MEMORANDUM TO:

William H. Taib, Jr
General Counsel
Department of State

William J. Haynes, II
General Counsel
Department of Defense

John Bellinger
Legal Adviser for National Security

Scott Muller
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

From: Jack Goldsmith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

Gentlemen:

Attached is a draft of an opinion, requested by Judge Gonzales, concerning the meaning of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as it applies in occupied Iraq. I would appreciate any comments you may have at your earliest convenience. As always, it is important that you keep this draft opinion a very close hold. Thanks.

Attachment

cc: David Leitch
MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R. GONZALES, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

Re: Permissibility of Relocating Certain “Protected Persons” from Occupied Iraq

Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“GC” or “Convention”) prohibits “[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, . . . regardless of their motive.” This opinion elaborates on interim guidance provided in October 2003 concerning the permissibility under GC of relocating certain “protected persons” detained in occupied Iraq to places outside that country.

1 The entirety of article 49 is as follows:

Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.

The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the evictions are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated.

The Protecting Powers shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken place.

The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the danger of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

2 While GC confers certain protections on “the whole of the population of the countries in conflict,” GC, art. 13; see also id. Part II (Title) (“General Protections of Populations against Certain Consequences of War”), if
conclude that the United States may, consistent with article 49, (1) remove "protected persons" who are illegal aliens from Iraq pursuant to local immigration law; and (2) relocate "protected persons" (whether illegal aliens or not) from Iraq to another country to facilitate interrogation, for a brief but not indefinite period, so long as adjudicative proceedings have not been initiated against them.

I. Removal of "Protected Persons" Who Are Illegal Aliens

We first consider whether removing a "protected person" who is an illegal alien from occupied territory constitutes a "deportation" or "forcible transfer" within the meaning of article 49(1)'s prohibition. We consider each term in turn.

We begin with "deportation." Under United States law, this term denotes the removal of an alien. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(3)(B) ("Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this chapter or any other law of the United States is deportable."); Black's Law Dictionary of 1951, two years after GC, confirms the point. It defines the term "[A]n American Law" as "[t]he removal or sending back of an alien to the country from which he came." If this American law meaning of "deportation" were the meaning of the word in article 49, then that article would apply to the removal of "protected persons" who are illegal aliens from occupied territory.

But article 49(1) — or at least the core of it — represents a codification of the customary international law of armed conflict as it stood at the time the Convention was drafted. See, e.g., Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 Harv. Int'l L.J. 207, 210 (1975) (asserting that article 49(1) "merely codifies the prohibition of deportations of civilians from occupied territories which in fact already existed in the laws and customs of war"). And in that body of law, "deportation" is a term of art with a quite different meaning that appears to be derived from Roman law. Black's Law Dictionary cautiously contrasts the American law meaning of "deportation" with its meaning under Roman law: "A perpetual banishment, depriving the banished of his rights as a citizen." Black's Law Dictionary 526 (4th ed. 1951) (emphasis added); see also id. at 525 ("Deportatio. Lat. in the civil law. A kind of banishment, where a condemned person was sent or carried away to some foreign country, usually to an island...and thus taken out of the number of Roman citizens.") (emphasis added). Under this

limits must of its protections to a narrower class of "protected persons," id., art. 4. See generally Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: "Protected Persons" in Occupied Iraq (Oct. 16, 2004). Among GC's provisions whose benefits are generally restricted to "protected persons" are those included in Part III, including Article 49. See Part III (Title "Status and Treatment of Protected Persons"). See also Jean S. Fishel, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 278 (1958) (stating that article 49 "prohibits the forcible transfer or deportation from occupied territory of protected persons") (emphasis added); id. at 283 (describing the meaning given them ["deportation" and "transfer"] in article 49 paragraph 1, i.e., the compulsory movement of protected persons from occupied territory) (emphasis added).

1 Black's Law Dictionary 526 (4th ed. 1951). Even in domestic Anglo-American law of that time, however, "deportation" was not strictly limited to the removal of aliens. See, e.g., Co-Operative Comm. on Japanese Canadians v. Attorney-General for Canada, 13 I.L.R. 25, 27 (Peycy Council 1945) (inquiring deportation under Canadian war-related legislation of British and Canadian nationals; "deportation" is "not a word that is unused when applied to persons not aliens").
Roman law definition, a prohibition on deportation would not apply to the removal of illegal aliens. As shown below, the term “deportation” in the international law of armed conflict presented this Roman meaning in the nineteenth century, through World Wars I and II, and at the time of GC’s framing.

As early as 1863, Article 23 of the Lieber Code stated that “[p]rivileged citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts.” F. Lieber, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," art. 23 (1863) (emphasis added). While this provision does not itself use the term “deportation,” it is widely recognized as a principal progenitor of the customary prohibition on deportations during wartime codified in article 49. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Deportation and Transfer of Civilians in Time of War, 26 Vand. J. Trans. L. 489, 482-83 (1993) (citing article 23 of the Lieber Code as support for the conclusion that article 49 embodied customary international law); Nato Taylor Support, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law in the World War II Internment of Japanese Americans—A Case Study, 40 B.C.L. Rev. 275, 305-06 (1998) (stating that “the United States had condemned the deportation of civilians in Lieber’s Code”) (emphasis added). Significantly, the Lieber Code’s prohibition of carrying off citizens to distant parts reflects the Roman meaning of “deportation” described above.

Article 23 of the Lieber Code reflected the state of the customary laws of war during the Civil War, and from that time through World War I. Despite this rule, Germany deported 160,000 Belgians from the Belgian “Government General” and the Zone d’Épope to Germany, during World War I. Germany’s action was widely condemned as a violation of customary international law. See, e.g., Myers B. McDougal and Florence P. Pelizano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 895 (1951); John H.H. Frew, Transfer of Civilian Munition Ports Occupied Territory, 40 Am. J. Int’l L. 303, 308-11 (1946). For example, the United States State Department protested during the War that the deportation of Belgians violated “humanitarian principles of international practice.” The Krupp Case, 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurnberg Military Tribunals 1, 1429-30 (1946-49). And after the War ended, the Responsibilities Commission of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference condemned “[d]eportation of civilians” as a violation of the laws and customs of war. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Punishments: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 Am. J. Int’l L. 95, 114 (1920). While the condemnation, as sometimes articulated, was directed at the deportation of inhabitants of occupied territory, see International Law 345-46 (Keith Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. 1944) (stating, in light of “civilized world’s” reaction to First World War deportation of Belgians and Germans, that “there is no right to deport inhabitants to the country of the occupants”) (emphasis added), nothing in the historical record suggests that this term was intended or understood to include illegal aliens, that the

1 Listed for the Union Army during the Civil War, the Lieber Code was the first instance in western history in which the government of a sovereign nation established formal guidelines for its army’s conduct toward its enemies.” Richard Hengg, Lieber’s Code and the Law of War 1-2 (1981). It “has had a major influence on the drafting of . . . such treaties as . . . the Geneva Conventions and, of course, on the formation of customary law.” Theodore M. Low, Human Rights and POWs in the Geneva Conventions 49 n.114 (1983), and remains “a benchmark for the conduct of an army toward an enemy army and population.” Hengg, supra, at 1.
condemnation extended to the removal of such persons pursuant to local law, or that the customary law of war had evolved so significantly beyond the Lieber Code's prohibition.

Furthermore, article 49 was written against the background of World War II, and it is the particular atrocities of that war that most directly inform the text. In World War II, Nazi-occupied countries were labelled as "reservoirs of manpower," and deportations of civilians for purposes of forced labor and slave labor "assumed staggering proportions." The Nazis also employed mass deportations to extort from areas conquered or annexed by Germany indigenous non-German populations, such as "over 100,000 French who were expelled from Alsace-Lorraine into Vichy France and over one million Poles who were deported from the western parts of occupied Poland (Warthegau) into the so-called Government-General of Poland." Alfred De Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 Colum. J. Int’l L. 257, 264 (1995). These Russellly and universally condemned atrocities explicitly informed the drafting of Article 49. See, e.g., 2A. Final Record, at 664 (summarizing statement of the Chairman, which “noted that the Committee was unanimous in its condemnation of the abominable practice of deportations … He suggested that deportations should, in the same way as the taking of hostages, be absolutely prohibited in the Protocols”); Jean S. Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 278 (1958) (“There is no doubt as to need to give an account here of the painful recollections called forth by the ‘deportations’ of the Second World War, for they are still present in everyone’s memory … The thought of the physical and mental suffering endured by these ‘displaced persons’, among whom there were a great many women, children, old people and sick, can only lead to thankfulness for the prohibitions embodied in this paragraph, which is intended to forbid such hateful practices for all time.”).

Here, again, however, there is no evidence that the outrage of the world extended to the removal of "illegal aliens" from occupied territory in accordance with local immigration law, and indeed there is no evidence that international law has ever disapproved of such removals. Cf. Ayn Shawat-Al-Khassawineh, Special Rapporteur, The Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Human Rights Dimension of Population Transfer, Including the Implantation of settlers, Progress report prepared for the Economic and Social Council, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/18, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/hrunode/hrunode.sdf?file=24506c, f, 53 (citing Guy Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of Persons Between States 261 (1978)) (“Among the grounds upon which the expulsion of aliens on an individual basis is justified in State practice are: entry in breach of law [and] breach of conditions of admission.”). The ICRC's account illustrates the point. In summarizing the war-time events that were oppression in the minds of the drafters as they framed article 49(1), the ICRC Commentary hastened, in particular, “that millions of human beings were torn from their homes, separated from their families and deported from their country, usually under inhumane conditions.” Pictet, supra, at 278 (emphases added).
And in discussing pre-Convention customary law (including the Nuremberg Trials), the ICRC Commentary remarks that a "great many... decisions" by the Nuremberg "and other courts" have "asserted that the deportation of inhabitants of occupied territory is contrary to the laws and customs of war." Pictet, supra, at 279 n.3 (emphasis added).\(^6\)

Accordingly, we conclude that the word "deportations" in article 49 bears the term-of-art meaning that it bore in Roman times and in international law from the Lieber Code through World Wars I and II and right up to the drafting of GC removal of a person from a country where he has a legal right to be. Cf., e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 320, 739-40 (1989) (invoking the "well established" principle that "definitions Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under... the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise states, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms"); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (applying similar principles to treaty interpretation). Indeed, "deportations" continues to retain the same term-of-art meaning in the law of international armed conflict today. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, reprinted as 37 I.L.M. 929 (1998) article 7(c)(d) (defining the "crime against humanity" of "deportation or forcible transfer of populations" as "forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law") (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Kragulac, Case No.: IT-97-25, Appeal Chamber Judgement, 17 Sept. 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Schonberg ¶ 15 ("The acts of deportation is forcibly removing or uprooting individuals from the territory and the environment in which they are lawfully present.") (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Waitho, Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber Judgement, 3 Mar., 2000, ¶ 234 ("The deportation or forcible transfer of civilian means forced displacement of the person concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.") (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). For all these reasons, it follows that article 49's prohibition on deportations does not bar the removal of "protected persons" who are illegal aliens from occupied territory pursuant to local immigration law.

Article 49 prohibits "forcible transfers" in addition to "deportations." We conclude that what has been said about the latter largely applies to the former. Passages from the ICRC Commentary and the negotiating record illustrate that the words "transfer" and "deportations" were used loosely and, at times, interchangeably to capture the atrocities practiced by the Nazis

\(^6\) Again, we do not understand the word "inhabitants" to include illegal aliens. During Nuremberg trials that addressed the crime of "deporting civilians," the term "citizens" and "inhabitants" were used interchangeably and intrachangeably. For example, in the trial of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the indictment defined the crime of deportation to involve "citizens," the prosecutor described the crime to involve "people who had been uprooted from their homes in occupied territories," the three-Judge Tribunal construed the definition for the crime to charged, Judge Manzann's concerning opinion described the crime as extending to the occupied territory's "inhabitants," and the concurring opinion of Judge Phillips described it as extending to the "population" of occupied territory. United States v. Milch, 3 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 353, 681-93, 790, 879, 886 (1946-1949). We have found no evidence that any of these dispositions were intended or understood to reflect an extension of the customary prohibition of deportations to illegal aliens. See also The Radina Case, 4 Trial of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 1, 610 (1949) (defendants charged with "systematically removing populations from their native homes") (emphasis added).
and the Japanese in occupied territories. See 4 Pictet, Commentary at 278 ("There is doubtless no need to give an account here of the painful recollections called forth by the "deportations" of the Second World War. It will suffice to mention that millions of human beings were torn from their homes, separated from their families and deported from their country, usually under inhuman conditions. These mass transfers took place for the greatest possible variety of reasons."") (emphasis added); 2.A. Final Record, at 664 (summarizing statement of Mr. Skoniet (Netherlands) that "In Indonesia, during the last war, numbers of women and children had been transferred to unhealthy climates and forced to build roads, and had died as a result").

(emphasis added); id. at 664 (summarizing statement of Mr. Czarnobry (U.S.S.R.), which "quoted the case of part of the population of the little island of Wake who had been transferred to Japan") (emphasis added); id. at 664 (summarizing statement of the Chairman, which "noted that the Committee was unanimous in its condemnation of the abominable practice of deportation."

He suggested that deportation should, in the same way as the taking of hostages, be solemnly prohibited in the Preamble."

(emphasis added).

Furthermore, at least when used in connection with "deportations" as a term of art in the international law of armed conflict, "transfers" also appears to connote the relocation of an individual from an area where he is lawfully present. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.188/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) article 7(1)(d) (defining "deportation or forcible transfer of population" as "forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law") (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Blaškic, ¶ 234 ("The deportation or forcible transfer of civilians means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.") (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).

Consistent with OC's negotiating record and this more general term-of-art usage, many sources speak of article 49(1) — and implicitly acknowledge its limitation to those lawfully present is occupied territory — without making any distinction between "forcible transfers" and "deportations." See, e.g., S.C. Res. 694 (1991) (Under OC, article 49, "Israel, the occupying power, must refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilians from the occupied territories") (emphasis added); Kamen v. Minister of Defence, 920 I.C. 85, 39(1) Final Draft 401, digested in 16 Israel Y.B. Hum. Rts. 330, 334 (1986) ("[T]o whatever the interpretation of Article 49 may be, it is not applicable to the expulsion of a person who enters an area illegally after the commencement of its belligerent occupation."); Kurt Ruedy Haliday, The Palestinian Refugees:

The Right to Return to International Law, 72 Am. J. Int'l L. 565, 566 (1978) ("Article 49 forbids the forced and permanent removal of persons from territory to which they are native") (emphasis added); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice 144 ("Article 49 comes into play whenever people are forcibly moved from their ordinary residences.") (emphasis added); see also Raymond T. Yippling and Robert W. Ginsburg, The Geneva Convention of 1949, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 393, 419 (1952) (article 49(1) serves the purpose of preventing a belligerent occupier from "deter[ring] its home economy and war industry with the forced labor of the inhabitants of territory which it has occupied") (emphasis added).
We conclude, accordingly, that article 49(1)'s prohibition on "forcible transfers," like its prohibition on "deportations," does not extend to the removal, pursuant to local immigration law, of "protected persons" who are illegal aliens.

This conclusion comports with common sense. It would be surprising if the Convention were to welcome mat to occupied territory, granting all who enter in violation of local law an instant and (during occupation) irrevocable right to stay. Cf. Affo v. Commander Israel Defense Forces in the West Bank, 83 I.L.M. 139, 153 (1993) ("[o]ne should not view the content of Article 49 as anything but a reference to those arbitrary deportations of groups of nationals as were carried out during World War II for purposes of subjugation, extermination and the similarly cruel reasons. [One should reject an interpretation entailing that] a murderer who escaped to the occupied territory would have a safe haven, which would preclude his transfer to the authorized jurisdiction."). It is also consistent with the general presumption under customary international law, as reflected in Article 43 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 43(1), 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Hague Art. 63(1) ("Hague Regulations"), that an occupying power should maintain and enforce the domestic laws of the country occupied. 1 Article 43(1) of the Hague Regulations provides: "The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." The exigencies of "public order and safety" will not often "absolutely prevent[]" enforcement of local immigration laws. To the contrary, enforcement of such laws will usually prove essential to maintaining the security of the occupied territory. And while the occupying power may be "absolutely prevented" from enforcing local law by a requirement of the Geneva Conventions, see Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Re: Authority of the President Under Domestic and International Law To Make Fundamental Institutional Changes to the Government of Iraq 15 (Apr. 14, 2003) ("Fundamental Institutional Changes Memorandum"), reading GC to require a suspension of

1 Although GC incorporates by reference the Hague Regulations when applied to violations between "powers who are bound by" the IV Hague Convention, see article 154, Iraq is not a party to the Hague Convention, and therefore cannot be considered bound by that Convention as a matter of treaty law. The United States is likewise under no treaty-based obligation to apply the Hague Regulations to the occupation of Iraq because Iraq is not a "Contracting Power" under the IV Hague Regulations. See Hague Convention art. 1, 36 Stat. 2250 ("The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, as well as in the present Convention, do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention."); Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Re: Authority of the President Under Domestic and International Law To Make Fundamental Institutional Changes to the Government of Iraq 15 (Apr. 14, 2003) (noting that "the Hague Regulations do not expressly govern the U.S. conflict with Iraq"). The Hague Regulations are, however, generally taken to be declaratory of customary international law, and the United States may choose to comply with them on that basis. See generally id. at 18, see also United States v. Young, 337 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Principles of customary international law reflect the practices and customs of States in the international arena that are applied in a consistent fashion and that are generally recognized by what used to be called "civilized states."). For present purposes, however, the point is that GC does not as a general matter, need to be consistent with the principles reflected in the Hague Regulations, whether or not those Regulations apply in a particular case.
local immigration law would put great and unjustifiable strain on the duty of the occupying power to ‘ensure... public order and safety.’

Of course, even the broadest reading of article 49 would not work a complete suspension of local immigration law in Iraq. Rather, it would only suspend the provisions for deportation. Violations of Iraqi immigration law, however, are subject not only to deportation but also to imprisonment. See Iraqi Law No. 118 of 1978, article 24; see also id., article 25. Under customary international law as reflected in article 43 of the Hague Regulations, then, the occupying power may be obliged to enforce Iraqi immigration law at least to the extent of imprisoning its transgressors. This requirement would flow not only from the obligation to “resist, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country,” but also from the more general obligation to maintain “public order and safety”—which, whatever else it entails, would presumably include the arrest of law-breakers. See Iraqi Law No. 118 of 1978, article 25 (“The Director General [of Nationality] is vested with the penal authority under the Criminal Procedure Law which empowers him to detain the [illegal alien] in custody until he is deported or expelled from the territory of the Republic of Iraq.”). The Convention itself makes this requirement explicit: “The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.” GC, art. 64. Under the broadest reading of the prohibitions in article 49(1), then, an occupier might be required to imprison illegal aliens, but forbidden from taking the milder step of returning them to the border instead. It is doubtful that article 49’s drafters intended such an implausible result.

In sum, historical context as well as common sense demonstrates that the terms “deportations” and “forcible transfers” in article 49 are terms of art that do not apply to the removal of “protected persons” in occupied territory who are present there in violation of current local law. We conclude, therefore, that the United States would not violate article 49(1) by removing “protected persons” who are illegal aliens from Iraq pursuant to local immigration law.

II. Temporary Transnational Relocation of “Protected Persons” to Facilitate Interrogation

We next consider whether GC permits the United States to relocate “protected persons” (whether illegal aliens or not) from Iraq to another country temporarily to facilitate interrogation. Because GC makes special provisions for “protected persons” who have been

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2 It is true that one might invert the point and argue that the power to change local immigration law under article 43 of the Hague Regulations amounts to a power to enforce article 60’s prohibition on “deportations” and “forcible transfers.” And indeed the concept and function of occupying power laws has at times included “essential changes” to the laws of an occupied territory. Fundamental Institutional Changes Reconsidered at 11. But this power does not amount to a power to enforce article 49, because those changes may only be imposed in accordance with certain “essential purposes,” such as the occupying power’s need to maintain order and security, id. at 11, or in order to protect rights guaranteed by the Convention, id. at 15. It follows that an occupying power could not, for example, change local immigration law to render all citizens of the occupied territory illegal aliens.

4 We recommend that if the choice is made to pursue this course, careful records should be maintained confirming the illegal status of each alien who is removed under current domestic law.
"accused of offenses," we consider such persons first. We then consider "protected persons" who have not been so accused.

A. "Protected Persons" Who Have Been Accused of an Offense

OC specifically provides that "[p]rotected persons accused of offenses shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein." OC, art. 76(1). This provision is unambiguous: "protected persons" who have been "accused of offenses" may not be removed from occupied territory either for pretrial detention or for postconviction imprisonment.

We need not attempt to ascertain the precise meaning of "accused" in this context, for the following can be said with some confidence. Once adjudicative proceedings have been initiated against a person, that person has been "accused" within the meaning of Article 76. The initiation of such proceedings may take any form. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 386 (1977) (noting that certain criminal procedure protections are triggered by initiation of judicial proceedings, "whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment"); quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). On the other hand, mere suspicion of an offense would not constitute an accusation, nor would an interrogation based upon such suspicion. Cf. Wayne R. LaFave et al., 3 Criminal Procedure, § 11.1(d) (1999) ("[The Supreme Court has] reaffirmed ... that a person does not become an accused for Sixth Amendment purposes simply because he has been detained by the government with the intention of filing charges against him").

Thus, if an occupying power merely detains a "protected person" for questioning — even if that person is strongly suspected of committing an offense — that person is not yet "accused" for purposes of article 76.15

In short, once adjudicative proceedings have been initiated against a "protected person," the person is "accused of an offense" for purposes of article 76, and may not be detained outside of occupied Iraq. But until that time, article 76 does not apply.

B. "Protected Persons" Who Have Not Been Accused of an Offense

Finally, we consider whether Article 40(1)'s prohibition of "forcible transfers" and "deportations" bars the United States from temporarily detaining (and detaining) a "protected

15 Iraqi law appears to draw a similar distinction, treating someone as a "suspect" during an investigation and as an "accused" once he has been charged in an indictment or summoned or named in a criminal arrest warrant. See, e.g., Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 16(3)(i) (Dec. 10, 2003) (available at http://www.iraq-legal.org/hsb/hlshb.pdf) (using the term "suspect" to describe persons under investigation and "accused" to describe persons charged in an indictment); Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings (Law Number 23 of 1977) ¶¶ 34, 56 (available at https://www.ijm.org/english/justicelaw/ictn.asp?ID=12936) (defining, inter alia, "accused" as "[a]ny one whom is summoned, invited or summoned to appear before a court to answer charges against him", and "suspect" as "[a]ny foreigner or citizen of Iraq who is subject to investigation while in Iraq and for whom an international warrant was issued") (emphasis added).
people" who has not been "accused of an offense" to a location outside of Iraq to facilitate interrogation.

It might be thought that the juxtaposition of the words "deportation" and "transfers" in article 49 reflects a dichotomy between permanent relocations, on the one hand, and temporary relocations, on the other. The word "deportation" does clearly connote permanence. See Black's Law Dictionary 526 (4th ed. 1953) (defining "deportation" in Roman law, as "a perpetual banishment"); see also supra Part I (concluding the meaning of "deportation" as a term of art in the international law of armed conflict flows from its meaning in Roman law). And the words "transfers," by contrast, does not necessarily have that same connotation. See Oxford English Dictionary 257 (1933) ("conveyance or removal from one place, person, etc. to another"). Were article 49 read in this manner, it would prohibit the United States from temporarily relocating a "protected person" from Iraq to facilitate interrogation.

While this dichotomy has some surface appeal, we ultimately reject it. The phrase "forcible transfers" and the word "deportations," when used as terms of art in the international law of armed conflict, see supra Part I, and especially when used in connection with each other, both convey a sense of uprooting from one’s home. See, e.g., Picket, supra, at 278 (emphasis added) (recalling the “deportations” and “mass transfers” that had occurred during World War II, where “millions of human beings were torn from their homes, separated from their families and deported from their country, usually under inhuman conditions”) (emphasis added); United States v. Milch, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal 353, 790 (1946-1949) (prosecutor’s description of the crimes of “deportation” as involving “people who had been uprooted from their homes in occupied territory”) (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Krugjekic, Case No.: IT-97-25, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 17 Sept. 2003, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg ¶ 15 (“[T]he acts of uprooting the population is forcibly removing or uprooting individuals from the territory and the environment in which they are lawfully present.”) (emphasis added). The concept of uprooting from one’s home clearly suggests resettlement, and while it may include not only permanent, but also extended or at least indefinite resettlement, it cannot reasonably be expanded to encompass more temporary absence, for a brief and definite period, from one’s still-established home. Cf. Kurt René Radley, The Population Refugees: The Right to Return in International Law, 72 Am. J. Int’1 L. 586, 598 (1978) (“Article 49 forbids the forced and permanent removal of persons from territory to which they are native.”) (emphasis added); 2A Final Record, at 664 (summarizing statement of Mr. Slamet (Netherlands) that “[i]n Indonesia, during the last war, numbers of women and children had been transferred to unhealthy climates and forced to build roads, and had died as a result”); id. at 664 (summarizing statement of Mr. Claman (U.S.), which “quoted the case of part of the population of the little island of Wake who had been transferred to Japan”); GC Art. 49(2) (carving out an exception to Article 49(1)’s prohibition of forcible transfers or deportations to allow evacuations, including transitional evacuations, required to protect the security of the population or by imperative military reasons, provided that “[p]ersons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.”).

11 For purposes of resolving the questions presented, we need not resolve the precise differences between "deportations" and "forcible transfers" under article 49. We presume that these concepts do not overlap entirely. See Kne France v. Skal, 470 U.S. 393, 397-98 (1985) (where defendants are different terms in the same treaty, they are relatively presumed to mean something different). One possible distinction is that "deportation," unlike the
This reading is confirmed by the Convention’s structure. As we explain below, if the word “transfer” were read to embrace all temporary relocations, however brief, it would create a prohibition inconsistent with a duty imposed by another provision of the Convention, cause a different paragraph of article 49 to create an implausible result, and render two other provisions of GC entirely superfluous. These structural considerations confirm that article 49 uses the term “transfers,” consistent with its connotations when used as a term of art in connection with “deportations” in the law of armed conflict, to refer to relocations involving uprooting and resettlement for a permanent, intended, or at least indefinite duration.

First, we consider article 49’s relationship with article 24. Article 24 provides: “The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate the reception of... children [who are under 15, who are orphaned or separated from their families as a result of the war] in a neutral country for the duration of the conflict with the consent of the Protecting Power.” This provision appears in Part II of GC and therefore “cover[s] the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict,” GC, article 13, including all individuals in occupied territory, see Pictet, supra, at 118-19, whether “protected persons” or not. At first glance, article 24’s duty to relocate certain children— including those who are “protected persons”— to a neutral country might appear to be fatally inconsistent with article 49(1)’s categorical prohibition of “forcible transfers” and “deportations” of “protected persons.” The relationship between articles 24 and 49(1) is easily understood, however, once it is recognized that the ex opus of article 49(1) is a prohibition on forcibly uprooting people from their homes. The children provided for in article 24 are precisely those who have been orphaned or separated from their homes already, by the war. Thus, relocating such children (even without their consent) does not implicate the central concern of article 49(1).

Second, article 49(6) provides: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” (Emphasis added). As the ICRC commentary explains, this provision was “intended to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for political or racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers weakened the economic situation of the native population and endangered their separate existence as a race.” Pictet, supra, at 283. This practice was often closely related to practices at which article 49(1) was directed— resettling the citizens of occupied countries out of occupied territory. As the International Military Tribunal concluded during the Nuremberg trial, the Nazis had undertaken a “gigantic program” that included three “interwoven and interrelated” aims: “to evacuate and resettle large areas of the conquered territories; to Germanize masses of the population of the conquered territories; and to utilize...” (emphasis added). See also id. at 532 (“Deportation. Lct. In the civil law. A kind of banishment, where a condemned person was sent or carried away to some foreign county, usually to an island... and that taken out the number of Roman citizens.”) (emphasis added). See also 24, Final Record at 611 (observation of Mr. Camberg [Norway] regarding the plight of “ex-German Jews dislocated by the German Government who found themselves in territories subsequently occupied by the German Army”). When we need not confine this distinction for purposes of this opinion, we note that it is fully consistent with our analysis and conclusions.
other masses of the population as slaves within the Reich." The _Eichmann Case_, A Trial of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 125 (1949); see also id. at 610 (defendants charged with "[e]vacuating enemy populations from their native lands and resettling so-called 'ethnic Germans' (Volksdeutsch) on such lands").

Not only do articles 49(1) and 49(6) address related wartime practices, they both do so by prohibiting certain transfers and deportations. There is a strong presumption that the same words will bear the same meaning throughout the same treaty. Cf., e.g., _Air France v. Salk_, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985). This presumption is particularly strong when, as here, the words appear multiple times within the same article.

If "transfer" is understood throughout article 49 to entail—consistent with technical usage—pecuniary, extended, or at least indefinite resettlement, then the scope of article 49(6)'s prohibition closely corresponds to its intended purpose. By contrast, if "transfer" is understood throughout article 49 to mean any relocation, however brief, then article 49(6) would have a much broader scope and would prohibit an occupying power from placing any members of its civilian population in the occupied country even temporarily. While such a prohibition arguably might not extend to civilian subjects to the military occupation administration, it probably would at least extend to various employees of private contractors and non-governmental organizations. Cf. GC III, art. 4(4)(C) (including as potential prisoners of war "persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany"). Such a result is far removed from article 49(6)'s intended purpose and would work to the manifest disadvantage of the inhabitants of occupied territory. For these reasons, it seems very implausible that article 49(6)'s prohibition of deportations and transfers into occupied territory should be construed to expansively. See _Ikei v. Korean Air Lines_, 516 U.S. 217, 221-222 (1996) (choosing from among different possible definitions of a treaty term the definition that avoided implausible results). It follows, therefore, that article 49(1)'s prohibition of forcible transfers and deportations out of occupied territory likewise should not be construed to extend to temporary international relocations of brief but not indefinite duration.15

Third, if article 49(1) banned all relocations out of occupied territory, no matter how brief, two different provisions of GC would be superfluous. Article 51 of GC, which makes provision for compelling the labor of "protected persons," provides: "The work shall be carried out only in occupied territory where the persons whose services have been requisitioned are." If article 49 forbade all relocations from occupied territory to another country, this portion of

15 We note one significant textual difference between articles 49(1) and 49(6). While the former provision bars only forcible transfers (as well as deportations), the latter does not so limit the transfers that it prohibits. We do not read the absence of "forcible" from the latter provision to eliminate conception of uprooting and resettlement, but rather to indicate that (unlike article 49(1)) article 49(6) prohibits voluntary as well as coercive resettlement. This interpretation is fully consistent with one of the principal purposes of article 49(6), as indicated by the ICCC. Commentary quoted in the text—"preventing an occupying power from colonizing occupied territory with its own civilian population. Extortion, of course, can be voluntary as well as forcible, but either way it entails uprooting and resettlement."
article 51 would be entirely superfluous. But "[t]his phrase, like all the other words of the treaty, is to be given a meaning, if reasonably possible, and rules of construction may not be resorted to to render it meaningless or inoperative."  

*Factor v. Leschenault,* 260 U.S. 276, 303-04 (1923). By contrast, if article 49(1) does not forbid brief transitory relocations, article 51 serves an important, independent purpose. While extended or indefinite relocations for purposes of forced labor might constitute "laborable transfer" and thus be prohibited under article 49(1) as well as article 51, at least active instances of briefly bringing an accused "protected person" across a border to engage in forced labor — on a daily basis, for example — would not fall within the scope of the prohibition of article 49 but would be barred by article 51.

Even more relevant to the text at hand, article 76 of the Convention provides: "Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein." If article 49(1) forbids all relocations, however temporary, from occupied territory to another country, then this portion of article 76 too would be entirely superfluous. It follows, therefore, that briefly relocating accused "protected persons" outside of occupied territory for pre-trial detention and interrogation — though forbidden by article 76 — falls outside the scope of the prohibition of article 49(1). But if briefly relocating an accused "protected person" to a foreign country for detention and interrogation (though forbidden by article 76) falls beyond the scope of article 49, then the otherwise indistinguishable act of briefly relocating a "protected person" who is not accused to a foreign country for detention and interrogation (which is not forbidden by article 76) must also fall outside the scope of article 49's prohibition.

It might, at first, appear surprising that a different result obtains for accused persons than for those who are not (or are not yet) accused. But special procedural protections often attach to individuals, including suspected offenders, only after they are accused. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. VI ("[t]he accused shall enjoy various procedural protections") (emphasis added);  

*United States v. Aral,* 415 U.S. 330, 332-34 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) ("[t]he initiation of adversary judicial proceedings ... marks the commencement of the 'criminal process' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] are applicable"). "(I)t is at only that time that the government has consented itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."  

*United States v. Gavant,* 407 U.S. 189, 189 (1972) (quoting *Kirby v. Illinois,* 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). And in this context, the distinction between those who are accused and those who are not (or who are not yet) accused is significant.

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18 We note that the ICRC Commentary appears to take the position that the provisions of articles 51 and 76 discussed in the text are, in fact, superfluous. "The provisions of article 76 under which any actioan of imprisonment must be set in the occupied territory itself is based on the fundamental principle forbidding depositions laid down in article 49." *Pictet, supra* at 263, see also id. at 279 (assuming without analysis that Article 49(1)'s prohibition is "strengthened by other Articles in the case in which its observance appeared to be most certain" and citing, inter alia, Articles 51(2) and 109(3)). We do not find this reasoning persuasive. Article 49 may well lay down a fundamental principle, but the scope of this principle must be ascertained by traditional rules of treaty interpretation, including the rule that each provision of a treaty "is to be given a meaning, if reasonably possible, and rules of construction may not be resorted to to make it meaningless or inoperative."  

*Factor,* 260 U.S. at 303-04.
and are not accused makes eminent sense: only after a person is accused must he be allowed to prepare his defense, and for this he may require access to resources that are available to him only in his native country.

Thus technical usage suggests, and GC's structure confirms, that Articles 49(1)\(^{11}\)'s prohibition on "deportations" and "forcible transfers" does not extend to all transnational relocations. And, for the reasons we have explained, we conclude that it is permissible to relocate "protected persons" who have not been accused of an offense from Iraq to another country, for a brief but not indefinite period, for purposes of interrogation.

III. Conclusion

Article 49 does not forbid the removal from occupied territory, pursuant to local immigration law, of "protected persons" who are illegal aliens. Nor does it preclude the temporary relocation of "protected persons" (whether illegal aliens or not) who have not been accused of an offense from occupied Iraq to another country, for a brief but not indefinite period, to facilitate interrogation.

Please let us know if we can provide further assistance.

Jack L. Goldsmith III
Assistant Attorney General

\(^{11}\) While we conclude that GC does not prohibit temporary relocations of "protected persons" from occupied territory for a brief but not indefinite period, neither technical usage nor the Convention provides clear or precise guidance regarding exactly how long a "protected person" may be held outside occupied territory without running afoul of Article 49. Furthermore, violations of Article 49 may constitute "grave breaches" of the Convention, art. 147, and thus "war crimes" under federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C. § 2441. For these reasons, we recommend that any contemplated relocations of "protected persons" from Iraq to facilitate interrogation be carefully evaluated for compliance with Article 49 on a case-by-case basis. We will provide additional guidance as necessary to facilitate such evaluations.

Furthermore, although we have previously indicated that only those who "find themselves . . . in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power" in "occupied territory" or the "territory of a party to the conflict" receive the benefits of "protected person" status, Protected Persons Memorandum at 5-6, this does not mean that a "protected person" who is captured in occupied territory and then temporarily relocated by the occupying power to a different location thereby forfeits the benefits of "protected person" status. On the contrary, we believe he would ordinarily retain those benefits. Cf. Art. 49(2)(c) (providing that, in some circumstances, protected persons may be evacuated outside of occupied territory, but that such persons must be transferred back to their homes as soon as possible).