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Command Policy

EVALUATION OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES



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This instruction implements Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5106.4, *Inspector General of Unified and Specified Commands*. It provides guidance for the evaluation of air defense forces assigned to the Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD) and/or Commander, United States Element, NORAD (USELMNORAD). This instruction applies to assigned and gained air defense units and to command and control units to include: NORAD alert fighter units, Region Air Operations Centers (RAOC), Air Defense Sectors (ADS), Air Control Facilities (ACF), the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC), the NORAD USSPACECOM Battle Staff (BS) and the NORAD Crisis Action Team (CAT). This regulation applies to Air National Guard (ANG) units when published in ANGIND2 and does not apply to Air Force Reserve Command units. Send recommendations to change, add, or delete information in this instruction to HQ NORAD Inspector General (IG), 125 East Ent Ave, Peterson AFB CO 80914-1283. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity or service in this publication does not imply endorsement.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

Added **Table 1.1.**, Purpose of Evaluation, which identifies inspection types and frequency. Changes Security to Information Operations as a rated functional area in each type of inspection. Clarifies grading criteria for fighter AFEs. Separates Track Detection from Identification for Air Defense Sectors (ADS) Alert Force Evaluations (AFE) and clarifies grading criteria for ADS Initial Response. Adds the Air Operations Center as a critical rated functional area in NORAD Operations Evaluations (NOEs). Standardizes terminology for the elements making up Sectors and Regions. Deletes all references to conducting NORAD inspection of Air Education Training Command (AETC) units. Deletes all references to conducting NOE's of Air Defense Fighter units and ADS. Clarifies critical functional areas in Cheyenne Mountain Operation Complex inspections. This instruction has been completely revised and must be reviewed in its entirety.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Purpose of Evaluations. Evaluations of air defense control forces by the HQ NORAD Inspector General (HQ NORAD IG) provide CINCNORAD with an assessment of the readiness and ability of these forces to accomplish NORAD's air control mission of North America. All command concept plans and operation orders (CONPLANS/OPORDs), directives, and instructions apply. NORAD evaluations are designated by the term **AMALGAM MUTE**.

1.2. Authority. Inspection authority for CINCNORAD/Commander, US Element NORAD is derived from the following references:

1.2.1. Title 10, U.S. Code 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act).

1.2.2. DoD Directive 5106.4, *Inspectors General of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands*.

1.2.3. Assignment of Forces for Unified and Specified Commands.

1.2.4. NORAD Agreement and Terms of Reference.

1.2.5. Evaluation criteria for USAF forces are detailed in supplements to AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, and this instruction. Evaluation criteria for Canadian Air Forces are detailed in 1 Canadian Air Division (CAD) Orders, Volume 7, *Operational Evaluation and Assessments*.

1.3. Concept. The readiness of forces made available to CINCNORAD will be assessed in conjunction with the appropriate parent command/service inspection agency. This will be done on a regular and recurring basis to prompt the preparation process that leads to increased readiness. These evaluations provide CINCNORAD a validation of readiness postures as reported on a monthly basis in the Status of Resources and Training System report (SORTS) (Canadian equivalent report). Readiness will be assessed via four kinds of evaluations. The first evaluation assesses RAOCs (or equivalent) readiness to perform NORAD peacetime-to-wartime missions and is called the NORAD Operational Evaluation (NOE). The second evaluation assesses the ability to perform the peacetime mission. For NORAD alert fighter units and ADSs, this is called the Alert Force Evaluation (AFE). The third type of evaluation is a CMOC Readiness Evaluation (CRE) and will be conducted by the NORAD-USSPACECOM (N-SP) IG to evaluate the CMOC peacetime mission. The fourth type is a CMOC Operational Evaluation (COE) and will be conducted by the N-SP IG to evaluate the CMOC peacetime-to-wartime mission. **Note:** For the purpose of brevity in this instruction, IG and A3 Eval are one in the same. Also, the word MAJCOM is used to designate Air Combat Command (ACC), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD).

1.4. Command IG Relationships. The parent command/service retains primary responsibility for assessing readiness of fighter units and ADSs. The NORAD IG may augment the parent command/service inspection teams and coordinate on the final report. The HQ N-SP IG is responsible for assessing readiness of the CMOC.

1.5. Scheduling. Scheduling of evaluations is a shared responsibility of the parent command/service IGs and the HQ N-SP/IG. The respective IGs will approve inspection schedules. For CMOC evaluations con-

ducted by the HQ N-SP IG, scheduling with HQ NORAD Director of Operations (J3), HQ USSPACECOM Director of Operations (J3), and Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) Staff (J3) will be accomplished.

1.6. Notification. Letter or message will initiate formal NOE and COE notification. Notification will be 180 days prior to the event to allow for proper preparations. AFEs and CREs are no-notice evaluations.

Table 1.1. Purpose of Evaluation.

Type of Evaluation	Frequency	Description/Purpose
NORAD Operational Evaluation (NOE)	Approximately Every 4 years	A region NOE is a live and/or simulated prior-notice evaluation conducted by HQ NORAD IG to assess the region's ability to conduct its peace-to-wartime mission IAW NORAD CONPLAN/OPORDs.
Fighter Unit Alert Force Evaluation (AFE)	Not later than every 18 months	A no-notice, live-fly evaluation of NORAD-assigned alert fighter units conducted by the HQ NORAD IG and augmented by MAJCOM inspectors. The fighter unit AFE is designed to test the capability of air defense alert forces to perform their peacetime air sovereignty alert (ASA) and contingency missions. Expanded AFE scenarios with time-compressed warning and intelligence buildup may be used.
Air Defense Sector (ADS) Alert Force Evaluation (AFE)	Not later than every 18 months	A no-notice, live-fly evaluation of air control forces at the Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR)/ADS, Canadian ADS, and Continental United States ADSs. ADS AFEs are conducted by the HQ NORAD IG and, when required, augmented by MAJCOM inspectors. The ADS AFE assesses the operational capability of NORAD command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) centers to perform their peacetime air sovereignty and contingency missions. Expanded ADS AFE scenarios with time-compressed warning and intelligence buildup may be used.

Type of Evaluation	Frequency	Description/Purpose
<p>Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI)</p> <p>Operational Evaluation (Op Eval)</p> <p>Initial Readiness Response Inspection (IRRI) and Combat Employment Readiness Inspection (CERI)</p>	<p>As directed by the applicable MAJCOM</p>	<p>A live and/or simulated evaluation of air control forces conducted by MAJCOM to assess the operational capability of selected air command, control, communications, and intelligence centers (ANR/ADS, CANR/ADS, and CONR/ADSs), fighter units, and E-3s. These centers and/or units will be evaluated while directing and monitoring the defense of their area of operations during a scenario that covers simulated/live peacetime, transition, wartime, and reconstitution environments. Units may be tasked to execute CONPLANS and OPORDs and to operate under assigned tasking based on CINC NORAD and the applicable MAJCOM concepts of operations, directives, and instructions. MAJCOMs are the lead agencies for ORIs, Op Evals, IRRIs, and CERIs with HQ NORAD augmentation if required. Units will be rated using the lead agency's criteria.</p>
<p>CMOC Readiness Evaluation (CRE)</p>	<p>Not later than every 18 months</p>	<p>The CRE evaluates the CMOC capability to perform its peacetime missions. To ensure continuity and completeness, this evaluation will normally include the CCC, AWC, SCC, MWC, and the CIW. Accordingly, the HQ N-SP IG in conjunction with the CMOC/J3/J3T/CVS will determine specific operational scenarios to conduct the evaluation.</p>
<p>CMOC Operational Evaluation (COE)</p>	<p>At the direction of the CINC</p>	<p>The COE evaluates the CMOC capability to perform its peacetime-to-wartime missions. To ensure continuity and completeness, this evaluation will normally include the BS/CAT, CCC, NBMC, SCC, MWC, and the CIW. This evaluation may also include the MCCC and SPOC. COEs may be conducted using combined HQ N-SP regularly scheduled exercises.</p>

Chapter 2

NORAD INSPECTION SYSTEM

2.1. Objectives of the NORAD Inspection System. This inspection system is designed to give CINC-NORAD and Region/Sector commander's feedback on the capability of NORAD-assigned/gained units to perform their NORAD mission. Specifically, the inspection system:

- 2.1.1. Measures NORAD readiness, as shown in unit and system performance.
- 2.1.2. Evaluates HQ NORAD and NORAD-assigned units' internal controls and identifies superior operational methods and areas for improvement for crossfeed to other units. Inspection and annual crosstell reports accomplish this.
- 2.1.3. Helps define NORAD priorities to units and provides guidance on the performance of their designated missions.
- 2.1.4. Follows up on corrective actions taken on previously identified findings.
- 2.1.5. Identifies readiness issues and other problems.

2.2. Concept of the Inspection System:

2.2.1. CINC-NORAD has the responsibility for command inspections. HQ NORAD IG is responsible to CINC-NORAD for implementing the inspection system.

2.2.2. DoD Directive 5106.4 and Inspection Memorandums of Agreement between CINC-NORAD and MAJCOM commanders dictate that inspections will not be redundant or excessive, so as not to overburden units or overtax limited inspection resources. The HQ NORAD IG schedules and designs inspections to test and evaluate mission performance at the unit and system-wide level.

2.2.3. The HQ NORAD IG has established a report-writing system that ensures Strengths, Best Practices, Areas for Improvement, and Findings are identified. Additionally critical performance items are clearly differentiated from those that are procedural or primarily administrative.

2.2.3.1. Strengths. A Strength is a positive comment made in a specific area or sub-area of the report. A Strength highlights superior actions or procedures that were noted in an area or sub-area.

2.2.3.2. Best Practices. Best Practices are ideas or practices worthy of command-wide attention. For NOE/COE/CRE reporting, Best Practice comments will be identified under Strengths, followed by the process owner's office symbol and DSN number. For AFE reporting, Best Practice comments will be entered in the major area or sub-area that the Best Practice pertains to Initial Response, Security, etc., followed by the process owner's office symbol and DSN number. Units can expect to receive inquiries from other units on their best practice candidates. HQ NORAD IG maintains a database of Best Practices.

2.2.3.3. Areas for Improvement. Areas for Improvement are negative comments made in a specific area or sub-area of the report. Areas for Improvement may be a result of unit noncompliance with a governing directive or a deficiency in a procedure, but it does not have a negative impact on the mission. Units do not have to answer Areas for Improvement.

2.2.3.4. Findings. Findings are core problems that need to be reviewed by the HQ NORAD staff and are indicated by an asterisked alphanumeric symbol in parenthesis *(R001). The rated unit

must answer these Findings. Three agency categories can be identified for action following the finding statement and are required to submit corrective action replies; these replies will be handled as follows:

- 2.2.3.4.1. Be validated with the unit at the appropriate level of command needed to begin corrective action on the deficiency. Inspectors receiving a non-concurrence with inspection facts will try to resolve the conflict through the chain of command and note the non-concurrence in the report.
- 2.2.3.4.2. Identify problems needing command emphasis.
- 2.2.3.4.3. Identify, to the extent possible, the basic cause of the problem and reference governing directives when noncompliance is the basis for the finding.
- 2.2.3.4.4. Identify an office of primary responsibility (OPR) and office of collateral responsibility (OCR), if applicable, to correct the problem at the lowest level of command or staff with the resources to do so.
- 2.2.3.4.5. Be placed against a headquarters staff organization if the finding affects the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. It must be validated and identified as a collateral finding in the inspection report.
- 2.2.3.4.6. Identify incorrect, counterproductive, redundant, or outdated guidance at any level of responsibility.
- 2.2.3.4.7. Be answerable by the unit IAW the format specified in the report.
- 2.2.3.4.8. Inspected Unit/Regions. (Example: SUSPENSE: 23 January 20XX) Forward report of corrective action to finding statements to HQ NORAD IG, 125 East Ent Ave, PAFB CO 80914-1283, with an information copy, if applicable, to parent unit, not later than 30 days after receipt of the final NOE/COE/CRE/AFE report. HQ NORAD IG will staff the report of corrective action with the appropriate staff agencies. These agencies will review the adequacy of the unit's reply and will, in turn, reply to HQ NORAD IG, information copy, if applicable to parent unit. If the corrective action is not deemed satisfactory by the reviewing agency, that agency will deal directly with the unit involved, sending an information copy of all correspondence to HQ NORAD IGI and parent unit, if applicable.
- 2.2.3.4.9. Staff. (Example: SUSPENSE: 5 February 20XX) Where a NORAD staff agency is indicated as OPR, that agency will answer the finding. The staff agency's report of corrective action will be forwarded to the HQ NORAD IG, information copy to inspected unit, not later than 30 days after receipt of the final report. If multiple staff agencies are identified, the first agency listed will be the primary OPR, and will prepare and coordinate the final reply with the other agencies listed.
- 2.2.3.4.10. Other Command Headquarters and their Subordinate Units. HQ NORAD IG will extract finding statements and forward to the applicable command IG. The command IG will act as OPR for forwarding the reports of corrective action to HQ NORAD IG. A suspense date will be stated in the HQ NORAD IG letter, which forwards the extracted finding(s).
- 2.2.3.4.11. The unit, region, and/or command staff agencies will send a follow-up to HQ NORAD IG for findings that are not corrected within 30 days of the date of the initial reply. Other command IG's also will be asked to send a follow-up for finding(s) sent to them, which

are still open 30 days after initial reply. Subsequent status reports for open items are due in successive 30 day increments until all items are closed or until notified by HQ NORAD IG and information copies are sent to units, regions, staffs, that status reports are no longer required. HQ NORAD IG, in coordination with applicable staffs, will close NOE/COE/AFE/CRE finding(s) after concurring that the replies satisfactorily correct the core problem, and will notify the action agency and/or other command IG that the item is closed.

2.2.3.4.12. Response instructions to findings requiring corrective actions will be forwarded through the applicable commander to the HQ NORAD IG. For findings not corrected by the date the reply was rendered, the anticipated completion date will be included. The HQ NORAD IG closes the reportable findings when corrective actions resolve the problem.

2.2.3.5. Special Interest Items (SII). Special Interest Items are useful tools to communicate headquarters' concerns to units and receive feedback via the HQ N-SP IG. SII are used to determine the extent and impact of known or suspected problems, to identify specific deficiencies, or to confirm that a problem has been resolved. SII are limited to a specific subject affecting more than one unit. Special Interest Items do not require ratings. Proposed NORAD-wide SII topics may originate at any level but must be coordinated through HQ NORAD IAW NUI 90-5, *CINCNORAD/USCINCSpace Special Interest Items*.

2.2.3.6. The HQ NORAD IG Team Chiefs debrief NORAD led NOE/COE/CRE and AFE results to the participants. A final written report/message to CINCNORAD and the inspected unit commander(s), subordinate, and supporting commanders will be distributed as soon as possible after the evaluation.

2.2.3.7. The NOE, COE, CRE and AFE report contains the results of the evaluation, best practices, any limiting factors (LIMFACs), unit deficiencies, and/or unsafe practices. Findings require a response and will include a finding statement, the governing directive (where applicable directives exist), appropriate supporting information, action OPR, and action OCR, if required.

2.3. Rating Policies:

2.3.1. All areas evaluated during a NOE, COE, CRE and AFE are rated using the five-tier rating system (**Table 2.1**). Objective rating criteria are established whenever possible. The HQ NORAD IG team chief will assign ratings that accurately reflect observed performance. The criteria are designed as a guide, not a substitute for the Inspector General's judgment.

2.3.2. Rated Functional Areas, Sub-areas, and Critical Areas/Sub-areas. Functional areas describe the unit's mission at the highest level and contain the most important elements or tasks that receive special emphasis during inspections. Sub-areas are tasks or actions that determine the minimum standards for an overall functional area. Critical areas/sub-areas are elements or actions that directly affect the unit's ability to perform its mission and are more heavily weighted when assigning a rating. Functional areas and sub-areas are rated using a specific rating policy and criteria; however, not all sub-areas must be evaluated to assign an overall functional area rating.

2.3.3. Items and Sub-items. Items and sub-items are specific actions, tasks, and procedures that define minimum standards for a sub-area. Individual items and sub-items are not rated but when taken collectively, may factor into a rating for the sub-area.

2.3.4. An overall unit rating is assigned based on functional area ratings. Although each functional rating contributes to the overall unit rating, critical functional areas directly affecting the unit's ability to perform its mission are more heavily weighted. An asterisk (*) denotes critical functional areas.

2.3.4.1. Each functional area is assigned a rating from the five-tier rating system (Table 2.1.) based on sub-area ratings. Although each sub-area rating contributes to the overall functional area rating, critical sub-areas directly affecting the unit's ability to perform its mission are more heavily weighted. A pound sign (#) denotes critical sub-areas.

2.3.4.2. Sub-areas within each functional area are rated using the five-tier rating system (Table 2.1.). Items and sub-items that make up a sub-area are not rated separately. Not all sub-areas must be evaluated to assign an overall rating for that functional area.

2.3.5. There are two initial indicators of possible degradation in readiness: An overall “Marginal” or “Unsatisfactory” rating in a critical area during an AFE, NOE, COE, or CRE; or an overall “Marginal” or “Unsatisfactory” rating for an MAJCOM ORI, IRRI/CERI, or OPEVAL. An overall marginal or unsatisfactory performance during a HQ NORAD IG-led inspection (AFE, NOE, COE, CRE) will drive a reevaluation as soon as practical; a repeat marginal or unsatisfactory rating may warrant CINCNORAD intervention in consultation with the appropriate parent command for the necessary corrective action.

Table 2.1. Five-tier Rating System.

OUTSTANDING	Performance or operation far exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are exceptionally well managed. No deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment.
EXCELLENT	Performance or operation exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs are efficiently and effectively managed. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not limit mission accomplishment. No finding in any area.
SATISFACTORY	Performance or operation meets mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an effective and competent manner. Resources and programs are adequately managed. Deficiencies exist, but do not significantly limit mission accomplishment.
MARGINAL	Performance or operation does not meet some mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and programs are not efficiently managed. Deficiencies exist which impede or limit mission accomplishment.
UNSATISFACTORY	Performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

2.3.6. All areas inspected during a MAJCOM-led ORI are rated in accordance with MAJCOM inspection directives except for the NORAD E-3 ACE portion of the region/sector ORI.

2.4. Safety. Although not rated as a functional area, safety is a critical area stressed in all activities. Incidents indicating poor safety emphasis, or a lack of flight safety consciousness, directly impact ratings in the areas where safety problems are observed and will generate a Finding.

2.5. Information Operations (IO) (Rated Functional Area). NORAD utilizes increasingly information-intensive capabilities (i.e., command and control, sensors, communications, computers, and weapon systems). Reliance on these systems and the information they generate creates a potential vulnerability to attack or manipulation. Defensive IO are actions taken to defend one's own information and information systems. They are employed on a continuous basis, in both peacetime and war, and are an inherent part of force protection. The IO rating is determined by IO assessed within each of the rated functional areas in Chapter 4 through Chapter 8. The defensive IO rated areas are operations security, communications security, and physical security. Unit personnel must demonstrate IO awareness and understanding complying with directives, instructions, and local operating instructions. Unit personnel must demonstrate proficiency in the use of authenticator systems, secure records and logs, electronic data, voice communications, and maintain communications discipline. The overall IO rating criteria is shown in **Table 2.2**.

2.5.1. Communications Security (COMSEC). Evaluate the unit's adherence to defensive IO procedures as they relate to COMSEC.

2.5.2. Operations Security (OPSEC). Evaluate the unit's adherence to defensive IO procedures as they relate to OPSEC.

2.5.3. Physical Security. Evaluate the unit's adherence to defensive IO procedures as they relate to physical security.

Table 2.2. IO Rating System.

OUTSTANDING	Procedures and activities are conducted in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are of exceptional merit in their use and management. No deviations or deficiencies noted.
EXCELLENT	Procedures and activities are conducted in a superior manner. Resources and programs are efficiently and effectively managed. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not significantly limit mission accomplishment and/or compromise security.
SATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are carried out in a competent manner. Resources and programs are adequately managed. Deficiencies exist but do not significantly limit the mission and/or compromise security.
MARGINAL	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and program are not adequately managed. Major deficiencies exist which impede or limit the mission and/or compromise security.
UNSATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deviations or deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment. Security is compromised. Does not meet marginal criteria.

2.6. Force Protection. Force protection may be formally evaluated upon completion of established command policy and procedures. Force Protection surveys will be accomplished during each evaluation until formal command procedures are finalized.

2.7. Inspection Criteria and Functional Area Checklists. Both inspection criteria and checklists are essential to the integrity and utility of the NORAD inspection system. Criteria and functional area checklists are developed by the NORAD staff and subsequently employed by inspectors. Emphasis is on mission performance and results in conjunction with appropriate directives. Inspectors provide the necessary feedback to refine inspection criteria and checklists.

2.7.1. Criteria used in subsequent chapters of this instruction define the standards against which the inspected unit and functional areas are rated.

2.7.2. The criteria use mission directives, concepts of operations, and war plans as the fundamental sources for development. Criteria are performance related as much as possible, oriented toward results, quality, and effectiveness of operations. Checklists should be current and provide sufficient detail to promote a thorough, objective evaluation.

2.8. Augmentation Personnel. Augmentees are requested from HQ NORAD, Numbered Air Forces (NAF), field units, and other MAJCOM inspection teams. The Director of Inspections supervises augmentees for inspection preplanning, execution, and reporting.

2.9. Access to Areas and Information. The IG will present an entry access/authority list (EAL) upon arrival for AFEs and as soon as possible for NOEs at the inspected or facilitated unit's entry control point. The EAL provides the inspected/facilitated unit with the IG team composition. This list authorizes IG members unescorted entry to controlled areas/restricted areas required to discharge NORAD evaluation functions. Access to classified and privacy act material will be limited to NORAD releasable material. Access to national information will be in accordance with national directives and instructions.

2.10. Trusted Agents. The HQ NORAD IG will designate trusted agents to handle and safeguard programming and planning information used in scenario development. Trusted agents will not release information to unauthorized individuals without HQ NORAD IG authorization. Commanders at all levels will ensure the integrity of the trusted agent system. If a commander discovers an unauthorized disclosure, he/she must take immediate action to correct the problem and inform the HQ NORAD IG that trusted agent information has been compromised.

2.11. Department of Defense (DoD) Inspections. HQ NORAD directorates will ensure that key management personnel are on duty and available to inspectors during DoD IG inspections.

2.12. Responsibilities:

2.12.1. HQ NORAD Inspector General:

2.12.1.1. As lead agency, HQ NORAD IG coordinates, schedules, plans, conducts AFEs and NOEs. MAJCOM personnel will augment as required. COEs and CREs are a combined HQ N-SP IG responsibility. As a minimum, the following activities will be undertaken:

2.12.1.2. Coordinate airspace and target resources with sector/region trusted agents.

- 2.12.1.3. Identify CINC/NORAD requirements to MAJCOM inspection teams during the scenario planning/design and execution phases of ORIs and NOEs.
- 2.12.1.4. Conduct the inspection of the E-3 NORAD ACE portion of the region/sector (live mode) ORIs and NOEs.
- 2.12.1.5. Fully integrate with MAJCOM inspection teams in conducting the inspections and writing the final report at fighter and AOC units when augmenting the MAJCOM team.
- 2.12.1.6. Coordinate with the NORAD staff for inputs to exercise/evaluation scenario design and for approval from CINC/DCINC of the overall evaluation scenario.
- 2.12.1.7. Provide the units with evaluation notification, EAL, letters of instruction (LOI), and special instructions (SPINS) concerning pre-evaluation, evaluation, and post-evaluation period requirements for AFEs, NOEs, COEs and CREs.
- 2.12.1.8. Develop an evaluation schedule and coordinate with MAJCOM inspection teams to resolve inspection schedule conflicts.
- 2.12.1.9. Provide an annual Evaluation Crosstell Report to regions, ADS, fighter units, and MAJCOM inspection teams detailing outstanding ratings, best practices, and findings reported during operational evaluations.
- 2.12.1.10. Ensure checklists provide sufficient detail to promote a thorough, objective evaluation.

2.12.2. MAJCOM Inspection Teams:

- 2.12.2.1. As the lead agency for fighter unit/ADS ORIs, MAJCOMs will schedule, plan, and be responsible for scenario design. Additionally, MAJCOMS will:
- 2.12.2.2. Coordinate ORI/NOE planning and scenario design with the HQ NORAD IG (if NOE is in conjunction with ORI) and respective region commander. CINC/NORAD's CONPLAN estimate of enemy capabilities and threat and the CINC/NORAD Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) will be part of scenario design and ORI/NOE objectives.
- 2.12.2.3. Augment the HQ NORAD IG as required for AFEs, NOEs, COEs, and CREs. Provide inputs to the final report.
- 2.12.2.4. Debrief fighter unit/ADS ORI results to the unit and provide a final written report. Ensure unit response to findings requiring corrective action will be forwarded to MAJCOM inspection teams with an information copy to HQ NORAD IG.
- 2.12.2.5. Coordinate on the HQ NORAD IG evaluation schedule to resolve inspection schedule conflicts.

2.12.3. HQ NORAD Personnel Staff (J1) will:

- 2.12.3.1. Develop evaluation criteria and functional area checklist for use by HQ NORAD IG during region NOEs and CMOC COEs.
- 2.12.3.2. Ensure criteria meet mission standards and provide guidance broad enough to facilitate inspector judgement.
- 2.12.3.3. Augment HQ NORAD IG team as required.

2.12.4. HQ NORAD Intelligence Staff (J2) will:

2.12.4.1. Develop NOE/AFE/COE/CRE evaluations scenarios, evaluation criteria and functional area checklists for use by the HQ NORAD IG during evaluations of NORAD-assigned air defense command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) centers, CMOC, fighter units, and NORAD E-3 ACE.

2.12.4.2. Ensure criteria meet mission standards and provide guidance broad enough to facilitate inspector judgment.

2.12.4.3. Augment the HQ NORAD IG team as required.

2.12.4.4. Support evaluations of NORAD-assigned air defense units. Interface between the NORAD Combined Intelligence Watch (CIW) with the CMOC CCC, AWC/NBMC, RAOCs, ADS, and fighter units will be accomplished using actual communications/computer systems as much as required.

2.12.5. HQ NORAD Operations Staff (J3) will:

2.12.5.1. Develop NOE/AFE/COE/CRE evaluation scenario inputs, evaluation criteria and functional area checklists for use by the HQ NORAD IG during evaluations of NORAD-assigned air defense command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) centers, fighter units, and NORAD E-3 ACE.

2.12.5.2. Ensure criteria meet mission standards and provide broad enough guidance to facilitate inspector judgment.

2.12.5.3. Augment the HQ NORAD IG team as required.

2.12.5.4. Support evaluations of NORAD-assigned air defense control units. Use of actual communications/computer systems will be accomplished as required or to the extent possible.

2.12.6. HQ NORAD Logistics Staff (J4) will:

2.12.6.1. Develop evaluation criteria and functional area checklist for use by HQ NORAD IG during region NOEs and CMOC COEs.

2.12.6.2. Ensure criteria meet mission standards and provide broad enough guidance to facilitate inspector's judgement.

2.12.6.3. Augment HQ NORAD IG team as required.

2.12.7. HQ NORAD Planning Staff (J5) will:

2.12.7.1. Assist the HQ NORAD IG and CMOC/J3 in developing evaluation scenarios, evaluation criteria and functional area checklists for use by the HQ NORAD IG during evaluations (NOE/COE) of NORAD-assigned and or gained air defense control units.

2.12.7.2. Ensure criteria meet mission standards and provide broad enough guidance to facilitate inspector judgment.

2.12.7.3. Augment the HQ NORAD IG team as required.

2.12.8. HQ NORAD Command Control Systems (J6) will:

2.12.8.1. Develop evaluation criteria and functional area checklist for use by HQ NORAD IG during NOEs.

2.12.8.2. Ensure criteria meet mission standard and provide broad enough guidance to facilitate inspector judgement.

2.12.9. **NORAD Regions:**

2.12.9.1. Augment HQ NORAD IG team as required.

2.12.9.2. During NOEs, the NORAD Region will:

2.12.9.2.1. Brief HQ NORAD IG team chiefs on the unit's mission, special tasks, resources, LIMFACs, operations concepts, and other factors affecting the evaluation.

2.12.9.2.2. Provide a copy of the LIMFACs to the IG team chiefs (normally NLT 120 days prior to the NOE).

2.12.9.2.3. Appoint a project officer(s) to support the inspection teams.

2.12.9.2.4. Provide the information management support identified in **Chapter 3**.

2.12.9.3. During AFEs, the RAOC, ADS, or fighter unit will:

2.12.9.3.1. Brief HQ NORAD IG team chiefs on the unit's mission, special tasks, resources, LIMFACs, operations concepts, and other factors affecting the evaluation.

2.12.9.3.2. Provide operations and administrative support as required.

2.12.9.3.3. Provide target monitor team as required.

2.12.10. **CMOC:**

2.12.10.1. During COEs, the CMOC will:

2.12.10.1.1. Brief HQ NORAD IG team chiefs on the unit's mission, special tasks, resources, LIMFACs, operations concepts, and other factors affecting the evaluation.

2.12.10.1.2. Appoint a project officer(s) to support the inspection teams.

2.12.10.1.3. Provide operations and administrative support as required.

2.12.10.2. During NOEs and AFEs:

2.12.10.2.1. Provide operations and administrative support as required.

Chapter 3

NORAD OPERATIONAL EVALUATION (NOE) (LIVE AND SIMULATED REQUIREMENTS)

3.1. Evaluation Scope for a NOE (Live Mode). A live-fly NOE is a limited-scope evaluation conducted by HQ NORAD IG to assess the operational capability of selected NORAD-assigned air command, control, communications and intelligence centers, and NORAD ACE teams. NOEs evaluate the unit's ability to execute CONPLANS and OPORDs, and the unit's ability to operate under assigned tasking based on CINCNORAD and MAJCOM concepts of operations, instructions, and directives. MAJCOM personnel may augment as required.

3.2. NORAD Requirements for NOE (Live Mode). NORAD CONPLANS/OPORDs, directives, CINCNORAD JMTEL, and CINCNORAD threat assessment of enemy capabilities define the requirements of the NORAD mission and will be used for the evaluation. The following are minimum requirements for the evaluation: the RAOC is evaluated as the primary C3I center until transition to the NORAD E-3 ACE, as required, or autonomous operations occur. Unless the RAOC is degraded to the point of being non-functional, it continues to be evaluated in the restoration of C3I actions and/or capability and sustainment of operations that are not degraded.

3.3. Evaluation Scope for NOE (Simulated Mode). A simulated NOE is a non-flying evaluation conducted by the HQ NORAD IG to assess the operational capability of NORAD-assigned region command, control, communications and intelligence centers to execute CONPLANS and OPORDs; and to operate under assigned tasking based on CINCNORAD and MAJCOM concepts of operations, instructions, and directives. MAJCOM personnel may augment as required.

3.4. NORAD Requirements for NOE (Simulated Mode). NORAD CONPLANS/OPORDs, directives, CINCNORAD JMTEL, and CINCNORAD threat assessment of enemy capabilities define the requirements of the NORAD mission and will be used for the evaluation.

3.4.1. The HQ NORAD IG rates four functional areas: The Battle Staff, Battle Staff Support Center (BSSC) or equivalent, Air Operations Center, and IO. Their interaction with HQ NORAD C3I centers, other regions, sectors, fighter units, NORAD ACE, and the NORAD Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC), as applicable, are an integral portion of this rating.

3.4.2. The support provided to the Battle Staff by subordinate elements is of prime importance during the evaluation. Peacetime, transition, and wartime functions evaluated include: Course Of Action (COA) and Air Tasking Order (ATO) development, establishment and sustainment of a command and control element to accomplish force deployments, resource management, air event response and reporting, rules of engagement (ROE), information flow, assessment of intelligence and attack warning, force survivability and dispersal plan, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reporting, air battle management, and reconstitution.

3.4.3. NORAD E-3 ACE is not rated during a simulated mode NOE; however, E-3 procedures will be evaluated under battle staff management criteria, if applicable. Specific guidelines will be included in LOIs and SPINS.

3.5. Notification (Live and Simulated Mode). Message or letter (generally 180 days) prior to the scheduled evaluation initiates formal notification. Upon arrival, the HQ NORAD IG team provides the unit with an EAL and LOI including specific ground rules and evaluation start time. Normally, the first evaluation activity begins several hours after the LOI presentation allowing time for HQ NORAD IG team chief in-briefing, unit briefing, and IG evaluation controller briefing. The HQ NORAD IG team chief will terminate the evaluation with an LOI or emergency action message (EAM).

3.6. Rating Policy and Criteria (Live and Simulated Mode) (RAOC). All areas evaluated during the NOE are rated using the five-tier rating system outlined in **Table 2.1**. An overall rating for the RAOC is based on functional area ratings. Although each functional area rating contributes to the overall unit rating, critical functional areas and sub-areas directly affecting the unit's ability to perform its mission are more heavily weighted. The Battle Staff is a critical functional area for computing the overall region rating. Critical areas are denoted with an asterisk (*). Critical sub-areas are denoted with a pound sign (#). The overall NOE rating criteria is listed in **Table 6.1**.

3.7. Information Operations (IO) (Live and Simulated Mode) (Rated Functional Area). Defensive IO as it applies to OPSEC, COMSEC, and physical security in all functional areas during the NOE is observed and a rating with comments will be provided in the final report.

3.8. Concept and Report. See **paragraphs 2.2.and 2.3..**

3.9. Ground Rules for NOEs (Live/Simulated Mode):

3.9.1. Real-world activities involving the aerospace defense of North America take precedence over evaluation events and, when observed, are evaluated and are factored into the functional area rating.

3.9.2. Evaluation inputs in the form of reports, messages, telephone conversations, scripted input cards, and computer switch actions are made by the Sim switch or Sim control cells. These activities simulate air events and actions from higher, lateral, subordinate units and outside agencies.

3.9.3. Actual transmission of exercise message traffic may vary from one evaluation scenario to another dependent upon the scope and scale of preplanned participation by outside agencies. HQ NORAD IG and region exercise offices will provide detailed direction in the form of an LOI or SPIN message prior to the start of the evaluation. All outgoing and incoming messages must be logged and a file copy retained. Copies of logs and messages are to be made available to the IG team at the termination of evaluation activity or when requested.

3.9.4. Real-world weather is used unless otherwise directed.

3.9.5. For simulated NOE scenarios, evaluation LOIs and SPINS will determine aircraft turn times, aircraft deployment completion times, and weapons readiness state attainment times. Acceleration of these times will also be IAW evaluation LOIs.

3.9.6. Inspection Delays. Unforeseen events such as equipment malfunctions, computer tape problems, or real-world requirements could cancel or delay the exercise/evaluation. The decision to delay or cancel the exercise/evaluation will be discussed with the unit commander but the MAJCOM exercise/evaluation director and NORAD IG team chief (with HQ NORAD IG concurrence) will make the final decision.

3.9.7. Reports. The standard computer-recording list is required and retained until the HQ NORAD IG team chief determines data reduction needs. Copies of BS, BSSC (or equivalent), NORAD ACE, and AOC/ADS logs are required after the evaluation.

3.10. NOE Support Requirements.

3.10.1. Inspector General work center:

3.10.2. Liaison. A liaison officer is required, E-4 or above, who will be assigned to the IG Work Center Manager upon team arrival. Liaison will inform commanders/supervisors that they are detailed and are not available to assigned unit for the duration of the inspection/evaluation. Duty hours must be flexible. Individual must have a thorough knowledge of base facilities.

3.10.3. For Phase I, office space is required for approximately five personnel and in close proximity to the RAOC, if not in the RAOC. Access to classified computers and telephone terminals will be required. A POC should be appointed to assist with administrative requirements. Phase I of the NOE will last approximately one week.

3.10.3.1. Upon arrival of the Phase II inspectors and simulation cell personnel, work center space in the RAOC would be ideal, but not mandatory. One room is required for approximately 20 personnel for conducting inspection changeover briefings and debriefings. Another room is required for approximately 12 personnel for the NORAD simulation cell. The simulation cell requires 12 separate classified computers (with network chat capability) and 12 STU-III/STEs. In addition, desk space and a telephone for one message center person, two four-drawer safes (SECRET/RELCAN), one printer, and one shredder.

3.10.3.2. Work center space for the writing phase of the evaluation is required for approximately 45-55 inspectors and staff. Space in the RAOC would be ideal, but service clubs, community centers, or similar facilities are normally suitable to accommodate the team as long as classified material up to SECRET/RELCAN can be stored in the building. The work center area can be one large room or co-located separate offices. If only a large room is available, then it must be partitioned off into three areas: an area for battle staff inspectors (approximately 26 personnel), battle staff support center inspectors (approximately 16 personnel), and IG work center management staff (4 personnel). In addition, separate offices for the IG and the IG Team Chief are required. Keys to the work center should be provided to the NORAD IG work center manager.

3.10.4. Writing Phase. An administrative clerk may be required during the writing phase of the inspection and must possess at least a SECRET security clearance. The work center liaison could possibly fulfill this position. Overtime/weekend (additional cost is funded by the inspected unit) shifts may be required and once assigned, the same administrative clerk should remain for the duration of the inspection. The Work Center Manager will coordinate requests for additional typing support with the unit liaison.

3.10.4.1. Computers. Computers must be compatible and use interchangeable disks. The Work Center Manager area requires two computers (Pentium II) and one laser printer (stand alone) with table/computer desk and adjustable chair for each computer/typist. The Battle Staff area requires three computers (Pentium II) with access to a laser printer and the Battle Staff Support Center area requires two computers (Pentium II) with access to a laser printer. Seven Word or Microsoft compatible programs for Windows application are required.

3.10.4.2. Equipment. The following equipment is requested to be in the work center upon arrival of the inspection team.

3.10.4.3. Miscellaneous Equipment. One copy machine (with toner cartridges and paper); one electric correcting typewriter (w/ribbon, correction tape); two four-drawer safe for storing classified material up to and including SECRET/RELCAN; one shredding machine; one fax machine; one blackboard/dry erase with chalk, markers, and eraser. One coffee maker with at least a 30-cup capacity. The inspected unit will be reimbursed by the IG team for supplying coffee, sugar, cream, cups, spoons, etc.

3.10.5. Administrative. Request an adequate amount of administrative supplies (to support 45-55 inspection team personnel) such as pens (black and red), pencils, staplers, dictionaries, thesauruses, highlighters, paper clips, alligator clips, scissors, rulers, tape, and a paper cutter. In addition, provide 8.5x11 inch typing/printer paper, 1x3.5 inch labels for a laser printer, post-it notes (large and small), letter-size folders, computer diskettes, two and three hole perforators, lined writing tablets, note pads, wastebaskets, and coat racks/hangars for 45-55 personnel.

3.10.6. Communications. Telephones with direct dial access to DSN and the base and local community must be provided along with sufficient telephone directories. The exact number of telephones may change based on the configuration of the work center. The unit POC will coordinate with the IG POC and Work Center Manager as to the actual communications requirements and configuration. At a minimum, seven phones with separate numbers are required for the IG (1), IG Team Chief (1), Work Center Manager area (2), Battle Staff area (2), and Battle Staff Support Center area (1). Telephones should have the capability to be intercepted/transferred to another phone number location. Three (3) STU-III's or equivalent should be available: one in the IG office and two located in the Battle Staff and Battle Staff Support areas. These phones can be part of the regular telephone requirement.

3.11. Other Requirements:

3.11.1. In-brief/Out-brief. In-brief and out-brief locations will be at the direction of the unit commander. Dates and times of briefings will be coordinated with the IG POC and the unit POC. Assistance may be requested for computer-generated briefings. (PowerPoint application or equivalent is requested.) The unit POC should schedule the out-brief facility the day prior to the out-brief for an IG dry-run and have a lectern with a light and public address system available. The day of the out-brief, a technician may be requested to handle light and communications troubleshooting.

3.11.2. Baggage. In some cases the IG team will arrive via military airlift and land at the base where the inspection will take place. In this case, a baggage detail is requested to unload the aircraft and transport the baggage either to base quarters, the billeting office, or awaiting vehicles. A baggage detail will also be required for departure of the IG team. The IG POC will contact the unit POC with specific instructions concerning arrival and departure.

3.11.3. Vehicles. When possible, transportation requirements will be gained from unit resources in the form of GSA, U-drives, or commercial rental vehicles. In the case of rental vehicles, request the unit rent the vehicles using AF Form 9, Request for Purchase. The HQ NORAD IG Resource Advisor will provide a fund cite to cover the cost of the vehicles. Approximately 20 vehicles will be needed. An adequate number of reserved parking spaces adjacent to the IG work center and RAOC should be made available. Specific spaces should be marked for the IG and IG Team Chief. Units should coordinate fuel support for IG vehicles during the inspection by providing fuel pump location and operat-

ing hours, if applicable. The IG POC will confirm the exact vehicle requirements with the unit POC as early as possible.

3.11.4. Lodging. Inspection teams require adequate lodging as defined in AFI 34-246, *Air Force Lodging Program* and the Canadian equivalent. Additionally, it is requested that single rooms for all inspectors, regardless of rank be provided. If adequate lodging is not available on base, commercial quarters off base that meet the same requirements are acceptable. If commercial quarters are used, the unit must provide the IG POC with name, address, and telephone number of a representative of the hotel/motel as well as expected cost per night. Every effort should be made to co-locate the inspection team either on base or in a single commercial off base facility.

Chapter 4

FIGHTER UNIT ALERT FORCE EVALUATION (AFE) CRITERIA AND RATINGS

4.1. Evaluation Scope. A fighter unit Alert Force Evaluation (AFE) is a no-notice, live-fly evaluation of NORAD-assigned alert fighter units conducted by the HQ NORAD IG and augmented by MAJCOM inspectors. The fighter unit AFE is designed to test the capability of air defense alert forces to perform their peacetime air sovereignty alert (ASA) and contingency missions. These missions will normally be one of the following: counter-drug operations, aircraft in distress, hijacking, unknown aircraft, Dangerous Military Activity (DMA), or airborne terrorist. Other peacetime scenarios may be appropriate as directed by HQ NORAD. Expanded AFE scenarios with time-compressed warning and intelligence may be used. **Note:** Peacetime scramble order procedures are defined in FAA publication Special Military Operations 7610.4H and the Canadian Scramble, Intercept and Recovery (SIR) Agreement.

4.2. Frequency of Evaluations. AFEs will be conducted at each NORAD-assigned alert fighter unit location at intervals not later than every 18 months IAW **Table 1.1**. The AFE may be conducted in conjunction with other inspections, but will normally be a separate evaluation.

4.2.1. Timing. Canadian Forces and Air National Guard home-base site unit evaluations will normally be conducted during normal technician duty hours, unit training assemblies, or encampment periods. Detached and caretaker sites may be evaluated anytime.

4.3. Conduct of Inspections:

4.3.1. Notification. The NORAD evaluation team will arrive at the evaluated unit's control center or command post and notify the unit by hand-carried letter of an impending AFE. This letter constitutes authority for conducting the evaluation and includes the team EAL and LOI or SPINS providing further guidance for the evaluation. The unit commander or designated representative may call the NORAD/USSPACECOM Consolidated Command Center to verify the EAL. Acceptance of the team's credentials is based on the provisions of AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*, or the CF National Defence Security Instruction (NDSI), Chapter 40.11. Additionally, all evaluated units will notify higher echelon commanders of the evaluation in progress via OPREP-3 Homeline reporting procedures.

4.3.2. Personnel. Upon AFE team arrival, the unit will identify personnel and aircraft currently supporting the NORAD alert mission. The NORAD IG Team Chief may allow substitution of unit alert aircraft and personnel only under exceptional circumstances.

4.3.3. Alert Commitment. Real-world air sovereignty operations have priority over an AFE at all times. Following the evaluated mission, the unit will complete all required actions to return the alert aircraft to the appropriate alert status. The unit will then advise the NORAD IG Team Chief that the alert aircraft are ready for inspection. At that time, the unit will request stand down from alert from the sector under the authority of the NORAD IG. When approved, the maintenance and weapons inspectors will evaluate the aircraft. Upon completion of the required inspections, the NORAD IG Team Chief will return the aircraft to the unit. The unit should then ensure the sector is notified that the aircraft are on status.

4.4. Rating Policy and Criteria. Areas evaluated during the AFE are rated using the five-tier rating system outlined in **Table 2.1.**, except as follows: Fighter unit Initial Response and the Alert Aircraft Turn-arounds (turns greater than 1 hour) are rated using the Pass/Fail system outlined in this chapter.

4.4.1. Rated Areas. Fighter units are evaluated in the areas of Initial Response, Command and Control, Employment, Alert Aircraft, and IO. Employment and Alert Aircraft are critical areas IAW paragraph 2.3.2.

4.4.2. Safety. Although not rated as a functional area, safety is a critical area stressed in all activities. Incidents indicating poor safety emphasis, or a lack of flight safety consciousness, directly impact ratings in the areas where safety problems are observed and will generate a Finding.

4.5. Fighter AFEs. Applicable directives and plans are used to complete this evaluation. The overall fighter unit rating criteria are shown in **Table 4.1.**

Table 4.1. Overall Fighter Unit Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Employment or Alert Aircraft is outstanding. All other areas are at least excellent; Initial Response is pass.
EXCELLENT	Employment or Alert Aircraft is at least excellent. All other areas are at least satisfactory; Initial Response is pass.
SATISFACTORY	Employment and Alert Aircraft are at least satisfactory; not more than one area is marginal and no areas are unsatisfactory; Initial Response can be fail.
MARGINAL	All areas are marginal or better; Initial Response can be fail.
UNSATISFACTORY	Any Rated Functional Area unsatisfactory.

4.5.1. Initial Response (Rated Functional Area: Pass/Fail). The unit’s ability to meet the directed response posture (RP) or airborne order (ABO) is evaluated. For scramble launches, timing will begin upon scramble line activation at the command post (or equivalent) and end when the last alert aircraft gets airborne. If aircraft are launched via an ABO, the alert force will be evaluated on its ability to meet the directed launch time. Initial response is pass/fail and rating criteria are shown in **Table 4.2.**

4.5.1.1. Limiting Factors (LIMFACs). Factors beyond the pilots' control will be considered. If an aircraft ground aborts prior to chock release and appropriate sector authority approves a single ship launch, all response timing will be based on the single mission capable aircraft.

Table 4.2. Initial Response Rating Criteria.

PASS	For scramble launch (RP Immediate), all tasks required to rapidly launch aircraft (airborne within 15 minutes) that are accomplished in a proficient manner with no more than minor deficiencies noted. For scramble launch (RP Tailored), all tasks required to rapidly launch aircraft (airborne within the tailored time) that are accomplished in a proficient manner with no more than minor deficiencies noted. For ABO tasking (RP Immediate or Tailored), ABO time met - 5 minutes to on time
FAIL	Does not meet pass criteria or a significant proficiency/safety of flight problems exist.

4.5.2. Command and Control (Rated Functional Area). The command and control rating criteria are shown in **Table 4.3**. Unit commanders will be held responsible for procedural deficiencies attributable to improper guidance or improper training of command post personnel supporting but not assigned to the unit being evaluated.

Table 4.3. Command and Control Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	One sub-area is outstanding and the other is at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Both sub-areas are excellent or one area is outstanding and the other is satisfactory
SATISFACTORY	One area is excellent and the other is satisfactory or both sub-areas are satisfactory.
MARGINAL	One sub-area is satisfactory and the other sub-area is marginal or both areas are marginal.
UNSATISFACTORY	Any sub-area is unsatisfactory.

4.5.2.1. Command Post (Sub-area). The ability of unit Command Posts to support NORAD ASA commitment(s) is evaluated. Command posts (CPs) not assigned to the evaluated unit, will be evaluated but not graded unless a signed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the alert detachment and the host unit is on file. Areas evaluated include, but are not limited to the following: entry control procedures, response to higher headquarters alert force tasking, alert mission monitoring, flight following, coordination with alert pilots, event reporting, currency and use of checklists, OI's, pertaining to the NORAD mission, currency and maintenance of required NORAD publications, coordination between controllers, internal/external support agencies.

4.5.2.2. Supervisor of Flying (SOF)/Battle Staff Commander Responsibilities (if applicable) (Sub-area). Evaluate SOF and/or Battle Staff commander, or designated representative, on actions taken to monitor mission status. Areas to evaluate include, but are not limited to the following: Adherence to local and MAJCOM procedures, weather monitoring, intelligence usage, internal/external coordination (base operations, RAOC, ADS, FAA, NAVCAN, tower, security police/airport security, etc.), use of checklists, and use of all available resources.

4.5.3. *Employment (Rated Functional Area) (Critical Area). Alert pilots are evaluated on their ability to perform the peacetime air sovereignty mission based upon a peacetime ASA scenario. Evaluated mission elements include pre-mission preparation, launch, communications, radar employment, intercept execution, threat assessment, and scenario conclusion through safe recovery. Pilots tailor each element to the given scenario using sound tactics IAW NORAD, Region, and Sector guidance. Evaluations may include specific tasks appropriate to the mission, such as photographic capabilities, when required by the Region. Employment rating criteria appear in **Table 4.4**.

Table 4.4. Employment Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Mission accomplished in a far superior manner and IAW NORAD, Region, and Sector guidance. Flight uses optimal tactics and considerations for the assigned mission(s). Exemplary in-flight leadership and teamwork.
EXCELLENT	Mission skillfully accomplished and IAW NORAD, Region, and Sector guidance. Flight uses effective tactics and considerations for the assigned mission(s). Very strong in-flight leadership and teamwork.
SATISFACTORY	Mission effectively accomplished IAW NORAD, Region, and Sector guidance.
MARGINAL	Mission partially or incompletely accomplished. Pilots inadequately adhered to NORAD, Region, or Sector guidance.
UNSATISFACTORY	Mission ineffective or unacceptably accomplished.

4.5.4. *Alert Aircraft (Rated Functional Area) (Critical Area). Alert aircraft are evaluated on their capability to meet mission requirements. The rated sub-areas are #Alert Aircraft Turnaround, #Quality of Alert Aircraft, #Aircraft/Weapons System Reliability, and #Maintenance Support. The alert aircraft rating criteria appear in **Table 4.5**.

Table 4.5. Alert Aircraft Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	At least three critical sub-areas rated outstanding or pass (a/c turns greater than 1-hour) and the other critical sub-area rated at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	At least three critical sub-areas rated excellent or pass (a/c turns greater than 1-hour) and the other critical sub-area rated at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	All critical sub-areas rated at least satisfactory or pass (a/c turns greater than 1-hour).
MARGINAL	Any critical sub-area rated marginal or fails (a/c turns greater than 1-hour).
UNSATISFACTORY	Any critical sub-area rated unsatisfactory.

4.5.4.1. # Alert Aircraft Turnaround (Critical Sub-area). Due to differences in individual alert facility locations and airfield layout, timing will be noted from both aircraft land time and aircraft first chock, until command post notification of return to air sovereignty alert status to the ADS, or equivalent. Unnecessary delays between aircraft land time and first chock attributable to alert force personnel constitute a deficiency and detract from the maintenance support sub-area rating. Fighters performing air sovereignty (RP Immediate), contingency, and air defense operations must return to the assigned RP one-hour from aircraft chock time. During AFEs, a dual turnaround rating system is used. One system is the rating criteria shown in Table 4.6. for any 1-hour directed turn. A second method will be used when the ADS or appropriate authority directs other than a 1-hour turn. In this instance, the Pass/Fail criteria as shown in **Table 4.7**. will be used. The following evaluated items in determining overall rating will be considered: Alert aircraft turnaround rating criteria as shown in **Table 4.6**. and **Table 4.7**.

Table 4.6. Alert Aircraft Turnaround Rating Criteria (Any one-hour directed turn).

OUTSTANDING	Mission-capable aircraft returned to alert status within 40 minutes of first chock with no deficiencies noted.
EXCELLENT	Mission-capable aircraft returned to alert status within 50 minutes of first chock; only minor deficiencies noted.
SATISFACTORY	Mission-capable aircraft returned to alert status within one hour of first chock; only minor deficiencies noted.
MARGINAL	One or more mission-capable aircraft exceed SATISFACTORY criteria by no more than 10 minutes; only minor deficiencies noted.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria and/or major deficiencies noted.

Table 4.7. Alert Aircraft Turnaround Rating Criteria (Turns greater than one hour).

Pass	Mission-capable aircraft returned to alert status within the period of time prescribed by the ADS or appropriate authority; only minor deficiencies noted.
Fail	Mission-capable aircraft does not meet pass criteria and/or major deficiencies noted.

4.5.4.2. # Quality of Alert Aircraft (Critical Sub-area). Alert aircraft inspections include a visual walk-around, inspection of all aircraft systems not included in the aircraft and missile system reliability inspection, and a review of aircraft forms for accuracy and aircraft reliability. At the discretion of the NORAD IG Team Chief, inspectors conduct checks and/or hot pre-flights to verify aircraft status to include spare aircraft placed on alert. Maintenance problems that result in a preflight ground-abort, air-abort, or inability to return to alert status impact the sub-area rating. Quality of alert aircraft rating criteria appears in **Table 4.8**.

Table 4.8. Quality of Alert Aircraft Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both alert aircraft mission capable; no deficiencies noted.
EXCELLENT	Both alert aircraft mission capable; only minor deficiencies that do not effect mission capability noted.
SATISFACTORY	Both alert aircraft mission capable; some deficiencies that do not effect mission capability noted.
MARGINAL	One alert aircraft not mission capable; the other aircraft may have minor deficiencies that do not effect mission capability.
UNSATISFACTORY	Both alert aircraft not mission capable.

4.5.4.3. # Aircraft/Weapons Systems Reliability (Critical Sub-Area). Functional checks of loaded missile stations and guns and radar bit checks will be accomplished on alert aircraft at the discretion of the NORAD IG Team Chief. Aircraft that are configured with an armed gun only will be graded pass/fail. Aircraft/Weapons systems reliability rating criteria appear in **Table 4.9**.

Table 4.9. Aircraft/Weapons Systems Rating.

OUTSTANDING	Each alert aircraft's loaded missile stations, gun systems, and radar are operational; no deficiencies noted.
EXCELLENT	Each alert aircraft have operational gun systems and radar and there is not more than one non-operational loaded missile station between aircraft; <u>or</u> , all missile stations operational and not more than one aircraft with a non-operational gun and/or radar.
SATISFACTORY	Each alert aircraft have at least one loaded missile station that is operational; one aircraft must have an operational gun and one aircraft must have an operational radar.
MARGINAL	One alert aircraft has at least one loaded missile station that is operational; one aircraft must have an operational gun.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

4.5.4.4. # Maintenance Support (Critical Sub-area). The following evaluated areas are used to determine the maintenance support rating: direction and coordination of maintenance actions (including assignment of personnel), cooperation between maintenance units and agencies, supervisory involvement and decision making, safety awareness, proper use and maintenance of technical data, personnel protective safety gear, aerospace ground equipment, tools and test equipment, foreign object awareness, proper fueling and Joint Oil Analysis Program (JOAP) (if applicable) procedures. Units will be evaluated for sense of urgency, motivation, teamwork, and esprit-de-corps. Maintenance problems that result in a post-preflight ground abort, an air abort, or inability to return aircraft to alert status, will not impact the sub-area rating if alert spare aircraft or maintenance action can circumvent mission degradation or loss.

Table 4.10. Maintenance Support Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Performance far exceeds mission/tech order requirements. Procedures and activities carried out in a far superior manner. Resources and programs exceptionally well managed. No deficiencies exist.
EXCELLENT	Performance exceeds mission/tech order requirements. Procedures and activities carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs efficiently and effectively managed. Minor deficiencies may exist.
SATISFACTORY	Performance meets mission/tech order requirements. Procedures and activities carried out in an effective and competent manner. Resources and programs adequately managed.
MARGINAL	Performance does not meet some mission/tech order requirements. Procedures and activities not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and programs not efficiently managed.
UNSATISFACTORY	Performance or operation does not meet mission/tech order requirements. Procedures and activities not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs not adequately managed. Significant deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

4.5.5. Information Operations (Rated Functional Area). NORAD utilizes increasingly information-intensive capabilities (i.e., command and control, sensors, communications, computers, and weapon systems). Reliance on these systems and the information they generate creates a potential vulnerability to attack or manipulation. Defensive IO are actions taken to defend one's own information and information systems. They are employed on a continuous basis, in both peacetime and war, and are an inherent part of force protection. The security rating is determined by security assessed within each of the functional areas. The security areas are Operations Security (OPSEC), Communications Security (COMSEC), Force Protection, and physical security safeguard programs. Unit personnel must demonstrate security awareness and understand and comply with instructions, directives, and local operating instructions, and safeguard instructions for control of entry, access, and escort in restricted areas. Unit personnel must demonstrate proficiency in the use of authenticators and codes, secure records and logs, data, voice communications, and communications discipline. The overall IO rating criteria is shown in **Table 4.11**.

Table 4.11. Information Operations Rating System.

OUTSTANDING	Procedures and activities are conducted in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are of exceptional merit in their use and management. No deviations or deficiencies noted.
EXCELLENT	Procedures and activities are conducted in a superior manner. Resources and programs are efficiently and effectively managed. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not significantly limit mission accomplishment and/or compromise security.
SATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are carried out in a competent manner. Resources and programs are adequately managed. Deficiencies exist, but do not limit the mission and/or compromise security.
MARGINAL	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and program are not adequately managed. Major deficiencies exist which impede or limit the mission and/or compromise security.
UNSATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deviations or deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment. Security is compromised. Does not meet marginal criteria.

Chapter 5

AIR DEFENSE SECTOR (ADS) AFE CRITERIA AND RATINGS

5.1. Evaluation Scope. An ADS AFE is a no-notice live-fly evaluation of air control forces at the Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR) RAOC/ADS, Canadian ADS, and Continental United States ADSs. The ADS AFEs are conducted by the HQ NORAD IG and, when required, augmented by MAJCOM inspectors. The ADS AFE assesses the operational capability of NORAD command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) centers to perform their peacetime air sovereignty alert (ASA) and contingency missions. The AFE is designed to test the response of the air defense alert force. These missions will normally be one of the following: counter-drug operations, aircraft in distress, hijacking, unknown aircraft, Dangerous Military Activity (DMA), or airborne terrorist. Other peacetime scenarios may be appropriate as directed by HQ NORAD. Expanded AFE scenarios with time compressed warning and intelligence buildup may be used. ADS AFEs are conducted at intervals not later than every 18 months IAW Table 1.1 and may be facilitated at any time (no ratings, verbal performance feedback) during out-of-cycle fighter unit AFEs. **Note:** Peacetime scramble order procedures are defined in FAA publication Special Military Operations 7610.4H and the Canadian Scramble, Intercept and Recovery (SIR) Agreement.

5.1.1. Notification. The NORAD evaluation team notifies the ADS of an impending AFE by hand-carried letter. This letter constitutes authority for conducting the evaluation and includes the team EAL and LOI or SPINS providing further guidance for evaluation conduct. The unit commander or designated representative may call the NORAD Consolidated Command Center (CCC) to verify the EAL. Acceptance of the team's credentials is based on provisions of AFI 31-101 or CF NDSI, Chapter 40.11. Additionally, the ADS will notify higher echelon commanders of the evaluation in progress via OPREP-3 Homeline reporting procedures.

5.1.2. Rating and Criteria. The respective region/sector(s) overall rating is determined from evaluation of the following areas: Initial response, command and control, employment, and information operations. The overall ADS AFE rating criteria are shown in **Table 5.1**.

5.1.3. Alert Commitment. Real-world air sovereignty operations have priority over an AFE at all times. Following the evaluated mission, the ASA fighter unit will complete all required actions to return the alert aircraft to the appropriate alert status. The ASA fighter unit will then advise the NORAD IG Fighter Team Chief that the alert aircraft are ready for inspection. At that time, the ASA fighter unit will request stand down from alert from the sector under the authority of the NORAD IG. When approved, the maintenance and weapons inspectors will evaluate the aircraft. Upon completion of the required inspections, the NORAD IG Fighter Team Chief will return the aircraft to the unit. The unit should then ensure the sector is notified that the aircraft are on status.

5.1.4. Safety. Although not rated as a functional area, safety is a critical area stressed in all activities. Incidents indicating poor safety emphasis, or a lack of flight safety consciousness, directly impact ratings in the areas where safety problems are observed and will generate a Finding.

5.1.5. Limiting Factors (LIMFACs). ADS LIMFACs should be briefed by the commander or designated representative prior to execution of the AFE. Factors beyond the ADS's control will be considered.

Table 5.1. ADS Overall AFE Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Two areas are rated outstanding; the other two areas are at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Two areas are rated at least excellent; the other two areas are at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Two areas are rated at least satisfactory; the other two areas are at least marginal.
MARGINAL	Three or more areas are rated as marginal.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not at least meet marginal criteria.

5.2. ADS Initial Response (Rated Functional Area). Initial Response rating criteria are shown in **Table 5.2.**

5.2.1. Track Detection and Continuity . The unit’s ability to detect, determine track validity, correlate, and survey track data that may represent a threat or concern to the region/sector’s area of responsibility is evaluated.

5.2.2. Track Identification. The unit’s ability to process, coordinate and communicate the identification, categorization, and classification of air traffic that may represent a threat or concern to the region/sector’s area of responsibility is evaluated.

5.2.3. Tactical Action. The ability to assess tactical conditions and take tactical action against air tracks to include pilot suit-up, alert force battle stations, runway alert, scramble, or divert to counter potential threats and/or provide required assistance is evaluated. This also includes:

5.2.3.1. Response to initial warning intelligence assessment and ability to make sound recommendations to higher authorities.

5.2.3.2. Planning for employment and/or ensuring optimum use of available air defense forces in the region or sector to counter the threat.

Table 5.2. ADS Initial Response Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Three areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Three areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other two areas are at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Three areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other areas are at least marginal
MARGINAL	Three areas are marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other areas are at least marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other areas are at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

5.3. ADS Command and Control (Rated Functional Area). ADS Command and Control rating criteria is shown in **Table 5.3.**

5.3.1. Coordination. The ability to coordinate with other ADS sections (internal) and external agencies (such as FAA/Air Traffic Control, NAVCAN, CCC, ADS, RAOC, fighter unit, radar site, E-3, tanker, C3I, JTF, AMICC, and U.S. Customs Service) to ensure proper track identification, track tell, fighter and/or E-3 flight clearance, information flow, etc., are accomplished effectively and within established time criteria is evaluated.

5.3.2. Reporting Procedures. The ability to accomplish track incident reporting, both internal and through the NORAD system according to AF, NORAD, and ANG instructions, is evaluated.

Table 5.3. ADS Command and Control Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other area is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

5.4. ADS Employment (Rated Functional Area). ADS Employment rating criteria are shown in **Table 5.4.**

5.4.1. Management and Direction. The ability to accomplish the following tasks in a timely and accurate manner is evaluated:

- 5.4.1.1. Management of ADS personnel and the status of employment actions.
- 5.4.1.2. Communicate guidance and recommendations to higher authorities and subordinate units.
- 5.4.1.3. Direct, support, and ensure tactical actions and ROE are employed according to defense plans, orders, and directives.
- 5.4.1.4. Ensure currency and maintenance of NORAD publications.

5.4.2. Intercept Phase. The ability to successfully maintain target track continuity and direct the intercept phase within the ROE, NORAD Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Special Instructions (SPINS) is evaluated. In addition, the following is also evaluated:

- 5.4.2.1. Direction and control provided to fighters and other aircraft once airborne, handoff, mission tasking and task execution through target intercept.
- 5.4.2.2. Monitoring of aircraft status, accuracy of air picture, and situational awareness, while maintaining strict radio discipline.

5.4.3. Post Intercept Phase. The ability to direct visual identification of the target, coordinate proper track re-classification, direct required actions to the fighters and other aircraft, and ensure execution is IAW applicable defense plans, orders, and directives is evaluated. Also, evaluate (if applicable) the following:

- 5.4.3.1. Direction and control provided to fighters and other air control aircraft during the follow-on mission to include further assistance for target surveillance, escort or intercept, and management of replacement air defense assets.
- 5.4.3.2. Monitoring of aircraft status, accuracy of air picture, and situational awareness.
- 5.4.3.3. Mission debrief with fighter unit when appropriate/available.

Table 5.4. ADS Employment Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Two areas are outstanding; the other area is at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Two areas are at least excellent; the other area is at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Two areas are at least satisfactory; the other area is at least marginal.
MARGINAL	Two or more areas are at least marginal.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

5.5. Information Operations (IO) (Rated Functional Area). NORAD utilizes increasingly information-intensive capabilities (i.e., command and control, sensors, communications, computers, and weapon systems). Reliance on these systems and the information they generate creates a potential vulnerability to attack or manipulation. Defensive IO are actions taken to defend one’s own information and information systems. They are employed on a continuous basis, in both peacetime and war, and are an inherent part of force protection. Unit personnel must demonstrate proficiency in the use of authenticator systems, secure records and logs, electronic data, voice communications, and maintain communications discipline. The overall IO rating criteria is shown in **Table 5.5**.

- 5.5.1. Communications Security (COMSEC). The unit’s adherence to defensive IO procedures as they relate to COMSEC is evaluated.
- 5.5.2. Operations Security (OPSEC). The unit’s adherence to defensive IO procedures as they relate to OPSEC is evaluated.
- 5.5.3. Physical Security. The unit’s adherence to defensive IO procedures as they relate to physical security is evaluated.

Table 5.5. ADS Information Operations Rating System.

OUTSTANDING	Procedures and activities are conducted in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are of exceptional merit in their use and management. No deviations or deficiencies noted.
EXCELLENT	Procedures and activities are conducted in a superior manner. Resources and programs are efficiently and effectively managed. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not limit mission accomplishment and/or compromise security.
SATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are carried out in a competent manner. Resources and programs are adequately managed. Deficiencies exist, but do not significantly limit the mission and/or compromise security.
MARGINAL	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and program are not adequately managed. Major deficiencies exist which impede or limit the mission and/or compromise security.
UNSATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deviations or deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment. Security is compromised. Does not meet marginal criteria.

Chapter 6

NORAD OPERATIONAL EVALUATION (NOE) CRITERIA AND RATINGS

6.1. General. A region NOE is a live and/or simulated prior-notice evaluation conducted by HQ NORAD IG to assess the region's ability to conduct its peace-to-wartime mission IAW NORAD CONPLAN/OPORDs. *Note:* When the NORAD IG augments ADS ORIs/CERIs/Op Evals, portions of NORAD evaluation criteria for RAOCs may be used. ADSs are rated using the MAJCOM ratings.

6.2. Frequency. The NORAD IG will conduct NOEs approximately every 4 years to assess the region's ability to meet peace-to-war readiness. See **Table 1.1**.

6.3. Scheduling. The NORAD IG will coordinate evaluation dates, availability, and support requirements.

6.4. Inspection Responsibilities. NORAD IG will be the lead agency for coordinating the inspection team, conducting the region NOE, and preparing the report. MAJCOMs may augment the NORAD IG as required. Augmentation funding for other than MAJCOM IG or A3 Evaluation personnel will be the responsibility of the NORAD IG.

6.5. Report. HQ NORAD IG is responsible for preparing and distributing the evaluation report.

6.6. Scope. Region designed exercises that cover HQ NORAD CONPLAN and OPORD operational procedures from peace-to-wartime, will be the primary scenario vehicle for NOE's. The IG may expand the region exercise scenario with time-compressed warning, intelligence, peace-to-wartime events, NBC, and logistics inputs.

6.6.1. The NOE will be in two phases. Phase 1 (Planning Phase) evaluates the Region's ability to respond to CINCNORAD direction involving Assessment, Courses of Action, Warning, Commander's Estimate, Alert, Operations Orders, Execution Orders, and Air Tasking Orders (ATO). Phase 2 (Operations Phase) evaluates the Region's ability to transition from peace-to-war IAW HQ NORAD CONPLANS/OPORDs.

6.6.2. Rating and Criteria. An NOE will normally consist of the following rated areas: Battle Staff (BS), Battle Staff Support Center (BSSC), or equivalent, Air Operations Center (AOC) or equivalent, NORAD Airborne Command Element (NACE) if applicable, and Information Operations. Critical rated areas are denoted with an asterisk (*). Critical functional sub-areas are denoted with a pound sign (#). The overall NOE rating criteria are listed in **Table 6.1**.

6.6.3. Limiting Factors (LIMFACS). Region LIMFACS should be provided to HQ NORAD/IG at least 120 days prior to the NOE. Additionally, the LIMFACS should be briefed by the commander or designated representative prior to start of the evaluation.

Table 6.1. Overall NOE Rating Criteria (Live and Simulated Mode).

OUTSTANDING	Battle staff and AOC are outstanding; all other rated areas are at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Battle staff and AOC at least excellent; no rated area is less than satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Battle staff and AOC are at least satisfactory; no rated area is less than marginal.
MARGINAL	Battle staff and AOC are at least marginal; no more than two rated areas are unsatisfactory
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

6.7. * Battle Staff NOE Criteria and Ratings (Rated Area). The battle staff rating is determined from the evaluation of the following functional areas: command and control (critical functional area), air operations (critical functional area), information flow, and reconstitution. Reference battle staff rating criteria in **Table 6.2.**

6.7.1. # Command and Control:

6.7.1.1. Leadership and Management. The unit is evaluated on its ability to lead, manage, monitor, plan and control assets and forces. Leadership and management includes response to CINC-NORAD direction involving Assessment, developing Courses of Action, Commander's Estimate and responses to Warning, Alert, Operations and Execution Orders, and ATO processing. Areas of interest are organization, lines of authority, communications, NACE, transfer of command and control, and continuity of operations. The primary emphasis in this area is on mission accomplishment, not unit methods.

6.7.1.2. Initial Response and Recall:

6.7.1.2.1. Command and Control Response to Alert Status. This includes demonstrating the ability to monitor, direct, support, and control (where applicable) the accomplishment of subordinate unit generation efforts within prescribed time criteria.

6.7.1.2.2. Unit's ability to recall personnel according to the unit's recall plan and exercise scenario. Recall reaction must demonstrate the unit's capabilities to respond to emergency conditions and to meet appropriate CONPLAN or OPORD tasking.

6.7.1.2.3. Commander's and staff's decisions regarding personnel on leave and temporary duty.

6.7.1.2.4. Adequacy of procedures to provide commander and battle staff with information on recall effectiveness.

6.7.1.3. Emergency Action Message (EAM)/Quick Reaction Message (QRM) Response. The battle staff's response to EAM/QRM tasking, to include proper receipt, validation, and dissemination of alerting messages, is evaluated according to applicable directives.

6.7.1.4. Contingency and Continuity of Operations. The adequacy of plans and the ability to transfer command and control functions to alternate locations or subordinate units are evaluated. In addition, the ability to accept and execute command and control authority when the responsibil-

ity is transferred down from the consolidated command center or alternate consolidated command center is also evaluated.

6.7.2. # Air Operations. The unit's ability to perform its assigned operational missions from peace-to-war according to appropriate directives and plans is evaluated to include developing appropriate Air Tasking Orders (ATO). During periods when peacetime or transition rules of engagement are in effect, the unit's ability to maintain air sovereignty of its area of responsibility (AOR) is tested. Response to tactical warning and the assessment of enemy attack will be evaluated. Under wartime conditions, the effectiveness of the unit's air control operations is evaluated defending against a simulated attack within its AOR by atmospheric weapon systems.

6.7.2.1. Air Battle Management:

6.7.2.1.1. Battle staff response, organization, and effectiveness in deploying and employing forces.

6.7.2.1.2. The capability to generate and accomplish accurate and timely operations reporting.

6.7.2.1.3. Key personnel's knowledge of taskings and actions required to meet those taskings.

6.7.3. Information Flow. The effective dissemination of information to higher headquarters, subordinate units, and other regions or sectors is evaluated.

6.7.3.1. Internal Information Flow. The ability of internal unit sections to ensure information on the current situation is passed quickly and correctly from the battle staff, BSSC, AOC, NACE, and all other unit sections who may need the information.

6.7.3.2. External Information Flow. The ability to provide critical information up-channel to higher headquarters, down-channel to subordinate agencies, and laterally to other agencies. The timeliness and accuracy of this information are fundamental to the assessment of this aspect of information flow, particularly information related to tactical warning and attack assessment on North America. Coordination procedures between the unit and external federal, state, and local governmental agencies, provincial agencies, and other military organizations not in its normal chain of command are evaluated.

6.7.4. Reconstitution:

6.7.4.1. Battle Damage Assessment. The unit's battle staff's ability to monitor and assess unit status as a result of system degradation caused by battle damage, natural disasters, sabotage, logistics, and/or maintenance problems.

6.7.4.2. Command and Control Transfer. The unit's ability to transfer command and control to the unit NACE and/or assumption of command and control from higher headquarters.

6.7.4.3. Survivability. The unit's action to reallocate and optimize its surviving forces to counter follow-on attacks.

6.7.4.4. Reporting. The capability to generate and dispatch reports as applicable, such as commander's operational report (OPREP); nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC); quick look capability index (QLCI); and commander's situation report (SITREP).

Table 6.2. Battle Staff Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Command and control and air operations are outstanding; no functional area is less than excellent.
EXCELLENT	Command and control and air operations are at least excellent; no functional area is less than satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Command and control and air operations are at least satisfactory; no functional area is less than marginal.
MARGINAL	Command and control and air operations are at least marginal; no functional area is less than marginal.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

6.8. *Air Operations Center (Rated Functional Area) . AOC personnel are required to demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the air control system and NORAD, applicable command and higher headquarter governing directives; and demonstrate their ability to direct and monitor air sovereignty, air defense, counterdrug and search and rescue activities, transition ROE, and wartime air battle management. The overall AOC rating will be determined from the evaluation of command and control (critical sub-area), air operations (critical sub-area), information flow and reconstitution. The overall AOC rating criteria is in **Table 6.3.**

6.8.1. # Command and Control (Critical sub-area).

6.8.1.1. Management and Direction. The focus of this area is the AOC's ability to support and accomplish mission objectives to assure the overall continuity of operations. Management and direction includes the assistance provided by the AOC to the battle staff and other agencies (as required) in evaluating the potential threat and recommending the appropriate actions are taken in the defense of the assigned AOR, through the employment of appropriate defense plans.

6.8.2. # Air Operations (Critical sub-area).

6.8.2.1. Response to Air Events and ROE Problems:

6.8.2.1.1. Initial warning intelligence assessment and continuous tracking of potential airborne threats.

6.8.2.1.2. The unit's ability to ensure an adequate force is employed to counter the potential threat or to provide required assistance.

6.8.2.1.3. The ability to monitor missions and ensure mission accomplishment, to direct appropriate ROE, and/or provide an appropriate level of direction to support mission requirements.

6.8.2.2. Air Battle Management:

6.8.2.2.1. Staff response, organization, and effectiveness in deploying and employing forces.

6.8.2.2.2. The capability to generate and accomplish accurate and timely operations reporting.

6.8.2.2.3. Key personnel's knowledge of taskings and actions required to meet those taskings.

6.8.2.2.4. Demonstrated knowledge of the air control system and allied equipment capabilities and limitations, and knowledge of operational procedures and information displays.

6.8.2.2.5. Timeliness and accuracy of battle management decisions, such as determining status of weapons readiness states, declaration of hostilities, and directing timely engagements according to the ROE to effectively limit the damage from attack.

6.8.2.2.6. Appropriate intelligence updates and briefings to battle staff, lateral organizations, and operations to include E-3, fighter squadrons, etc.

6.8.2.2.7. Direction and coordination with subordinate units and responsiveness to higher headquarters' requests.

6.8.2.2.8. The ATO is generated, reviewed, and disseminated in a timely and effective manner.

6.8.2.3. Fighter and Tanker Management. The allocation and use of fighter, tanker, and ADA resources to optimize its ability to defend its assigned AOR is evaluated.

6.8.2.4. Airborne, Ground-based, and Naval Surveillance Systems Management. The unit's ability to monitor the status of its surveillance systems and its management and allocation of these resources to optimize its ability to defend its assigned AOR are evaluated.

6.8.2.5. Communications and Electronics Systems Management. The unit's ability to monitor the status of its communications systems and its management and allocation of these resources to sustain its command and control responsibilities during all LERTCONs and reconstitution are evaluated.

6.8.2.6. Intelligence Support. The ability of the unit's intelligence staff to collect, analyze, and disseminate timely and accurate intelligence information to the battle staff, higher headquarters, and subordinate/lateral units is evaluated.

6.8.3. Information Flow. The effective dissemination of information to higher headquarters, subordinate units, and other regions or sectors is evaluated. The primary focus is on actions taken to ensure all time-sensitive information and factors, situations, or conditions that affect mission effectiveness are passed to all appropriate agencies (external and internal). Pre-mission briefings and internal/external coordination must be thorough. The clarity, timeliness, and accuracy of the air picture and status board display information are key items.

6.8.3.1. Internal Information Flow. The ability of internal unit sections to ensure information on the current situation is passed quickly and correctly to the BS, BSSC, NACE, and all other unit sections who may need the information is evaluated.

6.8.3.2. External Information Flow. The ability to provide critical information up-channel to higher headquarters, down-channel to subordinate agencies, and laterally to other agencies is evaluated. The timeliness and accuracy of this information are fundamental to the assessment of this aspect of information flow, particularly information related to tactical warning and attack assessment on North America. Coordination procedures between the unit and external federal, state, and local governmental agencies, provincial agencies, and other military organizations not in its normal chain of command are evaluated.

6.8.4. Reconstitution.

6.8.4.1. Battle Damage Assessment. The AOCs ability to monitor and assess unit status as a result of system degradation caused by battle damage, natural disasters, sabotage, logistics, and/or maintenance problems is evaluated.

6.8.4.2. Command and Control Transfer. Transfer of command and control to the unit NACE or appropriate subordinate agency and/or resumption of command and control from these agencies is evaluated.

6.8.4.3. Survivability. The AOC's action to reallocate and optimize its surviving forces to counter follow-on attacks is evaluated.

6.8.4.4. Reporting. The capability to generate and dispatch reports as applicable, such as commander's OPREP, NBC, QLCI and commander's SITREP is evaluated.

Table 6.3. Air Operations Center Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Command and control and air operations are outstanding; no functional area is less than excellent.
EXCELLENT	Command and control and air operations are at least excellent; no functional area is less than satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Command and control and air operations are at least satisfactory; no functional area is less than marginal.
MARGINAL	Command and control and air operations are at least marginal; no functional area is unsatisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

6.9. Battle Staff Support Center (BSSC), or equivalent NOE Criteria and Ratings (Rated Functional Area). The BSSC rating is determined from the evaluation of the following functional areas: Management and direction (critical functional area), reporting, information flow, and reconstitution.

6.9.1. # Management and Direction. Primary focus is on aggressiveness of managers in seeking information and determining those problems to be forwarded for resolution. Critical to this are problems impacting the battle commander's decision-making processes.

6.9.1.1. Logistics Management. The unit's ability to monitor the status of the region's logistic support for: Aircraft, Radar Sites, Mission Capable (MICAP) parts, Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL), Airfields, and the management and allocation of these resources to sustain its command and control responsibilities during all LERTCONS and reconstitution are evaluated. The region's ability to autonomously manage the Time Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD) and coordinate for strategic and tactical airlift support is also assessed.

6.9.1.2. NBC Management. The unit's ability to monitor, warn, and report on NBC events within their respective region. To provide the battle staff, higher headquarters, and subordinate/lateral units appropriate analysis, recommendations, and visual presentation utilizing automated or manual methods, for each event, are evaluated.

6.9.1.3. Personnel Management. The unit’s ability to provide support to the commander on all matters pertaining to personnel combat support issues. To assess the region’s ability to provide theater bed-down and support functions for fielding forces by hosting, providing or acquiring: Engineering Support, Personnel, Services, Medical, Force Protection, Casualty Reporting, Information Management, Public Affairs, and Legal.

6.9.2. Reporting. Reporting requirements must be met both in substance and format IAW NI10-19, *NORAD Aerospace Reporting System*. A timely and efficient system for accurate processing and dissemination of information to the battle staff and external agencies is required.

6.9.3. Information Flow. The effective dissemination of information to higher headquarters, subordinate units, and other regions or sectors is evaluated. The primary focus is on actions taken to ensure all time-sensitive information and factors, situations, or conditions that affect mission effectiveness are passed to all appropriate agencies (external and internal).

6.9.4. Reconstitution. Primary focus is on ensuring the status of warning and communication systems, air bases, munitions, and aircraft is immediately available to the commander, and appropriate recommendations are made for reallocating resources within the unit when required.

Table 6.4. Battle Staff Support Center Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Management and Direction is outstanding; no functional area is less than excellent.
EXCELLENT	Management and Direction is at least excellent; no functional area is less than satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Management and Direction is at least satisfactory; no functional area is less than marginal.
MARGINAL	Management and Direction is at least marginal; not more than one functional area is unsatisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

6.9.5. Information Operations Criteria and Ratings. (Rated Functional Area). NORAD utilizes increasingly information-intensive capabilities (i.e., command and control, sensors, communications, computers, and weapon systems). Reliance on these systems and the information they generate creates a potential vulnerability to attack or manipulation. Defensive IO are actions taken to defend one’s own information and information systems. They are employed on a continuous basis, in both peacetime and war, and are an inherent part of force protection. The IO rating is determined from the evaluation of the following areas: Operations security (OPSEC), communications security (COMSEC), and physical security safeguard programs. Unit personnel must demonstrate defensive IO awareness and understanding and comply with instructions, directives, and local operating instructions, and safeguard instructions for control of entry, access, and escort in restricted areas. They must demonstrate proficiency in the use of authenticators and codes, secure records and logs, data, voice communications, and communications discipline. The IO rating is determined by IO assessed within each of the functional areas. The overall IO rating criteria are shown in **Table 6.5**.

Table 6.5. Information Operations Rating System.

OUTSTANDING	Procedures and activities are conducted in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are of exceptional merit in their use and management. No deviations or deficiencies noted. All areas are rated at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Procedures and activities are conducted in a superior manner. Resources and programs are efficiently and effectively managed. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not limit mission accomplishment and/or compromise security. No one area rated less than satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are carried out in a competent manner. Resources and programs are adequately managed. Deficiencies exist, but do not significantly limit the mission and/or compromise security. No one area rated less than marginal.
MARGINAL	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and program are not adequately managed. Major deficiencies exist which impede or limit the mission and/or compromise security. Any one area rated unsatisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deviations or deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment. Security is compromised. Does not meet marginal criteria.

6.10. Safety. Although not rated as a functional area, safety is a critical area stressed in all activities. Incidents indicating poor safety emphasis, or a lack of flight safety consciousness, directly impact ratings in the areas where safety problems are observed and will generate a Finding.

Chapter 7

CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS CENTER (CCC/AWC/CIW) READINESS EVALUATION (CRE) CRITERIA AND RATINGS

7.1. General. A CRE is a simulated and no-notice evaluation conducted jointly by HQ N-SP/IG to assess the CMOC’s ability to conduct its peacetime mission IAW NORAD CONPLAN/OPORDs. *Note:* USSPACECOM/IG will evaluate Missile Warning Center (MWC) and Space Control Center (SCC) as part of the overall CRE.

7.2. Frequency. The HQ N-SP/IG will conduct a CRE NLT every 18 months IAW **Table 1.1.** to assess peacetime readiness. The CRE may be conducted in conjunction with other inspections, but will normally be a separate evaluation.

7.3. Scheduling. The HQ N-SP/IG will coordinate evaluation dates, availability, and support requirements with N/J3 and CMOC/J3.

7.4. Inspection Responsibilities. The HQ N-SP/IG will be the lead agency for coordinating the inspection team and preparing the report. MAJCOMs may augment as required. Augmentation funding for other than MAJCOM IG or A3 Evaluation personnel will be the responsibility of HQ N-SP/IG.

7.5. Report. The HQ N-SP/IG is responsible for preparing and distributing the evaluation report.

7.6. Scope. The evaluation will normally be a simulated event exercising peacetime readiness of the CMOC. HQ NORAD exercises or other suitably planned exercises may be used. A CRE will normally consist of the following rated areas for HQ NORAD: CCC, AWC, CIW, and Information Operations (IO). This chapter will set the criteria and ratings for the NORAD portion of the CRE. The overall CRE rating criteria are listed in Table 7.1. *Note:* A CRE will also consist of the following rated areas for USSPACECOM: MWC, SCC, CIW, and IO. USSPACECOM IG will conduct inspections of these functional areas IAW USSPACECOM Instruction 90-10, USSPACECOM Inspector General Activities, which contains the USSPACECOM IG criteria and ratings for the USSPACECOM portions of the CRE. The overall criteria for the CRE will amalgamate NORAD and USSPACECOM criteria with the scoring scheme enumerated in an LOI which normally will be the same as **Table 7.1.**

Table 7.1. Overall CRE Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Three areas are outstanding; all other areas are at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Three areas are excellent; all other areas are at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Three areas are satisfactory; all other areas are at least marginal.
MARGINAL	Two areas are marginal; no more than one area is unsatisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.7. Consolidated Command Center (CCC) Criteria and Rating.

7.7.1. CCC (Rated Functional Area). The CCC rating is determined from the evaluation of the following sub-areas: Initial response, command and control, and employment. The overall CCC CRE rating criteria are shown in **Table 7.2**.

Table 7.2. CCC Overall CRE Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Two areas are outstanding; the other area is at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Two areas are at least excellent; the other area is at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Two areas are at least satisfactory; the other area is at least marginal.
MARGINAL	Two or more areas are at least marginal.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.7.1.1. CCC Initial Response:

7.7.1.1.1. Initial Action. Evaluate procedures and ability to assess conditions, take appropriate action and to initiate or monitor action against air tracks. This includes:

7.7.1.1.1.1. CCC response to initial warning intelligence assessment, intelligence correlation with specific air event, and ability to provide sound recommendations to higher authorities and direction to subordinate units.

7.7.1.1.1.2. CCC/CAT, assessing, planning for and/or ensuring adequate air defense control forces, such as, fighters, E-3s, tankers, radar sites, C2 centers, etc., are employed in response to the assessed threat.

7.7.1.1.2. Initial Reporting and Coordination: Evaluate CCC procedures and ability to conduct/participate with necessary conferences, obtain CINCNOAD assessment, if required, complete initial reporting, briefings, and coordination for air event(s) in a timely and accurate manner. Consolidated command center initial response rating criteria is shown in **Table 7.3**.

Table 7.3. CCC Initial Response Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent, or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other area is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.7.1.2. CCC Command and Control:

7.7.1.2.1. Management and Direction. Evaluate procedures and ability to accomplish the following tasks in a timely and accurate manner:

7.7.1.2.1.1. Monitor all air events to termination and provide appropriate direction as applicable.

7.7.1.2.1.2. Render CINCNORAD Assessment appropriate for the situation.

7.7.1.2.1.3. Maintain and monitor current status of NORAD RAOC/AOC surveillance radars, CMOC operating systems, and the NORAD Alerting System.

7.7.1.2.2. Coordination. Evaluate CCC and CIW procedures and ability to coordinate within the CMOC and external agencies, such as, Space Operations Center (SPOC), RAOCs, Customs/law enforcement agencies (LEA), Joint Task Forces (JTF), etc., to ensure information flow and the air sovereignty mission are accomplished effectively and within established time criteria.

7.7.1.2.2.1. Coordinate with the NORAD Assessors for confirmation as required.

7.7.1.2.2.2. Make all necessary notifications upon receipt of Emergency Action Messages (EAMs).

Table 7.4. CCC Command and Control Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other is satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.7.1.3. CCC Employment:

7.7.1.3.1. Operations. Evaluate CCC and CIW (if applicable) procedures and ability to perform its operational mission to include:

7.7.1.3.1.1. Meeting the Air Defense and Air Sovereignty mission requirements IAW NORAD and CJCS governing directives.

7.7.1.3.1.2. Monitoring, recording, and analyzing air events in progress, and obtaining and processing periodic assessments in a timely and accurate manner. Key items are maintaining situational awareness and monitoring air events to ensure air sovereignty is accomplished.

7.7.1.3.1.3. Processing and transmitting EAMs when required.

7.7.1.4. Reporting. Evaluate the ability to accomplish internal and system-wide reporting within established time requirements and completion of logs and forms. Ensure systems status and event actions are briefed for both the crew changeover and operations intelligence briefings. CCC employment rating criteria are shown in **Table 7.5**.

Table 7.5. CCC Employment Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.8. NORAD Air Warning Center (AWC) (Rated Functional Area). The AWC rating is determined from the evaluation of the following functional areas: Initial response (critical area), command and control, and employment. The overall AWC CRE rating criteria are shown in **Table 7.6**.

Table 7.6. Overall AWC CRE Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Initial response and one other area are outstanding; the other area is at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Initial response and one other area are at least excellent; the other area is at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Initial response and one other area are at least satisfactory; the other area is at least marginal.
MARGINAL	Initial response and one other area are at least marginal
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.8.1. *AWC Initial Response.

7.8.1.1. Initial Action. Evaluate the ability to assess tactical conditions and to coordinate with the NORAD CAT and RAOCs to recommend or monitor tactical action against air tracks. This includes:

7.8.1.1.1. Responding to initial warning intelligence assessment or Granite Sentry (GS) indications and the ability to make sound recommendations to the CCC.

7.8.1.1.2. Receiving and accurately relaying the region or sectors' employment plan to the CCC.

7.8.2. Initial Reporting and Coordination. Evaluate the ability to complete initial reporting, briefings, and coordination for air events in a timely and accurate manner. AWC initial response rating criteria are shown in **Table 7.7**.

Table 7.7. AWC Initial Response Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other area is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.8.3. AWC Command and Control.

7.8.3.1. Management and Direction. Evaluate the ability to accomplish the following tasks in a timely and accurate manner:

7.8.3.1.1. Manage personnel and the status of air defense control forces.

7.8.3.1.2. Provide guidance and recommendations to higher authorities or relayed to subordinate units in a timely and accurate manner.

7.8.3.1.3. Update the GS database in a timely and accurate manner.

7.8.3.2. Coordination. Evaluate the ability to coordinate within the CMOC and internal/external agencies, i.e., RAOCs, Customs/LEAs, JTFs, etc., to ensure information flow and Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW&AA) are accomplished. Ensure all pertinent data is recorded in the AWC log to provide a clear picture of events.

Table 7.8. AWC Command and Control Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other is satisfactory; or one are is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.8.4. AWC Employment.

7.8.4.1. Operations. Evaluate the ability to perform the operational mission to include:

7.8.4.1.1. Knowledge of the air defense control system and applicable NORAD/CMOC governing directives.

7.8.4.1.2. Maintaining situational awareness and monitoring air events to ensure air sovereignty is accomplished.

7.8.4.1.3. Use of authentication procedures.

7.8.4.1.4. Demonstrate the ability to interpret, log and report all air defense radar outages, computer and RAOC forward tell outages, and weapons readiness deviations to the CCC.

7.8.4.2. Reporting Procedures. Evaluate the ability to accomplish internal and system-wide reporting to include: Track and incident reports, air defense control forces status reports, E-3 tab reports, AWC operations summary report, changeover briefings and AWC logs and forms. AWC employment rating criteria is shown in **Table 7.9**.

Table 7.9. AWC Employment Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other area is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.9. Combined Intelligence Watch (Rated Functional Area). The CIW rating is determined from the evaluation of the following areas: Initial response (critical area), command and control, and employment. The overall rating criteria are shown in **Table 7.10**.

Table 7.10. Overall CIW Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Initial response and one other area are outstanding; the other area is at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Initial response and one other area are at least excellent; the other is at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Initial response and one other area are at least satisfactory; the other area is at least marginal.
MARGINAL	Initial response and one other area are at least marginal.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.9.1. *CIW Initial Response. Initial response rating criteria are shown in **Table 7.11**.

7.9.1.1. Initial Action . Evaluate the ability to provide initial warning and to coordinate with the CCC, AWC, NORAD CAT, and external agencies, if applicable.

7.9.1.1.1. Response to initial warning upon receipt of Period of Interest notification.

7.9.1.1.2. Support to the NORAD CAT, if applicable, in assessing potential space, missile and air events.

7.9.1.2. Initial Reporting and Coordination. Evaluate the ability to complete initial reporting and coordination for space, missile, and air events.

7.9.1.2.1. Evaluate the ability to accomplish internal and external reporting.

Table 7.11. CIW Initial Response Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other area is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.9.2. CIW Command and Control. Command and control rating criteria is shown in **Table 7.12.**

7.9.2.1. Management and Direction. Evaluate ability to provide timely and accurate responses to requests for information and provide situation updates.

7.9.2.2. Coordination. Evaluate ability to maintain information flow with internal and external agencies.

7.9.2.2.1. Maintain a constant flow of information within the CMOC and with external agencies.

7.9.2.2.2. Support to CCC with timely, accurate information.

Table 7.12. CIW Command and Control Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.9.3. CIW Employment. Employment rating criteria are shown in **Table 7.13**.

7.9.3.1. Operations. Evaluate knowledge and situational awareness of personnel.

7.9.3.1.1. Knowledge of intelligence reporting systems and resources.

7.9.3.1.2. Maintaining situational awareness during space, missile and air events and providing CCC with information.

7.9.3.2. Reporting. Evaluate Critical Intelligence Message (CRITIC) reporting and documentation.

Table 7.13. CIW Employment Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both areas are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are at least excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is excellent and the other area is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding or excellent and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other area is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other area is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.10. Information Operations Criteria and Ratings. (Rated Functional Area). The IO rating is determined from evaluating IO in each of the CMOC functional areas – CCC, AWC, and CIW. Unit personnel must demonstrate defensive IO awareness and understanding and comply with instructions, directives, and local operating instructions, and safeguard instructions for control of entry, access, and escort in restricted areas. Personnel must demonstrate proficiency in the use of authenticators and codes; secure records and logs, data, voice communications; and communications discipline. The IO rating is determined by IO assessed within each of the functional areas. The overall IO rating criteria are shown in **Table 7.14**.

Table 7.14. Information Operations Rating System.

OUTSTANDING	Procedures and activities are conducted in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are of exceptional merit in their use and management. No deviations or deficiencies noted. All areas are rated at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Procedures and activities are conducted in a superior manner. Resources and programs are efficiently and effectively managed. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not limit mission accomplishment and/or compromise security. No one area rated less than satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are carried out in a competent manner. Resources and programs are adequately managed. Deficiencies exist, but do not significantly limit the mission and/or compromise security. No one area rated less than marginal.
MARGINAL	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and program are not adequately managed. Major deficiencies exist which impede or limit the mission and/or compromise security. Any one area rated unsatisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deviations or deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment. Security is compromised. Does not meet marginal criteria.

7.11. Safety. Although not rated as a functional area, safety is a critical area stressed in all activities. Incidents indicating poor safety emphasis within the individual centers may directly impact ratings in the areas where safety problems are observed and will generate a Finding.

Chapter 8

CMOC OPERATIONAL EVALUATION (COE) CRITERIA AND RATINGS

8.1. General. A COE is a prior-notice evaluation conducted by HQ N-SP/IG to assess the capability of the CMOC, and the BS/CAT to conduct its peacetime-to-wartime operational mission. This evaluation may include the SPOC and MCCC.

8.2. Frequency. HQ N-SP IG will conduct COEs at the direction of the CINC IAW **Table 1.1**.

8.3. Scheduling. HQ N-SP/IG will coordinate evaluation dates, availability, and support requirements with N/J3, SP/J3 and CMOC/J3.

8.4. Inspection Responsibilities. HQ N-SP IG will coordinate the inspection team, and conduct the COE. MAJCOMs and the HQ N-SP staff will augment the N-SP IG as required. Augmentation funding for other than MAJCOM IG or A3 Evaluation personnel will be the responsibility of the HQ NORAD IG.

8.5. Report. HQ N-SP/IG is responsible for preparing and distributing the evaluation report.

8.6. Scope. Regularly scheduled exercises will be used as the scenario vehicle for COEs.

8.6.1. A COE will normally consist of the following rated areas: BS/CAT, CCC, NBMC, SCC, MWC, CIW, and security. This chapter will set the criteria and ratings for the NORAD portion of the BS/CAT, CCC, NBMC, CIW, and Information Operations (IO).

8.6.2. USSPACECOM Instruction 90-10, USSPACECOM Inspector General Activities, contains the USSPACECOM IG criteria and ratings for the USSPACECOM portion of the BS/CAT, CCC, the SCC, the MWC, CIW and Security. NORAD and USSPACECOM IG criteria and ratings for these centers have been established by the CMOC/J3. See **Table 8.1**. for overall COE rating criteria.

Table 8.1. Overall COE Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Three areas are outstanding; all other areas are at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Three areas are excellent; all other areas are at least satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Three areas are satisfactory; all other areas are at least marginal.
MARGINAL	Two areas are at least marginal; no more than two areas are unsatisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

8.7. BS/CAT Criteria and Ratings:

8.7.1. BS/CAT (Rated Functional Area). The BS/CAT rating is determined from the evaluation of the following functional areas: operations and communications. Reference overall BS/CAT rating criteria are in **Table 8.2**.

Table 8.2. Overall BS/CAT Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is at least excellent and the other is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

8.7.2. Operations. The Battle Staff is evaluated on its ability to provide the strategic guidance, resources and coordination required enabling region commanders to carry out the operational mission of defending North American airspace across the spectrum of conflict.

8.7.2.1. Leadership and Management. Battle Staff directorates are evaluated on their ability to lead, manage, monitor, advise, assess, direct, allocate, coordinate, and focus on current and future strategic operations. Areas of interest are personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and command and control systems. The primary emphasis in this area is on mission accomplishment, not specific methods.

8.7.2.2. Crisis Action Team (CAT). The CAT is formed to perform a specific function or provide advice during a crisis or to work a specific issue. The CAT is evaluated on its ability to manage resources, support and monitor assets and forces, and assess the situation. Areas of interest are situation development, crisis assessment, course of action (COA) development, COA selection, execution planning, and execution.

8.7.2.3. Initial Crisis Response and Recall. The ability to assess the crisis situation and respond accordingly, directing the recall and activation of the Battle Staff/CAT in accordance with command directives. Upon assumption of duties, proved staff initial update briefing on crisis situation.

8.7.3. Communications. Ability to provide a timely and efficient system for accurate processing and dissemination of internal and external information. The primary focus is to ensure information priorities are recognized and actions are taken to inform appropriate agencies of time-sensitive information.

8.7.3.1. Information Management. This includes the orderly flow of internal and external information to include routine messages, EAMs, and QRMs. Maintaining read files, message handling procedures and ensuring all messages have proper security classification markings and cover sheets.

8.7.3.2. Reporting. The ability to ensure information on current situations is passed quickly and correctly to/from the BS/CAT and all other unit sections whom may need the information. Also, to up-channel information to higher headquarters, down-channel to subordinate agencies, and laterally to other agencies using the Commander’s Situation Report (SITREP) and commander’s Guidance as applicable.

8.8. Consolidated Command Center (CCC) Criteria and Ratings:

8.8.1. CCC (Rated Functional Area). The CCC rating is determined from the evaluation of the following functional areas: operations and communications. CCC rating criteria are in **Table 8.3**.

Table 8.3. Overall CCC Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is at least excellent and the other is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

8.8.1.1. Operations. The CCC is evaluated on its ability to process all time-sensitive operations. The CCC provides the command functions, situation assessments by monitoring worldwide activities, ITW&AA systems, and NORAD force readiness and postures.

8.8.1.1.1. Initial Response and Recall. Ability to recognize the problem, respond, and recall the appropriate (whether NORAD CAT and/or NORAD BS) personnel according to CCC recall plans.

8.8.1.1.2. Command and Control. This includes ensuring operations centers can accomplish their missions, exercising daily management of air control and missile warning assets, providing assessments for missile, space and air events to CINCNORAD, and providing a current air picture, status of forces and threat disposition.

8.8.1.1.3. Contingency and Continuity of Operations. The adequacy of plans to meet appropriate CJCS, CONPLAN, and OPORD tasking. To maintain operational continuity between daily event processing and contingency operations planning.

8.8.1.2. Communications. The ability to provide a timely and efficient system for accurate processing and dissemination of internal and external information. The primary focus is to ensure information priorities are recognized and actions are taken to inform appropriate agencies of time-sensitive information.

8.8.1.2.1. Information Management. This includes the orderly flow of internal and external information to include routine messages. Also, the CCC response to EAM/QRM tasking to include proper receipt, validation, and dissemination of alerting messages will be evaluated.

8.8.1.2.2. Reporting. The ability to ensure information on current situations is passed quickly and correctly IAW published directives. To provide critical information up-channel to higher headquarters, down-channel to subordinate agencies, and laterally to other agencies.

8.9. NORAD Battle Management Center (NBMC) Operations Cell Criteria and Ratings.

8.9.1. NBMC Operations Cell (Rated Functional Area). The Operations Cell rating is determined from the evaluation of the functional areas: operations and communications. NBMC Operations Cell rating criteria are in **Table 8.4.**

Table 8.4. NBMC Operations Cell Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is at least excellent and the other is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

8.9.1.1. Operations. The NBMC is evaluated on its ability to plan, direct, and coordinate resource allocation, monitor enemy and friendly forces actions, maintain connectivity with higher, lateral, and subordinate units, and continuously collect and present battle management information with the capacity to display the current air and surface picture or situation.

8.9.1.1.1. Battle Management. Ability to provide strategic guidance and establish priorities of effort. Monitor all air resources within NORAD’s Area of Operation (AOO). Coordinate mission priorities and resource allocation. Relay Battle Staff guidance, during CONPLAN operations, to component commanders on the general defense plan, overall objectives, priorities of effort, policy and delegation of authority to conduct specific activities.

8.9.1.1.2. Operations Cell. Evaluate its ability to continuously monitor the current air picture, status of NORAD assets and the air threat to North America. Disseminate current direction and guidance to the appropriate Region Air Operation Centers. Ability to interoperate with the Plans and Strategy Cells.

8.9.1.1.3. Plans Cell. The NORAD CAT forms the cadre for this cell and will transition to the NBMC upon Battle Staff recall. This cell will be evaluated on its ability to integrate, coordinate and develop contingency options, courses of action or CONPLAN modifications. Ability to interoperate with the Operations and Strategy Cells.

8.9.1.1.4. Strategy Cell. The NORAD CAT forms the cadre for this cell and will transition to the NBMC upon Battle Staff recall. This cell will be evaluated on its ability to look ahead of the current situation and plan for future operations. Analyze and prepare CINCNORAD’s strategic concept. Coordinate periodic strategy assessments and propose adjustments to the battle staff. When directed, adjust/revise the strategy. Conduct extensive internal and external coordination on all facets of strategic planning. Ability to interoperate with the Operations and Plans Cells.

8.9.1.1.5. Support Cell. The NORAD CAT forms the cadre for this cell and will transition to the NBMC upon battle staff recall. This cell will be evaluated on its ability to coordinate all

support issues between internal and external organizations. Ability to support functional annexes to planning documents, OPORDs and messages, and validates their functional area of COAs and other plans.

8.9.1.2. Communications. Evaluate the ability to provide a timely and efficient system for accurate processing and dissemination of internal and external information. The primary focus is to ensure information priorities are recognized and actions are taken to inform appropriate agencies of time-sensitive information.

8.9.1.2.1. Information Management. This includes the orderly flow of internal and external information to include routine message traffic, message handling, message distribution, limited distribution and U.S. only documents. Also, ensuring all messages have proper security classification markings and cover sheets.

8.9.1.2.2. Reporting. The ability to ensure information on current situations is passed quickly and correctly to all other unit sections who may need the information. Also, to provide critical information up-channel to higher headquarters, down-channel to subordinate agencies, and laterally to other agencies.

8.10. Combined Intelligence Watch (CIW) Criteria and Ratings:

8.10.1. Combined Intelligence Watch (Rated Functional Area). The CIW rating is determined from the evaluation of the operations and communications areas. The CIW is evaluated on its ability to support the CCC Battle Staff in accomplishing its peacetime-to-wartime operational mission. This includes monitoring, analyzing, and assessing all source intelligence and reporting from other operational intelligence organizations and available collection systems. Overall CIW rating criteria are shown in **Table 8.5**.

Table 8.5. CIW Rating Criteria.

OUTSTANDING	Both are outstanding.
EXCELLENT	Both areas are excellent; or one area is outstanding and the other area is satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Both areas are at least satisfactory; or one area is at least excellent and the other is satisfactory; or one area is outstanding and the other area is marginal.
MARGINAL	Both areas are at least marginal; or one area is satisfactory and the other is marginal; or one area is unsatisfactory and the other is at least satisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Does not meet marginal criteria.

8.10.1.1. Operations. Covers the CIW's ability to support and accomplish mission objectives to assure the overall continuity of operations. CIW personnel are required to provide time-sensitive intelligence for ITW&AA, evaluate evolving threat capabilities and intentions, and provide intelligence inputs to support strategic and tactical warning and threat assessments.

8.10.1.2. Communications. The primary focus is on actions taken to ensure all time-sensitive information and factors, situations, or conditions that affect mission effectiveness are passed to all appropriate agencies (external and internal). Changeover briefings and internal/external coordination must be thorough. The clarity, timeliness, and accuracy of reporting/processing to include but

not limited to the following: threat briefings for the command director/battle staff, tailored intelligence support on applicable threat capabilities and intentions, assessments and recommendations regarding expected enemy courses of action, and time-sensitive collection taskings to assist decision making.

8.11. Information Operations Criteria and Ratings. (Rated Functional Area). The IO rating is determined from evaluating IO in each of the CMOC functional areas – CCC, NBMC, BS/CAT and CIW. Unit personnel must demonstrate defensive IO awareness and understanding and comply with instructions, directives, and local operating instructions, and safeguard instructions for control of entry, access, and escort in restricted areas. Personnel must demonstrate proficiency in the use of authenticators and codes, secure records and logs, data and voice communications and communications discipline. The IO rating is determined by IO assessed within each of the functional areas. The overall IO rating criteria are shown in **Table 8.6.**

Table 8.6. Information Operations Rating System.

OUTSTANDING	Procedures and activities are conducted in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are of exemplary merit in their use and management. No deviations or deficiencies noted. All areas are rated at least excellent.
EXCELLENT	Procedures and activities are conducted in a superior manner. Resources and programs are efficiently and effectively managed. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not limit mission accomplishment and/or compromise security. No one area rated less than satisfactory.
SATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are carried out in a competent manner. Resources and programs are adequately managed. Deficiencies exist, but do not significantly limit the mission and/or compromise security. No one area rated less than marginal.
MARGINAL	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and program are not adequately managed. Major deficiencies exist which impede or limit the mission and/or compromise security. Any one area rated unsatisfactory.
UNSATISFACTORY	Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deviations or deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment. Security is compromised. Does not meet marginal criteria.

8.12. Safety. Although not rated as a functional area, safety is a critical area stressed in all activities. Incidents indicating poor safety emphasis within the individual centers may directly impact ratings in the areas where safety problems are observed and will generate a Finding.

H. DANIEL PHILLIPS, Col, USAF
Inspector General

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS***Abbreviations and Acronyms*

ABO—Airborne order
ACC—Air Combat Command
ACF—Air control facility
ADA—Air defense artillery
ADC—Air defense center
ADS—Air Defense Sector
AETC—Air Education and Training Command
AFE—Alert force evaluation
AFI—Air force instruction
AGE—Aerospace ground equipment
ALCM—Air-launched cruise missile
AMC—Air Mobility Command
ANG—Air National Guard
ANR—Alaskan NORAD Region
ADX—Air Defense Exercise
AOC—Air Operations Center
AOO—Area of operations
AOR—Area of responsibility
AMICC—Air Maritime Interdiction Coordination Center
ASA—Air sovereignty alert
ATO—Air tasking order
AWC—Air Warning Center
BS—Battle staff
BSSC—Battle staff support center
C2—Command and control
C3I—Command, control, communications and intelligence
1CAD—1st Canadian Air Division
CADS—Canadian Air Defense Sector
CANR—Canadian NORAD Region

CAT—Crisis Action Team
CCC—Consolidated command center
CERI —Combat Employment Readiness Inspection
CIC—Combined intelligence center
CINCNOAD—Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CIW—Combined intelligence watch
CJCS—Chairman Joints Chiefs of Staff
CMAS—Cheyenne Mountain Air Station
CMOC—Cheyenne Mountain operations center
COA—Course of Action
COE—CMOC Operational Evaluation
COMSEC—Communications security
CONPLAN—Concept plan
CONR—Continental United States NORAD Region
CONUS—Continental United States
CP—Command Post
CRE—CMOC readiness evaluation
CRITIC—Critical intelligence message
DCINC—Deputy Commander in Chief
DSN—Defense switched network
DOD—Department of Defense
EAL—Entry access/authority list
EAM—Emergency action message
EBS—Expanded/extended battle staff
ENDEX—End of exercise
FAA—Federal Aviation Administration
GSA—General Services Administration
GS —Granite Sentry
HQ—Headquarters
IAW—In accordance with
IG—Inspector general
IMC—Immediate message change

IO—Information Operations
IRRI—Initial Response Readiness Inspection
ITW&AA—Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
J1—Manpower & Personnel staff
J2—Intelligence staff
J3—Operations staff
J4—Logistics staff
J5—Planning staff
J6—Command Control Systems staff
JMETL—Joint mission essential task list
JOAP—Joint Oil Analysis Program
JTF—Joint task force
LEA—Law enforcement agency
LERTCON—Alert condition
LIMFAC—Limiting Factor
LOI—Letter of instruction
MAJCOM—Major Command
MCCC—Mobile consolidated command center
MCM—Multi-command manual
MICAP—Mission Capable
MWC—Missile Warning Center
NACE—NORAD Airborne Command Element
NAF—Numbered Air Force
NAVCAN—Navigation Canada
NBC—Nuclear/biological/chemical
NBMC—NORAD Battle Management Center
NLT—Not Later Than
NOE—NORAD operational evaluation
NORAD—North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSSF—NORAD Software Support Facility
NUDET—Nuclear detonation
OCC—Operations control center

OCR—Office of collateral responsibility
OPORD—Operations order
OPR—Office of primary responsibility
Op Eval—Operational evaluation
OPREP—Operations report
OPSEC—Operations security
ORI—Operational readiness inspection
PACAF—Pacific Air Forces
POC—Point of contact
QLCI—Quick look capabilities index
QRM—Quick reaction message
RAOC—Region air operations center
ROE—Rules of engagement
RP—Response posture
SAV—Staff assist visit
SCC—Space Control Center
SCIF—Special compartmented information facility
SECRET/RELCAN - —Secret, releasable to Canadians
SII—Special interest items
SIM—Simulated
SIR—Scramble, Intercept and Recovery Agreement
SLCM—Sea-launched cruise missile
SITREP—Situation report
SOF—Supervisor of flying
SORTS—Status of Resources and Training System Reports
SPOC—Space operations center
SPINS—Special instructions
SSO—Senior staff officer
STARTEX—Start of exercise
TPFDD—Time Phased Force Deployment Document
USELMNORAD—United States element, North American Aerospace Defense Command
USSPACECOM—United States Space Command