REFORMING ARMY CULTURE
FOR 21ST CENTURY WARS

BY

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United States Army

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ABSTRACT

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This Strategy Research Project (SRP) describes the kind of wars the U.S. Army will likely engage in over the next 20-30 years. It argues that the Army must adapt to a new complex sphere of expertise; it then offers recommendations on how the Army can reform its culture to succeed in these future wars. Transformation set the azimuth for change in the Army. Modularity offered structural flexibility and increased Army capabilities. Yet current Army culture and personnel systems support traditional war-fighting and leadership concepts. The culture supports a view of officership that is appropriate for symmetric warfare. Though slow to change, current operations are forcing the Army to adapt its culture and systems to meet the requirements for a counterinsurgency in Iraq and to prepare for similar asymmetric operations worldwide. Reforming Army culture, as a component of transformation, will change officership along with NCO and Soldier training and development. This reformation is an investment in the Army's most precious resource, its people.
Anticipating the nature and conduct of war in the 21st century is fraught with speculation, the foremost being that war is inevitable. Historically, successful armies have adapted to the changing conditions of war. Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz’s theory posits that when nations and their leaders find their non-violent instruments inadequate to achieve and maintain peace for the good of all humankind, they will declare war to achieve their objectives. Leaders apply the elements of power (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement [DIME-FIL]) to confront conflict. Unfortunately, war may be the outcome. But why war? Why can’t reasonable people celebrate their blessings and share religious, ethnic, and national identities in the interests of world prosperity? Or simply share the balance of power? To the naïve, this notion of celebration and prosperity seem simple enough and quite achievable. However, the word “power” alone connotes the contentious nature of civilization—calling to our minds concepts like authority, rule, supremacy, or control. Power suggests that identities, or how people associate with a group or state, will continue to struggle, resist, and dominate against social, political, economic, and cultural boundaries.¹ (The term “identities” more accurately reflects the various actors, both state and non-state, that populate the regional and global stage in today’s world. Since states or governments are not the only groups to wage war, “identities” implores us to seek the nomenclature that makes a group or people act.) When identities push against or violate certain boundaries, war becomes inevitable. But history reveals that war constantly changes. So in order to be victorious on the battlefield, armies must adapt to the changing conditions and types of war. This Strategy Research Project
(SRP) will develop a typology of war to describe the kinds of war that the U.S. Army will likely engage in during the 21st century. It argues that the Army must continue to adapt to a new complex sphere of expertise but also formalize supporting policies and systems. It concludes with recommendations on how the Army should reform its culture and officership as a component of transformation to achieve success in these future wars.

A Typology of War

In his renowned work On War, Clausewitz states that war is part of man’s social existence. His theories of human bellicosity are timeless, as relevant today as they were to him and his contemporaries in 1832, when the book was first published. This enduring nature of Clausewitzian theory enables us to speculate with some assurance on the conduct of war in the 21st century.

Clausewitz’s fundamental assertion is that war is the continuation of policy by other means. It stands to reason that members of a civilized society would cringe and call Clausewitz’s statement ludicrous, since war is a violent and ugly act. How could policy go so far awry? Critics of Clausewitz argue that the purpose of war, as he describes it, makes the conduct of war subservient to politics. However, consider that society has achieved its civility by furthering its interests and improving its situation just as Clausewitz posited. There is no need to review a battle or war, simply acknowledge that the fundamental nature of an identities’ existence is its desire to maintain or extend its power or interests. Clausewitz explains the power motive fully:

It can be taken as agreed that the aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all aspects of internal administration as well as of spiritual values and whatever else the moral philosopher may care to add. Policy, of course, is nothing in itself; it is simply the trustee for all these interests against other
states. That it can err, sub serve the ambition, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there. In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy, and here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community. Therefore policy is not merely the activity of conducting politics. Rather, it represents the interaction of identities within the social, political, economic, and cultural boundaries striving for power and self-interests in order to advance their level of civility, which they call their “interests.” Thus, we can anticipate war to continue as identities struggle, resist, and dominate within and beyond their boundaries.

Clausewitz describes war in terms of the trinity—the interaction and balance of “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” Clausewitz thereby informs readers of the relations among the will of the people; chance and probability as it applies to a commander and his army; and governments or identities as they execute a policy that is pursued through war. There are two critical points that undergird the trinity: First, the elements of the trinity have variable interactions with each other. Second, where, why, and how the trinity operates in the context of war is never constant. Noted Clausewitz expert Chris Bassford claims, “No two wars are ever the same: the participants, their respective morals, motivations, and strategies change from one occasion to another and even in the course of a single war. The statesman and strategist must therefore attempt to understand the unique character of each war.”

To help in the quest of understanding the character of war, Kalevi Holsti developed a typology for war in 1996 that complements Clausewitz’s theories. Holsti’s premise is
that wars of the recent past and the future have been and will continue to be fundamentally different from modern European wars and the Cold War.\textsuperscript{9} He believes that “wars of the third kind/peoples’ war” will be the principal type of future war. He then contends that Clausewitzian theories are not very relevant to 21\textsuperscript{st} century wars. Holsti describes “peoples’ war” as violent pursuits of statehood, of governance, and of a changed role and status of nations and communities within states.\textsuperscript{10} He classifies wars into three categories: institutional wars, total or hegemonic wars, and the aforementioned peoples’ wars.\textsuperscript{11} Holsti then provides a set of criteria to assess how a particular war fits into one of the three categories. His criteria include: the purpose of the war, the role of civilians during war, and the institutions of war. Figure 1 schematizes Holsti’s typology:\textsuperscript{12}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of War</th>
<th>Purpose of War</th>
<th>Role of Civilians</th>
<th>Institutions of War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional War (Silesian War)</td>
<td>Monopoly of force within the identities</td>
<td>Unwritten codes clearly separated soldiers and civilians</td>
<td>Strict codes of conduct, battles choreographed; rules, norms and etiquette applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total War/Hegemonic War (WW I, WW II)</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
<td>Technology combined with nationalism, entire populations mobilized</td>
<td>Air/Sea war, terror, targeting of civilians and non-military targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wars of the Third Kind/Peoples’ War (Vietnam, Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraq)</td>
<td>Establish or preserve a community; identities liberation or unification</td>
<td>Civilian/soldier distinction disappears; civilians support with arms, logistics, and sanctuary; support from external identities</td>
<td>Armies, civilians as combatants, insurgency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Typology of War

Holsti continues his criticism of Clausewitz’s description of war by asserting that the character and sources of war are less relevant in conflicts since 1945.\textsuperscript{13} Then, Holsti
endorses Martin Van Creveld’s claim that the “Clausewitzian eighteenth and nineteenth century concept of war,” which Holsti calls institutional war, “is not only fast fading, but is inappropriate as both an analytical and policy guide to those who must think and respond to violence that concerns ideology and/or the nature of communities, rather than state interests.”

Holsti further claims,

The symbolic manifestations of war transformation are clear: in wars of the “third kind” there are no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no points d’appui, and no respect for the territorial limits of states. The clear distinction between the state, the armed forces, and the society that is the hallmark of institutionalized war dissolves in “peoples’ war.”

Ironically, Holstii’s typology parallels Clausewitz’s trinity rather nicely when we consider the identities purpose in waging war, the role of civilians during war as an expression of will, and finally, the institutions of war as displayed by a commander and his army. Given Holstii’s partiality toward wars of the third kind, an analysis of his description of that category reveals that Holstii’s criteria are reminiscent of Clausewitz’s trinity. Indeed these criteria apply to all types of war. Although Holsti does not define his criteria like Clausewitz does, with a little effort we can correlate the similarities (figure 2). It is the variable interactions of the criteria that determine the type of war. To assert that the types of wars in the recent past and those anticipated in the 21st century lessens Clausewitz’s relevance is a misconception. It reveals a shallow understanding of Clausewitz’s complex, but otherwise insightful understanding of man and identities. Indeed, Clausewitz’s enduring description of war also accounts for the types of war.
Clausewitz defines war as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. It is a form of human intercourse in which identities exercise their creative abilities to achieve their purpose. The “accidental duo” of Clausewitz and Holsti appropriately identify the wars of the 21st century as the people’s wars. Recall the naïve aspiration of the world’s people wanting to celebrate and share religious, ethnic, and national identities for world prosperity. In this idealistic aspiration we can easily discover the reasons for peoples’ wars. Virtually thousands of sub-identities can be found within the larger social, political, economic, and cultural boundaries. Since war is cyclic, post-occupations of total wars, such as World War II, found identities willing to fight for the establishment or preservation of a community, for liberation, or for unification. Some identities are more important than others: Consider Algiers (1962) and Bosnia (1995) where the deeply rooted religious-based identities, intertwined across other boundaries, united a people whose devout affiliation or livelihood provided the will to war.

Current U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan also fit the accidental duo’s typology. Various purposes for waging war determine the level of will for civilians to act and armies to engage. As Figure 3 indicates, the warring identities are engaged in a peoples’ war. Given that wars are inevitable—and as identities continue to push against
or penetrate the social, political, economic, and cultural boundaries--the typology
reveals that society is in the midst of, and can expect more, peoples’ wars. (Consider
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Kenya to cite a few active and potential
flashpoints for the U.S.) How long these wars will continue is unknown. But if war is
cyclic, they will continue until the world endures the next total war. A great power like
the United States, along with an emerging power like China may very well perceive a
purpose for war that initially appears as a peoples’ war. Sub-identities internal to either
country will strive for their ends, which will complicate the purpose, change the role of
civilians, and cause other institutions to take form—leading to total war. As human
intercourse transpires and identities seek power within national and global arenas, the
Clausewitz and Holsti typology of peoples’ war, and eventually total war, will grimly
characterize the 21st century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Purpose of War (Trinity – the purpose of war as determined by the identities; the ends)</th>
<th>Role of Civilians (Trinity – the role of civilians indicates their will to endure and support the purpose; the ways)</th>
<th>Institutions of War (Trinity – the institutions that enable the identities to wage war in order to achieve their purpose; the means to achieve ends)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. and Coalition</td>
<td>Democracy and national interests</td>
<td>Civilian/soldier distinction disappears; civilians support with arms, logistics, and sanctuary; support from external identities</td>
<td>Armies, civilians as combatants, insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnis and Shiites</td>
<td>Ethnic identity and political dominance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al Qaeda and Taliban</td>
<td>Unite Muslims and reestablish Caliphate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3 – The Peoples’ War in Iraq and Afghanistan

Clausewitz’s concepts are complex, but perceptive. We can attribute the difficulty
of understanding Clausewitz to On War’s translation from its original German text, to its
logic that inadvertently oscillates among social, political, economic, and cultural
boundaries, and to its historical context. However, Clausewitz gains credibility simply
because so many soldiers, politicians, and scholars have interpreted his writings, critique and criticized them. Further, often unknowingly, they advance their own theories with Clausewitz as the foundation. Bassford affirms the profundity of Clausewitz in his review of *On War*:

Clausewitz’s writings are of fundamental importance not only for their actual content but because they have done so much to influence almost all subsequent Western (and many non-Western) military thinkers. Even Antoine Henri Jomini, often improperly understood as Clausewitz's "opposite," read *On War;* his own Summary of the Art of War (1838) contains not only several personal insults to Clausewitz but also a great many adaptations of and adjustments to his arguments. The Marxist-Leninists carried him off in their peculiar direction, navalists like Sir Julian Stafford Corbett and the airpower theorists in others, and American nuclear strategists in yet another. It is therefore hard to understand or appreciate the ways in which modern thinkers diverge without an understanding of this central influence. This is true, not despite, but because of the way in which Clausewitz’s original concepts have been denied, misunderstood, confused, distorted, evolved, adopted, adapted, and mutated through varying historical circumstances over the past 164 years. This represents not a weakness of Clausewitzian theory but its fundamental, flexible, adaptable strength—if also sometimes the willfulness or boneheadedness of its consumers.  

This analysis is deliberately limited in its historical applications because Clausewitz’s greatest contribution is less about waging war and more about why and how man chooses to wage war. To Clausewitz, war was a contest between independent wills, in which skill and creativity are no more important than personality, chance, emotion, and the various dynamics that characterize any human interaction. Clausewitz has earned his reputation because of his timeless understanding of human nature and political activities, and is an expression of how identities have pushed against or broken social, political, economic, and cultural boundaries.  

The typology indicates the U.S. Army will engage in peoples’ war for the foreseeable future. So, must the Army change?
A Change in U.S. Army Culture

The U.S. Army is currently undergoing its most significant change in recent history—and doing it while fighting a peoples’ war. This transformation started with former Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General (R) Eric K. Shinseki’s vision of lighter, faster, rapidly deployable military organizations. The resultant Stryker vehicle and system was the material solution that set transformation in motion. Shinseki’s successor, General (R) Peter J. Schoomaker capitalized on the Stryker momentum and technologies and created an Army modular force that is capable of full-spectrum operations, a design solution. In the midst of fighting the Global War on Terror and responding to an ever-changing security environment, current Army Chief of Staff George W. Casey has a tremendous opportunity to continue the transformation momentum by reforming officership and improving the Army’s institutional culture with a people solution. Through his writings and speeches, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has created the conditions for the Army to adapt to peoples’ wars. Now it is up to the Army’s senior leaders, and ultimately General Casey, to lead change in officership and Army culture.

Both the Stryker and modular force are proving their worth in current operations around the world. However, in Iraq, an adaptable enemy has challenged our leaders to rethink how the Army does business. In his 2007 address at the Association of the United States Army convention, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted,

We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.22
Gates also emphasized the need for changes in Army personnel policies to better recognize and reward young officers who show promise in less traditional areas, including those skilled in foreign languages and in advising foreign forces.\textsuperscript{23} As Gates begins his own transformation campaign, his vision of change focuses on people. For the Army, the change translates to officership and Non-commissioned officer (NCO) and Soldier development and requires change in culture—the collective mindset of the institution based on education, training, and experiences and the environments in which it functions.

Officership refers to the professional practices of commissioned Army leadership.\textsuperscript{24} In order to perform professionally, officers must have education (knowledge or skill obtained through learning processes) and/or training (repetition of a task to meet a standard or maintain skill). Current Army culture and personnel systems support traditional war-fighting and leadership concepts. This culture and its related systems support a view of officership that is practiced within the Army or military domain only in preparation for symmetric warfare. Though slow to change, current operations are forcing the Army to adapt its culture and systems to meet the requirements for fighting a counterinsurgency in Iraq and to prepare for similar asymmetric operations worldwide. The Army will conduct these future asymmetric operations in an emerging security environment that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA).

A peoples’ war, as the war typology indicates, will likely be fought in the VUCA environment. If we acknowledge that the purpose of this kind of war is determined by identities, not necessarily by the state, the complexity of dealing with non-state actors contributes to the uncertainty and ambiguity of the conflict. As the distinction between
civilians and soldiers is increasingly blurred, identifying combatants becomes more
difficult. Lastly, operating amid a combination of armies, armed civilians, and an
insurgency, as the U.S. is experiencing in Iraq, creates an explosive and unpredictable
environment, VUCA indeed.

The run to Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), followed by the
toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein and President Bush’s proclamation that
“major combat operations in Iraq” had ended signaled the completion of Phase III
operations (major combat).\textsuperscript{25} Up to this point, the Army’s culture and systems were
designed to fight and win wars against another army, not against tribes, groups, or
insurgents—a peoples’ war. Following Phase III, we launched the Phase IV (post-
conflict) operations of the campaign. But the Army was not prepared to execute such
operations. Indeed its culture and systems were unable to support post-conflict
operations. To prepare for mission sets in Phase IV, the Army is adapting its training
and tactics to fight against armed civilians with varied purposes and an insurgency—all
the while assuming roles in security, stability, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO).

A major cultural challenge for the Army now is to prepare thoroughly and intensely
to perform stability operations, particularly those which require governance, economic
stabilization, and reconstruction. Such operations have become inevitable parts of war
itself.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, as Phase IV operations in Iraq blend with counterinsurgency
operations, the Army is increasingly challenged to accomplish this compounded
mission. This challenge extends to the Army’s war-fighting culture itself.

One of the most profound changes for the Army is currently taking place in its
sphere of expertise within the VUCA environment.\textsuperscript{27} As one considers DIME-FIL, or the
elements of national power, current operations have forced the Army to acquire knowledge, skills, and attributes beyond the military aspects of the DIME-FIL. The Army has willingly accepted missions that could better be carried out by civil affairs experts, public works experts, humanitarian workers in non-governmental agencies (NGOs), or interagency personnel or international agencies such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), or the United Nations (UN); building or re-building state and political capacity to the UN or Department of State (DoS); and building or re-building economic capacity to USAID, private firms, or the World Bank. This expanded role for the military has created conditions in which Army officers need to understand the overall structure of governance, its foundation in society, and its supporting mechanisms, along with the social and cultural dimensions that are the foundation for development of postwar and ungoverned areas. These new demands on the Army must now guide the development of education, doctrine, and training for the foreseeable future to operate in this new sphere of expertise. Army senior leaders, with General Casey in the lead, can have a dramatic effect on Army culture by ensuring that training centers address these new requirements, that training is having the desired effects, and that education and training incorporates various socio-cultural domains in order to be prepare our officers and Soldiers to perform effectively anywhere in the world.

The Army’s recently published Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, provides a primary doctrinal source for how the Army should conduct operations in Iraq. Drafted and published with a tremendous sense of urgency, it offers a new paradigm on how the Army will operate in a counterinsurgency. Again, the Army’s culture and systems must adapt. In particular, Chapter 3 of FM 3-24, Intelligence in
Counterinsurgency, introduces key concepts and describes characteristics of the operational environment that leaders and Soldiers will have to consider when conducting operations. Leaders and Soldiers must now develop an understanding of civil considerations, with particular attention to people, history, and host nation government, or identities. Soldiers have to now conduct terrain analysis (complex, suburban, urban and key infrastructure), with close attention to physical geography.30

The civil considerations of waging a counterinsurgency have significant implications for Army culture. Leaders and Soldiers must now acquire a greater understanding of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.31 For closer attention to the most important characteristic, people, leaders and Soldiers must learn how to analyze society, social structure, culture, language, power and authority, and indigenous interests.32 The human dimension is a critical factor in today’s complex environments demanding that Soldiers at all levels possess some cultural awareness and foreign language capability. It is no longer sufficient for limited numbers of Soldiers in specialized skill sets and units to possess these capabilities.”33

At the core of this challenge is the improvement of Soldiers’ cognitive effectiveness in counterinsurgency, an aspect of conventional doctrine previously overlooked by the Army. A RAND counterinsurgency study defined cognition as simply the ability to make sense of a situation—in recognizing and comprehending, in reasoning and problem-solving, in employing intuition, processing facts, and making decisions.34 Earlier versions of Army doctrine such as AirLand Battle (ALB) focused on the kinetic effects of weapon systems and supporting tactics to defeat the enemy. Consider ALB doctrine’s four basic tenets for successful operations: agility, initiative, depth, and
synchronization; likewise, ALB’s supporting combat imperatives included anticipating
events on the battlefield in order to designate, sustain, and shift the main effort.35
Current doctrine in Field Manual 3-0, Operations, is specific with “multinational and
interagency partners provide cultures, perspectives, and capabilities that reinforce and
complement Army strengths and capabilities.”36 The attributes of ALB demonstrate the
Army’s focus on symmetric warfare with little to no attention to understanding the people
engaged in the conflict. Current doctrine reveals dependencies on other agencies. In
both cases, Army doctrine fostered a culture that readied itself for an army against army
war. As the Army engages in peoples’ wars, the best weapon may very well be one that
does not shoot—the Soldier’s mind may be the weapon of choice. Army culture must
adapt to this new reality and new challenge.

If we agree that traditionally the practice of officership is the repetitive exercise of
discretionary judgment, then the Army must update its doctrine to prepare its officers to
conduct counterinsurgency operations.37 Furthermore, the Army must institutionalize
building the capabilities of its officers to analyze society, social structure, culture,
language, power, and authority. Senior leaders must expand officers’ educational
opportunities to meet the emerging requirements for operating effectively in a VUCA
environment. Likewise, the Army must adapt its culture and systems to embrace new
NCO and Soldier education, initiatives, and incentives.

How the Army Can Adapt its Culture

The Army Training and Leader Development Panel’s (ATLDP) Officer Study
Report to The Army, released in 2003, acknowledged that Army culture was out of
balance. The Panel recommended institutionalizing learning in the Army’s culture and
systems to increase self-awareness and adaptability. Yet no formal educational solutions were instituted across the Army to address this recommendation. However, Secretary Gates recently cited the Army’s need for officers with language and cultural education and skills to better engage and understand foreign partners or potential foes and to successfully fight a peoples’ war. Gates’ statement indicates the Army is adapting to the VUCA environment. Moreover, with their institutional implications, changes must reflect new leading and training strategies that ensure officers, Soldiers, and NCOs are prepared to operate effectively in the VUCA environment.

Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, provides a blend of training and education that suits officers, NCOs, and Soldiers. As the field manual implies, and as OIF first-person accounts describe, it is often the young NCO who ends up “eye-to-eye” with insurgents or community members; this NCO is the first leader who needs to exercise discretionary judgment. The Army should develop certification programs, perhaps tied to promotions, to instruct NCOs in on-the-ground negotiations, socio-cultural relations, and grievance adjudication, to name a few possible topics. The Army should also establish incentives for Soldiers and NCOs who pursue educational programs that enhance their cultural knowledge. As the demands of asymmetric warfare change the roles of Soldiers and NCOs, the Army culture and support systems must also adapt.

The nature of a peoples’ war will force junior leaders to advise their superiors on extremely complex situations with strategic implications. Currently, young leaders are forced to “self-educate” or rely on “on the job training” while operating in a VUCA environment. To address this training deficiency and prepare junior leaders to operate in these complex situations, the Army must adapt its institutional programs accordingly.
Leader preparation must include opportunities for junior leaders to practice their decision making skills and exercise discretionary judgment in a VUCA training environment.

To prepare leaders for the VUCA environment, education and training should begin in the pre-commissioning phase. An officer’s education must focus on the core leadership and competency skills; however, these studies must take place in the context of the VUCA environment. To prepare junior leaders for these challenges, pre-commissioning programs at the service academies and ROTC programs should include more introductory discussions on the National Security and Military Strategies, the differences between tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare; the security environment to include regional cultures; and current strategic and national issues.\textsuperscript{40}

In years past, the Army institutional culture valued science and engineering degrees. For example, the United States Military Academy at West Point has long been recognized as a science and engineering institution. All of its graduates earn a bachelor of science due to its science and engineering core curriculum. The Army targets the awarding of ROTC scholarships to students who plan on studying a math or hard science, thereby overlooking those engaging in the social sciences and the humanities, the study of people. While science and engineering is important to the Army as an institution, placing a premium on an education grounded in culture, economics, or foreign language, coupled with training to operate in a VUCA environment represents a cultural shift the Army needs to succeed in a peoples’ war.

Upon successful completion of the company grade years, an officer’s formal education, possibly at the risk of operational assignment, must continue in people
oriented studies—a paradigm shift for the Army. Army culture must adapt to this new paradigm and acknowledge that officers may have to delay or forgo the traditional ticket-punching jobs in order to attend graduate school. The Army must make obtaining graduate education as career enhancing as serving as a battalion operations officer or battalion executive officer. This cultural shift will transform officership so that an officer's foreign area education and assignments carry the same weight as branch qualification assignments. The nature of officership will then change so that Army culture—along with personnel systems and policies—embraces this new requirement of commissioned Army leadership. General David Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force, Iraq, endorses this kind of officer education. In “Beyond the Cloister,” he advocates investing in advanced education for officers.41 According to Patraeus, the Army needs “officers comfortable not just with major combat operations but with operations conducted throughout the middle- and lower-ends of the spectrum of conflict, as well.”42 The Army needs an institutional culture that eliminates the aforementioned risk of missing an operational assignment and emphasizes educational experiences that places officers among those unlike themselves. These experiences should challenge officers to think, act, and learn among civilians. This will better prepare them for full spectrum operations, including the peoples’ wars.

The next major cultural shift the Army must make is in officer assignments and its placement of interagency employees within Army activities. Army culture must embrace and create opportunities for Army field grade officers to serve with other governmental agencies that make up the elements of national power, ones that the U.S. will likely call upon in future operations. Likewise, the Army must integrate civilian employees of the
governmental agencies into Army headquarters. Such cross-over assignments are critical to successful operations. Imagine Army leaders and interagency experts working together to establish support networks while gaining a better understanding of each others’ capabilities and limitations. Thus broad-based U.S. competence gets deeply embedded in professional relationships, rather than the current ad-hoc “assembly required” interagency organization. The Department of Defense has acknowledged the value of cross-over assignments, claiming that the Army leadership team, both civilian and military, must be able to integrate national resources within the larger national security enterprise.43

Reforming Army culture, as a component of transformation, will change officership and NCO and Soldier training and development. This reform is an investment in the Army's most precious resource, its people. Gates’ observation is that “men and women need to be retained, and the best and brightest advanced to the point that they can use their experience to shape the institution to which they have given so much. And this may mean reexamining assignments and promotion policies that in many cases are unchanged since the Cold War.”44 Secretary Gates has opened the door and has set the conditions for change. It will be a tremendous challenge for General Casey and Army strategic leaders to change Army culture. It will be resource intensive both in terms of time and dollars. But it is worth the cost. General (R) Shinseki appropriately noted, “It’s our duty to develop soldiers and leaders who have the skills necessary to succeed today and in the future.”45 Shinseki set the azimuth for transformation; Schoomaker provided design and increased Army capabilities. Now Casey can maintain
the momentum by reforming Army culture, securing the Army legacy as an agile, adaptable, world-class land force ready for service to the nation.

The debate continues within the Army about how best to prepare for the next phase of the Iraq war and for future conflicts.\(^4\) As Secretary Gates promised, “Army Soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. All these so-called ‘nontraditional’ capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy – where they must stay.”\(^4\) So it is time to end the debate and start to change. Identities will continue to struggle, resist, and dominate established social, political, economic, and cultural boundaries. The “accidental duo” of Clausewitz and Holsti, offering theoretical direction to U.S. senior leaders, mandate that the Army be prepared for peoples’ wars. These conflicts will require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing our will on an adversary and more a function of shaping behavior -- of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.\(^4\) The Army must adapt to a new complex sphere of expertise. We must reform Army culture to be successful in these future wars. We cannot rely solely on superior weaponry. More importantly, our improved appreciation and understanding of people, organizations, and cultures will be the key to future successes.

Endnotes


\(^3\) Ibid., 87.

5 Clausewitz, 606-607.

6 Ibid., 89.

7 Ibid.


10 Ibid., 21.

11 Ibid., 27.

12 Ibid., 19-40.

13 Ibid., 14.

14 Ibid., 36.

15 Ibid., 36-37.

16 Clausewitz, 75.

17 Clausewitz, 148-149.

18 The Algerian War from 1954-1962 found Muslim nationalists waging a terror campaign against France to restore the Algerian state in accordance with the principles of Islam. The Bosnia War, 1992-1995, pitted Christians against Muslims, Serbs against Croats, among other identities, to restore and/or gain religious, ethnic, and political power as well as geographic borders.


26 Ibid.


28 Ibid., 352.

29 Ibid., 352-353


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.


39 Gates.


42 Ibid.


44 Gates.


46 Spiegel and Barnes.

47 Gates.