STATUS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

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STATUS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This morning, the committee again focuses its attention on the Global War on Terror with a hearing on our ongoing security and stability activities in Afghanistan.

Our witnesses are the Honorable Karen Tandy, administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; Ms. Mary Beth Long, principal deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs, Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, commanding general, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan; and the Honorable James Kunder, assistant administrator for Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development. Thank you, folks, for being with us today. We look forward to your testimony. Appreciate your appearance.

Our forces in Afghanistan typify the quiet dedication and professionalism that we as Americans have grown used to seeing from our military personnel. Numbering over 21,000, these brave men and women often labor off the front page of our Nation’s newspapers.

Progress is deliberate and perhaps in the day-to-day view unexciting. But I think if you look back at how far that small but very important country has come, you begin to grasp the depth of the commitment of our military and civilian officials to see this job through until the end.

We would do well to remember what Afghanistan looked like under the Taliban regime less than five years ago. Girls over the age of eight could not go to school. Women were treated as personal property. People could not believe as they saw fit. Taliban rulers coexisted happily and indeed supported the people who murdered thousands of Americans in a single day. Today schools are open. People can vote for their own leaders, a number of which are women. Far from being ruled by a regime that supports terrorism, Afghanistan is a fledgling democracy whose friendship and partnership are invaluable to the United States. Our last hearing on Af-
ghanistan was over a year ago, and we need to get an update on the progress that is being made there.

Since last summer, Afghanistan has held its first parliamentary and provincial elections in almost 30 years. December saw the first session of that inaugural parliament. Good men and women continue to step forward in Afghanistan and are taking active roles in their nation’s stability and reconstruction.

As expected, U.S. men and women continue to serve in the security sector both within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and through the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan. Military and civilians together are also building a better Afghanistan through provincial reconstruction teams and U.S. Agency for International Development projects.

Coalition partners are also maintaining or even increasing their commitment to Afghanistan’s stability and reconstruction. This summer, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force will take over primary security responsibility for three-quarters of the country and will lead reconstruction efforts in northern, western and southern Afghanistan.

The Afghan National Army continues to come on-line. One year ago, no ANA units were capable of taking the lead in security operations. This year, six units serve on the front lines of their own country’s defense. A full 40 combat units fight alongside coalition forces in the day-to-day effort to keep peace and build security in Afghanistan.

A lot of work remains to be done. Afghanistan and its partners must cut off any resurgence of Taliban influence and violence now, while also clamping down on a serious poppy cultivation issue. No one denies that these are difficult problems and that the end is still far off.

But I think the Afghans, Americans and international partners prove every day that, if we will give the people of Afghanistan the tools, they will fight for their nation’s long-term stability and development.

During today’s hearings, I hope we hear how we can help you, as U.S. officials deeply involved in these efforts, to do your jobs better.

So thank you for being with us. This is a very critical issue. And it is good to revisit this issue at this point.

And before we go to our witnesses, let me recognize my great colleague on the committee, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, to speed up the hearing, because we have so many witnesses, I ask unanimous consent that my prepared statement be put into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. SKELTON. I welcome the witnesses. And it is especially good to see General Eikenberry here once again.

And thank you, sir, for your leadership. It is extraordinary.
It has been more than four and a half years since the invasion of Afghanistan following the terrorist attack of September the 11th. And the question is, what type of progress have we made since that time?

The news media, General, reports about the resurgence of the Taliban in the south, about the various firefight that go on. Are we fighting the Taliban? Plus, are we fighting the al Qaeda or doing so in combination thereof? Are we fighting just warlords because of the nature of the culture?

There is a transition coming up with NATO and its leadership and our role in the NATO piece; the huge amount of heroin that is being produced and whether the enemy or enemies are profiting from that—we would like to learn all of that from you.

And since we have so many witnesses, I will stop at that.

But we have real challenges there. I was led to believe a year ago that there was light at the end of the tunnel. And if there is light at the end of the tunnel today, we would like to know about it. Or will we be there 20 or 25 years?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Administrator Tandy, thank you for being with us today. And obviously, your piece of this challenge is a very important one, one that we don’t focus on a lot in this committee, but nonetheless one that compels review. So thank you for being with us, and we look forward to your statement.

And incidentally, the written statements of all of our guests today will be taken into the record, so feel free to summarize, and your written statement will be incorporated.

STATEMENT OF HON. KAREN P. TANDY, ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Ms. TANDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Skelton and the distinguished members of this committee, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and I, personally, appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss DEA’s counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. And on behalf of my 11,000 DEA members, and in particular the brave men and women serving in Afghanistan with DEA, I thank you for your support for our counternarcotics efforts there.

Much of the security and stability in Afghanistan rises and falls with the drug trade. The country’s production of 92 percent of the world’s heroin substantially contributes to the instability, violence, and lawlessness that we see in Afghanistan.

This drug trade also has the capability of financing terrorists and those who support them. While in power, as the chairman referred to, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation. But they did not ban trafficking or processing of opium. The Taliban, during that time, also used its poppy cultivation ban to drive up the price of its own substantial stockpiles of opium. The Taliban’s association with opium and heroin smuggling trade continues today, as they opportunistically use proceeds from the Afghan drug trade of today,
that it taxes and protects, as a source of revenue for the anti-coalition activities.

As President Karzai said recently, if we don’t destroy poppy, it will destroy us. Attacking the drug trade is critical to achieving stability in this struggling country. And DEA is combating drugs in Afghanistan, just as we do in every other country of the 85 foreign offices that we hold. We are going after the kingpins and the criminal organizations that control the drug supply.

I need to be very clear on a point that often is confusing. DEA goes after the traffickers and the transnational drug enterprises at the command and control level, not the crops. DEA is not involved in poppy eradication. Crop eradication is handled by the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

While crop eradication and interdiction, or the seizure of druglords, if you will, are important to be sure to achieve lasting success in reducing the supply and in restoring the rule of law, we also must focus on identifying, disrupting, and dismantling high-level trafficking organizations, their leaders, their infrastructure, and their illicit assets, if we are to have lasting success. Targeting the Afghan kingpins also will help prevent this country from returning, as it once was 25 years ago, the major supplier of heroin to the United States.

As this committee appreciates, the challenges we face fighting the drug trade in Afghanistan are tough: conducting law enforcement operations in a war zone often controlled by powerful heroin warlords in a country where the drug trade and culture is deeply entrenched, with an undeveloped infrastructure and fledgling Afghan law enforcement organizations. But these challenges are not insurmountable. In the past year alone, we have made great progress.

Afghanistan has promulgated new narcotics laws. They have conducted their first arrest and search warrants under those laws. They have ordered the first extradition of a major drug trafficker connected to the Taliban.

They have established a central tribunal court and prosecutors, which they did not have before, and conducted the successful prosecution of more than 100 traffickers.

In addition, DEA's counternarcotics programs are proving to be a valuable asset in the stabilization of Afghanistan and a value added to the security of the U.S. and coalition forces there. Since December 2005, DEA has collected and shared actionable intelligence with coalition and Afghan partners on more than eight occasions. And that intelligence that we shared directly averted deadly attacks against U.S. military personnel and leaders in Afghanistan.

This past April marked the one-year anniversary of DEA’s deployment of our foreign-deployed advisory and support, or FAST, teams, as they are known. FAST, which are supported and largely funded by DOD, re-enforce our primary mission of dismantling the drug-trafficking organizations in that country and that region.

As part of the FAST team investigations against the drug supply networks, the FAST teams also destroy related opium storage sites,
heroin processing labs and precursor chemical supplies, all of which directly related to the targeted drug enterprises.

In just the first 6 months of those DEA operations with the FAST teams, opium seizures totaled 38 metric tons, which is a 700 percent increase from the prior 6 months of opium seizures in Afghanistan.

These FAST teams also were deployed to Afghanistan to establish the National Interdiction Unit, or NIU, as it is known. DEA mentors the NIU and assists them in building their capacity as our future counterparts to disrupt and dismantle these trafficking organizations.

The first joint DEA–NIU investigation did just that. It resulted in the arrest of Misri Khan, the long-time head of a major Afghan heroin organization, and two of his key lieutenants. All 3 of those defendants have been convicted and each sentenced to 17 years in prison by the new central narcotics tribunal in Kabul under the new Afghan narcotics laws.

DEA activities in Afghanistan also resulted in the October 2005 landmark extradition of an Afghan citizen from Afghanistan. In that instance, the person extradited was a major trafficker, Haji Baz Mohammad, who boasted that he sent heroin as a form of Jihad against the United States in order to kill Americans.

This Taliban-linked narco-terrorist, the first ever extradited to the United States from Afghanistan, was charged with conspiring to export more that $25 million worth of heroin from Afghanistan to the United States and other countries.

In April of last year, DEA arrested former Taliban member Haji Bashir Noorzai on U.S. charges that he conspired to export more than $50 million worth of heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan into the United States and other countries. His arrest led to the disruption of his entire organization.

Both Noorzai and Baz Mohammad are awaiting trial in the U.S. courts. Both are the only two Afghan narcotics traffickers ever to have been listed among the world’s most-wanted drug kingpins and sanctioned by President Bush under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.

DEA also has been active in the countries surrounding Afghanistan. In 2002, we began leading a 19-country initiative known as Operation Containment, which essentially was intended to place a security belt around Afghanistan to prevent chemicals from entering the country and opium and heroin from leaving.

This strategy has been successful. Prior to Operation Containment, less than one-half of one metric ton of heroin was seized. In the past fiscal year, Operation Containment resulted in the seizure of 11.5 metric tons of heroin, which is almost a 3,000 percent increase.

DEA is continuing to expand our operational capacity in Afghanistan through the assistance and funding of DOD. DOD is funding and constructing a base camp that is scheduled to be completed this fall to provide housing and mission support for our FAST and NIU teams.

And in addition, on June 10th, the first two of eight DOD-funded Mi-17 helicopters arrived in Kabul. And they will be operational by mid-July and dedicated to these counternarcotics efforts of DEA
and the NIU. The remaining six helicopters are scheduled to arrive at the rate of two helicopters every six weeks until we reach the total of eight. These Mi–17s are essential, and they will be a significant help in providing greater mobility and increased operational security for our DEA and NIU agents on the ground.

To close, the road ahead is difficult. And there is no short-term solution to these long-entrenched challenges facing Afghanistan. But DEA's counternarcotics efforts there, with the assistance of DOD, are contributing to the rebuilding of this struggling country. We are strengthening Afghanistan's institutions of justice and policing capabilities. And we are helping to protect the U.S. and coalition troops from deadly attacks that are funded in part by drug traffickers. All in all, the international law enforcement community's counternarcotics efforts are setting the stage for a more lawful and stable Afghanistan in the future.

Thank you, and I look forward to answering the committee's questions at the appropriate time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tandy can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ms. Long, thank you for being with us today. And what do you think?

STATEMENT OF HON. MARY BETH LONG, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Ms. LONG. Thank you, Chairman Hunter. Thank you, Congressman Skelton and distinguished members, for the opportunity to be here today to speak about Afghanistan.

As you know, it has been about a year since Assistant Secretary Rodman was here to speak about Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. You might get a little closer to that mike.

Ms. LONG. Yes, sir.

And a lot has been accomplished in that year. That said, there is a lot that we need to do.

As you know, we at the Department of Defense are fully committed, as is Congress, to assisting the Afghan people and the government in creating a place where there is long-term stability and economic progress that is sustainable. We believe that progress toward these goals is integral to our success in the Global War on Terror.

But the United States cannot do this alone. We must do so with our allies and our partners.

Afghanistan must never again serve as the training ground for terrorists. Our goal continues to be a moderate, democratic Afghan government that is capable of controlling its territory and achieving economic self-sufficiency. To that end, the Afghans are and will remain our true partners.

The Taliban, ladies and gentlemen, have absolutely nothing to offer. They prey on ignorance and poverty. They work through violence and intimidation.

As Lieutenant General Eikenberry will elaborate, the coalition, the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, and importantly the Afghan national security forces are capable of and will
be capable in the long term of handling this kinetic Taliban challenge.

The larger problem lies in fostering the overall conditions that will enable the Afghans to achieve long-term stability and economic self-sufficiency.

We must continue helping that government build and sustain an environment in which its citizens, from the city dwellers to the farmers, from the teachers to the women and children at home, to have a better life through legitimate means.

That is happening in much of the country. However, it is not happening everywhere. In places where the insurgency is active and where opium is the primary crop, the Afghan and our forces are challenged. This is a long-term effort, and it requires military muscle and more.

We see our military's hard work, their bravery, and their tremendous achievements most prominently now in Operation Mountain Thrust, where, with our allies and the Afghan National Army, we are successfully engaging the Taliban.

And Lieutenant General Eikenberry will elaborate on this multi-month, multi-province operation and how it is preparing the ground for long-term stability and for the transition to additional responsibilities by NATO.

He will also elaborate on the other DOD missions, the training and equipping of the Afghan National Security Forces.

The Afghan National Army, in particular, has made considerable progress in the last year. And both of our governments understand that it is Afghanistan's own forces that must take increasing responsibility for Afghan security.

I believe that Administrator Tandy talked to you about the threat that opium plays. As she outlined, the Department of Defense does contribute to the overall counternarcotics effort, and I won't repeat those contributions here.

Just as military matters are the responsibility of the Department of Defense, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency of International Development have a lead on diplomacy and development. And I will leave the full treatment of those topics to my State Department colleagues and for Mr. Kunder.

Of course, security and development are related. You can't have one without the other. And that means that, at a policy level and at an operational level, we must work together. And we do.

You see that working together most dramatically at the end of the chain, which is our provincial reconstruction teams, where representatives of USAID, the Department of Defense and the other agencies work together at an operational level, where they foster security, development, and more capable government for the population. This is an attempt to overturn decades, if not a generation, of deterioration at the provincial and district levels.

Happily, as you know, the United States is not alone in this pursuit. Canada recently took responsibility for the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Kandahar province and southern command. United Kingdom took responsibility for a PRT in Helmand province, with contributions from Denmark and Estonia. And the Dutch, as you know, are sending substantial forces to lead the PRT in Uruzgan province, with contributions from Australia.
The transfer of authority in the south to NATO in the coming weeks will be treated more elaborately by Lieutenant General Eikenberry in his remarks.

As you know, we have active diplomacy. And the international community provides a lot of needed economic and other assistance to Afghanistan.

Earlier this year, at the donors’ conference in London, there was an Afghanistan compact, which was constructed as the post-bond framework for development and reconstruction in Afghanistan. For the donors, the compact emphasizes accountability and coordination. For the Afghans, it represents its capability-building and local ownership of the development process.

Our bilateral relations remain close and vibrant. From the Department of Defense perspective, the first meetings to advance the strategic partnership—and that agreement was signed by President Karzai and President Bush in May of last year. And our follow-on defense meetings took place just weeks ago in March.

As you know, democracy is taking root. After successful parliamentary elections last year, they were followed by a nationwide turnout for the national assembly elections, which was accomplished and followed through with the first national assembly inaugural session just weeks ago. Thus far, the national assembly has confirmed 20 members of its cabinet and 2 Supreme Court justices. It also modified and passed President Karzai’s budget.

The legitimate economy is growing. However, Afghanistan must still create a legal framework that will encourage private initiatives and foreign investments. The banking sector remains weak, and that is problematic for paying soldiers and the teachers and those who are in the provinces and the district.

Despite progress on many fronts, violence is indeed up this year. The Taliban are testing ISAF forces. But factional violence has gone down, in part because many of the Mujahedeen and the illegally armed groups were at least partially disarmed over the last year.

But there is much more to do, and General Eikenberry will speak to many of those issues.

We need to help the government connect with the provinces and the districts and to provide a robust judicial sector. We believe that the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people have confidence in President Karzai and in the advances that they made. We share that confidence.

We make progress every day, but we must keep in mind that this is a long-term effort.

One of the world’s least-developed countries, Afghanistan has few national resources that are developed. It has little infrastructure. It has a very high illiteracy rate. And recent history is marked by the Soviet invasion and decades-long civil wars.

We work together with the Afghans to overthrow the military arm of the equally despised Taliban regime. Expectations are high. And our nations must work together to rise to meet that challenge.

I know that the support of the Congress and the American people is behind our intergovernmental efforts in Afghanistan. And I welcome your comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General Eikenberry, how are you this morning?
General EIKENBERRY. Very well, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. We look forward to your comments. Thanks for your service and the service of all the great folks who are carrying the burden in that very challenging area of operations. And please let us know how things are going.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KARL EIKENBERRY, COMMANDER, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN, U.S. ARMY

General EIKENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, members of the committee, it is an honor to be here today representing the 28,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan.

When the United States and its coalition partners began Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, we started with two missions: first, to defeat al Qaeda and their Taliban allies; and second, together with the Afghan people and the international community, to help create the conditions where international terrorism could never again find witting support and sanctuary.

Viewed from the baseline of October 2001, the progress made to date in Afghanistan is truly significant: a democratically elected president, a sitting parliament, a confirmed cabinet, a functioning constitution, Afghan National Security Forces that are steadily growing in strength and capability, and the ongoing reconstruction projects across the country that are improving the lives of the Afghan people.

Against this progress, Afghanistan remains the target of terrorist groups, drug traffickers, and a very determined criminal element. Not all violence can be attributed to Taliban or al Qaeda, as narco-trafficking, tribal conflicts and land disputes also continue to challenge the overall security environment.

The enemy we face is not particularly strong, but the institutions of the Afghan state remain relatively weak. This situation is enabling the enemy to operate in the absence of government presence in some areas of Afghanistan. To be sure, the presence and strength of the Taliban has grown in some districts, primarily in southern Afghanistan. Since being removed as a regime, they have reconstituted elsewhere. We are seeing enemy forces now operate in formations of 40 to 50 fighters in some districts. They are demonstrating better command and control, and they are fighting hard.

Our current operation in southern Afghanistan, Operation Mountain Thrust, seeks to deny the enemy safe havens, to interdict his movement routes and, most importantly, extend the authority and writ of the central government of Afghanistan.

The combat phase of this operation is only the precursor to our longer-term goal of strengthening good governance, the rule of law, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, and economic development. This emphasis on government and development is indicative of our overall approach to the Afghan campaign.
Provincial reconstruction teams are actively engaging district and provincial leaders to facilitate good governance. Medical assistance teams are treating thousands of Afghans who otherwise would not have access to medical care. And we are building hundreds of miles of roads. This latter effort is key to expanding the reach of the central government and jumpstarting the rural economy. I cannot overstate its importance.

I have touched on our current operations, and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have in the discussion to follow. But with your permission, Chairman, I would like to now discuss the future.

This summer, the NATO International Security Assistance Force, or NATO ISAF, will expand its areas of operations from northern and western Afghanistan into southern Afghanistan. We anticipate that NATO will assume responsibility for the overall security mission for all of Afghanistan at some point later this year.

A key point to remember is that the United States' full commitment in Afghanistan will remain undiminished. As a NATO member, the United States will remain by far the single-largest contributor or troops and capability. We will maintain our strong national capability to support our counterterrorism mission to strike al Qaeda and its associated movements wherever and whenever they are found. Moreover, our military will continue to play a central role in the training and equipping of the Afghan national security forces. And we will remain a very important contribution to Afghanistan's reconstruction.

In addition to the transition from U.S.-led coalition to NATO ISAF international military leads, Afghanistan's continued development will be marked by three other important transitions.

The second transition under way is the increasing emphasis by the government of Afghanistan and the international community on the non-military aspects of our collective efforts. As I just explained, this effort relates to Operation Mountain Thrust. I need to emphasize that it is the heart of our long-term effort to make Afghanistan a viable self-sustaining member of the international community, free from international terror. In short, we seek to rebuild Afghanistan's middle ground—that is, its civil society ravaged by three decades of warfare, extremism, and terrorism.

Throughout Afghanistan's 34 provinces, rebuilding the middle ground remains the primary concern of the Afghan people. Indeed, a recent poll of the Afghans showed that 80 percent see economic reconstruction, not security, as their number-one need.

To further enhance security and stability, the government of Afghanistan and the international community must continue to work together to improve governance, the rule of law, economic reconstruction, and social services.

In campaigns such as this, the construction of roads and schools can be just as decisive, if not more, than military operations. The international community must make greater efforts in this area.

The third transition is from international-to Afghan-lead in all dimensions of Afghan governance and security. The growth in size and capability of the Afghan national security forces—that is, the
national army and the police—is one of the most visible aspects of this important transition.

Today, over 66,000 army and police are trained, equipped and engaged in security operations. The Afghan national security forces, partnered with the coalition and NATO units, are expanding their reach and presence more widely within the country. They are increasingly playing a major role in ensuring the stability of their nation, as evidenced by their very successful participation in the ongoing Operation Mountain Thrust.

It is imperative that the international community maintain its support and its commitment to this essential but still emerging institution of the Afghan state. We can anticipate emerging equipment requirements for the Afghan national army and police that NATO and the international community will need to address.

The fourth and final transition relates to the need to find cooperative approaches to the fight against international terrorism. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the international community are threatened by a common enemy. We have endeavored to adopt a coordinated military approach to address this threat, working to improve our combined operational effectiveness and build mutual confidence.

For example, on June the 6th, I represented the United States at the 17th session of the Afghan-Pakistan-U.S. Tripartite Commission at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. This session, like those before it, served to further cooperation between the coalition, Afghanistan, NATO ISAF and Pakistani military forces. We aim to expand information-sharing, communications and personal interactions at all levels of command. And I believe we are making significant progress.

In my discussion of the progress in Afghanistan, I do not want to discount the enormous obstacles that remain. Much work needs to be done. And the international community must remain patient and maintain uncompromising long-term commitment to Afghanistan's success if we are collectively to prevail.

Most pressing, the continuing assaults on Afghanistan by international terrorism, as well as narco-trafficking and the related corrosive effects on the government of Afghanistan, could threaten the viability of the Afghan state.

However, we should not be daunted by these challenges. Instead, we should take stock of the tremendous progress that Afghanistan and the international community have made to date and apply that same commitment to the difficulties that lie ahead.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again to this opportunity. And I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Eikenberry can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General, for a very comprehensive statement.

Mr. Kunder, thank you for being with us, sir. And the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES KUNDER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN GASTRIGH, THE AFGHANISTAN COORDINATOR AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today.

I am joined by Mr. John Gastright, the Afghanistan coordinator at the State Department, if members of the committee have any questions regarding our diplomatic or political efforts in Afghanistan.

Sir——

The CHAIRMAN. Excellent.

And I have to leave for just a few minutes, but I will be back very shortly, Mr. Kunder, but go right ahead, sir.

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, sir.

On the tried and true principle that a picture is worth a thousand words, I have in our testimony pack this powerpoint that I am going to walk through very briefly, about ten slides, to summarize the program. I believe each member has a copy of this in your packet.

This is entitled “Progress in Afghanistan.” And it summarizes very briefly the U.S. Agency for International Development reconstruction program in Afghanistan.

I want to say at the outset, as several members of the panel have already said, we work in very close tandem with our military colleagues. I had the opportunity to work in Afghanistan myself, and my tour of duty overlapped with the general’s during his earlier tour.

I think members of the committee are aware of the fact that this is the second time around for General Eikenberry in Afghanistan. He has given two years of devoted service to the reconstruction of that country.

On this slide show, the very first slide just is the cover obviously, but I just wanted to point out that picture in the lower right-hand corner. I know many members of the committee have been to Afghanistan, but that gives you some sense of the terrain we are working in. This happens to be a road project being pushed into the central highlands. But it is some of the most tortured terrain in the world in which to do reconstruction activities.

The first slide, entitled “Transition Strategy,” basically gives the outline of what we are trying to accomplish from a reconstruction point of view in Afghanistan.

Starting from the bottom of the page, it talks about the early stages of our work was in relief and stabilization, where we tried to take on problems like the humanitarian needs of Afghanistan, the displaced people across the country from that 23 years of fighting that Mary Beth Long referred to.

Where we are now is in the middle of this chart, what we are calling the reconstruction phase. What we are trying to do is focus on building Afghan capacity to take care of their own problems, building the Afghan government’s capacity, taking care of economic growth because we know foreign aid is not the long-term answer to Afghanistan’s economic stability. And where we are headed is at
the top of the page. And we are looking at about 2011 forward, where we hope the Afghan government can take on the bulk of the responsibilities for their own reconstruction activities.

On slide three, is a quick snapshot of the major infrastructure projects around the country, including both electrical and road construction projects. I think this illustrates two things. Number one, as we understand the criticality of this physical infrastructure reconstruction to bringing stability to Afghanistan—and we are doing a lot of work around the country. The total roadwork right now would stretch from Washington to Tulsa, Oklahoma.

But you can also see from this slide that there is an awfully lot of the country that isn’t spoken for yet. We are trying to get some of our other allies involved in the infrastructure area. But there is a lot going on, a lot more work to be done in physical infrastructure.

Slide four gives a couple snapshots of road construction activities in Afghanistan. There is very extensive infrastructure work going on. And as I say here, roughly 75 percent of the employees working on the Kandahar Highway, for example, are Afghans themselves. We are trying to bring the Afghan ministries and the Afghan construction firms into this so that we leave something behind.

This work—and again, I know some of you have seen some of these highways—to build the Kabul to Kandahar Highway, we literally trucked blacktop asphalt from Pakistan, a truckload at a time, over the Khyber Pass.

If you can imagine a road construction project where you travel truckloads at a time, dump a load of asphalt, then the truck turns around and drives back over the Khyber Pass to Pakistan to get another truckload, this is the kind of construction difficulties we are facing.

Yes, sir?

Mr. SAXTON [presiding]. Could I just interrupt you for just a moment——

Mr. KUNDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SAXTON [continuing]. To inform my friends on the committee. This is a single vote. Mr. McHugh has gone to vote. He will be back. When he comes back, I will go vote. So you all go, make up your own mind when you want to vote during this next 20 minutes or so. But we are going to keep going.

Mr. KUNDER. Should I continue, sir?

Mr. SAXTON. Yes.

Mr. KUNDER. Slide five gives a snapshot of the schools and health clinics we are building in Afghanistan.

Again, we try to illustrate two things: one, we are trying to cover the whole country but, second, there are enormous needs and enormous gaps.

And slide six shows a typical school construction project, either schools that had deteriorated over the last 23 years of violence or schools that had been destroyed in the fighting. On the left are the schools before and on the right are the schools afterwards.

Slide number seven shows our part in the battle against opium poppy cultivation. What we are trying to do is develop what we call the alternative livelihoods, that is to say, a better chance at a better living without growing poppies. I think members of the commit-
there are familiar with these statistics, but wheat is the primary grain crop in Afghanistan. Depending on the price for opium, a farmer can earn somewhere between 10 to 30 times growing poppy what he can earn growing wheat—10 to 30 times. So that the problem is what kinds of alternative livelihoods can we develop—grapes, spices, almonds—where a farmer can get a decent return on investment.

Slide eight shows the kinds of programs we are working on to battle opium poppy cultivation. We are doing—in the left-hand side you see some workers working on an irrigation canal. We do short-term work like this so farmers can get back to work without engaging in opium poppy growing. And then on the lower right, you see a grape field. And this is the kind of long-term economic opportunities we are trying to work on.

Slide nine talks about what we are really trying to get at and that is building a long-term Afghan economy. The economy was so devastated during the years of the civil war that what we have got to do is rebuild the financial sector. We have got to create an investment regime that brings in private sector investment. And we are having some success. The photo on the right shows a sugar manufacturing facility in one of the new industrial parks we are building in Afghanistan.

Slide ten attempts to answer for the committee a question I often get, which is, is the reconstruction effort being slowed down by violence in the country, by the increased violence that General Eikenberry was talking about.

The top three slides show cumulative progress in paving roads, putting farmers back to work and building schools and clinics. And you can see the trend line continues up. We are able to continue progress in these critical reconstruction areas.

The bottom slide, though, shows our casualties. These are civilian casualties primarily Afghans themselves who were involved in the reconstruction effort. On the left are security personnel, many of them Afghan guards, guarding highways, for example. And on the right are primarily international reconstruction workers.

So we are taking casualties. But we are able to continue the reconstruction work.

And finally, slide number 11 shows some of the benchmarks of reconstruction thus far. I would simply—this is for the members to look through at their leisure—but I would point out bullet number five, domestic revenues increasing, again, recognizing that foreign aid is not going to last forever in Afghanistan.

And one of the things we have been focusing on is getting the Afghans to raise their own revenues. Most of the domestic revenues are from border crossings, from customs duties. Those customs posts were previously controlled by warlords. And what we have managed to do, as a U.S. Government team, is push that more and more to the central government.

So now, the Afghan government, President Karzai, is raising $260 million a year of his own money to spend on reconstruction. And of course, we hope that number goes up considerably.

Mr. Chairman, this is a snapshot of the kinds of reconstruction activities we are doing in Afghanistan.

I am pleased to answer any questions the committee has.
Mr. SAXTON. Let me just thank each of you for what I interpret as a very realistic picture of what is going on in Afghanistan.

The initial phase of the war on terror, at least the offensive phase that we put into effect was, of course, Afghanistan. In the years since October 2001, it has become fairly evident that this is a long war. And I think that it would be fair to characterize your very open testimony this morning as evidence that we have concluded that this is a long war.

We have economic issues, cultural issues, societal issues, security issues, among other issues to deal with in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Let me just ask you for your assessment of progress that we might expect to see going forward.

And I would ask you, I guess in this vein—concerned is the wrong word—but an outlook which realistically assesses what we might be expecting to see in the years ahead, particularly in Afghanistan, and each of the sectors that you have talked about.

Let's just start with Ms. Tandy and move across. Just give us your objective view of what we expect going forward.

Ms. TANDY. On the counternarcotics front, I think that we are well under way in building the capacity for the National Interdiction Unit in Afghanistan both to grow beyond Kabul and move to forward positions in the country. As well as their capacity to actually go after and dismantle these principle trafficking organizations.

The DEA piece of that, I would anticipate with the supply of the helicopters that are coming from DOD to give DEA greater mobility and reach in the country to some principle provinces where we have been unable to go that are key areas for us in the way ahead in fighting counternarcotics.

Mr. MCHUGH [presiding]. Thank you. I am sure I asked a brilliant question, but I wasn’t the one that asked it. [Laughter.]

I hope someone has explained to our distinguished panelists the process here. And we appreciate your understanding and patience.

This is a hard choice, but I think I will deal with——

Ms. TANDY. Do you want the rest of the panel to comment?

Mr. MCHUGH. Oh, I am sorry. The rest of the panel is going to answer that question. Well, see I stepped in over my pay grade.

Ms. Long.

Ms. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From a broad perspective, the national assembly just ended its first session, having been elected last September, just last week, or two weeks ago, I guess, it would be now on June 5th. And they actually accomplished a tremendous amount in a very short period of time. And we went through some of those accomplishments with you.

I think it is fair to expect in the next year that the national assembly and the ministries will be concentrating on building their ministerial capacity from a central government point of view, in particular, that they will be building their capacity to reach to out into the provinces and into the districts.

It has been a long process in establishing the concept, which is working and has been favorably blessed by the Afghan people, the
idea of a central government. And I think in the next years you will see an effort to stabilize that, to build that capacity, and to reach out into the province and district level in order to promulgate that governance and to build the institution's ability to reach out.

Corresponding with that, we need a justice sector to reach out to the provinces and the districts, and a policing capability that corresponds with that, as well as economic development that reaches not only out from Kabul but that is seen and felt by individual Afghans in villages and provinces.

I think all that is very realistic to see in the next years, particularly as NATO steps up to assume assisting the Afghans in stabilizing the various provinces where they will be occupying PRTs and providing other assistance.

I also think it is realistic to see Afghanistan come into its own as a regional player. They are already reaching out to their neighbors. And we should expect that. And that we should look variably upon that. This is a sovereign government that deserves all of our support.

I think that we also need, as a final comment, to play our role in helping the international community not only from a security perspective but particularly from an economic development perspective to assist Afghanistan in developing the capacities that I just outlined.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much.

General.

General EIKENBERRY. Sir, for success in Afghanistan, long-term success, all of us, the international community, the United States, the Afghan people, we are going to need patience and perseverance to prevail there.

I do use the metaphor of what we call the middle ground. I said that in my opening remarks to try to explain what we are accomplishing there. When I talk to my soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, we use that metaphor of middle ground. If I could just explain that, it helps us, I think, to all identify then what are the key tasks that have to be accomplished.

Afghanistan, after 30 years of very brutal civil war and war among themselves, they have given up what we call the middle ground in civil society. All of us, right here in Washington, D.C., we stand on middle ground that we take for granted.

That middle ground in civil society is access to law enforcement if there is a threat against us. It is access to a reasonable justice system if we are threatened. It is reasonable access to health care and to education for our children, in all domains, reasonable access to different services and protection.

The Afghans, over the last 30 years, they have had their middle ground taken away from them from a war against the Soviets, war among themselves and most recently war against a very brutal Taliban regime. And so in the absence of that middle ground, international terrorism then is able to get a foothold in places like Afghanistan.

What we succeeded in doing in 2001, 2002, is toppling the al Qaeda Taliban regime. But now, our harder task at hand is to try to help the Afghan people rebuild that middle ground.
So in my own remarks, I talked about the building of security forces. And we have had, from Ms. Tandy, a discussion of what has to be done in the domain of counternarcotics, from Mr. Kunder, the building and reconstruction. All of that coming together to help create this middle ground for the Afghan people.

Now, our military role is—if we use the metaphor of middle ground, our military role is to try to provide a security perimeter behind which the Afghan people then can build this middle ground themselves with our assistance.

Over time, our expectation is, our aspiration is, and the Afghan people’s aspiration is that that security perimeter goes from us maintaining it to the Afghan national army, the Afghan national police.

I am optimistic with the progress that we are making on the ground with the Army, and increasingly now with the police program that is being delivered, that the Afghans will be able to take charge of their own security.

But the larger effort, the more sustained effort, has to be in to building that middle ground of the Afghan civil society.

If you ask me, Chairman, the question right now, would I prefer to have another infantry battalion on the ground of 600 U.S. soldiers or would I prefer to have $50 million for roads, I would say the answer is I would prefer to have $50 million for roads. Because that is what is needed right now to get the economy of Afghanistan moving forward, which ties then into the security of the Afghan people.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, General.

Mr. Kunder.

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, sir.

To answer the question what does the future hold, you have to start with where are we now.

And I am glad the chairman mentioned earlier that Afghanistan was one of the poorest places on the face of the Earth before 23 years of war—one of the poorest places before 23 years of war.

So that where we are starting from—it is not a question of we had a going concern and then it was destroyed in fighting so we just restore the going concern. This was a place by any social economic measurement you could dream up, literacy rates, infant mortality rates, was one of the dead last countries on the face of the Earth. So patience and perseverance, as General Eikenberry said, are the key words.

Right now, the data are that probably about one in four Afghan children die before the age of five. Twenty-five percent of the children die before the age of five.

To move such numbers, to make the kind of systematic change that requires this to be a going concern requires time based on our experience in a lot of other countries in the world where we have had success improving the education rates, the health care rates.

There are no silver bullets. There are no quick fixes. The reason those children of dying has a whole bunch to do with the healthcare system, nutritional practices, lack of access to clean water. And those things do not change over night. So I am very optimistic for the long term in terms of turning those kinds of numbers around, but only if we think in the long term.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you all very much, gentlemen.
Mr. Tyler. Gene. Taylor. I said Tyler.
Mr. Taylor. Mississippi.
Mr. McHugh. Tyler comes next.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our panel for being here, particularly you, general.
You have all got tough jobs. No one wants to see our Nation fail. But I don’t think we do ourselves any favors when we mislead the public. And particularly, Ms. Tandy, you know, your oral statements are very upbeat; your written statements are not.
The idea that somehow an additional eight helicopters rushing surplus at that is going to make a difference that would stretch from New Orleans to Washington, D.C., and then throw in 11,000- to 13,000-foot-tall mountains; a country that produced over 4,000 metric tons of heroin last year; a country that has had skyrocketing heroin production. Again, I think we are a little bit smarter than that.
Since I have never had the opportunity to speak to you, you know, we have got a dysfunctional drug policy. We are spending a fortune down in Columbia to pay DynCorp, very brave people, to fly crop dusters, spraying Roundup and other chemicals, herbicides on the poppies and on the coca down there. We are paying other guys to protect them, flying around in Hueys as gun ships to keep them from getting shot down. We are spending probably $1 billion a year down there between all the different sources.
We are spending a lot of money apparently in Afghanistan as opium has skyrocketed. The only thing the Taliban did right was shut down opium production.
And I want to pose this question to the lieutenant general in a moment. If we got serious about shutting down the drug trade, it is my opinion those guys would turn on us. And we would have a situation on our hands that even the Russians would find worse than what they saw.
And in particular, Ms. Tandy, what I think—I would hope you would admit the drug problem in America isn’t heroin from Afghanistan. It is not cocaine from Columbia. It is methamphetamines made in people’s backyards in rural Mississippi, in rural Alabama, maybe even in rural New York, for all I know.
And so again, I just see this dysfunctional system where there is always the silver bullet whether it is the 20 Blackhawks that we sent to the Columbians and now the 8 helicopters we are going to send to Afghanistan. Somehow trying to make the American people think this is going to make a difference when it really doesn’t.
And believe me, I am not a proponent of drugs. I think we ought to have mandatory drug testing for every single Federal employee, maybe starting with you and I after reading your testimony.
So my question is for the record. I have had a reporter that I consider to be a credible source tell me that that reporter—I am trying not to mention a sex—thinks that President Karzai or his family, but certainly members of his administration, profit from the drug trade.
Now, for the record, is that or is that not true, to the best of your knowledge?

Ms. TANDY. Mr. Taylor, I have, first of all——

Mr. TAYLOR. The second one, again, because the five-minute rule. I am sorry, my eyes are terrible. Mr. Canter—Kunder? Kunder, I am sorry. Mr. Kunder, what I would like to know—and again, I appreciate you trying to build roads in Afghanistan.

But based on what I have seen around the road, my frustration is, and I think the typical American’s frustration is, we think we are doing good things for the little guy in these countries, only to find out that time and time again the big recipient of the money is Halliburton, KBR, Bechtel, DynCorp, or someone like them.

So for the record, I would like to know, how much money are we spending with those four contractors or their subsidiaries in Afghanistan?

Mr. KUNDER. Sir, could you please repeat them again. I heard Halliburton, DynCorp?

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I don’t expect you to know this off the top of your head. But for the record, I would like that answer.

Mr. KUNDER. I will be glad to provide that information. I do not know them off the top of my head. Three of those companies USAID is not contracting with.

The only thing that I would add, sir, is that I know USAID doesn’t often testify before the House Armed Services Committee. But we have, in terms of our own American citizens running the U.S. foreign aid program around the world, about a re-enforced battalion, we have 2,100 employees, about 1,100 of whom are foreign service officers who deploy overseas.

And obviously, we don’t just go to the conflict—we don’t have a lot of folks in the conflict zones like Afghanistan and Iraq. We are also trying to go to the places where we hope we don’t have to send U.S. troops, Indonesia and places like that, Nigeria, Colombia, and so forth.

We rely on American contractors as our arms and legs, not just contractors, but nongovernment organizations, Save the Children, CARE, World Vision, and so forth. So the mechanism of using American contractors or American non-government organizations (NGOs) to get out on the ground and help immunize children or build schools is the way we put some arms and legs to the U.S. foreign aid program.

So I will be glad to get those numbers to you. But it is not that the money is going to them, sir. It is just that is how we do business because we only have 1,100 employees.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 101.]

Mr. TAYLOR. I appreciate you saying that. I also doubt that any of these people are in the business of charity based on the pathetic work at least one of those contractors did in south Mississippi in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.

Ms. Tandy, would you—we will start with you.

Ms. TANDY. In response to your question, we have no information that President Karzai has received funding support income from the drug trade in Afghanistan to be——
Mr. TAYLOR. His family or his administration?
Ms. TANDY. That is correct.
Mr. TAYLOR. Don’t know?
Ms. TANDY. To be sure, with a drug trade of this proportion, corruption follows that drug trade no matter what country it is in. And that is certainly true in Afghanistan. It is pervasive through the government, through the provincial governors and through other sectors in that country.
That is an obstacle that we deal with and deal effectively in the narrow sphere that we are operating there through what is essentially a vetted unit that we are working with that has been investigated, and we know are not corrupt because of the background that we have done on them and the daily work that we do with them.
So I also would like to respond to some of the comments that you made.
I am the author of my written testimony and my oral remarks this morning. Both of them accurately depict the counternarcotics frustrations, the obstacles, and the reason for hope in the future. I have never described the delivery of eight MI–18 helicopters as a silver bullet. But the DEA and the National Interdiction Unit have functioned quite well with some great and measurable success over the past year with very limited air mobility.
We have been confined to parts of Afghanistan as a result of that lack of air mobility that would have otherwise been daunting to anyone trying to deal with counternarcotics in that country.
Yet, we have achieved substantial success, not just in interdictions, although there is that. Not just in taking down hundreds of clandestine labs, although there is that. Not just in the first U.S. extradition and not just in the actual prosecutions, convictions and sentencing of narcotics traffickers who are significant in Afghanistan, although there is all of that.
And for DEA on the ground, we see a great deal of expanded opportunity with the support that we have been given by DOD with these helicopters along with the rest of the support that DOD has been and continues to provide us.
So if you detect optimism in my opening statement, that is accurate. We are looking at the way ahead. And we do see and sense that optimism from not just the delivery of helicopters but from the capacity-building that DEA has undertaken the leadership of with our future counterparts in Afghanistan and with the justice and policing systems that are now in place.
When we started a year ago, Mr. Taylor, we created this National Interdiction Unit of about 125 Afghans, some of whom did not have shoes. All of them had to be taught to tie their shoelaces when they got shoes. All of them had to be taught how to do a jumping jack.
We have started from that a year ago. So we have a great deal of reason to be optimistic about the future with our counternarcotics counterparts and the efforts that we are pursuing in Afghanistan.
Thank you.
Mr. SAXTON [presiding]. Thank you. Thank the gentleman from Mississippi.
The gentleman from——

Mr. TAYLOR. Wait. Mr. Chairman. Just for the heck of it—because I intentionally missed the vote to ask that question.

General, to the point of, if we crack down on drugs, would the warlords turn on us? And then, would you suddenly have a whole heck of a lot more enemies to be fighting? I mean, I would like your opinion on that.

General EIKENBERRY. Sir, the efforts to eradicate drugs in Afghanistan, of course, there is a balance that has to be maintained there.

And the threat that could come from a campaign in which—the efforts were being made in which the alternatives were not being given to farmers to have some other kind of livelihood that could be disrupted.

So I think that as the international community and the government of Afghanistan, they look at efforts of eradication—as there was a fairly comprehensive effort that was conducted this year in Helmand. It had challenges. But it was the largest scale effort taken to date. That was very much kept in mind. And there was some good lessons learned there.

But truly, yes, there is a balance.

You know, in terms of trying to provide the farmers of Afghanistan, the people of Afghanistan alternatives to poppy growing, there has to be a sustained effort to accomplish that.

You know, for instance, if you are down in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. And you are told not to grow poppy and here is a bag of wheat to plant in lieu of. Well, the question of the farmer might be where is the good irrigation system so I have got some water now for my field.

And if you provide him with an irrigation system, then the next question might be where is the road that allows me to take this wheat to market.

So it is complicated. Congressman, as you said, there is no silver bullet up there that is out there. It has to be a very broad-based approach. And I think that is what the international community, the United States and the Afghans are trying to deliver right now.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

We are going to move now to the gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. McHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let's see if we can get off a few of these here.

General, you mentioned in your written testimony, you spoke to it as well, the current end-strength of the police and army. You combined that figure at 66,000.

What is the goal? What are you shooting for for an end-strength to both of those?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, for the army, the current goal is 50,000.

However, we would like to look with the government of Afghanistan at a point next year to see if that number should go on and be built up to a figure of 70,000. Seventy thousand was the figure that, in 2002, that the international community, the United States
and the government of Afghanistan, in talking about the army, agreed to an army at that point not to exceed 70,000.

So set the build up to 50,000. We will take a look early next year to see if we should keep moving forward.

With regard to the police, the target right now is 62,000, sir.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you.

You heard Mr. Taylor’s comments about the size of Afghanistan. I have had the opportunity to go there a couple of times. I didn’t see much of it. But even what I saw was a lot, geographically.

I understand there were probably some small political considerations driving those numbers. But is that an even remotely reasonable figure to do what needs to be done, in terms of providing security in some reachable places? It may not be possible certainly everywhere.

General Eikenberry. Sir, we look with our Afghan partners at those numbers on a recurring basis.

Of course, what is not important ultimately is the numbers of the army. It is not the numbers of the police. It is what effects are they delivering.

As I had said earlier, Congressman, for instance, right now, if you were to ask me the question would it be more important to have a U.S. infantry battalion of 600 on the ground or $50 million for roads, we could deliver more security with $50 million of additional roads being put in.

So it is the overall context of the governance, the security forces and the economy that come together. And if you have an improvement in governance and an improvement in the economic livelihood of the people, that does deliver security.

Now, with that in mind, with regard to the army, I don’t know. As I said, as we look next year at what should be the ultimate size of the army, more important the numbers there for the effect the army delivers will be perhaps more mobility, more helicopter forces of their own, more firepower of their own.

With regard to the police, the number of 62,000, I think that could be a reasonable number. The police program right now is a bit behind that, of the delivery of the army program. The police program, a real comprehensive approach, did not begin until really last fall. And we are starting to see effects delivered.

But I am optimistic that that police force, when it is fully manned and equipped, which should be the late 2007–2008 period, that that will be transformational in terms of the security within the Afghan countryside.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you, sir.

Secretary Tandy, you mentioned in your written testimony about the drug flow patterns out of Afghanistan. You mentioned a number of different routes.

Assess for me the efforts in the cooperation, if any, of the Tajik government, also the Russian government, kind of two major destination points, if you will, of the product being grown in Afghanistan.

Ms. Tandy. First of all, with regard to the trafficking routes from Afghanistan, we have seen changes since 2004. We have seen a commensurate 15 percent drop in the movement of drugs from Pakistan and a 15 percent increase in the route through Central
Asia to the north. Part of that is, we believe, due to the expanding Russian market and use of drugs.

The border enforcement in Tajikistan has been an issue with the Russians phasing out of their presence on the border and enforcement activities of the Tajiks on the border, and other issues with Russian organized crime, along with Tajikistan organized crime. So that would be a draw for additional movement of drugs through Tajikistan.

What DEA is doing is establishing an office and presence in Dushanbe and actually working with the border patrol and our law enforcement counterparts in Tajikistan in the way that we do around the world, which is through secure sharing of intelligence and shared targeting of the organizations that are responsible for the great deal of the smuggling across that border, with the opium and heroin going out of Afghanistan and chemicals coming into Afghanistan.

Mr. SAXTON. I thank the gentleman——
Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. I thank the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KUNDER, as far as I am concerned, roads, roads, more roads, and I appreciate your emphasizing that.

The only thing I would say is, once you build a new road, there is nothing worse than having a wonderful new road, and the first year out realize it is covered with potholes. It is bad for morale. So I hope that we are building in some funding for you all to help keep those things maintained.

But roads, roads and more roads I think is a big key for Afghanistan.

Ms. TANDY, in your opening statement, you made mention of your 11,000 DEA employees. My experience with them is that you have a lot to be proud of amongst your 11,000 employees. As we are sitting here today, how many of those 11,000 employees of which you spoke, not contractors, are in Afghanistan right now?

Ms. TANDY. The actual numbers—I understand we will have a closed session following this. And I would like to give you the actual numbers of DEA's presence in that session.

I think it is public record of what the FAST team complement consists of. And for the FAST teams, each of the five task——

Dr. SNYDER. So the number of DEA employees in Afghanistan or wherever they are in the country is classified information? Or are you just choosing not to describe it here at this public session? Is that a classified number?

Ms. TANDY. It is sensitive information given——

Dr. SNYDER. All right. Thank you. Thank you.

Ms. TANDY [continuing]. The violence on the ground. I am happy to provide that information to you.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, General Eikenberry, I am a big fan of yours. And I appreciate the work you do in Afghanistan. I think you don't think we are doing enough to help you with what you are doing.

Mr. Chairman, if I might, General McCaffrey's trip report, dated June 3, 2006, from his trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, May 19
through 26 of this year, I would ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the record.

Mr. SAXTON. We can do that, without objection. Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 89.]

Dr. S NYDER. And as quickly as I can read, General Eikenberry, I want to read parts of it to you. And he has a lot of positive things about what is going on in Afghanistan. But this is looking ahead to where we need to go because we all want to have this thing get better.

He says—this is General McCaffrey—“In my view, there is little question the level of fighting has intensified rapidly in the past year. Three years ago the Taliban operated in squad-sized units. Last year, they operated in company-sized units of 100-plus men. This year, the Taliban are operating battalion-sized units of 400-plus men. “They now have excellent weapons, new IED technology, commercial communications gear and new field equipment. They are employing suicide bombers who are clearly not just foreigners. In many cases, they appear to have received excellent tactical camouflage and marksmanship training. They are very aggressive and smart in their tactics. Their base areas in Pakistan are secure. Drug money and international financial support has energized their operations.”

And anyway, that is part of his statement.

Then, with regard to the Afghan National Army, he has very positive things about their aggressiveness, their discipline, the training that you all have done.

But then, this is the part that I wanted to read because it involves us and where, I think, we are failing you: “The Afghan army is miserably under-resourced.” Again, this is General McCaffrey. “The Afghan army is miserably under-resourced. This is now a major morale forecaster for their soldiers. They have shoddy small arms, described by Minister of Defense Wardak as much worse than he had as a mujahedeen fighting the Soviets 20 years ago.

“Afghan field commanders told me they tried to seize weapons from the Taliban, who they believe are much better armed. The Afghan National Army reported AK–47s in such poor maintenance condition that rounds spin in the ground at 100 meters.

“Many soldiers and police have little ammunition, few magazines. The ANA units do not have mortars, few machine guns, no MT–19 grenade machine guns and no artillery. They have almost no helicopter or fixed-wing transport, or attack aviation now or planned.

“They have no body armor or blast glasses. They have no Kevlar helmets. They have no up-armored Humvees or light-armored tracked vehicles like the M113A3 with machine gun copulas and with slat armor. They need light-armored wheeled vehicles.

“There seem to be neither U.S. resources”—again, this is General McCaffrey’s opinion. “There seem to be neither U.S. resources nor political will to equip these ANA battalions to rapidly replace us as the first line counter-insurgency force.

“I strongly suggest that this army and police force should be 70,000 to 100,000 troops within 18 months, not an anemic force of
50,000 soldiers. We should fund this effort at $1.2 billion annually. And sustain it for ten years.”

That was billion—$1.2 billion.

“The force should be expanded to include 15 or more armed engineer battalions and medical battalions to work on the road, water, micropower”—parentheses, six percent of the country has electricity—“medical and security infrastructure requirements.

“This situation cries out for remedy. A well-equipped, disciplined, multi-ethnic, literate and trained Afghan National Army is our ticket to be fully out of the country in the year 2020.”

And that is the end of the quote. That is General McCaffrey’s.

Now, I have listened to the statements. And I had to keep myself—and I know these statements have to go through Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—but I had to keep myself from humming “Everything is Coming up Roses,” as some of these statements were read here today.

This is a different description.

Now, we have been in Afghanistan longer than we were in World War II. In World War II, in 3 1/2 years, we created 100 aircraft carriers, tens of thousands of planes, hundreds of thousands of vehicles.

And yet, we are asking our allies, the Afghan National Army, to creep along with equipment they are having to steal from the Taliban.

What do we need to help you, General Eikenberry?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, thank you.

I know General McCaffrey very well. And he said this—in my current command, this is the second time that he has visited us. And both of his visits were very helpful. And they provided a lot of insights for us. And I have read his report very carefully, which he sent to me when he concluded his trip to Afghanistan.

Sir, a couple points I would make about the Afghan national security forces.

First of all, the police, as I said, the police program is, let’s say, behind relative to that of the army. Although, right now, we are in a very robust equipping of the police forces. There is pay and rank reform that is going on. So the police force, I think, will see that start to take to the field in a more robust way here in the latter part of this year and then through 2007 and 2008.

You were talking about the army. I had the honor of serving in Afghanistan in 2002, 2003, where my main charter at that time as a major general was the building of the Afghan National Army.

Sir, it is important to remember the context here and to go back in time. In 2002, there was nothing there. There was no Afghan National Army. There was a dysfunctional Ministry of Defense. It was really grains of sand that we were building from.

Part of the challenge, of course, in trying to build what would be a values-based army, must be a values-based army that is founded upon discipline, respect for the rule of law, respect for the people, is leadership.

The leadership development of the Afghan National Army has been slow. And it couldn’t be any other way when we look back over the 30 years of chaos. Two generations of people without edu-
cation, 20 percent literacy rates within that country. So the development of leadership has been a slow process.

If you were to ask me in 2002, should this army get up-armored Humvees, for instance, should they get more sophisticated weapons? My answer at that time, and still today looking back, was correctly no, they should not. Because, Congressman, they would not have been able to maintain it.

We have reached a point here in 2006 where this army is becoming resilient. It has a good ministry of defense. Minister Wardak is a great minister of defense. It has a good general staff. We are starting to build the whole army right now, in terms of what we call sustaining institutions: not just riflemen on the ground but maintenance facilities and maintenance organizations that can maintain equipment behind those soldiers, personnel systems, military justice systems. This force, at this point in time, has become a much more resilient force than it was in 2002. They believe in themselves. They are fighting well side by side with us.

I would say with regard to the critique of equipment that, Congressman, it is not NATO-U.S.-standard equipment, but the Afghan army fighting side by side with us, we will not have combat formations of the Afghan National Army that are fighting side by side with us with broken weapons.

The Afghan National Army, the AK–47s, its equipment that it has, as I said, it is not 21st-century technology, but it is functional equipment. And we make sure of that.

There are challenges in terms of the distribution of ammunition. There are challenges within some units of maintenance. But we are after that.

To get to your point though, to the future of the Afghan National Army, Congressman, I do believe that it is now time, based upon the performance of this Afghan National Army, the resilience they have, their capability now of taking on higher levels of equipment and maybe most importantly the evolution of the threat, which is a different threat than the army faced in 2002, it is indeed time to look at improving the equipment, the mobility of this Afghan National Army.

We have taken some steps. For instance, we are already in the process of procuring and delivering new improved Kevlar helmets, the individual body armor, which you mentioned, what General McCaffrey addressed. We are in the process right now of getting protected Humvees and purchasing those for some of the commando units of the Afghan National Army.

But my sense is that we are going to have to look now very carefully at more important upgrades and more comprehensive upgrades of this force, mobility, fire power, other enhancements. They can maintain it at this point. They can effectively use it.

But here I would say that it should not just be a U.S. effort. With the NATO ISAF expansion that is occurring, the NATO expansion of the mission in Afghanistan, I think that we should be looking to our NATO colleagues and our NATO allies, that is, to stand up and also help us out with this equipping of a more higher level for the Afghan National Army.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General.
My time is up. But, you know, four and a half years you say it is time to start looking at this. I mean, I know that Chairman Hunter will be very supportive of any information you can give us where the Congress can help you supply these folks you are training.

Well, we can't help you if we don't know what is going on. And, man, it was tough reading these written statements to figure out where the problems are today. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. SKELTON. I appreciate that—Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri had a brief point to make.

Mr. SKELTON. I——

The CHAIRMAN. But let me just announce we have got a 15-minute vote, I think, a motion to adjourn. My intent is to keep the hearing going. So the folks leave, your position will be honored when you come back. And it will be Mr. Skelton for a brief point. And then, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. SKELTON. In answering Dr. Snyder's question, may I suggest in either a classified or unclassified manner after some consideration and thought on your behalf, would you be kind enough to recommend to us what you need in so far as assisting the Afghan army, whether it should come from us, whether it should come from NATO or whatever the case may be.

I think it will be very, very helpful because that is the way this committee works. We look at things that are necessary.

And if you would do that within the foreseeable future, I think that would be a bit better answer for Dr. Snyder as well as the entire committee.

Thank you.

General EIKENBERRY. Yes, sir. I would be happy to do that if you wish during the closed session, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that would be good.

The gentleman from Michigan, Dr. Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Kunder, we spoke before the hearing a little bit about the lack of public health facility, any sort of public health infrastructure in Afghanistan. People who have been in Afghanistan and people who are in Afghanistan now have come in to speak to me, as a physician Member of Congress, much like Dr. Snyder, about the fact that infrastructure doesn't exist.

And this is a place where I believe that the Congress should be aware. And the Congress should be instructed by people like yourselves and the folks that you have in Afghanistan, that General Eikenberry has in Afghanistan, about what we need to do in regard to setting up some sort of public health infrastructure.

Because literally it doesn't exist, whether it is immunizations, whether it is prenatal and peri-natal and post-natal care both for infants and mothers. The maternal mortality rate is the highest in the world, as you know, somewhere in the 15 percent to 20 percent range. That is maternal mortality rate. So, yes, I know it is a terribly difficult environment. The farther away from Kabul you get, the more difficult it is.

But could you just, kind of, free associate on this issue for me, perhaps General Eikenberry as well, and let us know what you
think we could do? What we need to do to establish some sort of—I don't want to say health care system because it won't be that sophisticated—but some sort of public health structure in Afghanistan?

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, sir.

We measure maternal mortality in terms of hundred thousands of live births. Our data indicates that the rate of maternal mortality is about 1,600 per 100,000 live births. Given the fact that the average Afghan woman has more than six children over her lifetime, simple math would indicate you have about a one in ten chance of the mother dying during childbirth in Afghanistan. So the numbers might be a little bit different. But it is an astonishing high number, the worse in the world by far. So we take the issue quite seriously.

And I appreciate your asking the question the way you did. Because it is a question of building a system. We are working with the Ministry of Public Health so that they can start taking care of some of their own problems. As General Eikenberry said earlier, we have got some very highly qualified and trained people within the Afghan government, just not enough of them.

Dr. SCHWARZ. We are talking about the diseases of antiquity here.

Mr. KUNDER. Yes.

Dr. SCHWARZ. It is unbelievable. So I am most interested to hear what you have to say.

Mr. KUNDER. And of course, improved living conditions is directly related to security and reconstructing this country and ending the insurgent threat in the countryside. So we take this very, very seriously.

We are trying to do two things to provide some kind of immediate relief.

First is we are trying to train birth attendants, midwives, if you will. Since the U.S. forces first arrived, since the U.S. Government reestablished its embassy there, the number of births in Afghanistan attended by trained midwives has doubled, but only up to about 25 percent. So in the mostly isolated rural areas, this is still—you know, in the home birth situation with perhaps a neighbor or family member attending.

The second thing we have been trying to do is—our goal is to establish at least a basic health clinic within two hours' walk of each village. Now, we are not there yet. We have built hundreds of such centers. Of course, the road construction is critical. Because if you have got the road infrastructure, someone can hire a taxi and if it is a complicated birth, get the woman to at least a regional health-care facility.

So we are moving forward. I mean, as Dr. Snyder said, this is a difficult question to ask folks like myself because this is an Administration budget request. And we realize there are many competing priorities, including in our country with Hurricane Katrina and so forth.

If you ask my staff in the field, or I think General Eikenberry, or any of our staff, can you use more money? You know, our folks are very dedicated. The answer is always going to be yes, we can use a lot more money.
Part of the answer is to get other international donors, like the U.N. agencies like United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), some of the other bilateral donors, engage the World Bank, engage so that the U.S. taxpayers are not paying it all.

And part of the answer, as I said earlier in my testimony, is to raise Afghan government revenues so it is not just dependent on handouts internationally.

But to answer your basic questions, there is a lot more that can be done. These are desperate numbers in terms of human suffering. And they aren’t going to be turned around at our current resource levels any where in the near future.

Congressman, if I could——

Dr. SCHWARZ. If you please, General.

General EIKENBERRY. I would make two points on the health care. And this goes back to Congressman Snyder and talking about roads and roads. You know, last year, I was driving in the Panjshir Valley of Afghanistan about, oh, 75 miles northeast of Kabul, and riding down this narrow valley road, which runs through the center of the province, a road completely beat up. We were with a four-wheel drive.

And I was with the chief of the general staff of the Afghan army, General Bismullah Khan, who hails from that province. We stopped and saw a young boy walking by who the general recognized. And I got out with my interpreter and asked him where he was going. And he said, “I am walking to school.” And I said, “How far is that?” And he pointed and said, “About two hours in that direction.”

We got into a good discussion with General Bismullah Khan about the importance of the infrastructure. Then, two hours, two hours back, four hours for school, how hard for the pregnant woman then to get to the clinic when she needs to be there.

So the amount of effort that we have got to put into the infrastructure right now, it is the backbone I think for the social services for Afghanistan, which I see as vital to improving security.

Congressman, the other thing I would say on the health-care side is that, as we talked about the weapons of the Afghan National Army, I would say that behind those most visible manifestations of the Afghan National Army, there are a lot of great things that are going on for this army in terms of building what we can the sustaining institutions.

Health care is a primary example. The Afghan National Army hospital in Kabul is the best hospital that the Afghans have. And there are regional hospitals that are being built.

And from those points of excellence, I think that we will see a transfer of those skills and that excellence to the civilian sector as well.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you. My time has expired. And I do look forward to discussing this with you at greater length. I think this is some place we can really help. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being before us today.
Obviously, I am one of those people who voted to go into Afghanistan. And I am very interested to make sure that we do the right thing there and stand by those people and get that country up and going.

The last time I was in Afghanistan, I had the chance to talk to President Karzai. And I read to him a paragraph out of a *Newsweek* article that basically said that he is the mayor of Kabul and that basically it doesn’t get to go around the country and he—because we don’t have control of the rest of the country.

And in reading a lot of the reports recently about the insurgency and the warlords coming back and the individual militias and everything, it has become even more apparent that we don’t have much control of the rest of that nation.

My question is, you know, we have put a lot of stake in this with respect to President Karzai. And there are recent reports, *The Washington Post* on June 26th talked about this leader losing support, for example. And, you know, it talks about his asking for more help to build his nation’s security forces, that he is not getting enough from the allies.

So I have several questions. The first question is, is Karzai getting around? Or is he really stuck in the capital right now? How is the general mood out there with respect to his leadership? Because it is not the only article. There have been several articles about his losing—you know, people being disillusioned and now turning maybe back to the warlords or, in particular, maybe to the Taliban.

The second question I have, another article from the Post said late last night a riot in Kabul, which protesters attacked foreign facilities for hours, as police vanished from the streets. And it raises concerns among many people here that the government is too weak to protect even the capital.

Can you talk about—I think Mr. Snyder brought up something that was very important, that is the outfitting and making sure the people have the right equipment. But this is the first instance that I have heard of the security forces that were helping to train sort of moving out of the way and really not going into battle, if you will. And can you comment on that?

And last, about two months ago, I was in Brussels. And I was speaking to NATO Commander Jim Jones. And he was telling me that actually our military was doing a great job in Afghanistan and listing one thing after another of what we had done correctly. And he seemed to indicate that other pieces of the NATO forces there, people who were supposed to be taking care of the poppy situation, institution building, he rattled off probably about six different things. I am sure you have heard him talk about it.

And he said, you know, and two or three are doing well, in particular, with our military. But there doesn’t seem to be any progress made or we are moving backwards in respect to the whole issue of drugs, the whole issues or institution building. Can you comment on that? And I would like to hear across the spectrum on these three questions.

General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, the first question you had was with regard to President Karzai and does he travel in Afghanistan. Yes, he does travel in Afghanistan. He is out every several
weeks. Just last week, he made a very good trip up to Pol-e Khormi, north of the Hindu Kush, to one of the provinces up there.

Indeed, in some instances, the U.S. coalition and NATO ISAF do help for making arrangements for those moves. Because there is a lot of—although, increasingly, the Afghan army and their own forces are taking the lead there.

Second, you had mentioned the Afghan national police and their performance during the Kabul riots. I would say that the national army performed brilliantly during those riots. There were indeed problems with the performance of the police. Congresswoman, I had noted earlier that the reform of the Afghan national police program is somewhat behind that of the army. But it is under way right now.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I did notice that you said that. And I wanted to ask you, what does that mean? And what does it look for?

And I am worried that really the only police we really currently are trying to stand up would be in the capital. I mean, considering the insurgency going on in other places, I would assume we are using troops versus civil police, for example.

General EIKENBERRY. No, there is actually, Congresswoman, there is a very robust program that is throughout the entire country of Afghanistan. When I say the police program is behind, the program was initiated, the reform of the police, or the training of the police, was initiated back in 2002. It was a very heavily training focus. But it was last year, last fall of 2005, that there was a comprehensive program that was put together and very much the United States government involved in that program.

And that is a program that has pay and rank reform for the police forces, beginning at the very top in this reform process, now working its way down through the ranks. Critical piece, because leadership is essential.

I talked about a values-based organization being the army, the police, exactly the same. In the end of the day, it is about values for the police force, their discipline, their loyalty to the state.

And so there is a good reform program beginning right now where leaders, beginning at the most senior levels, are competing for positions, being vetted and working its way down through the ranks. There is pay reform, as I had said, rank reform. There is a comprehensive equipping program that is under way. There is the delivery of communications equipment. There is the delivery of vehicles.

Very importantly, there is a very robust mentoring program for this police force. But there is regional training centers found throughout the country of Afghanistan. And police forces are being delivered throughout all the major regions. So it goes far beyond Kabul. Not, at the same time though, this program will take 6 months, 12 months, 18 months to deliver more effective reforms down through the ranks.

I think that what the Ministry of the Interior experienced during the Kabul police riots, it is fair to say that they have identified some very significant shortcomings in terms of the communications systems, in terms of the reliability of the force. But they are working very hard on that. We are providing them with support. I am
optimistic over the coming year that those problems will be addressed.

The final question you had was with regard to NATO and talking to General Jones, who I talk to frequently as this transition continues.

And I think that not talking about what has been accomplished or not been accomplished, but talking about what NATO ISAF will bring with this expansion of the mission for NATO, I think that they are going to be able to deliver a lot of—they are going to be very effective in improving this security environment and improving reconstruction in the areas that they are going into.

Let me give an example in Helmand province, southern Afghanistan. In Helmand province, the United States presence in Helmand province was about a 100-person soldier, civil affairs team that was there with a provincial reconstruction team. And we had about 50 special forces. The British now, the British army is moving into Helmand versus our 50 special forces, they will have 3,500 British Army. Their provincial reconstruction team, I expect, will be delivering about three times the amount of reconstruction funds that we were delivering through our own provincial reconstruction team.

So many of the things that General Jones is talking about, I think that the NATO ISAF transition, as it brings in more presence of international military forces, more capability of training with the Afghani National Security Forces, the army and the police, more reconstruction funds, will be exactly what is needed for us now to continue to advance the progress of Afghanistan.

Ms. Long. Great. Congresswoman, I have very little to add to what General Eikenberry has said, just two data points for you.

I spoke to a number of Afghan parliamentarians about the Kabul riots. And they shared your concern. But one of the things that we should note is that President Karzai made some changes within the police structure immediately following that incident in order to deal with some of the communications and other issues. So moving forward, measures have been taken to at least hopefully eliminate, if not mitigate some of the issues with the police as they performed in that situation.

Importantly, the parliamentarians that I spoke to thought that at least as much of the problem was the result of unrealistic expectations and frustrations by the population in where the incident took place. And they actually took upon it themselves to go back to the constituencies and explain better how to react and what exactly happens in those kinds of incidences. And I thought that was instructive.

On the lead nation concept, that perhaps was the conversation between General Jones and yourself, as you know, the post-bond structure had many good attributes to it, in that it assigned nations certain responsibilities. And that occurred over a number of years. I think it would be fair say that it had very many positive things and did some real good.

We also noticed that there were some gaps and some deficiencies. In January and February, there was a meeting in London where the Afghan Compact was constructed. And one of the things that happened in that process was to take a look at the lead nations and try to figure out what the weaknesses were.
And one of the weaknesses that was identified was there was really no ability to track or monitor how certain nations or NGOs or certain progresses being made in sectors. And what they came up with was a joint coordination and monitoring board that will meet in Kabul and actually includes the Afghans.

And what the board has been apt to do is sort of oversee, monitor and interact with either the countries, the NATO members, the multi-laterals, the NGOs that have undertaken these responsibilities in order to tweak them as things progress, if they aren't progressing in the manner that the Afghans need, or to readjust as we go along.

So progress has been made.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And when was that board put in place?

Ms. LONG. It was discussed at the January-February London conference for the Afghan Compact. I don't know if the board has actually met yet. We can get that information for you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 101.]

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes. I would appreciate that, because my discussion was more recent with General Jones.

Mr. KUNDER. Ms. Sanchez, just very briefly on this question of the writ of the Afghan government reaching, undercutting the site. I mean, it is a serious problem because the government system had broken down during the 23 years of warfare.

But just very briefly, we recognize this problem. And in terms of addressing it, we are building regional government centers, regional judicial facilities.

I mentioned during earlier testimony that the customs border post along the Afghan border, which were under the control of regional commanders, warlords, at the beginning of this government, are now under control of the Afghan government and putting revenues into the central treasury.

At the beginning of the Karzai administration, the president couldn't even speak by radio to regional governors. We now have a good telecommunications system. And of course, the parliament is functioning, which also is part of national integration.

So I would just say that, while there are still profound problems because of the breakdown in the physical infrastructure and the institutional infrastructure, there are a number of efforts going on with U.S. taxpayer support to make sure that this government is fully integrated.

We are not there yet. But a lot of progress has been made.

Ms. TANDY. Mr. Chairman, I would just add roads, roads, roads. I have been there. I think it is definitely a way to connect a lot of this country.

Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, may I follow through on one of the gentlelady's thoughts? Are we still having AWOL problems and problems when the army is getting paid and then disappearing for a couple of weeks before they come back?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, the rate of absenteeism over the past year has dropped appreciably. We now have an absentee rate. On the average it varies from unit to unit because it is very
leadership-dependent. But in the main, Congressman, it is about 10 percent.

The absentee rate of the Afghan National Army will always remain higher than it is within our army, than it is within the western armies. There are cultural issues that are there, as well as it is going to be many, many more years before we get the ATM devices installed. So there is a desire of Afghan soldiers to get home and deliver their pay.

Although we are coming up, working with the ministry of defense—we actually have come up with some pretty good systems that taken into account the reality of the absence of a national banking system. And those rates are going down. But really, Congressman, the important factor is, I think, the improvement of leadership of the Afghan National Army.

One other thing point I would make here as well in terms of the popularity of service within the Afghan National Army, also important two indicators of it. First of all, the retention rates. Now that the Afghan national army is a little bit over four years old, the three-year enlistment contracts of the forces that started to be built in 2002, those are coming to an end. The retention rates are about 30-percent-plus. That is very impressive.

Additionally, the recruiting stations for the Afghan National Army has got their recruits lined up, not a problem to get young men to join the Afghan National Army.

Back to your point about the rate of absenteeism, come down significantly. We would like to see it go lower.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I am glad that all of you are here. And I am very sorry that we have had such a disruptive meeting.

I have not been to Afghanistan. I have been to Iraq. So this is very important to me to hear what is taking place there.

My first question is, what is Pakistan doing? Are they a full-fledged partner with us, or does it just sound like they are?

General.

General EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, several points about Pakistan. First of all, in the war on terror, Pakistan's army has had more casualties over the past year in fighting insurgents, in fighting extremists. They have had more casualties, more killed in action than our coalition forces or the Afghan National Army has had in Afghanistan.

The second point is the amount of al Qaeda that Pakistan's authority, law enforcement and their army has arrested, killed, captured over the last several years is the highest of any nation.

We have worked very hard with Pakistan over the last several years to improve—when I say "we" now, the coalition, the Afghan military, ourselves have worked very hard with the Pakistan military to improve the amount of tactical coordination that we have along the border.

And the level of cooperation, collaboration that we have in the border area where this enemy crosses back and forth, is about as good as it has ever been. It has vastly improved over the last year.
We also have much work that we are doing in terms of facilitation of the Afghan National Army and the Pakistan army to try to increase mutual confidence between the two sides. That is more of a long-term effort. Captured by history, captured by geography, there is a tremendous amount of mistrust between the two sides. We are making progress in that area.

Having said all of that though, Congresswoman, the fact remains that we are up against an enemy that is able to operate very effectively on both sides of the border.

The leadership of these international terrorist groups and the Taliban, their associated movements, able to operate on both sides of the border, there are areas that they are able to stay within and to direct combat operations against ourselves and against the Afghan National Army.

So this is a long-term problem that we are facing.

We are taking, I think, good measures, as I said, to improve the tactical cooperation. But the fact is that the very senior leadership of the Taliban remains a very elusive target.

Mrs. Drake. Mr. Chairman, just to follow up with that, because I have heard from some of our special ops guys that, when one of the terrorists that they are chasing goes into Pakistan, they can’t continue to pursue. Is that true or untrue?

General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, we take what means we need to for the protection of our forces.

Mrs. Drake. And just one last question, because on my second trip to Iraq, we had the opportunity to really see the Iraq security forces. And it was quite a presence. So I wonder if it is similar in Afghanistan.

You probably have different problems. You talked about the leadership. But if we are using a similar model that as those troops are better equipped and better trained if that will mean pulling forces out, similar to what we are doing in Iraq, and our plans to reduce troops as we have been doing?

General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, clearly the delivery of well-trained, equipped, and sustainable Afghan national army and police forces improves the security environment of Afghanistan. And there is a relationship between the improvement of their own security forces and not only our presence but the presence of NATO.

What I would say is that we talk about lines of operations and military campaigns, over the past several years, for our U.S. coalition forces—and I think our NATO partners share this—what we would say is our main line of operation in Afghanistan for our military forces is the standing up of capable, well-respected Afghan National Army and assisting in the efforts to stand up a well-training and capable Afghan national police.

Mrs. Drake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.

Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here and for your service.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. But I am somewhat disappointed. I think it was mentioned at the
beginning that the last time we focused in this intensity in Afghanistan was well over a year ago. And it seems to me that, if Afghanistan is our front line on the war against terror, that we probably should have been doing this all along.

And I certainly appreciate the fact that you all are here. I have been to Afghanistan on several occasions, with the chairman initially and then back. And I look forward to going again.

I do recall that our embassy officials were not able to move beyond the embassy. And I am hoping—I don't know—whether that situation has changed at all or not. You might be able to speak to that in a second.

I wanted to just take a slightly different tack and particularly, General Eikenberry, we focus so much on the Afghan National Army and, yet, there is some concern whether in fact we have disproportionately done that and put all of the bulk of our funding and, I think, the national army—I understand Afghanistan is spending about 90 percent of their revenues on the ANA.

Is that correct? Is that a correct statement?

General EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, I would have to get back to you with the exact numbers. But the Afghan state is making significant contributions now to the salaries of the Afghan National Army. And they are providing for other operation costs.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I guess my question would be, are we doing the same for the police?

If that is so important and it is so important to people on the ground, their sense of security so that Karzai does not have to necessarily engage the militias, I think, in being out in the countryside as well, where is that balance?

And do you feel that there have been some problems in focusing more on the army and certainly less on the police? Are we needing the level or security there that we are actually training the army to?

I just wanted to provide perhaps the devil's advocate on that and see if we could have a discussion.

General EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, with regard to how much the Afghan government is currently funding the army and the police, we will get back and provide you with that information.

You indicated that you will be visiting Afghanistan soon. And I assure you that you will be able to move freely around the Kabul area. And however much time that you spend in Afghanistan, perhaps a chance to get outside of Kabul and see some of the great work that the whole interagency team here, the Department of State, USAID, Department of Agriculture and your military are doing in a lot of—all over Afghanistan right now.

The police program, the police are critical to success in Afghanistan, of course. That is the front line where the intersection of the government with its presence and its security, that is a point of intersection with the civil society that I talked about, the middle ground.

And so it is critical that the police program be carried forward. The program that exists right now is a very comprehensive program, as I had indicated earlier. Actually, in many ways, it is modeled on the military program. It begins at the ministry of the interior at the high policy level and command and control level. It
takes cognizance of the need to develop training institutions, logistics institutions, personnel systems.

And then, very importantly, with regard to the operational police forces themselves, there is a very robust program of equipping and mentoring.

Relative to that of the army, that program is behind. I wish it was farther along. But the good news is that that program is now in full swing and will be delivering results.

But clearly, you need a good balance of upfront police forces at the law enforcement front. And importantly, they deliver——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is it a correct statement then to say currently that they are under-funded, and the police particularly?

General EIKENBERRY. Congresswoman, I would say that now they are adequately funded. We have a robust program that gets into the——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

General EIKENBERRY [continuing]. Pay——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

I wanted to ask one other quick question. And that was the ratio of the military and the PRTs to civilians. And does that include civilians that are part of NGOs? Or is it civilians that are part of our foreign ops, USAID. What is that ratio today? And what is the number or the proportion of people that speak Farsi?

General EIKENBERRY. We have, I think, a total of 12 provincial reconstruction teams led by the United States. The vast majority of the personnel at those provincial reconstruction teams are U.S. military.

Let’s say, on average, that a provincial reconstruction team with the security forces, the staff, the military leadership, civil affairs teams—let’s say that that is about 60 to 70 military. Within that team, there will generally be one Department of State representative. Sometimes there will be a Department of Agriculture representative. And in almost all cases, there will be a USAID representative——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you know how many Department of State individuals are there working in PRT teams throughout the country?

Mr. GASTRIGHT. Congresswoman, I am John Gastright with the Department of State.

There are 23 provincial reconstruction teams in the country. We have a State Department provincial reconstruction team individual at every one of those, the NATO as well as the coalition.

As far as the number of Farsi, we are actually in the process now of developing more Farsi speakers. It is a process where you have to have one person in training while one person is out in the field. I can get the exact numbers of those in the field currently. But the goal is to have them all capable of speaking either Farsi or Pashto depending on their location.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 101.]

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope not to replow already plowed ground.

Ms. Tandy, you mentioned that DEA has responsibility for drug infrastructure, and the state has responsibility for the growers or the poppy eradication. Does that present programs in terms of doing an effective job of eradicating the overall drug trade out of Afghanistan?

Do you work well with each other? Should things be different or they should stay the same?

Ms. Tandy. We work very closely with State Department INL, the NAF officers in Kabul. The division of labor is not an issue in terms of us carrying out our respective expertise. The funding for some of our efforts comes through the State Department INL. And it is a collaborative relationship.

Mr. CONAWAY. So you are satisfied that the eradication of the actual poppies themselves, that effort is as strong as it needs to be or——

Ms. Tandy. I would have to defer to the State Department on the eradication side since that is not what DEA does.

Mr. CONAWAY. I know but——

Ms. Tandy. But in terms of how eradication could impact DEA's operations, I would just say that, to the extent that there was prior hostility with some of the eradication efforts in the past, DEA could have encountered that in some of our missions. We did not. We were not the target of that hostility from eradication.

And I think there are a couple of reasons for that. One is people see us very differently from eradicators. We hit the ground with us on our National Interdiction Unit teams is always a mullah who seeks out the tribal elder on our mission deployments and describes to the tribal elder exactly what we are doing there.

And I would quickly add that what we have found on the ground is the opposite of hostility. What we have found is that the people on the ground are glad to see us there. They are glad to see us taking out these trafficking leaders. And we have had them applaud us. And then, had them direct us to point out other potential targets to us. So the issues that eradication have seen, those efforts have seen, are not issues that we have seen.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. But there is not a conflict or the efficiencies between the two agencies in terms of a concerted effort of eradicating the growing of poppy, which is a cash crop—and it is difficult to replace cash crops—versus the work that you are doing.

If you cut off the raw material, then the distribution chain dies on its own. So is it working well enough between the two agencies like that? Or should they do a better job?

Maybe the State Department guys need to talk about——

Mr. GASTRIGHT. I would be happy to, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. The eradication piece in terms of how well you work with DEA.

Ms. Tandy. I would defer to State.

But I would just like to add, in closing, that these efforts both go hand in hand. And what we are looking at, if history tells us anything, is some 10 to 20 years out to totally eliminate cultivation. So you are dealing with a need for companion enforcement ef-
forts along with the eradication efforts for a long term. And that is where we are invested.

Mr. GASTRIGH. Sir, I would just add that we recognize that the key to the counternarcotic strategy is five pillars working together.

There is a public information piece, which is informing the Afghan people that poppy is bad. Our data tell us that 92 percent of the Afghan people don't agree with growing poppy; they oppose it. And so that has actually been a very effective tool.

There is the elimination-eradication piece that you highlighted. And this year, we had a substantial improvement over last year's effort. This is the second year we have been operating. We expect to eradicate between 16,000 to 18,000 hectares. That is about 40,000 acres of opium.

And there are teams operating in 19 provinces. Some of those are central teams. But it was a substantial improvement. Still work to do; still ways to improve that effort; and we are going to continue to refine it. And again, an increased improved effort over the last year.

The interdiction piece that DEA is doing, a very key piece, a law enforcement and judicial reform effort so that we can actually prosecute those that the DEA arrests. And we have actually built a counternarcotics tribunal to streamline the arrest of those figures that are arrested. And then, finally, there is the piece that USAID does, alternative livelihoods.

We recognize that all five pillars of this process are absolutely essential. The strategy doesn't work if one of the pillars falls off.

And I would just comment that we recognize DEA's important role here. We thought so highly of their people that we stole away one their individuals, a gentleman named Doug Wankel. And he now heads the interagency effort in Kabul. We think so highly of him.

Mr. CONAWAY. I am not sure—they reset the clock, but just one last quick one.

How do we protect the fledgling judicial system from Colombia-like influences of corruption and intimidation and those kinds of things? How are they able to—or are they able to protect their new judicial system from undue influence by the money that is available in this drug trade?

Ms. TANDY. I can tell you from the Justice Department’s perspective, and then I would defer to state. A couple of things. First of all, these are hand-selected members of the judiciary and the prosecution staff. They have been trained, and they are being protected. That protection is essential to the justice process there. Part of that protection is being provided by the United States Marshals Service to that central tribunal of judges and prosecutors.

The fact that they carried out, in fairly short order, the trial and conviction and sentencing within the last six months of a key narcotics trafficker and two of his lieutenants is a good sign that the system is beginning to work, that the judges are not afraid that they are going to be killed in carrying out their functions and responsibilities, and likewise for the prosecutors.

Mr. GASTRIGH. Sir, I would just add that, of all of the institutions in Afghanistan, probably the least developed and the most
difficult to develop will be the justice system, because there are many contradictions.

As Administrator Tandy identified, we established a central narcotics tribunal and a central narcotics task force specifically to address the narcotics issues and the narcotics cases that are now being presented and prosecuted.

The Department of State funds the Justice Department to develop a criminal justice task force. They investigate and execute narcotics cases. And then the central narcotics tribunal, again, we fund their activities. And that system has proved very effective.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you.

We will go back. General Eikenberry, thank you for coming today.

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman would yield on that line. I know he has asked some pretty extensive questions.

But with respect to the alternative forms of agriculture, I presume that includes the orchards instead of poppies, things that give a fairly high yield. Because you can't replace a poppy crop on a little postage-stamp piece of land with wheat, for example, because you get pennies in the dollar in comparison to what is yielded with poppies? But you can, for example, put in almonds or other orchard-type agriculture that yields a pretty good cash crop if you have a market.

And are you folks familiar with the—and I take it you are—with the orchards transplantation operations taking place in Afghanistan. Is that something you are fairly familiar with in detail?

Mr. KUNDER. We are, sir. We certainly understand that those kinds thing are taking place. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tandy, are you up to speed on that, and Ms. Long?

Ms. TANDY. In a more general way.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, I think obviously that is key, because people are going to resent losing thousands of dollars in cash crop, especially those people who don't have any other means of survival and subsistence, if in fact it is not replaced with something.

Now, are you familiar with the Ritchie brothers operation there, the——

Mr. KUNDER. Very much so, sir. Yes, sir, we are——

General EIKENBERRY [continuing]. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard a lot——

Mr. KUNDER. Which we are supporting. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard lots of good things about that. How is that going?

Mr. KUNDER. It is going well——

The CHAIRMAN. That is I think the almond crops and other types of orchards?

Mr. KUNDER. Cotton and some other cash crops.

What that allows us to do, sir—and you are touching on a very critical point, and General Eikenberry alluded to this earlier.

It is just like in our country. I mean, if I go out and grow almonds but I don't have agriculture credit at the beginning of the season, if I don't have a transport system to get my almonds to market, if I don't have a storage facility, if I don't have marketing
information on export standards and so forth, I am not going to be successful.

I am not going to get to a yield on my almonds commensurate with what I am—so that what the Ritchie brothers have been able to do, and others, are try to come up with an integrated system that looks at both processing and marketing, as well as production of the alternative crops.

The CHAIRMAN. So almost like co-op so you——

Mr. KUNDER. All aspects of the marketing cycle have to be addressed. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that working?

Mr. KUNDER. In my crew, cases where we are able to concentrate resources, it is working very well. The Afghans are a marketing economy and a marketing people. They are quite entrepreneurial. But because of the breakdown in the infrastructure, the roads and the marketing system, that is what we have to overcome systematically.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you working on that?

Mr. KUNDER. Absolutely. That is exactly the priority in that we have focused our efforts in those areas that are the highest poppy producers to look at integrated solutions to getting high-value crops to market. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, a lot of that boils down to a truck that will make it over the road, if you got that.

Mr. KUNDER. It is transport systems——

The CHAIRMAN. These integrated solutions.

Mr. KUNDER. Transports, new markets, it is storage facilities. And it is export market standards we worry about.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Where is your market at?

Mr. KUNDER. There is some internal market. But obviously, for high-value crops, you are looking at export market to really get value in the gulf, in western states, in Australia, globally.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you got cooperation from the marketed states, or from the potential market?

Mr. KUNDER. The Afghans have traditionally transported some high-value products. So, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I understand that. But we all agree the Afghans need help, right? So if somebody is going to develop these markets for these alternative crops, it is probably going to be us. How is that going? Are you conferring with potential customer states, if you will? Because most of those states probably have quotas and tariffs and barriers to protect their own people.

Mr. KUNDER. Yes, so the——

The CHAIRMAN. So it is going to require a government accommodation to this. Are we getting that?

Mr. KUNDER. We are, sir. Obviously, we ourselves, our own country created duty-free status for Afghan imports. And this is the kind of thing we need to discuss with other countries as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. How far away would you say we are from having a system, a total system, integrated system that will allow a guy to change his two or three acres of poppies into two or three acres of, say, almonds, and have an income on that?
Mr. KUNDER. Sir, I can’t overemphasize how critical Mr. Gastright’s earlier point was that 92 percent of Afghan farmers don’t grow poppy.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I understand.

Mr. KUNDER. And so we are talking about——

The CHAIRMAN. I was talking about the ones that grow poppies.

Mr. KUNDER. We are talking about a small percentage. And in many cases, it is because of the topographical conditions or the rainfall conditions that pushes them toward the poppy crops as opposed to almonds and so forth.

So there is no silver bullet, as we have said a bunch of times. We have all those pieces in place. In some areas, it is working quite well.

But to answer your question directly, we are years away from building all of that kind of alternative infrastructure to provide viable alternative crops, competitive alternative crops, in all the areas where poppies are grown.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Let me ask it this way. If you have some good, practical ag-types, some farmer types in your shop who kind of know what it takes to get a crop to us, get it in and get it to market, kind of some can-do, hands-on, agricultural folks who could maybe get this going—because as you mentioned, it is only a few percent of the Afghan farmers who are engaging in poppy growth.

What that means is you don’t have to convert a nation’s agriculture system. You only have to convert a very small piece of it. That ought to be doable, right?

Mr. KUNDER. It is doable. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it shouldn’t take a long time. I mean, I understand it takes a while to grow trees.

But if you have a fairly small crop, with all of our allies and with the American market available, we ought to be able to get a market up. And I suspect probably at this point the market is not the long pole in the tent. Because we probably don’t have enough production right now to really intrude on anybody’s market.

But I would just hope that we could move that program with efficiency. And I don’t know if it is—as you said, it seems to be slow in coming. Maybe there are a lot of reasons for that that are beyond our ability to accelerate substantially.

Mr. KUNDER. Well, it is. In fact, sir, the poppy productions, at least in the eastern part of Afghanistan, is done in some of the most isolated areas where road systems have never gone into it. As you mentioned correctly, almond trees take a while to bring to fruition. We do have some very practical hands-on folks who are entrepreneurial, who are thinking through these problems. I just want to give you a frank honest assessment of the time constraints. We are not going to snap our fingers and get it done. But we take it very seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, you usually need kind of some practical people to get things like that done. And the agriculture community in the United States has got lots of practical folks who know how to turn hillsides into farms quickly. And they know how to handle the practical problems of production and irrigation and fertilization and all of those things.
I mean, American farmers are some of the most creative and innovative in the world. And you may need to get a little batch of those people, maybe out of the central valley of California or Arizona or some of the other orchardous states, and get problem-solvers over there. Find out what the long poles and the tent are here and get this baby moving.

Ms. Long. Mr. Chairman, if I might——

The Chairman. Typically, a lot of the can-do people come out of operations. They don't come out of academia.

Mr. Kunder. We have got a number of partnerships with American-ally operatives and so forth. So we would welcome any other ideas you have, sir.

The Chairman. Okay.

Ms. Long. Excuse me for interrupting.

I think one of the things we might have been familiar with or maybe recalling is that former Deputy Agricultural Secretary Jim Mosley, who is one of the better experts that the United States has the privilege of working with, volunteered and spent some time in Afghanistan. And in fact, may be there now working with USAID.

And I know that one of the things that he may have spoken to you about is working with the Afghans to develop an agricultural extensive service like we developed here. And it is the real backbone.

And I know that there is interest in the department for endeavoring to support those kinds of efforts.

The Chairman. Okay. Well, I appreciate your thoughts on that. And I want to apologize to the gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo, for taking all this time, when she has waited for an hour and a half here for her question. But the gentlelady from Guam is recognized.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And you also took my question. [Laughter.]

I would like to welcome all the witnesses this afternoon and been here all morning. I have made a number of trips to Afghanistan, as well as my other colleagues. And the question that our chairman asked is certainly appropriate.

We had a long visit with President Karzai. And he was very, very enthusiastic about his new program. And how he was going to revert all these poppy fields to legitimate farming crops, such as the almonds and the flowers and the vegetables and so forth. And he was very excited about it. And we left the room rather dubious about it. Because, you know, the revenues certainly wouldn't be the same for these farmers.

So I would like to ask you, Ms. Tandy—and I know you may defer it someone else—and then also we met with the women parliamentarians that had just recently been elected. And they, too, were very enthusiastic at wiping out this poppy crop.

So how is the president involved? And did his reform program take effect?

Ms. Tandy. You are correct. On that piece, I will defer to State Department on the eradication side.

But I, too, have met with President Karzai and had similar discussions. And let me just say that I know his commitment is real.
I am sure he probably talked with you about restoring the pomegranate industry to Afghanistan, which he did with me. With eradication, as State Department I know will discuss, there has been a steep decline in the actual planting in Nangarhar where a great deal of DEA's law enforcement efforts are focused right now. It drops, I think, 90 percent.

There were rises in other areas, in southern Afghanistan in particular. But I think that does demonstrate that there is real commitment. There is success.

The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) just came out with its annual world drug report and reflected a 21 percent decline overall in crop planting. What President Karzai could not control was the weather, which I am sure you are aware, affected the yield. Planting was down. The hectares are down. But the yield was greater.

So there are some competing issues there that I know he is contending with and has actually changed to mobile eradication units to try to address some of these issues. With that, I will defer to the State Department on the remainder.

Mr. Gastright, Ma'am, as I indicated previously, it is a five-pillar strategy. We recognize that no one pillar is the silver bullet. They all have to work together, synchronized in an effort to address the problem. Last year, we did see that the crop was suppressed somewhat. Unfortunately, this year we are expecting a slight rebound.

The strategy is working better. So we will just have to stay the course and see that, as the eradication, as the interdiction, as the alternative livelihoods all come on, we can farmers to move away from poppy and into legitimate services.

I would mention, as far as political will, as Secretary Long indicated, the Afghanistan Compact adopted by the government of Afghanistan and the international community in January of this year, identified counternarcotics as a cross-cutting theme.

Addressing that problem is something that the government of Afghanistan is committed to. Because they recognize that the money from narcotics can swamp everything else that they are doing. The corruption that is a result of the narcotics trade can buy off as many police officers and as many administrators as we can produce in an effort to deal with this problem. So they recognize that they have to serious about it. And I think that their efforts this year are a step in the right direction.

If I could just go back to markets, the chairman mentioned that you have to be thinking about markets in an effort to make this a reality. And the secretary of state, who was in Afghanistan this morning, certainly has been thinking about that.

Part of that is an initiative she calls the regional integration initiative. And the key really is to tie the business hub of Central Asia and Kazakhstan to the warm-water ports of Pakistan, Karachi and Gwadar.

We are working with the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank and our partners in the region to address three things: One, infrastructure, you have got to have a road network that goes from those regions all the way to those ports. Two, you have got to have the markets, so we are focused on that. You have got to
have customs fees. You have got to have customs systems that allow transiting borders so that all of your profit doesn’t get sucked up as you cross border after border.

So we are focused on those things. And we think that we do have an initiative that has merit.

The key here is Afghanistan, the land bridge and focusing on those roads, roads, roads that General Eikenberry has highlighted so many times. It is the key, not only to the rural economy and security and counternarcotics and health infrastructure, it really is a key to all the things that we are doing. So we will keep coming back to that.

Ms. Bordallo. And one last comment just on this same subject. What, in your estimation, currently is a percentage of poppy growers in Afghanistan today?

Mr. Kunder. We estimate eight percent of the farmers are engaged in poppy production.

Ms. Bordallo. Really? I am quite shocked. I thought it would be much higher.

I have one other question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Go right ahead.

Ms. Bordallo. Okay. The interagency coordination and operation, such as Operation Enduring Freedom is very vital. And today’s hearing reflects the reality of modern warfare and the need for interagency efforts. Our witnesses today include the DOD, the USAID, and the DEA—professionals.

And this committee has had discussions about expanding interagency cooperation. We have talked about establishing a new national security university with all executive branches involved. We have talked about more exchanges of DOD and other agency personnel. We have talked about annexes to war plans being required from other executive agencies.

And let me go on record one more time emphasizing how important it is for this Congress and this committee to really dig down in this issue. I think it is vital to winning the war on terror and all future conflicts.

Do you believe the interagency and civil-military coordination within Operation Enduring Freedom is sufficient as the operational and the tactical levels?

And what are the major lessons learned on interagency coordination in Afghanistan? And how are they going to be institutionalized? And how can this committee support the effort?

I think the general may be the one to——

General Eikenberry. The degree of interagency cooperation that we have got in Afghanistan, if you compare it to when Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan began in late 2001, it is just remarkable how far we have come along.

If you look at provincial reconstruction teams, ma’am, that we have spread around Afghanistan, you have combined teams there of Department of State; USAID; as I said earlier, in some cases, Department of Agriculture; the United States military presence there.

If you consider how we are integrated in Afghanistan with regard to fighting the intelligence battle where we have got the very close cooperation of all the important agencies, the Department of De-
fense and our military, the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the very close coordination that we have with the DEA in that regard, and the commendable job that they have done, not only in their field, but providing us with very important information, which has helped us enormously with our force protection.

In all of those areas, there has been enormous progress.

And at this point, I think that most of us would say, though, that on the ground, none of us are satisfied with where we are. We do need to go further.

And there are aspects that have to do with what you are talking about, ma'am, about the training that we can be doing before we go into a conflict or even while we are in a conflict. And I think increasingly for different departments to look at what the requirements are in places.

I can only speak for Afghanistan and seeing if they can put more of that expertise that is required, niche kind of expertise, on the ground there.

Because at the end of the day, there is a military dimension to this campaign. But as I said also in my opening remarks, increasingly it has to do with non-military aspects for us to prevail, the governance, the justice, standing up a robust economy in Afghanistan.

Ms. Bordallo. General, are you satisfied with all the information that is being shared? I think this was our problem with 9/11 with all these agencies. Is all the information above-board and being shared?

General Eikenberry. Ma'am, I will speak to Afghanistan, which is where I am assigned. The intelligence cooperation that we have in the sharing of information that we have in Afghanistan is extraordinary. And I am very confident with the degree of sharing that does take place. It is truly a team effort there.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Davis.

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend you all on your work on Afghanistan and, particularly visiting a provincial reconstruction team down in Paktika province last year was quite a positive and eye-opening experience.

You know, we have seen a lot of changes. And I want to direct my question a little more strategically rather than focusing just on Afghanistan here from a lessons-learned perspective. But back when Colonel Brigham and I were second lieutenants, the idea of anything to do with joint usually meant a uniform code of military justice (UCMJ) procedure against a soldier for a narcotics problem.

But seeing the growth in joint operations, the great success of the joint interagency task force (JIATF) in hunting terrorists—and one area that we sensed in different parts of the area of responsibility (AOR) where we traveled and also just speaking to many people across the agencies and in the military specifically, is that the agencies still were learning in this new era.

It seems to be a lot of tension not only between the agencies but really the direction of where the military needs to go long term for
the types of 21st-century threats. It seems to be an appearance that many of the agencies have, let’s say, silos of interest that have internal objectives for individuals that don’t necessarily work for the greater whole.

And I mean that, especially from the sense of constructive criticism as our strategic policy of change, we move more and more into an era of short wars and long peace. I think that, in a sense, you know, we have had to make it up as we have gone along and develop systems and develop processes that never existed before.

And with that, and particularly from General Eikenberry, you are unique perspective of having watched this from really the very beginning in Afghanistan and then coming back again.

I would like you all to comment on a long-term perspective of how we need to reorganize. The State Department obviously is not there from a staff and a structural standpoint to be able to reduce uniform presence, deal with fundamental infrastructure ranging from banking, democratic policing, basic transportation and infrastructure sources, things to help a market economy grow. But how do see us organizing for the future, for the next conflict like this is will inevitably emerge 5 or 10 or 15 years down the road?

Ms. Long. Thank you for that question. And actually, I think the gentlewoman from Guam is going in the right direction.

I think one of the things that we have learned——

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Incidentally, we both sat in the same meeting and watched people from seven different agencies all come up with different answers to the same question. So it was common ground there.

Ms. Long. Oh, and I have no doubts that there will be difference among even the panel members or even—I am of two different minds depending on what hat I wear, whether it is my previously lawyer or deputy assistant secretary of counter-narcotics hat or whether it is my current hat in ISA, the international security affairs office.

But I think the one thing that we can speak to is a point that General Eikenberry hinted at, which is waiting for interagency integration cannot wait until we are on the ground and in the country. It has to occur well before that.

And I think the educational and training process to the extent possible needs to be integrated much earlier on among the agencies not only from a tasking standpoint but from a leveraging of resources standpoint.

Certainly, State Department and the other departments have different roles to play. But we need to leverage each of our roles in the Global War on Terror. Because they are not just kinetic fights. Increasingly, they are finding that there are developmental and institutional fights that a kinetic answer is not the solution. And the more familiar we become with each other’s institutions in a training atmosphere and an educational atmosphere, the better we will be when we are called upon to be on the ground with one another.

I think one of the things that we have learned, particularly with training and equipping, is that our traditional stove pipes and, from a resourcing standpoint with the Department of Defense, in particularly, aren’t satisfactorily flexible enough for us to respond to the kind of threats that we have now.
And that a lot of the tasks that one might assume in previous years—perhaps World War II was an example—would be undertaken by either the populations themselves because they were advanced and there was infrastructure available, or increasingly falling upon the shoulders of either the United States Government or our coalition partners.

And that we have to have our funding streams and our authorities be flexible enough that we can respond and perform those tasks not only within the department, but the entire interagency and NGOs. One of the things that we have learned in the Global War on Terror is it is just not the governments, that you require contractors, as my USAID and State Department colleagues pointed out.

And non-governmental organizations that have to follow in behind and contribute to the effort, and that the earlier we expose ourselves to each other's culture, that we train together and educate together, the more successful we will be when called upon.

General Eikenberry. Congressman, I will talk just from the military perspective, of course, in answer to your question.

I think that, if we look at the building of the security forces, the army and the police that our military has been engaged with, and the Department of Defense has, if we look at, first of all, the army, we are reasonably good at that job. But——

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. I would say more than reasonably good. What I saw was outstanding but——

General Eikenberry. The task of building an army though, in the case of Afghanistan and indeed in Iraq, was something that we had not done before. We are good at building operational forces, tactical units and doing the training and the equipping.

But this kind of enterprise that we have got in Afghanistan where, as I said earlier, we start with just grains of sand. And we have to stand up a ministry of defense and a general staff. We have to stand up complex institutions and complex structures within this army, military justice systems, logistics systems.

The lessons that I think that we are getting from Afghanistan and from Iraq will be very helpful to us in that regard. Because we have to think very long term. We have to think of terms of having a lot of patience. But it goes far beyond just fielding infantry battalions and soldiers.

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Maybe if I could redirect this just a little bit, no doubt of the quality of the work that you all are doing. I mean, for me, my crystallizing moment was watching a 20-year-old E–4 explain democratic policing to an Afghan, which is certainly a credit to our system and the tremendous witness of our soldiers.

But I feel, in a sense, we are almost in a 21st-century version of the Philippine campaign, dealing with scattered insurgencies and generally small scattered troops where the troops, or whoever else happens to be there, is mainly engaged in trying to either create or build infrastructure.

Introduce ideas, I mean, in Paktika, where they put the first road in 5,000 years. I have a couple of counties like that in my district. But it was a remarkable exercise.
And really what I am speaking to, particularly with the army, but also from the wider interagency community, is adapting in such a way so that, when we go into the next situation, when we have that six months that the local populace shows the love before they get upset, and have the opportunity to build the insurgency, what we can do to have—whether it changes within the nature of civil affairs, changes within the nature of, let's say, more of a post-conflict, peace-stabilization type of organization that would go on the ground that would have that interagency capability to deal not simply with cultural issues, but we look at the gap that we saw in Iraq.

Things got moving in the right direction a lot more quickly in Afghanistan. But how we could take that model to apply elsewhere.

If you would say maybe the top two or three things that need to be addressed either doctrinally or organizationally?

General EIKENBERRY. Maybe in three, Congressman.

The first one you led with, with regard to the police, the model that you have in Afghanistan and Iraq is you have to have the capability of building police in an environment in which security is not good.

So that mixing of the civilian police expertise that is available through the Department of State with the reality that you have got to have protection provided by the military to extend those trainers for.

Indeed, there are certain skills that the military brings that would probably have to be imparted within that police force for rough places, like Paktika, Congressman, where you went to.

And it is not necessarily the primary policing skill as being a good traffic cop. It is being able to defend your district headquarters if you are attacked in the middle of the night by a Taliban force.

So how to bring those kinds of capabilities together between state and the military.

The second, with regard to civil affairs, I think we have a very strong civil affairs corps in the United States military and the United States Army.

But when we look at some of the challenges again that we faced in Afghanistan where it is not only delivering humanitarian assistance at the very basic level, that we talk about building ministries of commerce, ministries of different sorts.

That kind of civil affairs ability to work throughout the entire institution from the very highest down to the cutting edge, that kind of skill is something I think that we are developing. It needs to be furthered.

And then, there would be, in the area of linguists, that to the extent that we can anticipate conflicts that we may have, making sure that we have a battery of linguists that are going to be able to serve our United States government well as we have to move forward into a campaign.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Great.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. KUNDER. Sir, could I just—the U.S. Government sent me to work in Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq. And I have one recurring take away from all this.
And that is we need to create something like the new coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization at the State Department where somebody husbands the resources of the civilian side of the U.S. Government to link up with the military at D-minus-180. Because all of the problems we are talking about, whether it is linguists or more experts in building governments, you can’t create those during the 180-day grace period.

And what we have on the military side is a standing capacity both to plan and deliver. What we have with an organization like ours with 2,100 people, we are fully committed. Everybody is out doing something. We don’t have any planning capacity. So what we need is to create a civilian unit that can link up with our military planners at D-minus-180 and then work these problems out ahead of time, pull the resources in. So that would be to my——

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Sort of a department of everything else to fill in all those blank spots we——

Mr. Kunder. A sort of joint staff for the civilian side of the U.S. Government.

But we have that idea. The U.S. interagency, to his credit, with full military participation created the new coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization at the State Department.

And that was the concept, to bring the Justice Department, Agriculture, USAID, to the table ahead of time so we can link up without having a pick-up game in the middle of a crisis.

And I would respect for an individual to suggest. That is something that we all, both branches of the U.S. Government ought to get firmly behind and put the resources into. Because that is what we need at the time when we need, not 180 days later.

Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Well, if the goal is to eventually create a Pashto Napa Valley, I think that in a conflict that something like that is necessary. And let us know how we can help you with this. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Missouri had a few more questions.

Mr. Skelton. I am somewhat confused. One of the major complements in Iraq is the lack of civilian agencies from our government assisting, as well as the interagency cooperation.

I have had discussions with General Casey and Secretary Rice about this regarding Iraq. And hearing what you have to say today, that does not seem to be the case despite the fact that General McCaffrey suggested to us that an effective interagency process in Afghanistan is completely absent.

What is the truth, General?

General Eikenberry. I only speak, Congressman, from my experience on the ground. And if I look at the deployed out to the field with our provincial reconstruction teams, we do have coherent interagency teams that exist across the board there.

With regard to the military’s own cooperation and our collaboration with the United States embassy, I consider Ambassador Ron Neumann my teammate in our approach to our fight in Afghanistan.
Mr. Skelton. That is not answering the question. Do you have sufficient numbers? Are they cooperating with each other? That is not the case in Iraq. Is that the case in Afghanistan?

General Eikenberry. Congressman, there are different areas I think within our provincial reconstruction teams of Afghanistan, there are different kinds of expertise out there.

We could use more Department of Agriculture, in my own view. We can use other kinds of experts in those provincial reconstruction teams. Let’s say, for example, a justice expert.

Whether or not that person has to come from the United States Government, should be contractor, I don’t know. But there are certainly different kinds of expertise that are needed right now in our provincial reconstruction team, which would be helpful.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you.

Ms. Long, from your vantage point in your position, could you describe for us planned both military and civilian involvement in Afghanistan over the long term, both involving NATO, military involvement and coordinated supplemental operations?

It is not clear, at least to me, about the long-term United States strategy from your vantage point as to where you sit.

Ms. Long. Yes, sir. And thank you for the opportunity to do so.

From a long-term perspective, the department’s long-term strategy with Afghanistan is set forth in the agreement signed between President Bush and President Karzai last year, which is our security partnership relationship. And on that document, we are committed to the security of Afghanistan and helping them build their institutions and dealing with insurgency and other threats to their national sovereignty, as well as their security.

We are committed to helping them and assisting them as regards to criminality that is a threat, their narcotics problem, as well as internal and external threats to their security.

From a long-term perspective, as you know, sir, NATO is going through a number of phases in order to assume, in that phased approach, responsibility for additional territories within Afghanistan.

The most recent phase, of course, we discussed earlier is the stage three, which will be occurring this July where NATO will move and take responsibility for additional territories in the south. That will be under the command of the United Kingdom.

There are, as you know, provisions made for the U.S. Government, in particular the Defense Department, with coalition partners to remain and retain responsibility for the counterterrorism aspect of our relationship with Afghanistan in parallel to that structure.

NATO has agreed and set forth a plan for stage four. The timing of that is conditions and undetermined at this time.

And that will occur at the point in time when NATO is prepared and the conditions are right for NATO to assume the responsibility for the remaining territory of Afghanistan and that, of course, is in the east.

I think the long-term commitment as set forth in the partnership agreement is the one that not only the president supports, but the Department of Defense and President Karzai are very pleased about.
And what it is, is a commitment, long term, to help Afghanistan and the international community build not only the security apparatus, which would be the Afghan National Army and the police, but the corresponding institutions, as well assist them with the reconstruction and development of the corresponding economic institutions.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much.

General, tell us how well the Pakistani forces are cooperating with you and your military efforts?

General EIKENBERRY. Congressman, the cooperation that we have got now with the Pakistan military along the border is, I think, quite good. To give you an example of the state of cooperation, collaboration that we have not with just the Pakistan army, but with the Afghan army as well and the Afghan National Police, in advance of Operation Mountain Thrust, which I discussed earlier, sir, we didn't have a full exchange of information with the Pakistan military and, of course, with our Afghan National Army allies.

And the Pakistan army with regard to that operation has been very cooperative and very helpful.

We have also achieved a level of cooperation and communications with them now where, along the border, we have communications protocols that have been established. There has been an exchange of radios that has taken place.

And so when we do have incidents that occur along the border area, we are able to communicate quickly.

And I am very satisfied when we do have incidents along the border about the degree of cooperation and teamwork that both sides are showing.

Mr. SKELTON. One last question. General, this falls under the category of who is the enemy. Of course, you have the Taliban. And you have the al Qaeda. But the real bottom line is, are the various leaders or warlords, whichever you choose to use, are they cooperating with them, with you, or are they neutral?

General EIKENBERRY. Sir, the enemies of Afghanistan, they are complex. And I know that is what you are getting at.

There are terrorists. There are Taliban. There are narco-traffickers. There are the enemies of the campaign progress here in Afghanistan, which can be anything from, as you would say, the warlord to a corrupt governor—can be enemies of progress in Afghanistan.

We always keep in mind, though, that that set of al Qaeda, the Taliban extremists, that is a group that is separate and distinct.

Did they have some connections in some places with other actors in Afghanistan? I am sure that they do. There are various connections that occur.

But in the main, that group of Taliban extremists, al Qaeda, they remain the enemies of all the people of Afghanistan. And they remain clearly our strategic enemy.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I think the witnesses should be complimented on the outstanding work that they have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I agree with the gentleman. I think they should also be complimented on their endurance. [Laughter.]
Thanks a lot.
Yes, sir, general.

General EIKENBERRY. Sir, with your permission, I would just like to make a final remark to recognize——

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

General EIKENBERRY [continuing]. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines in Afghanistan.

Sir, first of all, we are a coalition. We are partners with NATO. But our coalition that we have right now, I would like to just state that the tremendous sacrifice that the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, who are taking casualties far in excess of our own casualties on the ground right now, and are fighting ferociously for their homeland, all of our coalition allies.

In the last two months, we have lost brave French soldiers, Canadian soldiers, British soldiers, Romanian soldiers, and then our own forces on the ground, sir, that I know that everyone here is extremely proud of.

On any given day in Afghanistan, at this very moment as we are speaking, there are female medics of the U.S. Army that are somewhere in Uruzgan province right now delivering for the first time ever to some Pashtun women in Uruzgan front-line medical care. There are engineers right now that are building roads in central Afghanistan under very tough conditions. Out in Herat, in the west, we have got special operations forces that are training the Afghan National Army.

And then, we never forget, sir, that at this time that we are speaking, in northern Helmand province, at temperatures of about 120 degrees, we have got the Afghan National Army and our special forces that are taking the fight to the enemy.

In Konar province, at altitudes of about 12,000 feet, we have got conventional infantry forces with the Afghan National Army and Police that are in extremely tough conditions, freezing at night, that are taking the fight to this enemy.

And every day, sir, we remain on the offensive against this very dangerous threat.

Sir, I appreciate also—and I know I speak for all the members of our armed forces. We appreciate your leadership and all the members of the committee for their great support of our forces as you provide the means for us to stay the best equipped and toughest armed forces that has ever been fielded.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, thank you.

And we are going to break and go up to 2337.

But let me just observe that this is an enormous challenge. And maybe this could be aptly called the forgotten war, because so much focus has been on Iraq. This is a very difficult challenge. This is nation-building.

And if there is any with great respect for our coalition forces and for the NATO forces in this anticipated increase in the NATO forces in the theater—this is an American-led operation. There is no other country in the world that could do this. And if anybody can do it, we can because we are Americans.
And we very greatly appreciate and understand that both the elections in Iraq and the elections in Afghanistan were carried on the backs of American fighting personnel.

And, you know, incidentally, these provincial reconstructions teams, one thing that I noticed is that our national guardsmen, who now are part of this total force and make up a big piece of the American force in both theaters, are special forces of a sort.

Because, as my Marine son described to me, he said, Dad, these guys come from real jobs in the real world. And they have almost every discipline. And he said, you go over to their operation and many times, they have put up little communities because they have got plumbers and electricians and craftsmen and business people.

And so I think perhaps the most effective provincial reconstructions teams that we have ever fielded haven't come from academia and haven't come from the State Department. They have come from the guys wearing those cami fatigues, that desert cami, who back home have the disciplines that are directly applicable to this nation-building that we are involved in, and in many cases community-building, in many cases economy-building, and in many cases, today in your theater, ag, lots of agriculture endeavors.

So this is a multi-talented force that we have.

And I think it is interesting that perhaps the most effective with this new dimension of having to stand up a nation. Not just stand up a military, but stand up a nation in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the most effective we have got are forces that, heretofore, weren't deployed forward.

When you think of the Vietnam era, most of our national guardsmen didn't participate. Today, we move with a total force. And they bring this spectrum of skills that otherwise we would have to pay a fortune for in terms of bringing over specialists in these given areas.

And instead, we find out that the guy that we are paying a sergeant's salary to, who is wearing a desert camouflage uniform, he has the ability to wire that house, or to plumb that house, or to teach the people in the community how to do it, or to get that irrigation line going and along those lines.

So thank you, General. Give our very best to—and let me tell you, the folks that are in this committee, Democrat and Republican, visit the warfighting theaters often, as you know. And we are very, very appreciative. And we are going to be seeing a lot of you over there.

Now, we are going to adjourn to 2337, and we will talk about that.

But one last question, ladies, and to Mr. Kunder. This loya jirga, in talking with folks who are working this agriculture substitution, if you will, program, they talk about the loya jirga—that is the council, I take it, the Afghan council.

It is a traditional thing where people get together. And the elders bring up issues of the day and they talk it over. And they either accept proposals or they don't accept them.

Is that being utilized to the fullest degree possible in this substitution program in terms of convincing a community to start substituting out poppies and substitution in almonds or other orchard crops? Are we using that tradition?
Mr. KUNDER. Yes, sir, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. And we are not just imposing on them or telling them how it is going to be.

Mr. KUNDER. We would be fools to walk in as outsiders and try to lecture these folks without getting the village community in it. And by the way, sir, not just on areas on that, but where we have had some of these recent Taliban attacks on burning schools and so forth.

We have redoubled our efforts to make sure we get the community buy in. Because if the community supports the project, it is not just going to be more successful, but they are going to provide the security themselves against those who want to push back.

So you are absolutely correct, sir. We are asking the community first, ascertaining what their priorities are in terms of agriculture. Because they know something about marketing obviously well. They have been doing it a couple of thousand years. But that is a critical part of what we are doing. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Well, folks, thanks a lot. Thanks for your endurance.

And we will take a 15-minute break. And we will go into a classified session at 2337.

Thank you very much for this extended testimony.

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 28, 2006
Opening Statement for the Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services
US House of Representatives

Hearing- Status of Security and Stability in Afghanistan
June 28, 2006

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses.

Thank you all for being here today. General Eikenberry,
it’s particularly good to see you again. At the outset, I
want to thank you for your leadership. And I want to
express gratitude to the troops that you lead and commend
their extraordinary service.

It has been more than 4 and ½ years since the invasion of
Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September
11th. And there are many signs of progress within the
country. There is a constitution and an elected government. Reconstruction efforts are under way. And a rare coalition of forces from more than 30 nations are working together side by side to foster stability.

Yet, when I read the papers, I fear we are sliding backwards. Recent stories indicate we are in a “full blown insurgency” with Taliban elements in the south that are growing more brazen, sophisticated and lethal. Afghanistan still produces 90% of the world’s opium. And Afghan officials say Taliban commanders are using money from druglords to finance a guerrilla force that could sustain an insurgency for years.
Widespread corruption and a lack of strong governance at the local and federal levels compound the situation. And much of the population remains illiterate and impoverished—without even the most basic services such as running water and electricity.

Amidst all of this, the US is preparing to draw down its 23,000-member force and turn over significant responsibility for the troubled south and other parts of the country to NATO. The US also hopes the Afghan National Army will assume a greater role. Yet we know the Afghan Army—despite their improvements—is still not at full strength, remains an infantry-only force, and is
besieged by problems of attrition and under-equipping. And Afghan police forces have a much farther way to go.

Recently, General McCaffrey advised Members of this committee that the US would probably need to remain in Afghanistan for 20 years to ensure its stability. Yet I do not see a long-term comprehensive strategy from the administration. And if one exists— it is not being clearly communicated to Congress, the American people or the people of Afghanistan.

This is a critical mission— separate and distinct from the war against the Iraqi insurgency. Success will require a
strong sustained US commitment- through both NATO involvement and coordinated supplemental operations.

We need your assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. What will it take in forces and capability to bring the insurgency under control? What more must be done to set up NATO for success? What does President Karzai need to do for the political unity and progress of his country? What additional support is needed from the international community? And what is the path forward when it comes to illicit narcotics- and reconstruction?

This country was the first front and the center of the war on terror. We cannot let it fail. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Statement of
The Honorable Karen P. Tandy
Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration

Before the
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives

June 28, 2006

“Status of Security and Stability in Afghanistan”

Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Skelton, distinguished members of the Committee: on behalf of the men and women of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), I appreciate your invitation to testify today regarding the DEA counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. I appreciate the efforts and support this Committee has shown for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, and look forward to today’s discussion.

Overview

The large scale production of opium in Afghanistan is not only a significant threat to Afghanistan’s future and the region’s stability, but also has worldwide implications. In response to this threat, the DEA has undertaken an aggressive approach to combat the production of opium in Afghanistan. The DEA has opened and staffed our Kabul Country Office, initiated our Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Team program, and has begun to establish an aviation presence in Afghanistan and expand our regional presence.

There are many facets of combating narcotics production and trafficking in Afghanistan. In addition to eradication, interdiction, and seizing heroin labs, it is critical to attack the trafficking networks, their infrastructure, and illicit assets. Teams of DEA Special Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists provide guidance to our Afghan partners and conduct bilateral investigations to identify and dismantle drug trafficking and money laundering organizations operating throughout the region.

DEA also has been active in the countries surrounding Afghanistan. Operation Containment was initiated under DEA’s leadership and with special support from Congress. This large-scale, multi-national enforcement initiative emphasizes coordination and information sharing among 19 countries from Central and Southwest Asia, the Caucasus, Europe, and Russia. The program implements a joint strategy to: 1) place a security belt around Afghanistan, and 2) to prevent precursor chemicals from entering Afghanistan and drugs from leaving. This strategy deprives drug trafficking organizations easy market access and easy movement of chemicals and
drugs, and helps to deprive international terrorist groups of the financial support they receive from facilitating the illegal trafficking of drugs, precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition, and currency. Since its inception, Operation Containment has resulted in greater than a 2,800 percent increase in the amount of heroin seized in the region.

DEA also is providing training and assistance to law enforcement personnel in Afghanistan, and, along with the Department of Justice Senior Federal Prosecutors Program, is directly involved in advising U.S. Government and Afghan officials in counternarcotics programs and drug policy issues in Afghanistan. The DEA is confident that our efforts, along with those of our other U.S. and foreign counterparts, will result in the reduction of drugs trafficked from Afghanistan, and ultimately will assist in the stabilization of Afghanistan and the region.

Opium Production in Afghanistan

The Golden Crescent Region of Southwest Asia - Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran - has long been known as an illicit opium source area. Years of warfare in Afghanistan, including the Soviet invasion and occupation throughout the 1980s, and the civil strife of the 1990s, decimated the country's economic infrastructure.

In the mid-1980s, Afghanistan emerged as a major source of illicit opium in the region and the opium trade became the largest source of income in Afghanistan. Throughout the 1990s, Afghanistan produced increasing quantities of illicit opium, and by 2000 accounted for over 70 percent of the world's supply. As a result of the Taliban's taxing and controlling poppy cultivation during their rule, culminating in an announced "ban" during 2001, cultivation and production declined to only 63 metric tons, significantly below what it had been in previous- and, unfortunately, future- years.

Exploiting the chaotic situation following the collapse of the Taliban regime and initiation of coalition military action in the fall of 2001, Afghan drug traffickers encouraged farmers to resume opium poppy cultivation. In 2002, despite a renewal of the poppy ban in January and a modestly successful eradication campaign in April of that year, Afghanistan once again resumed its position as the world's leading producer of illicit opium. U.S. Government reporting indicates that opium production in Afghanistan rose from an estimated 1,278 metric tons of potential oven-dried opium produced in 2002 to 2,865 metric tons in 2003, and to 4,950 metric tons in 2004, the highest amounts of opium production ever recorded in Afghanistan. In 2005, although opium production declined to an estimated 4,475 metric tons, Afghanistan remained the source of approximately 92 percent of the global illicit opium supply.

The Production and Smuggling of Heroin and Morphine

Today, laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base, white heroin, or one of several grades of brown heroin. Afghanistan produces no essential or precursor chemicals for the conversion of opium into morphine base. Acetic anhydride, which is the most commonly used acetylation agent in heroin processing, is smuggled into Afghanistan from Pakistan, India, the Central Asian States, China, and Europe. The largest processing labs are primarily located in southern Afghanistan, with smaller laboratories located in other areas, including Nangarhar Province. In the past, many opium processing laboratories were located in Pakistan, particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province and Helmand Province. However, during the Taliban period, these laboratories relocated to Afghanistan, to be closer to the source of opium and to take advantage of the safe haven that the Taliban provided. The recent seizure of three clandestine laboratories and
approximately 17 metric tons of morphine base in Baluchistan indicates that coalition efforts may be displacing laboratory activity back to Pakistan.

The majority of the opiate products seized in Europe originated in Afghanistan. Most of the opiates produced in Afghanistan are smuggled to markets in the West, although some is consumed in Afghanistan as both opium and heroin. Afghan heroin is trafficked via many routes, with traffickers adjusting smuggling routes based on law enforcement and political actions. Traffickers in Afghanistan primarily rely on vehicles and overland routes to move drug shipments out of the country. Predominantly, illicit drug convoys transit southern and western Pakistan, while smaller shipments of heroin are sent through the frontier provinces to Karachi for onward shipment to the United States. Our investigations show that most of the Afghan heroin that makes it way to the U.S. originates in Nangarhar Province and transits Pakistan.

Morphine base can also be transported overland through Pakistan and Iran, or directly to Iran from Afghanistan, and then into Turkey, where Turkey-based trafficking groups convert the morphine base to heroin prior to shipment to European and North American markets. Shipments of Afghan-produced morphine base and hashish are also sent by sea from Pakistan’s Makran Coast.

In addition, a number of reports have been received indicating that large convoys of well-armed passenger trucks loaded with opiates are being driven across western Afghanistan into Iran. The Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) reports an increasing amount of opiate smuggling through Iran. The CNC estimates that as much as 40 percent of Afghanistan’s opiate production enters Iran, however, DEA has had a difficult time confirming these statistics due to our lack of presence in Iran.

Smuggling routes north through the Central Asian States, then across the Caspian Sea and south into Turkey also are used. Although significant amounts of morphine base continue to be smuggled out of Afghanistan, recent information confirms an increasing amount of morphine base is converted to heroin in Afghanistan prior to export.

Looking at the northern routes, DEA intelligence indicates that heroin shipments moving north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States to Russia have increased during the past two years. CNC reports that the northward flow has increased from 10 percent of Afghanistan’s output to 25 percent. For example, Tajikistan law enforcement agencies report that approximately 80 percent of their drug seizures in Central Asia are opiates. Tajikistan is a primary transshipment country for opiate shipments destined for Russia. Drug traffickers in Afghanistan will use produce laden trucks as a cover for drugs sent north toward Tajikistan, where it is handed off to other criminal organizations. Tajik criminal organizations are the primary movers of this contraband. Approximately half of the heroin that passes through Tajikistan is consumed in Russia. The balance transits Russia to other consumer markets in Western and Eastern Europe. To help combat this trend, DEA will be establishing an office in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in the spring of 2007.

**DEA’s Presence in Afghanistan**

The DEA’s Kabul Country Office was fully reopened in January 2004, and it has made significant progress under difficult conditions. DEA also has enhanced staffing levels in Afghanistan to more effectively complete our mission.
Working with the CNP-A and the Department of Defense (DoD), the DEA has established the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), which is comprised of CNP-A officers who have been selected to work on major narcotic enforcement operations with the Kabul Country Office. Through assistance, training, and mentoring, DEA’s goal is to make the NIU capable of conducting independent operations. Five classes of the NIU have graduated from a six-week training program that was sponsored by the U.S. Government. All NIU graduates are operationally deployed and work bi-laterally with DEA’s FAST teams. Presently, there are approximately 100 NIU officers with a total force of 125 expected this summer.

The Five Pillar Plan

The DEA has joined with coalition partners, the State Department in the U.S. Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics Implementation Plan. This “Five Pillar Plan” provides the DEA opportunities, as never before, to reduce heroin production in Afghanistan and contribute to the stabilization and rebuilding of this war-torn country. Our primary role falls under the “Interdiction Pillar,” where DEA is responsible for dismantling drug trafficking organizations. To achieve that goal, the DEA has expanded its presence in Afghanistan by permanently stationing additional Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts to enhance that country’s counternarcotics capacity. The DEA also provides drug enforcement training to our counterparts in the Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A). This effort will build Afghanistan’s institutions of justice and strengthen internal counternarcotics capabilities.

To help achieve our goals in Afghanistan, DEA has established specially trained, Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST). FAST is a key tool by which DEA advances its enforcement and training operations. FAST consists of five teams of six specially trained agents and analysts who deploy to Afghanistan for 120 days at a time to assist the Kabul Country Office and CNP-A in the development of their investigations. They advise, mentor and train our Afghan counterpart.

Department of Defense Support

The Department of Defense is funding and constructing a FAST and NIU base camp in Afghanistan which is expected to be completed in the first quarter of FY 2007. This facility will be capable of housing and providing mission support for our deployed FAST teams and their NIU counterparts. FAST personnel currently are being housed at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and at the Bagram Air Field until this base camp is completed.

The Department of Defense is providing the Afghan Ministry of Interior with eight Mi-17 helicopters dedicated to counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, which also will provide needed mobility for DEA FAST Team personnel. On June 10, 2006, the first two Mi-17 helicopters arrived in Kabul and will be operational by mid July. The remaining six helicopters are scheduled to arrive every six weeks until there are a total of eight helicopters in country. An additional two Mi-17s are located at Ft. Bliss to facilitate the training of future Afghan pilots and crews. On June 2, 2006, the first of these crew members graduated from the Mi-17 pilot training program at Fort Bliss, Texas.

DOD also is assisting counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan by funding the construction of the NIU training facility, the purchase of equipment and training for Afghan counternarcotics officers, the construction of hangars for DEA and Afghan aviation assets; and other support. A DOD funded clam shell hanger for the DEA air wing was completed on June 22, 2006. The DEA
King Air and crew departed Addison, Texas enroute to Afghanistan on June 23rd and is scheduled to arrive in Kabul on July 7, 2006.

**Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams**

In support of the Administration’s “Five Pillar Plan,” DEA initiated the Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams. The first two FAST teams arrived in Afghanistan in April 2005. The FAST program directly improves the DEA’s work force and capabilities in Afghanistan increasing the time spent with the NIU to identify, target, investigate, disrupt or dismantle transnational drug trafficking operations in the region. The FAST groups provide guidance to their Afghan counterparts, while conducting bilateral investigations aimed at the region’s trafficking organizations. The FAST groups, which are supported and largely funded by the Department of Defense, also help with the destruction of existing opium storage sites, clandestine heroin processing labs, and precursor chemical supplies directly related to our investigations.

The FAST groups, who received specialized training, will be deployed in Afghanistan, two groups at a time, and rotate every 120 days. The non rotating three groups remain at the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia, where they engage in training and provide operational support for the deployed teams in Afghanistan.

**Operation Containment**

DEA’s participation in the Five Pillar Plan is an expansion of the DEA-led Operation Containment, initiated in 2002. This program was necessary due to the lack of fully developed institutional systems for drug enforcement in Afghanistan, such as courts and law enforcement agencies. Through Operation Containment, in May 2003, the DEA was also able to establish a 25-member Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) in neighboring Uzbekistan, a country critical to containing the threat of Afghan opium entering Central Asia for further transit to Russia and Western Europe. On April 19, 2006, the DEA funded Uzbekistan SIU executed a search warrant in Surkhandarya Region, Uzbekistan resulting in one arrest and the seizure of approximately 129.5 kilograms of heroin.

This multi-national cooperative program has been responsible for record seizures and cases against high value targets. Prior to the initiation of Operation Containment, in 2002, only 407 kilograms of heroin were seized. In FY 2005, Operation Containment, which includes the seizures in Afghanistan, resulted in 577 arrests, a 16 percent increase over FY 2004 (498), and the following seizures: 248 labs, approximately 23 times the number seized in FY2004; 43.9 metric tons of opium gum, over 7 times the amount seized in 2004; 14.2 metric tons of precursor chemicals—4 times the amount seized in FY 2004; 11.5 metric tons of heroin—a 2,826 percent increase over what was seized before Operation Containment was put in place, and 1.3 metric tons of morphine base.

Unfortunately, additional statistics on what else occurred prior to Operation Containment are not available, as there was no uniform collection of statistics for any seizures that were not heroin.

During FY 2005, Operation Containment resulted in the initiation of 146 investigations, and led to the disruption of two Consolidated Priority Organization Targets, including the Haji Bashir Noorzaee and Haji Baz Mohammad organizations. Haji Bashir Noorzaee’s organization was severely disrupted. The Government of Afghanistan, with the assistance of the Department of Justice prosecutors in Kabul, extradited Haji Baz Mohammad to the United States for prosecution. This
was the first ever extradition from Afghanistan to the United States. Both Baz Mohammad and Noorai are incarcerated and are pending federal prosecution.

**Corruption**

Corruption is widespread throughout Afghan society. The Kabul Country Office has received numerous reports of corruption at all levels of government to include civil, legislative, and law enforcement components. Other reports indicate that officials are indirectly involved or are willfully blind to the illicit activities of traffickers who operate within their areas of responsibility.

For example, in June of last year the DEA and Afghan Counternarcotics Police raided the offices of the then-governor of Helmand Province, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada. We found over 9 metric tons of opium stashed there—the largest since we returned to Afghanistan in 2002.

**Security Situation in Helmand Province**

The southern Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Nimroz present a number of common challenges that adversely affect DEA’s ability to operate there. The key challenge is force protection for our DEA agents and NIU counterparts. For example, in 2005, two NIU investigators were lured to Helmand Province, kidnapped and then murdered by anti-coalition elements. Tribal conflicts, institutionalized drug production, and anti coalition activities have hindered our efforts. The ongoing military operations along the Afghan-Pakistan border and the spike in violence have impeded our ability to work in the south.

Because of the current security situation in the region, DEA currently has no operational infrastructure, assets, or support to conduct operations in the Helmand Province. Travel restrictions and transportation shortages make travel to, from, and through, the south problematic.

**Drugs and Terrorism**

In the past, terrorist groups derived much of their funding and support from state sponsors of terrorism. With increased international pressure, many of these funding sources have become less reliable and, in some instances, have disappeared altogether. As a result, terrorist groups have turned to alternative sources of financing, including fundraising from sympathizers and nongovernmental organizations, and criminal activities, such as arms trafficking, money laundering, kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, racketeering, and/or drug trafficking. This trend is true not only in Afghanistan, but around the world, and increasingly blurs the distinction between terrorist and drug trafficking organizations. Both criminal organizations and terrorist groups continue to develop international networks and establish alliances of convenience. In the new era of globalization, both terror and crime organizations have expanded and diversified their activities, taking advantage of the internationalization of communications and banking systems, as well as the opening of borders to facilitate their activities.

DEA’s investigative approach focuses on the utilization of credible, corroborated, confidential sources whose activities are closely directed and monitored by Special Agents to identify, penetrate, disrupt, and hopefully dismantle these organizations. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, DEA has developed a cadre of reliable sources of information and developed many valuable relationships.
Because DEA is concerned with the nexus between terrorist activity and its association with narcotics trafficking, DEA personnel are directed to solicit information of assistance in the global war on terror at all informant debriefings. These relationships have yielded actionable intelligence of ongoing anti-coalition activity, and information gathered through DEA human intelligence sources have thwarted hostile acts against U.S. personnel and interests inside of Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The DEA continues to take an active leadership role in the multi-national efforts to combat the world-wide drug threat posed by heroin production in Afghanistan. To date, DEA has increased staffing levels in the Kabul Country Office, deployed our FAST teams in Afghanistan, mentored and trained the Afghan NIU, targeted high value trafficking organizations and their leaders, achieved the first extradition from Afghanistan and coordinated Afghan based investigations with our law enforcement partners in Operation Containment.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this critical topic. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
U.S. Policy in Afghanistan

Prepared Statement of
The Honorable Mary Beth Long
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Before the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services
Wednesday, June 28, 2006

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you for providing this opportunity to talk about Afghanistan. Much has been accomplished since Assistant Secretary Rodman appeared before this Committee in June of last year. Much remains to be done.

Afghanistan is vital to our national interests. A stable Afghanistan is vital to the region. We are fully committed, with the support of Congress, to helping the Afghan people and government achieve lasting stability. Progress toward that goal is integral to the Global War On Terrorism. And it is essential to American credibility. Keeping in mind the events of 9/11 and the irrevocable changes it brought, our government must do all it can to safeguard our present – and future – security.

We must do so with allies and partners. Afghanistan must never again serve as a training ground for terrorists. Our goal continues to be a moderate, democratic Afghan government that is capable of controlling its national territory and achieving economic self-sufficiency.

The Taliban have nothing positive to offer. They prey on ignorance and poverty. They work through violence and intimidation. As LTG Eikenberry can elaborate, the Coalition, the International Security Assistance Force, and, importantly, the Afghan National Security Forces are capable of handling the kinetic challenge.

The larger challenge lies in fostering the overall conditions that will give the Afghan people grounds for hope and long-term stability. We must continue helping their government build and sustain an environment in which its citizens, from city dweller to farmer, can make a better life for themselves through legitimate means. That is happening in much of the country.
But it's still not happening everywhere. In places where the insurgency is active and where opium is the primary crop the Afghan government and our forces are challenged. This is a long-term effort – and it requires military muscle and more.

We see our military’s hard work, bravery, and achievements most prominently now in Operation Mountain Thrust, where, with allies and the Afghan National Army, we are successfully engaging with the Taliban. LTG Eikenberry can elaborate on this multi-month, multi-province operation and how it is preparing the ground for long-term development and NATO’s increasing role in the south.

He will also elaborate on another critical DoD mission – training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces. The Afghan National Army especially has made great progress, and both our governments understand that Afghanistan’s own forces must take increasing responsibility for their security.

The Department of Defense also contributes to the overall counternarcotics effort. We have helped train and equip the Afghan National Interdiction Unit, developed aviation capacity at the Ministry of Interior, and provided planning and airlift when available. Administrator Tandy will elaborate on the broader U.S. counternarcotics strategy.

Just as military matters are the responsibility of the Department of Defense, State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development have the lead on diplomacy and development. I will leave a fuller treatment of those topics to John Gastright and Jim Kunder. Of course, security and development are interrelated. You can’t have one without the other. What that means is that at the policy level, and in the field, our agencies work closely together.

We see that most dramatically at the end of the chain – in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) where representatives of agencies here today collaborate, to foster security, development, and more capable governance for populations neglected for decades – if not a generation.

Happily the United States is not alone in this pursuit. We have an active diplomacy, and the international community provides much-needed economic and military assistance. The donors conference in London earlier
this year established the Afghanistan Compact, which lays out a post-Bonn framework for a new relationship between Afghanistan and its allies. For donors, the Compact emphasizes accountability and coordination. For Afghanistan, it emphasizes capacity building and local ownership of the development process.

Our allies’ contributions are also manifested in NATO’s leadership of the International Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF). Having assumed responsibility first for the northern and then the western regions, our NATO partners in ISAF are now moving into the south. Earlier this year Canada took responsibility for the PRT in Kandahar Province and the southern command. The United Kingdom then took responsibility for the PRT in Helmand Province, with contributions from Denmark and Estonia. The Dutch are sending substantial forces to lead the PRT in Uruzgan Province, with contributions from Australia.

Transfer of authority for the south, from Coalition to ISAF, should take place later this summer. LTG Eikenberry can talk more about this transition and the critical role U.S. forces will have in ISAF and their continuing, separate mission in support of Afghanistan’s security. Let me just say that we welcome the increased forces and resources for development ISAF contributors are bringing.

PRTs continue to evolve, and we appreciate our allies stepping up to the plate. They know PRTs must have the resources and personnel to accomplish both security and development. Next month we and Canada are co-hosting a conference in Budapest to discuss PRT effectiveness.

Our bilateral relations remain close and vibrant. The first meetings to advance the Strategic Partnership agreement signed by Presidents Karzai and Bush in May of 2005 took place in Washington this past March, and we look forward to follow-on meetings in Kabul this fall.

Democracy is taking root. Successful parliamentary elections last fall followed the countrywide turnout for presidential elections the year before. The new National Assembly has taken its responsibilities seriously, accomplishing a great deal in its inaugural session. It confirmed 20 members of the Cabinet and two Supreme Court justices, and it approved with some changes President Karzai’s budget.
The legitimate economy is growing, particularly in the towns where infrastructure is more advanced. But there are many challenges. Afghanistan must create a legal and regulatory framework that will encourage private initiative and foreign investment. The government has created a stable currency, but the banking sector is weak, particularly in the provinces. That makes is hard to pay on time the soldier in the field, the policeman in the district, and the teacher in the village.

Despite progress on many fronts, violence is up this year. As expected, it has been highest in the south. The Taliban are testing the mettle of ISAF forces. LTG Eikenberry can discuss efforts to enlist Pakistan’s cooperation in denying sanctuary and cross-border support for the Taliban and other killers.

Factional violence has gone down, in part because many former mujahaddin and illegally armed groups have at least partially disarmed. There’s still more to do.

And the drug trade is a factor, especially where eradication efforts have been most active. Tribal or family feuds, land disputes, and banditry flourish where governance is weak. We need to help the government connect with the provinces and districts and provide a robust justice sector. I believe the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people have confidence in President Karzai and his government to bring them out of decades of violence. We share that confidence. And, we are determined to work with his government to develop the capabilities to do just that.

In conclusion, I hope you are as determined as we are to help Afghanistan stand on its own feet. We make progress every day. We must keep in mind that it is a long-term undertaking, however. One of the world’s least developed countries, Afghanistan has few natural resources, little infrastructure, a high illiteracy rate, and a recent history marked by Soviet occupation and a brutal civil war. We worked together with the Afghans to overthrow the equally despised Taliban regime. Expectations are high. Our nations must continue to rise to the challenge.

We know that the support of our Congress and of the American people is essential to achieving our objectives. I welcome your questions.
Opening statement of Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry
Commander, Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
28 June 2006
Washington, DC

(As prepared for delivery)

Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, members of the Committee.

It is an honor to be here today representing the 23,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines of the Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan.

When the United States and its Coalition partners began Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, we started with two missions: First, to defeat Al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies; and second, together with the Afghan people and the international community, to help create the conditions where international terrorism could never again find willing support and sanctuary.

Viewed from the baseline of October 2001, the progress made to date in Afghanistan is truly significant: A democratically-elected president, a sitting Parliament, a confirmed Cabinet, a functioning Constitution, Afghan National Security Forces that are steadily growing in strength and capability; and ongoing reconstruction projects across the country that are improving the lives of the Afghan people.

Against this progress, Afghanistan remains the target of terrorist groups, drug traffickers and a determined criminal element. Not all violence can be attributed to the Taliban or al-Qaeda, as narco-trafficking, tribal conflicts and land disputes also continue to challenge the overall security environment. The enemy we face is not particularly strong, but the institutions of the Afghan State remain relatively weak. This situation is enabling the enemy to operate in the absence of Government presence in some areas of the country. To be sure, the presence and strength of the Taliban has grown in some districts, primarily in the South. Since being removed as a regime, they have reconstituted elsewhere. We are seeing enemy forces now operate in formations of 40 – 50 fighters; they are demonstrating better command and control; and they are fighting hard.

Our current operation in Southern Afghanistan, Operation Mountain Thrust, seeks to deny the enemy safe havens, interdict his movement routes, and, most importantly, extend the authority of the central government. The combat phase of this operation is only the precursor to our longer-term goal of strengthening good governance, the rule of law, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, and economic development. This emphasis on governance and development is indicative of our overall approach to the Afghan campaign.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are actively engaging district and provincial leaders to facilitate good governance; medical assistance teams are treating thousands of Afghans who otherwise would not have access to medical care; and we are building hundreds of miles of roads. This latter effort is key to expanding the reach of the central government and jump starting the rural economy. I cannot overstate its importance.

I have touched on our current operations and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have in the discussion to follow, but now I would like to discuss the future. This summer, the NATO International Security Assistance Force, or NATO ISAF, will expand its areas of operations from Northern and Western Afghanistan, to Southern Afghanistan. We anticipate that NATO will assume responsibility for the overall security mission for all of Afghanistan at some point later this year. A key point to remember is that the United States’ full commitment in Afghanistan will remain undiminished.

As a NATO member, the United States will remain by far the single largest contributor of troops and capability. We will maintain our strong national capability in support of our counterterrorism
mission to strike al-Qaeda and its associated movements wherever and whenever they are found. Moreover, our military will continue to play a central role in training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces; and we will maintain our important contribution to Afghanistan’s reconstruction.

In addition to the transition from the US-led Coalition to NATO ISAF international military leads, Afghanistan’s continued development will be marked by three other transitions. The second transition underway is the increasing emphasis by the Government of Afghanistan and international community on the non-military aspects of our collective efforts. As I just explained how this effort relates to Operation Mountain Thrust, I need to emphasize that it is the heart of our long-term effort to make Afghanistan a viable, self-sustaining member of the international community free from international terror. In short, we seek to rebuild Afghanistan’s “Middle Ground” — that is, its civil society ravaged by three decades of warfare, extremism, and terrorism.

Throughout Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, rebuilding the “Middle Ground” remains the primary concern of the Afghan people. A recent poll of Afghans showed that 80% see economic reconstruction — not security — as their number one need. To further enhance security and stability, the Government of Afghanistan and international community must continue to work together to improve governance, the rule of law, economic infrastructure and social services. In a campaign such as this, the construction of roads and schools can be just as decisive as military actions. The international community must make greater efforts in this area.

The third transition is from international to Afghan lead in all dimensions of Afghan governance and security. The growth in size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces — the National Army and Police — is one of the most visible and important aspects of this transition. Today, over 80,000 Army and police are trained, equipped and engaged in security operations. The Afghan National Security Forces, partnered with Coalition and NATO units, are expanding their reach and presence more widely within their country. They are increasingly playing a major role in ensuring the stability of their Nation, as evidenced by their successful participation in Operation Mountain Thrust. It is imperative that the international community maintain its support and commitment to this essential — but still emerging — institution of the Afghan State. We can anticipate emerging equipment requirements for the Afghan National Army and Police that NATO and the international community will need to address.

The fourth and final transition relates to the need to find cooperative approaches to the fight against international terrorism. Afghanistan, Pakistan and the international community are threatened by a common enemy. We have endeavored to adopt a coordinated military approach to address this threat, working to improve our combined operational effectiveness and build mutual confidence. For example, on June 6, I represented the United States at the 17th session of the Afghan-Pakistan-US Tripartite Commission at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. This session, like those before it, served to further cooperation between the Coalition, Afghanistan, NATO ISAF and Pakistan military forces. We aim to expand information sharing, communications, and personal interaction at all levels of command and we are making significant progress.

In my discussion of the progress in Afghanistan, I do not want to discount the enormous obstacles that remain. Much work needs to be done and the international community must remain patient and maintain an uncompromising long-term commitment to Afghanistan’s success — if we are to prevail. Most pressing, the continuing assaults on Afghanistan by international terrorism, as well as narco-trafficking and related government corruption could threaten the viability of the Afghan State. However, we should not be daunted by these challenges. Instead, we should take stock of the tremendous progress that Afghanistan and the international community have made to date and apply that same commitment to the difficulties that lie ahead.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to speak today about USAID’s progress in helping the people of Afghanistan to improve their economic circumstances, advance health care and education and to live in a thriving democracy. In today’s testimony, I will describe the significant challenges of working in Afghanistan and highlight how USAID’s programs are contributing to the achievement of the U.S. foreign policy objective of achieving a stable and secure Afghanistan.

Development reinforces diplomacy and defense in attempting to establish a secure and stable Afghanistan that is never again a haven for terrorists, relatively free of conflict, and controlled by a tolerant, representative and effective government. USAID is employing a multi-faceted strategy with short-term components that both provide tangible signs of hope while also building the framework for long-term, sustainable development efforts. These efforts dovetail with diplomacy and security to help improve stability.

There continues to be better coordination on reconstruction activities between USAID and US and coalition forces in Afghanistan. In recent meetings with the Commander of the US military’s Joint Task Force 76 and with leadership at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the respective militaries offered to provide significant logistical and security assistance in USAID’s effort on reconstruction, particularly in the volatile southern region of the country.

There are three stages to the reconstruction strategy for Afghanistan. The first stage focused on relief and humanitarian assistance. The current stage is focusing on stabilization and building systems that will act as a bridge to
the third and final stage of sustaining an environment with a legitimate government and a market-based licit economy.

As the first USAID official on the ground in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, I have witnessed how this strategy has been instrumental in helping the people of Afghanistan move towards creating a stable and productive state. Historically, the vast majority of Afghans have not had access to electricity or safe water. In some remote mountainous villages, the nearest paved road is a two-week walk away. And when USAID first arrived in Kabul, much of the population had been severely traumatized after years of war, which has contributed to the highest maternal mortality rate in the world and a 70% illiteracy rate. Most Afghans did not remember a time when conflict was not a major part of their lives. Today, in Kabul and other major cities throughout the country, the economy is growing quickly: cell phones are everywhere, there are free radio and television stations, and more and more women are making their own choices about their lives.

**Implementing USAID’s Strategy in Afghanistan**

The first stage of USAID’s strategy in Afghanistan focused on getting people back to some sense of normalcy by providing emergency relief and basic services. We needed to get food on tables and jobs for people. We needed to tackle the collapsed social service sector. Since agriculture is the mainstay of about 70 percent of the population, we put much emphasis on the development of rural livelihoods. Children – especially girls – had not been to public schools in at least six years, so it was vital to get the education system back up and running and to provide the means for those who had missed schooling altogether to catch up. As mentioned earlier, Afghanistan has unconscionable health indicators, and we had to work to set things right, especially when women and children were dying at such alarming rates. In response to these incredible needs, we focused our funds on agriculture, education and health.

In December 2001, in Bonn, Germany, Hamid Karzai had just been named the head of the Afghan Transitional Authority. The country had to be put on a path of democratic stabilization, and USAID supported this process by funding and helping with the logistics for the Emergency Loya Jirga held the following June and then to implement the rest of the Bonn accords. These actions were augmented by a series of “transition initiatives”, designed to show the people of Afghanistan that there were concrete dividends that
would come from a new government. These included rebuilding destroyed schools, market centers and other small-scale, quick impact projects, and the development of an independent media, including radio and television stations.

After the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan had five different currencies in circulation. As a first step in creating the environment for the development of an economy, USAID helped unify these currencies into one, country-wide new unit, and launched a program to help the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank with monetary and fiscal policy.

In addition to the lack of a viable currency, the total lack of physical infrastructure presented a serious impediment to economic growth. A country cannot develop without a functioning transportation network and electricity. Subsequently, both President Bush and President Karzai decided that Afghanistan needed a major road project. Therefore, USAID began an ambitious plan to rebuild the highway connecting Kabul with Kandahar and Herat as well as nine provincial roads. When finished, 14 provincial capitals will be connected to a critical trade route. Because only seven percent of Afghans have access to electricity, USAID began to rehabilitate the Kajaki Dam, the premier source of hydroelectricity for southern Afghanistan, so that region could have access to a good, consistent supply of electricity.

The future for Afghanistan does not look encouraging unless Afghans can develop relevant skills to generate economic growth and find employment. Most Afghans, particularly the younger generations, have been denied this opportunity. Therefore, one of the fundamental tenets of USAID’s program is, wherever possible, to train and transfer skills to Afghans. This will allow Afghans to participate in their country’s development and will lead to greater sustainability.

As I mentioned before, USAID is currently in the second stage of its long-term strategy and will be implementing this second stage of its reconstruction assistance program from 2006 to 2010. I would now like to discuss our priorities.

The four key components of our strategy’s second stage are the improved environment for development; a thriving licit economy led by the private sector; democratic governance with broad citizen participation, and a better educated and healthier population. Within the current strategy, additional
focus has been placed on roads and power in order to accelerate economic growth and show visible, tangible signs of progress to coincide with Afghan and coalition offensives.

- **The Improved Environment for Development**: We intend to establish a platform for sustainable economic growth for the Afghan people. This strategy builds on our current programs, yet explicitly empowers the private sector as a key player and driver of Afghanistan’s future. USAID will set the stage for sustainable economic growth by bolstering the justice system and providing means for conflict resolution, legitimizing local governance structures, and providing employment opportunities in the short- and long-term. In May, President Karzai and Ambassador Tobias launched USAID’s Afghans Building Capacity Program, a 5-year $125 million initiative to strengthen the institutions and skills of the Afghan Government and its public and private sectors.

- **A Thriving Licit Economy Led by The Private Sector**: USAID will expand the licit economy through continued investment in physical infrastructure – roads and power – essential to the development of even the most basic industries. Growth in the agricultural sector, which provides a livelihood for the majority of Afghans, combined with other employment opportunities, has to happen to give impoverished farmers a valid income generating alternative to poppy cultivation.

In December 2004, USAID launched its Alternative Livelihoods Program (ALP) to provide these alternatives. The program is one of five pillars of the joint counter-narcotics strategy of both the U.S. Government and the Government of Afghanistan and is designed to accelerate economic growth in Afghanistan’s principal poppy-producing provinces. It is important to emphasize that the Alternative Livelihoods Program will not be fully successful if the remaining pillars of interdiction, eradication, public information and law enforcement do not move forward at the same pace. While the program is no substitute for eradication and there will never be a dollar for dollar replacement for poppy income; the program does provide an alternative means for income and subsistence for farmers who have had their poppy fields destroyed or who have decided not to plant poppy. The program principally targets core poppy-producing areas in southern (Helmand and Kandahar Provinces), eastern (Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces) and northern (Badakhshan and Takhar Provinces) Afghanistan but includes activities in other provinces where
poppy cultivation is expanding or where there has been a concerted effort to eliminate narcotics production. ALP is a decentralized activity that relies on cooperation with government entities across the country and in many remote areas. Therefore, a key cross-cutting objective of ALP is to train local government officials in planning regional economic development, facilitating the growth of local businesses and effectively administering the public good.

- **Democratic System with Broad Citizen Participation:** This guarantees the rule of law through the electoral process will promote good governance and make it easier to prosecute offenders ultimately restoring the country to the tranquility it enjoyed in the 1960s.

- **A Better Educated and Healthier Population:** This will be achieved through continued investments in social services to create an educated and healthy workforce, which will be able to participate fully in the country’s economy and democratic government. Through sustained efforts in education, we will make vital, heavy investments in the health of mothers and children – the future work force of Afghanistan.

**SUCCESSES, FAILURES AND CHALLENGES OF USAID’S RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM**

USAID has had measurable success in Afghanistan in responding to the country’s needs. USAID provided textbooks to school children in time for the start of the first school year after the fall of the Taliban; built the road linking Kabul to Kandahar in record time; assisted with the currency conversion; and supported the implementation of the Bonn Process, including the Emergency Loya Jirga, the Constitutional Loya Jirga, presidential and parliamentary elections and the seating of parliament.

To date, USAID has built 524 schools accommodating nearly 400,000 students and 528 clinics serving 340,000 patients per month. By the end of 2006, USAID anticipates completing more than 600 schools and 600 clinics. This is a phenomenal number, averaging 19 schools and clinics per month since construction first started in April 2002. These buildings, constructed to high quality standards, are designed to withstand harsh environmental conditions, repair easily with local materials and expertise, and maintain cultural appropriateness. They are also earthquake-resistant, something which we take seriously since Afghanistan is in an earthquake zone. Initial reports
showed that 18,000 schoolchildren died or were seriously injured in the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake because their schools collapsed onto them.

Our presence on the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) has allowed us to build closer relations with local officials and community leaders to better understand local needs and development goals. Since the Coalition and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) militaries staffing a PRT are able to offer the necessary protection for our staff, PRTs have been a useful platform for USAID to monitor our programs throughout the country and ensure that aid is being delivered to the right people.

In addition to developing local connections and monitoring USAID’s national programs, on each PRT, USAID has contributed to the province’s local needs and development goals through the Quick Impact Program (QIP). QIP is the USAID funding mechanism that allows our field program officers on the PRTs to undertake specific development projects in their provinces. The field officers select appropriate projects and activities in consultation with the military on the PRTs, while ensuring local leadership. The primary purposes of QIP projects are to extend the reach and influence of government throughout the provinces and to create a climate of improved freedom and economic activity. Projects implemented through QIP include tertiary roads, bridges, water supply, irrigation, government administrative buildings, schools, clinics, micro-power generation and training courses for women.

PRTs are a vital part of Afghanistan’s reconstruction, and as the majority of them shift from Coalition to ISAF control, it is important that USAID continues to work with each of the current ISAF member states (Germany, United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, and – as of next week – Sweden) that lead NATO PRTs, as well as the nations that are expected to contribute by fall 2006, when ISAF is scheduled to assume responsibility for security in the south.

In addition, USAID coordinates closely with the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of State to ensure that activities in development, diplomacy and defense complement and strengthen U.S. foreign policy goals, with the ultimate goal of extending the reach and legitimacy of the emerging government of Afghanistan. This inter-agency approach has been one of the most successful aspects of the PRTs.
We cannot talk about progress in Afghanistan without acknowledging that a major obstacle to getting our work completed on schedule is the security situation. Our staff faces real dangers every day, such as rocket attacks, banditry and kidnappings. We take necessary precautions to ensure their safety. Increasingly, our contractors are being targeted, and a number of them have been killed, making it more difficult for USAID to recruit appropriately qualified staff. The ancillary costs to provide security have also risen substantially. During the May riot in Kabul various USAID Implementing Partners had buildings burnt that may lead to increased security costs for all partners.

We continue to implement our projects despite security threats by extremists who attempt to disrupt services and destabilize the country. Since 2002, 139 USAID-funded workers have been killed in hostile incidents, 148 seriously injured or disabled, and another 35 staff were killed in accidents. Building schools and roads or educating girls is a challenge in an insecure environment. For example, USAID has built 524 schools and another 128 are currently under construction, but construction crews at 53 of our schools experienced violence. This spring, a headmaster was shot in Helmand; 200 schools in Kandahar and 165 in Helmand closed for security reasons, and in January, a high school teacher was beheaded in Zabul. The Ministry of Education has recorded 174 schools as being damaged or destroyed over the past 18 months. Fifteen USAID funded schools have been damaged or destroyed by terrorist attacks since the inception of the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment Program (SACCRP) in May 2004. Extremists have burned girls’ schools and have injured or killed personnel with roadside improvised explosive devices. However, the Afghans continue to persevere under these extremely difficult conditions.

Another ongoing challenge to working in Afghanistan is managing the expectations of the Afghan people, the government and the media. Because of decades of insecurity, destruction, and corruption, the state was incapable of the most basic functions by the time the Taliban fell. The country has been trampled by foreign invasions and fragmented by international as well as internal politics. The result was massive poverty, a state devoid of institutions to govern and serve the people, and the dominance of a drug economy that hindered revenue and state building as well as legitimate economic growth.
An important fact to remember is that development takes time. Comparing statistics from similar countries shows us that:

- It took Bangladesh 17 years to increase adult literacy by 9%, from 32% in 1985 to 41% in 2002.
- It took India 44 years to decrease the infant mortality rate from 242 deaths per 1,000 births down to 85 (a 65% decrease).
- It took Morocco 43 years to increase its GDP from $2B to $44B.

These examples also took place in the absence of active insurgencies or security concerns.

USAID has only been engaged in Afghanistan for just four years, and change takes time, despite the expectation of many that reconstruction and development should happen at lightning speed.

I want to take this opportunity to recognize and thank our U.S. men and women in uniform, as well as the American and international staff on USAID projects who have given up the comfort and safety of their homes to help rebuild Afghanistan, and also acknowledge the major contributions of the Afghan staff working alongside us. Without them, we would have no success story.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL MIKE MEASE
DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

COLONEL CINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

Subject: Academic Report- Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan
Friday, 19 May through Friday, 26 May

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides follow-on feedback reference visit 19-26 May 2006 to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Look forward to doing a faculty seminar with Department of Social Sciences at your convenience in the fall semester.

2. SOURCES—AFGHANISTAN:
   b. Afghan Minister of Defense Wardak: Office visit and discussions.
   c. Afghan Minister of Interior Mehsuli: Office visit and discussions.
   d. Afghan Army Chief General Bismullah Kahn: Office visit and discussions.
   f. Afghan 205th Corps Commander and battle staff, Kandahar Visit: Briefings and informal discussions.
   g. Commanding General, Afghan Military Academy: Briefings, classroom visits, informal discussions.
   h. U.S. Ambassador Ron Newman: One-on-one Lunch and discussions.
   i. LTG Karl Eikenberry, Commander Combined Forces Command Afghanistan: Briefings and one-on-one discussions.
   j. LTG David Richards, UK Army, Commander ISAF (NATO): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
   k. MG Ben Freakley, U.S. Army, Commanding General JTF-76 Battle Staff briefings and one-on-one discussions.

o. BG James Terry, U.S. Army, ADC-Ops -- 10th Mountain Division: Discussions and briefings.

p. BG Christopher Miller, U.S. Air Force, Commander of Air Combat Command for CJTF-76

q. BG (F) Stephen Layfield, U.S. Army, J3 ISAF: One-on-one discussions and briefings.

r. BG David Fraser, Canadian Army, Commander Coalition Task Force Aegis, Kandahar (NATO): Discussion and briefings.

s. BG (Ret) Herb Lloyd, DYNCORP Afghanistan: Lunch. One-on-one discussions and updates. Drug Situation.

t. Colonel John Nicholson, U.S. Army, 10th Mountain Division Brigade Combat Team: Field Visit and briefings - Battalion Commanders and Brigade Battle Staff.


w. Colonel Mo Morrison, U.S. Army, JTF76 J2 Intelligence Officer: One-on-one briefing and discussions.

x. Mr. Tom Koenigs, United Nations Representative Afghanistan: UNAMA. One-on-one discussions and briefings.

y. Mr. Doug Wankel, U.S. Embassy Drug Policy: Briefings and one-on-one discussions.


aa. Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) Battle Staff Campaign Brief.

bb. Dinner Seminar NATO ISAF Staff: LTG's and Colonels.


dd. Special Operations Headquarters—Afghanistan: Visit and Briefings.

ee. JTF-76 Joint Operations Intelligence Center: Briefings and discussion.

3. SOURCES—PAKISTAN:

a. U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker: Embassy residence - dinner discussions; Office call - one-on-one visit.

b. BG Sandy Davidson, U.S. Army, U.S. Defense Representative Pakistan: Briefings and one-on-one discussions.

c. ODRF Briefing by Colonel Allen and Colonel Shapiro: Discussions Support to the Pakistani Military.

d. Mr. Bob Cahill FBI — DOJ Legal Attaché Team: Briefings - War on Terrorism.

e. U.S. Defense Attaché Round Table with Colonel Tom Wahlert and team.
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f. Mr. Tom Nuss, DEA SAC: Discussions and briefing.

g. U.S. Embassy Political Officer Ms. Theresa Grendik: Briefing and discussion.

h. U.S. Embassy Economic Officer Mr. Drew Quinn: Briefing and discussion.

i. Office Call Pakistan Vice Chief of Army Staff, Gen Ahsan: Briefing and discussions.

j. Vice Chief of General Staff MG Yusaf: Pakistan Army Operations Brief.

k. LTC Kalik Dar, Pakistan Army: Current Operations Briefing.

l. LTG Raza, Commandant Pakistan National Defense College: One-on-one office call and discussions.

m. Luncheon Seminar Pakistan National Defense College with LTG Raza and Senior Staff: Open discussion the strategic situation of Pakistan.

n. MG Shahid Iqbal, Chief Instructor, War Wing at the Pakistan National Defense College. Discussions.

o. MG Muhammad Tariq Masood, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis at the Pakistan National defense College.

p. Vice Air Marshall Faaz Amir, Chief Instructor ND Wing at the Pakistan National Defense College

q. Dr. Mazari, Institute of Strategic Studies: (Rant by Ms Mazari for an hour about the danger of Afghanistan and the refugees, the evil of the Indians, the ignorance of the Americans, etc. Suggested Afghan refugees should be driven out of Pakistan and get killed in their own country. Nice lady... PHD from Columbia University)

4. TWO EQUALLY VALID VIEWS OF AFGHANISTAN:

1) OBSERVATIONS ON THE GROUND:

- Afghanistan has in the short space of five years moved from a situation of mindless violence, cruelty, poverty, massive production of drugs, the absence of government, and isolation - to a nation with a struggling democratic government; an exploding economy; a rapidly growing, disciplined Army; a vibrant free press, and active diplomatic and economic ties with its neighbors and the world. The 30 million people have showed almost unbelievable gratitude for the actions of the international community and have welcomed a significant foreign presence with great hospitality and trust.

- Opium production has been dramatically slashed by 48% just in the past year. In less than three years, 4.4 million refugees have flooded back into the nation. 93% of the refugee camps in Pakistan have been closed. A Constitution has been adopted.

- A President has been elected who is a Statesman of enormous integrity, vision, and courage. A Parliament has been elected with representation from every walk of political life - and a greater percentage of women than any other democracy in the world. The road network and transportation infrastructure have gone from absolutely non-functional to a rapidly growing network that is beginning re-vitalize the economy and trade with its neighbors.

- Massive amounts of international and private foreign aid are pouring into the country. The totally destroyed educational system is beginning to function. The agricultural and livestock system has grown enormously. The irrigation system destroyed by the Soviets is coming back.

- The security situation is so dramatically changed for the better that no platoon-sized unit has ever been defeated in battle. U.S. Forces routinely operate in squad sized units.
As one US Army Aviation Brigade Commander told me: "I have been flying over this country for three combat tours since 2001; the change for the better is almost unbelievable - I can see it with my own eyes from 500 feet."

**SECOND DESCRIPTION FROM UNCLASSIFIED OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS:**

- Afghanistan is also described in official unclassified US Government documents as a nation where: security forces act independently of government authority; terrorist attacks, armed insurgency, and violence continue; security and factional forces commit extrajudicial killings and torture; local police routinely torture and abuse detainees; and corruption and official impunity remain pervasive problems.

- The judiciary was inefficient and subject to influence and corruption; and local Shuras sentence people to death by stoning or flogging.

- The country remains devastated by the peril of 450,000 landmines which kill and maim hundreds of people a year; foreign missionaries are harassed; there is widespread public perception of government corruption, including ministerial involvement in illegal narcotics; intimidation and violence directed at NGO workers increased during the past year.

- Violence against women persisted, including beatings, rapes, forced marriages, kidnappings, and honor killings; violence impeded access to education; child abuse was endemic throughout the country; and violence and instability hampered relief and reconstruction efforts in different parts of the country.

- Afghanistan also produces more than 90% of the world’s opium poppy (4,475 metric tons 2005) and is also the world’s largest heroin producing and trafficking country. Illicit opium production is one-third of the entire GNP and valued at $2.8 billion. The GOA has not been able to enforce its decree banning opium production. They have conducted limited opium eradication. Drug addiction is growing rapidly with 920,000 drug users (to include 7000 injecting heroin addicts). The drug problem has grown out of control (al) but two of Afghanistan’s 34 Provinces. Evidence has mounted that the drug proceeds are supporting the Taliban and terrorist groups.

**SUMMARY—THE THREAT:**

- In my view, there is little question that the level of fighting has intensified rapidly in the past year. Three years ago the Taliban operated in squad sized units. Last year they operated in company sized units (100+ men). This year the Taliban are operating in battalion sized units (400+ men).

- They now have excellent weapons, new IED technology, commercial communications gear and new field equipment. They are employing suicide bombers who are clearly not just foreigners. In many cases, they appear to have received excellent tactical, camouflage, and marksmanship training. They are very aggressive and smart in their tactics. Their base areas in Pakistan are secure. Drug money and international financial support have energized their operations. Their IO campaign is excellent.

- In three years, the Taliban has reconstituted the movement. They are brutalizing the population, in particular in the Pashtun areas. They are now conducting a summer-fall campaign to knock NATO out of the war, capture the Provincial capital of Kandahar, isolate the Americans, stop the developing Afghan educational system, stop the liberation of women, and penetrate the Police and the ANA.

- The Taliban will be slaughtered in the coming six months of their attempt to confront NATO in large unit operations. They will be forced back into a more cautious insurgency role. We obviously must fight them politically, economically, as well as militarily. In my view, they will soon adopt a strategy of "waiting us out."
5. FRIENDLY FORCES:

a. U.S. Joint Task Force 76:

- We have fielded an aggressive, beautifully equipped air-ground team that operates freely throughout the country. Tactics are sound. Operational security (OPSEC) is impressive. US information operations (IO) and non-kinetic operations are tightly aligned with fire and maneuver. The discipline, morale, and competence of the troops are simply awesome.

- The chain-of-command is extremely experienced. The tactical commander (MG Ben Freakley JTF-76) and his battalion and brigade commanders are in many cases on their third or fourth combat tour. They absolutely know what they are doing. LTG Karl Eikenberry the strategic and operational Commander (CFC-A) has great experience and a very sophisticated grasp of the political and military situation. He is respected by the Afghans as the “Father of the Afghan Army”.

- The US Army National Guard units embedded as trainers of the new Afghan Army (ETT’s) have done a superb job. Afghan progress has been so dramatic that CENTCOM should consider using an Active Duty Light Infantry Brigade Combat Team for the next set of US Afghan unit trainers and partnership units. We will need to push those developing Afghan units to a higher training and operational level.

- We have a very, very small US military presence (17,000 troops) in a giant and dangerous land which is one third larger than Iraq. (The size of Texas). US Forces face thousands of heavily armed Taliban as well as pervasive criminal and Warlord forces. Pakistan is an active sanctuary for the Taliban and is struggling against the “Talibanization” of their side of the frontier. Afghanistan is awash with weapons. Taliban suicide bombings and IED’s are now constant and rapidly growing in intensity and effectiveness (although they are very primitive and ineffective compared to Iraq). Pakistani Madrassas continue to get the very bright sons of the Afghan rural areas because of poverty and a lack of an Afghan educational system.

- The Taliban have not been defeated. NATO Forces will face a great challenge during the coming 24 months as ISAF assumes total responsibility for the security situation. The training and partnership of the Afghan Forces will require at least five years of continued robust US Military presence.

- In my view, the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan requires a continuing division-sized US military force with at least six ground combat battalions supported by significant US Army aviation, engineers, USAF CAS and C130/ AC130, civil affairs, military police, reconnaissance, intelligence, logistics, and 155mm and MLRS artillery support.

- Suggest we must have a continued robust presence of Special Operations Forces for counter-terrorist unilateral action. (These SOCOM Forces are inspiring for their incredible professionalism in stealthy air-ground actions supported by superb intelligence. They are in my judgment, the most dangerous people on the face of the earth.)

- We will encounter some very unpleasant surprises in the coming 24 months that will require US fighting forces which can respond rapidly throughout this huge and chaotic country to preserve and nurture the enormous successes of the past five years. The Afghan national leadership is collectively terrified that we will tip-pace out of Afghanistan in the coming few years—leaving NATO holding the bag – and the whole thing will again collapse into mayhem. They do not believe the United States has made a strategic commitment to stay with them for the fifteen years required to create an independent, functional nation-state which can survive in this dangerous part of the world.

b. NATO Forces – ISAF:

- The new commander of ISAF LTG David Richards (UK Army) is very, very capable. He has an excellent grasp of the situation on the ground and an equally clear view of the NATO realities that limit his capabilities. ISAF is fenced by parameters that will politically and militarily constrain their possible future actions. The good news is
that the current ISAF HQs is a standing NATO capability of enormous competence. They have extensively trained together and rehearsed for this operation. They can without question coordinate and synchronize all NATO military forces under their control. There is also a sizable and talented US military team resident in the ISAF NATO Headquarters.

- ISAF is now taking OPCON of some very powerful NATO battalion combat teams— in particular the Brit’s, the Canadians, and the Dutch (1300 troops with their own lift, attack helicopters, and F16 ground attack aircraft). However, ISAF flexibility will be severely limited by the realities of the political-military ROE’s (both known and unknown) that will constrain each of these national contingents. In addition, ISAF is severely lacking adequate enabler forces (attack and lift helicopters, smart munitions, intelligence, engineers, medical, logistics, digital command and control, etc) to fully leverage and sustain their ground combat power.

- The rapidly expanding NATO ISAF Forces are doing very well on the ground. The Canadians have done some fierce fighting and have responded very well to their first exposure to real combat since WWII. They should be very proud of their leadership and the courage of their soldiers. However, the Taliban campaign envisions knocking NATO out of the war by massing on perceived weak points in the Alliance. The Dutch are widely believed to be a significant target since the Dutch Parliament has signaled their weak political support of this deployment. Other Allied units (e.g. the Rumanians) are weak formations wrapped up in ad hoc allied organizations. Some small NATO units have deployed badly-equipped and poorly structured. US Joint Forces will have to remain very cognizant of these ISAF vulnerabilities during their transition. ISAF success will have huge importance to our US national security objective to internationalize the political and economic development of Afghanistan. If NATO fails— we fail.

- NATO-ISAF has another daunting problem. By this coming February 2007 (seven months), NATO will assume total responsibility for the entire battle space of Afghanistan. The next ISAF Commander (three-star) and the Headquarters (Corps level requirement for operational and tactical control of 25,000 NATO troops (including US) and 50,000 + Afghan security forces) has not yet been identified. This ISAF command element for next February should already be fully assembled in one physical location (such as Grafenwoer Training center) and undergoing a six month training workup to assume control in Afghanistan. This as yet unidentified NATO HQ will need to actually start movement into Afghanistan NLT Nov-Dec 2006. In sum, we are already in danger of not fielding an adequate NATO command and control capability suitable for this crucial requirement.

c. Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police Formations (ANP):

**THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY:**

- The creation by US CPC-A of 44 battalions of ANA Forces (30,000 troops) in 36 months is an enormous success story. They are the most disciplined, and effective military force in Afghanistan’s history. In general, these troops are very courageous, and aggressive in field operations. They operate like armed mountain goats in the severe terrain of Afghanistan. Their relations with the embedded US trainers have been appreciative and trusting. In general, the US Embedded Training Teams (ETT’s) admire and work effectively with their counter-part units. Our courageous US Army National Guard and Reserve Army and Marine training units operate in great isolation and under very demanding conditions from other US JTF76 forces.

- The Afghan Army is miserably under-resourced. This is now a major morale factor for their soldiers. They have shoddy small arms— described by Minister of Defense Wardak as much worse than he had as a Mujaddeh fighting the Soviets 20 years ago. Afghan field commanders told me that they try to seize weapons from the Taliban who they believe are much better armed. The ANA report AK47’s in such poor maintenance condition that rounds spin into the ground at 100 meters. Many soldiers and police have little ammunition and few magazines.

- These ANA units do not have mortars, few machine guns, no MK19 grenade machine guns, and no artillery. They have almost no helicopter or fixed wing transport or attack aviation now or planned. They have no body armor or blast glasses. They have no kevlar helmets. They have no up-armored Humvee’s or light armor tracked vehicles.
vehicles (like the M113A3 with machine gun cupolas and with slat armor). They need light armored wheeled vehicles.

- There seem to be neither US resources nor political will to equip these ANA battalions to rapidly replace us as the first line counterinsurgency force. Strongly suggest that this Army and Police Force should be 70,000 to 100,000 troops within 18 months—not an anemic force of 50,000 soldiers. We should fund this effort at $1.2 billion annually and sustain it for ten years. The force should be expanded to include fifteen or more armed engineer battalions and medical battalions to work on the road, water, micro-power (6% of the country has electricity), medical and security infrastructure requirements. This situation cries out for remedy. A well equipped, disciplined, multi-ethnic, literate, and trained Afghan National Army is our ticket to be fully out of country in the year 2020.

**THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE:**

- The Afghan National Police are vital to establishing order in the urban and rural areas. (33,000 Afghan National Police ANP nominally exist and 5,200 Afghan Border Police) They are in a disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and trained, riddled by drug use and lacking any semblance of a national police infrastructure. There is very little oversight at Province or District level.

- CFC-A in close and effective partnership with Department of State (DNI) is now working diligently to correct the situation—principally using contractors as the training and management mechanism. This must be a crucial US national security objective in the coming ten years. We are starting from ground zero. The Germans who have lead nation responsibility have not been much help. In my judgment, the ANP training program must primarily be executed in-country with the very capable and courageous embedded US contractor police mentors/advisors.

- The Afghan police lack uniforms, armored vehicles, weapons, ammunition, police stations, police jails, national command and control, and investigative training. The police situation is perilous and vital to Afghanistan regaining control of the country from the rampant criminality, the Taliban, the tribal and factional fighting, and the constant multi-year vendettas that persist among tribes and families over resources (water, gems, drugs, timber smuggling, grass grazing rights, etc).

- The Afghan National Police cannot function unless there is a corresponding significant, funded coherent strategy to create a system of justice. We should do this with primarily an international contractor force. They need a thousand jails, a hundred courts, and a dozen prisons. The international community must build an educational and vocational training system tied to District level leadership to provide a re-entry system. The US cannot continue to be the only option of incarceration—in lieu of Afghan authorities either killing criminals/Taliban or letting them go.

- Without a reliable framework of National Police and a Justice System to create internal security—the political and economic development of Afghanistan will not be possible. Afghanistan will rapidly become in the coming years a narco-state. Afghanistan is already clearly a narco-economy.

**6. DRUGS, ROADS, KIDS, AND AGRICULTURE:**

The only thing that works well in Afghanistan is the giant, sophisticated opium/heroin-hashish drug industry. It will consume the country. It can only be countered by the simultaneous application of three major strategic lines of operation.

- First, we must eradicate the opium crops without fail each growing season with increasing power and effectiveness—primarily using contractor operated manual eradication employing masses of Afghan rural workers. A kilogram of injectable heroin in Afghanistan can be bought for $2,500.00. The same kilogram can be sold on the US East Coast for $95,000.00. These desperately poor people are not stupid. They only get a fraction of this profit—but opium cultivation is a guaranteed way to make huge money now.
Second, we must provide an alternative economic option. In the short run, this is easy. We must provide direct help to farmers so they do not starve. This does not cost much money. (It costs us a billion dollars a month to fight the Taliban)

In the longer run, it means building a road network for $450 million over the coming seven years. It means connecting the Province and District capitals to a unified electricity national grid. This would be a $1.2 billion project which could be completed by 2016. (Now four disconnected grids) It means forging an educational system to teach kids and young adults: agronomy, basic health and preventive medicine, literacy, animal management, well-digging and irrigation management, road construction and management, the management of micro-power energy cooperatives, management of tourism, basic structures construction, simple accounting, Islamic values of honesty and service, etc.

The international community will support us on this objective. It also requires foreign investment. This would be a fifteen year program which should primarily be carried out with Afghan labor, small Afghan companies, and foreign oversight and management which mentors and develops Afghan talent.

Third, the Afghan national political leadership must study the example of China, Thailand, Pakistan, Bolivia, Peru and other nations where drug cultivation has been severely constrained by a national campaign to convince the population that drug production will: weaken the nation, be in conflict with national cultural and religious values, addict the labor force and children, and destroy the possibility of peace and a moral family life. This is actually an easy message to craft and a joy to disseminate.

7. PAKISTAN:
The central question seems to be --- are the Pakistanis playing a giant double-cross in which they absorb one billion dollars a year from the US while pretending to support US objectives to create a stable Afghanistan—while in fact actively supporting cross-border operations of the Taliban (that they created) — in order to give them themselves a weak rear area threat for their central struggle with the Indians?

- The web of paranoia and insomno on both sides of the border is difficult to assess. However, I do not believe that President Musharaff is playing a deliberate double game. Pakistan is four nations in one weak and violent state. The Pakistan Army is the only load-bearing institution holding the nation together. The Army provides the only corps of high-integrity societal leadership (in general—and certainly when compared to civilian political elites). There is absolutely no way that the Army is serving as a dupe while fielding 13 battalions in severe combat in the FATA—battalions which have suffered hundreds of casualties (while preserving the necessary degree of both courage and embarrassing ineffectiveness). The ISI is the Army. The Frontier Police are the Army. The senior state and national police leadership and much economic business is the Army.

- In my view, the real problem is that the Durand Line marking the border does not exist. The Pashtuns and others are not primarily Afghans or Pakistanis—they are ferociously conservative, ignorant, hostile, black turban, black baggy pants guys—with AK47’s and an aversion to infidels and national government. They move back and forth from Quetta to Khostalak to fight and live—and have for decades. The Pakistanis barely control 5% of Baluchistan. They do not control most of the FATA. They fear the increasing radicalization of their frontier. Afghanistan does not control anything except parts of Kabul most of the time. Both nations are consumed by nationalistic hatred of the other state. Pakistan far, far less than Afghanistan. Pakistan conversely reserves nationalistic hatred for the Indians—which is of course reciprocated equally.)

- Cross border coordination military to military is superb between JTF 76 and the Pak’s. Intelligence cooperation is superb. The US should consider actively supporting a concept of fencing and putting barriers along selected areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border to constrain movement of the many, many armed groups moving back and forth across the frontier. The US can also will serve a useful role in promoting cross-border dialog and cooperation in every way possible - while scrupulously respecting the sovereignty of both nations.
8. CONCLUSIONS:

There is much to be encouraged about in Afghanistan. Karzai is a giant. The Parliament is talking and negotiating. The ANA is beginning to be a serious security force. The poor, desperate Afghans have crawled out of their caves and bunkers and are putting together a survival economy. (The 4th poorest nation on the face of the earth). The Taliban are being gunned down day and night when they mass. The international community—both NATO and the UN are engaged and making a difference. We are not alone.

- The Afghans are very impressive people. Traditionally they were pragmatic, not extremist. They are sick of fighting and they know we brought peace. They are genuinely a remarkable, hospitable people.

- CENTCOM brilliantly flipped our strategy from counter-terror to counter-insurgency at the end of the first year. Our US military forces have acted with enormous discipline and skill. We must be careful to rapidly tone down our aggressive operations in any urban area or when dealing with the civilian population in the coming months. Our current detailed operations at Bagram Air Base and in the brigades are now extremely professional, firm and humane. We must continue to ensure absolutely zero tolerance for abuse or unseemly treatment of any Afghan under our control. The protection of Human Rights is a military objective.

- Our goal must be zero innocent civilian casualties—even where this means Taliban units escape destruction by hiding among the people. We have to stay out of the cities and push the ANA with our backup into civil population control operations. We need to defer on the roads to the civil population while actively countering IED's and suicide bombers. (Move convoys at night, build by-pass roads, get US military and AID infrastructure out of built-up areas, use ANP units to accompany our small unit convoy movements.) Suggest we need to concentrate on the ANA and the ANP...not on large unit US operations.

- Active participation by the US inter-agency team and adequate international economic reconstruction aid are the future keys to winning the struggle for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. We also must publicly commit to a joint, long-term strategy of cooperation with the Afghan government. (Fifteen years)

- We must re-think the relative importance we place on Afghanistan. This was the source country of international terrorism. If we fail and it slips back into anarchy—it will again be a sanctuary for international terror. Iraq now receives five times the funding of our nation-building programs in Afghanistan. We support Iraqi forces that are 2.5 times larger and growing—than those of Afghanistan. Desperately poor Afghanistan can now fund only 15% of their Security Forces budget. Conversely, oil rich Iraq can fund 50% of their security forces.

- The bottom line is that there is the potential for a twenty year miracle in Afghanistan on the order of magnitude of the birth of modern Japan following WWII. Afghanistan will never have any significant economic lever in the world arena. But it can become an island of stability and an example of a modern Islamic state—with a people who can dry up the sanctuary that murdered 3000 Americans on 9/11.

- It was an honor to see the men and women of the US Armed Forces and the CIA—as well as NATO—who are creating a new Afghanistan by their collective courage and dedication. We are without question moving inexorably in the right direction to achieve our goal of a stable, peaceful Afghanistan in the coming years.

Barry R McCaffrey  
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 28, 2006
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. I would like to know, how much money are we spending with those four contractors or their subsidiaries in Afghanistan?

Mr. KUNDER. Since establishing its Afghanistan operations in 2002, USAID has not held contracts with, nor expended resources for work in Afghanistan to Halliburton, KRB, Bechtel or Dyncorp. We have held a contract with the Louis Berger Group (LBG) in the amount of $700 million over four years. LBG is USAID’s largest contractor in Afghanistan and has been responsible for significant infrastructure projects, including: refurbishing major portions of Afghanistan’s roads, both primary and secondary; constructing schools and clinics; improving critical segments of irrigation canals; and, rehabilitating hydropower at the Kajakai Dam, the primary source of power in the south.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ

Ms. SANCHEZ. When was the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board put in place?

Ms. LONG. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)—a key outcome of the London Donor’s Conference on Afghanistan—was established to track donor pledges and monitor aid effectiveness. The JCMB met for the first time on April 30, 2006 and for the second time on July 30, 2006. Smaller, issue-focused sub-groups have met numerous times to accelerate progress in key areas, such as power sector development, airport security, and police pay reform.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA

Ms. DAVIS. And what is the number or the proportion of people that speak Farsi?

Mr. GASTRIGHT. All State Department provincial reconstruction team (PRT) positions in the field are language designated for either Pashto or Dari. Currently, there are two Dari speakers in the field, and we are aggressively recruiting for next year, with the goal of having one person in language training for every PRT position. As these are one-year assignments, this year we are recruiting two people for every position and expect to significantly increase our cadre of language-capable officers over the next few years.

Ms. DAVIS. Do you know how many Department of State individuals are there working in PRT teams throughout the country [Afghanistan]?

Mr. GASTRIGHT. At this time, there are 28 State Department positions in Afghanistan working at or supporting the work of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The State Department has a representative at 20 out of the 23 PRTs throughout the country, as well as having two representatives at the ISAF Headquarters, and one representative each at Regional Command South and Regional Command East. There are also four positions in Embassy Kabul’s political section devoted to supporting the work of the PRTs. USAID has 18 positions working on PRT teams throughout Afghanistan, including at all PRTs led by the United States.