

**US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE  
BALKANS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF  
*DE FACTO* PARTITION**

Evelyn N. Farkas

and

**IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS  
THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Beth L. Makros

Jeremy C. Saunders

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Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to:

Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies  
HQ USAFA/DFES  
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27  
USAF Academy, CO 80840  
phone: 719-333-2717  
fax: 719-333-2716  
email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil

*Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at*  
<http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss>

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## FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this fortieth volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The decade following the Cold War has seen a rise in ethnic conflict, and the United States military has found itself involved in a range of humanitarian intervention situations. The US Commission on National Security Strategy/21<sup>st</sup> Century—the Hart-Rudman Commission—has forecast a continuation in this type of conflict and in concomitant calls for United States military intervention at some level. While the US military has expressed mixed attitudes toward this type of political-military mission, and while they have had to climb a relatively steep learning curve gaining experience and expertise in the range of “peacekeeping” operations, several issues have been identified as important to the success of current operations and to planning for future situations. These two papers identify, explain, and analyze two very important sets of those issues. They are presented here not as endorsements of US military intervention or as a “cookbook” of keys to successful peace operations, but as solid and sobering examinations of the complexity of this operational realm and of the unique military requirements and opportunities it presents.

In the first paper, *US Policy Towards Secession In The Balkans And Effectiveness Of De Facto Partition*, Evelyn Farkas addresses inherently non-military contextual challenges encountered by military forces during NATO efforts to make or enforce peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. She highlights significant problems that have emerged in both former Yugoslavian states; namely, that the initial progress towards establishing stable multiethnic states has been stalled by criminal networks and the lack of functioning central governments. She concludes that civil and military peace implementers must be more aggressive in administering the protectorates NATO has established in order to advance the political and economic reforms that are needed to

achieve a lasting peace. Her efforts help to detail the struggle of institution-building that accompanies peace enforcement and peacekeeping efforts.

In the second paper, *Improving US-Russian Relations Through Peacekeeping Operations*, Beth Makros and Jeremy Saunders use Bosnia and Abkhazia peacekeeping interventions as case studies to show the need for, and possible strategic benefits from, improving cooperation during combined or multinational peacekeeping operations. Not only do they outline the major weaknesses of Russian peacekeeping efforts and spell-out the differences between Russian and American peacekeeping doctrine, but they identify a major US weakness in combined settings: the lack of US peacekeepers' knowledge of the Russian language and culture and how such knowledge would improve the ability of US troops to effectively function in the field with their Russian counterparts within these combined settings. Their paper highlights both the wider potential benefits that can be gained from multinational operations and the further complexity and requirements they generate in order to ensure such broad success.

It is hoped that the issues and lessons highlighted by the authors of both papers will enable US policy makers and military commanders to identify means to more effectively lead or participate in such interventions for as long as the international situation and United States policy dictate a need for military intervention.

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JAMES M. SMITH  
Director



# US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF *DE FACTO* PARTITION

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the decade of the 1990s, as ethnic conflicts obtained greater salience and demonstrated renewed ability to destabilize the international order, successive US administrations fostered cautious multilateral policies. Washington advocated interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo that were designed to end conflict and restore order in the short-run while firmly denying the right to partition the original state. Partition—the creation of one or more new independent states from an existing one—was normatively and practically rejected. Instead, the US and its NATO allies opted for *de facto* partition as the “best of the worst” policy choices.

The *de facto* partitions in Bosnia and Kosovo are short-term military and political expedients involving the use of non-sovereign boundaries to divide states ethnically, geographically and politically. Simultaneously, the regimes imposed by the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and the UN protectorate in Kosovo emphasize the use of political and economic incentives to bridge military and territorial boundaries. The following study examines the two major ongoing civil-military attempts to manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans via *de facto* partition. The analysis focuses on the extent to which policy implementation bolsters the underlying objective—to maintain a multiethnic sovereign state and prevent secession or partition. The study assesses the *de facto* partition regimes in Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of their short-term effectiveness containing conflict and the long-term prospects for state preservation. In each case, the analysis begins with a brief review of the objectives of the intervenors. Subsequent sections focus on the military and political aspects of the intervention, and the extent to which they are reinforcing partition or integration. The conclusion offers a blunt final assessment of international efforts in the Balkans and policy recommendations addressing current shortcomings.

The evidence demonstrates that some progress has been made towards achieving the underlying objective in both cases—to establish multiethnic democracy and prevent secession or partition. *De facto* partition has brought short-term gains to Bosnia and Kosovo. It has proven to be an effective post-conflict mechanism to separate formerly warring parties. The international forces have restored peace to Bosnia and Kosovo. However, progress towards establishing a stable multiethnic state and territory in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively, has been slowed and is in danger of stalling. The continued presence of war criminals and associated mafias in both states provides a sustained threat to internal security. The criminal networks prevent true freedom of movement of peoples, goods and capital, affecting long-term economic prospects as well. Finally, in Bosnia the lack of a functioning central government leaves the state out of the European integration process and continues to prevent compromise and a power shift from nationalists to more moderate politicians.

The study recommends that the implementers in Bosnia and Kosovo move quickly and assertively to: 1) remove internal security threats, 2) begin to reform the economic system and 3) in Bosnia, rewrite the constitution to strengthen the central government. The author asserts that *de facto* partition cannot become the basis for policy, if civilian and military peace implementers are unwilling to aggressively administer the protectorates that result. Firm international administration is required to implement the political and economic reforms that will bridge the *de facto* partition. Imposing reform upon these ethnically divided societies is the only “shock-therapy” that will allow for relatively quick political change and conditions conducive to a removal of the international forces that enforce the *de facto* partitions.

# IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The post-Cold War era has seen a rise in the number of international peacekeeping operations undertaken by the world community. While these missions have often consumed the world's attention, the US-Russian relationship still plays a crucial role in world affairs. This paper seeks to answer three main questions:

- 1. Can relations between the US and Russia be improved through combined peacekeeping operations and support for Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad?*
- 2. In what areas can the US most effectively use resources to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping?*
- 3. What actions should the US take to initiate or improve relations in these areas?*

### Cooperation in Peacekeeping

The US has several vital and important interests involved in maintaining a cooperative relationship with Russia. While the current relationship is somewhat tense, one of the most promising ways to improve the overall strategic relationship is through cooperation in peacekeeping efforts. These efforts provide an opportunity for higher level political figures to interact and allow the US and Russia to promote their mutual interests.

### Assessment of Russian Peacekeeping

To find the areas where the US can most effectively use its resources to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping, this paper assesses: 1) where Russia is most likely to participate, 2) Russian peacekeeping training and equipment, 3) Russian peacekeeping doctrine, 4) a case of participation in an international operation, Bosnia, and 5) a case of involvement in the near abroad with a low level of UN supervision, Abkhazia.

*Participation:* Russia's economic and political situations limit them to participation in peacekeeping missions in the near abroad, the Balkans, and, to a limited extent, UN operations.

*Training and Equipment:* The training Russian forces receive for these missions is adequate, but their equipment is outdated and poorly maintained.

*Doctrine:* Russian peacekeeping doctrine, at least in practice, differs from US doctrine in three areas: 1) a greater propensity to use force, 2) an often-times partial approach to promote Russian interests, and 3) the inclusion of combatants in the peacekeeping force.

*Performance in Bosnia:* As an example of Russian participation in combined operations with the US under NATO auspices, Bosnia shows that Russian troops perform adequately. The major issues in Russian performance include setting up a mutually agreeable command and control structure, questions of Russian partiality and lack of professionalism, equipment and maintenance problems, and language and cultural barriers.

*Performance in Abkhazia:* In Abkhazia, Russian forces act under CIS auspices with UN supervision. They perform the minimum task of maintaining stability reasonably well, partly because of their heavy-handed approach. Russian troops have frequently acted with partiality towards the Abkhaz, and have been unable or unwilling to completely fulfill their mandate to provide a secure environment and to facilitate the return of refugees.

*The US has an opportunity to improve the overall strategic relationship with Russia by improving cooperation in the Balkans and finding areas to support Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad.*

#### **Bosnia**

The US should seek to improve cooperation and communication in Bosnia by: increasing the number of LNO's (liaison officers) to the Russian Brigade, including a Russian Representative in PfP command post exercises, and restarting the combined patrolling missions that the Russian and US troops perform. To reduce cultural misunderstandings and break down language

barriers, the US should set aside more time to brief incoming American commanders (down through platoon leaders and NCO's) and develop phrase books on various differences in military culture, terminology, and procedures.

#### **Abkhazia**

The US can support Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad by allowing American UN observers more freedom to travel in the conflict region and increasing their interactions with CIS peacekeeping forces. The US should also encourage and support other CIS nations, such as the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia, to take a more active role in CIS peacekeeping missions, bolstering the CIS and improving its peacekeeping capabilities and legitimacy.

#### **Overall Recommendations**

These recommendations can improve the US-Russian relationship in the context of any type of peacekeeping operation:

- 1) Define each nation's participation in the operational planning of multinational peacekeeping operations by the level or amount of their participation in the operation.
- 2) Restart educational exchanges between US and Russian military personnel.
- 3) Perform combined exercises of staff level officers under the established PfP program.
- 4) Improve Russian language and cultural expertise among US officers.
- 5) Increase cultural training for officers and NCOs assigned to work with Russian units.
- 6) Give more credit to Russia for its peacekeeping operations in recognition of improved performance in desired areas.



*Uncharted Paths, Uncertain Vision:  
U.S. Military Involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa in  
the Wake of the Cold War*

**INTRODUCTION**

The end of the Cold War brought significant, sudden change to the international security environment. In its early days, the new era saw widespread confidence—even euphoria—in the prospect of an immediate attenuation of worldwide conflict. But that early optimism was rapidly overcome in the sobering reality of a world rife with festering tensions, and a proliferation of violence even less constrained than in the years of direct superpower confrontation. Scholars soon were groping for new paradigms to explain the altered international environment.<sup>1</sup>

Few regions have seen more tragedy in the post-Cold War world than parts of sub-Saharan Africa, a region remarkable for the number of external military interventions in the 1990s. And no other part of the world has seen a more profound array of U.S. military involvements. Some of the recent American experience in Africa has been captured in powerful media images: the naked corpses of U.S. servicemen dragged by gleeful Somali crowds through the streets of Mogadishu, mutilated victims of genocidal violence in Rwanda, and Marine helicopters evacuating terrified civilians from escalating disorder in Liberia. But while crisis interventions have generated much temporary media attention, they obscure other U.S. involvements. Their long-term significance is much less than the routine military relationships between the United States and much of the region.

America has interests in Africa, and has pursued them with a variety of military activities over the past decade. What is much less

clear is whether or not the military ventures articulate well with each other, or harmonize with the diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of America's regional policy. This concern is particularly relevant in light of the Clinton Administration's unambiguous assertion that it intends to so shape events as to preclude the necessity for expensive military interventions.<sup>2</sup>

This paper is an assessment of U.S. military involvements in Africa in the wake of the Cold War. The research on which it is based included interviews in mid-1997 with approximately one hundred U.S. and African government officials, both military and civilian. The most important questions simply were these: to what degree do U.S. military involvements in Africa promote America's long-term regional interests? And, what could be done to enhance the effectiveness of military activities in promoting America's interests?

Because of the reactive nature of much of America's foreign policy in the region, these questions are not often asked, and even less frequently aired in public discourse. And yet, good stewardship of the nation's resources would seem to require some coherent mechanism for measuring the value of its public sector regional involvements. This paper is offered as a limited effort to provide such an assessment.

## **U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA**

America's military involvements in Africa could be evaluated in a variety of ways. But a taxpayer could be expected to ask if they secure the nation's regional interests, and if they do so more effectively than other available options.<sup>3</sup> This is a useful basis for assessing America's military activities in Africa. And of course, a clear understanding of national interests is a fundamental requirement for good foreign policy.

So an evaluation of America's regional activity should begin with an identification of regional interests.

Unfortunately, this is not as easy as it sounds. The U.S. Constitution unambiguously confers on the Executive Branch the preponderance of responsibility for management of America's foreign relations.<sup>4</sup> However, neither the Founding Fathers nor their descendants have ever endowed the Presidency with sole prerogative for identifying national interests. Nor have U.S. presidential administrations ever enjoyed an entirely free hand in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.<sup>5</sup> At times, public opinion or Congress have severely constrained the administration's options or forced its hand in foreign relations.<sup>6</sup>

Americans do not particularly agree among themselves on what constitutes U.S. national interests in Africa. And although the current Administration has specified regional interests for the use of Executive Branch agencies,<sup>7</sup> it has resisted doing so via the more widely disseminated National Security Strategy.<sup>8</sup> So two questions remain: who really determines the national interests in Africa and what are those interests?

The answers to both questions are complex. Various groups inside and outside of government debate what is (or is not) the national interest.<sup>9</sup> Multiple voices compete for the right to define U.S. interests in Africa, and they are by no means all in one accord. Obtaining a national consensus on any list of U.S. interests in Africa would be difficult under the best of circumstances.<sup>10</sup>

Because of the lack of consensus on interests, it is not surprising that U.S. Africa policy is inconsistent and reactive. One noted scholar argues that "U.S. policymakers have tended to ignore the African continent until some sort of politico-military crisis grabs their attention." He rightly observes that this produces ". . . policy that often becomes

driven by events, as opposed to the more desirable outcome of policy shaping events.”<sup>11</sup> However, continuing U.S. regional involvements suggest at a minimum that Americans agree there are interests worth pursuing in Africa, whether or not the interests are articulated in any official medium. Sometimes the public commitment to these interests is temporary and media-driven.<sup>12</sup>

It is possible to identify at least eleven desirable conditions in Africa which most knowledgeable Americans probably would agree are regional interests. The United States has devoted public sector resources in efforts to advance each of these conditions. While each is a major foreign policy goal in its own right, all are interrelated and at least somewhat codependent. They include the following:<sup>13</sup>

- Regional stability
- U.S. access to key persons, institutions, facilities and economic opportunity
- Information and warning
- Safety of American citizens
- Region free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- Regional comity and cooperation
- Region free of sponsors or safe havens for transnational threats
- Freedom from egregious suffering
- Regional governance that is humane, managerially competent, and accountable
- Sustained economic development
- Unthreatened natural environment

Not readily apparent to the average American is the large degree to which the United States uses its military establishment to pursue its African interests. Americans are well aware of the recurring interventions driven by complex humanitarian emergencies. However,

these responses—the military interventions for evacuation of citizens, humanitarian relief and peace operations—are a relatively small part of the overall picture. Other more prominent involvements include the daily activities of the small numbers of military personnel assigned to America’s regional embassies, the various forms of security assistance, recurring military exercises and U.S. consultations with African military leaders on a host of issues.

## **WHAT ARE “MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR”?**

Nothing better captures the military spirit of the 1990s than the phrase “Military Operations Other Than War,” often known by its acronym MOOTW or OOTW (and pronounced “moot-wah” or “oot-wah”).<sup>14</sup> MOOTW features the use of a nation’s military power in roles other than direct combat in a declared war.<sup>15</sup> The United States has not fought a declared war in Africa since World War II, so all of America’s post-Cold War military involvements in Africa fall under the general rubric of “operations other than war.”

In theory, there could be an almost unlimited variety of “operations other than war,” though in actual fact, U.S. joint military doctrine specifies the sixteen distinct types listed below.<sup>16</sup> A seventeenth category, not specifically mentioned in the literature (but obviously applicable) is appended at the end of the list below.

- Arms Control
- Combating Terrorism
- Department of Defense Support to Counterdrug Operations
- Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations
- Enforcing Exclusion Zones

- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
- Humanitarian Relief
- Military Support to Civil Authorities
- Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
- Peace Operations (PO)
- Protection of Shipping
- Recovery Operations
- Show of Force Operations
- Strikes and Raids
- Support to Insurgency
- Special missions and other activities

Of the seventeen distinct forms of MOOTW, the U.S. military has conducted only about ten in Sub-Saharan Africa. And of these, only five have been a significant feature of U.S. military involvements in Africa since the end of the Cold War. It is this more limited list that is of particular interest to the study.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the U.S. military has not been significantly involved in arms control, support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions, enforcement of exclusion zones, military support to civil authorities, protection of shipping, or efforts to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight.

The U.S. military has conducted some forms of MOOTW in very limited contexts in Africa; for instance, by providing small amounts of counterterrorism training to selected African countries.<sup>17</sup> It does not normally conduct counterdrug operations in Africa, but the U.S. military is involved in intelligence collection and analysis of international drug organizations, some of which have African connections.<sup>18</sup> During the Cold War, the U.S. employed its armed forces to conduct several

“recovery operations” of sophisticated Soviet military equipment captured by American clients in Angola and Chad. Under Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) oversight, the U.S. military provided some training to anti-Communist insurgents in Angola. While the U.S. has not conducted strikes or raids in Sub-Saharan Africa, it assisted allies in these activities in 1965 and 1978.<sup>19</sup> Show of force operations have been a feature of some of the interventions.<sup>20</sup> None of these forms of MOOTW currently are a major feature of U.S. relations with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The significant post-Cold War military involvements include noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian relief and peace operations, nation assistance, and special missions. It is to these activities that the discussion now turns: first, to identify them, then to assess their effectiveness in advancing U.S. regional interests.

### **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**

When required by the local security situation, the National Command Authority orders the U.S. military to evacuate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country, and to protect itself and the evacuees in the process.<sup>21</sup> The primary American concern is the safety of U.S. citizens, although citizens of some foreign countries also are evacuated.

The basic responsibility for noncombatant evacuation rests with the Department of State. The senior U.S. diplomat on the scene, normally the U.S. Ambassador, initiates it. However, the Department of Defense devises evacuation plans and, when necessary, conducts the relocation itself. The U.S. military has conducted a relatively large number of these operations in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade (See Appendix 1).

### **Humanitarian Relief Operations**

Humanitarian relief operations are activities of limited duration conducted by U.S. military forces to assist citizens of foreign countries in conditions of natural or manmade disaster. There are many different circumstances under which humanitarian assistance missions may be conducted, but they all are intended to complement the efforts of the civil authorities of the foreign nation being assisted. One important subfield of humanitarian assistance is “humanitarian demining,” a Department of Defense role which has attained increasing visibility since 1995.<sup>22</sup>

The U.S. conducted humanitarian relief missions in Somalia in late 1992 and 1993, another in Rwanda and eastern Zaire in 1994, and came relatively close to conducting another in the same area in late 1996. The United States has conducted humanitarian demining programs in several African countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Namibia and Rwanda, and is planning such activity for several others.

### **Peace Operations**

When Americans think of “operations other than war” in Africa, they tend to view peace operations—and particularly the intervention in Somalia—as the stereotypical form. Because of the tendency of the media to focus on such operations, this preoccupation is understandable. However, peace operations are a very small part of U.S. military involvements in Africa.<sup>23</sup>

In distinction to the humanitarian relief operations discussed earlier, the United States actually has committed its ground forces to only one “peace operation” in Africa—United Nations (UN) operations in Somalia after May 1993. (Technically, the U.S. intervention in Somalia from December 1992 to May 1993 was a “humanitarian relief operation.”) However, the U.S. has supported other peace operations in

Africa with staff officers and observers, military equipment, airlift and funding.<sup>24</sup>

### **Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency**

U.S. military assistance to foreign countries, other than that categorized specifically as “war” or “humanitarian relief,” generally falls under one of three separate kinds of programs labeled “security assistance,” “foreign internal defense,” or “humanitarian and civic assistance.” These programs are conducted in individual countries under the supervision of the U.S. Ambassador.

***Security Assistance.*** In Security Assistance programs the United States provides military materiel, military training, and other military-related services to foreign nations. Depending on the program and the country, these activities may be funded by U.S. grants, loans, credits, or by cash sales.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has provided very small amounts of military materiel to several African countries. However, the major feature of security assistance in Africa has been the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which provides U.S. military training to foreign military personnel. Arguably, this is the longest term, most consistent and most important U.S. military relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa as a region. (An overview of security assistance funding for Sub-Saharan Africa since Fiscal Year 1994 is provided at Appendix 2.)

***Foreign Internal Defense.*** According to U.S. doctrine, “Foreign Internal Defense” (FID) comprises the “total political, economic, informational and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency.”<sup>25</sup> The military component of this effort could include provision of advice, training and materiel. FID is a principal mission of U.S. special operations forces,

which have provided a very limited amount of FID training to several African countries.

***Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs.*** U.S. law authorizes provision of certain forms of assistance to foreign nations in conjunction with U.S. military organizational training.<sup>26</sup> The idea here is to provide humanitarian benefits to the local population during the course of U.S. military exercises. While the U.S. unit practices its wartime skills by deploying and exercising, it can provide services such as medical, dental and veterinary care, road construction, well drilling and construction of public facilities. The United States has slowly increased the level of such activity in Africa over the past decade. African leaders have received this activity very well.<sup>27</sup>

***Combined Exercises.*** The United States conducts several types of military exercises with African countries. These tend to be rather small-scale and tend to be bilateral rather than multilateral activities. The most typical are the Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises conducted by the special operations forces. However, other combined training includes U.S. Navy exercises with African naval forces and (occasional) larger-scale exercises sponsored by the military unified commands.<sup>28</sup> (A listing of recent JCET exercises in Africa is attached at Appendix 6.)

Of the various types of combined exercise, the kind which has stimulated the most enthusiasm in Africa by far is the MEDFLAG series—exercises sponsored by the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) which involve the military health care establishments of the United States and African hosts. (A listing of MEDFLAG exercises by country and date is provided at Appendix 3.)

***Excess Defense Articles (EDA).*** Current U.S. law allows the distribution to selected foreign countries of some materiel declared excess to U.S. military requirements. The material is provided free of

cost or at very nominal cost.<sup>29</sup> Under normal circumstances, the recipient country is responsible for identifying the desired materiel and transporting it from U.S. depots to its destination. The recipients also are obliged to accept it in whatever condition it happens to be. Several individual African countries have received small quantities of excess defense articles (EDA).

***Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP).*** In response to a congressional mandate, the U.S. military has since the early 1990s supervised the distribution of a considerable quantity of excess non-lethal U.S. military materiel to foreign civilian communities. Such material includes medical supplies, office equipment, bedding and similar items.

***Environmental Protection.*** While it has not been a continuing major program, the U.S. military has been tasked to assist foreign countries in efforts to protect the natural environment. In 1991 and 1993, Congress allocated funding for use by African military establishments in “biodiversity preservation” operations. The funds were disbursed and the program was implemented by the Department of Defense as “security assistance.” (A listing of the U.S. military “biodiversity” programs in Africa is provided at Appendix 4.)

***Special Missions and Other Activities.*** Though not specifically addressed in the joint literature, there are several other kinds of U.S. military missions in Africa. These can be characterized as “special missions and other activities.” Perhaps the most important of these activities is routine military-to-military representational functions occurring daily in African countries. U.S. military personnel posted in America’s regional embassies generally conducts these.<sup>30</sup>

U.S. military travel in Africa, another prominent activity, features recurring visits for consultations by senior Department of

Defense personnel and “counterpart visits” to African officials by senior generals of the U.S. unified commands.

Special missions also include the activities by the U.S. intelligence community to obtain regional political-military, order-of-battle, and military capabilities information. Of particular significance to this effort are the military attachés posted in U.S. embassies in some twenty African countries.

Information-gathering activity is not limited, of course, to purely military issues. The U.S. Transportation Command dispatches teams to evaluate the capabilities of airfields around the world: this information is widely available to private and public sector consumers. The U.S. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) conducts limited research in Africa relevant to its mission of apprising the U.S. military forces of regional health threats. The U.S. military maintains a small medical team in Kenya that cooperates with Kenyan and other civilian experts in research on African diseases, primarily malaria.

Among potential future U.S. military activities in Africa is a U.S. initiative to create an African Center for Security Studies. The idea originated with EUCOM in the early 1990s, and was a spin-off of the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany.<sup>31</sup> Though still very much in the conceptual phase, this initiative may result in a U.S. and/or NATO-funded center for Africans similar to that currently available in Germany for eastern Europeans.

## **MILITARY INVOLVEMENTS AND U.S. INTERESTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

Are U.S. military activities in Africa effective in securing the nation’s regional interests? In mid-1997, the author posed that question to thirty U.S. diplomats serving in Africa, twenty-five government experts in the

U.S. intelligence and policy communities and some forty-five African officials, both military and civilian. Their responses form the gist of the subsequent discussion.

The one striking, basic difference between African and U.S. respondents had to do with the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Africans in general believed that the United States should play a more activist role as world leader than that envisioned by the American interviewees, arguing strongly that it was a moral imperative. However, the African conception of this role had more to do with economic and humanitarian assistance than with military interventions per se. Although they were far too polite to state it so crudely, African respondents wondered why a country as rich as the United States was so reluctant to share its wealth with its needy neighbors.<sup>32</sup>

No individual interviewed during this research argued that the United States currently is more militarily involved in Africa than appropriate to U.S. interests.<sup>33</sup> However, both African officials and U.S. diplomats commented that other instruments of national power—diplomatic and economic—were underused in comparison to the military involvements.

No interviewee (civilian or military, U.S. or foreign) suggested that the U.S. should expand significantly the current levels or types of its military involvements. U.S. diplomats believed that U.S. regional interests are reasonably well served by the existing involvements. They did, however, suggest a number of modifications which (they believed) would better secure U.S. interests. The subsequent discussion reflects findings from the various interviews. Interspersed with these views is some explanation of roles, missions and structures.

### **The Role of the Unified Commands**

Responsibility for initiating U.S. military activity falls under the purview of civilian policymakers, commencing at the top with the President—the “Commander in Chief.” That said, the planning and implementation of U.S. military operations outside the continental United States generally are the responsibility of a major regional military command (a so-called “unified command”). There are five of these, which have a distinct geographical focus. Between them, they divide up the responsibility for military operations across virtually the entire surface of the earth.

The unified command plays an extremely important role in the entire gamut of regional military involvements. In addition to supervising the security assistance programs and posting security assistance personnel to African countries, it plans and implements the combined (U.S./African) military exercises, plans and conducts the U.S. military interventions, including noncombatant evacuations (NEOs), and uses its senior generals to maintain good relations by conducting frequent visits to key civilian and military leaders in the region.

Largely as an accident of Cold War history, different parts of Africa fall within the area of responsibility of four separate unified commands. Most of the African continent falls in the area assigned to EUCOM, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. Five countries in the northeastern corner of Africa fall under the responsibility of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquartered in Tampa, Florida. Islands off the west coast of Africa are the responsibility of the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. Islands off Africa’s Indian Ocean coast are the responsibility of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) headquartered in Hawaii.

The essential role of the unified command actually is something of a problem for the consistent, coherent pursuit of U.S. interests in Africa. Each of these commands finds its major missions and focus

somewhere in world other than Africa. Thus, crises in the command's region of greatest concern (Eastern Europe/Persian Gulf/Korean Peninsula) almost inevitably will divert its attention and resources from Africa.

Perhaps as significant is the fact that each unified command has different approaches and priorities in its military-to-military programs. Africans find these differences puzzling, as do U.S. (civilian) diplomats. The division of responsibility for different African countries between the unified commands makes it more difficult than necessary to implement multilateral programs involving countries from the different African subregions.<sup>34</sup>

Despite these pitfalls and problems, the unified commands endeavor to translate the administration's broad policy into specific regional objectives, which can be pursued with available resources and programs. In fact, it can be argued that the unified commands perform this role with greater focus and intensity than is true of any other agency of the U.S. Government. The downside may be an apparent overemphasis (in Africa) of the military instrument of U.S. national power at the expense of the diplomatic and economic.

### **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)**

One of the unified command's most significant responsibilities is the evacuation of American citizens from crisis situations. If the evacuation requires a military operation, that operation will be planned and conducted by the appropriate unified command. Each unified command maintains well-refined evacuation plans.

Almost without exception, Americans interviewed for this study complimented the U.S. military for its proficiency in evacuating U.S. citizens from troubled African countries in NEOs. No one questioned the propriety or relevance of this military capability. All American

interviewees seemed to agree that it contributed substantially to the U.S. interest in “safety of American citizens.” All seemed to agree that it is in the best interest of the United States to maintain at least the present capacity to conduct such operations. However, American respondents offered interesting perspectives on the actual conduct of NEOs. These are summarized here.

The decision to order an evacuate is the ambassador’s “call.” However, in situations of escalating disorder, considerable pressure often is exerted by the Department of State and the unified command on the ambassador to order the evacuation.

In crisis circumstances which look like a NEO may be necessary, the complexity of an evacuation requires that the U.S. military initiate preparation long before the order be given to commence the evacuation. This preparation may include actual deployment of military forces. This sometimes results in tensions among U.S. officials. The military is anxious to complete the mission and minimize the prospect of any harm to American citizens. The U.S. diplomats on the scene typically seek to maintain an official U.S. presence in the country until the last possible moment. Thus, to members of the Department of State, the U.S. military can appear to be obsessively concerned with completing the evacuation, whether or not warranted by the circumstances on the ground. The military leaders, in contrast, can see an ambassador’s reluctance to order an evacuation as indecision and dithering.

While both stereotypes may have some basis in fact, it is difficult to offer a compelling argument why existing procedures should be changed in any fundamental way. (Clearly, the senior diplomat at the site is the appropriate person to judge what is in the best long-term interest of the United States, whether or not this frustrates would-be rescuers.) The system works well and has done a good job of safeguarding American lives.

Seen from the African perspective, however, NEOs may not be so benign. African military establishments generally are quite small. Although the U.S. typically deploys small-sized amphibious or ground force elements to conduct an evacuation, such forces can appear comparatively large, powerful and technologically sophisticated to African viewers, almost invariably raising suspicions of American motives. This particularly is true if the U.S. force lingers in the region for any length of time.<sup>35</sup>

Africans sometimes also see racial implications in NEOs. Generally, in the course of a NEO, the U.S. force will evacuate not only Americans (and their dependents), but citizens of some other countries as well, particularly those of European allies. The message seen here by Africans is that the United States (and other European states) will go to great lengths to save the lives of white people, but are not terribly concerned if large numbers of black people die in situations of escalating violence.<sup>36</sup> Such conclusions undermine (at least in some degree) the goodwill and access enjoyed by the United States in Africa. However, few would argue that this should preclude such operations.

While it probably is unrealistic to expect that all African suspicions could be assuaged in evacuations conducted by outside military forces, it would better serve U.S. regional interests if such interventions were very rapid, small-scale and discrete and left a minimal “footprint” of presence in the region. (For those locations accessible to amphibious forces, the U.S. Marines probably do this better than any other combination of U.S. forces.) It also would be productive for U.S. forces to devote considerable effort to the public relations campaign surrounding the intervention and to much more effective use of U.S. military psychological operations during the intervention.

### **Humanitarian Relief and Peace Operations**

Humanitarian relief and peace operations, significant U.S. interventions, are military involvements that occur in the wake of a complex humanitarian emergency, as in Somalia or Rwanda. The actual U.S. interventions have produced a significant literature, which need not be repeated here.<sup>37</sup> But the key question here is whether these involvements effectively secure U.S. interests. Generally, the interests which are most threatened by the crisis are those of “enduring regional stability” and “freedom from egregious suffering.”

The seeds of a humanitarian or peace operation generally appear first in discussions in Washington among Executive Branch agencies, including intelligence and policymaking communities. As this initial informal discussion takes shape, it evolves into more formal consultative fora for the national government known collectively as the “interagency process.” Ultimately, this process provides the Administration with options which, if adopted, can result in the exercise of national power, often primarily diplomatic, sometimes military. Because of the relative speed with which it can be applied, there is a strong incentive in crisis to resort to a military option. If a military option is adopted, the Secretary of Defense directs the appropriate unified command to plan and execute it.<sup>38</sup>

If a crisis drags on for a long period of time, various U.S. domestic constituencies and interest groups typically are energized and exert pressure on Congress and the Administration for a particular U.S. response. This can result in irresistible pressure on the Administration either to intervene, refrain from intervening or end an ongoing intervention (the latter being the case in Somalia after the casualties suffered by U.S. forces in October 1993).

The propriety of intervention always is a touchy issue. External military interventions in Africa tend to defer resolution of the issues that initiated the conflict.<sup>39</sup> War is, after all, a form of conflict resolution,

perhaps the only one that fully resolves some of the perplexing dilemmas left by Africa's tortured history. If the United States seeks enduring regional stability, military intervention to halt a conflict may not be an effective way to achieve such conditions.

Interventions are in any event analogous to attempts to treat a medical patient after he has contracted a serious disease. They are reactive applications. In Africa, they generate as many problems as they solve. Still, following the medical analogy, if the United States is inevitably going to accede to U.S. domestic or international pressure to intervene in African crises, it would be preferable (and less expensive) to prevent the malady rather than attempting to cure it. In other words, to stress "prevention" rather than "cure." Though Congress has been willing to fund U.S. responses to complex humanitarian emergencies in Africa, it has proven consistently reluctant to allocate significant, consistent funding for regional crisis prevention.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, the United States likely will play a continuous "curative" role, and will intervene militarily in selected cases of great humanitarian tragedy. U.S. decisionmakers will do this reluctantly, sensitive to the inevitable criticism in Congress and the media, and will strictly limit the involvement in the hopes of minimizing U.S. military casualties. These involvements will be multilateral: the United States will intervene only when some sort of international coalition can be stitched together to provide political "cover."

One of the most important contributors to successful humanitarian relief and peace operations is effective coordination not only of military forces of coalition partners, but also with a very wide variety of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). These humanitarian organizations play essential roles in addressing some of the root causes of instability. They often are "on the scene" in the region prior to the arrival of the

military intervention force and after the military force is withdrawn. Sometimes, the military intervention is designed primarily to protect the work of these humanitarian organizations (as in Somalia in late 1992 and Rwanda in 1994).

For a variety of reasons, relations between the military intervention force and the humanitarian organizations can be problematic. The humanitarian groups generally have very different organizational cultures than their military partners, reflecting considerable differences in ideological inclinations and *modus operandi*. They sometimes pursue agenda that are at odds with the military intervention mission (as seen by U.S. officials).<sup>41</sup> However, because they often target root causes of suffering and instability over the long term, these organizations may play a more important role than the military in protecting U.S. regional interests. Humanitarian relief and peace operations would be much facilitated by close cooperation between military forces and humanitarian organizations.

Since the early 1990s, the U.S. military has become much more sophisticated in its approach to cooperation with humanitarian organizations. Military and government agencies have sponsored (or participated in) a variety of conferences, colloquia and exercises designed to effect better cooperation. EUCOM has designed semi-permanent planning teams containing representatives from such organizations. CENTCOM conducts an annual symposium to assess mechanisms to facilitate cooperation. That said, this clearly is one area where much more could be done to facilitate effective humanitarian and peace interventions.

Both U.S. government and African interviewees stressed that humanitarian relief and peace interventions should be timely, decisive and directly compatible to needs of the situation.<sup>42</sup> The multilateral dimension of such involvements—the necessity for good and continuous

communication with coalition partners at all levels—puts a premium on the availability of officials with regional expertise. U.S. officials praised the Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) for their skills in facilitating such communication, and lamented that there never seemed to be enough of them.

A substantial minority of the American interviewees, and a majority of the Africans interviewed for this study, argued that a more intelligent and vigorous U.S. response in the early stages of a humanitarian emergency could be an important contribution to regional stability, and could play a major role in attenuating such situations before they became larger-scale humanitarian disasters.

Africans frequently told the author that the United States must exert a leadership role in resolving large-scale crisis situations in Africa. (This seemed to derive from a high regard for the influence, power and resources of the United States.) African interviewees were generally agreed that the United States has not fulfilled this expectation. On the other hand, Africans tended to visualize a U.S. role largely in UN contexts.<sup>43</sup> They did not think that the U.S. should conduct unilateral military interventions, although they did suggest that the United States has much more ability to conduct peace enforcement operations (in coalition operations) than the U.S. has been willing to use.

African interviewees seemed agreed that the U.S. decision to end its participation in the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) after October 1993 was very ill-considered, several were quite contemptuous of the U.S. decision to “run away from the situation after suffering a small number of casualties.” Somewhat in contrast, a number of African military officers who had served in Somalia believed that the U.S./UN intervention was warranted and produced worthwhile long-term results that have been ignored by the media.

*U.S. Peace Operations and the ACRI.* One of the most striking examples of the reactive character of U.S. peace operations in Africa is furnished not by specific crisis interventions, but by American efforts to prod Africans into developing a regional peace operations capability. This is the case of the African Crisis Relief Initiative (ACRI)—a foreign policy initiative produced by the Clinton Administration on short notice in late 1996, in reaction to deteriorating security conditions in Burundi.<sup>44</sup>

The original idea had its genesis earlier among mid-level government officials who understood America's regional interests and had a reasonable notion of how the idea could be implemented. However, they were unable to sell the project to senior policymakers until a crisis seemed to require a short-notice option. At that point, the Administration decided that an American program to create an indigenous African crisis response force was a convenient answer to a difficult problem. The idea was adopted as U.S. policy without the minimum consultation and vetting appropriate to a major initiative. Then, the timing and manner of its announcement left little doubt overseas that this was a sudden American reaction to crisis. When it was first announced in late 1996, Africans and Europeans saw in the initiative a patronizing American unilateralism that took them for granted. Not surprisingly, initial responses from both African leaders and America's European allies were tepid at best.

Despite the less than overwhelming reception, the Administration continued to work on the issue, appointing a senior Foreign Service Officer to head an interagency working group in early 1997. The working group launched intensive consultations with foreign officials that gradually mitigated much of the initial skepticism in Africa and Europe. The working group also established an ACRI linkage to the UN and articulately argued ACRI's merits in congressional testimony.<sup>45</sup> By mid-1997 the U.S. Army Special Forces had begun instructing

selected African military forces for peace operations roles under the new program.<sup>46</sup>

Africans themselves still were ambivalent about the ACRI in 1997. Officers in several African countries seemed interested and cautiously optimistic about its prospects. Officers in several other countries seemed to regard it as a very patronizing attempt by outsiders to define Africa's problems and dictate solutions. Several Africans suggested to the author that ACRI was an American effort to shift the "world's" dirtywork onto the backs of Africans alone. Military officers in one African country doubted the reliability of U.S. promises of material and logistic support for an African peace operations force.<sup>47</sup>

Two very strong messages seemed to emerge from discussions with Africans about ACRI and similar efforts. First, Africans were very uncomfortable about any large-scale peace operations not under the aegis of the UN.<sup>48</sup> A second message was the importance of allowing Africans to devise their own conflict resolution processes without constant badgering by uninformed outsiders. This message (though conveyed politely by Africans) could be more bluntly expressed as follows: "If you really want to help, let us take the initiative. When we need help from our friends, we will request it. But let us determine what that assistance should be."

The ACRI is by no means the first effort to construct an indigenous African peace operations capability, and whether or not it comes to a fully satisfactory fruition, there are indigenous African developments in peace operations that are worthy of U.S. attention and support. The United States has supported ongoing efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to develop a conflict resolution cell and a military observer force. America also has supported peace operations in Liberia conducted by the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG).<sup>49</sup>

In fact, developments in African subregional organizations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) may be the most promising in this arena. An impressive initial example was an unprecedented multinational, peacekeeping exercise held in Zimbabwe in April 1997.<sup>50</sup> Termed BLUE HUNGWE,<sup>51</sup> it included military contingents from Zimbabwe, Botswana, Tanzania, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, South Africa and Mozambique (as well as observers from Zambia and police participants from Angola. The BLUE HUNGWE scenario was designed to test command-and-control and interoperability at battalion level in a realistic “peacekeeping” environment. The significance of BLUE HUNGWE is that it is part of a coherent subregional effort to develop multinational peace operations capabilities. As this is written in late 1997, a similar exercise, hosted by Senegal, is scheduled for early 1998.

***Humanitarian/Peace Interventions and the National Interest.***

Both U.S. diplomats and African interviewees told the author that American military interventions were effective in attenuating egregious suffering in Africa during times of humanitarian catastrophe. African officials seemed to encourage more consistent American attention to humanitarian relief. They were puzzled by the apparent selectivity and did not seem to be aware of the competing pressures on U.S. policymakers in such circumstances. Africans were prone to suspect hidden agenda in American choices to intervene or not intervene. They suggested that the United States does not consult very well with its regional friends about its interests, motives and intentions in such circumstances.

Neither the U.S. diplomats nor Africans consulted for this study believed that military interventions in themselves fundamentally promoted enduring regional stability. However, Africans pointed to the seeming success of UN peacekeeping missions in Namibia and

Mozambique as evidence that military operations can be essential in transitions from conflict to peace. Despite some skepticism by U.S. interviewees, and much difference of opinion on details, most of the interviewees thought that U.S. efforts to assist in the creation of indigenous conflict resolution capabilities would contribute to enduring regional stability.

### **Nation Assistance**<sup>52</sup>

U.S. (military) nation assistance programs originate with the U.S. Congress, which allocates funding to specific countries for security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance programs, and similar activities. However, the real genesis of these programs is found in routine executive branch interagency coordination (particularly between the Department of Defense and Department of State) which results in an annual submission to Congress (by State) of proposed levels and allocations of funding. The ultimate say, of course, belongs to Congress.

The interagency decision about levels of nation assistance to specific countries is heavily influenced by the local U.S. embassies.<sup>53</sup> Occasionally, individual African countries lobby Congress for special consideration, although no country in Sub-Saharan Africa has achieved much result in such efforts to date.<sup>54</sup>

Once Congress has appropriated the funding in program lump sums, the Department of State breaks the lump sums down into regional and country allocations. The Department of Defense then actually implements the country-level programs. It falls largely upon the staff of the relevant (military) unified command to supervise the programs in the countries of their particular responsibility. The unified commands do this by working, in turn, through personnel in U.S. embassies in their region.

At the level of the individual African country, the responsibility for managing the day-to-day details of the various peacetime military activities, including nation assistance programs, thus falls upon personnel of the U.S. embassy. In some African countries, the embassy has a “military mission”—a small resident group of military individuals who work directly for the unified command and whose role specifically is to manage the military-to-military relationships between the United States and the host country. Some embassies in African countries have a Defense Attaché Office, which can perform the same role.<sup>55</sup> Many of the U.S. embassies in African countries have neither a military mission nor a Defense Attaché Office. In these cases, it becomes necessary for a civilian embassy officer to assume this role as a secondary duty.

Among U.S. diplomats and military authorities consulted for this study, there was striking unanimity on the basic value to the U.S. of Nation Assistance Programs. Within this broader category, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs received particular commendation, though in both cases with some reservations. Each of the subcategories is discussed in more detail below.

***International Military Education and Training (IMET).*** The IMET program has provided military training, mainly in the United States, for thousands of African military personnel. Interestingly, U.S. diplomats consistently mentioned that a key value of IMET was exposure of African military personnel to the ethical dimensions of a professional, western military. They also mentioned that IMET provided substantial U.S. embassy access to African military officials. However, U.S. interviewees, civilian and military, offered several criticisms about the IMET program.

Management of an IMET program—even a very small one with an annual budget of several thousand dollars—is a very complex process.

It involves a large amount of coordination with the host country and with various U.S. military bureaucracies. The process is difficult and labor-intensive. U.S. officials often struggle to understand these structures and offer clear training choices to their African counterparts. Embassies with no resident military presence can be at a considerable disadvantage. It also is frustrating to Africans, who sometimes have to deal with a confusing succession of junior embassy civilians, many of whom have no military experience.

A second criticism has to do with the long-term coherence of an IMET program in any single country. All such programs in Africa are relatively small—generally sufficient to send a dozen or less personnel per year to study in the United States. Obviously, the long-term value of the program depends heavily on careful management to assure that the training reaches the military personnel who ultimately will make a difference in their countries. Unfortunately, under current circumstances, such management is difficult. Few of the “pieces” of the program are long-term: the U.S. managers rarely serve more than two years in the position, and the amount of IMET funding allocated to countries changes (sometimes dramatically) from year to year, making it difficult to pursue a coherent, long-term plan. With limited exceptions, the program manager cannot dictate to the host nation who should (or should not) be selected for the training. The rules undergirding the program are subject to sudden shifts. Availability of training in U.S. schools also varies from year to year. It is little wonder that African recipients (like their American providers) often find it difficult to know what IMET options they really have.

Third, while an IMET program traditionally has been intended to increase U.S. influence and access, a second and increasingly important objective has been that of enhancing professionalism, technical competence, and commitment to human rights. Since the early 1990s,

U.S. congressional interest in IMET has resulted in the requirement that IMET training promote U.S. professional ethics.<sup>56</sup> This, in turn, has significantly affected the kind of training offered and the kind of personnel which African countries send to U.S. training programs. To illustrate this point, African armies tend to send their combat leaders to courses that emphasize “hard skills” and combat leadership. They send their staff officers and resource managers to the courses more designed to inculcate values. The current IMET emphasis means that U.S. training is now less likely to influence those particular African officers who will rise to the most senior leadership ranks. If it is important to influence the future senior African military leadership, it would be wise to allow more flexibility for IMET managers.

A fourth criticism has to do with what might be characterized as “critical mass” in an IMET program—the point at which enough personnel in a given country are exposed to U.S. military training for there to be a significant impact on access or host-country military professionalism.<sup>57</sup> It is entirely possible that an IMET program in a given country could be so small as never to produce much influence, access or enduring professional capability. It is important that IMET programs in individual countries be sufficiently large that the professional values acquired by IMET graduates are not simply buried in the host-nation military culture.

A fifth criticism applies to IMET programs in those African countries that still maintain strong military links to France. IMET alumnae from these countries often believe that they face discrimination and reduced opportunity in their own establishments because of their selection to attend American (rather than French) military training programs. (That said, African officers sent to U.S. military schools from Francophone Africa regularly tell the author that they value their U.S. training.)

A final criticism cuts across the earlier discussion: there currently is no provision for incisive studies of the whole regional IMET program in a way that will give Congress and program managers clear options on how to best pursue U.S. regional interests with IMET.<sup>58</sup> Uncharacteristically for a U.S. military activity, there is no comprehensive study with a historical perspective on IMET's regional successes and failures. The lack of such a study significantly compromises IMET's potential use as a policy tool, and should be viewed as an inadvertent failure in accountability to the American taxpayer.

Africans consulted for this study were, in general, very enthusiastic about IMET training. They regarded travel to the United States for training as a key “perk”—a stimulating, rewarding experience. The IMET graduates themselves almost invariably displayed a greater understanding of U.S. perspectives and greater sympathy for U.S. interests in Africa and the world. Africans frequently praised IMET for its value in exposing African military personnel to the values and perspectives of a modern, professional military. Their only negative observation was that some of the IMET training was not relevant to their own military establishments since it involved sophisticated American technology not available to the Africans.

Some IMET instruction is conducted not in the United States but by U.S. military training teams deployed to African countries. This instruction includes seminar programs addressing such subjects as military resources management, civil-military relations in democracies, and military justice. African audiences have received this training very well. Embassy officials and Africans say that these events promote good civil-military dialogue. The downside is that there is not much money for any form of IMET for African countries.

*IMET and the Staff Colleges and War Colleges.* A consistent theme that emerged in discussions with every group consulted for this study was the value of the higher levels of professional military education—particularly that afforded by the U.S. staff colleges and war colleges.<sup>59</sup>

Attendance at these military schools affords senior African military professionals an intense exposure to western military establishments, with their associated ethical and organizational norms. U.S. diplomats and military personnel said that they had much better access to African alumnae of these institutions, and that the training resulted in observable improvement in military planning in African military establishments.<sup>60</sup> A staff college or war college education also directly improves the ability of U.S. military leaders to cooperate with their African counterparts in coalition activities such as peace operations.<sup>61</sup> In the relatively small military establishments of Africa, small numbers of staff college and war college graduates can make a significant difference.<sup>62</sup>

Attendance at U.S. staff colleges and war colleges, however, is problematic for African countries. The U.S. Services carefully control the invitational process. The number of available positions in these schools is very limited, and Africans are not the only foreign officers seeking the opportunity.<sup>63</sup> Few African countries can afford to pay for the training, and must rely on IMET funding granted by the United States. Unfortunately, the \$90,000 price of one annual staff college or war college position represents a large portion of an African country's entire annual IMET budget. African and U.S. officials repeatedly stated that even modest increases in the availability of such education would pay significant dividends in access for U.S. officials and increased professionalism for the host-country military.

***An Overlooked Option: Supporting African Military Schools.***

The United States could reach a much wider audience of African military officers through the African schools themselves rather than through limited allocations of student positions in U.S. schools.

Several African countries have staff colleges and a few have war colleges.<sup>64</sup> Generally, each of these African institutions trains officers from more than one African country. The author repeatedly was told by U.S. and African officials that the United States should support African staff colleges and war colleges. At minimum, they said, such support should include exchanges of instructional materials and regular exchange visits of subject matter experts and instructor personnel. This just does not occur at present.

***Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.*** In the 1990s the United States has pursued programs in Africa to benefit African countries while providing training to U.S. military forces. These programs are funded under Title X of the U.S. Code and thus are categorized as U.S. military training rather than “security assistance.” The activities themselves range from Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs) conducted by Army Special Forces, to combined medical exercises (MEDFLAGs) involving U.S. and African military medical establishments, to Exercise-related Construction (ERC) in which U.S. Reserve Component engineer units cooperate with African military forces in operations to build schools, dig wells, repair infrastructure and perform similar construction tasks. (An outline of the location and costs of these activities in recent years is provided at Appendices 3, 5 and 6.)

In general, both the U.S. and African officials spoke highly of these involvements. Africans liked “combined” training that emphasized the role of Africans as partners rather than clients. They also liked the expressly humanitarian nature of many of the involvements—particularly those that provided medical care.

All seemed to believe that the programs generated good-will, promoted access to African civil and military authorities, made at least modest contributions to the professionalization of regional armies, contributed tangibly to infrastructural development and attenuated some health threats. In other words, there was general agreement that these programs promoted U.S. regional interests.

However, African and American interviewees offered some criticisms. Both commented on the seemingly arbitrary, haphazard, and sporadic application of the programs. Both wondered why the African countries most needful of such assistance were least likely to receive it. (Some of the Africans tended to see the uneven application as evidence of a hidden U.S. regional agenda.) U.S. interviewees in Africa tended to believe that these programs fell far short of their potential, and that this resulted from deficiencies in vision rather than limitations in resources.

***Humanitarian demining.*** As a result of 1994 legislation, the U.S. military has begun to train African military forces to conduct demining operations. The mission itself has been given to the U.S. Army Special Forces, which by mid-1997 had conducted training in several African countries. The demining training programs actually feature more than just the technology of demining: they are tailored to the needs of individual countries and include additional programs like mine awareness training for local civilian communities.

While no interviewees thought that demining was unimportant, the success of the U.S. military efforts has been somewhat uneven. As currently structured, the U.S. programs do not provide a permanent U.S. military demining presence. Not all African recipients have shown the commitment to continue the demining activity after departure of the U.S. military team. In countries such as Angola, international organizations already are heavily involved in demining efforts, calling into question the relevance of a U.S. military effort in the country.

African interviewees tended to commend the demining programs, although their comments were very general. Several U.S. diplomats wondered if demining were not better left to international organizations and civilian contractors rather than to military establishments. Presumably, this would provide the stable, long-term commitment necessary to assure that demining efforts continue. Humanitarian demining is one program which would profit from a careful study after about five years of program activity (i.e. in about 1999) to determine if the program is a good value for the money spent.

***Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Exercises.***

Another specialty of the U.S. military special operations community is the JCET exercise, in which the U.S. forces conduct training with African counterparts. While this training could include a wide variety of different skills, in Africa it has tended to emphasize basic combat skills, small unit leadership, basic and advanced airborne (parachuting) techniques, and marksmanship. By mid-1997, the training in Africa included the exercise of sophisticated automation for command and control of peace operations.

In general, African officials spoke highly of the willingness of the U.S. special operations personnel to live with and work with their African counterparts. They tended to see the training as of good quality. However, they offered several criticisms. First, they noted that the Special Forces training teams are small and reach only a small part of any African army. Africans seemed to believe that the training repertoire was limited, and that their requests for specific kinds of training often were ignored. Some African officers thought that they were offered the kind of training desired by the U.S. military rather than that which they themselves wanted. Second, because successive JCETs tended to repeat the same training rather than going on to more sophisticated skills, they thought the training was overly repetitive.

U.S. diplomats and military officers generally were happy with the JCET exercises, but with several reservations. Because of the relatively small size of the exercises and low level of the units involved, the visibility of this activity to the public and to the civilian government is not very high. Such exercises contribute to host-nation military professionalism, and to good military-to-military relations, but not particularly to access for U.S. officials. In fact, the exercises probably are best justified by their role in enhancing the skills and regional knowledgeability of the U.S. special operations forces.

The most specific reservation expressed by U.S. officials was the difficulty experienced in coordinating the JCETs by U.S. embassies without a resident military presence. They also seemed to believe that the U.S. military did not understand the importance of detailed consultations with host-nation counterparts, that the military personnel sent to coordinate the exercises often were quite junior and lacked the requisite cultural sensitivity to understand host-nation concerns properly.<sup>65</sup>

Overall, the JCETs are by far the most ubiquitous of the U.S. programs for exercising with African militaries, and seem to do a good job of maintaining a U.S. presence and U.S. contact with African military establishments. However, in planning for these exercises, U.S. officials probably could be more sensitive to host-nation desires and expectations. This would entail more careful, early coordination between (U.S. military) site survey teams and the relevant African military establishment. It may be wise for such site surveys to include officers of more senior rank than is currently the practice. The presence of a resident U.S. military presence in an embassy could be a significant benefit to this coordination.

**MEDFLAGs.** In 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the EUCOM initiate a series of medical exercises with African countries.

These exercises were designated “MEDFLAGs.” By about 1994, EUCOM had developed the MEDFLAGs into sophisticated, complex exercises involving U.S. and host-nation military medical establishments, along with private sector African medical personnel and NGO health-care organizations. The MEDFLAGs themselves had evolved into exercises of about three weeks duration that provided health care training, disaster relief training, and basic medical and dental care to local populations.<sup>66</sup>

After about 1995, the effects of U.S. military downsizing in Europe, increasing commitments in the regions of the former Soviet Union, and the impact of U.S. deployments to Bosnia resulted in a seeming suspension of the African MEDFLAGs—at least in the size and complexity of those in 1994/1995. Much smaller, simpler medical exercises, conducted as part of various JCET exercises, have continued. MEDFLAGs seemed to be resuming in 1997 after a two-year lull.

Few U.S. military activities in Africa have generated the goodwill, approval or attention of the MEDFLAG exercises. In addition to the very obvious common effort to reduce human suffering, the MEDFLAG exercises provide excellent training to U.S. military medical units, promote communication within various official and unofficial communities in African countries, significantly enhance U.S. access to political and military decisionmakers, and offer an excellent model for U.S./African cooperation in other military and nonmilitary endeavors. In at least some cases, the medical care to local communities initiated by the MEDFLAG continued long after the departure of the U.S. force.<sup>67</sup>

One of the most significant aspects of MEDFLAG exercises is their unambiguously humanitarian and transparent nature. Regardless of their origins, the participants live and work together in close proximity, all treated as valued partners in a struggle against non-human enemies. It is difficult to find any hidden agenda, and difficult to criticize motives.

This kind of activity appeals directly to African notions of community, comity and leadership. It builds precisely the kind of relationships that the United States would want in all its regional involvements.

Despite their merits, MEDFLAG exercises in Africa are problematic. They are expensive and difficult to coordinate, requiring (among other things) sympathetic local U.S. diplomats, some organizational competence on the part of the host-nation military establishment, and U.S. medical unit commanders with vision, innovativeness and organizational and communications skills. As the United States has reduced its military presence in Europe in the wake of the Cold War, the resources available to the unified command for use in MEDFLAGs has significantly decreased. When there are crises (or competing demands) in Europe, MEDFLAGs in Africa are an early victim.

As in other U.S. military involvements in Africa, the MEDFLAG opportunities vastly exceed the available resources. For instance, it is unlikely that the United States would devote enough resources to conduct more than three or four MEDFLAGs per year in Africa. This means that no African country should expect to see more than one MEDFLAG per decade. In fact, because of the limited (or nonexistent) U.S. military-to-military relations with them, the neediest African countries probably would never see a MEDFLAG. For these reasons, MEDFLAGs could be far more effective if they were multinational exercises extending over a subregion of Africa rather than a largely bilateral exercise involving the United States and one African country.

But despite the various limitations and problems, MEDFLAGs could protect and pursue more U.S. regional interests than any other single military involvement, and represent a very good return on the

investment. Sadly, to date the MEDFLAG program falls very far short of its potential.

***Exercise-related Construction.*** Exercise-related construction (ERC) consists of minor construction projects by U.S. forces exercising with foreign armies. These result in upgrading of host-nation infrastructure. Due to its obvious proximity and the efforts of the responsible U.S. unified command, Latin America has seen a considerable degree of this military involvement. ERC has been much less a part of U.S. military involvements in Africa.

Still, since the early 1980s, U.S. military forces have conducted ERC projects in several African countries, although the application has been sporadic and the follow-up negligible. (Exceptions include Botswana and Kenya. In the case of Kenya, the United States has conducted a series of increasingly ambitious ERC exercises beginning in 1996.<sup>68</sup>) ERC exercises generally require the skills of engineer construction units and are a particularly appropriate role for U.S. military reserve components. Like MEDFLAGs, the ERC exercises have much potential as mechanisms to promote U.S. access, to encourage multinational cooperation, and even to promote economic development.

***Biodiversity.*** In the 1990s, the U.S. military has been involved in efforts to protect the African natural environment. This is a direct result of funding allocated by Congress in 1991 and 1993, and provided to selected African countries to involve their military establishments in environmental security missions. The focus of the program was to maintain wildlife habitats through construction of park infrastructure, anti-poaching operations and protection of coastal fishing areas. Thirty African countries received benefits under one or both of the allocations. (More details about specific country programs are provided at Appendix 4.) Congressional staffers indicated in 1993 that no future disbursements of this type were contemplated.

The program, generally known as “biodiversity,” fell under Security Assistance, so the Department of Defense assumed responsibility for it. Management “on the ground” in individual African countries fell to the personnel in the U.S. embassy who handled security assistance for that country.

Results of the Biodiversity Program have been very mixed. In Botswana, the program reinforced and enhanced an existing government commitment to using the military in effective anti-poaching operations. In Niger, the funding enabled military engineers to repair and construct much-needed infrastructure in national parks. In these cases, the program was a success—it engaged the host-nation military in operations to protect the country’s natural environment and resulted in tangible improvement in the host-nation capacity to preserve biodiversity.

Unfortunately, these successes are balanced by several egregious failures. A number of African countries received funding, equipment, or other resources and did not (or could not) induce their military establishments to assume a viable environmental protection role. Almost immediately after receiving money for biodiversity in 1993, the Department of Defense was subjected to congressionally-mandated reprogramming and was obliged to withdraw funds from individual country biodiversity programs in order to pay for higher priority programs elsewhere.

Interlocutors consulted for this study had widely differing views on the merits of military “biodiversity” efforts. Several U.S. diplomats commended the program for its ambitious vision and at least modest successes. Others regarded it as foolhardy wastage of the taxpayer’s money. U.S. and African officials in several countries criticized the program for encouraging African armies to assume inappropriate roles, or roles already fulfilled by other government agencies such as the police or national park service. On balance, the most salient criticism had to do

with the haphazard initiation and termination of the program. Africans saw it as something of a metaphor for U.S. aid programs in general: a desire to do good, a program initiated with great fanfare and publicity, then suddenly dropped and forgotten.

While the various criticisms have merit, this program begs for a careful relook. The U.S. military establishment has considerable sophistication in environmental security operations, and has human resources and materiel that can be used in foreign assistance roles.<sup>69</sup> Africa's natural environment is severely threatened.<sup>70</sup> African political authorities constantly are faced with difficult choices of resource allocation. Developing societies simply do not share the same concerns for the environment as their counterparts in the developed world. Thus any program that focuses national attention on environmental issues has value. An important benefit of involving African militaries in such efforts is the implicit message that a national interest is threatened and must be protected—by military power if necessary.

*Excess Defense Articles (EDA).* At first glance, the notion of offering unneeded U.S. military materiel to U.S. partners in the developing world seems like a good idea. However, despite some successes, this program has had a rocky history in Africa. A substantial amount of the problem has to do with the very different perspectives of government and military officials in a rich, developed country (like the United States) and those in poorer, developing nations (like those in Africa).

As a general rule, in order to obtain EDA, recipient countries must be able to make requests against a constantly changing list of available U.S. materiel, must make their own arrangements for inspecting it, and (if they decide they want it) must make their own arrangements for acquiring and shipping it. For small military establishments on shoestring budgets, these are not easy measures.

There is, moreover, a nominal fee for acquisition of much of the materiel: nominal, that is, by U.S. standards. Several thousand dollars may be entirely beyond the capacity of the neediest potential recipients.

Some of the EDA is new, unused materiel, which happens to be excess to U.S. needs, but much of it is used; in some cases, very thoroughly used. There is very little provision in this program for upgrading the used material to serviceable standards, or providing spare parts and other necessities for normal use. This means that, under normal circumstances, if the recipient wants serviceable used vehicles, with spare parts, he must pay for the repair and parts separately.<sup>71</sup>

There are many opportunities for miscommunication in the administration of EDA. Africans wonder why a rich country like the United States would offer unserviceable materiel or materiel without provision for transporting it free of cost to the consumer. It is not difficult for Africans to suspect that the U.S. simply is “dumping” unwanted materiel at their expense. The potential for misunderstanding is illustrated by one African country that applied for donation of excess C-130 transport aircraft. The country’s leaders were flabbergasted in 1997 to find a several million-dollar fee for what they had believed to be donated items. This issue thoroughly poisoned military-to-military relations between that country and the United States for a period.

This said, EDA has been of benefit to several African countries, and has been effectively used by EUCOM to support African contingents involved in peace operations in Liberia. However, if its American managers could make it far more “user-friendly,” this clearly is a program with a great deal more potential in Africa than has ever been realized to date.

### **Special Missions and Other Activities**

The ability of the United States to pursue its regional interests is compromised by the way military personnel are assigned and distributed to American embassies in Africa. In 1997, less than half of these embassies has a resident military presence, including embassies in countries like Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Ghana and Mali. The U.S. national military establishment depends heavily on attaché reporting in crisis situations, so lack of a resident attaché is a serious intelligence deficiency.<sup>72</sup> Likewise, an embassy's ability to maintain regular contact with senior host-nation military leaders, and manage a security assistance program, is compromised by lack of a resident U.S. military presence.<sup>73</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has been the recipient of a considerable amount of routine U.S. military travel, much of it involving visits by personnel from the unified commands and from high-level military staffs in Washington. Such visits are designed to demonstrate U.S. interest. They typically stress "orientations" to familiarize officials with local situations and consultation with host-nation counterparts. U.S. military personnel also attend seminars, conferences and colloquia in African countries on a variety of issues. These activities promote a variety of interests, including access. They are indicative of growing military-to-military partnerships between the United States and African countries.

However, there are at least two "downsides" to this travel. One is the unintended signal to Africans that U.S. regional policy places a strong emphasis on military involvements. The other is the impact on small regional U.S. embassies. In fact, the ultimate "filter" for peacetime U.S. military involvement in a country is the local U.S. embassy. It is up to individual embassies to grant "country clearance"—permission for official travel by U.S. Government executive branch employees to that country. On occasion, simultaneous visits by large numbers of official

visitors can severely burden the typically small U.S. embassies in Africa.<sup>74</sup>

## **GETTING THE MOST OUT OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENTS IN AFRICA**

U.S. military activities in Africa include a substantial reactive dimension. That certainly is true of humanitarian relief, peace operations and noncombatant evacuations. But by no means all U.S. military involvements in Africa are reactions to unanticipated tragedy. Thus, it should be possible to use military power to pursue U.S. regional interests through coherent, long-range planning. The greatest current deficiency in U.S. military activity in Africa is the lack of a clear, relatively specific overarching national security strategy for the region.<sup>75</sup> This deficiency, in turn, degrades the effectiveness of virtually all U.S. military involvements.

Exactly who within the U.S. Government bureaucracy should be responsible for initiating and promulgating such a strategy could be a matter of debate. Tradition would dictate that this is a role of the Department of State, with particular responsibility falling upon the Deputy Secretary for Policy or upon the Assistant Secretary for Africa. It might even be argued that the Africa Director in the National Security Council should be allowed to expand his charter to take more direct and forceful responsibility.

Related to the lack of an overarching regional security strategy is the confusion caused by the division of military responsibility for the continent among four separate U.S. unified commands, each with a focus somewhere in the world other than Africa. This situation practically guarantees that policy implementation will take very different forms in the differing unified commands. The situation makes it difficult to

rationalize U.S. military involvements in regional/subregional organizations. There should be one unified command for Africa and its surrounding islands.

For situations potentially requiring humanitarian relief and peace operations interventions, the United States could do a much better and more thorough job of consulting with its African partners. Such consultation should not be *ad hoc* and situation-driven, but continuous. Some of the “consultation” should be the routine embassy communication with host-country counterparts; other should result from a (currently missing) exchange relationship between African and U.S. Staff Colleges and War Colleges. The latter would require the assignment of some U.S. civilian and military personnel as observers to regional organizations and as instructors and student “fellows” in the African military training institutions.<sup>76</sup>

Regional solutions to impending crises probably could be significantly facilitated by U.S. willingness to work behind the scenes in regional fora, for instance, by early guarantees of funding and logistic support to subregional organizations prepared to head off crises in early stages. In peace operations in Africa, the United States should be willing on short notice to provide forces (on at least a small-scale) for temporary peace enforcement operations. Despite the inevitable reservations of the U.S. Congress, it should be established from the outset that such a force could serve under nominal African leadership. In all these consultations, the United States should be willing to react rapidly to local initiatives, but should avoid the temptation to promote unilateral U.S. solutions.

U.S. government and military efforts to link PVOs and NGOs to the planning for military humanitarian interventions should be encouraged and expanded. Humanitarian organizations should be a permanent part of the intra-government consultations leading up to an intervention.

The various nation assistance programs, particularly IMET and humanitarian assistance, represent a good value for protection of U.S. regional interests. They provide at least some access. They acquaint military leaders of potential partners with U.S. doctrine and methods. They are good insurance that the United States will have militarily competent, dependable regional allies in crisis interventions. Africans generally appreciate them. However, they are very small-scale and are subject to precipitous, arbitrary revision by U.S. decisionmakers at various levels.

If Americans want to maximize the effectiveness of their “nation assistance” programs, they must assure that these are not held hostage to the vicissitudes of U.S. domestic politics nor to the constantly shifting priorities of U.S. responses to regional crises elsewhere. A modest expansion of these programs is clearly within the national interest and more opportunity for Africans to attend U.S. staff and war colleges could provide substantial benefit. A further noteworthy improvement would be exchanges between U.S. and African military schools, particularly at the staff college level.

U.S. nation assistance programs for the entire region should be rationalized to provide an intelligent distribution of IMET funding, military exercises, and humanitarian assistance in support of U.S. regional interests. The extraordinary, bureaucratic complexity of security assistance programs like IMET is an obstacle begging for simplification. Managers “on the ground” should not have to deal with the excruciating, overlapping paperwork requirements.

Regular consultations on African issues with other allies (particularly France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, the Scandinavian countries and Japan) could rationalize and leverage a host of currently unrelated military training activity. Such consultation

should be broader and much more consistent year by year than is currently the case.

Within the U.S. Government, security assistance programs for African countries should not be subject to the undue influence of country advocates with particular clout. They should emphasize combined exercises, with a bias toward medical and humanitarian activities. A subregional MEDFLAG-type operation would be a superb model for such exercising. Such operations should involve not only multiple African countries, but also European and Asian military medical units as well. The exercises also should draw from U.S. reserve component resources.

The actual MEDFLAG exercise series should be expanded in scope and frequency, with greater efforts to involve the military medical personnel of U.S. allies. Because of the differing environments and the importance of accommodating subregional political sensitivities, at least one MEDFLAG should be conducted annually in each of Africa's subregions: West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa/the Horn, and Southern Africa. The program should be protected against sudden suspensions due to crises in Europe or the Middle East.

For the same reasons "writ large," and for early warning against "hot zone" epidemics, the United States should fund (or at least take the lead in finding funding for) African subregional medical research facilities. At a minimum, four should be founded: one each in East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa. These facilities should be under the nominal leadership of the host nation in which they are established, and should be staffed by local physicians and scientists, experts drawn from international and nongovernmental organizations, and some U.S. military medical personnel. Such centers could be effective hubs for expanded, sub-regional medical exercises modeled on the MEDFLAGs. This would provide a much-improved capacity to

attenuate local suffering and could provide appropriate care and warning in the early stages of epidemics.<sup>77</sup>

Maximizing the effectiveness of the various forms of nation assistance would require some individualized adjustments by country. For instance, in those embassies without a resident U.S. military presence, serious consideration should be given to one of the following options:

- Requiring the unified command to provide a full-time military presence of a least one mid-level noncommissioned officer with security assistance training.
- Requiring the unified command to provide the embassy with an officer or noncommissioned officer on a temporary-duty basis (perhaps for a week in every quarter and during visits by senior DOD personnel) to accomplish the routine coordination for military-to-military activities with host-nation officials.
- Requiring the unified command to provide funding for a local-hire, full-time position to be trained to perform military-to-military coordination for the embassy. Preferably, this would be a U.S. national, perhaps a dependent of a U.S. Government employee in the embassy community.

The U.S. regional interest in an unthreatened natural environment in Africa could be well served by reviving a coherent “biodiversity program” funded at a modest level. This should be started with a careful study of what worked (and did not work) in the 1991 and 1993 iterations. Although this would be a military nation-assistance program, it would benefit substantially by cooperation with interested PVOs and NGOs. However, for it to be effective, this program must be long-term and consistent. From the outset, its sponsors must have a long-term vision and must recognize that initial successes probably will be modest.

The value (to U.S. regional interests) of the various forms of nation assistance is difficult for policymakers to assess because of the

lack of coherent, empirical evaluations of these programs. These should be a regular feature of U.S. military programs in Africa (and elsewhere, for that matter). Assessment requirements should be built into congressional allocations. To assure objectivity, such studies should be performed by agencies outside of the Department of Defense—preferably by reputable academic institutions.

Under present circumstances, one U.S. regional interest, which is not as well served as needed, is that of militarily-relevant information and warning. This is due to the low priority assigned generally to intelligence collection in Africa, the spotty regional coverage by national-level collection systems, and the very inadequate distribution of U.S. military attachés in Africa. Probably the most appropriate “fix” to this problem would be to at least modestly increase the number of Defense Attaché Offices in U.S. embassies in Africa, or to increase the numbers of attaché personnel in existing offices that can be accredited in a nonresident status to other countries in the region.<sup>78</sup>

The United States clearly needs more regional experts to mediate its military relations with African counterparts, and should encourage the U.S. military services in ongoing efforts to select and train personnel for such roles. The Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program is a good model for selecting and training such personnel, but it provides too few to do the nation’s business in Africa.

## **CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Times of significant political change are times of great opportunity for those with vision. The end of the Cold War ushered in such an era. America’s allies and potential enemies are watching for evidence of sure-footed international leadership, in Africa as elsewhere. What the world

has witnessed over the past decade in Africa is an indecisive America with a proclivity to intervene in egregious crises when these are advertised by the international media. This reflects a foreign policy that largely is reactive to regional events. It is unworthy of a world leader, reflecting an approach that is “penny wise, but pound foolish.”

One obvious challenge in any U.S. administration is the difficulty in obtaining the consistent interest and focus of the key policymakers. Related to that is the difficulty of mobilizing a politically significant constituency that would support a consistent regional policy. Without concerted effort, this situation is unlikely to change in the near future, but an administration could facilitate and encourage communications among those various domestic groups that have private agenda in the region. If done with appropriate focus and political skill, this probably could generate enough popular interest for an administration to “sell” a reasonably ambitious “Africa” policy to a skeptical American public.

Whatever regional involvements ultimately emerge, they will continue to lack focus and coherence unless an administration can skillfully meld the efforts and capabilities of the various U.S. Government bureaucracies that influence or implement U.S. regional policy. They will never be as effective as they could be in securing U.S. interests unless the involvements also include the coordinated participation of private sector groups, whether humanitarian, educational, or even commercial.

The United States has interests in Africa, and could better protect them by articulating them clearly through a more focused and better resourced National Security Strategy. Such a strategy would include more effective use of diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of national power in pursuit of U.S. regional objectives. If this were the case, the role of the military instrument probably would

decrease in importance. However, in the absence of a national consensus on America's regional interests, it is unlikely that an administration will craft such a National Security Strategy. Given a continuing U.S. tendency to react (rather than attempt to prevent) African crises, and the U.S. inclination to use modestly funded military involvements as a primary mechanism to secure U.S. regional interests, it is difficult to envision much change to current practice.

The forms of U.S. military activity seen in Africa over the past decade appear to secure many of America's regional interests. This particularly is true of "safety of American citizens," "access," and "information and warning." Arguably, these involvements also contribute to "regional stability," "freedom from egregious suffering," and "regional comity and cooperation." Because of the interconnectedness of the interests, one could show that the U.S. military activity in Africa bears in some degree on other U.S. regional interests such as "a region free of sponsors of transnational threats," and "sustained economic development." However, the military involvements cannot fully protect any of America's regional interests, and invariably work best when skillfully combined with diplomatic, economic and informational policy measures.

The military activities themselves could, however, be more effective if better resourced, rationalized, articulated, and distributed. These programs also deserve to be much more regularly and coherently evaluated in ways that provide better options to policymakers and better accountability to the taxpaying public.

U.S. policymakers are correct in their inclinations to encourage development of African regional capacities to resolve regional crises. Despite some recent improvement, the United States has erred badly in failing to see these processes as a genuine partnership in which African interests and sensitivities are respected. In fact, the single most

egregious problem is a failure to achieve consistent, coherent consultation with Africans at various levels.

The United States could significantly improve the value to its interests of its various military involvements in Africa if it could achieve greater year-to-year consistency and could forge true multi-national partnerships with African countries in efforts of common concern (such as peace operations, control of epidemic diseases and environmental protection). The importance of partnership cannot be overstressed. In fact, any semblance of patronization or neocolonialism affronts African sensitivities, diminishes U.S. influence, and must be strenuously avoided.

Perhaps the most significant recommendation that this study can make is the plea for a new model of U.S. relations with African countries, collectively and individually. These relations should be built around the “three C’s” of consultation, consensus and cooperation—qualities that should characterize the efforts of partners in a common struggle to secure shared interests.

Appendix 1. Significant U.S. Military Operations in Africa (1990-1997)

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>OPERATION NAME</b>	<b>ACTIVITY</b>
1990	SHARP EDGE	Noncombatant evacuation from Liberia
1991	EASTERN EXIT	Noncombatant evacuation from Somalia
	QUICK LIFT	Noncombatant evacuation from Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo)
1992	(no operation name)	Noncombatant evacuation from Sierra Leone
	PROVIDE TRANSITION	Election support in Angola
	RESTORE HOPE	Humanitarian operations in Somalia
	PROVIDE RELIEF	Humanitarian operations in Somalia
1994	DISTANT RUNNER	Noncombatant evacuation from Rwanda
	SUPPORT HOPE	Humanitarian operations in Rwanda
1995	UNITED SHIELD	Support to UN withdrawal from Somalia
1996	QUICK RESPONSE	Noncombatant evacuation from Central African Republic
	ASSURED RESPONSE	Noncombatant evacuation from Liberia
	GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE	Humanitarian operations in central Africa
1997	GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL	Preparation for noncombatant evacuation from Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo)
	NOBLE OBELISK	Noncombatant evacuation from Sierra Leone
	ASSURED LIFT	Operations in support of ECOMOG deployment in Liberia

Appendix 2. International Military Education and Training (IMET) (in thousands per indicated Fiscal Year)

Country	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98 (Projected)
Angola	0	0	0	125	200
Benin	99	161	281	350	350
Botswana	364	440	454	450	500
Burkina	0	0	0	0	0
Burundi	0	44	71	0	0
Cameroon	100	0	83	100	125
Cape Verde	0	75	64	100	100
Central African Republic	0	186	110	150	150
Chad	225	62	0	25	50
Comoros	0	0	64	75	75
Congo-Brazzaville	109	150	162	175	175
Congo-Kinshasa	0	0	0	0	0
Cote d'Ivoire	150	120	151	150	150
Djibouti	106	125	150	100	100
Eritrea	82	200	261	375	400
Ethiopia	113	248	327	400	450
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0
Gabon	0	0	0	0	0
Gambia	100	0	0	0	0
Ghana	229	222	257	260	285
Guinea	88	155	35	150	150
Guinea-Bissau	102	75	88	125	125
Kenya	288	283	297	300	400
Lesotho	0	32	72	75	75
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0
Madagascar	0	0	102	100	100
Malawi	125	125	154	225	225
Mali	134	163	155	150	175
Mauritania	0	0	0	0	0
Mauritius	0	0	0	25	50
Mozambique	0	138	203	175	175
Namibia	220	126	190	200	200
Niger	200	189	11	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	75	50	243	300	300
Sao Tome	0	29	75	75	75
Senegal	450	598	637	650	675
Seychelles	0	10	31	75	75
Sierra Leone	0	52	134	115	115
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa	104	297	466	700	800
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0
Swaziland	0	57	50	75	75
Tanzania	114	81	126	225	225
Togo	0	0	0	25	40
Uganda	128	138	189	300	350
Zambia	75	92	99	150	150
Zimbabwe	241	232	224	275	350

Appendix 3. African Countries which have Hosted MEDFLAGs

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>
Botswana	1989, 1994
Benin	1997
Cameroon	1988, 1991
Chad	1997
Cote d'Ivoire	1995
Equatorial Guinea	1990
Gabon	1988
Ghana	1994
Guinea-Bissau	1991
Liberia	1989
Mali	1996
Mauritania	1990
Niger	1993
Senegal	1990, 1993
Sierra Leone	1992
Tunisia	1990
Zambia	1992
Zimbabwe	1991, 1995

Appendix 4. Biodiversity Programs in Africa

<b>Country</b>	<b>Funding (in thousands)</b>	<b>Program</b>
Benin	\$250 (1993)	Small ships for fisheries protection
Botswana	\$2400 (1991)	Light surveillance aircraft and airboats for anti-poaching activity in the game parks
	\$1800 (1993)	Surveillance aircraft/commo equipment for anti-poaching operations
Burundi	\$250 (1991)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Cameroon	\$800 (1991)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Cape Verde	\$1700 (1991)	Patrol boat for fisheries protection
Central Afr. Rep.	\$250 (1991)	Vehicles for anti-poaching operations
Chad	\$200 (1993)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Congo (Brazzaville)	\$220 (1993)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Cote d'Ivoire	\$1100 (1991)	Surveillance aircraft, airboats and communications equipment for fisheries protection, anti-poaching operations and game counting
Gabon	\$250 (1991)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
The Gambia	\$1300 (1993)	Patrol boat for fisheries protection
Ghana	\$450 (1991)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
	\$600 (1993)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Guinea	\$100 (1993)	Patrol boat for fisheries protection
Guinea-Bissau	\$1700 (1993)	Patrol boat, training and communications equipment for fisheries protection
Madagascar	\$250 (1991)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
	\$1700 (1993)	Military engineering operations for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Malawi	\$1500 (1991)	Surveillance aircraft, vehicles, utility boats, rifles, commo equipment for anti-poaching operations
Mali	\$750 (1993)	Surveillance aircraft for anti-poaching operations

Appendix 4 (continued). Biodiversity Programs in Africa

Mauritius	\$325 (1991)	Underwater equipment protection/restoration of plant life on small islands and reef
Namibia	\$2700 (1991)	Surveillance aircraft, commo equipment, radar for fisheries protection, anti-poaching and game counting operations
	\$600 (1993)	Surveillance aircraft spares for anti-poaching operations
Niger	\$600 (1993)	Military engineering for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Rwanda	\$525 (1991)	Vehicles, commo equipment for anti-poaching operations
	\$525 (1993)	Funding for repair of engineering equipment used for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Sao Tome and Principe	\$190 (1993)	Training and minor equipment for fisheries protection
Senegal	\$2700 (1993)	Patrol boats for fisheries protection
Seychelles	\$325 (1991)	Contingency equipment for cleanup of oil spill
	\$110 (1993)	Contingency equipment for cleanup of oil spill
Sierra Leone	\$500 (1991)	Spare parts/training for fisheries protection
Tanzania	\$100 (1993)	Fisheries protection law enforcement training
Uganda	\$425 (1993)	Military engineering for infrastructure upgrade in national parks
Zambia	\$300 (1993)	Light boats and support equipment for riverine anti-poaching patrols
Zimbabwe	\$1100 (1991)	Surveillance aircraft, radar, rifles, utility boats for anti-poaching operations
	\$1050 (1993)	Engineer equipment for demining in national parks, radars for anti-poaching aircraft

Appendix 5. Exercise Related Construction (ERC) in Africa since 1993

<u>Country</u>	<u>Fiscal</u> <u>Year (thousands)</u>	<u>Amnt.</u>	<u>Activity</u>
Botswana	1994	\$114.5	Dig wells at Shoshong
	1997	\$45	Construct latrine and laundry at Shoshong
Egypt	1996	\$41.6	Construct movement control facility
	1997	\$569	Quality of Life (QOL) improvements
Eritrea	1997	\$450	Construct airport taxiway and medical clinics
Ethiopia	1998	\$150	Repair/improve airborne school
Kenya	1996	\$75	Dig wells, construct classrooms
	1997	\$75	Dig wells, construct classrooms
Morocco	1995	\$100	Dig wells at Sidi Slimane
	1997	\$200	Construct latrines and tent pads at Sidi Slimane
Senegal	1994	\$335	Build classrooms and barracks, renovate operations building, resurface runway at Thies Air Base
	1995	\$105	Renovate hangar at Thies Air Base
Tunisia	1993	\$400	Renovate hangar at Tunis
	1994	\$520	Build air-ground training range at Ben Gilouf
	1996	\$150	Air-ground training range at Ben Gilouf, phase II construction
Uganda	1996	\$33	Construct fuel berms at Entebbe Airport

Appendix 6. Locations and dates of Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Exercises in Africa

<b>Country</b>	<b>Fiscal Year</b>	<b># of JCET Exercises</b>
Benin	1996	1
Botswana	1996	2
Central African Republic	1996	1
Congo (Brazzaville)	1996	1
	1997	1
Cote d'Ivoire	1996	1
	1997	1
Egypt	1996	2
	1997	1
Eritrea	1996	2
	1997	1
Ethiopia	1996	2
Equatorial Guinea	1997	1
Ghana	1997	1
Guinea-Bissau	1996	1
	1997	1
Kenya	1996	2
Malawi	1996	2
	1997	1
Mali	1996	1
	1997	2
Mauritania	1996	1
Morocco	1996	3
	1997	1
Mozambique	1996	1
	1997	1
Namibia	1996	1
	1997	1
Rwanda	1996	1
Senegal	1996	1
	1997	1
Sierra Leone	1996	1
	1997	1
Tunisia	1996	2
	1997	1
Uganda	1996	1
Zambia	1996	1
Zimbabwe	1996	2

**NOTE: Data for 1997 are through 3d Quarter only.**



## ENDNOTES

- 1 See, for instance, Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing U.S. Grand Strategies," in *Strategy and Force Planning* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College Press), 1995.
- 2 *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, The White House, May 1997, 6.
- 3 All nations have interests and national leaders pursue those interests with varying degrees of coherence and success. See, *inter alia*, Michael G. Roskin, *National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1994; Robert D. Blackwill, "A Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond," in *Europe in Global Change*, Gutersloh, Germany, 1993, 100-119.
- 4 See Article II, Section 2.
- 5 The constitutional balance of powers assures a strong congressional say in the selection of senior Executive Branch policymakers and in the agreements which an Administration reaches with foreign powers. See Jeremy D. Rosner, *The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch and National Security*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995; and George F. Kennan, "Diplomacy Without Diplomats?" *Foreign Affairs* 76 (September/October 1997): 204.
- 6 This is illustrated in, *inter alia*, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (in which Congress forced a reluctant Administration to apply economic pressure against South Africa to force political change) or in the late 1992 U.S. intervention in Somalia (in which the Bush Administration reacted to public outrage over media depiction of violence and starvation in Somalia). For a useful discussion of the roles of interest groups and think tanks, see Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, *Beyond the Water's Edge: An Introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 179-232.
- 7 See, specifically, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 35.
- 8 In fact, former Assistant Secretary of State Herman J. Cohen, wrote in 1995 that he had ". . .yet to see a credible definition of U.S. national security interests beyond the Israel-Egypt-Persian Gulf nexus." *Foreign Service Journal*, June 1995, 38. That situation has not significantly changed to date.
- 9 One such group, the American Assembly, described a recent conference as follows: On March 13, 1997, sixty-nine men and women representing government, business, academia, nongovernmental organizations, the law, international financial institutions, labor, the military, religion and the media gathered at Arden House, Harriman, New York for the Ninetieth American Assembly entitled "Africa and the U.S. National Interests". . . This Assembly was designed as a prelude to the National Summit on Africa which begins this year with regional meetings and culminates with major national events in 1999. . . This project is chaired by former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Donald F.

McHenry. Document reposted on-line by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC), 6 May 1997 <http://www.igc.apc.org/apic/docs97/amas9704.1.htm>

10 The debate turns on several axes. One is ideological: conservatives tend to be minimalists, liberals maximalists in specifying “interests” in the developing world. Other axes are cultural, humanitarian and economic, generated by interest in Africa on the part of the African-American community, Africanist academics, the business community, humanitarian organizations, think tanks and religious and other interest groups.

11 Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* (Cambridge: University Press), 1994, 2.

12 This was anecdotally illustrated by an Administration official in a 1996 “off-the-record” discussion who, when asked to specify U.S. interests in Africa, cynically responded by asking: “Where is (CNN correspondent) Christianne Amanpour reporting from today?”

13 For a more detailed discussion of each of these interests, see Dan Henk, “U.S. National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Parameters* XXVII (Winter 1997-98): 92-107.

14 The new roles have been controversial within the U.S. military establishment. See, for instance, Richard J. Rinaldo, “Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers do MOOTW?” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 96-97): 111-116. Some of the more interesting—if extreme—arguments against the new roles were reflected in a provocative article by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” *Parameters* XXIII (Winter 1992-93): 2-20.

15 MOOTW “. . .encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.” In other words, they are “military operations which are distinct from large-scale sustained combat operations” conducted by the nation in a “wartime state.” *Joint Publication 3-07*, August 1995, p. GL-3.

16 *Joint Publication 3-07*, 16 June 1995.

17 While counterterrorism is a key role for U.S. military special operations forces, primary responsibility for combating terrorism overseas rests with the Department of State. Except for Sudan (characterized as a “refuge, nexus and training hub for international terrorist organizations”) sub-Saharan Africa is not a region which currently poses a significant terrorist threat to the United States. See *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996* (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publication 10433, April 1997), 2, 25.

18 So far as the author knows, no significant quantity of illegal narcotics reaching U.S. shores originates in Sub-Saharan Africa. That is not true of North Africa. According to U.S. counternarcotics officials, there is considerable evidence of heroin production in the western Maghreb and extensive use of Morocco as a drug transshipment point.

19 This occurred twice, both times in (what is now) the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 1965, the U.S. provided airlift for a Belgian airborne assault to rescue

hostages in Stanleyville (now Kisangani). In 1978, the U.S. provided airlift for the Belgian and Zairian airborne assaults against rebel forces in Kolwezi. For an excellent account of the former, see Thomas P. Odom, *Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1988). For the latter, see Roger Glickson, "The Shaba Crises: Stumbling to Victory," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 5 (Autumn 1994): 180-200.

20 For instance, in the mid 1980s, the U.S. deployed combat aircraft to Sudan as a warning to Libya which had intervened in Chad's ongoing civil war.

21 Not all evacuations require the participation of U.S. military forces. The United States has relied on France for evacuation of U.S. citizens from African crises. In some circumstances, the U.S. Embassy advises threatened citizens to evacuate using locally available transportation options.

22 Congress allocated \$10 million in 1995 for DOD development of a program to develop structures, systems and technologies for humanitarian demining. Congress' intention was that the technology would be shared and the techniques taught (by U.S. military personnel) in foreign countries. Implementation of demining programs in foreign countries has devolved upon the U.S. special operations forces, particularly those in the U.S. Army. It is important to note here that the U.S. role is to provide demining skills to host-nation personnel: the U.S. military does not conduct the actual demining operations.

23 According to U.S. "joint" military doctrine, "peace operations" are ". . . military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. . . [they are] conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict." *Joint Publication 3-07*, p. III-12.

24 As this is written (in late 1997) the United States provides a military officer, resident in Luanda, accredited to the Angola peace process. The United States also has furnished a liaison officer to the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) to facilitate peace operations in Liberia. Similarly, the U.S. provided a military officer as an observer to monitor a cease-fire agreement in Mozambique in 1991 (which was negotiated to permit free use of the Beira transportation corridor) and a team of military observers to the UN in 1992 to monitor developments in Angola in the wake of the Bicesse Accords. Another U.S. military officer attended the talks in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1994 that almost brought a negotiated end to the civil war in Rwanda prior to the genocide.

25 *Joint Pub 3-07*, p. III-10.

26 Title X, U.S. Code Section 401.

27 C. William Fox, Jr. *Military Medical Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa: The DOD "Point of the Spear" for a New Century* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), 22-25.

28 For instance, EUCOM has initiated a series of multinational command post exercises, designated FLINTLOCK, in southern Africa. The first was held in Botswana in 1996 and the second in Zimbabwe in 1997.

29 For relevant legislation, see Section 21, Sales from Stocks, Arms Export Control Act, as amended; Section 516, Modernization of Defense Capabilities of NATO's Southern Flank; and Section 519, Additional Authority Relating to Modernization of Military Capabilities, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

30 Although (as this was written) the United States does not maintain standing forces in Africa, it does assign very small numbers of military personnel to some of its African embassies. These military personnel come in three different varieties: the first is the small contingent of enlisted U.S. Marines who guard many of the embassy compounds, the second variety are the Defense Attachés found in some embassies, and the third variety is that of the small groups of military personnel in several African embassies whose role is to perform security assistance duties. (In some cases, the same personnel perform both the attaché and the security assistance functions.) In mid 1997, the U.S. Defense Attaché Offices were maintained in fourteen Sub-Saharan African countries: Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. In mid-1997, the U.S. maintained separate security assistance missions in three Sub-Saharan African countries (Botswana, Eritrea and Kenya).

31 The Marshall Center is an institution created by the United States (but supported by NATO countries) which provides a non-threatening academic environment in which senior civil and military authorities from the former East Bloc can study issues that bear on the democratization of military establishments, and civilian control of military establishments. This is intended to ease the transition to fully democratic, free-market societies in the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.

32 One of the many evidences of this African concern was the question raised by virtually every African interviewee: "why is the U.S. so reluctant to pay its UN dues?"

33 It is very important here to stress the word "current." Many African respondents believed that the United States made serious errors in its interventions in Africa during the Cold War period. They cited, for instance, U.S. backing of (the former) Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko, and U.S. support for Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi. These activities featured some U.S. military involvements.

34 For instance, U.S. military relations with Kenya and Ethiopia (in Central Command's area of responsibility) may be different than those with neighboring Uganda (in the European Command's area of responsibility). By the same token, it is very difficult to use the military personnel in the Kenyan-U.S. Liaison Office (who belong to the Central Command) to assist the U.S. Embassy in neighboring Tanzania (which falls in the European Command area of responsibility).

35 An example of this African reaction was evident to the author in April 1997, when he was performing temporary duties in the North African nation of Chad. At the time, EUCOM had deployed a small Joint Task Force to Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) and Libreville (Gabon) to conduct an expected evacuation from (what was then) Zaire. Chadian military personnel had been following these events avidly, and were convinced that the U.S. force was going to be used to intervene (in support of one side or another) in the ongoing civil war in Zaire. No amount of argument could entirely assuage that suspicion. The French media abetted these Chadian suspicions. (See, for instance, *Le Figaro*, issue of 9 April 1997.)

36 While this is an African perception related to the author by African interlocutors, it is not an entirely accurate perception. U.S. military evacuations in Africa have included numbers of Africans, perhaps best illustrated by the sizable number of (non-Liberian) Africans evacuated by the United States from Liberia since 1990. (Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Anthony D. Marley, U.S. Army, Retired, 12 August 1997.)

37 See, for instance, Walter S. Clarke, *Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia: Bibliography* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 1995); and Shawn H. McCormick, The Lessons of Intervention in Africa, *Current History* (April 1995): 162-166.

38 Often, the unified command is a direct participant in the interagency consultation via liaison officers and video-link communications. Sometimes, the perspectives and capabilities of the unified command are fundamental determinants of the U.S. response.

39 One can speculate, for instance, on the reaction by Americans if an uninvited coalition of European powers had intervened to halt the American Revolutionary War after the battle of Yorktown in 1781, or the American Civil War immediately after the battle of Gettysburg in 1863.

40 In fairness, it should be noted that Congress has shown increasing interest in Africa conflict resolution over the past five years. However, the need vastly exceeds the allocation to date.

41 A particularly illustrative example can be cited from Central Africa. Following the genocide in Rwanda in mid-1994, the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front swept into power. However, international intervention in the conflict facilitated a huge flow of Rwanda refugees into eastern Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), just ahead of the rebel army. Among the refugees were the most egregious perpetrators of the earlier genocide. Once in Zaire, the international community provided the refugees with food, shelter and medical care in large refugee camps. Meanwhile, the officials and military forces of the defeated regime took over the camps, using them as recruitment bases for insurgents, which they then began infiltrating back into Rwanda. The humanitarian organizations, narrowly focused on humanitarian concerns, either could not or would not halt these activities. Outraged, the new Rwandan government demanded action. When it became evident that neither the

humanitarian organizations nor the international community would halt the use of the refugee camps as insurgent bases, the Rwandans themselves intervened militarily.

42 This brings to mind the assertion of (Canadian) Major General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1994, that availability of 5,000 well-trained and disciplined peacekeeping troops could have averted much of the genocide in Rwanda. For an interesting assessment of this claim, see COL Scott R. Feil, "Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered," *Georgetown University Institute for Study of Diplomacy (ISD) Reports III* (April 1997).

43 African respondents had a high regard for the United Nations and were very critical of (what they perceived to be) a U.S. tendency to ignore or slight that organization. By and large, African interlocutors saw the United Nations as the most appropriate organization for conducting (or at least endorsing) humanitarian and peace operations in Africa.

44 For a more detailed discussion of the origin and ramifications of ACRI, see Dan Henk and Steven Metz, *The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1997).

45 Ambassador Marshall McCallie, on-the-record briefing at the U.S. Department of State, 28 July 1997; Colonel Dan Henk interview with Colonel Richard Roan (USMC), military staff member of the U.S. Mission to the UN, 2 October 1997; unpublished "P3 Information Paper," 18 July 1997, received from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

46 See, for instance, Judith Matloff, "A Recipe for Peace: U.S. Know-How, Local Troops," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 August 1997, 1; and Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Ready to Train African Peacekeepers," *Washington Post*, 30 June 1997, A-16.

47 This suspicion has some basis in fact. Zimbabweans still recall unfulfilled and forgotten promises made by the U.S. to solicit their participation in the U.S.-led operation in Somalia in early 1993 (UNITAF). When the Zambians committed a force to the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Angola in 1995, Zambia requested U.S. airlift into southeastern Angola and was ignored. (Zambia eventually deployed its forces by land through northern Namibia, a considerable logistics feat given the distance of the move and the war-damaged infrastructure of southern Angola.)

48 By mid-1997 the U.S. Interagency Working Group, headed by Ambassador Marshall McCallie had established an ACRI linkage to the UN, but this was not widely known in Africa at the time. (Interview with COL George Oliver, military staff member of the U.S. Mission to the UN, 2 October 1997.)

49 There are many reasons why ECOMOG may not be the best model for future peace operations structures in Africa. See, *inter alia*, Max A. Sesay, "Collective Security or Collective Disaster?: Regional Peacekeeping in West Africa," in *Security Dialogue* 26 (June 1995): 205-222; and Earl Conteh-Morgan, "Conflict and Militarization in Africa: Past Trends and New Scenarios," in *Conflict Quarterly* XIII (Winter 1993): 39-40.

50 Plans for the exercise actually were hatched at a regional conference held in Harare (Zimbabwe) in January 1995, co-hosted by Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom, which addressed the issues of preparation and training for African peace operations forces. The United States and other European countries sent observers to this conference, which was attended by delegates from all over Africa.

51 The *shiri ye hungwe* or "bird of the Hungwe [clan]" is a highly stylized stone depiction of a fish eagle found in the stone ruins of Great Zimbabwe. This image has been adopted as a national symbol of Zimbabwe. For a discussion of the exercise itself, see Major George Thiar, "Africa's eagle of hope has landed," *Salut* (The official monthly periodical of the South African National Defence Force) (June 1997): 12-17.

52 For a much more detailed discussion of security assistance, and the degree to which it supports U.S. interests in Africa, see LTC Karl Prinslow, *Future American Security Assistance and Military Cooperation Activities in Africa*, unpublished manuscript prepared for the USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 1997.

53 If, for instance, the local ambassador has more than normal clout and interest in these military programs, he/she often can exert enough pressure significantly to increase the funding allocation. Likewise, those embassies with resident military staff are more likely to take full advantage of funding available in the security assistance system.

54 One interesting effort in this regard was that of Kenya in the late 1980s/early 1990s to find alternative ways of obtaining U.S. funding for military equipment. Kenya hired a U.S. lobbyist to convince the U.S. Congress to provide funding on the understanding that it would be used in environmental protection missions. This actually resulted in Congressional allocations of funds for military "biodiversity" missions in Africa, though ironically, Kenya did not receive any of the funding.

55 Although the distinction is arcane to those not closely connected with the functions, there is a significant difference in role between the "Military Mission" and the "Defense Attaché Office." The former works for the unified command and is responsible for managing military-to-military relations, particularly security assistance. The latter works directly for the Defense Intelligence Agency and is primarily responsible for collecting and reporting political-military information. The placing of both kinds of functions in African countries has been a somewhat haphazard process, driven by Cold War priorities and funding constraints. It is important to note, however, that all U.S. military

activities in the region fall under the supervision of the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the appropriate unified command. In each African country with a resident U.S. military presence, the CINC designates one military individual as the “Senior Defense Representative”—the CINC’s personal representative in the country.

56 Congressional interest in this subject was expressed in the FY 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act which earmarked IMET funding for training of military officers and civilian administrators of defense establishments in expanded courses emphasizing military justice, codes of conduct, and protection of human rights. By 1993, eligibility for this training was extended to almost all host-country government officials with some connection to supervision of the military, including national legislators. This was the so-called E-IMET, or “expanded IMET.” By the mid 1990s, the U.S. military security assistance establishment had identified specific military courses which qualified as “E-IMET,” and was pressuring program administrators to emphasize E-IMET training at the expense of regular IMET courses.

57 Here, it is important to add a caution: U.S. military training, even that which stresses professional ethics, does not inherently guarantee that its recipients will subscribe to the U.S. models of professional behavior. For instance, relatively large numbers of military officers from Liberia and Zaire attended U.S. military schools in the 1970s and 1980s. However, it has been difficult to see results in resulting behavior. That said, African and U.S. interlocutors offered strong commendation of the U.S. training, with ample anecdotal evidence of its value in promoting professional ethics. It is worth noting that several of the more professional—and apolitical—military establishments in Africa (those of Botswana, Kenya and Malawi) have a relatively high proportion of U.S.-trained officers. This professionalism was evident in Malawi during the political transition that replaced long-time dictator Hastings Banda with a freely elected president. (See Jonathan Newell, “An African Army Under Pressure: The Politicisation of the Malawi Army and ‘Operation Bwezani,’” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 6 (Autumn 1995): 159-182.)

58 There have been some limited studies of IMET programs in Africa. See, for instance, William H. McCoy, Jr., *Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development*, A RAND Note prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1994. Unfortunately, the existing studies do not provide a comprehensive, regional assessment.

59 In the U.S. model, staff colleges educate officers at the rank of senior captain or major, focusing on military planning at the “operational” level of war. War colleges educate lieutenant colonels and colonels for “strategic planning”—the highest levels of national security planning. In both cases, officers are intensively exposed to professional ethics, national political-military decisionmaking, formulation of national security strategy and roles of the military in MOOTW.

60 There also is a significant spin-off educational benefit to African military establishments. Three of the senior African officers who attended the U.S. Army War College between 1995 and 1997 returned to fill high-level leadership positions in the military training establishments of their own countries upon graduation from the War College. These assignments reflect African confidence in the relevance of War College education to the professionalization of their armies.

61 See, for example, Dan Henk, *Peace Operations: Views from Southern and Eastern Africa* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute Occasional Paper, June 1996), 46.

62 A former U.S. Defense Attaché in Mozambique who had observed the UN peacekeeping operation in that country (1993-1995) noted that one African UN contingent arrived initially with several graduates of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College among its senior leadership. When the U.S.-trained leaders rotated back to their country (and were replaced by leaders without the Staff College training) the contingent's performance deteriorated markedly. (Interview with LTC Gregory M. Saunders, U.S. Army, 19 January 1996.)

63 Of the limited number of foreign students that can attend U.S. staff colleges and war colleges, some already are identified in bilateral agreements between the U.S. and its close allies such as the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Germany, Canada and Australia. For the remainder of the available positions, the (U.S. military) Service Chiefs upon the recommendations of the unified commands proffer the invitations. This means that the countries invited to send students reflect the priorities and interests of the unified commands, a factor that tends to work against Africans. As an example, the U.S. Army War College has positions each year for forty foreign students. In academic year 1996 and 1997, two Sub-Saharan Africans attended the War College each year. In academic year 1998, only one Sub-Saharan African attended. While no one would argue that U.S. interests demand a large African contingent in U.S. military schools, it also seems obvious that lack of opportunity for African professionals sends an unfortunate message.

64 African countries with Staff Colleges include Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. African countries with War Colleges include Kenya and South Africa.

65 The military penchant for *ad hoc* communications apparently causes some problems. Members of one embassy provided an illustrative anecdote. In the early 1990s, a U.S. military headquarters attempted to arrange a JCET in an African country. The military organizer contacted the embassy by phone, discussing the details of the proposed exercise with an embassy staffer. The staffer, though supportive, could not provide final approval and agreed only to discuss the proposal with the Ambassador. The military headquarters, however, assumed that it had accomplished the required coordination and continued planning for the exercise without further consulting the embassy. Meanwhile,

the Ambassador had considered the request, decided to reject it, and awaited the formal proposal by message (which never came). The military organization was obliged to cancel the exercise at the last moment when it discovered that it had never requested—nor received—the requisite authorization.

66 See Fox for a detailed discussion of MEDFLAGs.

67 Malian military officers, for instance, observed to the author in mid-1997 that the “temporary” clinic set up by the MEDFLAG in Mali in 1990 had proven so popular that the local population undertook to furnish and support it out of their own resources, without recourse to the national government. The clinic was still functioning effectively years after the end of the exercise.

68 For specific details, see LTC Karl E. Prinslow, “Building Military Relations in Africa,” *Military Review* LXXVII (May-June 1997): 18-25.

69 One example of military interest in this area is the Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) now collocated with the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta.

70 Senior American policymakers have expressed a well-supported concern, including former Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, “Why Africa is Important,” *Foreign Service Journal*, (June 1995): 24-33; and former Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a 1996 speech at Stanford University, in which he argued that America “. . . must also lead in safeguarding the global environment on which. . . prosperity and peace ultimately depend.”

71 Lieutenant Colonel Anthony D. Marley (U.S. Army, retired), a regional expert with rich experience in African nation assistance programs, describes the condition of EDA from an African perspective as “far away, and broke.” He strongly recommended that EDA offered to African countries emphasize such items as uniforms, medical supplies, office equipment and rations. See Henk, *Peace Operations*, 33.

72 The Defense Intelligence Agency currently plans a modest increase in the number of Defense Attaché Offices in Africa, but such plans are subject to the vagaries of Defense budgeting and shifting world-wide intelligence priorities. Without Congressional interest, authorization and funding, it is unlikely that the regional attaché coverage will significantly increase in the foreseeable future.

73 A related issue begging for resolution is the difference between attaché offices and military missions. The current distribution of these two organizations in Africa is a relic of the Cold War and historical accident. Unfortunately, their functions are not interchangeable, nor do they answer to the same “bosses.” As a result, some Embassies have military missions—which are forbidden to collect and report military information. Other embassies have Defense Attaché Offices—which often are poorly configured to manage security assistance programs. Many embassies have neither. A rationalization of function and distribution is badly needed if the taxpayer is to get the most efficient use of the Defense dollar in this area.

74 Embassy (civilian) officials also complain about the lack of coordination—and even communication—between military headquarters. In one extreme case cited to the author, an embassy was hosting simultaneous visits by one delegation of senior officers from Washington and another from the headquarters of the unified command. Relations between the two military groups were so strained that the embassy was obliged to act as the communications link between the two delegations—whose members refused to communicate with each other directly.

75 To be sure, a DOD document entitled “*United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*,” published in August 1995, could be cited as evidence for such a strategy. However, the document is essentially a summary of general Administration objectives followed by a somewhat self-congratulatory listing of U.S. military involvements. It never identifies specific U.S. regional interests or the ways in which they could best be protected. It does not show how the military instrument of national power articulates with others in pursuit or protection of interests. It provides neither a clear vision nor the “ends/ways/means” discussion of an explicit strategy.

76 One of the key problems in establishing such exchange relationships is the fact that African countries often cannot afford to pay the travel costs and living expenses of the military officers which would be posted at U.S. installations. For this program to work, the U.S. probably would have to fund these expenses.

77 See Fox for a detailed discussion of this issue.

78 These facts are well recognized in the U.S. Intelligence Community and efforts are underway to modestly expand the number of Defense Attaché Offices in Africa over the next several years. However, this is one area that begs for more careful study and congressional attention. Changes in the international relations in the world as a whole since the end of the Cold War has vastly expanded the need for military attachés throughout the world. Congressional authorization is necessary to increase the number of the Defense Attaché personnel sufficiently to even minimally meet the anticipated requirements.