APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM HURRICANE KATRINA: HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS PREPARING FOR THE UPCOMING HURRICANE SEASON

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HEARING HELD MAY 25, 2006

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APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM HURRICANE KATRINA: HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS PREPARING FOR THE UPCOMING HURRICANE SEASON

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APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM HURRICANE KATRINA: HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS PREPARING FOR THE UPCOMING HURRICANE SEASON

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
SUBCOMMITTEE,

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. Good morning.

The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities meets this morning to discuss how the Department of Defense is preparing for the upcoming hurricane season. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated last year, when there is a catastrophic disaster, the military will be called upon to aid in the response.

During Katrina, the military, and the National Guard in particular, shouldered this responsibility and completed its mission with valor.

There is always room for improvement, however. This hearing will investigate how the Department of Defense has incorporated lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina as it plans and prepares for the upcoming hurricane season. In the weeks and months following Hurricane Katrina, the Federal response to the disaster was scrutinized and critiqued.

The Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation For the Response to Hurricane Katrina, the Government Accountability Office and the White House have all issued reports reviewing the Federal response to the hurricane, and the military response in particular.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how they are responding to the findings and recommendations of these reports. It is important to note that the military mission in responding to domestic catastrophes is primarily a support mission. Other agencies are in the lead.

As a result the military ability to complete its mission rests on the level of coordination between the Department of Defense, the National Guard, Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the Department of Homeland Security, and State and local entities as well.
In many ways, mission success will be determined by the level and quality of interagency coordination. I encourage the witnesses on both panels to address this issue during the testimony.

Unfortunately, the planning, training and exercising for hurricane response operations are not a theoretical matter. Just this week, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration predicted for this year 13 to 16 named storms with 8 to 10 becoming hurricanes of which 6 could become major hurricanes, Category 3 strength or higher.

While I hope this hurricane season passes without any Category 3 hurricanes or higher, our military in coordination with Federal, State and local entities must be prepared for the worst.

It is also important to keep in mind that military preparedness to deal with catastrophic events is important for reasons beyond hurricanes. While Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the great challenges our leaders face when implementing an emergency response plan, we have to remember that in the case of Katrina we had three days warning. In the case of a terrorist attack, we will have not have the luxury of any warning.

The military's mission to provide support for civil authorities applies to manmade disasters as well as natural disasters. As chairman of this subcommittee, I am constantly reminded that al Qaeda and its affiliates actively seek to carry out a catastrophic event on our soil. This threat is another reason why the military capabilities to respond to catastrophes is a matter of great importance. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the criticality of getting right our response to disasters.

To me, the importance of this matter is simple. The more we perfect our response capability, the more lives will be saved.

With us this morning are the Honorable Paul McHale, a great friend, and we are glad to see him back again for the second day in a row, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security.

Lieutenant General Steve Blum, also with us for the second day in a row, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and Major General Richard Rowe, U.S. NORTHCOM. Thank you for being here again today, General.

Major General C. Mark Bowen, the Adjutant General of the State of Alabama and Major General Douglas Burnett, the Adjutant General for the State of Florida.

We welcome you and look forward to your testimony.

After consultation with the minority, I now ask unanimous consent for Mr. Taylor to sit as part of this panel. Welcome, my friend.

Before we begin I want to recognize Adam Smith for any remarks he may have as today's ranking member.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. Mostly I just want to agree with everything you said. I think you outlined it very well. And the thing that I am most interested in is the coordination aspect of it. We obviously haven't had an event like this in the Pacific Northwest, but I have been in many, many meetings
with the energy management folks and all the different layers, city county, Federal, and I think the big issue everybody is interested in is how do we coordinate when an event like this happens, how did we very, very quickly figure out who is in charge and what the hierarchy is, because I think there are a great many experiences that time is lost, so sort of looking around saying, well, we have all got a role to play but who is organizing it? And certainly, I think our experience with the hurricanes in the South was that the Department of Defense (DOD), once they got on the scene, did a better job than anybody else.

So I think you probably have a lot to offer in terms of that coordination. I am curious to hear about that.

With that, I yield any additional time I have to Mr. Taylor, who is joining us, who I know has very specific concerns in this area, if you had anything to say.

Mr. Taylor. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. With that, we will begin with Secretary McHale. We look forward to your testimony, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL MCHALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

Secretary McHale. Good morning, Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting my colleagues and me to address the progress we have made in preparing for the 2006 hurricane season.

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my formal statement for the record and in the interests of time and to maximize the opportunity for questions, I will give you, if I may, an abbreviated summary of that formal statement.

Mr. Saxton. Without objection, thank you.

Secretary McHale. Hurricane Katrina, as noted, Mr. Chairman, was one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history in terms of persons displaced, businesses disrupted, commerce effected and a projected aggregate economic loss.

In response to the massive devastation caused by the storm, the Department of Defense's deployment of military resources in support of civil authorities after Hurricane Katrina exceeded in speed and size any other domestic disaster relief mission in the history of the United States.

As President Bush said on April 27, 2006, in New Orleans, one of the things we are working on is to make sure we have learned the lessons from Katrina. We have learned lessons at the Federal level, the State level and the local level, and now we are working closely together in preparation for the upcoming hurricane season, end of quote, echoing in many ways Representative Smith's comments, that coordination is the key to an effective response during the 2006 hurricane season.

Mindful of the lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina, the Department of Defense has taken deliberate actions to prepare for the 2006 hurricane season.

By June first, 2006, just a few days from now, the Department of Defense will have assigned a defense coordinating officer, a DCO, to each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) regional offices. DOD is giving priority to hurricane prone regions. Region IV, that is Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, and Region VI, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.

Both of these FEMA regions will have a fully staffed DCO and a five-member defense coordinating element complement by June first, 2006. The DCO and Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) will have the capability to deploy in support of the interagency joint field office.

Representative Smith, again, that is where the coordination that you talked about takes place and in the questioning we would welcome the opportunity to talk about the new paradigm in place to ensure that at the joint field office, all of the participating response elements, to include our Department, have been fully integrated in that combined effort.

In coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA and Department of Transportation, DOD has developed what we call 18 prescribed requests for assistance to expedite the provision of DOD support to civil authorities. These 18 prescribed, basically boilerplate, RFAs, requests for assistance, address DOD support for transportation to include helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, communications, public works and engineering, damage assessment, mass care, resource support, to include installations, mobilization centers and ground field distribution, public health and medical services, to include helicopter Medevac and temporary medical facilities.

In short, those prescribed RFAs drawn from the experience of Hurricane Katrina provide a template which when completed will automatically trigger the types of support that I have just described. We don't want to be writing these RFAs in the middle of a crisis when we can anticipate the mission requirement and have that draft largely complete before the crisis ever occurs.

March 31st, 2006, FEMA and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) signed an interagency agreement stating that DLA will provide logistic support to FEMA. DLA has been working with FEMA to prepare and plan for logistical support during all phases of a response.

FEMA has provided $70 million to DLA to procure, store, rotate and provide supplies, including meals ready to eat (MREs), commercial meal alternatives, health and comfort kits, tents, generators, fuels, medical supplies, construction items, and other equipment. DOD has been participating in weekly interagency meetings with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, and other departments and agencies to coordinate Federal planning and preparations for the 2006 hurricane season.

Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing U.S. Northern Command's revised contingency plan 2501 for defense support to civil authorities.

DOD has published a defense support to civil authorities standing execute order that authorizes the commanders of the United States NORTHCOM, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM),
and the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) to prepare DOD assets in order to be ready to deploy in support of civil authorities in response to natural disasters. Some of the areas covered by the executive order would include senior officers for command, control and coordination, identification of DOD installations as staging areas, helicopters for search and rescue, support for the movement of special needs patients, communications teams, logistical specialists for the establishment of food, water, and medical supply distribution points.

In April, 2006, the Department of Defense in coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services developed the DOD sections of the medical services concept plan again for the 2006 hurricane season. In that regard potential DOD support would include surgical support augmentation, including general surgeons, anesthesiologists, operating room nurses, and surgical support personnel.

DOD is supporting FEMA efforts to augment communications capabilities in the gulf coast region.

Interoperability of communications proved to be one of the major challenges in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Accordingly, before the hurricane season this year DOD will participate in four FEMA communications exercises to validate interoperability among Federal, State and local emergency management officials.

In addition, DOD in conjunction with FEMA has developed prescripted requests for assistance providing deployable communications options that can be called upon in the case of disaster.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the DOD response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest, fastest, civil support mission in the history of the United States. Nonetheless, as noted by the chairman, any military mission includes a serious after action review, and with an unflinching eye, we have been our own worst critics in terms of where we could have performed better last year. We have not only learned the lessons of Hurricane Katrina, we have acted upon them.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions upon the conclusion of the opening statements by my colleagues.

[The prepared statement of Secretary McHale can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for the very thorough statement. We appreciate it. And General Blum.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. H. STEVEN BLUM, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, U.S. ARMY

General Blum. Chairman Saxton and distinguished members of the committee, it is our honor and privilege to be here today to talk about the National Guard and the actions taken since Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and get ready for the current season, which is upon us in the next few weeks.

National Guard response has been described as the fastest and largest in the U.S. history, but that does not mean that we are ready for this hurricane season without improving what is already an outstanding record of accomplishment. For the last 9-1/2 months we have been working feverishly with interagency, inter-
governmental partners and our active duty partners to ensure that we have the capabilities and equipment that we did not have last year so that our response this year will be even more effective than what you saw last year.

There are two things that are very key to this, and the Congress has been very, very instrumental in providing the resources to make those capabilities possible.

I came before this committee about 8 months ago now and said that we needed $1.3 billion for communications equipment and for tactical vehicles, high water vehicles, so our mobility and communications and command and control could be better utilized, particularly in an area that would lose all its infrastructure, electrical grid and normal means of communication, and because of the generosity of the Congress we have spent $900 million on improving that capability for interoperable communications.

Last year I had three deployable satellite communications systems that could stand up and operate independently, very few satellite phones, as Congressman Taylor knows. This year we had 39 of those deployable forward positioned command and control satellite Field Emission Display (FED) systems that work off their own power, and beyond that we have now a system that will integrate not only the Department of Defense communications so that the National Guard can talk to the Army, Air Force, Navy and the Marine Corps that may be operating in the area, but we also have systems integrating equipment that allows us, more importantly, to talk to the civilian first responders on the 800 megahertz system, the 900 megahertz system, Ultra High Frequency (UHF), Very High Frequency (VHF), land line radios, cell phones or any other known communication architecture that exists in the United States of America. We have mapped that architecture out. We know what exists normally in those States and the territories, and we have now programmed our communications to be able to interoperate with the civilian first responders as well as the military responders that would show up on the scene.

Beyond that, any good team gets good with practice or better with practice. Nobody goes to the Super Bowl without a huddle and nobody goes there without scrimmaging and lots and lots of hard work. That is what we have been doing for the last 9-1/2 months.

Secretary McHale adequately described what we have done. There are two that I want to highlight. We have participated in all of those with U.S. Northern Command, the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, FEMA itself, to make sure that we are seamless. When we are called to support the lead Federal agency, we don't want to be exchanging business cards on the day of the hurricane. We want to make sure that we know who the DCO the DCE and important players are down there, and that they know our capabilities and our limitations so that Northern command can lean forward to fill the gaps that the Guard may not be able to provide.

For instance, we don't have any gray hull ships and we don't walk on water. So we are going to need the Navy and the Coast Guard and rely on them very heavily.

Two important exercises were the ones that we conducted in April in South Carolina where we had the hurricane States rep-
resented from the Mid-Atlantic States. I am going today to New England because this hurricane, the hurricane season is upon us. Where it is going to hit, no one knows. Where it will make landfall, nobody knows.

But we are being told this year we may see more activity on the Atlantic Coast, even as far as north as New England, and so I am going to New England to make sure that they are not complacent in New England in their preparation for the hurricanes and if they have the same vigor and interest and are prepared for hurricane season as the Southeast does and the gulf coast has put great attention to this.

The exercises conducted in the southeastern part and the Middle Atlantic States and, in particular, we just conducted as recently as last week an extensive look at Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi’s hurricane preparation. We conducted this in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and we did this with the interagency partners, the intergovernmental partners and our DOD partners, specifically U.S. Northern Command, again every one of these all along the way.

Last year, the visibility or seam that some of you may have perceived between the National Guard and the Department of Defense, that seam has been closed and you will not see a seam this year.

As General Rowe knows, he has perfect visibility on what we are doing at all times and I have perfect visibility knowing what NORTHCOM is anticipating to come in and support the National Guard when it is required.

I think this ARDENT SENTRY exercise that we just conducted was deliberately designed. It was a U.S. Northern Command exercise, was two weeks long in length. Rich? I will leave that to him to talk to. But I can tell you the big outcome of that is that the relationship between the National Guard and NORTHCOM is absolutely critical when you are talking about homeland defense, support of the homeland security, and I think that we have that relationship about as solid as it has ever been and we will make it more solid each and every day. It is that important.

So by applying the lessons learned and the very tough scrutiny that everybody’s response to hurricane Katrina Wilma and Rita really underwent, we have taken those lessons very seriously. We have taken those criticisms not personally, we have taken them professionally, and we are trying to shorten the list so that if we respond to hurricanes this year, that list will even be shorter the next time we are taken to task.

I anxiously await your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Blum can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, General Blum. General Rowe.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD J. ROWE, JR., DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND, U.S. ARMY

General Rowe. Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here to represent Admiral
Keating today and the men and women of U.S. Northern Command.

I am privileged to be part of a total force team, military, active and reserve, and to get to the extent of the partnership. During Secretary Chertoff’s visits to the Governors recently, I have had the honor of sitting next to General Burnett and General Bowen in both Florida and Alabama as part of that teaming effort that we are trying to describe.

Day to day, our headquarters is focused on deterring, preventing and defeating attacks against our homeland. We also stand ready to assist primary agencies in responding quickly to man-made and natural disasters when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

We maintain situational awareness through our NORAD/NORTHCOM command center, into which in the past year we have embedded a specific watch desk manned by highly qualified officers and noncommissioned officers that provides us direct insight into the National Guard deployments and the operations within the various States. We are networked with our subordinate commands and other government agencies and are prepared to bring all necessary capabilities to bear.

In the past year, both the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force have dedicated headquarters as component commands for U.S. Northern Command and today, 5th Army in San Antonio and 1st Air Force at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida are assigned those missions directly responsive to the U.S. Northern Command. That is different than last year.

We support civilian authorities by providing specialized skills and assets to save lives, reduce suffering and restore infrastructure in the wake of catastrophic events. In 2005, we supported the Department of Homeland Security in responding to four hurricanes, including the unprecedented response to Hurricane Katrina.

We have taken significant steps to improve our response capabilities based on the lessons learned and findings in the House, Senate and White House reports on Hurricane Katrina, as well as our own very detailed internal review.

Secretary McHale highlighted many of those actions. I will just list the names: The joint staff standing execution order for defense support of civilian authorities to support the operational planning for the hurricane season; the integration of full time defense coordinating officers and staffs to each Federal Emergency Management Agency region; the development of and actual authorship of the language for the prescripted requests for assistance for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Notable events include a hurricane preparation conference in which Admiral Keating had the distinct privilege of hosting 10 adjutants general from the gulf coast region as well as the U.S. Northern Command senior leadership in February for fairly extensive discussions on what we learned from 2005 and how we wanted to approach 2006.

Our information management mobile training teams have deployed across the country to demonstrate and instruct the use of collaborative tools, and information sharing processes to our Department of Defense and interagency partners.
To improve our communication capabilities, U.S. Northern Command has purchased, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, cellular network packages that include over 100 cell phones, 40 laptop computers, a satellite terminal and radio bridging. We also procured 300 satellite phones to assist in distribution for first responders in a disaster when directed.

In addition, we established a link into the homeland security information network picture in exchange liaison offices with the Department of Homeland Security, a national communication system, National Guard Bureau and the FEMA and joint field offices.

We are indeed much more prepared today to respond to a catastrophic hurricane than we were just a few short months ago. In the absolute worst case scenario, we will respond. We will respond with every bit of effort that we can to support our fellow Americans. We will do this as fast as possible. We will give it every bit of effort needed, and our success will be a result of the consideration that we have had and the hard work as a team.

We are working this as hard as we know how, at the same time maintaining a balanced approach to look at the defense requirements of our area of responsibility.

Gentlemen, I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Rowe can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much, General Rowe. Before we move to General Bowen and General Burnett, let me just say, I probably should have introduced General Blum this way, never before, at least in the 22 years that I have been here, have we depended on the National Guard to the extent that we do today. Tens of thousands of National Guardsmen are deployed overseas. We have just initiated a new program for the National Guard on the southwest border, and we are here today to discuss the important role the National Guard plays in response to hurricanes and other natural disasters here in the homeland.

So we are very fortunate today to have leaders like General Bowen and General Burnett with us today to help us understand the role the Guard plays in this homeland security role.

Thank you for being with us here today and we will begin with Major General Burnett.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DOUGLAS BURNETT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF FLORIDA

General Burnett. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Saxton, Mr. Meehan, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to appear before your committee today. I know you are deeply committed to national security and our Nation's response to domestic threats, including natural disasters. For me personally it is an extreme honor to be present before Members of Congress who represent the people of this Nation. I know of no higher honor for a military leader than to appear before the people.

As the Adjutant General of Florida, I speak on behalf of nearly 12,000 soldiers and airmen of the Florida National Guard. I have submitted my full statement to the committee, which I ask be made part of the hearing record. I would like to now give a brief opening statement.
My remarks this morning focus on three topics, Florida emergency response systems, our preparation for this hurricane season, and some thoughts for the future.

My intent is to highlight improvements we have made since the 2004 and 2005 hurricane season and outline Florida’s comprehensive culture of preparedness. The Florida system of the National Guard is part of the statewide emergency management team led by Governor Jeb Bush and the State coordinating officer, Director Craig Fugate. These are strong, experienced leaders, each with a well-earned national reputation in emergency response operations. The Governor serves as the State incident commander. In short, Governor Jeb Bush leads the cavalry in Florida. A Federal coordinating officer positioned in the State emergency operation center works closely with our State coordinating officer to ensure the ongoing flow of supplies, resources and assistance. Our unified response is based on a comprehensive emergency management plan with extensive preparations which take place throughout the year.

The State of Florida’s funding and preparation for domestic crises are significant and unparalleled. During this past legislative session, Florida’s legislature strongly supported and fully funded Governor Bush’s $565 million for disaster response. In fact, the number really is closer to $700 million of State funds. More than $97 million of these funds will be allocated to hurricane preparedness supplies, public education, and for strengthening home structures. 154 million was committed to emergency planning for special needs shelters for our most vulnerable, evacuation planning and county emergency operation centers. And, yes, Florida has accommodations for pets in our shelters.

Florida National Guard is the Governor’s first military responder, and by statute I serve as its principal military adviser. We prepare for homeland security and domestic security operations with the same intensity as we prepare to conduct combat operations, which we have been involved in in the last five years.

During the early stages of a significant domestic crisis we position a command team with the Governor in Tallahassee. The Adjutant General then appoints a joint task force commander to provide command and control over military forces in support of relief operations, while at the same time our joint force headquarters in St. Augustine establishes a common operating picture of the impacted areas and maintains constant communications with the National Guard Bureau, the State Emergency Operations Center, 5th Army and U.S. Northern Command.

Good communications builds trust, and trust builds speed, and speed is the essence of what we do.

National Guard liaison teams join each of Florida’s 67 counties in their emergency operation center. They are well trained and they serve as a liaison to elected leadership. Our goal is to assist State and local agencies in reestablishing their governing responsibilities, while being sensitive to not getting out in front of elected leadership, but in support of, which is the way it should work in a democracy.

As part of Florida’s comprehensive response team, the Florida National Guard remains in the affected area until local elected leadership, agencies and contractors are functioning and can meet
the needs of our citizens. Our Florida National Guard leadership team represents a highly experienced team, each having served in more than ten State activations for hurricane duty. In the last two years alone, they were all major teams.

I was actually on the ground as an airman in 1964 in our hurricane season in Mississippi as a lieutenant during Camille and that hurricane season, 1969, and for the last two years.

Let me turn to current assessment. In 2005, responders to devastation of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Dennis and Wilma on Florida. We also deployed assistance or advisory teams to both Louisiana and Mississippi. We learned much from these experiences. I think we all did.

Based on Louisiana-Mississippi lessons learned, we adjusted our plans and refined procedures to improve the ability to respond with large-scale forces to storms of serious orders of magnitude.

Along with our southeastern State partners we have revalidated our emergency management assistance compacts. Mr. Chairman, EMAC is a very workable system. It is effective. It saves money, and it relieves the active military certainly in a time of combat operations overseas.

EMAC ensures quick and effective movement of National Guard forces and State employees across State lines, and I cannot say enough about EMAC. Some military planners have accused me of liking this legacy system. Well, I like legacy systems such as the Constitution and having the military in support of civilian leadership and having elected leaders charged with the response efforts.

We have also conducted numerous training exercises. In fact when I left for Washington yesterday Governor Bush, his agency heads and more than 170 State emergency operations staff reloaded their entire staff to Camp Blanding from Tallahassee to show that we could reconstitute government and we could move from Tallahassee and never miss a lick in responding to the needs of our citizens.

And by the way, this exercise was a Category 4 hurricane the size of Katrina hitting Tampa and at the same time including two terrorist bombings in our cities.

We have more than 8,000 soldiers and airmen currently available for disaster response, and we have the equipment as well. We thank Secretary of Defense. We thank the Congress and General Blum for resetting National Guard equipment. As you know, we left a lot in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we understand that and respect those reasons. We also thank the Congress for funding the Guard and our needs that General Blum addressed earlier.

My staff and I met with teams from NORTHCOM, the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, 5th Army, and the National Guard Bureau to ensure we have one common message, one common response effort. The integration of these forces will lead to unity of effort in support of the Governor. In short, we believe we have made the appropriate preparations. And I can't say enough about the collective capabilities of the National Guard Bureau. No one could put thousands of soldiers on the ground as quick as General Blum.

Our final thoughts, Mr. Chairman, we need to improve our communications capability. As we move from one interoperability with
local first responders, our ability to up channel quickly, we think we are getting there. Congressman Bill Young funded significant amounts of money last year, and Florida has probably five times the capability to communicate in a blinding storm than we had in the 2004–2005 season.

In summary, let me say the State of Florida and the Florida National Guard will be ready this season. I know this subcommittee and Members of Congress will continue to provide focus and resources on improving our response.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Burnett can be found in the Appendix on page 76.]

Mr. Saxton. Thank you. Thank you very much. We are going to move now to General Mark Bowen.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. C. MARK BOWEN, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF ALABAMA

General Bowen. Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith. First, thank you for your kind words about our soldiers. This is what it is all about as far as I am concerned, and thank you for those kind words. They have carried a pretty big load, and they are doing very well.

It is certainly an honor for me to be here today to testify before this committee here in Congress, and I want to thank you for allowing me to be here.

As you know, I appeared early this year before Representative Tom Davis’s Katrina review committee and I understand the General Accountability Office and many other groups have issued reports on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but today I want to present what we have done in Alabama and what we did right, what we did wrong, what we have done since then, because as the Adjutant General for the State of Alabama, I work for Governor Riley. He has taken a very personal interest in this. So we have made some changes on what we did.

So what we are really talking about is how does the Alabama National Guard provide the military support to the civil authorities. Well, you know, the way we look at this thing is the first thing, first duty we have is we want to get into an area, we want to alleviate the pain, we want to provide security, we want to provide comfort, we want to do search and rescue, and we want to provide distribution of supplies if needed. So that is what we have to do.

So the first thing we have to do is response time, and that is what brings me here. Our response was very quick in Alabama. We start watching that cone, where the hurricane is about 72 hours out, and as it starts approaching the gulf coast and gets toward Mobile, we get a little bit antsy. At that time is when we start moving soldiers. So the thing that would help us is an early declaration, so I can place soldiers and airmen on duty 72 hours prior to landfall.

So that will give us approval of Federal funds, Title 32, for the pay allowances, operation and maintenance, and this would further enhance my ability because what I do is I move soldiers down toward the coast. You know they just don’t show up. They have jobs.
They may be on 18 wheelers driving. So I have to get them a little alert time so I can get them back to the army, I can load the trucks and equipment, the sand bagging equipment, whatever I need, and start pre-positioning it, the dozers, the frond-end loaders, the dump trucks off to the side of the hurricane. Because if I do that, then, wherever the hurricane hits, then I am able to move in as it comes through. I don't want my soldiers driving through the front of it. So we try to come in from the side.

Now the reason I say 72 hours is because you know how the hurricanes do. They may hit Alabama. They may hit Doug over in Florida. The good thing about that is I will have a task force on board that is prepared to go down, and I can turn left or right. I can go help Doug over in Florida, I can go help Harold in Mississippi or I can help Bennett over in Louisiana, which we did all of this last time.

I sent nearly 2,000 to Mississippi, 1,500 to Louisiana. I sent 100 to Texas and had 1,000 in Mobile, and I sent Doug about 100 over there. So we know how to do this.

But things we have to do, we have to alert. We have to mobilize, pre-position troops and supplies. So I just need a little time to do that in.

We have a joint force organization that works very well. Doug alluded to it. What we have in our task force and I can bring up one task force, two task forces or three. They have the capability for security, communication, medical, logistics, and that is internal and external logistics. When I send a task force to Mississippi or Louisiana, I send it self-contained. I want it to have everything it needs for seven to ten hours—seven to ten days so nobody has to worry about resupplying them where they are self-contained. And that has worked very well for us in Mississippi and Louisiana.

Again the Title 32 status I want to emphasize that provides a lot of the benefits for our soldiers, particularly in areas of injury, disability, duty related deaths. State active duty for Alabama, I will be honest with you I hate to pull them up on State active duty because if I do they have no death survivor benefits. They have workman's comp and that is all. I hate to tell you that, but it is the truth. So State active duty is not an option I like to go with. Title 32 again is the answer.

We talked about joint communications already. In this task force that I put together I flew over Mississippi the morning after the hurricane and the first thing I realized there was nothing down there. So I put together my task force. I used my satellite communication out of my Air Guard, and I used my multiple scriber equipment, MSE equipment out of the Army because that allowed my Humvees to talk to each other. There is nothing else down there. The long range satellite gave me the capability to talk back to Alabama, to talk to General Blum at National Guard Bureau or to NORTHCOM if it needs to go. That is how we did it, and we did it well.

So now we are doing some things different. We did not deploy our civil support team this time with the interoperable van that we have that makes us talk to everything because I sent it to Mississippi. But I now have, the State of Alabama has picked up more
of those vans, like Doug was talking about, so now then we will have those also available.

One of the things I do, I believe in putting liaison officers to each one of the headquarters. I send them to the Alabama emergency management agency, their emergency operations center (EOC). I also send them to the counties that are affected and I receive them from the State Emergency Management Agency (EMA) or National Guard Bureau or from NORTHCOM. We just believe it works well if they got situational awareness and knows exactly what is going on in Alabama because that provides better response for our people here.

One of the other things I do that we had not thought about the last time we did it is sundry packages. You think that is not important, but when you put a soldier out there working 18–20 hours in water up to his knees in the filthy conditions, we were able to contract porta potties from Birmingham, Alabama because there is not any down there, also shower units. We send sundry packages that had everything from Gatorade to post exchange items and personal because these soldiers are working hard and they are in miserable conditions, I will tell you. One of the soldiers told me, he apologized, he said, sir, I lost a magazine of ammunition. I said, well, how did that happen, son? He said, well, I was in New Orleans, we were doing search and rescue, and it fell out while I was rescuing somebody off a house and, sir, I wasn't getting in that water. And I understood. We will write that one off. But it is very miserable conditions they work in over there is what I am trying to get across to you. It is very important we take care of those soldiers.

Medical package, I think a medical package command of Army and Air also, and I do that because I have got a few more docs and Physicians Assistant (PAs) in the Air than I do the Army, but the Army had the medication. And I do that to take care of my soldiers. I will let the civilian authorities and the other agencies come in and take care of the civilian population. But I have to have medical help there for my soldiers. We did deliver a baby while we were down there. We will do things if we have to. I tell them if it has a bone sticking out and it is bleeding, we will take care of it. But we are not there really to take care of the civilian population.

Another thing we learned worked very well, I have topo units, topographical units that makes maps. We got to Mississippi and there were no street signs and no maps, Shreveport same way, and New Orleans.

So we sent a topo unit that made maps for us right there. They became the most hot commodity down there besides the water and ice. Everybody needed a map because you know when you get in there you can tell where you are. That worked very well.

So now we have loaded that into our task force. So when I load that task force, topo unit will be with it. Very critical. So that is one of those things we learned.

The EMAC General Burnett referred to in a minute, that works great. It is not broke, let's don't fix it. If Doug calls me or if General Cross from Mississippi calls me, it is a done deal, and it works very quickly, very smoothly. But one of the things we need to remember is that EMAC is not just for Alabama National Guard. It is also for the Department of Transportation, Department of Public
Safety, Fish and Wildlife, law enforcement agencies. We sent a lot of law enforcement agencies into Mississippi, Louisiana. They all worked under the EMAC system. That works very well. So that one is not broke.

One of the things I do want to do is we have been faxing and stuff back and forth, and that fax gets a little smudged after it goes so we are working on, they assured me in Baton Rouge, to have it where they do that electronically and that will work much better.

What did I do wrong? I sent college students, pulled them out of college. Sent them. I needed them. Their unit was called and they went. But then some of them on college scholarships, some of them on military scholarships, and the parents got a little antsy. So after 4, 5 days I sent a bus back over there, we loaded about 44 of those college students up, brought them back home. I learned from that. I won't send them next time unless it gets real tight. They don't want to come home. They were happy as they could be. But that is one of the things I learned.

We have to get those public affairs people in there quicker. We have to tell the Guard's story. We did not do a good job of that. Now we sent some locally but it went to local newspapers. And we have been talking that everywhere I have been. We ought to have sent them in initial forces. We have to manage it a little better. The public wants to know about the logistics, about the safety, about the issues, what is going to happen next? We have to do a better job of that and we will do that.

Internal planning, just like the rest of them, Alabama National Guard conducted internal exercise. We called it DRAGON SLAYER, went to include all agencies. We exercised our joint operations center headquarters, our standard operating procedure (SOP). We wanted to validate it, make sure we have been using it, it works great. The Governor had a table top exercise that brought all the agencies in. We started 96 hours out and we went in a big room and everybody had to say 96 hours, 72 hours, 40 hours, what are you doing, what is going on? We have worked out, we had FEMA, we had NORTHCOM with us.

One of the things that came out of these is we will have a (PFO), principal Federal officer, there that can make the decisions on the Federal dollars right there without having to go through several layers of bureaucracy. That went very, very well. I think that is done up very good.

We did the same things. Hurricane States have a quarterly hurricane conference. They meet regularly. And they have identified the worst case scenario, which is for me a Category 4 or 5 off the middle of Mobile Bay, probably have a 20-foot storm surge, would drain out pretty quickly, not like New Orleans. We do have some equipment shortages based on deployments, units to overseas and Iraq and Afghanistan, a lot of equipment left. We do have some shortage. I feel confident that Congress will take care of those issues so we will have those equipment. I know in Alabama one of the things I am going to have this next time probably is going to be some shortages of engineer equipment, fuel haulers always critical, if you will think what it was last year we really had a fuel shortage that time. And then aircraft. My first 131st Aviation deployed right now to Iraq. I won't have the Blackhawks that I had
last year. But I will be calling through EMAC, my sister States here, and say, hey, I need a little coverage this time.

Federal coordination, as I say, we sponsored all that, we have done all those kind of things. We had a commander summit here in Alabama made up of Maxwell-Gunter, Redstone, all the active, and we have—altogether we have a list and the preference was for us to identify all the capabilities of all them kind. And they are ready.

I just got back from a—General Rowe referred to it—I asked the general conference, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the focus of the hurricane, the conference was hurricane preparedness. They were talking about EMAC agreements. We talked about National Guard Bureau’s role. We talked about public affairs. I am very confident in the planning that has happened in the local and State, national levels for 2006.

One of the areas that we haven't talked about is what we call RSOI, reception, staging and onward integration. One of this things I found in Katrina and Rita we had a lot of States, we moved a lot of soldiers down there. A lot of them drove through Alabama, and they wanted to spend the night in Alabama, and they wanted me to refuel them. Fuel was short. We got fuel everywhere we could get it. We had to take care of them. We had to house them. It was very intensive. We used all our maintenance shops, we used all our air bases and all our armies taking care of these coming through. I have assigned that to the 167th Theater Sustainment Command. They will have that mission this time we are prepared.

We also built some container express (CONEX) containers. Each CONEX container will handle about 500 soldiers and in that CONEX we have MREs, we have water, chain saws, gloves, goggles, reflective vests, communication packet radios, chem lights access, everything you need. So if I am going to send a task force of 500, 1,000, 1,500 we just load them on the trailer and here they go.

I talked about Civil Support Teams (CST) vans. We know that. I talked about the lack of aviation. I am going to have the Memorandum of Understanding between States, the law enforcement, the rules of engagement. They are working to get that sort of standardized, so it is not a real problem.

Another area you wouldn't think about was the disengagement criteria, and that is that it is hard to get out of there. When you get in there, the public people want you. And so we have to have disengagement criteria and we established that early on.

One of the things we look at, is the Wal-Mart open? If they are open, it is time for us to go home. And we engage with them early on because we are here, but we are going to leave early.

Again let me remind you, we do need some equipment. We need to practice. We need Title 32. That is the critical things we need right here. Alabama furnished about 6,000 soldiers this last time, and I am confident in our ability to respond this next time, and again I certainly appreciate you having me come here, and thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Bowen can be found in the Appendix on page 92.]
Mr. SAXTON. General Bowen, thank you very much and, General Burnett, thank you for being here with us today.

As I said at the outset, we are dependent on the Guard today more than any time in recent history and so we thank you for the leadership roles that you play.

Mr. LoBiondo and I both represent coastal districts in New Jersey, and the last time that I recall a direct hit, a serious hit from a hurricane was 1962. And in your case, every fall or every summer and fall when the hurricane season starts, you have to be sitting there thinking, which one of us is it going to hit? So we appreciate your situation, and your experience and the wisdom that you bring to today's discussion is very much appreciated. We are going to go first for questions to Mr. Smith. And go ahead, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for the testimony. It was very informative and appreciate the work that you do.

A couple of areas I want to hit on. One, as I mentioned, coordination, I guess the aspect of it I am most interested in is coordinating with the locals, the local communities, and most specifically, you have to sort of deal with the executives, whether it is a governor or mayor, county executive. And all the emergency preparation that is going on on the Federal level and even on the State level, you know it is primarily a lot of career people who are involved in that. And by and large I think they do an outstanding job. It is what they do. They are used to talking to each other. They get to know who is who and are ready to go. But then when the disaster hits, well, you have to deal with a bunch of politicians, and local politicians, who you know have been running a whole bunch of different issues.

And I think one of the things we tried to do in my State and that General Lowenberg, who is our Adjutant General in that State, has really worked very, very hard. Every time a mayor gets elected, every time a county executive gets elected, they bring them in and say, hey, if something happens in your county, we are set up ready to go. You are the guy who has to make the decision. Are you ready to that?

I am curious in your plans on how you are doing, how you coordinate, specifically with those local officials, and on the Governor level, may work very closely with National Guard and all that. It is more on that local level I am interested in. Mr. McHale and then General, if you will.

Secretary MCHALE. Congressman, what I will do is just give a brief introduction and then turn to others who at the operational level have been integrating their planning and deployable capabilities with State and local officials. One of the real differences this year compared to last year is last year a Principal Federal Official under the National Response Plan wasn't named until we were well into the crisis. If I recall correctly, the hurricane came ashore on August 29th and it wasn't until August 30th that we had a Principal Federal Official named to take charge of the coordination of the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina.

By contrast this year a Principal Federal Official has already been selected. His name is Gil Jamieson. He has been physically located—I am focusing now on Louisiana. He has been physically
located in Louisiana. Although I don’t know his schedule precisely, I would estimate for about two months. He was named about three or four months ago. He has been on the ground communicating daily with State and local officials to ensure that when we in the Department of Defense support the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA in the integration of Federal response capabilities of the type that we have all been describing during the last hour, that that capability in turn is properly coordinated with State and local officials.

Our engagement with State and local officials exists in two ways. At the policy level we do it through the Principal Federal Official, Mr. Jamieson, and our contact with him has been very close and very detailed. He knows exactly what capabilities DOD can deliver. And then at the operational and tactical level, General Rowe, who is seated on my left, General Blum, seated to my right, use Title 10 forces and Title 32 forces to integrate with State and local authorities.

And I would like to turn to them to bring it down a couple of rungs to talk about how they operationally have been engaging with their Louisiana counterparts.

General Rowe. In Louisiana we have a full-time planning team collocated with the Federal coordinating officer planning team, headed by Lee Foresman, who works for Mr. Jamieson. It is headed by a Colonel. It includes representatives from Northern Command, but also from United States Transportation Command, Joint Readiness Medical Planner, and they are working with the State officials, extraordinarily good relationship with the National Guard State Headquarters.

I took a debriefing this week from one of our planners, and the officers in charge down there was the Colonel, who remained in touch in New Orleans for almost 60 days and he has a very, very good relationship with Terry Ebert, who is the City Emergency Manager in New Orleans. They are working very hard to understand the local and the State plans.

I think, as has been highlighted, there have been challenges with sheltering, there are challenges with the details of the transportation plan. Until you know where you are going to take someone to be sheltered, it is hard to build your transportation plan. We are very actively working the special needs population. One solution is to throw the hands up and say U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), come with big airplanes and help us. The problem with that is if you wait until you throw your hands up, big airplanes can’t come in and fly into the airstrips, and so we are really working the details of that to understand, very good relationships.

Backing out from Louisiana, there are currently a review led by the Department of Homeland Security, but with the strong Department of Defense effort to look at 131 State and local, large local regional plans associated with overall evacuation, tries directly to——

Mr. Smith. If I may, General, one more thing I have to ask on behalf of Mr. Taylor before I go, and General Bowen, you looked like you have something specifically you want to say. If you do that I quickly and I will ask Mr. Taylor’s question quickly and move on.
General Bowen. Very quickly, I want to take it to a little bit lower level. The way I tell my people to respond to those mayors who come out, who are elected and the police chief, they are in charge. We are there to support them from below. They may have two deputies in a whole county and 150 MPs. But we work for them.

Mr. Smith. Absolutely and sometimes that is the problem, because you are trained and you are experienced, and they are like, this didn't come up in the campaign.

So are you working, are you working with them now as they come?

General Bowen. Yes, sir. We had all the sheriffs in the hurricane counties that came to Montgomery for the hurricane. We know them very well. We work with them daily and on other issues. It is not a problem.

Mr. Smith. That is what really needs to happen. You never know—obviously I mentioned the campaign. In Louisiana if you are running for mayor of anywhere it is a big issue. But it wasn't two years ago.

So the question Mr. Taylor was interested in, specifically someone had mentioned the problem with fuel and he was wondering if there had been plans set in place on two fronts, one, if we are talking, primarily talking about coastal areas, if you are talking about hurricanes to barge in fuel, take advantage of—Mr. Taylor had mentioned during the Katrina thing some hospital ships were brought in and sort of used the access points of the water, if there are any plans in place to barge in fuel, first of all. And second of all, the issue of contracting in advance for fuel. I realize that can be a little tricky and that you are contracting for something that you hope won't happen, but if you don't you show up in a situation where fuel prices are going through the ceiling and anyone who has got it to sell knows that every day they hang on to it it is more expensive, and I know that was a bit of a problem in Katrina.

So if someone could touch on those fuel issues quickly. I see a couple of hands. I will go to General Burnett and General Rowe and I am done.

General Burnett. Florida uses 25 million gallons of fuel a day. That is a lot. We get most of our fuel through barges because of our littoral coastline. There are issues there. One, you have to keep the fuel in the tanks full before the hurricane come along because there is structural integrity based on fuel moving in the tanks.

What the Governor has done, he has partnered with our filling station vendors. They have generators now in place to pump gasoline. We try to manage that throughout the State with our Department of Environmental Protection Agency head. So we learned that in 2004, and I think we have a very good plan to do that across Florida, balancing those fuel loads. It is a tough one to handle, but I think we have our arms around it and lessons learned from the past.

General Rowe. This is from traveling with Secretary Chertoff and Mr. Paulson, Chief Paulson. They have built within FEMA a construct to position fuel early along the evacuation routes. I have not heard discussion about delivery of fuel over the shore following a storm strike. Certainly that is a possible solution.
Mr. Smith. I am sure Mr. Taylor would want to follow up and find out, and so will I. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you being generous with the time.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. It is good to see you again. Most of you are here again, and again it is nice to have the The Adjutant Generals (TAGs) here.

Several directions I would go here, I am interested in the resetting the Guard's equipment issue, but we could probably talk about that all morning.

Let me go instead to the how do we get activated, and when do we get activated, and the who is in charge question, not between the National Guard and the sheriff, but I guess I am swinging around to you, General Rowe. When I was out visiting you guys a couple of months ago, a great tour, I was very, very impressed with the discussions with Admiral Keating and with your folks, well organized. NORTHCOM has representatives from virtually every relevant agency, as I recall, including even nongovernmental agencies like the Red Cross. So I was very much reassured that NORTHCOM is in a position to coordinate, to command if necessary, had the information necessary, the intelligence, if I can use that word in this context. But the question is, and I am looking at you, Mr. Secretary, or you, General, how do we activate that and in what terms?

Let me just talk for another 30 seconds and I will look for some input from you. I would assume, for example, that the use of your satellite phones, General, could be made available at the drop of a hat, there is not a whole lot involved in that.

And if the TAGs in Florida or Alabama or Louisiana or something needed more communication, that kind of thing, you could do—we have talked about some support from the Defense Logistics Agency, probably not a lot involved in that. But if you are looking about command and control, as we saw in Katrina, when we went from FEMA to Admiral Allen, that was a significant change in who is in charge and how it was run.

So my question, Mr. Secretary, General, anybody, is what does it take to put NORTHCOM in charge and is that something in your judgment that we want to do?

Secretary Mchale. Sir, the literal answer to your question is no. Nor is that provided by the law. But your question, nonetheless, is a very good one. The person who represents the senior Federal authority on the scene is the PFO, the Principal Federal Official, and unlike last time, as I said earlier, where Mr. Brown was not designated until the day after landfall, Mr. Jamison as the PFO was already in place, already down in the Louisiana area. I didn't mean to focus disproportionately on Louisiana, but because of the remaining damage from Katrina and the amount of temporary housing in Louisiana, Louisiana remains our most vulnerable area in terms of a hurricane this year, though obviously we face a danger throughout the entire region. In any event, the PFO is Mr. Jamison, and we in the military bring our forces in to the area of
Mr. Kline. Let me interrupt. I understand why you are talking about Louisiana and Mr. Jamison in the past, but as we have discussed, we could be talking about a catastrophe anywhere.

Secretary McHale. It could be a terrorism attack.

Mr. Kline. So I would like to kind of put it in that broader context. It is not enough when it comes to the point where the tag—the government of the tag simply can't do it and you have the—okay, we have the agreements with the other States, and we have said that is not broken. We don't need to fix that. But there comes a time when it is overwhelming.

Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kline. And I guess——

Secretary McHale. And that is when we get engaged.

Mr. Kline. So I am working back to the point where I was earlier. I know I am going to run out of time. NORTHCOM has got in place all the pieces. It appears to me. All the pieces that you need to coordinate.

Secretary McHale. Yes, sir. And give me just a moment, and I will try to be of assistance.

The PFO is either in place, or if it is some other part of the country, if it is New England, the PFO will be named by Secretary Chertoff as soon as the requirement for a PFO would become apparent. Throughout the gulf coast, we have already—Secretary Chertoff has already named the PFOs in anticipation of hurricane season. So he names the PFO. Now to get to the heart of your question. We should bear in mind that in response to Hurricane Katrina and in a similar manner in anticipation of future catastrophic events, only about 30 percent of the military force came under NORTHCOM. About 70 percent of the military force, the National Guard, came under the EMAC agreements and the respective governors.

So we anticipate that in a future domestic response whether it is a hurricane or terrorism attack, that rough ratio would probably remain in place. So NORTHCOM has everything they need for the Federal active duty piece, but that is probably only about 30 percent of the military response. The 70 percent, the more robust element of the response would be through the EMAC agreements described by General Blum and our two adjutant generals, and at this point, let me pull back and let NORTHCOM talk about how they would be put in a position for rapid deployment. Essentially, it would be in my judgment the verbal authority of the Secretary of Defense to transfer Title 10 forces to NORTHCOM consistent with the needs identified by Admiral Keating and that would be the 30 percent of the force.

For the 70 percent, we would go back to the EMACs and the dialogue between the adjutant general coordinated by the chief of the National Guard bureau to move in that larger portion of the force. But let me turn to General Rowe and General Blum for their comments.

General Rowe. Sir, you really lay out—we will generally be in support. And ahead of a storm strike, unless incredible circumstances where a governor and a President agree, the change
how we are going to handle a natural disaster we will be in support for the lead Federal agency and the lead within the State will be—the governor will lead that fight using all of his tools as the tags have laid out. Post strike post natural disaster, which hurricanes give us a little warning, they don't tell us where. Other natural disasters might not give us any warning at all. Now it is the read there has been a culmination of the culpability of the local responders and the State capabilities to support the people who need—to have their lives saved to preserve life, to do the immediate recovery, to protect infrastructure, they have. Those circumstances, I think, could result in a call to say a Federal response, once again, agreed on conversation between the governor and the President and the Presidential decision, in which case an area would be defined, the force arrangements for command and control when they are defined we are set up superbly for that poor—I don't think there is a high probability of that, but we are set up well with that now with the standup of 5th Army, the development during our qualification of their operational command post, which is now joint configured to be prepared to come in, either to be in support of a Federal agency and support of the State, or if given the responsibility, to be a lead effort in which case the student body arrangements would be in the other direction. But most of the time we will be, when directed, in support for civil support.

General Blum. Let me make a point. You hit on a very core issue here. This is the United States of America, which obviously nobody in this room needs reminding, but it is, to put it in context. The United States military always, as long as we are the United States of America operating under a constitution, will have its uniformed members in support of the elected civilian authorities that have been charged with the responsibility and authority to govern our States and to govern our Nation.

Having said that, the only time that the military is ever in charge of anything is that they are in charge of commanding and controlling the military assets that are being sent in support of that mayor, that governor, the President or whatever elected official in our Nation or in our States, or at the local level, if necessary, needs the assistance that only, that only the military can provide because it either ceases to exist, or it did not previously exist somewhere in the civilian community. As good as DOD is, you don't want it running the government of a State, a county or this Nation at any given time.

Having said that, I would like you to put up that chart, please. We take our responsibilities of support very seriously, and even though as Chairman Saxton said, we have 71,000 people involved in that gray part of the chart overseas fighting the war on terror. And we have 6,000 recently assigned to a mission on a southwest border. That still leaves you 367,000 citizen soldiers and airmen that are commanded by the kind of guys you see at this table in 50 States and four territories of our Nation, and all of that blue pieces are the States that I think are vulnerable for the hurricane season that is coming up.

So we at the National Guard bureau are working very close with Northern Command, they know what our capabilities are and they know what our limitations are. We cannot do everything. But we
can do much of what is routinely required for a natural disaster response.

And then Northern Command, to specifically get to your question, what do they do, they fill in the gaps and fill in the niche capabilities that the National Guard that is forward deployed in literally every place that anybody votes in this Nation, because that is where they live, and that is where anybody cares where anything happens. We have a presence in 5,400 communities around our Nation. So we are the first military responders, but we are responding in support to whatever legal elected official is in charge of that property, the political boundary and that problem that affects that boundary.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. I yield back.

Secretary MCHALE. In responding to Congressman Kline's question, I said in a general sense, that about a third of our force would come out of Title 10 forces in response to a future disaster and about two-thirds would come out of the National Guard, and that is true for a natural disaster.

The point I wanted to make in closing, was if we have a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear contaminants, the percentage of the Federal force under NORTHCOM would likely go up as a relative percentage, the Guard would go down because some of our most robust high-end capabilities for a terrorist attack involving seaborne contaminants can be found primarily within the active duty force, so that rough construct one-third/two-thirds generally fits, but it has got to be adjusted to the requirements at hand.

Mr. KLINE. Exactly. If you can indulge me since we reentered the conversation here. I do understand civilian control of the military and I appreciate the reminder and the lesson, General but the question was looking at the capabilities that NORTHCOM has got, inherent in the command in the building with all the people there, when and how would they be activated to be able to bring that to bear, never mind the forces, the 70 percent, 30 percent or 50 percent or 50 or 30 or 50, it is what is involved in that command. The people, the structure, the communications, the ability that in the event of a terrorist attack or some very major attack, you may want to bring that to bear, and the question was how do you get them to bear.

Secretary MCHALE. A very good question. I am sorry, sir. We didn't give you an adequate answer. The answer is as soon as—we are talking about a hurricane it would differ obviously for other kinds of—but if it is a hurricane, we would probably get notice a week out of a tropical storm approaching a given area of the country. We began tracking the hurricane that became Katrina about seven days before landfall. It was a tropical storm, very low level tropical depression, I think, out at that point out in the Atlantic, but we knew about it. We had no idea at that point it would be so severe. We track very carefully in advance. We have a standing executive order that has been signed by the Secretary of Defense that has already delegated to Admiral Keating at NORTHCOM, certainly preliminary authority within his own authority delegated by the Secretary to begin to respond to an approaching catastrophic event.
So about seven days out, six days out, five days out, Admiral Keating has the authority to deploy those Damage Control Officers (DCOs). He has the authority to select bases for staging areas. He has certain other competencies that has been delegated to him. But I would estimate as the storm becomes more severe, three or four days out, the Secretary of Defense based on the recommendation of the combatant commander at NORTHCOM would then transfer from our operating forces, our service components, the capabilities to NORTHCOM that would seem to be appropriate for the mission that was at hand, the approaching catastrophic storm or a catastrophic hurricane.

And it would be our expectation that is consistent with what is known at that point, about three to four days out, DOD would chop forces to NORTHCOM for employment in a possible response and at the same time our civilian leader would be looking at issues such as evacuation, potential search and rescue, those kind of things.

So the time line is dependent in the case of a hurricane on what you can anticipate in terms of weather for coast and about the outer limit of that is maybe seven days out from landfall with significant military action taking place in response three to four days out.

General Blum. To include the repositioning Naval forces so they can be in the right place to come in and help. That is what NORTHCOM would do. The Guard can't do that.

Mr. Kline. Thank you.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much for the great questions, Mr. Kline. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. Langevin. I want to thank you for being here this morning. I especially want to thank Secretary McHale and General Blum. We always appreciate you being here, and appreciate the job you are all doing. I would like to actually build on that question on an area that I wanted to touch on.

Because I recognize that much of today's potential involvement to hurricane response will be dependent upon assistance from States, and as well, as the Department of Homeland Security. So to what extent and does DOD coordinate with States and Homeland Security immediately prior to an event. As you were just discussing, you know, the National Hurricane Center projects that a level 4, level 5 hurricane is approaching the U.S. Coast. Is there or what is the mechanism for DOD to reposition any supplies or equipment to expedite disaster response?

Secretary McHale. Again, let me give a brief introduction and turn to the officers who have been coordinating this on a tactical level. Our coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, and specifically with FEMA, in anticipation of the 2006 hurricane season has been daily, and that coordination has been at that level of engagement for many, many months now. I spent, just as an example, I spent three hours in a tabletop exercise yesterday with Secretary Chertoff and other cabinet officials, where the scenario being examined was a catastrophic hurricane passing directly over New Orleans. General Rowe is the operations officer for NORTHCOM, has just concluded a two-week exercise, a major ele-
ment of which was a catastrophic hurricane coming ashore in Louisiana.

We have been working with FEMA, with HHS, and with all other interagency’s partners for many months now in a series of almost unlimited exercises to determine what are the requirements to assist civilian authorities to include law enforcement authorities in the case of National Guard capabilities, and what do we need to get those ready.

And we have a high level of confidence that based on that degree of coordination that I would ask these two gentlemen to describe in detail that we have spring loaded—a rapid DOD response with robust capabilities to provide an even faster, more competent response than the very good response that we provided as a Department last year.

Last year was the largest fastest military civil support mission by far in our Nation’s history. This year we can do better because of the coordination. I would ask these gentlemen to describe.

Mr. Langevin. Can you also expound on the mechanism you are using to coordinate directly with the State who you are talking to, and one of the things that we heard from Katrina, there was not good coordination between State and local and Federal Government.

Secretary Mcrale. I will ask General Blum to talk about that. The direct coordination between the Federal civilian leadership, and the civilian leadership of an individual State is a responsibility assigned to the Department of Homeland Security. Secretary Chertoff has the responsibility to communicate with the governors to ensure that communication from civilian to civilian at the elected level of leadership, or in the case of Secretary Chertoff, that our senior civilian Federal and State are talking to each other. We are in a supporting role to Secretary Chertoff, and what we do is communicate closely daily continuously with a full-time staff from DOD over at DHS to make sure we understand the overarching Federal plan, and what we do is communicate operationally primarily through the adjutant general in the individual States through the military contact that we have.

We support through those military contacts the overall civilan-led effort where Secretary Chertoff has the ultimate responsibility. So I would ask General Blum to talk about how he has been coordinating with the States through the respective adjutant general.

General Blum. Great question.

Short answer: In the past, what you described the coordination between DOD and the State and local level, it didn’t exist.

In the last, particularly in the last year and a half, it has gone through what I would call the crawl phase to the walk phase to the full run phase, and I think we are—right now, it is probably as good as it has ever been and probably—and probably not as good as it needs to be, but we are working on it every day.

I can tell you that the National Guard and Northern Command constantly, the communication between us is constant and is continual and it is ongoing. It never quits. It is a dynamic process. And we are constantly tweaking our capabilities. NORTHCOM knows what we can do, and he knows what we cannot do, and they plan what we cannot do or what they might have to do, if we can-
not do what we think we can do, and that is not double talk. That is actually a military contingency plan, and it is going on at the highest level of DOD, and having said that, what Northern Command lacks and will never have, and I will never have at the National Guard bureau level, is the local knowledge, the existing relationships that are necessary for the confidence trust and efficiency when a disaster strikes that area, and the trust and confidence of the local people.

That is where these two gentlemen put the foundation for a solid response. They can’t do it all by themselves. But they do, in fact, at the—for the military part of it, they set the foundation for the military response at the State and local level, and they field me the same situational awareness and common operating picture of what their capabilities are, and what their limitations are, frankly, in equipment or personnel, or in skills or certain expertise sets.

If I can find them through EMAC, through emergency mutual assistance compact that the governors have signed on to from next door in Alabama and even in Rhode Island, we will arrange for that. If I don’t have it and I can’t get it, I communicate that to Northern Command, and they find it within the DOD Army Navy inventory, which is quite capable, obviously.

Now having said that, that is not the whole solution, sir, because you do have at the State level, and here is where—that same kind of process that I just described that is happening on the military level at State, national and DOD through Northern Command needs to happen with the State emergency managers who are the civilian counterparts of the Department of Homeland Security in these States. That has to also occur at that level so, that we have the State energy planner emergency what the month emergency planner capable of doing, and what they are not capable of doing and that has to be passed up to regional people that work for DHS and ultimately to the national level because when it happens, either at the State level, at a national level or DOD level, the uniforms are still going to come in support of the Department of Homeland Security, probably, or one of their sub elements that are to leave Federal agencies.

Secretary McHale. With two-thirds of our force likely to be drawn from the National Guard, the military portal into the State is through the adjutant general. Two-thirds of the military response for a natural disaster will likely be drawn from the National Guard, and so to find out how we can best employ those guardsmen, many of whom will be coming from other States, this gentleman seated on my right, General Blum communicates constantly with the adjutant general of the State so that we can be informed as to how those forces can be best employed under the command and control of the governor.

Bear in mind two-thirds of the response though paid for by DOD will be under command and control of the governor so the adjutant general of the State becomes the critical player in enabling most of the military response.

Mr. Langevin. Just one quick follow up to that, if I could. I recently, over the weekend, I had a discussion with our State’s adjutant general. And he was talking about trying to look at better options for getting preapproval for deploying assets when it is likely
to be a federation of a Federal disaster. And is there a better mechanism that we could almost give preapproval for deploying assets. I think the States would likely to predeploy assets if, in fact, they knew they had at least some support and there was going to be some Federal reinforcement.

General Blum. That is an excellent, excellent point. And is good preparation is largely dependent on the resources that the State has to be able to apply for that appropriation. You heard General Bowen say, and all of the governors and all of the adjutant generals can call out their National Guard in a non paid status if they need to. But then as we tragically found out in Katrina, sometimes we lose national guardsmen in responding to hurricanes and trying to save lives.

And they get injured. And they are not covered properly. And they are not compensated properly. So in the past there was no appetite and no interest at the Department of Defense level for providing Federal funds to the States for hurricanes. Zero interests. That has changed. And I think if we were—had reasonable data that said we are going to have landfall in Newport, Rhode Island when the next 72 hours, or it was even possible I think that we would be able to obtain at this point the resources beyond calling people up on State active duty or probably Title 32 would probably be made available in reasonable amounts where in the past that wouldn't even be considered. And I will leave the rest of that to Secretary McHale.

Mr. Langevin. Is there a change in the law that we need to make sure that we can do that.

Secretary McHale. I don't think there is a change in the law, but I think we need to and will likely implement some of our procedures under the national response plan along a different time line than what we used last year. From numerous meetings that I have attended with Secretary Chertoff on this topic, I think particularly with regard to some of the vulnerable areas of the gulf coast, we would likely see an early emergency declaration recommended by Secretary Chertoff and a very cautious approach to an early declaration of an incident of national significance.

We frankly, within the Department of Defense, have no difficulty at all resolving the very significant question of whether those 50,000 guardsmen should be placed in Title 32 in response to Katrina. That was a huge decision quickly and relatively easily made, because it was clear to the senior decision makers, most especially the Deputy Secretary of Defense, that placing those forces in Title 32 was the right thing to do. What I am suggesting is that in light of what we have learned from Katrina, if we were to have an early declaration by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security that we faced an incident of national significance, it is quite probable though the decision belongs to the Secretary of Defense, it is quite probable we would do exactly what we did last time, and that is place the Guard forces in Title 32 without serious debate.

Mr. Langevin. I appreciate your answer, and I think that would be an important step toward making sure we are as prepared as possible if this occurs.

Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for your testimony. Thank you.

Mr. SAXON. Thank you very much for the great questions. Very pertinent. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky,

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Listening to all of the comments of planning remind me of the first rule of Roger Rangers don't forget nothing. Just brings to mind a couple of questions that I would like to ask regarding the leadership aspect of this. There is certainly no substitute on the ground for initiative in the localities where disaster strikes on the front lines, and we saw firsthand, at least from a distance, the human factors impacting leaderships in the different States.

There were some qualitative contacts, and based on that local leadership, we saw great local officials move forward, but one thing that I am particularly interested in is if you have a first of two contingency questions worked into your exercises dealing with a recalcitrant State or local elected official and dealing with your chain of command, if they are paralyzed, unable to make a decision, how you would work around that and coincidental with that, is do you have a plan in place for federalizing assets in the case of that type of resistance?

Secretary McHALE. Congressman, let me answer that again, first, as a matter of policy and then invite comment from my colleagues.

We are the Department of Defense and if there were to be a situation where, let's say, a State official exercised profoundly poor judgment in terms of responding to a disaster, the Federal official who would have the responsibility to deal with that, let's say that governor would not be the Secretary of Defense, that responsibility is entrusted by law to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Our military role is to support that Secretary of DHS and so if a decision were made to bring in the military a greater unified command and control role, the option that is available by law to the President is to federalize the National Guard, which is a Presidential decision authorized by statute and to invoke the Insurrection Act, which would allow Title 10 military forces to engage in law enforcement activity.

So for the portion of the duty that we face, the law is clear and well established, and that is in order to overcome State opposition manifested through the National Guard, when the statutory requirements are met, the President can overcome that opposition by federalizing the Guard and invoking the Insurrection Act.

That pertains only to the military portion of the response. I don't think anyone at this table is qualified to address the larger civilian implications that go beyond the military piece, but that is an accurate description of how local opposition could lawfully be overcome within the military sphere.

Mr. DAVIS. I think both of us understand the constitutional implications. But I am kind of a practical guy. I want to come down to the basic level all politics is local, and it would be very difficult for the President to willfully federalize a situation if there is an intact structure in the State just because of the perception of avocation of local leadership and all of the civil political impacts of that. I guess what I am asking is a practical question of have you
worked contingencies of a workaround for example, and certainly with the adjutant general sitting at the table, I know that would not be a problem within your States at all. Have you considered this contingency of establishing be the kind of relationships to execute integrated operations with that State's assets as well as your outside assets so you didn't leave that uncovered or unnecessarily having them redundant?

Secretary McHale. Let me preface it and quickly turn to General Blum. If we have competent leadership at all levels of government, the expectation is there would be a likely JTF commander assigned by NORTHCOM and that JTF commander would coordinate with the adjutant general of the State so the senior active duty officer would have a coordinating relationship with the adjutant general of the State.

If that coordinating relationship went well, we would proceed as we did during Hurricane Katrina, with General Honore conferring constantly with General Landrino. That was a good relationship that worked well. But if it were to deteriorate in some future instance, that is when the President would have the responsibility to consider the possibility of federalizing the National Guard to achieve unity of command.

What I would like to do is ask General Blum, is talk about that coordinating relationship to get a sense of how we are working out the dual chain of command that is inherent in federalism to make sure we have coordinated military activity.

Mr. Davis: I appreciate your answer, Mr. Secretary, but that is still not answering the practical question of let's assume that got the leadership implosion, and let's say you don't have the right to replace the patrol leader, what other contingencies do you have systemic contingencies to deal with that to maintain out-of-uniform level and working with public safety?

General Blum. The first part of your question is a political decision. I am not authorized to make those kind of decisions, fortunately. So I will have to sidestep that, because that is a political decision made at the very highest level of our government. It is inappropriate for me to even comment on. If I get to what you are asking about, let's say, I have a competent leader who is incapacitated or has diminished capacity for whatever reason, do I have an ability to replace that leadership?

Yes, we do. We do that through EMAC and we did that. Very competent good leaders were soon overwhelmed and fatigued by the enormity by the tasks they had to perform the magnitude of the operation, the scope of the operation, and frankly, the physical exhaustion that they were experiencing in the operation.

And we did flow in command and control headquarters from the National Guard from other States to the affected States to replace the command and control that was not there because it happened to be in Iraq or Afghanistan at the time. We had three very competent brigade headquarters that were overseas fighting the Global War on Terror, so to make up for that shortfall, we brought in a division headquarters out of the midwest and we brought in division headquarters also out of the midwest, unaffected areas, so that we didn't take leadership out of an area that had their own problems. We brought those down and they were highly, highly effective in
Mississippi, and they were highly effective in Louisiana in affecting command and control, or expanding the capabilities that were there to be large enough to handle the enormity of the situation they had. Does that get to what you are talking about?

Mr. DAVIS. Not completely, but this perhaps is more appropriate in an off-line discussion, since the cameras are rolling. I would like, if I could, have the chairman for a follow-up to this.

Do you believe that DHS is sufficiently clarified, and this is for the adjutant generals specifically, clarified the roles of the Principal Federal Official, and Principal Federal Coordinating Officer. And is it clear to you who will be in charge of coordinating the Federal response, and ultimately, I guess the final piece of this is if it is not, who do you think should be in charge from a Federal level.

General BURNETT. Congressman, with the experience of eight hurricanes in the last year, I would tell you there is no better coordinating officer than this defense coordinating officer. It works well. There is no question that that can be stepped up. I know of no need that we had that was unmet to strong leadership of officers like Colonel Mark Fields. That was a huge storm for us. If it was C-17s or C-5s bringing in the equipment we needed, or meals or water, whatever it was, that works very, very well. Certainly there is a role for the Principal Federal Official to play, and I think we respect that. By the end of the day, under Governor Bush's leadership, his team going right to the DC0 you can get everything this Nation has to offer.

Leadership is in place. What we need is other things, and we found it is certainly available and we spoke every night. If I could follow on, sir, and go back, starting out early and it is popular to recall these folks. Every night, I call the leadership of First Army. I call the leadership of General Blum at home, and I called Northern Command. Here is what we are looking at. Here is what we are doing and, if you want to adjust that calibration, I was open and I would present that to Governor Bush, and we did that consistently throughout that spectrum.

I said to General Clark and Admiral Keating, here is what we are doing in Florida in this hurricane exercise, so we build that trust. They know we are communicating; they know we are communicating. But we think the DCO is the answer. There may be things beyond it but at what price do we need things that are working well now. And I think we have it.

General Bowen. I understand exactly how it works. I think putting the Principal Federal Officer in there the other day, and we met him the other day, we know him. He understands what our capabilities are. We know that if we can not do it, all we have to do is ask for it. No problem at all.

Mr. SAXON. Thank you. The Chair will recognize Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Gentlemen, thanks for coming to help us out today. First question is for General Blum. It is kind of deja vu all over again for you and me, because I think I was sitting in this exact chair, you were sitting probably right there the last time we talked about equipment and people, because you mentioned we have 350,000 available National Guard folks. I am wondering how many people will be available. How many are committed doing something
else in Conus or something else but so not available of that 350,000.

The second thing, looking at some of these numbers that you have supplied to us where you have 101,000 pieces of equipment in different missions around the world, and then the request over the next 5 or 6 years for Air National Guard, and Army Guard, about $23 billion worth of equipment; and then thinking about Major General Bowen's comment needing fuel haulers, aircraft and so on, if push comes to shove, what are we doing to ensure that our tags, and you and perhaps Northern Command aren't chasing the same piece of equipment in this hurricane season.

If you could talk a little bit about that, so how many people do we have and what do we do to ensure that we are not all chasing the same piece of equipment because of where other equipment is.

And then I have got a separate set of questions for Secretary McHale.

General Blum. I will try to keep it short and to the point. I would say about 300,000 citizen soldiers and airmen are available in the United States to go anywhere in the United States to do whatever is needed to be done, natural disaster response, terrorist acts whatever would be required. That is the first part of your question.

The equipment piece we are working feverishly with the Air Force and the Army, and I say with them, that is a good thing. Because now the Army has accepted the response of national disasters, is a very significant mission of the National Guard and a mission of the Army, and the Air Force as well. So the Army and the Air Force are working with me to ensure that I have, even faster than the PALM or the program of record will deliver this equipment.

We are taking extraordinary measures right now to move equipment into the hurricane effective State to give them brand new trucks, divert them from where they were originally intended to go, active units, Guard units, Reserve units and move—redirect the distribution of that equipment so that it is available in the next few weeks and months for the hurricane season.

I think that is a tremendous step forward and a great demonstration of sincere commitment on the part of the Air Force and Army to step up and recognize this mission should not be laid on the backs of the States. They share in this responsibility.

Are we going to get well from this effort? No. Will we improve significantly from it? Absolutely.

The money that is in the program of record needs to stay in there, and if it gets diverted or it gets taxed or used for another purpose, then we are not going to be as capable as the National Guard as we need to be. So I watch that every day and I try not to blink, frankly, because it is very important to our Nation, it is very important to our adjutant general that equipment and that money gets to where it is supposed to go.

Mr. Larsen. Is that plan for that $23 billion, as so as right now you are coordinating with Air Force and Army to fill a potential equipment gap, and looks like it is going to get filled. But as that $23 billion gets spent and we purchase new equipment, does that
come to the National Guard and the equipment that you have then reverts back to Army Air Force. Is that how——

General Blum. That is not my intent, sir. I am not aware of any intent to do that. That would not make much sense to me, to be honest. I mean, that is direly needed, once it is there, it needs to be left there and then we need to improve a lot of the others out there to face forest fires in a different season, and flooding in a different season, and then you can't have the equipment chasing the event.

That is not the way you want to do it. You want the equipment in the local area, because when it happens, everybody talks about a week's notice. I would love to have a week's notice for specificity of where a hurricane is going to land. I don't think that is possible. I have talked to experts and they spent their life doing this and they really don't have a good idea of where it is going until about three days out. Some say five days out, but even when that projection is there, you have a very wide window of area.

Secretary McHale. General Blum is correct on that, which is why we are going to have to make decisions far enough out from landfall, based on imperfect information. Seven days out we are going to know there is a storm, but we are not going to know within hundreds of miles where it might come ashore. Nonetheless, specifically in the case of New Orleans, we are going to have to be looking, meaning as a government, State, local, Federal, at evacuation plans at a stage where the information is going to be imperfect.

So it is entirely possible that acting in due diligence with imperfect information of the type described by General Blum, we may have one or more evacuations that turn out to be false alarms, but to protect the lives, we may have to do that.

Mr. Larsen. If I may, Mr. Chairman, for Senator McHale. There is one about Com Plan 2501 and covers with the National Guard Association (NGA). In your testimony, you said the 2501 is now in front of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and you haven't got approval on that. When do you expect to get SECDEF okay, and is there going to be time to apply principles and concepts? I know you have been practicing some of things. Is there going to be time to practice those, but also communicate those concepts to folks so you can put 2501 in place.

The second on NGA, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) points out the first gap in the GAO study was the lack of timely damage assessment. I note in your testimony, you met with NGA to talk with damage assessment the availability of assets to make those kind of assessments. What kind of cooperation are you getting from NGA, and what are they telling you and what can they expect?

Secretary McHale. Let me take the second half of the question, and then I am going to ask General Rowe to answer the first half. The relationship, the approval of Com Plan 2501 involves the relationship between the combat commander, who develops that plan and that relationship flows directly not through me, through the Secretary of Defense, I have visibility into it, but I think General Rowe can give a better perspective. If you look at the GAO report that was written on Hurricane Andrew in 1992, you will find in

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that report an observation that the post damage—the post landfall damage assessment was slow and inaccurate.

And if you look at any fair minded assessment of Hurricane Katrina, you will see that the post landfall damage assessment was slow and inaccurate. If you look at we, in the Department of Defense did in anticipation of Hurricane Rita, you will see, from having learned from the experience of Andrew and Katrina for Hurricane Rita, the combatant commander developed a very comprehensive system of DOD capabilities, mostly aerial imagery and NGA capabilities to rapidly assess over a wide area the amount of damage that had occurred because media reports historically have been very inaccurate during those kinds of chaotic circumstances.

So the short answer to the second part of your question is for Rita and for all future events, shaped by the combatant commander, we will have damage assessment capabilities, mostly aerial imagery from NGA and from other lower level aerial observational capabilities P3s, C-26s, C-130's, up to and including NGA type assets to get that aerial imagery so that we, more rapidly and accurately, understand how bad the damage is. Let me turn to General Rowe.

Mr. LARSEN. It seems from General Bowen's comments this is the kind of commission you need to dump on these guys.

Secretary McGaHEE. DHS—here is the linkage that has to take place. DHS has to get that, because damage is not a DOD responsibility, but we have the best collection assets to download and forcefeed to DHS so that our civilian leadership has a much clearer, much more accurate understanding of how bad the damage is. We didn't have that after Andrew. We didn't have that after Katrina. We were prepared as a department to provide that to DHS after Rita, and we will be similarly prepared for all hurricanes in the future. And NGA is a big piece of that.

General BURNETT. If I can respond to that just from experience. In Florida, we put mass on the objective. We reconned with force. We know a Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5 hurricane is going to do about these kinds of things, kind of like when a baby cries, everybody knows you grab a diaper, you go grab some food, you go nurture. Well, we go down range with our people and we send reports back. But we know what we are going to see. It is, just did it go beyond that, or is this street blocked, or this one blocked, so we do use a lot of search and rescue National Guard special forces, fish and wildlife team.

But we send forth knowing what we are going to get, and like the Secretary said, certainly there is an overhead piece of that we can do it in 24 hours. Can't mobilize overhead assets in 24 hours. So you got to be there and we can do it with large numbers of National Guards in our State response and it works.

Mr. SAXON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Gibbons.

Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much for your presence up here on the Hill. I know the rigorous schedule of constantly being dragged to the Hill interferes with your ability to do your job, but it helps us better do our job, and we thank you for that.

You know, there is something, Mr. Chairman, that I wanted to add to your remarks and apologize for having to be taken away to
go down to the floor for an amendment, but when you talked about the importance of the Guard and its contribution to natural disasters, forces overseas, the war on terrorism, I don’t think you could have made a clearer message as to why we need to treat the National Guard as a joint force provider to give them the recognition and the status.

General Blum, as Lieutenant Blum should be a 4-star general, not just because we want to make the National Guard a co-equal branch of the Air Force or the Navy. That is not it at all. But because he needs the authority and the ability to sit in those meetings and have a voice that competes as a joint force provider. And to me, that is the one thing this committee should be looking at, should be doing is giving the National Guard a voice. To equal the mission in the world that they play and not only the war or terrorism, natural disasters, but the whole picture of how they supplant and actually, in many cases, support all of our active duty forces as well.

That being said, General Burnett, I wanted to tell you that in 1969, I was a young lieutenant at Egland Air Force base in special operations, so I remember Hurricane Camille as well as you do. We were there probably together in some fashion.

But what I wanted to ask about today is, of course, General Blum, when we look at the logistics and the transfer and the needs are we projecting where we will have the resources and the dollars to move those people to move those equipment without having to rob Peter to pay Paul at that time, because we know it is coming, we see it out there, and oftentimes, budgeting gets reprogrammed and shuffled around a little bit. Can we in Congress help you do that job better?

General Blum, Congress has done a magnificent job in recognizing the needs of the Guard and addressing them. A perfect example is post Katrina you ask—this body asks what we needed. We say we needed about $1.3 billion. You rightfully asked how did you come to that number. We listed every piece of equipment that we thought we needed to be better prepared to respond to the next hurricane season. You graciously provided $9 billion. We have spent it exactly the way we said we would, and our capabilities are much better.

I would like to not comment on your earlier comment, but I would like to add a clarification to it.

We are, in fact, indeed, and have been a joint force provider for at least the last 5 years in ways that we have never been in the previous 350 years.

But that joint force is in a Title 32 joint force provider. We are not a Title 10 joint force provider. We do that through our services and that is our secondary role. I mean, the Guard is unique. It is the only DOD force that is a joint force provider in Title 32. All of us are joint force providers in Title 10, sir.

Mr. Gibbons. What I was trying to do and trying to get at, but more importantly on budget, do we have the budget means without having to take away from training, without having to take away from equipment purchases down the road in order to meet the needs and the expenses, and moving our Guard group in an emergency. I want to make sure that we are giving you the right budg-
etary latitude within which to do that, without having you have to
come waltzing back up here and beg us to back bills where you
need to take that money from.

We know your obligations. We know your commitment. We know
what you have got to do in the future. We want to be able to enable
you to do that without worrying about stealing it from training,
taking it or reprogramming it to purchase equipment and such.
That is all I was trying to get at.

General Blum. You are right. We have developed an art and
science over the years as to how we rob our own Peter to pay our
own Paul. And if we were adequately resourced, we would have to
do less of that.

Mr. Gibbons. My time is running out very quickly.

Secretary McHale, welcome back again. Can you give me a very
quick rundown of what the chain of command would be, or what
is the command scenario when we go into one of these situations?
Where is the responsibility as we go through this chain of com-
mand membership?

Secretary McHale. With the passage of the Homeland Security
Act in 2002, and the publication of national response plan at a Fed-
eral level, this is basically the way it works out. The cabinet level
secretary, who has the overall coordinating responsibility for Fed-
eral assets, is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity. Secretary Chertoff is in charge of coordinating the entire Fed-
eral response. The official he would name, normally in the area
that has been hit is the Principal Federal Official, the PFO. And
in the case of the hurricane season coming up, Gil Jamison is the
predesignated PFO for Louisiana.

We have other PFOs predesignated throughout the rest of the
gulf coast area. The PFO works with the Federal coordinating offi-
cer out of FEMA. His partner is the defense coordinating officer.
On the military side, we support Secretary Chertoff to achieve his
civilian-led mission. The military chain of command goes from the
President of the United States to the Secretary of Defense to the
affected combat commander, Admiral Keating. So Secretary
Chertoff is in charge of Federal coordination. We in DOD get mis-
sion assignments or requests from assignments from FEMA work-
ing for Secretary Chertoff. We retain command and control over
our own forces, but we roll in under DHS to assist them in the exe-
cution of their mission.

Mr. Gibbons. I had one small question, and I apologize for tak-
ing up extra time in this. But I guess maybe if I could talk to the
adjutant generals that we have here, to maybe respond as to are
we getting back the resources that we truly need? Is Congress
doing an adequate job of preparing you monetarily to enable to
handle all of these disasters. But most importantly, in your mind,
do you think we have a strategy like we do in DOD for a 2 war
major theater war strategy do we have a 2 major disaster, for ex-
ample, if we had Mount Rainier explode in south of Seattle, and
a hurricane hit New York City, magnitude force 3 or greater, can
we respond National Guard-wise to that sort of a magnitude of
command and challenge for us?

General Bowen. Well, you have gone a little above my level, but
I will tell you that I feel very confident. When you say do I got
enough—when I sent them to Louisiana, and I send them to Mississippi, and I am fighting a war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and he is real concerned that I have enough, and I show him the numbers that I have got, I am very confident in what we do.

By the same token we had the numbers up here a while ago that the way we responded to Katrina and Rita it was 50, 60,000. We still had soldiers left over. Yet, the more you deploy, the more you are going to run out of equipment because in Alabama, we have to cross level because we are not 100 percent fully funded, but it has never been, and it is probably not going to be, but I have a lot of confidence.

General Burnett. Congressman Gibbons, responding to the equipment issue specifically, yes. Yes, we do have the right equipment to do the job, and we can do the job you talk about, and it takes a lot of moving around. The National Guard has gotten pretty good about that, certainly when you look at some of the cuts that came our way recently, I think to Congress, that didn’t occur. Before 9/11, we had about 74 percent of our authorized equipment in the National Guard. Now we are somewhere between 27 and 34 percent. It depends on the State. In Florida, we have an adequate amount, thanks to General Blum. He makes sure that hurricane-prone States are kind of preset, ready to go. We thank Congress and Bill Young in the Appropriations Committee for the huge support of National Guard reset of equipment, and we think we are about where we can be considering the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, we think we are okay.

Mr. Gibbons. I want to make sure as we focus on Hurricane Katrina that we also look at natural disasters in other parts of the country as well.

General Burnett. May I make one statement to Congressman Taylor?

Mr. Saxon. We are going to go to him for questions.

Mr. Taylor. Let him get the first swing.

Mr. Saxon. Go ahead.

General Burnett. I am a lifelong resident of Florida. However, I am a graduate of Southern Mississippi. I want to tell you it is an honor to deploy with over 4,000 soldiers Florida State employees to be based in St. Louis after Katrina, and reestablish local operations with the mayor, the police chief and certainly the superintendent of schools. The people of Southern Mississippi are great, and I know they appreciate your leadership.

The Chairman. The gentleman from Mississippi, who knows more about this subject than anybody else on this panel. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Taylor. Thank you. Being a resident of St. Louis, when the Floridians showed up, I think on Thursday night, they were very welcome and greatly appreciated.

Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to overdramatize this, but really, in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, as I looked around having been on this committee for a long time, it really did hit me when there is an attack on the United States, not if, this is what it is going to look like. There is not going to be any food, any fuel, communications are going to be shot. There is not going to be a place to put the dead. The hospitals are going to be out. You know,
thinking whether it is in the EMP, electromagnetic pulse, whether it is a dirty bomb, whether it is someone blowing up the levees in New Orleans, that is what it is going to look like.

I think it is great that we have these gentlemen here because it is great to talk about what they did right and the National Guard did a heck of a lot of things right, but we also need to address some of the things we could have done better. I would ask Congressman Smith to mention it and Paul, I know you would be a very smart guy, but I can't emphasize this enough, one of the things that was lacking was a water-borne strategy. We were bringing fuel from over 200 miles away from areas that had no fuel. You are going down roads where you know the four-lane highways are down to one lane where you are lucky because the trees have fallen and hurricanes are going to hit a waterfront community.

Floods are going to hit waterfront communities. The biggest cities in America are all waterfront. The idea that we did not have a strategy to get fuel there by the barge load is a glaring omission that has to be fixed. When you think of the problems of getting people out of New Orleans, a water-borne strategy to put them on offshore fly boats, of which there are hundreds in Louisiana, or put them on deck barges in which there are hundreds in Louisiana, and get them out of the area and get some up to Baton Rouge, get them some place where it is easier to feed them and house them, and take care of them again, it is lacking, but not just with this scenario, but for any scenario of a disaster, either man made or natural, when you consider how many of our big cities are on the water.

It has got to be a piece of it. I distinctly remember at Stennis Airport that I had to describe to General Blum in Hancock County out of the middle of nowhere bringing in planeloads of ice. Welcome. Wonderful stuff. That is the most expensive way to get a fairly heavy, fairly inexpensive product to some place. And so we do have better strategies, particularly when you keep in mind a fuel barge has its own generator, it has its own pumping capacity. You don't have to deal with gravity. You can be loading trucks there. Can be loading individual vehicles there.

So again, I belabor this point because I mentioned this to Secretary Chertoff. I don't think he gets it. I mentioned this to others within the Department of Homeland Security. They don't seem to get it. You are the kind of guys who gets things. And so if they won't fix it, I am asking you to fix this, because remember, there is always going to be a good side and bad side of every hurricane.

Generally, if you are on the west side of the hurricane you are going to be okay, because you are catching the breezes that are upcoming from onshore. So if a hurricane hits Pensacola, New Orleans will probably do okay. If a hurricane hits New Orleans, Houston will probably be okay, because it lies to the west. So you ought to have a strategy.

And the second thing is, you have to have contacts in place. A couple years back, Secretary Rumsfeld came before the committee. At that time, our local engineering unit was just getting back from Iraq. They had been instructed to leave every piece of equipment in Iraq. By the time the storm hits, they had 60 percent of their equipment and they did a magnificent job. I can't say enough good
things about the 890. They cleared the streets so when the police showed up from Florida they could actually get down those streets. But, remember, they had only 60 percent of their equipment. We need to do better than that.

And the second thing is, after a disaster, the piece that hit me is I distinctly remember the Secretary saying we will just go out and buy it on the market. When a disaster hits, the demand on that market has tripled, quadrupled, exploded over night. You have every contractor in America trying to buy the same generator, trying to buy the same piece of heavy equipment. So we need contracts in place to guarantee that equipment will be there at a fixed price, fuel in particular.

I strongly suspect that some of the jobbers in south Mississippi sat on their inventories. Why did they sit on their inventories? Because when the gulf went down, the price of gasoline went up overnight; and these guys knew they are making tens of thousands of dollars a day every day they sat back and didn't sell their fuel.

You have to have a contract in place that says this is what you are going to be paid; you are going to show up and this is going to be the market price on that day. You can't count on the market because any disaster to the homeland you are going to see the price of gasoline jump from 50 cents to a dollar overnight, and you have to have someone who is going to be a willing seller on that day.

Last, it is great to hear about the communications. But again going back to the one satellite phone that was operating out of Hancock County on that Tuesday night, the first call, if I am not mistaken, was to General Blum; second call to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).

And what was really interesting on one hand and really scary on the other is I said, guys, this is really, really serious. I really, really need your help. I am not exaggerating. Our hospitals are out. We have no fuel. We are looting the food stores to feed people, et cetera, et cetera. Without going into the whole scenario, both of them, the first reply back to me is, tell me about your bases; where can I put people.

Now what is scary for me sitting down there is that the CNO doesn't know what Homeport Pascagoula looked like, that you don't have a good assessment of what Kessler Air Force Base and its huge runways look like, that you don't have a good assessment of what Seabee Base looks like.

I am sitting in a county that is more or less isolated because all the bridges are destroyed and the ones that are still there are under water, and I have to tell them what these things look like?

I am sitting in a county that is more or less isolated because all the bridges are destroyed and the ones that are still there are under water, and I have to tell them what these things look like?

So, again, not just what the Guard and Reserve do but within the regular forces. And, again, an attack on homeland is going to look just like this. We have to have a better job of communicating between our bases and the Pentagon so that we know our starting point for where you can launch out of to help other people. And I cannot emphasize that enough.

To this day, I have never had a good answer from either the Air Force or the Navy as to when they first got in touch with the Pentagon to let them know their status and, you know, whether they need to spend their time taking care of themselves or whether they
were prepared to go out in the community and help others. And your job, that has got to be something that gets fixed.

The other thing I can’t emphasize enough, that hurricane happened in August, early September. It is warm. No one is going to die of cold. What if one of these attacks happens during the dead of winter? No generators. No water. No food. One of things that hit when I am calling around trying to get tents for shelter for people, all the tents are in Iraq. They are in Afghanistan.

So things that we on this committee can consider, “tail,” because we have been trying to put more money into “tooth” for fighting—when the attack occurs on the homeland you are going to need a lot more tail, you are going to need a lot more generators, you are going to need a lot more tents, you are going to need a better way of getting water to people than buying it one bottle at a time. That is great in the short term, but it is also the most expensive way we get water to people. We have to have a strategy of getting the wells up and running again and maybe even digging wells if the need occurs.

MREs are wonderful. You can drop them from a helicopter to feed people. It is also a very expensive way to feed masses of people.

Again, if it is an attack on Los Angeles or New York, we are going need a more efficient way to feed a lot of people under bad circumstances.

So just my observations. I have offered at least one solution when it came to the fuel that we need to be taking advantage of. And, quite frankly, Paul, there are copycat crimes and there are copycat attacks. I think any future foe of the United States is going to blow the levee in New Orleans. They saw how easy it was. If I was an enemy of the United States, I would sure as heck do it.

We also know you can simulate an electromagnetic pulse. There was a barge out on the Chesapeake 10, 15 years ago. It was called the Empress. Its purpose was to simulate an EMP attack on a ship. So we know we can do that short of a nuclear device. So if we could do it 20 years ago, you have to figure any potential foe can do it now. So you have to have backup communications that are somehow sealed against that, that you break out after the attack and get the word out and get the things done that can be done.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Listen, thank you, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. One last thing, if I may. I will keep it short.

Mr. SAXTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. General Blum was right in pointing out we lost a National Guardsman that night. And this is something I hope we can address administratively; and, if not, we need to address it legislatively. He was a veteran of the battle of Fallujah. A Marine came home, joined his local Guard unit and tragically died the night of the storm trying to rescue what turned out to be his own grandparents. Had he died in Fallujah, his widow and children would have gotten twice the benefit.

Now, because of the horrible circumstances—General Blum was great. General Cody was great. Working it from both ends we were
able to see to it that he got the same benefit as if he had died in Iraq.

But I would hope that under that narrow window of being in a Presidially declared natural disaster that those families would be treated the same as if they had been in Iraq or Afghanistan.

It just makes no sense at all. If he had died in Fallujah, his family would have gotten, I believe, $400,000. But because he died in Poplarville, it would have been only $200,000. Again, it was corrected. And I am greatly—and I know the family is extremely grateful for doing that. But that ought to be a matter of policy for us, rather than an exception.

Secretary McHALE. Did he die in State active duty status before title 32 was invoked?

General BLUM. No, sir. He was covered in title 32.

Secretary McHALE. Because of the retroactive nature of it?

General BLUM. Because the Secretary of Defense authorized title 32 back to the 29th of August. He died on the evening of the 29th.

Secretary McHALE. But your concern is what if in some future event the approval from the Secretary was not retroactive to an early date immediately after or even before the occurrence of the event.

Mr. TAYLOR. And let's say—you know, let's say some of the rumors that turned out not to be true about New Orleans really were true? What if there really had been shooting at Cornville? Whether you are 20 miles from home or 2,000 miles from home——

Secretary McHALE. Congressman, we will take it back there for review by the Office of General Counsel (OGC). My initial impression is if we have a situation where a soldier is already in title 32, that in terms of death benefits and so on he is well cared for. The concern would be, if we didn't have a retroactive declaration—which we did have for Katrina—where there might be a gap between the time of the event and the declaration of title 32, where in State active duty status, the benefit wouldn't be nearly what it is. We heard some discussion of that earlier in title 32.

Mr. TAYLOR. In all honesty, I attended the funeral. If the officer assigned by the National Guard to take care of the family had not brought it to my attention, it might not have been fixed.

So, again, for the next time, it ought to be something that automatically gets fixed.

Secretary McHALE. Yes, sir. We understand.

Mr. SAXTON. Once again, thank you for being with us today. We appreciate your being here, and we appreciate very much the job that you are all doing. And, hopefully, when we have our next event, we will be better prepared than we were last time.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Landreneau can be found in the Appendix on page 97.]
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pickup can be found in the Appendix on page 108.]
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 25, 2006
Statement by

Honorable Paul McHale,

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

Before the 109th Congress

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities

Committee on Armed Services

United States House of Representatives

May 25, 2006
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Saxton, Ranking Member Meehan, distinguished members of this Subcommittee: thank you for inviting me here to address the progress we have made in preparing for the 2006 hurricane season.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history -- in terms of persons displaced, businesses disrupted, commerce affected, and in projected aggregate economic losses. In response to the massive devastation caused by the storm, the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) deployment of military resources in support of civil authorities after Hurricane Katrina exceeded, in speed and size, any other domestic disaster relief mission in the history of the United States. The ability of our military forces -- Active Duty, Reserves, and the National Guard -- to respond quickly and effectively to an event of this magnitude is a testament to their readiness, agility, and professionalism.

As President Bush said on April 27, 2006, in New Orleans, Louisiana, “One of the things that we're working on is to make sure that we've learned the lessons from Katrina -- we've learned lessons at the Federal level and State level and the local level. And we're now working closely together in preparation of the upcoming hurricane season.”

DOD ACTIONS TO PREPARE FOR THE 2006 HURRICANE SEASON

Mindful of the lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina and with an extraordinary sense of urgency, DoD has taken deliberate action to prepare for the 2006 hurricane season.
Interagency Coordination

By June 1, 2006, DoD will have assigned a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to each of the ten Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional office. DoD is giving priority to hurricane-prone Regions IV (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee) and VI (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas); both will have a fully staffed DCO and a five-member Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) complement by June 1, 2006. By August 2006, DoD will have a fully-staffed DCE complement in all ten of the FEMA regional offices. In the interim, from June to September 2006, any temporary vacancies in the DCEs will be filled by Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs), who are senior military Reserve officers trained in emergency response operations. The DCO and DCE will have the capability to deploy in support of an interagency Joint Field Office (JFO), which is a facility that integrates Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector incident management entities.

In coordination with DHS, FEMA, and the Department of Transportation (DOT), DoD has developed 18 pre-scripted Requests for Assistance (RFAs) to expedite the provision of DoD support to civil authorities during a disaster response. These 18 pre-scripted RFAs address DoD support for:

- Transportation (helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft);
- Communications;
- Public works and engineering (debris removal);
- Emergency management (DCO/DCE and damage assessment aircraft);
- Mass care, housing, and human services (prepare temporary housing and food distribution to points of departure);

- Resource support (installations, mobilization centers, and ground fuel distribution); and,

- Public health and medical services (helicopter medevac and temporary medical facilities).

On March 31, 2006, FEMA and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) signed an Inter-Agency Agreement (IAA), stating that DLA will provide logistics support to FEMA. Additionally, DLA will detail a Liaison Officer to FEMA during disaster response operations. DLA has also been working with FEMA to prepare and plan for logistical support during all phases of an event, FEMA provided $70 million to DLA to procure, store, rotate, and provide supplies, including Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MREs), commercial meal alternatives, health and comfort kits, tents, generators, fuel, medical supplies, construction items and other equipment. In addition, DoD’s depot infrastructure is prepared for the supply, storage, and distribution of Federal assets.

In addition, DoD has been participating in weekly interagency meetings with DHS, DOT, Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, and other Federal departments and agencies to coordinate Federal planning and preparations for the 2006 hurricane season.

Planning

We have undertaken significant planning initiatives to prepare for the 2006 hurricane season. For instance, the Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing
U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM’s) revised Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 2501 for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). This CONPLAN will provide guiding principles for DoD operations and the technical/operational architecture for DSCA. USNORTHCOM is also developing a reconnaissance annex to this CONPLAN, which will provide the mechanisms to request, approve, and coordinate DoD damage assessment operations in support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM tested the annex’s concepts during the ARDENT SENTRY exercise from May 8-18, 2006, and expects to complete this annex, including incorporating any lessons learned during ARDENT SENTRY, by September 2006.

DoD has also participated in numerous interagency and intergovernmental planning efforts. For example:

- Beginning in February 2006, USNORTHCOM has participated in DHS’ effort to review emergency response plans in all 50 States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia;

- At my request, USNORTHCOM deployed planners to conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessment in the Gulf Coast states with an emphasis on Louisiana. The assessment effort was integrated into an interagency effort led by FEMA. The areas assessed were evacuation, search and rescue, and communications interoperability. DoD is working to identify potential assets that may be required to fill gaps in capabilities;

- On March 1, 2006, USNORTHCOM hosted a catastrophic incident Rapid Response Operational Planning Conference in Colorado Springs, Colorado, which brought together Federal disaster response participants including
DHS the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Urban Search and Rescue teams;

- On March 20, 2006, USNORTHCOM hosted a Hurricane Planning Conference with State Adjutants General;

- From April 4-6, 2006, USNORTHCOM and Army North (ARNORTH) co-hosted a Federal Coordinating Office (FCO) / Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) Conference in San Antonio, Texas; the conference focused on orientation and planning for 2006 severe weather season;

- On April 6, 2006, DoD provided planners to DHS (3 USNORTHCOM operational planners and 1 U.S. Transportation Command transportation planner) to assist with the development of response plans for the 2006 hurricane season. The resulting plans will focus on the provision of logistics to an area impacted by a major or catastrophic hurricane;

- On April 21, 2006, the Secretary of Defense approved the increase the number of planners at DHS to 12 personnel. These additional planners arrived on April 24, 2006. During April 14-28, 2006, DoD personnel accompanied the Secretary of Homeland Security on a tour of the Gulf Coast States to discuss and assess 2006 hurricane preparations;

- From April 10-11, 2006, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) hosted the DHS Damage Assessment Conference to discuss available assets for damage assessment for the 2006 hurricane season;

- From April 10-14, 2006, DoD participated in the National Hurricane Conference in Orlando, Florida;

- The Joint Staff, DLA, and USNORTHCOM participated in the interagency Domestic Disaster Response Logistics Working Group that is synchronizing logistics planning for the 2006 hurricane season. In addition, from April 12-13, 2006, the DoD Logistics Working Group for Domestic
Disaster Response met with FEMA planners to begin the development of a logistics concept of operations in advance of the 2006 hurricane season;

- From April 20-21, 2006, DoD participated in the FEMA Pre-Hurricane Conference to conduct advance planning for the 2006 severe weather season;

- DoD has published the DSCA Standing Execute Order (EXORD), that authorizes the commanders of USNORTHCOM, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command to prepare DoD assets in order to be ready to deploy in support of civil authorities in response to natural disasters. Assets covered by this EXORD include:
  - Senior officers for command, control and coordination;
  - Identification of DoD installations as staging sites;
  - Helicopters for search and rescue and transportation for damage assessment;
  - Aircraft for situational awareness and to support the movement of special needs patients;
  - Communications teams to facilitate communications interoperability;
  - Liaison officer communications packages;
  - A joint airborne command center/command post; and,
  - Logistical specialists for the establishment of food, water, and medical supply distribution points.

- Finally, in April 2006, DoD, in coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services, developed the DoD sections of a Medical Services
Concept Plan for Hurricane Season 2006, and the Hurricane Response Action Steps document. These documents provide steps for coordinating and/or managing the Federal public health and medical assets required prior to, and in the aftermath of, a hurricane or tropical storm making landfall in the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, or the Virgin Islands. Per these documents, potential DoD support could include:

- Helicopters and aircraft for evacuation of special needs patients;
- Ground ambulance/ambulance bus transportation with accompanying medical attendants to move casualties;
- Medical regulating teams to assist in coordinating and moving patients;
- Surgical support augmentation, including general surgeons, anesthesiologists, operating room nurses, and surgical support personnel;
- Medical support augmentation, including internal medicine medical officers, medical/surgical nurses, corpsmen/medics; and,
- Victim identification teams to support the recovery and identification of remains.

**Emergency Response Exercises**

DoD has executed or participated in numerous exercises to prepare for this year’s hurricane season. For instance:

- DoD has participated in several Catastrophic Assessment Task Force (CATF) exercises. The CATF was established by the Homeland Security Council Staff to design, develop, and deliver Cabinet-level tabletop exercises focused on catastrophic events – events that challenge the Federal
Government’s ability to respond. CATF III is focused on Hurricane preparation in the Greater New Orleans area and will highlight for Cabinet officials (1) the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments during a Category 5 Hurricane and (2) individual departmental planning efforts. DoD has participated in regional table top exercises and after action conferences led by the DHS Preparedness Directorate in coordination with FEMA (Region III, May 3-5, 2006 and Region VI, May 17-19, 2006). DoD has also participated in Federal CATF III table top exercises at the assistant secretary-level (May 3, 2006), deputy secretary-level (May 11, 2006), and Cabinet-level (May 24, 2006).

- USNORTHCOM, held Exercise ARDENT SENTRY, May 8-12, 2006, which was based on a Category III Hurricane hitting New Orleans, Louisiana;

- DoD participated in regional hurricane preparedness table top exercises led by the DHS Preparedness Directorate in coordination with FEMA, which are designed to validate improvements in hurricane response plans based on 2005 hurricane season after-action reports, and to identify immediate coordination and preparedness improvements that have been made, or need to be made, prior to the 2006 hurricane season. The first table top exercise, which focused on FEMA Region III (Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia), was held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 3-4, 2006. The second table top exercise, which focused on FEMA Region VI (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas), was held in New Orleans, Louisiana, May 17-18, 2006;

- DoD will also participate in three additional table top exercises, scheduled for May 31-June 1, 2006, in Atlanta, Georgia, for FEMA Region IV (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee), June 20-21, 2006, in New London, Connecticut for FEMA Regions I (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and II (New Jersey and New York), and June 5-6 for OCONUS based FEMA region II (Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands); and,

- DoD hosted a logistics exercise, May 23-24, 2006, at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, with FEMA, DOT, DLA, the Joint Staff, NORAD-USNORTHCOM, and U.S. Transportation Command to assist with hurricane disaster logistics planning.

Communications

DoD is supporting FEMA efforts to augment communications capabilities in the Gulf Coast region. In addition to increased deployment of satellite phones with emergency response staff, FEMA is augmenting current capabilities with High-Frequency (HF) equipment integration, Land Mobile Radios, Disaster Satellite Communications and mobile communications. Before the hurricane season, DoD will participate in four FEMA communications exercises to validate interoperability among Federal, State and local emergency management officials. All of these measures will improve the ability of disaster responders at all levels to communicate with each other during disaster responses.

The standing EXORD for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) authorizes the Commander, USNORTHCOM, to deploy communications capabilities to support FEMA response activities. These capabilities include:

- Teams to facilitate communications interoperability;
- Liaison officer communications packages;
• Joint airborne command center/command post; and,

• A small internet command and control protocol package.

In addition, DoD, in conjunction with FEMA, has developed a pre-scripted request for assistance (RFA) providing deployable communications options that can be called upon in the case of a disaster. Finally, USNORTHCOM, supported by the National Guard Bureau (NGB), is assisting FEMA’s development, in conjunction with Louisiana State officials, of a communications contingency plan.

From May 1-2, 2006, DoD participated in a Gulf Coast Recovery meeting in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with Louisiana officials to address a concept plan for evacuation, search and rescue, and communications interoperability. Other interagency participants in this meeting included DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the National Communications System. A draft concept plan for the Federal response was submitted to the Director of Gulf Coast Recovery on May 10, 2006.

Federal and State Military Integration

In addition to planning efforts mentioned earlier, we have taken steps to improve the integration of Federal and State military planning and operations in a disaster response:

• The National Guard Bureau is working with the States to build a database of current and planned standing Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) to ensure rapid deployment of forces when activated, and to avoid duplication of effort by Federal forces;

• The new Defense Readiness Reporting System will incorporate requirements to report deployment of National Guard units and personnel,
under the authority of Title 32, U.S. Code, which will significantly improve USNORTHCOM’s situational awareness during the response to a domestic incident;

- The National Guard has participated in USNORTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group, which is composed of representatives from DoD components and non-DoD organizations such as DHS (and its components such as FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard), DOT, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the U.S. Geological Survey; and,

- DoD has held or participated in several planning meetings to coordinate and deconflict Federal and State military actions. For example, USNORTHCOM held a planning meeting, February 12-13, 2006, with Adjutants General from those States affected by hurricanes. Additionally, the National Guard Bureau held planning conferences for the South Eastern States from March 14-16, 2006, and April 25-28, 2006, and USNORTHCOM held a Joint Force Air Component Command hurricane planning conference from April 18-20, 2006.

CONCLUSION

In terms of its magnitude, Hurricane Katrina constituted one of the most destructive natural disasters in U.S. history, and proved to be the deadliest storm to strike the United States since 1928. In a domestic disaster relief operation unprecedented in scale, over 72,000 Federal military and National Guard forces flowed into the Gulf Coast region over a twelve-day period to assist their fellow Americans in distress. The DoD response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest, fastest civil support mission in U.S. history.
We have not only learned the lessons of Hurricane Katrina, we have acted upon them. With our Federal, State, and local partners, we have planned, prepared, and enhanced our readiness through exercises for this upcoming hurricane season.

Mister Chairman, I commend you and the members of this Committee for your leadership, interest in, and support of, the Department’s homeland defense and civil support missions. I look forward to any questions you may have.
RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H STEVEN BLUM
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SECOND SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

ON
APPLYING LESSONS LEARNT FROM HURRICANE KATRINA:
HOW DOD IS PREPARING FOR THE UPCOMING HURRICANE
SEASON

MAY 25, 2006

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
I’d like to thank-you for the opportunity to speak to you today regarding the National Guard’s preparedness for the upcoming hurricane season. As always, the men and women of your National Guard stand ready to provide assistance to civilian authorities—*in the form of personnel and equipment*—at the request of the Governors or the President, through a rapid, integrated response across the nation. Even as I stand before you today, your National Guard has over 54,000 troops serving bravely in the overseas warfight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, in a historic announcement made just days ago by the President, the National Guard—some 6,000 troops—will be called to support our border with Mexico for up to two years. This call-up of forces doesn’t take into consideration the thousands of Army and Air National Guard forces that are currently serving on the nation’s borders supporting the counterterrorism and counterdrug mission. This recent announcement is confirmation that the National Guard’s geographical distribution, community integration, and other traditional strengths make it an effective and cost efficient force for many Homeland Defense (HLD) and civil support requirements at both the State and Federal levels.

I share this with you so you might find comfort in knowing that, through real-world training, your National Guard is constantly preparing for the next mission whether the next enemy comes in the form of a terrorist or takes shape as a natural disaster. I’m positive no one wants to see the likes of Hurricane Katrina again; however, we are realistic and no preparedness is the best course of action. So, we continue to train for like, or even larger, disasters in order to stay ready, reliable and relevant.

The National Guard is a full spectrum force which balances expeditionary warfight support with Homeland Defense. Training and preparation for the overseas warfighting mission provides National Guard forces with the vast majority of the preparation required for Homeland Defense. It should be noted that the Homeland Defense requirements do not focus solely on material solutions; they also identify needed cultural changes—specifically regarding coordination and unity of effort across multiple agencies and intergovernmental seams. We’re seeing great strides in this area. The emphasis of our Homeland Defense mission is on prevention, pre-event deterrence, and responding within the first 96 hours after a major incident.
In preparing for these missions, the National Guard continually examines the emerging threats facing our nation as well as lessons learned from past performance—an in this particular case for which you've invited me here today, the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and Rita. So, with that said, the National Guard leadership has identified the capability gaps that as a military force must be overcome in order to be our most effective. While we have overcome many of them, we are constantly working to fill all gaps in order to see continued success in future missions. Failure is not an option, especially when American lives hang in the balance.

I want to be very specific about what your National Guard has done to prepare for the next Katrina; however, in order for you to understand where we are going I think it equally important that you understand where we've been. With that said, I'd like to address the core capabilities inherent within the National Guard that we continue to refine through various initiatives to address the identified gaps I've briefly touched on. My hope is that this will give you a baseline of what the National Guard brings to the fight.

Governors count on the National Guard to be the first military responder and call on Guard assets at their disposal within the first hours of an event; therefore resourcing is critical. The National Guard must be able to support the Governors' requirements on an immediate basis, and respond with the right capabilities, to the right location, at the right time. The States have indicated to the National Guard Bureau that there are certain capabilities they feel they need to meet emergencies. As a result, we have identified the following ten essential capabilities each State, Territory and District of Columbia must maintain at all times: 1) Joint Force Headquarters (2) Engineering (3) Civil Support Teams (4) Security (5) Medical (6) Transportation (7) Maintenance (8) Logistics (9) Aviation and, (10) Communications. In many cases, we leverage the EMAC—Emergency Management Agreement Compact—system to ensure these ten essentials are available to every state and territory. EMAC has proven successful in, and I'll discuss this agreement in more detail.

We are seeking to further leverage the capacity currently existing in these 10 essential capabilities to address identified gaps through the development of the following initiatives and concepts.
(1) **Joint Force Headquarters—State (JFHQ-State).** JFHQ-State is a joint command and control entity in each State and territory. It is integrated into national consequence management and contingency planning structures. JFHQs provide situational updates (common operating picture) information to national level headquarters before and during any contingency operation and Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Movements, and Integration (JRSOI) for all inbound military forces. In very simplistic terms, JRSOI is simply a selection of predetermined sites (distribution points, airports etc) and routes for moving supplies and personnel into affected areas. Federal law provides a mechanism whereby a National Guard officer can command federal troops. Such a commander at the head of a Joint Task Force—State (JTF-State), which is created in times of emergency by the Joint Force Headquarters, can assume tactical control of all military units –State National Guard, other National Guard forces, Active Component and Reserves. The JTF-State commander can be a dual-hatted commander of both Title 32 (Federally funded, yet state controlled) and Title 10 (Federally funded and controlled) forces as demonstrated in the 2004 G8 Summit as well as the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

(2) **Joint Force Headquarters Joint Operations Centers (JFHQ JOC).** The JOC is a network composed of the National Guard Bureau JOC, located in Arlington, Virginia and a separate JOC in each of the 54 States and Territories. The JFHQ JOC serves as the primary entity for coordinating, facilitating, and synchronizing efforts in support of their states, information requirements of the National Guard Bureau and customers at the Federal level during natural disasters, National Special Security Events (NSSE), exercises and domestic activities. Each JFHQ JOC has redundant connectivity: DoD architecture of NIPR and SIPR; a High Frequency (HF) network with classified and unclassified voice and data information; and commercial systems. In a nutshell, the JOC concept allows for a continual and accurate flow of information from each state and territory into the National Guard Bureau. In turn, this information is consolidated and shared with Northern Command and other federal agencies.

(3) **National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP).** The
National Guard developed and fielded 12 CERFP teams to provide a regional capability to respond to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological or high explosive threats. Each team is designed to rapidly (less than 96 hours) provide the capability to locate and extract victims from a CBRNE incident site and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination and medical triage and stabilization. The CERFP augments the capabilities of the National Guard’s Civil Support Teams (CST). The incremental training and equipment for this capability is specialized, compatible with the first responders, and interoperable with the incident command system. Congress provided direction and, for FY’06, funding to establish an additional 5 teams bringing the total to 17.

(4) **Critical Infrastructure Program- Mission Assurance Assessments (CIP-MAA).** National Guard CIP-MAA teams execute the pre-planning needed to educate the civilian agencies on basic force protection and emergency response. Additionally, these teams are building relationships with first responders, owners of critical infrastructure and National Guard planners in the States and Territories. CIP-MAA teams deploy traditional National Guard forces in a timely fashion to assist in protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, including vital elements of the Defense Industrial Base. Currently, six “pilot” teams staffed by 14 specially trained National Guard personnel conduct vulnerability assessments.

(5) **National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF).** Being based in so many communities, the National Guard has proven time and again that it can muster forces and be on the scene of an incident within hours. Each of the 54 States and Territories is currently training a battalion size reaction force that can respond anywhere in the state with an initial 75 to 125 person element within a minimum of four to eight hours. So, generally, we can get a company of troops on the ground within hours and a battalion in place overnight. These reaction forces provided crucial support to law enforcement in the response to Hurricane Katrina. The NGRF is task-organized from existing units and can provide Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), site security, and security and support during CBRNE contingency operations.

(6) **Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE).** The National Guard has successfully established a JCCSE nationwide. This communication environment is a joint National Guard Bureau and Northern Command strategy for leveraging current National Guard communication capabilities to provide...
support to the major military commands, Department of Defense as well as non-
DoD partners at State/Territory-level and to any incident site. Each JFHQ
established Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) linkages. The HSIN
is an unsecured collection of Department of Homeland Security systems
designed to facilitate information sharing and collaboration. Additionally, each
Joint Force Joint Operation Center (JF JOC) has secure/non-secure real-time
operational network linkages in addition to secure video teleconference
capabilities. This is critical to providing real time operational connectivity as well
as a common operating picture to local, state and federal agencies.

(7) **Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs).** Include 22
Army and Air National Guard- Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel organized,
trained and equipped to enter contaminated areas and identify contaminants
within a short period of time. They have extensive reach-back communications
capability to facilitate off-site evaluation and support from various laboratories.
They are equipped with mobile laboratories capable of providing identification of
chemical or biological materials. To date, the National Guard has fielded 36
CSTs and will have 55 teams by FY07.

(8) **Aviation Security and Support (S&S) Battalions.** As part of the Army’s overall
aviation transformation, the Army National Guard has been able to convert and
grow some valuable dual-purpose aviation structure that will be readily available
and responsive to Homeland Security/Defense needs, in addition to their normal
Army operational mission. The ARNG officially activated six of these 24-aircraft
S&S Battalions on 1 October 2005 and placed them in readily responsive
locations across 44 states.

We are, once again, on point to test many of these preparedness measures—some
which were put in place since last year—as we are fast approaching another hurricane
season. In this post-Katrina era we find that the best preparation for the next potential
disaster is history. With that said, I want to stress for the record that I continue to be
particularly proud of the timeliness and magnitude of the National Guard’s efforts in
advance of Hurricane Katrina and our response in its immediate aftermath. National
Guard forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing people
within four hours of Katrina’s passing. Over 50,000 National Guard personnel hailing
from every state and territory responded to calls for support of the affected region. The
effort was tremendous, but we realize we can always improve. I always tell my leadership and my troops that in order to have a great team we have to practice to the point of failure to ensure our future success. Once you identify the broken parts, you can then focus on a plan to strengthen the weak link. With that said, the real-world test on the magnitude of Katrina, definitely helped us find the breaking points on which we’ve focused much attention.

In our after-action reviews of our response to Katrina, we talked with our troops on the ground in the hurricane affected areas as well as our commanders, and we participated and learned from the Senate and House hearings to gain a good understanding of our performance shortfalls. We’ve taken these “lessons learned” and incorporated them into our training and exercise play to improve upon our emergency response effectiveness over the past several months. I’d like to take a moment to walk you through a couple of our most recent activities focused specifically on hurricane preparedness and emergency response. I believe they serve as a very good warm-up to the beginning of the hurricane season.

Our most recent preparedness measure was our participation in Ardent Sentry ’06. The two-week U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) exercise was designed to test military support to federal, provincial, state and local authorities while continuing to support the Defense Department’s homeland security mission. This emergency response exercise included more than 5,000 U.S. and Canadian service members working with authorities in five state and two Canadian provinces to test response capabilities. The scenario includes crises ranging from a major hurricane to a terrorist attack to a pandemic flu outbreak. Again, the goal is to find the points of failure. Among the many objectives of the exercise—improved communications, interagency coordination, and emergency response training—I am particularly pleased with the working relationship that has developed between the National Guard Bureau and Northern Command. It may seem like a simple objective, but this relationship between the two is critical to future success of any national response.

Several hurricane response workshops and conferences have been conducted throughout the year with the most recent being in Hilton Head, South Carolina at the end
of April. Attendees included National Guard planners from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, Virgin Islands, Northern Command and other federal agencies. I don’t have to tell you that there are huge benefits to pulling these key regional players together in one place. Each participant provided updates on their specific hurricane preparedness and assets that are available to them. So, we’re all learning from one another and, I’ll stress that if this opportunity allows just one state to improve on its’ existing hurricane plan by gaining an idea from another state I’d consider that a success. Simple changes can save many lives. When you net it all down, the sharing of information—whether it be too identify deficiencies and shortcomings or helping others to understand capabilities available to them in time of disaster—prior to an actual event is important to your survival during the actual event.

While we’ve conducted several and have more to follow, I’ve only highlighted a couple of the conferences and exercises specifically designed to improve our emergency response to a hurricane. We conduct these exercises for obvious reasons; however, it’s worth repeating that a great team must practice to the point of failure to ensure future success.

Our review of Katrina helped to identified four major issues that needed to be addressed before this hurricane season—resourcing, interoperability, command and control of all military forces and training. I’d now like to address what we have done and what we are doing to address each of these issues in order to ensure our preparedness.

RESOURCING
Even prior to 9/11, the National Guard did not have all of the equipment it is required to have to be fully mission capable. The pace of combat has placed even further challenges on us. In order to ensure that deploying units are fully equipped and ready to support operations anywhere in the world, we have transferred over 101,000 items of equipment in support of these missions. This situation has presented the National Guard with challenges in keeping our inventories here at home fully supplied with critical items such as trucks, radios, and heavy engineering equipment. With the help of Congress and the President, we have made an excellent start in filling these equipment gaps, and the President’s budget will allow the National Guard to continue on the road to
recovery. Over the FY06-FY-11 timeframe, the Administration plans to invest $19.2 billion and $4.4 billion in the Army and Air National Guard, respectively, demonstrating an unwavering commitment to providing the resources necessary to protect our homeland.

We are also addressing this through force structure rebalancing and as mentioned earlier the use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as an essential force multiplier. This agreement among the States enhances a Governor’s response capabilities by providing access to regional forces and equipment. Without question, EMAC enabled the National Guard to overcome many of the equipment/resource obstacles faced during Hurricane Katrina and Rita. The National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center (NGB JOC) served as the coordination point for the various EMAC requests before sending the requests out to the states and territories. We provided needed advice and assistance to Governors in identifying, selecting, requesting and deploying Guard forces needed in the affected states. We were able to test this process thoroughly during the recently conducted Ardent Sentry ’06 exercise that I just discussed.

Maintaining essential capabilities across the National Guard, amid on-going overseas operations, Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) rebalance, modularity conversions, and national strategy adjustments is an evolving task. Nevertheless, the National Guard Bureau attempts to synchronize all of these activities to ensure at least 50 percent of a given state’s National Guard is always available for state missions, and HLD operations.

**INTEROPERABILITY**
The White House report, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned* spoke to the need for interoperability. It said, “lack of interoperable communications was apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency responders, National Guard, and active duty military use different equipment.” Our specialized C4 packages, though limited in number, were able to bridge the frequency gap between military and civilian personnel in many locations. An in-depth look at interoperability is on-going and there is a “sense of urgency” inside the Army and the Defense Department about meeting the National Guard’s equipment needs.
On a positive note, Katrina supplemental funding was leveraged to enhance the National Guard’s Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE), which I discussed earlier as a joint National Guard Bureau and Northern Command strategy. As a result, twenty-three states—located primarily in the hurricane region—will have access to the new Joint incident Site Communications Capability (JISCC) by hurricane season. This communication system will provide a bridge for civilian and intergovernmental agencies that exist at the state and local level, so they can interface in a synergistic and coordinated fashion with the DoD assets that may be requested.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

The infusion of the active duty forces into the Hurricane Katrina response effort presented some challenges at the operational level. There were some gaps in communication, coordination, and integration into ongoing National Guard and Emergency Response operations already underway by the affected states. The situation was occasionally exacerbated by incompatible communication systems, lack of familiarity with the local area, and lack of involvement in the pre-Hurricane planning.

The efficacy of the creation of the Joint Forces Headquarters-State (JFHQ-State)—which I discussed earlier—was proven in the National Guard portion of the response as both of the hardest hit states, Mississippi and Louisiana, were able to integrate forces from 53 other states and territories and the District of Columbia. Furthermore, the Joint Forces Headquarters-State could have provided reception, staging, and onward integration for the federal forces deployed by NORTHCOM to support the civil authorities in the affected states.

In addition to the benefits of JFHQ-State I’ve already discussed, a Joint Task Force-State (JTF-State) can, with state-federal concurrence, assume tactical control of all military units ordered to respond to a contingency operation or disaster. This includes all state National Guard, other National Guard forces, Active Component as well as Reserves. The JTF-State commander can be a dual-hatted commander of both Title 32 and Title 10 forces giving unity of command within the military forces. The JTF-State can act as a subordinate Command and Control headquarters for US NORTHCOM if
required. The effectiveness of dual-hatted command was proven in 2004 at the G8 Summit, Operation Winter Freeze as well as the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. These were landmark achievements. For the first time in our nation’s history, the military attained unity of command for all forces operating in support of a major event. In each case, from one Joint Force Headquarters, a single National Guard officer commanded Guard units from multiple states operating under Title 32 authority, as well as Active Component Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps title 10 forces in a joint, intergovernmental, interagency environment.

**TRAINING**

I’d like to transition into training and the National Guard’s determination to take advantage of opportunities to share training and planning expertise with civilian partners, and the importance that these efforts be institutionalized. One of the White House reports that came out after Katrina recommended that each Federal agency have a homeland security professional development program. We are pleased to say that we are already heading in that direction. The National Guard’s Joint Interagency Training Center in West Virginia, serves as a model that demonstrates how joint training capacity can be expanded and how the military and civilian communities can train and work together. We are working with the Joint Forces Command to institutionalize this Center within the Departments process for joint education and training. This will allow us to increase the overall effectiveness of the national effort through standardized operational concepts, shared experiences, and enhanced interoperability.

These four areas of concern -- resourcing for personnel and equipment, interoperability, command and control of all military forces, and training -- will require continued attention as each is crucial to ensuring an effective response for Homeland Defense and civil support. Identifying and correcting these concerns will only improve the National Guard’s already high state of readiness.

I’ll close by saying your National Guard is ready, reliable and relevant. Thank you for your time, and I would be happy to answer any of your questions at his time.
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

STATEMENT OF
MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD J. ROWE, JR, USA
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ON
"APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM HURRICANE KATRINA: HOW DOD IS
PREPARING FOR THE UPCOMING HURRICANE SEASON"

25 MAY 2006
Chairman Saxton, Congressman Meehan and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), thank you for this opportunity to discuss our preparations for the 2006 hurricane season.

As directed by the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM is prepared to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hurricane response efforts. All DoD support is provided at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense and in accordance with the National Response Plan. Hurricane relief is conducted as a team effort among federal, state and local governments, as well as non-governmental organizations. When requested, USNORTHCOM will be fully engaged in supporting operations to save lives, reduce suffering and protect the infrastructure of our homeland.

Actions Taken Since Hurricane Katrina. We have taken significant steps to improve our response capabilities based on lessons learned and findings in the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina report entitled, “A Failure of Initiative,” the White House Report entitled, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned” and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Report, entitled, “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared.”

USNORTHCOM has incorporated the Joint Staff standing execution order (EXORD) for Defense Support of Civil Authorities into operational planning for the 2006 hurricane season. The EXORD gives the USNORTHCOM Commander authority, in coordination with supporting commands and military departments, to: deploy Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) and their staffs; establish operational staging areas, federal mobilization centers, and DoD base support installations in support of FEMA; and deploy airborne fire fighting systems upon receipt of a request for assistance from a federal primary agency. In addition, the USNORTHCOM Commander can place the following assets on 24-hour prepare to deploy orders: medium and heavy lift support helicopters, fixed wing search aircraft, communications support packages,
patient movement capability, a Joint Task Force for command and control of Federal military forces, a forward surgical team, and a Deployable Distribution Operations Center. USNORTHCOM is currently integrating full-time DCOs and their staffs into each FEMA region.

To further improve our response capability, we have:

- Developed pre-scripted requests for assistance for FEMA, in collaboration with DoD and DHS, based on anticipated capability requirements.
- Purchased, in conjunction with DHS, cellular network packages that include over 100 cell phones, over 40 laptop computers, a satellite terminal and radio bridging. USNORTHCOM also procured 300 satellite phones for distribution per request of the lead federal agency in support of state officials. Besides the physical hardware, USNORTHCOM also provides an unclassified, Internet-based situational awareness picture. In addition, we established a link into the Homeland Security Information Network picture and exchanged liaison officers with DHS/National Communications System, NGB and FEMA/Joint Field Offices.
- Identified a series of deployed communication options from each Service that can quickly adapt to support FEMA’s pre-scripted mission assignments and the needs of a request for forces from a joint task force. In addition, we identified assets from the Services and Joint Communications Support Element (e.g., voice, video and data packages to support a small command post or large joint task force).
- Deployed eight USNORTHCOM planners in support of FEMA and state officials in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Planner focus is on evacuation plans, preparations, communication interoperability and response operations.
- Conducted Exercise ARDENT SENTRY 06 from 8-19 May 2006. This exercise focused on both homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities and included a Category 3 hurricane striking the Gulf Coast in the vicinity of New Orleans.
• Hosted or participated in more than 140 conferences or tabletop exercises since Hurricane Katrina.

• Developed procedures with Air Force North, a Service Component of USNORTHCOM, to increase visibility and provide de-confliction of airborne rescue assets.

• Coordinated on a damage assessment concept of operations with DHS and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Collaboration is ongoing on pre- and post-hurricane imagery collection processes between DoD and interagency partners, as well as dissemination methods for imagery products.

• Deployed information management mobile training teams to demonstrate and instruct the use of collaborative tools and information sharing processes to our DoD and interagency partners. Our teams have trained National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center personnel and the staffs of 28 National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State, 11 of which are located in hurricane regions. We are also coordinating with Army North, a Service Component of USNORTHCOM, to train DCOs and Defense Coordinating Elements on the use of collaborative tools, process and procedures to facilitate greater information sharing. This initiative started in late 2003 and is an ongoing process.

• Hosted a three day Federal Coordinating Officer-Defense Coordinating Officer Conference in April 2006 in San Antonio, Texas. This conference provided a unique forum to review disaster lessons learned and enhance and build response relationships.

• Coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard and NGB on a Joint Search and Rescue Center for large-scale operations.

• Developed engagement strategies with DHS to support federal communication authorities, to include public affairs plans and guidance for the upcoming hurricane season.

USNORTHCOM is prepared to provide public affairs presence forward and embed media

**Ongoing Initiatives.** We continue to work with our interagency partners on ways to strengthen our nation’s crisis response capabilities. These actions include:

- Monitoring the logistical preparations of FEMA and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to include the pre-positioning of stocks (food, water and ice) in FEMA logistics centers. USNORTHCOM also has visibility into FEMA’s coordination for the delivery of three million Meals Ready to Eat stored in DLA warehouses. DLA is the primary source for DHS and FEMA for emergency meals, fuel and pharmaceutical, medical and surgical supplies. USNORTHCOM’s improved situational awareness helps reduce the need for short-notice airlifts.

- Hosting a Logistics Federal Response Rehearsal in late May to ensure critical commodity support (food, water, fuel and pharmaceuticals). This rehearsal will demonstrate the effectiveness of agreed-upon procedures between FEMA, DoD, DLA, the National Guard, state emergency managers and other interagency and non-governmental organizations.

- Assisting DHS in their National Plan Review process development to ensure compliance with the Conference Report (House Report 109-241) to the 2006 DHS Appropriations Act. The report directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to report on the status of catastrophic planning, including mass evacuation planning in all 50 states and the 75 largest urban areas. Results of the National Plan Review will provide a better understanding of community capabilities when making an impact assessment in the event of a catastrophic incident.

**USNORTHCOM and National Guard Coordination.** Since the National Guard will play a pivotal role in disaster response, we must ensure unity of effort between active duty forces and state status National Guard forces when assembling and directing a large-scale, multi-state and international response to a domestic catastrophic event. To enhance our ability to achieve unity
of effort, USNORTHCOM hosted a 2006 Hurricane Preparation Conference at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado this past February. The conference afforded ten Adjutants General and USNORTHCOM senior leadership the opportunity to prepare for the 2006 hurricane season. The conference advanced our collective ability to respond with the full spectrum of military capabilities in a timely manner.

USNORTHCOM has initiated collaborative planning and preparation efforts with the Adjutants General from all states, and we participated in the recent meetings of the National Governors Association and the Adjutants General Association of the United States. In addition, the National Guard participated in the USNORTHCOM-hosted legal conference. These face-to-face meetings provided a forum for USNORTHCOM and the National Guard to discuss challenges and responsibilities and enhance our unity of effort initiatives.

To improve our situational awareness with the National Guard we formalized our efforts to achieve interoperability, collaboration and information sharing via a Concept for Joint Command, Control, Communications and Computers, signed in November 2005. As recommended in the White House Report, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” USNORTHCOM is also pursuing avenues to enhance situational awareness of National Guard troop movements and locations to ensure the application of the full capability of the joint force for domestic response missions.

USNORTHCOM established a full-time National Guard watch position in the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center. This watch position has connectivity to the NGB Joint Operations Center to ensure routine coordination of operational missions conducted in State Active Duty or Title 32 status. The NGB also participates in USNORTHCOM Commander’s Situational Awareness Meetings to provide daily deployment and mission data to the Command.

Conclusion. USNORTHCOM is leaning forward and ready to provide robust support to DHS/FEMA during the upcoming hurricane season. We have incorporated lessons learned into our operational planning, and we have conducted rigorous exercises to hone our capabilities.
We appreciate everything Congress has done to support our servicemen and women who safeguard Americans during natural or manmade catastrophes. Even as we act to support civil authorities in responding to natural disasters, we never lose focus on our primary mission of homeland defense. One fact remains constant—our enemies should make no mistake about our resolve or our capabilities.
STATEMENT BY

MAJOR GENERAL DOUGLAS BURNETT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF FLORIDA

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES

SECOND SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

ON
APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA: HOW DoD IS PREPARING
FOR THE UPCOMING HURRICANE SEASON

MAY 25, 2006
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. This morning, I would like to outline the state of Florida’s Emergency Management System and how the Florida National Guard provides Defense Support to Civil Authorities. My remarks will then describe in some detail how the Florida National Guard conducts Hurricane Relief Operations and our current readiness to execute those relief operations in conjunction with local, state, and federal supporting organizations. Finally, I would like to close with some current concerns regarding our current capabilities to execute future homeland security and homeland defense related operations.

**FLORIDA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

The daunting reality is there have been over 1,300 tropical storms and hurricanes in the last 150 years and a large number have impacted Florida. We prepare for hurricanes in Florida because we know we will deal with them every year. It is not a possibility -- it is a certainty. Because of this reality, and because of the leadership of Governor Jeb Bush and his State Coordinating Officer, Mr. Craig Fugate, the state of Florida has developed a very robust Emergency Management System.

In the past two years, Florida experienced two of the most devastating and challenging hurricane seasons in history. In 2004, five named storms (Tropical Storm Bonnie, Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) impacted Florida within a period of six weeks. These storms impacted virtually the entire state, destroying more than 25,000 homes, significantly damaging another 40,000, and causing the evacuation of 9.4 million people. In addition, 368,000 Floridians were publicly sheltered, more than 8.5 million lost power, and 122 lost their lives. This was the first time since 1886 that one state had experienced four hurricanes in one year.

The 2005 hurricane season proved to be an even more challenging with four hurricanes (Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma) impacting Florida. This season was historic with records set for the number of named storms (28), hurricanes (15) and Category 5 hurricanes (4). This was the most damaging in our nation’s history, causing more than $70 billion in damage. Throughout these devastating hurricane seasons, the Florida State Emergency Response Team provided support and assistance to the citizens of Florida.

The Florida National Guard is part of a comprehensive emergency management team led by Governor Bush and Mr. Fugate. State law emphasizes that emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation capabilities will be developed through enhanced coordination, long term planning, and adequate funding. The state’s focus is on disaster support to local emergency response efforts. The state is prepared to provide effective, coordinated, and timely support if these communities require assistance beyond their capabilities.

Governor Bush’s operational philosophy may be described as “One Plan, One Team, Many Threats.” The state’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan establishes an overall framework for nested or supporting plans. The Governor serves as the state’s Incident Commander. Local and state elected officials and emergency response staffs form the core of our team. An assigned federal coordinating officer serves as our partner and is integrated into our team. This structure provides the basis for our response to hurricanes, fires, floods, mass migration, and any other natural or man-made disasters.
The Florida Division of Emergency Management is the Governor’s primary coordinator of Florida’s emergency management team. It provides direction and overall policy coordination of state disaster mitigation, response, and recovery activities; and coordinating the activities of all state agencies providing disaster assistance. Their efforts include:

- Development of a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) provides guidance to state and local officials on procedures, organization, and responsibilities for emergency management.
- Establishment of a web site (www.floridadisaster.org) provides a comprehensive reference guide for Florida’s emergency managers and citizens.
- Development of the State Emergency Response Team, composed of state, local, volunteer agencies, and the private sector; the 17 emergency support functions, and the Emergency Coordinating Officers.
- Development of a communications system to facilitate contact between local and state government and emergency agencies.
- Investment in a state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee.
- An aggressive public affairs campaign, emphasizing personal responsibility.
- Training for emergency management staff at local and state levels.
- Funding for programs that protect lives and mitigate property loss.
- Development of an Emergency Alert System which will alert the public of impending danger or other emergencies.

Florida’s functional approach divides assistance into 17 separate functions. These emergency support functions and lead agency responsibilities are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency Support Function</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
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<td>1. Transportation</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<td>2. Communications</td>
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<td>3. Public Works and Engineering</td>
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<td>8. Health and Medical Services</td>
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<td>9. Urban Search and Rescue</td>
<td>Department of Insurance</td>
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<td>11. Food &amp; Water</td>
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<td>12. Energy</td>
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<td>13. Military Support</td>
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<td>14. Public Information</td>
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<td>15. Volunteers &amp; Donations</td>
<td>Department of Community Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Law Enforcement &amp; Security</td>
<td>Department of Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Animal Support</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD

The Adjutant General of Florida serves as the senior military advisor to Governor Bush. Forces available to the Governor include formations assigned to both the Florida Army National Guard and Florida Air National Guard. The Florida Army National Guard has 10,000 Soldiers with the 53rd Infantry Brigade (Separate), 164th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 83rd Troop Command, and 50th Area Support Group as its Major Commands. The Florida Air National Guard has 2,000 Airmen with the 125th Fighter Wing, Southeast Air Defense Sector, 202nd Red Horse Squadron, 290th Joint Combat Communications Support Squadron, 114th Range Operations Squadron, 159th Weather Flight, and Weather Readiness Training Center as its Major Commands.

The Florida National Guard has been a significant force provider for the Global War on Terrorism, providing units that have served or are currently serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle and other contingency missions. These Florida Guard members have been deployed to Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Philippines, Kosovo, Bosnia, Cuba, and other locations throughout the world while also conducting homeland security missions in the United States. The Florida National Guard has deployed over 8,000 troops for the Global War on Terrorism and currently has approximately 2,000 troops deployed overseas and in the United States.

Concurrent with conducting federal missions, the Florida National Guard remains fully prepared to conduct its state/homeland security mission in support of Governor Bush and the citizens of Florida. Governor Bush and I have coordinated with the Department of Defense, United States Northern Command, Forces Command, United States First Army, National Guard Bureau, other State National Guards, federal and state agencies to ensure National Guard forces are available at all times to support state missions. The Florida National Guard has responded to eight hurricanes in the past two years, while continuing our federal missions. With the support of all federal and state agencies, the Florida National Guard remains fully capable and prepared to conduct its federal and state missions.

Since 1992, the Florida National Guard has supported 55 domestic operations, operating for over 1,500 days. The Adjutant General of Florida is responsible for the coordination, employment, and control of National Guard forces and resources. The protection of life, property, and the maintenance of law and order within the state of Florida are the primary responsibility of civil authorities.

The Florida National Guard is normally employed only after local and state resources have been fully utilized or when the situation exceeds, or is likely to exceed, the capabilities of the local and state civil authorities. The Adjutant General of Florida serves as the primary military advisor to the Governor. This relationship is similar to that between the President and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is particularly important during domestic operations. The Governor relies on the Adjutant General for input on all military operations not just Florida National Guard roles and missions. In Florida, the Adjutant General is not the emergency manager, but works in close coordination with the State Coordinating Officer during Florida National Guard domestic operations.
At the direction of the Governor, and in close coordination with federal agencies, Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and other state agencies, the Florida National Guard is prepared to support:

- **Hurricane Relief Operations.** Security, logistics, transportation, debris clearing, search/rescue, reconnaissance teams, rapid initial assessment teams, traffic control points, airport clearance, engineering assistance, humanitarian assistance, Logistics Staging Areas, distribution points, State Logistics Systems Support, airlift, aerial re-supply, communications, County Emergency Operations Center Liaison Officers

- **Wildfire Operations.** Security, logistics, transportation, aircraft control, helicopter fire suppression, finance, fire fighters

- **Reverse Laning.** Preparation and security of the state's major highway systems to permit rapid evacuation of large populations

- **Airport, Seaport, Nuclear Power Plan Security.** Security of key installations and sites

In addition, the 44th Civil Support Team provides support throughout the state to augment first response agencies in incidents involving hostile use of chemical, biological, or radiological agents.

**FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS**

The Florida National Guard prepares for homeland security and domestic operations with the same intensity as preparing to conduct combat operations. The continual threat during the hurricane season has required a preparation cycle that has become second nature to the Florida emergency management community to include the Florida National Guard. Preparation at all levels of the Florida National Guard is crucial to the successful conduct of hurricane relief operations.

The Florida National Guard’s operational concept for hurricane relief operations is to remain prepared to rapidly and safely deploy resources in support of disaster response; work with state, federal, and local agencies to provide professional and effective support that meets the needs of the citizens of Florida; continue to support the Global War on Terrorism and other federal missions; conduct operations safely; and ensure the needs of Florida National Guard Soldiers, Airmen, and families are met, with particular emphasis on meeting the needs of deployed servicemembers’ families.

Hurricane relief operations present many unique challenges. The timeline for action is significantly compressed, as aid needs to reach affected citizens within 24 hours. There is minimal lead time for Guard members to report to their units and deploy to the affected area. Although the hurricane has passed prior to the start of relief operations, there can continue to be significantly adverse weather conditions. The destruction caused by hurricanes presents challenges for all phases of the operations, particularly safety. To ensure a timely response, the Florida National Guard prepositions forces immediately outside the projected hurricane impact area; however, there have been many instances where units had to reposition due to a change in the hurricane track. Communications are not normally operating in the affected areas. This means Florida National Guard units must supply their own communications. Guard members conduct relief operations operate in a very austere environment, and each unit must be self-sufficient for food, water, fuel, and communications.
Pre-Incident Strategy.

Success in domestic operations is built on preparation, planning, and resource investment. The foundation of Florida National Guard hurricane relief operations is highly qualified leadership, starting with Governor Bush as the Commander in Chief. The Florida National Guard has tremendous experience in domestic operations at all levels of leadership. This is particularly important in senior leadership positions, as every senior leader has been involved in multiple domestic operations throughout their career.

The Florida National Guard has been completely integrated into the state's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and has published a Joint Operations Plan that is used as a template by other state National Guards. The Florida National Guard Joint Operation Plan for Military Support to Civil Authorities/Homeland Defense provides guidance to units of the Florida National Guard to use when planning, coordinating, or performing operations that support the state of Florida during emergencies. This document is in the doctrinal format of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.03A. The Joint Operation Plan contains all operations, personnel, intelligence, logistics, communications report formats and requirements, allowing all Florida National Guard units to work from a common operating picture. Publication and full implementation of this plan has enabled the Florida National Guard to conduct coordinated and planned operations regardless of the mission or conditions.

Frequent coordination with the state Emergency Operations Center and other appropriate entities ensures the Florida Guard is prepared for all contingencies. The Florida National Guard Joint Force Headquarters publishes updates on the State Threat Assessment, leveraging the broader intelligence community to provide the most current and relevant data. The Florida Guard has significantly upgraded its Emergency Operations Center located at state headquarters in St. Augustine.

Although Florida Guard personnel are deployed overseas for the Global War on Terrorism, prior planning ensures sufficient personnel are available to support any domestic contingency. Extensive coordination has been conducted with the National Guard Bureau and other state National Guards in case assets from other states are required through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a mutual aid agreement between states which facilitates the rapid deployment and allocation of National Guard personnel and equipment to help disaster relief efforts in other states. Such agreements enable the National Guard to provide support assets across state boundaries.

The Governor and state legislature have made a significant investment in our readiness. Florida law provides job, health insurance, and school protection for Florida National Guard Soldiers and Airmen on State Active Duty. Florida National Guard members are paid at the federal military rate, with enlisted personnel paid an additional $20 per day. Individual states determine the rate paid to personnel on State Active Duty. Florida has invested in the retention of our Soldiers and Airmen by paying at the federal military rate, ensuring our personnel do not suffer financially.
The Florida National Guard’s commitment to excellence in hurricane relief operations is a year round commitment and includes:

- **After Action Review.** At the end of hurricane season (normally November), the Florida National Guard holds a workshop with all major commands and task forces. An After Action Review is conducted to analyze all phases of the year’s operations.

- **Plans Revisions.** The December-February timeframe is used to complete plan revisions, concepts of operations, and training programs. Interagency coordination is completed and the Florida National Guard educates local, regional, and state agencies on new tactics, techniques, or procedures that have been developed. The Florida National Guard participates in local, regional, and state level table top exercises that may focus on a particular issue noticed during the previous season.

- **Individual/Team Training.** During the February-May period, the Florida National Guard performs state-unique mission training for State Emergency Response Team Liaisons, Assessment Reconnaissance Teams, Joint Operations Center training, and State Emergency Operations Center Emergency Support Function 5 (Information and Planning) and 13 (Military Support). Units conduct training to their Soldiers and Airmen on Rules of Use of Force during emergency operations and special equipment training.

- **Interagency Coordination.** The Florida National Guard participates in national and state level conferences for additional interagency coordination and training. We offer these opportunities to our tactical commanders so they receive first hand knowledge of the civil authority plans. During these conferences, we also provide training to our civil authority counterparts on the role of the National Guard as part of our continuous education process. Internally, we perform our pre-hurricane season conference with participation by our field units and task forces where we train them on new tactics and procedures. This brings Florida National Guard leadership together immediately prior to hurricane season.

- **Collective Joint/Interagency Training.** The state of Florida sponsors collective training events and exercises centered on a different hurricane scenario each year to prepare the interagency team for the season. The Governor’s Hurricane Conference provides workshops, training, and speakers to Florida’s emergency management personnel. The statewide Hurricane Exercise is usually conducted in the May timeframe and involves the emergency management community at every level. Municipalities, counties, regions, state, and federal agencies all work together during that week to test the adequacy of their plans and make adjustments where a weakness is discovered. It is a combination of field movements and message play designed to stretch the capabilities of the system to its breaking point.

**Pre-Landfall Strategy.**

The Florida National Guard continually monitors weather and other factors that may result in the deployment of our forces. As weather conditions develop for a possible hurricane landfall, the Joint Force Headquarters develops courses of action for possible missions. In coordination with the State Coordinating Officer, the Florida National Guard requests approval from the Governor to activate planning cells in the Joint Force Headquarters and Major Commands.
This decision is complicated due to funding considerations, as Florida must pay all costs with no federal reimbursement if the hurricane does not impact the state. Governor Bush has consistently authorized early planning cells to ensure the Florida Guard is fully prepared to render assistance. Warning orders are issued to Guard units for possible activation with timelines dictated by the projected hurricane track.

The Adjutant General ensures that simultaneous to hurricane relief operations, other missions continue. During both the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the Florida National Guard had approximately 2,000 personnel mobilized for Global War on Terror operations. Required federal training continued although Florida National Guard leaders had to modify previously scheduled training. While domestic/hurricane relief operations are the Florida National Guard’s first priority during these emergencies, it is crucial other important missions continue.

At the early stages of any significant domestic operation, the Adjutant General travels to Tallahassee to be with the Governor. As the Governor’s military advisor, the Adjutant General will provide advice on Florida National Guard and all military issues, to include the possible requirement for federal military forces. The Adjutant General retains overall command and control of Florida National Guard operations, but normally appoints a Joint Task Force Commander to run the operation. The Florida National Guard Joint Task Force has the capacity to command National Guard assets; and provide Reception, Staging, Onward Integration, and control of active duty military units sent to the affected area. The Florida National Guard normally provides support through its area commands, based on geographic boundaries.

The Joint Force Headquarters establishes communication with all federal, state, local and other partners, to include the State Emergency Response Team, National Guard Bureau, 5th Army, and the Defense Coordinating Officer. Requirements are continually assessed, with this information passed to our partners at least daily.

In coordination with the Governor and his staff, the Joint Force Headquarters implements a media campaign to establish with the citizens of Florida that a comprehensive, coordinated plan is being implemented to meet their needs. The Adjutant General is the Florida National Guard’s lead for this campaign although all personnel are expected to enhance media relations. This campaign emphasizes number of units, troops, trucks, and aircraft dedicated to hurricane relief operations.

The majority of National Guard mission taskings will come through Florida Division of Emergency Management to ensure unity of effort and maximization of resources. In special situations, local Emergency Management Directors may coordinate directly with Florida National Guard units to ensure timely mission support. Upon the direction of the Adjutant General, the Florida National Guard implements the Joint Operations Plan and takes the initial actions outlined below (these actions may occur sequentially or simultaneously depending on the situation):

- Activate Planning Cell at Florida National Guard Joint Operations Center
- Activate Emergency Support Function 13 at State Emergency Operations Center
• Issue Warning Order to Florida National Guard Major Commands  
• Authorize Planning Cells for Florida National Guard units  
• The Adjutant General designates Joint Task Force Commander (if required)  
• The Adjutant General moves to Tallahassee to be with Governor  
• Mission Staff Coordination Assistant Team, Rapid Initial Assessment Team, Reconnaissance Teams and Liaison Officers  
• Deploy Florida National Guard Liaison Teams to County Emergency Operations Centers  
• Deploy Joint Force Headquarters Staff Coordination Assistance Team to Major Commands  
• Activate Florida National Guard units  
• Assign Areas of Responsibility by Major Command or Functional Area

The State Coordinating Officer provides guidance to Florida National Guard forces on mission and intent. Florida Guard units have been given wide latitude for early entry into affected areas as the presence of Soldiers provides assurance help has arrived. The Joint Force Headquarters establishes a red and yellow zone for priority of support. The red zone is normally the hardest hit area and is the primary focus of relief operations with the yellow zone requiring less support. This initial establishment of red and yellow zone is based on the projected storm path. The composition of each zone often changes after an assessment of storm damage post landfall. These zones are normally defined by county, as the Florida emergency response plan support is oriented to counties not individual cities.

Florida National Guard units are pre-positioned based on the projected storm path to provide immediate response once the hurricane has passed. Once an area has been assigned to a unit, our commander meets with local officials prior to landfall to preplan missions as post-landfall communications will be severely limited. Florida Guard units are issued a three-day supply of food, fuel, water, and other commodities to ensure self-sufficiency when moving into an affected area.

If the Governor determines that evacuation is required, he may implement a reverse laning (or contra-flow) plan for interstate highways or other major roads. This plan allows quicker evacuation by having traffic flow for four lane highways to flow in one direction. For example, evacuation from the south Florida area may call for all lanes on Interstate 95 and Interstate 75 to flow north. The Florida National Guard supports Florida law enforcement agencies to implement the reverse laning plan.

To supplement Florida National Guard forces, National Guard units from other states can deploy to Florida through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a mutual aid agreement between states that was developed to allow for the rapid deployment and allocation of personnel and equipment to help disaster relief efforts in other states. The Joint Force Headquarters analyzes requirements and, if required, requests Emergency Management Assistance Compact support through the State Emergency Operations Center. This pre-landfall analysis is crucial as Emergency Management Assistance Compact forces
will need a longer lead time to respond. An important planning consideration is that the Emergency Management Assistance Compact agreement does not have a provision for conducting security missions across state lines; however, a Memorandum of Understanding can be developed and ratified between individual states to allow National Guard forces from outside the affected state to conduct such missions. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact was used extensively in the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, with the National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina exceeding 40,000 troops.

**Landfall Strategy.**

During hurricane landfall, the Florida National Guard maintains situational awareness of the operational area and constant communication with the State Emergency Operations Center and other partners. The Joint Force Headquarters ensures subordinate units are provided a Common Operating Picture, with specific information on Recovery Indicators and Projections, Damage Impact Assessment Models, weather effects, weather forecast, and wind effects. Mobilized Florida National Guard units are either pre-positioned outside the storm path or remain at home station preparing their troops to conduct operations. Units from outside the State of Florida activated through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact move toward locations designated by the Joint Force Headquarters.

**Post-Landfall Strategy.**

The Governor's initial post-landfall emphasis is Search, Secure and Stabilize. For the first 72 hours a push system is in place that pushes water, ice, Meals Ready to Eat, and other supplies to the affected areas. The Standing Orders for these operations are:

- Establish Communication with Areas Impacted
- Search and Rescue / Security
- Meet Basic Human Needs:
  - Medical
  - Water
  - Food
  - Shelter
  - Ice is a distant fifth (Unless it's really hot)
- Restore Critical Infrastructure
- Open Schools / Local Businesses
- Begin the Recovery

The Joint Force Headquarters analyzes the operational area and provides guidance to subordinate units. Florida National Guard units move into affected areas when the winds drop below 40 mph and conduct pre-assigned and on-call missions:

- Reconnaissance / Rapid Assessment Team.
- Search and Rescue.
- Logistical Staging Areas.
- State Emergency Response Team Forward Support.
- State Emergency Operations Center Support.
- Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.
• Security Operations; Traffic Control Points; Law Enforcement Support.
• Airport Clearance.
• Engineering Assistance; Debris Removal.
• High-wheeled Vehicles for Flood Assistance.
• Points of Distribution Sites (PODS).
• Airlift; Aerial Re-supply.
• Construction of Temporary Structures.

Transition Strategy.

The Florida emergency response team assists state, county, and local governments in reestablishing their governing responsibilities. As part of this team, the Florida National Guard remains in the affected area until local governments, agencies, and businesses are functioning and can respond to the needs of their citizens. The process to disengage from hurricane relief operations requires extensive analysis and coordination. Reducing (or rightsizing) operations require as much an interagency planning as the initial response. The Joint Force Headquarters monitors basic infrastructure status as key indicators of affected communities returning to some basic form of normalcy. Specific rightsizing criteria can include:

• 911 system availability
• Changes in power, phone, and water availability
• Traffic signal status
• Curfew enforcement changes
• Changes to state and local law enforcement requirements
• Changes in Logistics Support Area and Distribution Center throughput
• Changes in crime rates or civil frustration
• Coordinated Commander’s assessment

As these services are restored, and the local agencies and responders are able to address the remaining needs of the victims, the Florida National Guard initiates a reduction in force plan. Infrastructure restoration, however, is not the only factor in determining when Florida National Guard support can be reduced. Every transition plan requires diplomacy and compromise to ensure all parties are in agreement that it is time for the military to depart and return to home station. Political influence can and often plays a role in this decision, thus elected officials should be an integral part of the planning process.

Redeployment Strategy.

Upon completion of their mission, Florida National Guard units redeploy to home station and conduct maintenance and accountability of equipment. All equipment is repaired and returned to fully operational capability. Emergency Management Assistance Compact units return to their home state. Various administrative, medical, and finance actions are taken to ensure personnel receive all requisite pay, allowances, and medical treatment. There is command emphasis to release Soldiers and Airmen as soon as possible after mission completion; however, equipment maintenance may require that some personnel (normally volunteers) remain on duty for an extended period.
In every event the military undertakes, evaluation and after action reviews are part of the operation. The Florida National Guard captures lessons learned while the operation is fresh in the mind of participating units. The after action review process is a requirement, not an option. These lessons learned establish the foundation for our future improvements. This process is not solely a self-evaluation; the Florida National Guard solicits candid evaluations of the mission response from all agencies supported during the operation. Thorough evaluation enables the Florida National Guard to continually improve capabilities and begins our preparation phase for next hurricane season.

**FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD CURRENT READINESS**

The Florida National Guard remains fully prepared to conduct hurricane relief operations. Our units maintain a high state of readiness with mature and experienced leaders. Although we face challenges, we are confident that we are more ready today to respond to hurricanes or other disasters than ever before.

**Personnel and Equipment.**

The Florida National Guard is composed of more than 12,000 Citizen-Soldiers and -Airmen. Approximately 2,000 are currently serving overseas in the Global War on Terrorism. We believe 8,000 Florida National Guard troops are immediately available for domestic operations. Additional personnel and National Guard formations could deploy into the state in accordance with our Emergency Management Assistance Compacts with other states. In terms of equipment, we have carefully assessed mission requirements. Although significant quantities of materiel have been left in Southwest Asia, we believe the Florida National Guard has the necessary items of equipment on hand to fully support the needs of our citizens during the hurricane season. This year we will employ a truck-mounted, mobile command center with a full communications suite and command and control software to support operations in an austere environment. We have increased the number of tactical satellite terminals as well as the number of handheld local civilian radios available to our units.

**Assessment and Improvement.**

Based on lessons learned from last year’s hurricane season, we have adjusted plans and refined procedures to accept additional support contingency forces which may be required to move into our state. Along with our southeastern state partners, we have revalidated our Emergency Management Assistance Compacts. We have conducted numerous training exercises and currently Governor Bush, his agency heads, and more than 170 state emergency operations center staff are redeploying their operations center in Tallahassee to our National Guard operations center in northeastern Florida. This exercise tests the state’s capability to provide a continuity of government.

Florida National Guard senior leaders and staff have met with planning teams from Department of Homeland Security, United States Northern Command, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5th U.S. Army, the National Guard Bureau, and other organizations to prepare for hurricane operations.
State of Florida Investment.

During the recent legislative session, Florida legislature strongly supported Governor Bush’s $565 million proposal for disaster response. More than $97 million has been allocated during FY 06-FY 07 for hurricane preparedness supplies, public education, and for strengthening home structures, with $154 million committed to emergency power for special needs, shelters, evacuation planning, and county emergency operations centers.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

Florida has developed a culture of preparedness. We make great efforts to evaluate our readiness and identify actions which increase our capability to respond. The following are areas which deserve attention.

Resourcing State Programs.

Although the nation has invested in a number of initiatives since Hurricane Katrina, most of these have focused on improving federal response capability. It is important to improve the ability of the federal government to respond to disasters and support of the states; however, it is equally important to invest in states' response capabilities.

Since September 11th, this country has created a new federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and reorganized many others in an effort to improve the ability of the federal government to provide for homeland security and homeland defense. The Department of Defense has expanded the North American Air Defense Command, created the United States Northern Command, and redefined the mission of the 5th United States Army as United States Army North. Unfortunately, there has been little federal investment in strengthening the National Guard’s domestic response capabilities.

Equipment. Although the Florida National Guard is sufficiently equipped to respond to citizen needs during the hurricane season, some equipment shortfalls exist. It is exceptionally important the communications equipment, vehicles, aircraft, night vision devices, and other materiel transferred to the federal government in support of overseas mission be replaced, and that the additional resources necessary to enhance our emergency response efforts be resourced.

Communications. Military communications equipment does not exist in sufficient quantities nor does it provide the long range, interoperable solutions commercial satellite-based equipment offers. The Townsend Report, issued earlier this year, recommends the Department of Homeland Security establish and maintain a deployable communications capability, to quickly gain and retain situational awareness when responding to catastrophic incidents. That same capability must exist in hurricane vulnerable states. The Florida National Guard, with the help of the Florida delegation, has obtained interoperable, commercial, off-the-shelf satellite communications. Additional funding is required to enhance this capability.
Joint Operations Centers. National Guard Joint Operations Centers serve an essential role in coordinating the complex interagency response of our Joint Task Forces. They also assist the National Guard Bureau and the United States Northern Command in maintaining situational awareness and an accurate common operating picture. Like other state operations centers, the Florida National Guard Joint Operations Center provides day-to-day “all-hazards” event tracking. It also works in close coordination with the state’s operations center. Immediately following September 11\textsuperscript{th}, federal funds were available to staff a 24-7 capability. This around-the-clock operation supported a myriad of security mission requirements and facilitated the rapid call up of emergency response personnel. As funding has been reduced, Joint Operations Center activities have been significantly curtailed. With sufficient funding, we could maintain a much needed 24-hour capability.

Joint Operations Training. There is a significant requirement for military disaster response training. Joint Operations Center staff and other military first responders require access to procedural guidelines and best practices. We need the ability to share lessons learned across state lines to avoid repetition of past mistakes. The Florida National Guard has initiated an extensive Joint Operations Center training program and has trained military staff from 23 states in the past 60 days. We believe a joint operations training center curricula should be formalized and taught in a regional training center or school.

Exercises. National Guard units and staffs are experienced in many domestic response mission assignments; however, additional training and exercises centered on a broader range of threats including, pandemic influenza and Weapons of Mass Destruction events, are required. These threats necessitate specialized training, planning, and equipment to meet expected mission profiles. Appropriate funding would permit training with our interagency partners.

Formalized Lessons Learned Process. Our nations’ military possess a number of processes to share military lessons learned. However, no formal process currently exists to share new approaches, tactics, techniques, and best practices in domestic operations. We should develop and invest in a capability which would permit the National Guard and other military first responders to share lessons learned.

Command and Control Linkages - Federal Military Support.

I would like to take this opportunity to discuss the individual state and National Guard linkage to federal military authorities and the deployment of federal troops in support of domestic disasters.

Our Governors. Our Governors have direct constitutional and legal responsibility for the protection and safety of our citizens. All supporting forces responding to domestic emergencies within the states should normally remain under the control of our Governors.

Our National Guard. The National Guard is organized, trained, equipped, and experienced to function in the chaotic and challenging environments surrounding domestic emergencies. National Guard forces are forward-deployed throughout the United States with a presence in 2,700 communities. This decentralization enables the Guard to establish long term relationships with state and local officials. We believe the Adjutant General or his designated
Joint Task Force Commander should normally have operational control of military units that respond to a domestic emergency in our state. This arrangement is especially important when coordinating with civilian responders who do not fully appreciate the differences between Soldiers operating under Title 10 and those operating under Title 32 orders.

**Federal Support.** The National Response Plan identifies the Department of Defense as a support agency for support to civilian authorities in disaster response circumstances. Federal military forces possess unique capabilities that may be needed during catastrophic domestic operations. Ideally, this support would be facilitated through the state’s assigned Defense Coordinating Officer. The Defense Coordinating Officer system has worked exceptionally well for decades in Florida.

**Unity of Effort.** The National Response Plan prescribes the process by which Department of Defense and Active Duty Title 10 forces can be tasked to support a lead federal agency. This agency, in itself, supports the lead state agency in charge of a state’s emergency management operations. Since all disasters and all emergencies are local in nature, Guard forces will already have been deployed pursuant to the Governor’s emergency orders. The units will have been or are fully integrated into the mature and ongoing state and local emergency response team prior to the arrival of federal military forces. We believe unity-of-effort can best be achieved by having the latter arriving Title 10 forces operate under the control of the Adjutant General or his Joint Task Force commander.

Although federal military forces would be under the control of the Adjutant General, full command and control of federal forces remains with the Title 10 authorities. The deployed Title 10 forces are merely directed to operate under the control of the Adjutant General. This force employment policy would ensure the priorities and operational objectives established by the Governor are accomplished. This force employment recommendation is consistent with existing doctrine and does not require any statutory, regulatory or doctrinal change. Depending on the level of federal military support, a Title 10/32 dual status commander could provide the best unity-of-effort. This would be appropriate when active duty forces are used for logistics and presence missions and can be assimilated into existing National Guard forces already on the ground. The National Guard Bureau has conducted specific training for National Guard dual status commanders and is working closely with Joint Forces Command to develop this doctrine.

Regardless of the ultimate command and control structure used to employ federal assets, the National Guard will continue to be the Governor’s primary military asset to address emergencies. It is critical that all federal, state, and local assets support the Governor’s plan to address the disaster. State and local officials normally have the experience, critical information, and local knowledge to ensure federal assets are properly employed.

Interagency and intergovernmental relationships are essential to the success of any disaster response. To improve response efforts in the future, the National Guard, Department of Defense, other government agencies, state, and local authorities must continue to exercise and train together regularly. Additionally, to improve coordination and the readiness of United States Northern Command to assist states in domestic crises, we should significantly increase the number of National Guard personnel serving in that command full time, to include General Officer positions. The leveraging of unique National Guard domestic
operations experience will significantly enhance Northern Command’s capacity to seamlessly integrate federal military support with the state’s emergency management plan.

SUMMARY

I want to thank the Members for the opportunity to testify. We have outlined the state of Florida’s Emergency Management System and how the Florida National Guard provides Domestic Support to Civilian Authorities. We described how the Florida National Guard conducts Hurricane Relief Operations and outlined our current readiness to execute relief operations in conjunction with local, state, and federal supporting organizations. We also identified current concerns and recommended ways to improve our collective ability to support Florida’s citizens during homeland security and homeland defense operations. In many ways, how we respond to catastrophic events defines our government, organization, or agency. The most critical time of the event is the initial response. We must be well prepared and capable of providing immediate relief in those most challenging environments. If we have not made investments in leadership, resources, training, and exercises we will fail and we will fail with much notoriety.

Since Hurricane Andrew, the entire state of Florida and the Florida National Guard have made significant investments in leadership, training, and funding. We have conducted numerous exercises designed to stress our systems in order to identify weaknesses. We have developed and implemented new tactics, techniques, and procedures to address those weaknesses. During the hurricanes of 2004 and 2005, the state of Florida demonstrated to the state and nation what a well prepared, well lead emergency response team can accomplish.

There are no quick fixes or shortcuts to achieving a high level of readiness in Emergency Preparedness. Only hard work, involved senior leaders, adequate funding, and sufficient training will suffice. Excellence is achieved through continuous training and, just like any professional organization; we must go out and re-earn our reputation during every hurricane. I would like to thank the members of the committee for allowing me the opportunity to testify on this important issue.

Thank you for your time and attention.

Enclosures - 2
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to be here to testify before this committee. I have appeared earlier this year before Representative Tom Davis’ Katrina Review Committee and I understand the Government Accountability Office and many other groups have issued reports on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Today, however, I will present what we in Alabama did right, what we did wrong and the planning I have done for this year as the Adjutant General of Alabama for Governor Bob Riley.

What we did Right -

1. Response Time - Our response was very quick but we can improve with an early declaration to place airman and soldiers on duty 72 hours prior to landfall. Approval of federal funds (Title 32) for P&A / O&M will further enhance the Guard's ability to respond much faster. With this declaration in affect we would be able to alert, mobilize and preposition troops and supplies well in advance.

2. JTF Organization (See Power Point - slide 4) – Our plan consists of both Air and Army Guard units with full capabilities for Security, Communication, Medical, Logistics (internal and external), Engineering Assets, Maintenance, Power to critical infrastructure and Search and Rescue (SAR).

3. Title 32 status - provides much better benefits (retirement, injury, disability or duty related death) for Guard members than State Active Duty.

4. Joint Communications - Air Communications and Army MSE combined provide great communications.
5. **Liaison Officers (LNOs)** - I sent LNOs to Alabama EMA EOC and each affected County EOC as well as receiving LNOs from our State EMA and NGB.

6. **Soldier and Airman Comfort** - I sent sundry packages along with latrines and bath units to provide comfort for Soldiers and Airman. Gator-aid, Post Exchange items and personal services are needed for dirty and long duty.

7. **Medical Packages** - We treated military members only along with some limited emergency civilian medical care only. Civilian medical care provided civilian medical care.

8. **Topographical Map Teams** - AL Guard units created our own maps to determined routes, etc. There was a critical lack of maps in the devastated area.

9. **EMAC** - The Alabama EMA and Guard worked well with all EMAC states. This Compact is critical to allow the Guard states to assist each other with capabilities. With this system in place, the possibility of needing DoD forces is very remote.

**What we did Wrong -**

1. **College Students** - They need to be last for deployment and only if necessary.

2. **Faxing EMAC Agreements** - This was cumbersome and we will use scan and electronic versions in the future with copies to NGB and NORTHCOM.

3. **Public Affairs Unit** - This is needed with initial forces to manage press concerning logistics, safety and issues the public needs to know. We are strongly considering using embedded reporters with each JTF or TF. We also believe we must transport outside reporters into the affected area to insure accurate information.
Planning for 2006:

1. **Internal Planning.** The Alabama National Guard conducted an internal exercise (Dragon Slayer). This exercise included state agencies. Exercise objectives were:
   - Exercise the 122nd CSG as the JTF-South lead element.
   - Exercise functionality of the JFHQ-AL JOC / Validate JOC manning document.
   - Validate JFHQ-AL JOC SOP.
   - Validate JFHQ-AL DSCA SOP. (Defense Support to Civilian Authorities)
   - Exercise coordination with other states, state and federal agencies.
   - Exercise 46th CST response capabilities in a civil support role.
   - Test communication systems.

2. **Regional Planning.** The Guard in the Southeastern Coastal States began a quarterly hurricane conference to identify the following:

   - Worst case scenario – ours is a CAT-4/5 moving directly into Mobile Bay. Probable affects would be storm surge of 20 feet which would flood most of the downtown. However, the water would recede within 8 hours.

   - We also identified equipment shortages that could impact recovery operations. i.e., engineering equipment, fuel haulers and aircraft just to mention a few.

   - We identified locations to preposition food, water and ice during recovery operations.

   - Developed a possible CONOPS for Regional EMAC assistance.

3. **Federal Coordination.**

   - The Governor of Alabama sponsored a table-top exercise which included all state and federal agencies.
- The state EMA has conducted numerous exercises with state, county and local responders.

- Many of my key staff members attend a local Commanders Summit at Maxwell AFB composed of the following: all the active military installations, state and federal agencies within the state. The purpose of the conference was to identify capabilities of each facility and insure they understood Alabama Response Plan and the role of the National Guard.

- I also attended a recent Adjutants General conference in Baton Rouge LA. The focus of the conference was hurricane preparedness. Topics included EMAC agreements between states, NGB's Role, and public affairs.

I am confident in the planning at the local, state and national level for the 2006 hurricane season.

4. RSOI and Staging - Reception, Staging and Onward Integration. I have designated the 167th TSC to oversee RSOI operations in the event of a major disaster in Alabama. Also during Katrina, the need for overnight fuel and food by states traveling through Alabama to the disaster site became a resource intensive mission. Alabama Maintenance shops, Air bases and armories provided this support will continue to provide this service.

5. CONEX Containers - equipment for 500 military members (MREs, water, chain saws, gloves, goggles, reflecting vests, communication packet/radios, chemical lights, axes, flashlights and Rules of Force cards)

6. CST and 8 Communication Vans - I plan to use the communication equipment of the Civil Support Team and Communication Vans of the Alabama Dept. of Homeland Security.
7. **Lack of Aviation** - Alabama’s 1/131 Aviation Battalion is deployed. Therefore, Alabama has no Blackhawk helicopters but some Chinook helicopters. EMAC / other states are key for aviation support.

8. **MOUs for Law Enforcement** - EMAC MOUs allow units to be used for law enforcement across state lines by agreements between Governors.

9. **Disengagement Criteria** – My staff develops a disengagement criteria based on the situation however, sometimes civilian authorities resist the National Guard departing. I am now training my JTF Commanders to engage with local leaders to insure they understand our system. Once a Wal-Mart and Waffle House open, the Guard is nearing a time to leave - we are last in and first out.

10. **Congressional / VIP visits** - Establish a Distinguished Visitor Coordinating Officer to coordinate VIP visits to the recovery area.

During Rita and Katrina, the Alabama National Guard supported the citizens of Alabama, Mississippi, Texas and Louisiana with over 3,000 personnel at one time. We were **12%** of the total National Guard effort for Rita and Katrina relief and recovery. I am confident in Alabama’s planning for the approaching hurricane season and especially note the federal and state coordination that has happened thus far. I will be glad to take your questions at this time.
STATEMENT BY

MAJOR GENERAL BENNETT C. LANDRENEAU
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON

Louisiana National Guard
2006 Hurricane Preparedness

MAY 25, 2006
STATEMENT BY
MAJOR GENERAL BENNETT C. LANDRENEAU
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA

I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to provide a statement regarding Louisiana National Guard 2006 Hurricane Preparedness. With just a few days left before the start of the hurricane season we are currently participating in a Department of Homeland Security multi-day exercise and heavily engaged in testing our revised Emergency Operations Plan.

Hurricane forecasts indicate the likelihood of a major hurricane striking the Gulf Coast during 2006. While the State of Louisiana is still conducting significant infrastructure repairs and recovery operations due to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we are fully engaged in preparations for the upcoming hurricane season.

I am extremely proud of the efforts of our Louisiana National Guard Soldiers and Airmen in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Their courage, sacrifice, and selfless service during the most devastating natural disaster in our history are truly inspiring. Louisiana National Guardsmen were in the water and on the streets conducting search and rescue efforts before the storm had even passed and they continued to work long, arduous hours for several months assisting with clean-up and recovery efforts. They now stand ready to serve again when called.

The Louisiana National Guard (LANG) has completed a thorough and extensive After Action Review (AAR) of the 2005 hurricane response and incorporated lessons learned and best practices into our revised Emergency Operations Plan. The revised plan reflects the new organization, structure, and command and control capabilities. This plan
is transferable to not only hurricane operations but any emergency operation. I will
discuss the Louisiana National Guard plan in detail, but first want to address state level
initiatives that have occurred since last year.

Act 35 of the First Extraordinary Legislative Session created the Governor’s
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) as an independent
agency in the Office of the Governor and, through its director, reports directly to the
Governor.

Louisiana has adopted the Unified Command System for Emergency Response to
streamline State efforts with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Under
the Unified Command System, the Governor, as the Unified Commander works with her
Cabinet and her Deputy Unified Commander, currently the Acting Director of GOHSEP,
to lead the efforts of State Agencies and Departments. The Unified Command System
has four Sections: Operations, Plans and Intelligence, Unified Logistics, and
Administration and Finance. These sections incorporate the 15 Emergency Support
Functions (ESFs) each of which has at least one designated Primary Agency and one or
more Support Agencies. The one state organization that serves as a support agency for
every ESF is the Louisiana National Guard. In addition, the LANG is the co-lead for
ESF-2 Communications and ESF-7 Logistics.

In preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, the newly created ESF 16, Military
Support, acts as a single clearing house for National Guard missions from ESFs 1 thru 15
and will be directed by a Louisiana National Guard General Officer. Mission requests
will be processed through ESF 16 (located in the GOHSEP Emergency Operations
Center) to the Louisiana National Guard’s Joint Operations Center (JOC), where they will
be assigned to the Joint Task Force (JTF) for execution. A newly created Forward Tactical Command Post (TAC) on-site with GOHSEP will monitor this process, and provide Situational Awareness to the Governor, Adjutant General and other senior state leaders and make military recommendations for the employment of all military forces in emergency-affected areas.

For many years the Louisiana National Guard has pre-positioned liaison officers in parishes likely to be affected in order to provide local civilian leadership with a subject matter expert on National Guard capabilities. These liaison officers also work closely with local emergency managers to expedite requests for National Guard assistance and to coordinate mission execution upon troop arrival. In addition to the liaison officers provided to Parish Emergency Management officials in affected areas, we have provided liaison officers to each of the other ESFs.

Unified Logistics, which includes representatives from FEMA and GOHSEP, but predominantly staffed with logisticians from the Louisiana National Guard, is working to improve the flow of resources during an emergency. The Chief of Unified Logistics is a Louisiana National Guard logistics officer. We are taking a proactive approach in the storage and distribution of commodities, allowing us to improve on what we did last year. The plan calls for pre-positioned commodities prior to an emergency and a resource database that will list assets available to the state. Unified Logistics has divided the state into four regions and is finalizing plans that will make it easier to distribute commodities in the affected areas following an emergency. Four cities in each region of the state were identified as primary distribution sites: Lake Charles, Lafayette, Hammond and Shreveport. Unified Logistics is also working with parish emergency operations directors
to identify local staging areas. Essential commodities such as food, water, tarps, hygiene items, and ice will be sent from Camp Beauregard in Pineville, LA, to the nearest regional distribution site prior to a storm. After the storm, the supplies will be distributed to warehouses in the affected parishes and to the distribution site where citizens will be able to access supplies. Unified Logistics is also developing a state resources database, making it easier to allocate state assets during an emergency. State agencies and ESFs will be able to see what resources are available.

The Louisiana National Guard Joint Operations Center (JOC), formerly located at Jackson Barracks, has been relocated to Camp Beauregard in Pineville, Louisiana. The JOC maintains communication with the Tactical Command Post (TAC) and ESF 16 at GOHSEP as well as the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and forward deployed forces through the Joint Task Force (JTF). It conducts a detailed analysis of all LANG missions and determines how the Louisiana National Guard can best provide support. The JOC has a robust and secure communications capability and as such is responsible for maintaining communications with NGB and all other higher level headquarters including Homeland Security/Homeland Defense.

In addition, the JOC is responsible for coordinating, thru GOHSEP, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) requests for external military support and the Reception Staging and Onward Integration of forces as they arrive and depart the state. EMAC support during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was a huge success story for Louisiana and the National Guard. The numbers of forces deployed and their rapid arrival on scene were phenomenal. We are currently coordinating with NGB to
update our existing EMAC requests to pre-script and facilitate early and responsive support to meet our needs.

The Louisiana National Guard Emergency Operations Plan for storms and hurricanes that threaten the state provides for a robust force, scalable to four levels of response based on the threat of the storm. The lower levels of response (Level 1-2) are executed using day to day operations with the JOC and execution of OPERATION MINUTEMAN with the pre-identified force provider from within the Louisiana National Guard. The higher levels of response (Level 3-4) include standing up a JTF and sizable force structure. We will conduct these levels of response over four phases: Before, During, Response, Recovery.

Phase I: (Before the storm makes landfall): During the initial stages of this phase, we set the critical conditions for a successful hurricane response by planning, equipping, training, and maintaining appropriate response forces. We have established command and control nodes with the JOC, the TAC at GOHSEP, the JTF, and a Louisiana National Guard Mobile JOC (Forward) in the projected strike zone. We have also pre-staged equipment to assist military forces in operations before and after hurricane landfall. The next part of this phase consists of alert, mobilization, and preparation at home station after the Governor declares an emergency. The JTF and the TAC are activated. Louisiana National Guard liaison officers mobilize and report to parish Emergency Operation Centers throughout state. We stand up ESF 16 at GOHSEP and ESF 1 thru 15 liaison officers at the ESF Emergency Operation Centers. The Louisiana National Guard Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ-LA) implements a force structure based
on hurricane threat and requests EMAC agreements as appropriate. Standby forces are alerted for possible activation in order to provide flexibility to grow the force should the need occur. Air National Guard communication teams and Army National Guard engineer assessment teams move into areas projected to be affected by the storm. Engineer assets stage equipment and teams in preparation of post-storm debris operations. Engineer assets also stage boat teams near strike zone in preparation for Search and Rescue post-landfall. Army National Guard aviation assets support evacuation and security plans and execute other missions in accordance with the Emergency Operations Plan.

**Phase II (During – Storm land fall to sustained winds < 45 mph):**
Mobilized units continue to protect the force by remaining in fixed hardened sites until sustained winds fall below 45 MPH. Aviation assets reconfigure helicopters for Search and Rescue and aviation reconnaissance missions. Communication teams with engineer assessment teams provide continuous updates of the status of affected areas. Security operations at shelters continue during the storm.

**Phase III (Response – Sustained winds < 45 mph to release by JTF):**
Units execute assigned tasks to subordinate units and other tasks assigned by JTF. Land-owning units will also coordinate with local authorities and parish liaison officers to determine local needs. JTF will request additional LANG forces or EMAC support if additional forces are required to meet demands of post-storm response operations. LANG forces continue to protect the force by conducting on-going risk assessments during response operations.
Phase IV (Recovery – Release by JTF until released by unit at home station): When released by the JTF, LANG units will report back to their home station for demobilization activities in order to reset equipment and personnel for future missions.

The single most critical issue that affected our response efforts during Hurricane Katrina was our ability to communicate. There have been many improvements to our communication systems since Hurricane Katrina. Driven by our lessons learned, the Louisiana National Guard has embarked on an aggressive campaign to improve our communication capabilities in areas of Interoperability, Mobility and Survivability.

By Executive Order No. KBB 2006-17, Governor Blanco established the Statewide Interoperable Communication System Executive Committee to ensure reliable communications for the entire emergency response community. One of the largest Interoperability initiatives is the partnership with the Louisiana State Police and GOHSEP in planning, building and adopting one statewide 700MHz trunked radio system. National Guard radios are being upgraded to this new standard, and will be backward compatible with the 800MHz system, if needed, for interoperable communications with other state and local partners. We have also made improvements to our data systems and communications plans to achieve a better level of situational awareness through the development of a collaboration site on the Army’s Internet Portal, AKO.

In order to take advantage of these new systems, and these new levels of interoperability and collaboration, new plans were required. We requested and received communications planning support from the Department of Defense in the form of a
planning cell from the Joint Communications Support Element. This team came to Louisiana and worked directly with our communications planners to develop a new comprehensive concept of operations to take advantage of all of our new capabilities. Our communications planners have also collaborated directly with the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, Department of the Army’s CIO/G6 Office, Northern Command’s J6 Office, Communications Elements from Army North, National Guard Bureau’s J6 and G6 Offices, and National Guard elements in Florida, Mississippi, Texas, South Carolina and Delaware. Additional collaborative sessions have been held between several state and local emergency preparedness officials, and private sector communications providers.

In the area of Mobility, we teamed-up with NGB, in support of their Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE) initiative, to obtain and deploy a new mobile communications suite called the Joint Incident Site Communications Capability or JISCC. The JISCC is designed to be deployed in support of first responders at an incident site, and provides access to the commercial Internet, commercial telephone networks, video teleconferencing, and radio cross-bandng for Interoperability.

We have made a number of improvements to our networks and data systems to provide better Survivability. The key difference this year is that the hub of our networks and Data Processing Installation now reside four hours north of New Orleans at Camp Beauregard. All key systems have been rebuilt, and new backup power and environmental controls have been added to support this new facility. Our goal is to continue to strive for improvement in our communications capability. We have provided
National Guard Bureau with the remaining gaps in our communication resources which are currently being filled.

All of the above improvements have been incorporated into our revised Emergency Operations Plan. The Louisiana National Guard has conducted extensive coordination, training, and numerous exercises with our local, state, and federal partners in preparation for the upcoming hurricane season. We have fully trained our liaison officers that support Parishes, GOHSEP, and the Unified Command to insure they understand their duties and the processes necessary to facilitate National Guard support. We have participated in workshops with local agencies and our ESF partners to work out solutions and support requirements. We have participated in NIMS and ICS training in order to better understand and support concepts outlined in the National Response Plan. We are currently participating in various Tabletop, Functional, Emergency Deployment Readiness, and Communication Exercises to ensure we can quickly execute our response in support of the State’s emergency response plan. We have also conducted coordination meetings with NGB, ARNORTH, and NORTHCOM representatives to improve our ability to communicate and coordinate military support from other states and DoD. We worked closely with GOHSEP and the parishes to identify their specific support requirements and continue to refine our plans for pre-positioning of forces, equipment, and logistics to be most responsive.

The Louisiana National Guard stands ready to save lives, protect property, and relieve suffering in the event of an emergency. We have a tremendous amount of experience, especially at the leadership level. With the return of the 256th Infantry Brigade from Iraq, we also have 3000+ additional Soldiers ready for this year’s hurricane
season. I am confident that the brave and dedicated men and women of Louisiana
National Guard are ready to answer the call to duty.
HURRICANE KATRINA
Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters

Statement of the Record by Sharon Pickup, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
May 25, 2006

HURRICANE KATRINA

Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters

What GAO Found

The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives, but it also faced several challenges that provide lessons for the future. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, DOD’s initial response relied heavily on the National Guard, but active forces were also alerted prior to landfall. Aviation, medical, engineering, and other key capabilities were initially deployed, but growing concerns about the disaster prompted DOD to deploy active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. Over 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active personnel participated in the response. However, several factors affected the military’s ability to gain situational awareness and organize and execute its response, including a lack of timely damage assessments, communications problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, unexpected logistics responsibilities, and force integration issues. A key lesson learned is that additional actions are needed to ensure that the military’s significant capabilities are clearly understood, well planned, and fully integrated.

As GAO outlined in its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, many challenges that the military faced during Katrina point to the need for better plans and more robust exercises. Prior to Katrina, disaster plans and exercises did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully identify the military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example, the National Response Plan made little distinction between the military response to smaller regional disasters and catastrophic natural disasters. In addition, DOD’s emergency response plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. It did not account for the full range of assistance that DOD might provide, address the respective contributions of the National Guard and federal responders, or establish response time frames. National Guard state plans were also inadequate and did not account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe, and they were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover, none of the exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina had called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities to respond to a catastrophic hurricane. Without actions to help address planning and exercise inadequacies, a lack of understanding will continue to exist within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in response to a catastrophe; the timing of this assistance; and the respective contributions of the active, reserve, and National Guard forces.

DOD is examining the lessons learned from a variety of sources and is beginning to take actions to address them and prepare for the next catastrophe. It is too early to evaluate DOD’s actions, but many appear to hold promise. However, some issues identified after Katrina, such as damage assessments, are longstanding, complex problems that cut across agency boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require sustained attention from the highest management levels in DOD and across the government.
Mr. Chairman and the Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for your hearing on how the Department of Defense (DOD) is preparing for the upcoming hurricane season and applying lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history and, because of its size and strength, will have long-standing effects for years to come. Prior catastrophic disasters and the actual experience after Katrina have shown the need for DOD to contribute substantial support to state and local authorities given its extensive capabilities and expertise in key areas such as damage assessment and communications. As you know, under the National Response Plan, DOD is generally assigned a supporting role in disaster response but, even in this role, has specific planning responsibilities in anticipation of being called upon in a disaster. Within DOD, the 2006 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support envisioned a reliance on National Guard and Reserve forces for homeland missions, including disaster response, but recognized that active duty forces may also play a role depending on the nature of the event. Individual states have their own disaster response plans which typically include substantial supporting roles for their National Guards.

In anticipation of and in the days following Hurricane Katrina's landfall, the military took many proactive steps and mobilized significant resources—both active duty and National Guard forces—that saved many lives and greatly enhanced response efforts. At the same time, as local, state, and federal governments responded in the days following Katrina, conclusion surfaced as to what responsibilities the military has and what capabilities it would provide in planning and responding to a catastrophic event. While this experience underscored the importance of the military, especially in the wake of a catastrophe, it also identified some areas requiring more attention to enhance future military responses. As the nation is quickly approaching the 2006 hurricane season, sorting out the relevant lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina for the military, putting them in the context of the military's role in the complex disaster response mission, and then following through with needed changes is vital.

1Throughout this statement, we use the term military to refer to the combined efforts of the National Guard and the federal military forces. We use the term DOD to distinguish between the federal military response commanded by the U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard response. During Katrina, DOD's federal military response consisted of active duty military personnel and reservists who volunteered to be part of the federal response.
This statement is based on our report issued earlier this month, entitled Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters (GAO-06-543), and summarizes the key points from that report, including (1) the support that the military provided in responding to Hurricane Katrina along with some of the challenges faced and key lessons learned; (2) actions needed to address these lessons, including our recommendations to the Secretary of Defense; and (3) the extent to which the military is taking actions to identify and address the lessons learned. The work supporting our report reflects our travel to the affected areas, interviews with officials who led the response efforts at both the federal and state levels, and extensive analysis of data and documents from numerous military organizations that provided support to the Hurricane Katrina response operations. We conducted our review from September 2005 through April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition to our recently completed review of the military response, we have published several products on Hurricane Katrina and prior disasters, and currently have a large body of ongoing work to address preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Summary

The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts but faced several challenges from which many lessons are emerging. The military took proactive steps and responded with over 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active federal personnel. Consistent with its June 2006 civil support strategy—but unlike past catastrophes—DOD relied heavily on the National Guard during the response. Active duty forces were also alerted prior to landfall, and key capabilities, such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces, were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. However, like other responders, the military faced challenges in its
response that affected its ability to gain situational awareness and organize and execute its response. These challenges included obtaining timely damage assessments; restoring and maintaining interoperable communications; coordinating search and rescue efforts; and assuming unexpected responsibilities for logistics support, which led to limited visibility of items that had been ordered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and were in transit to the affected areas. Moreover, integrating the large numbers of active and Guard forces from many parts of the country was at times problematic. In addition, a key mobilization statute, which limits a unit or member of a reserve component from being involuntarily ordered to federal active duty for disaster response, also affected the integration. Reservists who responded to Katrina were volunteers, and they constituted a relatively small portion of the response when compared to the National Guard and active component portions of the response. While the military clearly provided vital support, no one had the total picture of the situation on the ground, the capabilities that were on the way, the missions that had been resourced, and the missions that still needed to be completed.

Unfortunately, many of these problems are long-standing, and we reported similar issues after Hurricane Andrew hit south Florida in 1992. Therefore, the key lesson learned is that while the military has significant and sometimes unique capabilities that can be brought to bear, additional actions are needed to ensure that its contributions are clearly understood and well planned and integrated.

Many of the challenges faced in the response point to the need for better plans and more robust exercises, as we outlined in our recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Such plans are needed to better define the military's role in a catastrophic natural disaster, identify capabilities that could be available and provided by the military, and integrate the response of the active and reserve components. Robust exercises are then needed to test those plans and allow planners to refine them. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and exercises were insufficient and did not

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Section 13204 of Title 10 of the United States Code prohibits the involuntary activation of National Guard and Reserve members for domestic disaster operations. While this restriction applies to both National Guard and Reserve forces, National Guard forces were mobilized under Title 32 for Hurricane Katrina. No similar provisions exist to specifically mobilize Reserve forces for disaster response, although it is conceivable that if the President declares a national emergency and invokes 10 U.S.C. § 13202 reserve component forces could become available for involuntary activation. Under 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (d), the President can activate National Guard and Reserve volunteers for any purpose.
incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example, the government’s National Response Plan (NRP) made little distinction between the military response to a smaller regional disaster and its response to a catastrophic natural disaster. In addition, DOD’s emergency response plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities during disasters did not account for the full range of assistance that might be provided by DOD, address the respective contributions of the National Guard and the federal responders, or establish response time frames. National Guard state plans did not account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe and were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover, plans had not been tested with a robust exercise program in that none of the exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic hurricane. As a result, a lack of understanding exists within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in the event of a catastrophe, the timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the active duty and National Guard forces. We recommended that DOD take a number of actions to help address planning and exercise inadequacies, including fully addressing the proactive functions the military will be expected to perform under the NRP in the event of a catastrophe and improving military plans and exercises so that these plans specifically address the potential contributions of the military in key areas—such as damage assessment, communications, search and rescue, and logistics support—as well as the integration of the military’s active duty and Reserve and National Guard forces.

Since Hurricane Katrina, DOD has analyzed the military response and is taking several actions to address the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and prepare for the next catastrophic event. In addition to conducting its own lessons-learned reviews, DOD is also examining the lessons and recommendations from other sources, including GAO. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations we made in our recent report and is taking actions to address catastrophic disaster response problems that we and others have identified. While it is too early to evaluate DOD’s actions, many appear to hold promise, such as the efforts to refine the NRP complete its operational plan, and embed defense officials into FEMA regional offices. However, such DOD actions are only first steps. Some issues identified after Katrina are long-standing problems that we identified after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Moreover, they will be difficult to address because they are complex and cut across agency
Background

About 9 months prior to Katrina’s landfall, the NRF was issued to frame the federal response to domestic emergencies ranging from smaller, regional disasters to incidents of national significance. The plan generally calls for a reactive federal response following specific state requests for assistance. However, the NRF also contains a catastrophic incident annex that calls for a proactive federal response when catastrophes overwhelm local and state responders. The NRF generally assigns DOD a supporting role in disaster response, but even in this role, DOD has specific planning responsibilities. For example, the NRF requires federal agencies to incorporate the accelerated response requirements of the NRF’s catastrophic incident annex into their own emergency response plans.

Within DOD, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which was issued in June 2005, envisions a greater reliance on National Guard and Reserve forces for homeland missions. The military response to domestic disasters typically varies depending on the severity of an event. During smaller disasters, an affected state’s National Guard may provide a sufficient response, but larger disasters and catastrophes that overwhelm the state may require assistance from out-of-state National Guard or federal troops. For Katrina, the response heavily relied on the National Guard, which is consistent with DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. This represents a departure from past catastrophes when active duty forces played a larger role in response efforts.

During disaster response missions, National Guard troops typically operate under the control of the state governors. However, the National Guard Bureau has responsibility for formulating, developing, and coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army and Air National Guard personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication between the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the National Guard in U.S. states and territories. Although the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does not have operational control of National Guard forces in the states and territories, he has overall responsibility for National Guard Military Support to Civil Authorities programs. The U.S. Northern Command also has a mission to provide support to civil authorities. Because of this mission, U.S. Northern Command was responsible for commanding the federal military response to Hurricane Katrina.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Military Response Was Massive but Faced Several Challenges, Which Provide Lessons for the Future</th>
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<tr>
<td>During its massive response to Hurricane Katrina the military faced many challenges, which provide lessons for improving the future military response to catastrophic natural disasters. Issues arose with damage assessments, communications, search and rescue efforts, logistics, and the integration of military forces.</td>
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<th>The Military Response Was Massive</th>
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<td>In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the military mounted a massive response that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts. Military officials began tracking Hurricane Katrina when it was an unnamed tropical depression and proactively took steps that led to a Katrina response of more than 50,000 National Guard and more than 20,000 federal military personnel, more than twice the size of the military response to 1992’s catastrophic Hurricane Andrew. By the time Katrina made landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi on August 29, 2005, the military was positioned to respond with both National Guard and federal forces.</td>
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<td>Prior to Katrina's landfall, active commands had published warning and planning orders and DOD had already deployed Defense Coordinating Officers to all the potentially affected states. DOD also deployed a joint task force; medical personnel; helicopters; ships from Texas, Virginia, and Maryland; and construction battalion engineers. Many of these capabilities were providing assistance or deploying to the area within hours of Katrina's landfall. DOD also supported response and recovery operations with communications equipment and many other critically needed capabilities. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large active duty ground units beginning on September 3, 2005, 5 days after Katrina's landfall.</td>
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<td>Prior to landfall, anticipating the disruption and damage that Hurricane Katrina could cause, the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi activated their National Guard units. In addition, National Guard officials in Louisiana and Mississippi began to contact National Guard officials in other states to request assistance. While National Guard forces from Louisiana and Mississippi provided the bulk of the military support in the first days after landfall, most of the Guard response to Hurricane Katrina came later from outside the affected states. The National Guard Bureau acted as a conduit to communicate requirements for assistance in</td>
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Challenges Provide Lessons for the Future

While the military response to Katrina was massive, it faced many challenges, which provide lessons for the future, including the need for the following:

- **Timely damage assessments.** As with Hurricane Andrew, an underlying problem in the response was the failure to quickly assess damage and gain situational awareness. The NRP notes that local and state officials are responsible for damage assessments during a disaster, but it also notes that state and local officials could be overwhelmed in a catastrophe. Despite this incongruous situation, the NRP did not specify the proactive measures necessary for the federal government to gain situational awareness when state and local officials are overwhelmed. Moreover, DOD’s planning did not call for the use of the military’s extensive reconnaissance assets to meet the NRP catastrophic incident annex’s requirement for a proactive response to catastrophic incidents. Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and the military’s extensive reconnaissance capabilities were not effectively leveraged as part of a proactive federal effort to conduct timely, comprehensive damage assessments, the military began organizing and deploying its response without fully understanding the extent of the damage or the required assistance. According to military officials, available reconnaissance assets could have provided additional situational awareness during Hurricane Katrina, and in September 2005, considerable surveillance assets were made available to assess damage.
from Hurricane Rita, primarily because of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.

- **Improved communications.** Hurricane Katrina caused significant damage to the communication infrastructure in Louisiana and Mississippi, which further contributed to a lack of situational awareness for military and civilian officials. Even when local officials were able to conduct damage assessments, the lack of communication assets caused delays in transmitting the assessments. Under the NRP, the Department of Homeland Security has responsibility for coordinating the communications portion of disaster response operations. However, neither the NRP, the Department of Homeland Security, nor DOD fully identified the extensive military communication capabilities that could be leveraged as part of a proactive federal response to a catastrophe. DOD’s plan addressed internal military communications requirements but not the communication requirements of communities affected by the disaster. Because state and local officials were overwhelmed and the Department of Homeland Security and DOD waited for requests for their assistance rather than deploying a proactive response, some of the military’s available communication assets were never requested or deployed. In addition, some deployed National Guard assets were underutilized because the sending states placed restrictions on their use. Communications problems, like damage assessment problems, were also highlighted following Hurricane Andrew.

- **Coordinated search and rescue efforts.** While tens of thousands of people were rescued after Katrina, the lack of clarity in search and rescue plans led to operations that according to aviation officials, were not as efficient as they could have been. The NRP addressed only part of the search and rescue mission, and the National Search and Rescue Plan had not been updated to reflect the NRP. As a result, the search and rescue operations of the National Guard and federal military responders were not fully coordinated, and military operations were not integrated with the search and rescue operations of the Coast Guard and other rescuers. At least two different locations were assigning search and rescue tasks to military helicopter pilots operating over New Orleans, and no one had the total picture of the missions that had been resourced and the missions that still needed to be performed.

- **Clear logistics responsibilities.** DOD had difficulty gaining visibility over supplies and commodities when FEMA asked DOD to assume a significant portion of its logistics responsibilities. Under the NRP, FEMA is responsible for coordinating logistics during disaster response efforts, but during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA quickly became overwhelmed. Four days
after Katrina's landfall, FEMA asked DOD to take responsibility for procurement, transportation, and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel, and medical supplies. However, because FEMA lacked the capability to maintain visibility—from order through final delivery—of the supplies and commodities it had ordered, DOD did not know the precise locations of the FEMA-ordered supplies and commodities when it assumed FEMA's logistics responsibilities. As a result of its lack of visibility over the meals that were in transit, DOD had to airlift 17 million meals to Mississippi to respond to a request from the Adjutant General of Mississippi, who was concerned that food supplies were nearly exhausted.

- **Better integration of military forces.** The military did not adequately plan for the integration of large numbers of deployed troops from different commands during disaster response operations. For example, a Louisiana plan to integrate military responders from outside the state called for the reception of not more than 300 troops per day. However, in the days following Hurricane Katrina, more than 20,000 National Guard members from other states arrived in Louisiana to join the response effort. In addition, the National Guard and federal responses were coordinated across several chains of command but not integrated, which led to some inefficiencies and duplication of effort. Because military plans and exercises had not provided a means for integrating the response, no one had the total picture of the forces on the ground, the forces that were on the way, the missions that had been resourced, and the missions that still needed to be completed. Also, a key mobilization statute limits DOD's Reserve and National Guard units and members from being involuntarily ordered to federal active duty for disaster response. As a result, all the reservists who responded to Hurricane Katrina were volunteers, and they made up a relatively small portion of the response compared to the National Guard and active component members. Moreover, the process of lining up volunteers can be time-consuming and is more appropriate for mobilizing individuals than it is for mobilizing entire units or capabilities that may be needed during a catastrophe. After Hurricane Andrew, we identified this issue in two 1993 reports.4

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Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Define and Guide Future Military Responses during Catastrophic Natural Disasters

Operational challenges are inevitable in any large-scale military deployment, but the challenges that the military faced during its response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrate the need for better planning and exercising of catastrophic incidents in order to clearly identify military capabilities that will be needed and the responsibilities that the military will be expected to assume during these incidents. Prior to Katrina, plans and exercises were generally inadequate for a catastrophic natural disaster.

- **The National Response Plan.** The NRP, which guides planning of supporting federal agencies, lacks specificity as to how DOD should be used and what resources it should provide in the event of a domestic natural disaster. The NRP makes little distinction between the military response to smaller, regional disasters and the military response to large-scale, catastrophic natural disasters. Even though past catastrophes, such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 1989 earthquake in the San Francisco area, showed that the military tends to play a much larger role in catastrophes, the NRP lists only a few specific DOD resources that should be called upon in the event of a catastrophic natural disaster. Given the substantial role the military is actually expected to play in a catastrophe—no other federal agency brings as many resources to bear—this lack of detailed planning represents a critical oversight.

- **The DOD plan.** When Hurricane Katrina made landfall, DOD’s plan for providing defense assistance to civil authorities was nearly 9 years old and was undergoing revision. The plan had not been aligned with the NRP and had been written before the 2002 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which called for a focused reliance on the reserve components for civil support missions. The plan did not account for the full range of tasks and missions the military could need to provide in the event of a catastrophe and had little provision for integrating active and reserve component forces. It did not address key questions of integration, coordination, and control, and division of tasks between National Guard resources under state control and federal resources under U.S. Northern Command’s control. Moreover, the plan did not establish time frames for the response.

- **National Guard plans.** At the state level, the plans of the Louisiana and Mississippi National Guards were inadequate for Katrina and not well coordinated with those of other National Guard forces across the country. The Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans appeared to be adequate for smaller disasters, such as prior hurricanes, but they were insufficient for a catastrophe and did not adequately account for the outside assistance that could be needed during a catastrophe. For
example, Joint Forces Headquarters Louisiana modified its plan and reassigned disaster responsibilities when thousands of Louisiana National Guard personnel were mobilized for federal missions prior to Hurricane Katrina. However, the Louisiana plan did not address the need to bring in thousands of military troops from outside the state during a catastrophe. Similarly, Mississippi National Guard officials told us that even their 1969 experience with Hurricane Camille, a category 5 storm that hit the same general area, had not adequately prepared them for a catastrophic natural disaster of Katrina’s magnitude. For example, the Mississippi National Guard disaster plan envisioned the establishment of commodity distribution centers, but it did not anticipate the number of centers that could be required in a catastrophic event or following a near-complete loss of infrastructure. In addition, the National Guard Bureau had not coordinated in advance with the governors and adjutants general in the states and territories to develop plans to provide assistance for catastrophic disasters across the country. Specifically, the bureau had not identified the types of units that were likely to be needed during a catastrophe or worked with the state governors and adjutants general to develop and maintain a list of National Guard units from each state that would likely be available to meet these requirements during catastrophic natural disasters.

- **Exercises.** An underlying reason that insufficient plans existed at all levels is that the disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a robust exercise program. Such exercises are designed to expose weaknesses in plans and allow planners to refine them. As a result, when Hurricane Katrina struck, a lack of understanding existed within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that the military might provide, the timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the National Guard and federal military forces. The Homeland Security Council has issued 15 national planning scenarios—including a major hurricane scenario—that provide the basis for disaster exercises throughout the nation. While DOD sponsors or participates in no less than two major interagency field exercises per year, few exercises led by the Department of Homeland Security or DOD focused on catastrophic natural disasters, and none of the exercises called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic hurricane. In addition, although DOD has periodically held modest military support to civil authorities exercises, the exercises used underlying assumptions that were unrealistic in preparing for a catastrophe. For example, DOD assumed that first responders and communications would be available and that the transportation infrastructure would be navigable in a major hurricane scenario. Finally, the First U.S. Army conducted planning and exercises in response to six
These exercises led to actions, such as the early deployment of Defense Coordinating Officers, which enhanced disaster response efforts. However, DOD's exercise program was not adequate for a catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina's magnitude.

Based on our evaluation of the aforementioned plans and exercises, we made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. First, we called for DOD to work with the Department of Homeland Security to update the NRP to fully address the proactive functions the military will be expected to perform during a catastrophic incident. Second, we recommended that DOD develop detailed plans and exercises to fully account for the unique capabilities and support that the military is likely to provide during a catastrophic incident, specifically addressing damage assessments, communication, search and rescue, and logistics as well as the integration of forces. Third, we called for the National Guard Bureau to identify the National Guard capabilities that are likely to respond to catastrophes in a state status and to share this information with active commands within DOD. Finally, we recommended that DOD identify the scalable federal military capabilities it will provide in response to the full range of domestic disasters and catastrophes. We also raised a matter for congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress consider lifting or modifying the mobilization restriction—10 U.S.C. § 12304 (c)(1)—that limits reserve component participation in catastrophic natural disasters.

DOD has collected lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina from a variety of sources. Within the department, DOD has a formal set of procedures to identify, capture, and share information collected as a result of operations in order to enhance performance in future operations. Even in the midst of the Hurricane Katrina response operation, officials from various military organizations were collecting information on lessons learned and this continued well after most operations had ceased. For example, communications issues that had surfaced were studied by both active and National Guard commands that had responded to Hurricane Katrina. DOD also formed a task force to study the response and is compiling and analyzing various military and other lessons-learned reports to help design an improved response to future natural catastrophic events. According to DOD officials, they have also reviewed White House and congressional reports identifying lessons to be applied or challenges to be addressed in future response operations.

As of today, DOD has also begun taking actions to enhance the military's preparedness for future catastrophic events. Specifically, in responding to
our recently issued report, DOD generally concurred with our recommendations for action and told us that it had developed plans to address them. DOD noted, for example, that the NRP would be revised to plan for a significant DOD role in a catastrophe and a more-detailed DOD operational plan that has been in draft would be finalized. Our recommendations and DOD's response to them are shown in appendix I.

In addition, DOD said that it was taking several additional actions, including

- colocating specially trained defense department personnel at FEMA regional offices;
- folding support from federal reconnaissance agencies into the military's civil support processes;
- developing "pre-scripted" requests that would ease the process for civilian agencies to request military support;
- conducting extensive exercises, including the recently completed Ardent Sentry and other planned events, with FEMA; and
- delegating authority for deploying defense coordinating elements and placing on "prepare to deploy" orders communications, helicopter, aerial reconnaissance, and patient-evacuation capabilities.

The department plans to complete many of these steps by June 1, 2006—the start of the next hurricane season—but acknowledged that some needed actions will take longer to complete. Since details about many of the department's actions were still emerging as we completed our review, we were unable to fully assess the effectiveness of DOD's plans, but they do appear to hold promise.

Concluding Observations

In conclusion, while DOD's efforts to date to address the Hurricane Katrina lessons learned are steps in the right direction—and the department deserves credit for taking them—these are clearly only the first steps that will be needed. The issues cut across agency boundaries, and thus they cannot be addressed by the military alone. The NRP framework envisions a proactive national response involving the collective efforts of responder organizations at all levels of government. Looking forward, part of DOD's challenge is the sheer number of organizations at all levels of government that are involved, both military and civilian. In addition, many of the problems encountered during the Katrina response are long-standing and were also reported after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The complexity and long-standing nature of these problems, DOD's planned and ongoing actions must receive sustained top-
management attention, not only at DOD but across the government, in order to effect needed improvements in the military's support to civil authorities. While the issues are complex, they are also urgent, and experience has illustrated that the military has critical and substantial capabilities that will be needed in the wake of catastrophic events.

For further information regarding this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include John Pendleton, Assistant Director, Michael Ferren, Kenya Jones, and Leo Sullivan.
## Appendix I: GAO's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to Improve Military Support and DOD's Response.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>GAO recommendation to the Secretary of Defense</th>
<th>Department of Defense (DOD) Response (dated May 5, 2006)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Provide the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with proposed revisions to the National Response Plan (NRP) that will fully address the proactive functions the military will be expected to perform during a catastrophic incident, for inclusion in the next NRP update.</td>
<td>DOD said that it is working with the Department of Homeland Security to review the NRP. DOD stated that the long-term focus of the U.S. government should be to develop more robust domestic disaster capabilities within the Department of Homeland Security. It acknowledged that DOD will need to assume a more robust response role in the interim period and when other responders lack the resources and expertise to handle a particular disaster.</td>
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<td>Establish milestones and expedite the development of detailed plans and exercises to fully account for the unique capabilities and support that the military is likely to provide to civil authorities in response to the full range of domestic disasters, including catastrophes. The plans and exercises should specifically address the use of reconnaissance capabilities to assess damage, use of communications capabilities to facilitate support to civil authorities, integration of active component and National Guard and Reserve forces, use of search and rescue capabilities and the military's role in search and rescue, and how the military might be expected to play in logistics.</td>
<td>DOD listed a number of steps it is taking to improve its disaster response planning and exercises and said that consistent with its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the active component should complement, but not duplicate, the National Guard's likely role as an early responder. DOD also said that planning and exercises should include local, state, and federal representatives and should stress the responders with the highest degree of realism possible—to the breaking point if possible.</td>
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<td>Direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to work with the state governors and adjutants general to develop and maintain a list of the types of capabilities the National Guard will likely provide in response to domestic natural disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements along with the associated units that could provide these capabilities, and make this information available to the U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and other organizations with federal military support to civil authority planning responsibilities.</td>
<td>DOD listed steps the U.S. Northern Command is taking to better understand the capabilities of National Guard units, and it stated that the National Guard is creating a database to facilitate planning its employment in support of the homeland.</td>
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<td>Establish milestones and identify the types of scalable federal military capabilities and the units that could provide those capabilities in response to the full range of domestic disasters and catastrophes covered by DOD's defense support to civil authorities plans.</td>
<td>DOD noted that it has developed scalable capability packages in conjunction with pre-scripted requests for assistance and U.S. Northern Command's Contingency Plan 25G1, which is scheduled to be signed in the spring of 2006.</td>
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*Note: The recommendations are from GAO. Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-543 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).*
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