00
<input type="checkbox"/> HLSI Issues Workshop 2000	8-9 Mar 00
<input type="checkbox"/> Information Briefings for DAS and DCSOPS	20, 31 Mar 00
<input type="checkbox"/> LEXINGTON 2000 Political -Military Game	4-5 Apr 00
<input type="checkbox"/> HLS Army Strategic Plan Workshop	12-13 Jul 00

Figure 2. Background

Figure 2 provides a timeline of key events associated with the Homeland Security Initiative. HLSI was launched following the Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA's) challenge at the October 1999 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) meeting for the Army to prepare for its role

in supporting homeland security. The Conflict Analysis Center (CSCA-CA) of the Center for Army Analysis proposed the analytical effort to the War Plans Division (DAMO-SSW), Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans. Following work plan approval by the Director, CAA, and the Deputy Director, DAMO-SS, an HLSI Working Group was established on 1 December 1998 to lay the groundwork for the effort. This was followed over the next 2 years by a pair of issues workshops (IW), the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game and an Army Homeland Security Strategic Plan Development Workshop, with a series of information briefings throughout to keep senior Army and Department of Defense (DOD) leadership informed on the initiative's progress.

1.5 Game Plan




Figure 3. Game Plan

Figure 3 depicts the game plan for executing the Homeland Security Initiative. Over the course of events, the goal was to define "Homeland Security" and review Army support roles, responsibilities, and interfaces. It was understood that the Department of Defense and the Army were primarily in a support role to civil agencies in executing homeland security responsibilities.

1.6 Pol-Mil Gaming Methodology




Figure 4. Pol-Mil Gaming Methodology

Figure 4 depicts CAA’s political-military gaming methodology. This methodology was used to execute the two HLSI Issues Workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game.

Overview

CAA conducts issue workshops and political-military games in support of Headquarters, Department of the Army, US Army major commands, and Army components of US unified commands. All political-military games are developed in direct coordination with the sponsor and are designed for use as a tool in policy development and decision making.¹

A CAA political-military game provides direct feedback for issue identification, prioritization, and clarification of questions involving the application of national power. Experts attending political-military games draw from their professional experience to address specific

¹ Future references to political-military games also describe methodology for conducting issues workshops. The exception is some issues workshops do not use opening and special situations (scenarios) as part of their methodology, which was the case for the HLSI Issues Workshops.

issues as part of the political-military game scenario. The political-military game scenario provides a specific structure for issue analysis and the development of key insights.

Political-Military Game Structure. The political-military game structure is composed of three phases: preprocessing, gaming, and postprocessing (see Figure 4). CAA developed the three-phase structure to increase efficiency and ensure successful execution. During the preprocessing phase, issues are identified and a scenario is developed. The participants are then grouped, based on their background and perspective, and assigned to teams. Finally, within the framework of the scenario, the teams are charged with addressing the issues in a logical, disciplined manner. Their responses form the basis of the preliminary key insights (PKIs) for the political-military game. These PKIs are then briefed to a Senior Council, composed of executive defense planners and decision makers.

Preprocessing. Preprocessing takes the conventional form of a discussion that yields concept definition. This process is initiated by an Army component commander, member of the Army's senior leadership, Army staff principal, or a noted expert. Preprocessing includes initial research and data collection.

Onsite Research and Discussion. An action officer assigned to the project by the sponsor is the main point of contact during the preprocessing phase. The CAA project director coordinates directly with the action officer to determine the purpose, scope, and objectives for the political-military game. Research is conducted by the project director to establish specific details on the project, within the context of the sponsor's original guidance.

Issue Identification. Draft issues are provided by the sponsor as a set of objectives or concerns for the subject of the political-military game. The issues are tied directly to the objectives of the political-military game and may be revised and enhanced as preprocessing progresses. Once the issues are finalized, they are logically grouped and synchronized with the scenario.

Political-Military Game Design. The design consists primarily of establishing an individual plan for a specific political-military game. The process involves determining the most productive combination of team assignments, confirming an appropriate sequence for the presentation of objectives and charges, and ensuring that the detailed scenario encompasses all aspects of the overarching problem or hypothesis. Based on this sequencing, the game is broken up into a series of moves, each addressing one or more objectives.

Political-Military Game Participant Roster. Identification of appropriate participants is absolutely key to a successful political-military game. The sponsor identifies principal participants during the initial stages of planning. Additions or deletions are made based on the scope and experience required.

Political-Military Game Scenario. The scenario provides perspective and establishes a platform from which to address the objectives of the game. Ideally, the scenario will consist of a realistic situation that tasks the participants to draw from their professional experience to conduct problem solving and decision making. A majority of the situations carry

the participants forward in time and project a future state of events that requires consideration. This intentional displacement serves the additional benefit of removing any preconceived notions or current day issues that may complicate the problem.

Political-Military Game Objectives. The number of political-military game objectives is determined by the scope of the political-military game. A standard political-military game might examine four or five objectives. Each objective, in turn, may have four or five charges (questions) that should be addressed.

Conduct of the Political-Military Game. Participants are welcomed and then given a series of introductory briefings before breaking into teams to address the objectives and related issues.

Scenario Briefing. Participants will come from various backgrounds and must be brought together to interact towards the common objectives of the political-military game. This interaction is synchronized through the use of a special scenario developed specifically for the political-military game. The scenario answers questions and provides information on assumptions required in order to accurately address the issues.

Political-Military Game Dynamics. Team composition, and the small number of personnel on each team (normally 15 or less), allows for unique interaction that encourages individual participation. The conduct of some games requires larger team composition, in which case, the team leader must exercise additional control in balancing individual participation and group interaction with time constraints in addressing game objectives. In the small group setting, the ability to elicit a response under the constraints of the scenario and time schedule comprises the group dynamic.

Preliminary Key Insights (PKIs). The product of each team discussion is a set of responses to each charge and PKIs, representing the most important insights gained during that particular move. The charge responses and PKIs are carried forward to the plenary session at the end of each move and presented to the political-military game. Summary PKIs are briefed to the Senior Council at the end of the game.

Record of Proceedings. In addition to a team leader, each team is assigned a CAA analyst who assists the team leader and records insights. The insights are recorded on a computer and take the form of bullet comments augmented by text passages where required. At the conclusion of the political-military game, all comments are compiled to form a nonverbatim, not-for-attribution written memorandum report of proceedings for the political-military game. This report includes all key insights and provides the sponsor with a complete accounting for all phases of the political-military game.

Postprocessing. During the postprocessing phase, the sponsor determines the steps to take in order to maximize the benefits of the political-military game (based on the impact of the insights, applicability of the scenario, Senior Council's instructions, etc.). Normally the results and memorandum report are presented as a series of briefings to key decision makers throughout

the Department of Defense. New objectives and issues derived as a result of the game's cardinal insights could form the basis of another related or unrelated political-military game, as required.

1.7 Pol-Mil Game Dynamics




Figure 5. Pol-Mil Game Dynamics

The key to successful game execution is the use of a structured process to ensure the events flow, and all important issues are addressed. This is accomplished by working closely with the sponsor to formulate objectives and key issues to be addressed. The game is then organized into a series of moves, usually three for a 2-day game, where each move addresses a series of charges to answer one or more objectives. Participants are divided into teams to address the charges. The number and size of teams depends on the number of participants and the desired game dynamics. The completion of each move is followed by a plenary session where each team briefs its responses to the charges. This also includes discussion, and for some issues consensus is reached on specific charges, while for others, lack of consensus is noted. Upon completion of the moves and plenaries, preliminary key insights (PKIs) are briefed to a Senior Council made up of senior leaders. Consensus PKIs may be briefed or individual team PKIs can be briefed. Completion of the Senior Council ends the game, and then PKIs are refined into Cardinal Insights in the postprocessing phase of the effort. This process is portrayed in Figure 5.

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2 ANALYTICAL ARCHITECTURE




Figure 6. Analytical Architecture

Figure 6 provides a pictorial look at HLSI. Due to the postponement of LEXINGTON 99 at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), it deviates from our standard three phased analytical approach of Working Group (WG)/Issues Workshop (IW)/Political-Military Game by adding a second issues workshop (8-9 March 2000) to capture emerging issues that occurred since the conduct of the 24-25 February 1999 issues workshop, in preparation for the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game.

A working group was established in December 1998 to define key HLS issues and identify subject matter experts and interested organizations. The 24-25 February 1999 issues workshop resulted in a draft definition for Homeland Security and examined roles and responsibilities. The 8-9 March 2000 issues workshop reconfirmed this definition with minor revisions, addressed political concerns with use of the term "Homeland Defense" (opting instead to carry forward the term "Homeland Security") and examined capabilities, requirements, and Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support (DTLOMS) issues. The 4-5 April 2000 LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game, the capstone event of HLSI, examined issues raised during the previous workshops in an operational context through the use of stressful opening and special situations. The HLS Strategic Plan Workshop was convened to outline the

road ahead for turning insights gained during HLSI into an Army Homeland Security Strategic Planning Guidance.

2.1 HLSI Issues Workshop 99




Figure 7. HLSI Issues Workshop 99

Figure 7 presents the framework for the 24-25 February 1999 Issues Workshop. Over 70 people from throughout the Army as well as other DOD and Federal civil organizations participated in this issues workshop, the first major event under HLSI. This workshop produced a draft definition for Homeland Security. In addition, this workshop examined Army HLS roles and responsibilities as well as interfaces with other DOD and Federal civil organizations. During this workshop, participants were also asked to define functional areas that should be included under the HLS umbrella. Preliminary key insights from this and subsequent events have been consolidated and are presented in Figures 13 through 20.

2.2 HLSI Issues Workshop 2000




Figure 8. HLSI Issues Workshop 2000

Once again, over 70 people from throughout the Army as well as other DOD and Federal civil organizations participated in the 8-9 March 2000 Issues Workshop, whose framework is presented in Figure 8. This second issues workshop, conducted in preparation for the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game, was included to reexamine Army issues in supporting homeland security following the postponement of LEXINGTON 99 at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This workshop refined the definition developed at the previous workshop, examined challenges the Army faces when responding to HLS requirements, reexamined the Army's roles in support of the commanders in chiefs (CINCs) and other DOD and Federal civil agencies, and examined DTLOMS issues under HLS. It was during this workshop that the Army adopted the term Homeland Security in place of Homeland Defense to satisfy political concerns. The change in terminology had no effect on the definition or functional areas included under Homeland Security.

2.3 LEXINGTON 2000 Po-Mil Game




Figure 9. LEXINGTON 2000 Po-Mil Game

Figure 9 presents the framework for the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game. LEXINGTON 2000, the capstone event of the Homeland Security Initiative, was conducted on 4-5 April 2000 and once again included participants from throughout the Army as well as other DOD and Federal civil agencies. LEXINGTON 2000 was used to operationally test, assess, and refine the insights gained at the two previous issues workshops. LEXINGTON 2000 was designed to examine the Army's response capabilities and ability to synchronize them in supporting HLS incidents by identifying and examining Army-unique preparedness and response capabilities that can be leveraged for HLS, examining interfaces in support of interagency functions, and identifying critical areas of concern to improve the Army's HLS response capabilities.

2.4 Game Concept




Figure 10. Game Concept

Figure 10 outlines the flow of LEXINGTON 2000. We used a series of three moves to gain a better understanding of Homeland Security by examining Army response capabilities and interagency integration and then outlining strategic plan requirements for the Army in its mission to support HLS. Following a series of overview briefings to set the foundation for the game, participants were divided into three teams, two Friendly Force (FRNDFOR) teams and an Opposition Force (OPFOR) team. An opening situation outlining national and international conditions (political, economic, cyber, etc.) set the stage for the game. Special Situations 1 and 2, introduced in Moves 1 and 2, respectively, provided accumulating incidents designed to stress the resources required to support the HLS missions.

In Move 1, the two FRNDFOR teams were asked to respond to the opening situation and Special Situation 1 (SS1) through a series of charges by identifying lead federal agencies, DOD and Army roles, and interfaces for each incident requiring support. The OPFOR was asked to evaluate the threat concept of operations introduced and develop improvements to this concept. The OPFOR was also introduced to Special Situation 2 (SS2) and given the charge to further develop SS2 to attack US (including DOD/Army) centers of gravity. Following a plenary

session where each FRNDFOR team presented their response to the opening situation and SS1, the OPFOR in Move 1A took this information and modified their update to SS2 to take advantage of the FRNDFOR response in Move 1.

In Move 2, the two FRNDFOR teams repeated Move 1 activity using the OPFOR modified SS2. Key in Move 2 was identifying shortfalls in general terms as the accumulation of incidents overstressed our ability to provide support. While the FRNDFOR was responding to SS2, the OPFOR used Move 2 to develop an outline for a Threat Strategic Plan for attacking the US. Finally, in Move 3, using insights gained during the first two moves, all three teams were asked to outline the various elements that will contribute to the development of an Army Strategic Plan for supporting HLS.

2.5 Game Organization




Figure 11. Game Organization

Figures 11 and 12 present the game organization for LEXINGTON 2000. Once again we had over 70 people from throughout the Army as well as other DOD and Federal civil organizations participating. We also had a distinguished group of executives serving as team leaders and participating on the Senior Council at the conclusion of the game, as shown in Figure 11. While

the DCSOPS was unable to participate on the Senior Council, he came out during game execution and visited each of the team rooms, offering his perspectives and receiving updates on game progress.

2.6 Team Organization




Figure 12. Team Organization

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3 HLSI KEY INSIGHTS

3.1 Key Insights – Threats




Figure 13. Key Insights –Threats

Figures 13 through 20 present the key insights developed during the course of the Homeland Security Initiative, covering the two issues workshops and the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game. Figure 13 addresses threats to homeland security. What is not depicted here, and what will be reinforced in later figures as falling under the Homeland Security “umbrella,” are threats from natural disasters, which require some of the same resources required by man-made incidents.

3.2 Key Insights – HLS Mission Areas




Figure 14. Key Insights – HLS Mission Areas

Figure 14 shows the mission areas falling under Homeland Security as developed under HLSI. Mission areas were grouped under two major categories, National Defense and National Civil Support.

The following are reasons for including the mission areas identified in Figure 14 under the Homeland Security umbrella: (1) many share common resource requirements, i.e., natural disasters and WMD incidents have many of the same support requirements; (2) asymmetric threats of the future can include synchronized use of various “weapons”, i.e., missile attack/WMD incident(s)/information operations/cyber attacks, where a coordinated US response would require visibility over all incidents; and (3) there may be competing resource demands among the various mission areas. Maintaining visibility over them holistically will allow more effective requirements prioritization. Unity of effort in dealing with future asymmetric threat(s) is critical.

3.3 Homeland Security Definition




Figure 15. Homeland Security Definition

Figure 15 presents a definition for Homeland Security that was initially drafted at the 24-25 February 1999 Issues Workshop and refined through the follow-on events under HLSI and the staffing of the *Army Homeland Security (HLS) Strategic Planning Guidance*. Without addressing specific mission areas, it is broad-based to cover the full array of potential DOD missions and shows DOD in a support role.

As a matter of record, there is ambiguity in the definition concerning the term *consequence management*. When the Homeland Security definition was initially developed, *consequence management* was used in the context of its definition in DOD Directive 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*, in which it is defined as the following: “Comprises those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes... .” This definition emphasizes the all-hazards approach, to include natural and man-made disasters. An alternate definition is presented in the *Terrorism Incident Annex* of the *Federal Response Plan*, where consequence management is defined as “...measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.” This takes a more narrow approach to defining consequence management as supporting only man-made disasters, i.e., terrorism incidents.

3.4 Key Insights - Planning

- 
- Develop a comprehensive Army HLS strategy based on DOD and National HLS strategies to ensure coordinated response to civilian agency leads
 - Resourcing is not focused through a single program. Programs are competing for resources
 - The Army is built for warfighting IAW Title 10. HLS must be worked like an MTW
 - Mission requirements (for AC and RC forces) in support of HLS need to be appropriately defined as “war missions” so that required funding will follow
 - Homeland Security mission must be included in the planning process as a dimension of the war fight
 - CONUS (+) as an AOR
 - Homeland Security Mission planning and execution is iterative and evolutionary
 - Joint and Army doctrine should be developed to adequately address HSL
 - TAA-09, QDR, and other planning efforts should address HLS requirements
 - DOD WMD/MSCA domestic support plans and policies must be integrated

Figure 16. Key Insights - Planning

Figure 16 presents key insights developed that fall under Planning. During the LEXINGTON 2000 Senior Council briefing, the following challenges for DOD to consider in HLS planning were identified: (1) states are sovereign and have varying degrees of capability to respond to incidents, and (2) DOD must have a clear understanding of civilian requirements and interfaces to effectively plan for its roles and missions. Thus, DOD must plan to provide varying degrees of support for HLS incidents based on civilian response shortfalls.

3.5 Key Insights – Synchronization of Roles

- 
- Need one office in DOD for policy guidance and a single all-hazards execution chain of command within DOD
 - Missions and responsibilities of JFCOM, DOMS, JTF-CS, and the RTFs must be clarified in supporting Homeland Security
 - High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) units not capable of handling multiple simultaneous incidents
 - Specialty Units (CB/RRT, TEU, CBIRF, etc.)
 - C2 Units (JTF-CS, RTFs)
 - Maximize use of current capabilities and units in support of HLS
 - Examine RC role in meeting shortfalls
 - ✓ Skills well adapted to HLS missions
 - ✓ Integral part of civilian communities
 - Army medical force structure ability to respond to HLS support missions in conjunction with supporting MTW requirements needs to be examined
 - Current IA LNO structure needs enhancement

Figure 17. Key Insights – Synchronization of Roles

Figure 17 presents key insights covering the synchronization of roles and responsibilities in support HLS missions. These insights address interface requirements, potential shortfalls, and Army-unique capabilities.

3.6 Key Insights - DTLOMS




Figure 18. Key Insights - DTLOMS

Figure 18 provides several recommendations focused around Homeland Security Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support (DTLOMS) issues.

3.7 Key Insights - Requirements

- 
- ❑ Build JMTOF(s) addressing multiple near simultaneous geographically dispersed incidents with/without MTW - will help identify LD/HD multiple taskings and shortfalls
 - Develop integrated response plan(s), to include TPFDDs, with the LFA
 - Need to identify thresholds that would require DOD support of various incidents
 - Large initial incident will absorb resources that will make it difficult to support follow-on incidents or deploy to an MTW without prioritization decisions
 - Reconcile competing Deployment vs Homeland Security missions using threat/vulnerability assessments to determine priorities
 - ❑ Dichotomy in how FEMA requests DOD support (in terms of capabilities) and how DOD provides support (in terms of units)
 - ❑ National Homeland Security must have a plan if military can't deliver required support
 - ❑ An assessment of medicine and vaccine deployment throughout the US (military and civilian) is needed

Figure 19. Key Insights - Requirements

Figure 19 highlights Requirements recommendations for supporting Homeland Security.

3.8 Key Insights – Additional Findings


- 
- DOD must be cognizant of Federal Response Plan (FRP) and accompanying Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) in supporting civil community
 - Information sharing from Federal to State to Local is critical
 - DOD/Army emerging role in critical infrastructure protection needs further study
 - Public Relations / Education must be a priority - Public Affairs role is key
 - A comprehensive study of all laws, policy, and guidance affecting HLS is needed
 - A Homeland Security DOD capabilities/units data base needs to be funded, developed, and maintained with a lead agent assigned responsibility
 - Protection and treatment of GIs and their families will be critical to MTW deployment and execution during Homeland crises
 - DOD's role in Information Operations needs to be further examined
 - Examine other countries effort in HLS (Best Practices)
 - Examine role of DOD Intelligence agencies in HLS

Figure 20. Key Insights – Additional Findings

Figure 20 presents additional insights generated during HLSI. Any Army look at interagency coordination and the development of an interoperability plan must consider the Federal Response Plan (FRP). Independent of the creation of an interoperability plan, as a minimum, there is a need for an integrated, coordinated interagency liaison officer (LNO) network. There are a number of existing DOD/interagency communication avenues in existence, both formal and informal. Informal networks of communication should become more formalized to increase institutional awareness of military support to Homeland Security missions.

A concern was expressed during LEXINGTON 2000 over the dilemma of deploying soldiers to a major theater war when there was an actual or perceived terrorist risk to their families at home. Soldiers need to be assured that their families will be protected. Also, DOD's role in Information Operations needs to be further examined in the context of its roles, responsibilities, and interfaces with the Law Enforcement community.

3.9 The Road Ahead




Figure 21. HLS Army Strategic Plan Workshop

Following LEXINGTON 2000, the road ahead called for the development of an Army Strategic Plan for supporting Homeland Security. A workshop was convened on 12-13 July 2000 to develop a framework for this strategic plan. The ODCSOPS took the framework developed at this workshop as well as the insights gained from the LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game and the two HLSI issues workshop and used them as the launching point to develop the *Army Homeland Security (HLS) Strategic Planning Guidance*, which is planned for publication this summer.

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APPENDIX A PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS

1. PROJECT TEAM

a. Project Director

Mr. Greg Andreozzi, Conflict Analysis Center

a. Team Members

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Mr. Robert Barrett (CSCA-CA)

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Mr. Duane Gory (CSCA-CA)

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b. Other Contributors

COL Jerry Brown (DAMO-SSW)

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MAJ Patrick Tennis (DAMO-SSW)

Issues Workshop and Game Participants (see Figure 12 for LEXINGTON 2000 participants)

2. PRODUCT REVIEWERS

Dr. Ralph E. Johnson, Quality Assurance

Ms. Nancy M. Lawrence, Publications Center

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APPENDIX B REQUEST FOR ANALYTICAL SUPPORT

P *Performing Division:* CA *Account Number:* 2000132

A *Tasking:* Verbal *Mode (Contract-Yes/No):* No

R *Acronym:* LEXINGTON 2000

T

Title: LEXINGTON 2000 Political-Military Game

1 *Start Date:* 10-Mar-00 *Estimated Completion Date:* 30-Jun-00

Requestor/Sponsor (i.e., DCSOPS): DCSOPS *Sponsor Division:* SSW

Resource Estimates: a. *Estimated PSM:* b. *Estimated Funds:* \$0.00

c. *Models to be Used:*

Description/Abstract:

Assess the Army's preparedness and response capabilities in supporting the Homeland Defense Mission. This includes an examination of the Army's interfaces with the CINCs and other DOD and civil agencies.

Study Director/POC Signature: Original Signed *Phone#:* 703-806-5665

Study Director/POC: Mr. Gregory Andreozzi

If this Request is for an External Project expected to consume 6 PSM or more, Part 2 Information is Not Required. See Chap 3 of the Project Directors' Guide for preparation of a Formal Project Directive.

Background:

P CAA began the Homeland Defense Initiative (HLDI) in FY 99 and successfully conducted an IW in Feb 99 to define HLD, identify/review roles and responsibilities, and identify other critical HLD issues. Following an OSD-requested postponement, we were given the go-ahead to continue the effort in Dec 99 and subsequently conducted an Issues Workshop

A on 8-9 Mar. The 4-5 Apr LEXINGTON 2000 Po-Mil Game will refine and build on the results of the two issues workshops.

R *Scope:* Conduct LEXINGTON 2000 Po-Mil Game involving Army, JS, CINCs, OSD, other Defense agencies,

T DOJ, FBI, FEMA, and other civil agencies

2

Issues:

1) Assess Army's response capabilities and ability to synchronize them for HLD incidents; 2) Evaluate Army HLD mission evolution and supporting Title 10 responsibilities; 3) Examine Army-unique preparedness and response capabilities that can be leveraged for HLD; 4) Examine interfaces in support of interagency functions; 5) Identify critical areas of concern to improve Army's domestic response capabilities

Milestones:

1) ID participants / coordinate with SSW 2) Send out invite memo 3) Conduct coordination meetings 4) Develop Opening and Moves/charges 5) Conduct Working group meeting to develop Opening and Special Situations 6) Prebrief Team Leaders on 3 Apr 7) Conduct LEXINGTON 2000 4-5 Apr 8) Conduct postprocessing analysis and outbrief PKIs

Signatures *Division Chief Signature:* Original Signed and Dated *Date:*

Division Chief Concurrence: Mr. John Elliott

Sponsor Signature: Original Signed and Dated *Date:*

Sponsor Concurrence (COL/DA Div Chief/GO/SES) :

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GLOSSARY

AC	Active Component
ACIC	Army Counterintelligence Center
AF	Air Force
Air NG	Air National Guard
AOR	area of responsibility
ARC	American Red Cross
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARSPACE	Army Space Command
ASA(M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
ASD(RA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
ASD(SO/LIC))	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
AUSA	Association of the United States Army
AWC/SSI	Army War College/Strategic Studies Institute
BG (Ret.)	Brigadier General (Retired)
CAA	Center for Army Analysis
CBIRF	Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
CBRNE	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and High Yield Explosives
CB/RRT	Chemical-Biological Rapid Reaction Team
CINC(s)	commander(s) in chief
CND	Computer Network Defense
COMMZ	communications zone
CONUS	continental United States
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSCA-CA	Conflict Analysis Center (CAA)
DAMO-FDF	DCSOPS Force Integration and Management Division
DAMO-OD	DCSOPS Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate
DAMO-ODI	DCSOPS Information Operations Division
DAMO-SS	DCSOPS Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate
DAMO-SSD	DCSOPS National Security Policy Division
DAMO-SSW	DCSOPS War Plans Division
DAS	Director of the Army Staff
DCSINT	Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DDir	Deputy Director
Dep DOMS	Deputy Director of Military Support
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOMS	Director of Military Support

DOS	Department of State
DTLOMS	Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, and Soldier Support
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI (NICP)	FBI National Infrastructure Protection Center
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
FRP	Federal Response Plan
HD/LD	High Demand/Low Density
HLS	Homeland Security
HLSI	Homeland Security Initiative
HQ USAF	Headquarters, United States Air Force
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HQDA(OCPA)	Headquarters, Department of the Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs
IA LNO	Interagency liaison officer
IAW	in accordance with
INTEL	intelligence
IO	Information Operations
IPR	in process review
IW	issues workshop
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JMTOF	Joint Mission Task Organized Force
JS	Joint Staff
JTF-CS	Joint Task Force Civil Support
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LIA	Logistics Integration Agency
LIWA	Land Information Warfare Activity
LNO	liaison officer
MACA	Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
MACOM	major Army command
MANSCEN	Maneuver Support Center
MG (Ret.)	Major General (Retired)
MSCA	Military Support to Civil Authorities
MTOF	Mission Task Organized Force
MTW	major theater war
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
NMD	National Missile Defense
NMRI	Naval Medical Research Institute
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OASD(C3I)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,

	Communications, and Intelligence)
OASD(RA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
OCAR	Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
ODCSLOG	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
OPFOR	Opposition Force
OSA	Office of the Secretary of the Army
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTSG	Office of the Surgeon General
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PKI	preliminary key insight
POC	point of contact
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RC	Reserve Component
RTF	Response Task Force
SBCCOM	Soldier, Biological, and Chemical Command
SMDC	Space and Missile Defense Command
SPACECOM	US Space Command
SS	Special Situation
TAA-09	Total Army Analysis - 2009
TEU	technical escort unit
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	US Army Transportation Command
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USA MEDCOM	US Army Medical Command
USAF CP Ctr	US Air Force Counterproliferation Center
USARC	US Army Reserve Command
VA	Veterans Affairs
WG	working group
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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