HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
SILVESTRE KEYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
RICK Larsen, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
CAROL SHEA-PORTEER, New Hampshire
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DAVID LOEBBAck, Iowa
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD P. “BUCK” McKEON, California
MAC THORNBERY, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
KEN CALVERE, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
CATHY McMorris Rodgers, Washington
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
 GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director
PAUL OSTERBURG SANZ, Professional Staff Member
AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member
MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant
CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Hearing:

Appendix:
Wednesday, March 21, 2007 ................................................................................... 45

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services ................................................................. 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services ........................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Cartwright, Gen. James E., Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Marine Corps ..................................................................................... 5

Appendix

Prepared Statements:
Cartwright, Gen. James E. .............................................................................. 54
Keating, Adm. Timothy J. .................................................................................. 73
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A. .............................................................................. 94
Skelton, Hon. Ike ............................................................................................ 49
Stavridis, Adm. James G. ................................................................................. 118

Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]

Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................. 147
Ms. Bordallo .................................................................................................... 148
Mr. Skelton ..................................................................................................... 147
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today’s hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings with combatant commanders.

I am pleased to welcome General Cartwright of Strategic Command (STRATCOM); Admiral Keating of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), who will soon be taking the reins at Pacific Command; General Schwartz at Transportation Command (TRANSCOM); and Admiral Stavridis.

Do me a favor. Pronounce that correctly for me again.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, it is Stavridis.

The CHAIRMAN. I got it. Thank you—of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

And we are honored to have all four of you today. Appreciate what you do, and especially want to express gratitude to each of those who work with you and for you, in and out of uniform.

Although the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere consume so much energy and resources, our attention should be in other parts of the world, as well.

In Colombia we have spent over four billion dollars since 1999 to stem the flow of illegal drugs into our country and to aid the Colombians in their fight against homegrown terrorists. But according to the latest figures from the Justice Department, the supply and purity of illicit narcotics in our streets has not changed much.

The administration of President Uribe is also currently embroiled in a criminal investigation into a seemingly widespread conspiracy between high-ranking government officials and leaders of the paramilitaries.

Guantanamo Bay, a name that now rings throughout our country—I would like to begin a discussion as to whether we should continue to use the naval station there as a detention facility.

(1)
Although recent legislation, Supreme Court decisions, and Department of Defense directives have probably improved the nature of interrogation and detention at that place, I think it may be a bit too late. It has become in the minds of many of our allies a textbook example of how not to run a detention facility.

NORTHCOM—Admiral Keating, I am interested in the status of planning and training activities between NORTHCOM on the one hand, and national guard and reserve components and local responders on the other.

And as you know, the response to Katrina highlighted the need to better coordinate these activities, as cited in the recent Guard and Reserve Commission report, the commission on which someone who used to work in your shop, Stanton Thompson, has sat.

Traditionally, I have been a strong proponent of the total force concept of integrating the reserve and active components into one effort. And yet, I am concerned about reports that NORTHCOM does not adequately understand the capabilities of the guard and reserve due to the fact that NORTHCOM is overly staffed by active duty personnel.

With regards to STRATCOM, we are interested in the warfighter’s perspective on the balance between nuclear and conventional forces in the future.

I understand, General Cartwright, that you do recognize the need for a national discussion on this important issue, and I think that in that regard, I look forward to hearing your thoughts about the Reliable Replacement Warhead and Conventional Trident Modification programs, and what you can say publicly.

I follow with interest the expanded role the warfighter has been playing in the missile field defense business, particularly in the context of the North Korean test of a long-range missile last summer.

In regard to TRANSCOM, General Schwartz, I believe that the critical issue for the committee will be to understand better the nature of our future mobility requirements. We are reaching ultimate decision points on strategic airlift production and modernization that will impact our capabilities.

I ask that the total of my statement be put into the record. And I ask my ranking, my friend, Duncan Hunter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]
ward to meeting with your replacement in NORTHCOM, General Renuart, in the near future.

You know, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the importance of NORTHCOM’s mission of support to U.S. civil authorities. And the recently released National Guard Commission report recommends that NORTHCOM should increase its capacity to execute its civil support mission.

So, at the appropriate time, I hope you comment on how NORTHCOM executes its civil support mission and how it is reaching out to the national guard and working with state and local entities to ensure that it has full situational awareness.

Admiral Stavridis, welcome to your first hearing as SOUTHCOM commander. We have had a chance to visit a little bit. Obviously, Latin America and the Caribbean are America’s neighbors. And although there are no conventional threats in the region at this time, developments in the region do impact U.S. security.

The U.S. and South America continue to work together. And while there are examples of progress, there continue to be regional security and political challenges.

Illegal drug production and trade, particularly in the Andean Ridge, continues to be a problem. In Colombia, President Uribe, the first modern Colombian president to win reelection, is fighting narcoterrorism in his country with U.S. support. And I know we have chatted a little bit. You see good trends with respect to that issue.

In Venezuela, President Chavez maintains close relations with Cuba and Iran, while aggressively importing arms and defense capabilities not proportional to its defense needs. And furthermore, there are indications that radical Islamists may be taking advantage of instability in that region.

So, I am interested in learning how SOUTHCOM is working with its regional and interagency partners to address these challenges.

Last, this committee continues to remain focused on SOUTHCOM’s responsibilities for Guantanamo Bay. And I am going to reserve most of my comments until next week, when the committee intends to hold two hearings, but let me make one quick point.

We, as a nation, cannot afford to close Guantanamo. It houses dangerous people who are intent on killing innocent Americans. And if you need a reminder of this fact, all you have to do is read this recently released transcript of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s statements to the effect that he did, in fact, involve himself in the killing of thousands of Americans and sees no problem with killing more Americans, if given the opportunity.

And I would just say that we have all seen the reports percolating that there may be moves to close Guantanamo and remove these terrorists into the United States.

I think one of the most dangerous things we could do is move people who have expertise in explosives anywhere close to the general prisoner population in the United States. I think isolation is absolutely appropriate.

And as a guy who has been down to Guantanamo with some of my colleagues on the committee, and having looked at the conditions, at the outstanding medical care that is given people in Guan-
tarnamo, you know, their health care there would rival that of most health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States.

The food is excellent. They are given taxpayer-paid-for prayer rugs and Qurans, and their routine is interrupted five times a day for prayer.

When you look at the reports from international agencies that complain about lack of square footage and other things that I would consider not to be substantial complaints, I think it is very clear that Guantánamo is being run very professionally. But beyond that, it is a necessity in this war against terror.

So, maybe you can touch to some degree on Guantánamo. I know we are going to have extensive hearings on Guantánamo shortly.

General Cartwright, thank you for testifying before us twice in a couple of weeks.

In this post-Cold War environment, we have got to have a full range of capabilities to deter and respond to multiple threats and adversaries that span the gamut from transnational terrorists and rogue nations like North Korea, who just tested this missile that the chairman mentioned a few minutes ago, and is working to develop ways to deliver its new-found nuclear capabilities.

So, I think the committee would appreciate also hearing about our Nation’s strategic posture needs. And I am particularly interested in the Conventional Trident Modification Program and hearing about the need for the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the combatant commander’s missile defense needs. So, if you could talk about that briefly, that would be good.

Last, the chairman mentioned the Chinese anti-satellite test (ASAT) that occurred in January. And though its target was a Chinese weather satellite, it sent a clear message. Most people do not try to attain the capability to shoot down their own satellites. And I think that that heralded a new era of military competition in space, whether we want it or not.

So, understanding this is not a classified hearing, maybe you could testify a little bit about your thoughts with respect to that recent test.

General Schwartz, welcome to you. You obviously are a critical player in the nation’s warfighting operations today. And let me just thank you. You have always been extremely responsive to all the services and their transportation needs, especially in the warfighting theaters.

I know you have some thoughts on where we are going to go with lift, and you are going to have to make some difficult choices. Thanks for your efforts on behalf of all the warfighting forces. And please let us know how we can help you become more efficient and stretch those TRANSCOM dollars.

So, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. It is absolutely timely and critical to the nation’s defenses, and I look forward to the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the ranking member.

Since we have four witnesses today, I hope that you will do your best to confine your remarks. And we will, without objection, put your prepared statements in the record.
I would also recommend to the members, since we are under the five-minute rule, that you may wish to confine your questions on the first round, at least, to one or two of the witnesses.

So, without any further ado, General Cartwright, welcome, sir.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General CARTWRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, I appreciate this opportunity to come and testify today.

Since I have had the opportunity to testify before some of your subcommittees, and that is a matter of record, I am not going to go into any great detail until we get to the question-and-answers, and leave it for that. But I think there are a couple of issues that were highlighted by both the chairman and Congressman Hunter that are worth at least a mention here in the preamble.

The threat out there is growing, and it is expanding. And as was said earlier, it spans from the conventional or the nation-state challenges that we have to rogue states and extremists. And this is a broader threat than we have taken on in the past.

And so, trying to define a deterrence strategy for the 21st century and the capabilities necessary to lend credibility to that deterrence is what STRATCOM has focused its efforts on.

And I think, in moving forward here, I am going to hit just a couple of points, the first being on our offensive capabilities and the discussion about our nuclear capabilities.

And given that this is an open hearing, let me just say that we entered into an agreement with the Russians called the Moscow Treaty. It set limits on our active stockpiles and drawdown, and a goal for 2012. In 2007, which is where we are today, was the mid-point in that drawdown, and both we and the Russians have reviewed our progress in that activity.

Both of us are ahead of schedule in shutting down systems and the active stockpile. But the active stockpile is only one part of our stockpile. There is also the inactive portion of it.

In the strategy that has been put forth by this Administration, and that we are working toward is, the lowest number of nuclear weapons necessary for national security. That is the objective.

And so, as we move forward on the drawdowns in response to the Moscow Treaty, we need to increase our other capabilities as alternatives and replacements for the drawdown of the nuclear weapons that we have in our stockpile.

Part and parcel to that, in that drawdown through 2012, is refurbishing the stockpile that we have. And the activity that we are undertaking here is to ensure that the weapons that we have are the safest they can be for the people who use them and handle them, that they are as secure as modern technology will allow us to make them, and that they are reliable.

All three of those attributes will help us draw this stockpile down. All three of those attributes will have effect on both the active and the inactive stockpiles. That is critical.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead, which just finished its first study efforts, is now entering into the second phase of study. That is our intention, to move into the more detailed engineering studies.
The activity associated with that and the capability that we are seeking with this Reliable Replacement Warhead is first, safe, secure, and reliable; second, its form, fit, and function replacement for the existing weapons.

In other words, there are no new delivery vehicles. There is no new capability. This is taking my 1966 Mustang and making sure that it has got four-wheel brake disc brakes, it has got seat belts—it has got all of the things that it ought to have to be responsible, to maintain control over and be able to use and develop these weapons in a safe, secure way.

And that is our intent with the Reliable Replacement Warhead. In order to get to the lowest numbers necessary for national security, we have got to see the emergence of conventional capabilities to replace or augment some of the existing nuclear capabilities. One of those that was mentioned in the opening statement was the conventional Trident.

What we are seeking here is prompt, global strike. And with the technologies we have today, we can do that with conventional weapons. And we can draw down the number of nuclear weapons necessary to accomplish prompt global strike, number one.

And number two, we can have a capability that is beyond nuclear. In other words, today, if something happens quickly and we have to respond quickly, the only choice that we have in a global capability is a nuclear weapon.

That is unacceptable for the range of threats that we are going to face in the future. We need a conventional capability. It will be more appropriate for several of the scenarios, and I am happy to discuss that, to the extent that we can, in this hearing.

The second piece of this activity is a defense that is credible. In other words, what we want is a balanced offense-defense capability. Offense is not always the right answer, and it is usually where you do not want to end up. What we want to be able to do is drive this to a non-confrontational issue, whatever happens to occur.

And so, a defensive capability gives us a way to defuse things, to devalue things.

The asset out there in the world that has got the biggest market right now are short-and medium-range ballistic missiles. And we have got to find a way to respond to those.

They launch quickly, and they arrive quickly. They do not wait for conventional force to close. They threaten neighbors.

How do you devalue those, so that they stop proliferating? How do you make the governments who have them think twice about using them, number one, and think twice about the effect that they are going to have?

How do you change the adversary’s calculus about his opportunity to be successful with these short-and medium-range ballistic missiles?

That is the next phase that we have got to start to take on with ballistic missile defense.

The phase after that that we are starting to look at is cruise missiles. And what are we going to do against the proliferation of cruise missiles and their increased sophistication?

What we are convinced, at least inside of STRATCOM, is you do not want to build a completely separate system for cruise missiles.
You want to leverage the lessons that we have learned and the capabilities and command and control and sensor management that we learned in ballistic missile and apply that to cruise missile, rather than building a separate system.

And that is the path that we are on. I would be happy to have more discussion about that.

Two other areas. Space: There were questions about space and the ASAT test. I would be happy to discuss that.

But the position from the command is, number one, just because there is a threat in space does not mean you have to respond in space. We do not need an arms race in space.

And the last piece is cyber. In cyber, this country is under attack on a daily basis, whether it be in the commerce and industry sectors, in the academic sectors or in the defense sectors.

We have to start to understand how we are going to contest this environment, provide defenses for the country, rather than, as we do today, just defend the terminals, wait for a patch and lose money the whole time, or lose intellectual capital the whole time that we are waiting for somebody to fix a vulnerability.

We have got to start to extend our defensive perimeters out beyond the terminals, beyond the computers and the firewalls.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield the rest of my time here to my counterparts.

[The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much, and we will look forward to asking you those questions to which you referred.

Admiral Keating, I guess this is your last appearance in your present role.

Admiral KEATING. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your excellent service in the past. We look forward to your future service.

Admiral Keating.

STATEMENT OF ADM. TIMOTHY J. KEATING, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, members of the committee. It is a privilege to appear before you this morning to represent the men and women of North American Aerospace Defense Command and the United States Northern Command.

Homeland defense is the core of our national military strategy. And while NORAD and NORTHCOM are separate commands, we operate with complementary missions. We work together for our sacred mission of defending our homelands.

We operate within a common security environment. We share a headquarters staff. We embrace common values. We understand the importance of executing our duties with a sense of urgency in the face of very real and present dangers.

It is my honor to represent all those fine young men and women before you today.

The core capability to accomplish our missions resides in our people. We are grateful for your support, Mr. Chairman, and all the
Congress, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen. Their welfare and the welfare of their families is our highest priority.

We remain resolutely committed to defending the United States and Canada and Mexico against all threats.

To address a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Hunter, that you asked in your opening comments, we are vitally interested in providing the American people the capabilities that they need to defend our homeland and to provide support to civil authorities when we are directed.

That means an integrated team of active, reserve and guard forces. That is our sole focus, the integration of this team.

We have seven general officers on our staff at the United States Northern Command who are reserve or guard officers—seven. Over 150 troops come through our doors every morning who are reserve or guard or Air Guard forces.

We have an annual conference in the late winter with all of the hurricane adjutants general—the adjutants general from New York all the way around the Atlantic Coast and the Gulf Coast of Texas. Ten to a dozen adjutants general come every spring, and we discuss the requirements that may well be levied upon us if a hurricane is of sufficient import.

I have met with each and every adjutant general of the United States and discussed face-to-face with them their issues and our issues.

I am convinced that we are on the same page, Mr. Chairman, and that we have a common purpose: to provide the American people with the support that they deserve.

I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Keating, thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter and members of the committee, it is also a pleasure and a privilege for me to represent the 150,000 folks in the Transportation Command who basically move by air, land and sea the materiel and personnel of the Department of Defense.

We, during 2006, I think, have provided noteworthy support to the department, as well as made considerable efforts to advance the distribution processes and systems that we depend upon, along with the remainder of the logistics community.

Fundamentally, I think we have focused our attention on making sure that the right personnel, the right equipment, the right sustainment and support is delivered at the right place and time in order to support, as you suggested earlier, our warfighters.

In addition, we have the responsibility of being the distribution process owner for the department. And in that, we are laboring to improve the precision, the reliability and the efficiency of the DOD supply chain, simply by improving business process, by making in-
formation systems interoperable and by securing enhanced mobility assets.

I would also note, Mr. Chairman, that we take particular pride in the rewarding aero-medical evacuation mission. And we do that with special care.

I could not be prouder of our joint team and our national partners. We all are supporting the global war on terror while making a concerted effort to transform the military deployment and distribution enterprise.

I am grateful to you, sir, and to the committee for allowing me to appear before you today, for the essential support that you provide in enabling our capabilities. And I am prepared to take any questions that you have, sir.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Schwartz can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, General Schwartz.

Admiral Stavridis, welcome.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRDIS, COMMANDER, U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral STAVRDIS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to come before you today and discuss some of the issues, what we are doing, and the challenges we face throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

I want to thank each of you personally for your service. And I would encourage each of you to come travel in the region. And I would encourage you to come to Guantanamo Bay and see it for yourself, if you have not done so.

On behalf of all of us at Southern Command, thank you for the support you provide to us, just as you do to my wingmen here today.

I do want to say to General Cartwright and Admiral Keating and General Schwartz, thank you for all the support you give to U.S. Southern Command. We appreciate it greatly.

Our mission down south is straightforward: to promote security cooperation and conduct operations with the 32 countries and 13 territories that are down south of Mexico. About 450 million people live down there. And we feel our work contributes to the defense of the United States.

Our ability to accomplish the mission is significantly influenced by our understanding of the diversity and the culture down south, and that is an important part of what we seek to do at U.S. Southern Command.

On that note, I would say all of us in the United States think and understand that we live in a shared home called the Americas. We tend to think of the term American as applying to a citizen of the United States, but we are all Americans in this hemisphere. It is an extraordinary and diverse part of the world.

And I would argue that the part of the world that I am engaged in is not America’s “backyard.” I do not like that expression much.
I would not even call it America’s front porch. It is part of a shared home that we all have together.

I have been in the job about five months. I have had a chance to travel pretty widely since then, and I can tell you that our partners in the region are making, I think, good, strong progress.

They face significant threats and challenges: narcotics, we have talked about a little bit; gangs—“pandillas” and “maras” they are called—to the south; illicit trafficking in human persons.

The challenges of this region are many, but they are not straightforward military challenges. And thus, there is a particular emphasis in this part of the world on working with the interagency, working with our partners at State, with Homeland Security, particularly the Coast Guard or the Drug Enforcement Agency and many others.

I would tell you that everything we do in Latin America and the Caribbean, frankly, depends on strong interagency linkages.

Given that, I think it is important to understand the great potential of the region. And if we can unlock that together—the United States and the other nations of the region working together—we and the military-to-military realm want to be part of that in a very positive way. And that is what we seek to do.

I would like to close, as my compatriots have, by just saying how proud I am to serve alongside the men and women of the U.S. Southern Command: active duty, reservists, civilians, soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. I could not ask, as we would say in the Navy, for better shipmates anywhere ashore in the world.

Thank you again to the members of the committee, the chairman and the ranking member. Appreciate your time, and I look forward to your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in the Appendix on page 118.]

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly thank you gentlemen for your excellent testimony.

I will ask one question of Admiral Stavridis and then turn to my ranking, and then we will be off and running on the five-minute rule.

Admiral, the United Nations, some members of the Congress and other people in and out of our country have raised the issue of the detention and interrogation facilities at Guantanamo.

Could the detainees be held elsewhere within your area of responsibility with the same security and effectiveness?

Admiral STAVRDIS. No, sir. I do not believe they could be held anywhere in my area of responsibility with the same degree of security and effectiveness.

I believe at Guantanamo Bay we are operating a humane, a legal, and a transparent detention and interrogation facility.

Transparent—we have had over 2,000 journalists visit it over the last four years. We have had over 2,000 high-level visitors, including many, many members of Congress. Most recently, Senator Levin and Senator Graham came down just this past week.

We fully follow Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. We follow the laws of the United States. We will continue to do that.
I believe it is a humane facility. I think compared to any facility in the world, it is a very humane and well-run operation.

I personally cannot think of another location in my area of responsibility that would make sense to move these particular individuals. And I believe they must be kept in a place where they are not free to do the kinds of things that have occurred before in terrorist acts against the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. My friend, Duncan Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, following your custom here, I see Mr. Conaway and Mr. Davis down in the front row. I would be happy to pass on my time and yield them my time under the five-minute rule, and I will ask a few questions at the end of the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet. Which one do you choose?

Mr. HUNTER. You know, I think Mr. Davis is getting up there.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Davis is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you, Ranking Member Hunter, for the opportunity.

One question that many of us are interested in, particularly as we deal with the challenges of the rising problems with Islamic radicalism, seeing the action of our agencies, particularly during Hurricane Katrina, other issues that we have run into, I am very curious about your views of interagency reform needs, in Southern Command in particular.

And generally from a Northern Command and homeland defense standpoint, if Admiral Keating and Admiral Stavridis might comment on some statutory changes that might improve the interagency process, to make our interagency community a little bit more expeditionary, but also more integrated, to anticipate the types of things, particularly the non-military types of things, where we can preempt or minimize the likelihood of conflict.

Admiral KEATING. Congressman Davis, I would be happy to start, and then Jim can provide his perspective.

We have 60, at Northern Command, different agencies represented in our headquarters. So, that is true interagency representation.

It goes beyond that, however. There is actual productivity. It is not just activity, but it is productivity during the courses of exercises—and we conduct a number of those—during the courses of real-world operations. We benefit significantly from the presence and the expertise represented by those 60 different agencies.

And it is not all federal. About two-thirds of those are Federal agencies, and a third are non-federal, like Red Cross, World Health Organization, and folks like that.

As far as the imposition of statutory concerns for us, I am unaware of any that would be of significant early benefit compared to the day-to-day operations that we conduct and day-to-day staff work, though I think there is merit in some consideration, and I believe this is under way for the similar Goldwater-Nichols-like education and joint duties as requisites for promotion within other agencies, sir.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, as is often said on Capitol Hill, I would like to associate myself with Admiral Keating’s remarks. I would
echo the fact—the good news is that there is an awful lot of inter-agency partnering that is going on in all the combatant commands and with all the partners exactly as Admiral Keating indicated.

What we do at Southern Command is, we have just stood up a new directorate. We call it the J–9. So, it is one of our key functionalities within the command, that is devoted to the inter-agency. It is staffed with interagency partners. Various agencies around the government have volunteered to put people into this group down in Miami.

And I would argue that, as we look forward at the future of combatant commands, they will start to look a lot more interagency, more combined, more international partners involved and in the headquarters. We have six international partners who are in our headquarters with us.

And again, I agree with Admiral Keating, that exactly the type of wisdom that Congress had in passing Goldwater-Nichols, which led to a better level of jointness between the services, I think that is an extremely rich area for study, and should be pursued.

And again, we are trying to do it at our own level, but it certainly would be a sensible topic to pursue. Again, certainly in Southern Command, where so many of the tasks we face, the challenges we face are not direct military kinds of things.

We are not launching Tomahawk missiles downrange in SOUTHCOM. We are launching ideas. And we need interagency partners to help us do that.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. That is one area that we would like to work with you on, having seen a consistent pattern of challenges faced, whether it was during Hurricane Katrina in Haiti, the military can only get the ball so far down the field. And I think we are dealing with the same things in Iraq and Afghanistan right now, where the visible cost is so much higher.

But a lot of the types of challenges that could be faced by a more integrated—and I still get the sense that there will have to be statutory change to amend personnel policies and to change some of these priorities, you know, ranging from reconstructing a banking system after a hurricane to more complex matters.

So, thank you.

I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much for all the great work that you all do.

Admiral Stavridis, in your testimony, you state that your region is a highly likely base for future terrorist threats. And you comment, coupled with the significant reduction of the Navy presence in the Gulf Coast—you know we shut down the only deepwater base we had, which was Naval Station Ingleside.

And it was not too long ago we had a big meeting here, and the question came up about who were the gangs involved. One of the gangs, prominent gangs, that came up was the Mara Salvatrucha. You are probably very familiar with them.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. But, you know, I am also concerned with the drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned with keeping the commercial
sea lanes open in the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned with all the refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. We do not have a deepwater sea port.

You are doing a great job by doing exercises with the different countries in that area. But you know what? I am very, very concerned.

And I read in the statement that you said that the economic linkage between the nations of the Americas has risen dramatically over the last decade, with north and south trade comprising about 40 percent. Well, it seems to me that the Navy does not look north and south—at least the overall Navy. I was told that they look east and west.

But are you happy with what we have there? Could we do more? I am very, very concerned. They are our neighbors, and it seems to me that we have not really focused.

And I know it is not entirely your responsibility. We have to do something to help you.

And then you mention about Hezbollah, as well. That terrorist group has a prominent—and now, I know I am asking too many questions, but they are very much in that area. And I am concerned that we do not have enough militarily to respond in case we do have a crisis.

Maybe you can respond to—your statement was a great statement, maybe because I come from Texas, from the Gulf of Mexico. But that was a very, very good statement, Admiral.

Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.

I am going to ask Admiral Keating to chime in here, because he is actually the combatant commander who has principal responsibility for the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. My border kind of runs just south of Mexico itself, and so, he owns those waters. I own the Caribbean waters immediately adjacent. But I think your question is relevant to both of us.

As far as the Navy’s posture and where it is located, I would certainly leave those questions to the chief of naval operations, who has the requirement to do the training, equipment, and organize.

I would mention that last summer we had a Navy aircraft carrier come through those waters. A very successful deployment. We called it the Partnership of the Americas carrier. Did a whole series of exercises that ranged from military readiness to counterterrorism to counternarcotics to humanitarian and civic projects.

We have multiple ship visits on any given day throughout the waters of the Caribbean. And this summer, as you may have seen, the President just announced that he approved an initiative that we sent up to bring a hospital ship into those waters.

Clearly, it does not bring offensive power. But again, in this theme that we are not sending missiles downrange in Latin America, we are sending ideas and interactions and humanitarian assistance in so many ways. And that contributes to our long-term security.

We will have the Comfort in the region for over four months, which I think is very positive.

We were also operating something called Enduring Friendship, which is a counterterrorism use of funds that the Congress allo-
cated under section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) last year. That puts radars, boats and command and control apparatus in place in eight different nations of the region, which I think are helpful against the kinds of threats you so aptly identified.

Last, the Navy is approving the deployment of something under an experimental type of concept called Global Fleet Stations, which will be a high-speed vessel, a swift, which will come into the area of operations and operate throughout the Gulf, partnering with our nations there to try and take on these kinds of threats that you, again, correctly articulated.

Admiral Keating, anything to add to that, sir?

Admiral KEATING. Congressman Ortiz, I would share your concern about the threat to our homeland from terrorists. We share that concern, and we are working across the spectrum with those capabilities in the Department of Defense, not just from a Navy perspective, though we are actively working with the Navy, the Coast Guard and Air Force in particular.

Their forces are integrated in the this overall system-of-systems that we have, that we think is doing an adequate job of addressing approaches to our homeland, whether they are air, land or maritime.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. My time is up. Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

It looks like Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Two of the happiest four-stars maybe in the world are sitting here. I know General Cartwright, because he is a Marine aviator on an Air Force base, and Admiral Keating, because he has taken a back-to-back hardship tour, moving from Colorado Springs to Honolulu.

Congratulations to you both, and to all of you.

I want to associate myself with the remarks and discussion about the interagency process. Admiral Keating and I have had discussions about this a number of times. And if I have the chance, I would like to get back to that.

But I would like to go to SOUTHCOM, if I could, for just a minute. And while we were gathering before the hearing, you were speaking in Spanish for a minute or two and sounded conversant, if not fluent. After sort of “buenos días” and “bienvenidos,” I tend to run out.

But the question is, your whole area of responsibility—well, absent Brazil and Belize and maybe one or two others—is Spanish-speaking. How are you staffed? What is the competency in Spanish of your staff right now?

Admiral Stavridis. It is one—

Mr. KLINE. Don’t even think about it.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Estudio estudiando espanol una hora cada dia, porque es muy importante por el jefe o commando sur.

I know Congressman Ortiz got that.

Mr. KLINE. I will ask for a translation from him later.
Admiral Stavridis. Okay. I said I am studying Spanish about an hour a day, because I think it is very important for the commander of U.S. Southern Command.

Of 450 million people, about 180 million speak Portuguese, which is similar to Spanish. The rest, largely, sir, you are correct, speak Spanish.

I think it is a crucial part of what we need to do. If we are going to be involved in this region, we must learn the languages.

These are not extremely difficult languages, as Japanese would be for a U.S. speaker, or Arabic or Pashto or Hindu. These are Romance languages. They are very similar to English in many ways.

What we are doing at U.S. Southern Command is, we have set a goal that 60 percent of the personnel assigned will speak a second language, one of the languages of the region. That is a stretch goal. It will be a challenge to achieve it.

We are putting resources behind that, everything from computer programs that people can self-learn, to having classes, to having testing of the——

Mr. Kline. Excuse me. Where do you think you are now toward this——

Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think I am at 40 percent, which is extremely high. DOD-wide, it might be 20 percent.

But at U.S. Southern Command, because we are lucky enough to be in the Miami area, a lot of people volunteer to come down who are of Hispanic descent. So, we have a rather high number of native Spanish speakers, which helps the rest of us as we seek to improve our facilities.

I believe, to learn another man’s language is to understand his life. I think it is an important aspect of integrating and acting in an area of operations. So, I am putting serious resources against it in this part of the world.

Mr. Kline. Thank you. I agree with you, and I applaud you for that effort.

I don’t know. I guess we are always looking for ways that we can help, so if you will stay in dialogue with us. I am a little reluctant to put something like that in a statute.

But, again, I commend you for that effort. And I am glad to hear it is moving that way.

Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.

And I would mention that the Department of Defense has recently increased the incentives for individuals in the armed forces to learn foreign languages broadly around the world, and that is very helpful. And that is being funded by the Congress, and we appreciate it greatly.

Mr. Kline. Right. Thank you very much.

Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kline. The light is still green. It will not be for much longer. But, Admiral Keating, we have had discussions on a couple of occasions in your offices and in mine about this interagency process. And you have been able to get quite a bit done. I mean, we talked about plans that you have on the shelf, and those involved inter-agencies.
One of my concerns is, this is personality-driven. If there is something that we can help with for process in institutionalizing it, we would like to be able to help.

If you have got any comments now, the light is about to turn red, but I would like to——

Admiral Keating. And nothing directly, Congressman. I do not know that a statutory imposition is a good idea.

But your active and abiding concern, which many of you have demonstrated by visits, not just in Northern Command, but throughout the United States and visiting folks like civil support teams that are national guard and active duty, and the embedded defense coordinating officers that are Title 10 folks with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.

As you course around the country and visit your constituents, I would recommend those locations to you.

Mr. Kline. Thank you.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Keating, I am doing my best to try and figure out just what it is, four and a half years later, that the Northern Command does. Who is in charge of what?

I have read through your testimony. I have gone through the staff preparation on mission and organization. It seems like a lot of words in here about homeland defense, referring to a concerted national effort to secure the homeland from threats and violence, as differentiated from homeland defense, referring to military protection of the United States, civil support areas, called C.S., in the area of homeland defense, with the DOD as the lead agency.

Are you or are you not in charge of civil support defense of the United States? And if you are, who is subordinate to you, and what is the reporting hierarchy?

Admiral Keating. I would answer the question, Congressman, that I am not in charge of civil support homeland defense. I am tasked by the secretary of defense and the President for defending the homeland and providing defense support to civil authorities.

And I think the words matter here and the distinction is important.

Mr. Abercrombie. I think so, too. I cannot figure out what you do. As far as I can tell, you have a group of people, approximately 500, because these budgets all disappear into joint task forces and all kinds of integrated team efforts. I cannot even find—I am doing my best to try and figure out where all your budget is.

What precisely do you do?

Admiral Keating. Defend our homeland and provide defense support to civil authorities.

Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Then what is your relationship to the Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard Bureau?

Admiral Keating. The relationship to the National Guard Bureau is informal.

As far as my dealings with General Steve Blum—who is a good friend; I talk to him frequently—he has, as you are aware, budg-
etary authority for the national guard and the international guard. And so, we work with him to advocate certain programs for him. But he has an $18-billion-a-year budget, and ours is $130 million. So, our impact on his budget is primarily through advocacy.

In terms of our relationship with the Department of Homeland Security, it is not a statutory relationship. It is one that is based upon a common goal of providing security and support for the citizens of the United States.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What does that mean? Aside from being good friends and aside from speaking to one another, what does it mean?

Admiral KEATING. It is a lot more than that, Congressman. It is exercising frequently. It is sharing plans. It is sharing officers and staff workers.

It is engaging in comprehensive activities across the broad range of our assignments and Department of Homeland Security’s requirements to ensure that we are not again attacked, and that in the event of a catastrophe, whether natural or manmade, we work, when we are directed by the President, to operate closely with the Department of Homeland security to mitigate suffering and save human lives.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. That is all very well and good.

The National Guard Commission report says that, after four and a half years, the Northern Command should develop plans for consequence management—whatever that is—and support the civilian authorities that account for state level activities and incorporate the use of national guard and reserve forces, as first military responders.

We have had four and a half years to plan that.

Admiral KEATING. The plans are done, Mr. Congressman. They are on the shelf.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. They were not done as of March 1, 2007, according to the National Guard Commission report.

Admiral KEATING. The report is in error, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, maybe we will need to get the National Guard Commission here, because Admiral Keating says that this commission report, which you have referred to, is in error.

The CHAIRMAN. The National Guard Commission will be testifying before this committee on this Friday, as a matter of fact.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You do have plans now for consequence management and support of civil authorities that account for state-level activities and incorporation of the national guard and reserve forces in a first responder military activity in response to an attack on the United States. They are in existence.

Admiral KEATING. They do exist and have for some time.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Then who is in charge?

Admiral KEATING. It depends on what the President decides, whether he gives it to the Department of Homeland Security or Department of Defense. By statute, it is the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, so you have Title 10 and you have Title 32.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, that is already established as to whether the governor calls up a national guard unit under state status for payment by the state or by the Federal Government. And you bring in the posse comitatus situation under Title 10. We already know that that is established.

I want to know who is in charge of these plans. Who executes them? Do you, or the national guard, or the individual states, or the Department of Homeland Security?

Admiral KEATING. It depends on the situation, the gravity of the consequence management challenge presented. And we are prepared to do it, if we are tasked. We in the Northern Command are prepared to execute that mission.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Or do you figure it out as you go along?

Admiral KEATING. It depends on the situation and it depends on who gets the assignment from the Department of Defense and the President of the United States.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have to examine very, very closely whether this needs to go on, or that this is just another proliferation of tail-chasing bureaucracy.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you, as always. Let me always express gratitude every time you come before a committee like this. Those of you who pay the price for human freedom, at least as we know it in America. I am very grateful to each one of you.

General Cartwright, I have had an opportunity to talk to you in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee a number of times. And I am glad you are on our side.

Let me first talk to you a little bit. It seems like most of the threats that this country has had in the past, just historically, for some reason, the trend has been that we never seem to recognize something before there is blood on the wall.

There was a time when the Nazis were just a bunch of guys in brown shirts riding across the bicycles in France, and they were no threat to anybody, except that they had a dangerous ideology that had the ability to take hold.

The Cold War began when we got one of our secrets lost in Los Alamos and the Russians kind of took it and ran with it.

In each case, we could have probably responded earlier and maybe prevented some of the great challenges that we had. And I think that these things sneak up on us a little bit.

But there is one thing in the distance that is not sneaking up on us, and that is the growing power and capability of China.

I do not think they are being very quiet. And I think there is a rumble in the distance there, and that we need to be very aware of what is occurring there.

Their ASAT test concerns me greatly. And obviously, I think it is important that the United States gain some superiority in space, as soon as possible, given the implications of that ASAT test.

With that in mind, do you think there is enough urgency in this Congress and in this country related to our missile defense capabilities in space, our capabilities to defend this country in general, in that growing frontier?
General CARTWRIGHT. Sir, I think, in regards to China, and in regards to the ASAT test, that we have set the conditions over the past five years to improve our situation awareness, to start to understand what is an appropriate defense in space, sensors and capabilities, and to understand that our responses to threats in space do not necessarily have to be directed or accomplished in space.

The question for me—and I think you have rightly described it—is, are we moving quickly enough to foster ourselves in this environment? Should we be doing something else to make ourselves ready?

And it is always difficult. I mean, the crystal ball is always better on Monday morning than it was on Friday before the game.

And so, we have moved aggressively to improve our space situation awareness. There is a substantial amount of organizational construct. And we talked a little bit here about—we have listened to some interagency discussion on how we change.

Many of those changes associated with space have been accomplished, and we are now in the process of executing those relationships, and starting to put them into beyond the personal, to actual directive, to connect the dots, so to speak, between the different agencies and their equities in space.

The second piece is, as you alluded to, where is China going in this activity and how are they approaching it versus how we are approaching it?

They have started to field what we call a continuum of capability, from the lowest end of capability all the way through the most sophisticated, and filling in all of the blocks en route.

And ASAT, a direct ASAT, a direct ascent ASAT, is something that is effective against low-earth orbit satellites. It does not reach out into highly elliptical or other types of orbits out to geostationary. But it can reach many of the valuable satellites that we have down in low-earth orbit.

Mr. FRANKS. General, forgive me. I hate to interrupt you, but I am almost out of time, and you did good, but I want to get this on the record, as well.

Related to some of the missiles that we have been testing, we have had seven out of eight attempts with the missile three successful, and the missile two, the block two-four, against short-range target missiles in May of 2006—all successful.

Isn’t it time—and help me understand why not—that these be placed on our Aegis ships, so that at least we have that capability, in case it should ever be needed?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. And we are doing a limited deployment, but you always run the risk of transitioning while you are still testing, of building too many, and then finding out that the configuration needs to be changed, and now you have got to go back and re-change.

We have built what we call a hedge—we are fielding that right now—sufficient missiles and ships that are matched in capability that can be deployed forward in extremis. And that is the hedge capability.

We are trying not to overbuild until we have a good understanding of what the end state ought to be and finish all of the testing.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sometimes the price of trying to aim ahead for some of these dangers is sounding a little bit overwrought before everyone else is. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The next gentleman is Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SnyDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schwartz, I wanted to ask you—this topic has come up before—this issue of the statutory language that we put in the defense bill, I think, last year and maybe some other years also, in which we essentially prohibit you all from retiring old C–5s, old C–130E models. I think there are some other planes. It has been difficult for me to understand why we do that. Would you discuss that issue? My guess is that members get concerned that, if a plane is retired it will mean that there will not be any replacement coming to a particular local base.

But what is the reality of that? How much money is it costing us? As somebody who has C–130Es with wing box problems in their district, I would just as soon they would be retired and we would try to replace them. I do not think they are doing anybody any good.

But what is your perspective on that?

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Snyder, in prior times when Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) was a major concern, these issues about holding on to old iron perhaps had greater relevance.

At the moment, we are in a situation where it is very challenging for the Air Force to manage the fleet in a way that optimizes their support of my mission.

In the case of the C–130’s, as you are aware, we have had difficulty retiring the old E models. And, as a matter of fact, those E models we have retired have to be maintained in recoverable status out in Arizona at the bone yard, if you will, which is a more expensive way to maintain the retired asset than if you simply retired it outright.

And so, my point as the operator on this—and, of course, the Air Force is the organize, train and equip entity—but that I recommend that you give the Air Force the flexibility to manage the fleets to best effect, to support the joint force mission.

And that means accessing old platforms and really making them go away, rather than remaining on the ramp, where the youngsters have to continue to maintain them.

A key point—the maintainers that support the airplanes are really the coin of the realm. And if we have to spread their talent over a larger population of air frames, some of which we cannot really fly—it is true in the KC–135 fleet and also in the 130 fleet—it is not the right way to run this operation.

Dr. Snyder. Do you need affirmative language from us in the defense bill? Or do you just need us not to put prohibitive language into the defense bill?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I think the latter is the approach, which would be not to have language which specifically affects certain aircraft——

Dr. Snyder. The KC–135s, the C–130s——
General SCHWARTZ [continuing]. Certain locations, and so on. That is correct.

Dr. SNYDER. Are those the——

General SCHWARTZ. And for that matter, C–5s.

Dr. SNYDER. Are those the three, the C–5s, the KC–145s and C–130Es?

General SCHWARTZ. On the lift side, that is correct, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. On another topic, would you make a comment about the mobility capability study?

There are some who have expressed concerns—I think the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is among them—that the study—I think maybe some people thought it was going to be a more far-reaching or revolutionary, or whatever word you want to use, that it seemed to endorse kind of a status quo look ahead.

Now, that may not be a fair statement. Sometimes you look ahead and there is not a revolution on the horizon.

But what are your thoughts about that?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the mobility capability study was not bold. I think that——

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry. What? I am sorry.

General SCHWARTZ. It was not bold.

Dr. SNYDER. It was not bold, okay.

General SCHWARTZ. In other words, the way it came out, for example, was, for big airplanes there was a range of 292 to 383, and this was a matter of how much risk you were willing to accept.

It would have been more satisfying, I think, to all of us, had the study given us an objective. For me, big airplanes, big cargo lift airplanes, roughly 300 airplanes is the right target. And that is what I would recommend to you as the target.

Studies inevitably are based on assumptions. And there are people—people can argue about whether the assumptions entailed with Mounted Combat System (MCS) was adequate.

I can tell you, sir, that our sense is that about 300 big airplanes, about 400 C–130-like airplanes. And it remains to be seen what the tanker fleet looks like, but probably somewhere in the 400 to 500 aircraft range.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

I do not mean to ignore the other gentlemen, but thank you all for being here.

Thank you, General Schwartz.

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Castor appears to be the last on the before-the-gavel list, unless someone comes back that was on it. Ms. Castor is recognized.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Admiral, when it comes to Southern Command and enhancing our national security, I strongly believe that, yes, we need to continue to work on the partnerships with the nations there, yes, militarily, but also economically and politically. And I thought I would give you a short list of a few, and ask you to comment upon them.

The Panama Canal right now is going through a widening and modernization. Could you comment on that, what you know about
the status and the safety and security of that very important asset moving forward?

Also, the struggles that we are having in Haiti. If you could comment briefly on Cuba, I would appreciate that. That could take much longer than five minutes.

And then also, the Southern Command’s medical readiness training exercises. When I think about, as we consider the markup and the resources that need to be spanned across the globe, I think it will be very important to enhance our national security, like I said, on the peacekeeping in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America.

Talk to me then—have you asked for enough on humanitarian and civic assistance, your New Horizons program?

And if we were able to target additional resources, where would you recommend?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you. And if I do not get through all that, I will get back to you taking the question for the record. But I think I can get through most of this quickly.

Panama Canal—I am a naval officer. In fact, I am a ship driver within the Navy. We do have pilots and submariners, but I drive ships.

I have driven ships through the Panama Canal, both when it was run by the United States of America and during the period of time now when it has been run by the Republic of Panama.

It is an excellent, safe, professionally run facility. And I am very, very impressed with the work the Panamanians have done in the canal. It is really the beating heart of the economy of the Americas, when you look at the flow through the canal. It is extremely important. And I think it is a very well-run facility.

We do an annual exercise with 20 different countries to look at the security of the Panama Canal. It is called Panamax. It looks at counterterrorism threats, which are always an issue. And it will be going on this June.

Haiti, I think, is at this moment in a stable place. It is the poorest and most impoverished country in the region, as I am sure you know.

The United Nations is there with about 6,600 peacekeepers. About half of those are provided from nations of the region. They are doing a very credible job building a base of stability from which, hopefully, prosperity can emerge.

I am traveling to Haiti, in fact, with your colleague, Congressman Meek, in April, and I am looking forward to the trip.

We do not have a large investment in terms of U.S. military presence. I would call it a success story by the United Nations in terms of what they are doing, and I look forward to learning more about it when I go down there personally.

Cuba is obviously in an interesting moment in its history. Fidel Castro’s health is a question mark. The degree to which his brother, Raul, has taken the reins of power is also under some question, given the health of Fidel. So, I think it is very difficult to make a prediction from this moment as to what will happen. We continue to watch the situation closely.

Medical readiness—we have a series of projects to which you alluded, and I thank you for doing so, called the New Horizons, which are training projects for U.S. military folks who go down into
countries in the region and provide services ranging from building a clinic to putting in a well to doing medical treatments.

They are very successful as a means of both exercising the military and of undertaking the kinds of strategic communication we are talking about here, about launching ideas into the region.

I will couple that with—the deployment of the Comfort this summer will be matched up with some of that. We treated, last year, 250,000 patients. We treated 80,000 animals. There is a veterinary part of this that goes with it. It is a very robust part of our program.

We have requested funds from the Congress for it, and I think they are adequate to our needs. And I solicit your support for them.

Thank you.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The next person is Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Cartwright, I would just like to make a remark, and ask you if you would be willing to work with me. I have got a question that is probably best answered off-line. It relates to Boost Phase Intercept.

I have noted the preponderance of our investment and activity and effort on mid-course and terminal intercept. And I had some folks from the Navy in the other day, and we were talking about boost phase. And it seems to me like we might be spending a little more time looking at boost phase, particularly from naval platforms.

I would like to sit with you someday and spend some time just discussing that phase of missile defense, if that is possible.

General CARTWRIGHT. I would be happy to do that, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. General Schwartz, thanks for being here this morning. I appreciate it very much.

I was first elected to Congress in 1984. It seems like a long time ago. And one of my great experiences was to go out to McGuire Air Force Base, which is in my district, and spend some time with the then–21st Air Force commander, Don Logeais.

And one of the activities that we did that day was to just ride along the flight line and look at the C–17s that were sitting out there—the CE–141s, excuse me—that were sitting out on the flight line.

And I think, if my memory serves me correctly, there were 62 birds that were assigned to McGuire at that time. And I remarked what a remarkable fleet it was. And General Logeais said—now, this was 1985—“They are wearing out.”

And we went and had lunch and he said, “There is one more thing I want to show you.” And we went around the corner to a little reception room. And there on the wall was an artist’s rendering of an airplane. It was a C–17, in 1985. And it would be six years until the next one, until the first operational model came off the line. It was actually in June. It was June 14, 1991, that it rolled off the line.

That was 16 years ago. And we did not know, when we started rolling them off the line, how many we were going to buy. First we said—I think the initial number was 100 or 115. And I think we
arrived at that number for budgetary reasons. And then we bought 15 more for special ops, because we thought we needed them. And then we said, “We are going to have to increase the size of the fleet,” and then we went to 180. Last year we bought 10 more and we went to 190.

And these birds, some of which are now 16 years old—I am going to use Don Logeais’s words—are going to wear out and are on the way to wearing out. For a whole bunch of reasons: We are flying them more than we thought we would. We have been at war more than we thought we would. We are increasing the size of the military that we carry with them, more than we thought we would. The activities—we are doing tactical lift with them in theater in Iraq. Never thought we would do that. The C–130’s wore out and made us do that.

So, this is not the first time you and I have had this conversation, and I always appreciate having this conversation. But I think it is important that we put on the record here today, what, if any, plans you have to expand the buy of C–17s, and what needs to be done in order for us to have the resources to do that.

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I would ask only that we not focus exclusively on the C–17.

Lift, on the air side, is a combination of platforms that are U.S. Government-owned and -operated—clearly, the C–5 and the C–17 principally.

And, as well, there is a significant commercial component that contributes to our ability to operate the Department of Defense’s transportation and distribution mission.

A quick example, when we deployed the first of the five plus-up brigades to Kuwait and Iraq over the holiday period, 29 of the 34 aircraft that supported that deployment were commercial. So, it is a significant piece of what we do.

And what we need to do, sir, is to have the right number of organic airplanes and the capability to maintain our commercial partners.

My belief is that, what we need is around 300 total, large-lift, modern and reliable aircraft.

Your point about airplanes getting tired is certainly valid. And you can compensate for that either through maintenance and repair of the aircraft or buying new.

In the end, this is a question about opportunity cost. And if we buy additional C–17s, the question is, what else might we not get, like a new tanker, which, as you know, I believe is a more pressing requirement than additional C–17s.

However, sir, if the collective wisdom is we need to continue to procure C–17s, what I would recommend is that you allow the department to adjust the fleet mix accordingly. That means to take down lesser utility aircraft, and that means C–5As. That is the trade space. And that is what I would recommend.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo, the gentlelady from Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.

Admiral Keating, first let me publicly welcome you to the Pacific area.

Admiral KEATING. Thank you.
Ms. BORDALLO. There are some exciting changes and challenging times ahead, particularly in my area, the Territory of Guam, and the Pacific Command. I welcomed your visit yesterday, and I do look forward to working with you in the years to come. Welcome.

General Schwartz, as the commander of Transportation Command, I respectfully request that you help provide the committee information on an issue of particular importance to my constituents; that is, military retirees who live on Guam who are referred off-island for specialty care and are forced to travel to those locations at their own expense.

Prior to 2005, however, the Department of Defense reimbursed retirees for the travel expenses they incurred as a result of such medical referrals, or retirees were able to move on MILAIR flights from Guam and Honolulu that flew on a regular basis.

But as a result of the loss of this MILAIR service and the change in policy and practice to no longer reimburse travel costs associated with referred specialty care, the costs are borne solely by the retiree. These trips to access referred specialty care in Hawaii or the state of California cost thousands of dollars.

I have raised this issue with the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, Dr. Winkenwerder, on a number of occasions, and did so most recently on March 8th. I am awaiting a response from the Pentagon about whether retirees on Guam, who had been referred off-island for specialty treatment, can currently travel on military aircraft on a space-available basis to receive that medical care.

The retirees on Guam deserve resolution brought to this matter. Insofar as TRANSCOM plays a role in the policy for Space-A travel, and in the scheduling of MILAIR traffic in the Pacific region, I respectfully ask that you examine this issue.

What I have proposed as an interim solution until we can adequately resolve the underlying transportation service and reimbursement issue, is that the department revise its policy to report our military retirees, who are medically referred away from Guam to receive specialty care, access to aircraft on a space-available basis.

I have proposed that retirees should qualify for Space-A travel at the category two priority level, and therefore, treated the same as authorized personnel on environmental morale leave status.

Can you comment?

General SCHWARTZ. Congresswoman, thank you for this input. This is a system issue that I was not aware of and one that I will certainly look into as you have requested.

Let me just give you a little bit of background, though. The retirees are entitled to Space-A travel, notwithstanding their medical condition. And that is category three priority.

We recognize that, because of the level of effort that is currently being devoted to Central Command, that, in the Pacific—and Admiral Keating will soon discover this—that the way we have compensated is by having commercial aircraft move cargo and people in the Pacific theater. That has limited space-available opportunities.
In order to compensate, ma'am, what we have tried to do—and we issued instructions to military aircraft in the Pacific, to maximize their Space-A capacity.

So, for example, where the tankers routinely did not carry Space-A passengers, KC–135s, they now will. And they have guidance to do so. That is part of the solution.

I will look at this question about the relative priority of retirees seeking specialty medical care, and I will get back to you, ma'am.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 148.]

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General, and I appreciate your response.

The Chairman. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Chairman, following up on some of the conversation earlier, I want to encourage the committee to look further into this interagency process issue.

I received, yesterday, a written report from one of my constituents who just got back from Iraq. And his belief is that this is one of our greatest deficiencies, is the inability of different agencies to effectively work together.

And I would hope that, even though it extends, of course, beyond this committee's jurisdiction, I would hope that we can at least explore some of the problems, which was mentioned earlier.

Let me try to get to two areas, briefly.

Admiral Stavridis, we vote every year on funding for our efforts in Colombia, with some people arguing that we are making no progress. Can I get your view as to how things are going there?

Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.

I think, when thinking about Colombia, it is important to decide where you are going to start measuring the progress. And I would argue, we should look probably in the 1997, 1998, 1999 timeframe, when Colombia was in really difficult straits. And there is a rich literature of the difficulties Colombians faced in those days.

If you come forward from about the year 2000, moving forward, let me give you a couple of metrics that I would say are strong indicators of progress.

One is that today, in 1,098 municipalities, there is a strong police presence all around Colombia. Another is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been diminished in its membership, probably by about 30 percent, from 18,000 to 12,000.

Additionally, one of the three insurgent groups of those days, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), has been demobilized through a negotiated settlement with the government. Kidnappings are down 76 percent. Murders are down about 50 percent.

The current president, President Uribe, enjoys very high, positive ratings in public polls by internationally recognized firms, well above 75 percent. Conversely, the FARC's approval rating is below 10 percent. I think those are metrics.

Atmospherically, in my own travels in Colombia, I find you can move about far more freely than you could five or six years ago. My sense is, Colombia is far from perfect.
They continue to strive to improve their human rights record. They are dealing now with a political problem associated with folks who perhaps had interactions with some of the right wing insurgent groups.

But they are dealing with those in a mature, sensible way, the way a strong democracy does. It looks at a potentially difficult situation, and it goes to the courts and it resolves them.

So, my sense is, Colombia is a nation on the move and they are doing well. And we should be proud of the efforts of the United States in that country, including the finances that were provided by the Congress, and the work of the very small number of U.S. military folks, less than 500, who have been in the country over that period of time.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

General Cartwright, there is a press report today that the British have foiled an al Qaeda plot to take down the internet in Britain. You have been quoted in some trade press as not being satisfied, shall we say, with our country’s approach to defending cyberspace.

Can you elaborate a little more on what your concerns are and issues that you think we need to pay particular attention to in cyberspace?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think, first, I am never satisfied, and I am always paranoid.

To me, where we need to improve, one, we have taken effort, both in the Department of Defense over on the director of national intelligence and homeland security, to start to integrate offense and defense, so that the defenders have the capability to protect themselves, so to speak.

Second is to start to layer this capability, like we would any other defensive plan, both in the cyberspace in defending the terminals, defending the backbone, defending the switches—all of those things that are components of the internet, in this case—and start to do that in a way that is consistent with the way we defend the rest of our capabilities, onshore and expanding offshore, to be able to understand what is out there and what might be coming toward us.

The key to doing that, and the challenge in this environment is that—let’s take as an example Baghdad and a virus, say, that was launched from that part of the world toward someplace in the United States. Even if it takes the long route from Baghdad to geosynchronous orbit and back down to Chicago, it is only about 300 milliseconds.

This is a very, very tight timeline to be able to assess the threat, figure out what the appropriate response is, take that action and have it be effective, before the threat reaches us. That means a tight command and control between the interagency process, all of those who would have equity—and the commercial sector—to be able to do this for the country.

Understanding how to do that, understanding how not to disrupt freedom of speech—because a lot of things travel across these internet pipelines—understand what is a threat and what is not a threat, in those timelines, are the technologies we need to start to understand and acquire, and are also the factors we need to start to understand in statute.
Do we have this right? Can we apply the appropriate authorities to a fight that occurs that quickly and does not have a lot of respect for geographical boundaries?

Those are the challenges we are trying to understand, and that is where my frustration is, trying to get the technology, understand the fight that occurs in milliseconds, and understand how to apply the appropriate authorities to that fight so we do not abrogate freedom of speech and other things.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning, and thanks for your service.

I want to start out with Admiral Keating. First of all, thank you for the things you have done at NORTHCOM.

And as you prepare to leave, I would like you to comment on three things. First of all, the work that you have done with the Canadian government to monitor our northern border, the work that has been done with Mexico and our southern border. And if you could contrast those, I would appreciate it.

And then third, if you can address the progress that we have made with former Joint Task Force (JTF)-6, now JTF-North, and its ability to expand its agenda, not just in support of all law enforcement agencies, but in its ability to expand from narcotics and immigration into terrorism, antiterrorism issues, as well.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir, I will do my best. And if I could wrap all three by starting with Joint Task Force North, Congressman.

Mr. REYES. Okay. All right.

Admiral KEATING. From your district, of course, Brigadier General Tony Ierardi is now the commander, about 150 folks in his headquarters. But I would recommend to you that their impact is much greater than their relatively small size.

Examples: They have conducted many operations in the past two and a half years I have been fortunate to be at Northern Command, that are broad, interagency efforts. Relatively small, very small Title 10 or even reserve and guard inclusion—or rather, the forces are included—in these comprehensive efforts. In San Diego and the Pacific Northwest, down off the coast of Brownsville and one in southern Florida are the four most recent.

And in each case it was interagency representation, Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Patrol, integrations in customs, active, reserve and guard forces—using active and guard forces that were training for missions overseas, integrating those capabilities into this broad network of border protection activity.

And in each case, we satisfied several intelligence priority objectives. Are there terrorists trying to get into the country? We did not capture any. And we continue to think that, while they may have plans to get in, they are not executing those plans.

There is no known nexus between narcotraffickers and terrorists. We do continue, in support of the Coast Guard, principally, to find a significant flow of narcotics out of Jim’s AOR into ours, primarily.

And it is not just from south to north—this addresses your Canadian border interest—there is significant traffic from north to south.
So, Joint Task Force North working both the southern and northern borders—all domains, not just land domain—to increase the security of our borders.

We are working with Canada. They now have, as you are aware Canada Command, CANCOM, which is rather a counterpart to Northern Command.

It is a newer combat organization, but they are our Northern Command counterpart, if you will, north of the border. And we have extensive liaison with them. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant General Dumais, is a good friend, and they are standing up their command.

We are increasingly active on our southern border with the new leaders there, and my relief, General Renuart, will visit them within the next month.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Reyes. I really did not get my five minutes. That red light stayed on from the time that I was—could I ask for a ruling from the chair?

The CHAIRMAN. If your feelings are hurt, you may go ahead and ask one more question. [Laughter.]

Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, my time is coming up. I would be happy to let Mr. Reyes have a minute or two of my precious time.

Mr. Reyes. Thank you.

Mr. Hunter. But he will really owe.

Mr. Reyes. Actually, I just wanted to thank Admiral Keating and wish him well in his new position, as well.

And then just finish up by asking Admiral Stavridis to address the issue, because there is a lot of interest in Congress about the allegations of corruption in the Colombian government.

Can you give us your perspective specifically? I know you referred to it as a political problem, but I am concerned that that may become a bigger issue here in Congress, in spite of all the progress that you cited in Colombia.

So, if you can just address that, I would appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis. Certainly, sir.

I am not an expert on that. I think your question would best be addressed to our American ambassador there, who is an extremely capable person, Ambassador Bill Wood.

From my perspective in the military-to-military contacts I have, what I sense is a willingness in the country to grapple with the issue. It is not being swept under the rug. It is being covered on the front pages of the newspaper.

People have been indicted. They are pursuing it vigorously, as best I can tell, looking at it. They are looking it in the eye.

And I would look at that as a sign of progress in the country, although certainly it is unfortunate, if the allegations are true.

And again, I would close by suggesting you would get a richer understanding of the situation from our State Department counterparts who are actually in the country on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. Reyes. Has that hampered our abilities to work with the Colombian government, in terms of our operations under Plan Colombia in any way?

Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, it has not.
Mr. REYES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis—and I mispronounced that. I very much——
Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, you are good, sir.
Mr. JONES. Well, you know, when you have got a name like
Jones, it just makes everything else more difficult——
Admiral STAVRIDIS. I am thinking about changing my name to
Jones. We will see. [Laughter.]
Mr. JONES. No, I am going to practice, so next time it will not
be a problem.
Admiral STAVRIDIS. That is fine, sir.
Mr. JONES. Admiral, the reason—I want to ask you, with the re-
sponsibility—and, of course, you said you had been there five or six
months, and maybe Admiral Keating or someone else can assist
with this.
I had the opportunity to meet with a gentleman—and I do not
want to talk too much about this—who is now an American citizen,
that helped our Federal Government in a way that he would qual-
ify for special citizenship, and I will leave it at that—but he is from
Honduras.
And he brought to my attention that, in certain countries under
your command, that there seems to be a migration of Arabs moving
in—and I am not talking about terrorists, but I am talking about
Arabs who are coming into the population, starting businesses and
becoming a part of the community.
Are you seeing in any of these countries, or your staff, where
there are a fair number of Arabs moving from other countries into
some of these Central American countries for the purpose, not of
terrorism—I want to make that clear—but to become part of the
society?
Admiral STAVRIDIS. There are concentrations of Arab popu-
lations, as well as Islamic populations, throughout Latin America
and the Caribbean, sir.
Numbers are hard to define, as they always are, and nailing
down either religious or ethnic, particular, specific numbers in
many countries. But the numbers I have seen are in the range of
three million to six million Islamic. And of that, a significant popu-
lation traces their roots to the Arab world. The total population in
the region is about 450 million, so you are probably in the 1 per-
cent range.
The areas in which there are some concentrations, I think most
well-known is the so-called tri-border area, which is the point in
southern South America where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay
come together. In that region, there is a fairly robust Lebanese
population.
There are additionally some significant pockets in southern
Brazil in a couple of their larger cities, particularly Sao Paulo. And
on the northern coast of South America, there are some additional
pockets. Again, you are in the one percent range.
As is always the case, my assessment would be, the vast majority
of those people are living in peace and are attempting to integrate
themselves into the societies and in the country.
However, we are concerned in some of those populations that there are indications of Hezbollah financing, recruiting, and proselytizing. Our intelligence folks are working closely with their counterparts in those countries as part of the global effort against the war on terrorism.

Mr. Jones. Well, the gentleman that I am making reference to suggested that I get the book, I think the title is *The Dove and Abdullah*. And his concern—of course, he is now an American citizen—was that many of those people, as you said yourself, Admiral, are coming there with true purposes, the right purposes. But there could be those who have relationships, or want to see relationships that you made mention to, develop.

And I have thought for a long time about that, as a Member of Congress, and nothing I can really do about it but speak out and show interest. But I have felt for too long that this nation has not paid the right attention that it needed to with Central and South America, really from an economic standpoint, that if we cannot help the natives of those countries, then they are going to look elsewhere. And that could really present a serious security problem for us.

So, thank you very much for your answer.

Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Jones.

Mr. Sestak.

Mr. Sestak. Generals, Admirals.

General, if I could ask you a couple of questions on the Reliable Replacement Warhead for the Conventional Trident Missile, the ballistic missile conventional.

General, how will a foreign nation discriminate between a nuclear and a conventional ballistic missile coming from the center of the ocean? Russia, China—by the time we have it out there, 2013—potentially Iran, India.

General Cartwright. The ambiguity issue is one that we have talked a lot about.

We, today, have treaty and protocol activities associated with contacts. So, if we are testing or we are doing some sort of a——

Mr. Sestak. Yes, sir. But this is a sudden crisis, one hour.

General Cartwright. Understand. But these are in place for our exercises, and whatnot, and have been in place for a lot of years.

We have done about 470 Trident launches with these protocols in place, where we exchange information—principally with the Russians today, trying to expand that out to the Chinese.

What we are trying to establish for operational activities is what is called the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is set up right now with Russia, so that we share real-time information——

Mr. Sestak. So, in a real crisis—General, if you don’t mind—in a real crisis, you would actually let them know that within an hour you are going to launch?

General Cartwright. That is the——

Mr. Sestak. So, you would let Russia and China know that.

General Cartwright. That is the intent today.

Mr. Sestak. India? Iran?
General CARTWRIGHT. We are working to expand that out. But the initial effort over the past year is to codify this with the Russians.

Mr. SESTAK. Well, how do you feel about China and Russia developing the same capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. To me, to start to reduce the numbers of weapons of mass destruction is a positive attribute. To the extent that we can replace them and get the attributes we need in an offensive system with something other than a mass destruction, that is a positive vector.

The question is second-and third-order effects, and being able to understand what those might be. Ambiguity—

Mr. SESTAK. So, but what do you feel about China and Russia developing one?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think that they are—

Mr. SESTAK. Is that a good thing?

General CARTWRIGHT. I would certainly encourage—

Mr. SESTAK. A conventional ballistic missile from their submarines.

General CARTWRIGHT. From their submarines, from their silos—

Mr. SESTAK. And they would warn us an hour before they would launch it, so we would know it would not be a nuclear one.

General CARTWRIGHT. Again, there are multiple activities going on here. Overflight, is it anywhere near your country, et cetera. But, yes, to reduce that ambiguity to the maximum extent practicable—

Mr. SESTAK. General, what are two scenarios you can see us using this in?

General CARTWRIGHT. Two scenarios that would come to mind are targets that are deep. Let us take as an example the recent ASAT test.

If the target is deep and you want to go in there and ensure there cannot be a second launch, then having a conventional capability against something that was launched that was conventional in nature, as the ASAT is, that seems to me to be an appropriate target to defend our interests in space.

Another is a fleeting target, in which the timelines are short, whether they be short-range or medium-range ballistic missiles or a terrorist camp, where you have an offensive action that is already under way, and you are trying to be appropriate in maintaining control over escalation and drive this away from a weapon of mass destruction. That would be another scenario where this one might be appropriate—

Mr. SESTAK. What is the end-to-end architecture needed in order to be able to use something within one hour of detection and launch?

General CARTWRIGHT. We look at three key pieces, the command and control, to be able to make the decisions and do the planning in those timelines. The second is the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), to connect what we call the fixed piece, and then find, fix, and then finish.

So, you need the missile and the warhead, in this case in the submarine. You need an ISR capability that connects the dots and
provides the right location of the target. And then you need the command and control to——

Mr. Sestak. What is the commensurate timeframe you think we would be able to have this? And even if you have an idea of the costs?

General Cartwright. The easier targets are the ones that are fixed in known locations. That helps you a lot.

The harder targets are the mobile targets, those that are hidden. The harder the target, the longer today. But today, the command and control, we believe is in place.

The ISR needs to be integrated better, and we are working on that. And that is not terribly expensive. It is more about connecting the right dots.

Mr. Sestak. But the satellite system, does this require transformational satellite (TSAT) and——

General Cartwright. No. No. We have in place both the air, the space and the terrestrial capabilities to move this information in that timeline.

Mr. Sestak. But actually to see a fleeting target in one hour that you have been hunting for, and then strike it within that hour?

General Cartwright. Again, the easier——

Mr. Sestak. This with space-based radar——

General Cartwright. You see, your timelines are associated with the fixed targets. The more challenging are the mobile targets. They may take longer than an hour. It just depends on if it is in some place you knew about, or you are going someplace you had no idea, and you get down to mensuration, and things like that.

Mr. Sestak. So, you are comfortable that the word from the Chinese and the Russians, that that is not a nuclear weapon, is what we will rely upon.

General Cartwright. We are on a path to ensure that that is the case and to reduce the ambiguity to the maximum extent practical.

Mr. Sestak. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis, in your written testimony, you included background information pertaining to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, WHINSEC, and briefly discussed its mission.

I have got a number of questions that I want to ask you in regard to that.

Can you elaborate for the members of this committee on this program and what it is achieving? Is it effective in promoting relations with other nations? Is it succeeding in its mission to spread democracy while preventing human rights abuses?

And I ask these questions, Admiral, because I know—I am sure you know—that there are members of this House of Representatives, and, indeed, maybe even members of this committee, who would want to cut off funding for WHINSEC.

And I, as a member of the Board of Visitors, representing this committee on the minority side, formerly on the majority side, am very concerned.
And I want to also ask you specifically, as commander of the United States Southern Command, do you believe we should fund this institute? And what would be the consequences of actually cutting the funding to WHINSEC?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you very much, sir. I am going to ask Admiral Keating to also comment, because Mexico is part of the equation, I believe, in answering this question correctly.

The Western Hemisphere Institute is a superb, superb operation. Now, it does not work for me. I am on the Board of Visitors, sir, as you are, as is Senator Levin, representing the majority side. So, I think there is a balanced representation on the Board of Visitors.

And I believe all of us on the Board of Visitors who have actually spent time would attest to the fact that this 200-person faculty, which is drawn from nations all around the region, in addition to U.S. military personnel, has a curriculum.

It is taught in Spanish. We talked earlier about the importance of languages here. A subset is taught in Portuguese for our Brazilian counterparts.

We put well over 1,000 students through the school in any given year. And we create an opportunity for a real generation of mid-grade officers to come to the United States, study and learn about our military, and do it in their own language, while having the opportunity to interact with our citizens here.

They then go back to their countries, and they go on to positions of senior leadership. The institute is one of the strongest methodologies we have to connect us with the nations of this region.

I want to specifically mention, it is, without question, the crown jewel for the study of human rights and how a military ought to respect human rights. It is fundamental to the curriculum.

Every student who comes gets between 20 and 50 hours of instruction in human rights and I believe leaves the institute with a rock-solid basis to go back to their own military and inculcate that view of the importance of human rights in a military.

So, I believe it is an exemplary institution. Again, it does not work for me, so I am not blowing my own horn here. I am observing another command’s institute. It is part of the U.S. Army, and I believe it is superbly run and vitally important.

Dr. GINGREY. Admiral Keating, would you care to comment, as well?

Admiral KEATING. And, Doctor, I will try and be brief.

Because of our increasingly robust theater security cooperation efforts with Mexico, we, too, place high importance on the institute’s progress. And we welcome them twice a year, I believe. If that is not right, I will get back to you.

As part of their course, their curriculum, they come to Northern Command and we spend about a day, a day-and-a-half with them. So, we share the same opinion as the commander of Southern Command.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, in just the few seconds that I have got left, I just want to say for the record that, of course, I have been to the WHINSEC facility on several occasions, and I certainly can attest to the value of the program. And I appreciate the admirals sharing that with us.
WHINSEC is succeeding in its mission to provide professional education and training to military personnel. Actually, in addition to them, law enforcement officials, civilians that support the democratic principles of the charter of the Organization of American States.

So, I am gravely concerned about any movement toward defunding such a great program, and I certainly appreciate the testimony of Admiral Keating and Admiral Stavridis, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis. Sir, may I just add, sir, that I would encourage any congressman who has any doubt to come and visit the institute.

Dr. Gingrey. Well, Admiral, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I was going to suggest the very same thing. I think it would be a great CODEL for the members of this committee in a bipartisan way to go down to Columbus, Georgia, the home of the infantry, a great part of my state, formerly in my district. And I think it would be—you know, what you see with your eyes is worth 1,000 words. And I think that is exactly what we ought to do.

And I thank you, Admiral, for that suggestion.

The Chairman. I associate my thoughts with the gentleman from Georgia. I am familiar with the institute quite well, and actually, its predecessor, which I had the occasion to visit when I was sitting down on the front row of this committee.

So, thank you for your thoughts on that.

Last but not least, the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, I have another question I would like to ask.

General Cartwright, you have got this missile defense responsibility, at least in terminal phase. And the combatant commands are arranged mostly geographically, with areas of responsibility that an incoming missile is going to transit fairly rapidly.

Just generally speaking, really two questions: What are your thoughts on how effectively we are organizing to be able to handle the transit of a single missile over several areas of responsibility?

And second, what is your personal take on how effectively and efficiently we are developing our missile defenses? Just your general, personal take on how things are going.

General Cartwright. The first is the command and control question. Just using the example of the activities in July with North Korea, you are spanning about nine time zones and you have at least four different combatant commanders with equities in the activity, not the least of which is probably the target in Northern Command.

And so, how we work this activity, because the sensors may live, so to speak, in different AORs. They may not even belong to the Department of Defense. They may not belong to the United States.
And so, we have to work this in a way that is very cross-compartment in ways that we have never had to integrate systems before. And that has been a challenge.

I have to say, though, that the technology has moved us in a direction to solve most of those challenges and to ensure that the visibility is out there for each combatant commander that has equity. They can see what is happening. They can know immediately what their equities are, whether it is consequence management, whether it is part of the fire control solution, whether it is notification that something is going to fly over someone’s territory.

So, the technology has helped us move in the right direction. I think that we are moving in a direction that says that, if you have an equity in this, you need to be able to have a voice.

You need to be able to see what is happening and make that transparent, and then be able to register any concerns that you might have with an intercept that is occurring, even though the decision timelines are down in the four- to six-minute timeline.

That system is starting to emerge. We run it daily in exercise, to start to train to this.

The most difficult challenge is, most of the time we try to do this by voice, when we get the senior leadership together. Voice tends to be a very slow way to get discovery of situation awareness and make a decision. We have got to do that part of it better. We are exercising that now.

The secretary of defense has put in place an exercise program that will start to move us more to a data picture, so you can see very quickly what the situation is that everybody shares. And when we get that, I think we will be in better stand. That is the first piece of the question.

How is the system moving? To me, the credibility, the deterrent value has gone up significantly since the activities associated with the 4th of July and North Korea.

There is no doubt in our mind, and clearly in the minds of our allies, that there is value in missile defense. It offers you an alternative to an offensive-only strategy, for many countries. That is point one.

Point two is, I think we have to start focusing on our deployed forces and our allies, and allowing them to plug into this system and develop for them what they believe are the attributes of a defensive system, whether it is the Israelis and the aero system, or the Brits—or whoever needs this.

That is the direction we have to start to move.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I might just ask, with my remaining time, if any of our witnesses have anything that they have not talked about that is on their mind, as we conclude this hearing.

Gentlemen, any parting shots you would like to give the committee here?

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Hunter, if I may, quickly, I do have one concern. And that relates to an issue under consideration by the House related to the Armenian genocide in the early 1900s.

The resolution, I am told, will come to the floor either later this month or in the very early part of April.
I just want to alert the members that that resolution may trigger a reaction from the Turkish government, which would limit our access at Incirlik Air Base, which we operate there.

That cargo hub moves almost 75 percent of the cargo we send to Iraq, and last year was 55,000 tons.

And so, I just wish to alert the members that an unintended consequence of that resolution could be to make our job much harder to support the troops downrange.

Thank you, sir, for that opportunity.

Admiral Stavridis. If I could, sir, I would simply encourage the committee and the members of the committee to come travel in the region. There is no substitute for personal contact, personal knowledge.

Senator Nelson came down recently, Senator Reid, over on the Senate side. I am going, I believe, with Representative Meek down to Haiti in a few weeks. I would really welcome the opportunity to see the members come travel in this important part of the world.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Before I call Mr. Meek, General Schwartz, my recollection is that the French assembly—correct me if I am wrong—the French assembly passed a resolution regarding the 1915 genocide occurrence. And as a result thereof, Turkey cut off all military connection, as well as the contracts with France.

Am I correct?

General Schwartz. Sir, not all military-to-military relationships. For example, the NATO relationships, as I understand it, remain intact. But those commercial interfaces certainly were cut off.

As I understand it, the Office of Defense Cooperation that France has in Ankara closed. In addition, the blanket overflight clearance, which Turkey had allowed France to exercise, was also terminated. And for us, the overflight clearance issue would be a significant matter.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. Meek.

Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I must say that, you note that I am a little delayed here today, but I did get here in time.

I have, Mr. Chairman, the congressman-to-be with me. He is on spring break this week, so we are working together here in the Capitol—my son.

Generals, Admirals, I am glad that you all have come before us today.

And I think the question on the resolution, General, that you just outlined, that is the kind of information we need to know here in Congress.

And, Admiral, as you know, we are going to go down to Haiti in a couple of weeks. And I guess I wanted to ask you a question, because we have two free trade agreements, I believe, that is in your area, that is being considered before Congress.

Have you heard anything from your counterparts on the other side, on the military's part? Is State working with you?

Because I know, down in your command, basically, the Southern Command has been our attache, our State Department—everything. And I know that we are trying to refocus down there with
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and a number of other agreements, but we have two that are pending.

Have you heard anything?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you for the question, sir. I have, indeed.

As I travel and talk to my interlocutors in the military-to-military venue, there is strong support, as they perceive it, as a matter of security, to have that kind of agreement with the United States. And they often refer, as you just alluded to, sir, to the Central American Free Trade Agreement, which the Congress passed, and has been of significant benefit in Central America in strengthening our relations there.

So, as always, the lead on those kinds of things is with the State Department, with the Department of Commerce, and so forth. But from a security perspective, what I hear from my counterparts is support for that.

Mr. MEEK. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, and I must say that you and the ranking member now, Mr. Duncan, have been supportive of not only my movements in Haiti, but also then very successful within the mark, to be charitable, not only to the Southern Command, but also to our mission.

As you know, in the last 10 years we have—or last 15 years—we have had to go down twice to bring about peace in Haiti. Now, more than ever, we have the opportunity, not only through the U.N. and the United Nation Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and other countries like Canada and others that are contributing in Haiti, may very well assist us in securing the kind of democracy that we need in Haiti.

And I would encourage, just like the admiral did, members of the House and of the Senate to travel to Haiti and travel in the Southern Command region.

Admiral, one other question as it relates to the trip, as it pertains to Cite Soleil, I know that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has a presence there. As it relates to the future and security, I know that taking down Cite Soleil—and MINUSTAH took out the gangs—but long-term security, Haiti so many times has been like a roller coaster. It is secured and it is non-secured.

And because of the drug activity that is taking place, the gang activity—for most, thuggery—what kind of plans do you feel long-term that we can put in place so that we do not have to continue to give our military assets to a country that really should not need it, because the Haitian people are peaceful people?

And also, as a mission to stop Haitians from taking to sea, and that usually gets the attention of not only the United States, but the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and other islands?

Long term where are we? We know we made a $20 million investment recently, but where are we as it relates to long-term plans?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thanks for the question, Congressman.

First of all, I want to really applaud the excellence of the United Nations mission there, which is doing a fine job. As you know, there are 6,600 peacekeepers on the ground, about half of them
coming from the region. So, this is very much a regional effort in security.

And I think the first and best thing we can do, we the United States, is to encourage that kind of a regional solution in Haiti, to continue to ask the nations that are contributing peacekeepers, people like Brazil and Argentina and Colombia and Chile and Uruguay, to go the next step and to be participants in economic efforts in the country of Haiti.

Second, in terms of the narcotics, I think that is absolutely correct. That is a growing concern, and we need to—we the United States government, through interagency means—need to bring partnership and capability to our friends in Haiti, so they can rid themselves of this drug scourge, and so it does not undermine this very fragile democracy in Haiti.

So, regionalism, interagency approaches, I think are the way to go here, and a continued judicious approach with the use of U.S. aid, which, of course, is not my purview. And, of course, you will be hearing testimony from Department of State representatives there.

For our purposes we have, at U.S. Southern Command, we have a military group commander there who is very helpful in working with the Haitian military, and you and I will have a chance to get a briefing from him on this subject when we go down.

Overall I am hopeful about Haiti. I think it could be an example of where regionalism and interagency efforts, which we have talked about this morning, could really solve a real problem in our hemisphere.

Mr. Meek. Well, thank you so very much, Admiral.
I want to thank also the generals for being here.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to ask the questions.

And I just would want to say to both of you publicly, I appreciate your support, not only for the Southern Command, but also the support that you have given me as a member of this committee, to go down on behalf of the committee and learn more about our activities under our jurisdiction there in Haiti, so thank you.

The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Florida. It is always good to welcome members of families, so they can see their parents hard at work.

And, Kendrick Meek, Jr., we welcome you, sir. Glad to have you in the audience. Thank you very much.

Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Keating, by the time you get to the Pacific Command, you may be thinking that this will be a relief for you.

Are you a member, I mean, institutionally, of the Homeland Security Council?

Admiral Keating. No, sir.

Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. That is unfortunate.

I am making reference here to the Joint Force headquarters, the National Capital Region at Fort McNair, because that deals with incident management in terms of homeland defense. And then the Joint Task Force Civil Support at Fort Monroe in Virginia.
The reason I mention that is that, that has, at least in my information, command and control responsibilities with regard to catastrophic events, including nuclear or high-yield explosive events.

The reason I bring that up is that, there is a story today—and I bring it to your attention not expecting you to necessarily have it in front of you, because it is so recent—a story today in The Washington Post concerning a government report provided by the Homeland Security Council and the Energy Department, with regard to the lack of definitive plans for a situation in which you might have a nuclear attack or a terrorist attack using the so-called dirty bombs radiological attack.

Northern Command, again, I will not get into an argument or a colloquy about what control and command means, or what coordination means, and so on.

But I am bringing it to your attention, because what the contention is, is that the government lacks rules and standards for sending out first responders in radiated areas to save people or warn them of approaching fallout, even including standards for firefighters, et cetera.

Now, it would seem to me, at a minimum, that this is the kind of coordination, should it exist, that needs to take place.

Now, if this is, in fact, so, or if this is the contention, can you state with any certainty that, as a result of your various exercises and planning sessions and so, that this report would also be inaccurate?

Admiral Keating. Congressman, we conducted an exercise in the fall, we in Northern Command and Department of Homeland—

Mr. Abercrombie. Excuse me. I should have said parenthetically, they made specific reference to Washington, D.C. That is why I cited the two, the Fort Monroe and Fort McNair.

Admiral Keating. So, as a little bit of preamble, we conducted an exercise in the fall—not just Northern Command, but a broad interagency effort, including the Department of Homeland Security and the Michigan National Guard in which, during the exercise scenario, a radiological dispersal device, a dirty bomb was detonated in Detroit, Michigan, and fallout went across the river into Canada.

So, we did not just——

Mr. Abercrombie. I am familiar with that.

Admiral Keating. So we had international implication, as well as significant national implication.

Major General Bruce Davis, National Guard office, deployed from Joint Task Force Civil Support Headquarters, with the lead element of his assessment team—that is what Joint Task Force Civil Support does—to the area.

They physically went to Detroit, integrated with state and local responders and Department of Homeland Security officials to assess the damage, figuratively, and begin to provide the command and control and collaboration and coordination that you describe, in a simulated event with real-world folks moving around. So, we exercise to that scenario, Congressman.

Joint Task Force National Capital Region, and one of our subordinate commands, tasked with a broader set of requirements for addressing defending—the many aspects of defending the National
Capital Region, including the integrated defense system of the missiles that ring the National Capital Region.

So, with those two examples for JTF Civil Support and JTF National Capital Region, I am satisfied that I can report to you that we have plans on the shelf for responding to disasters—natural or manmade—up through and including nuclear disasters, on a combatant commander level.

Mr. Abercrombie. Would it be fair to say, then, that this report—and these, by the way, are at least two years old. And my guess, my estimation is that it is probably at least two years.

Since the time these reports were done, or these observations were made, would it be fair to say that your contention is that that issue, or those issues raised in that report, as I outlined them to you, have been taken into account and you are trying to exercise or make plans to be able to address the kinds of situations that I raised for you?

Admiral Keating. Precisely.

Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Let us leave it at that.

I commend that to your attention, particularly the one from the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, of the Energy Department.

Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Abercrombie. And we will take it from there. Thank you very much.

I have some questions also for, Mr. Chairman, for TRANSCOM, which I would like to submit for the record to get an answer.

The Chairman. Without objection.

Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Abercrombie. I wish you good fortune and aloha, Admiral, as you head to Honolulu.

Admiral Keating. Looking forward to it, Congressman.

The Chairman. The good news is you inherit Mr. Abercrombie.

[Laughter.]

Admiral Keating. Can’t wait.

The Chairman. You will love it.

Mr. Abercrombie. You are used to dealing with challenges, right?

The Chairman. He is great to work with, Admiral.

Admiral Stavridis, I understand that the Afghan National Interdiction Unit is attending an 18-week jungle commando course in Colombia. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral Stavridis. I do not have the details on that. I will be happy to get them and give them to you for the record, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 147.]

The Chairman. Would you do that, please?

Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. The military is always trying to apply lessons learned. At least that is part of nearly every briefing we receive. Admiral Keating, lessons learned from Katrina. What did you learn, positive, negative?

Admiral Keating. Some of both, Mr. Chairman. And we are working very hard to differentiate between lessons observed and
lessons learned. All kinds of folks have long lists of should-have, would-have, could-have.

Throughout the agencies where we spend our time—principally FEMA, DHS and DOD—we are working hard to take lessons observed and make sure they are lessons learned, and hopefully not mistakes repeated.

Examples would include communication. We have, since Katrina, contracted for—through your direct help, you will recall—and obtain funding for three separate cell phone farms, if you will, so if the infrastructure is wiped slick, let’s say, in Congressman Taylor’s region of Gulfport, Mississippi, we airlift or through air, land or water, media.

We will get the cell phone farms where we put up a tower, we fire up a generator and we pass out hundreds and hundreds of cell phones—don’t care who gets them—and satellite phones.

DHS has a dozen-plus of those same systems. National Guard has a dozen-plus. So, where there were none, there are now upwards of 30, I think is the number, but it is between 20 and 30 of these entirely self-sufficient organic cell phone farms.

We have defense coordinating officers embedded full-time, active duty colonels, who are trained in the art of disaster response, who are embedded in each of the FEMA regions.

We have provided our planning expertise—and I use that term advisedly. You will appreciate it better than most, perhaps, because we in the military have this planning culture, because we have had the opportunity to capitalize on the educational reform that you have provided for us.

We have provided planners to FEMA, to the Department of Homeland Security. And we have full-time representatives in FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, and they have full-time representatives in our headquarters.

So, we have taken the larger strategic issues and tried to rectify those, and we are down even in the tactical level for ability to communicate. And we do not care, it is not just guard or reserve or active forces. Whoever needs a cell phone, we will pass it out until such time as the commercial infrastructure can re-support.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you might find it of interest, Admiral, that in Missouri National Guard, particularly the unit in Jefferson City at the headquarters there, is training in the communication challenge that we might have, should there be another New Madrid Fault earthquake, which last happened in 1811, which caused the Mississippi River to flow backward. And it evidently was a local disaster all along the Mississippi River Valley.

I jokingly told a Missouri guardsman that they are training in this communication operation for something that is not going to happen for another 400 years. And hopefully I am right. But they did seem very, very serious in what they were doing.

General Cartwright, very quickly, describe the process involved in setting the nuclear force structure requirements.

General CARTWRIGHT. In setting the nuclear force——

The CHAIRMAN. Force structure requirements.

General CARTWRIGHT. Force structure requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
General CARTWRIGHT. We are given guidance as to the types of capabilities that our adversaries possess, that the government desires to hold at risk. We look at that. We compare the desired effect to the inventory required to get that effect. And then we match them with timeliness factors to obtain those objectives.

And we set that down. We write it down, we exercise it, we wargame it, and we pass it back up. We have a feedback loop to learn as we move forward.

There are a lot of factors in this that change our equations—precision, timeliness, delivery factors, reliability of weapons. All of that is considered in that activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I thank you, gentlemen.

I do have one last question for General Schwartz. Very quickly, can you touch on the thoughts of retiring C–5s, in 25 words or less?

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, again, I would not recommend retiring C–5s unless we have access to additional C–17s. In which case I would recommend retiring the older airplanes, the A models, first, both in a manner which we could harvest the crews and maintenance to apply to the new airplanes and, likewise, enhance the reliability of the entire system as a result.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. It has been an excellent hearing, and I appreciate, all of us appreciate, you gentlemen being with us.

Admiral Keating, good luck in your new assignment.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

March 21, 2007
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 21, 2007
STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN IKE SKELTON
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

POSTURE HEARING FOR SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, AND TRANSCOM

MARCH 21, 2007

• The Committee will come to order.

• Today’s hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings with Combatant Commanders. I am very pleased to welcome General Cartwright of STRATCOM, Admiral Keating of NORTHCOM who will soon be taking the reins at Pacific Command, General Schwartz of TRANSCOM, and Admiral Stavridis of SOUTHCOM. We are honored to have all four of you with us today.

• I also want to extend my gratitude and appreciation to the men and women in and out of uniform whom you command. They provide a valuable service to our country, and we are in their debt.

• Although the challenges which we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere consume much of the energy, resources, and attention of our nation and our Committee, we ignore other...
parts of the world and other issue areas at our peril. For the sake of brevity, I will mention only a few key issues in each COCOM.

- In Colombia, we have spent over $4 billion since 1999 to stem the flow of illegal drugs into our country and aid the Colombians in their fight against home-grown terrorists. But, according to the latest figures from the Justice Department, the supply and purity of illicit narcotics on our streets has not changed much in the last several years.

- The Administration of President Uribe is also currently embroiled in a criminal investigation into a seemingly widespread conspiracy between high-ranking government officials and leaders of the terrorist paramilitaries.

- I fear that this scandal and the underlying unholy alliance, if proven to be true, will severely undermine the ability of the Colombians to assume greater responsibility for combating narcotics trafficking and taking the fight to the terrorists — both of which may place a larger strain on our American forces during this time of war.
Finally, with regard to Guantanamo Bay, I would like to begin a discussion on whether we should continue to use the U.S. Naval Station there as a detention facility and venue for the military commissions. Although recent legislation, Supreme Court decisions, and Department directives have probably improved the nature of interrogation and detention at Guantanamo, I think that it may be a little too late.

Guantanamo, like Abu Gharib, has become, in the minds of many of our allies, a textbook example of how NOT to run a detention facility. There are hardened terrorists who must be detained and tried, but the name Guantanamo has come to reflect on the well-deserved, sterling reputation of our armed forces.

As I turn to NORTHCOM, Admiral Keating, I am interested in the status of planning and training activities between NORTHCOM, our National Guard and Reserve components, and local responders. As you know, the response to Katrina highlighted the need to better coordinate these activities, as cited in the recent Guard and Reserve Commission report. We must do more to improve this coordination process.
• Traditionally I have been a strong proponent of the “Total Force” concept of integrating the Reserve and Active components into one effort. Yet, I am concerned about reports that NORTHCOM does not adequately understand the capabilities of the Guard and Reserves due to the fact that NORTHCOM is overly-staffed by active duty personnel. I look forward to hearing your assessment of this observation and learning what proposals, if any, you might make to remedy this imbalance.

• With regard to STRATCOM, I am interested in the war fighters’ perspective on the balance between nuclear and conventional forces in the future. I understand that General Cartwright recognizes the need for a national discussion on this important issue, and in that regard I look forward to hearing his thoughts about the Reliable Replacement Warhead and Conventional Trident Modification programs.

• I have followed with interest the expanded role the warfighter has been playing in the missile defense business, particularly in the context of the North Korean test of a long-range missile last summer. In addition, would like to hear your assessment of how we should respond to the recent Anti-Satellite test conducted by the Chinese.
• With regard to TRANSCOM, General Schwartz, I believe that the critical issue for the committee will be to understand better the nature of our future mobility requirements. We are reaching untimely decision points on strategic airlift production and modernization that will impact our capabilities. For example, without knowing exactly what the mobility requirements and concept of operations of the Army’s Future Combat Systems will be, how can we make informed decisions to support fully our warfighters?

• I am also concerned about the state of our airlift, tanker, and seagoing platforms as they continue to age due to procurement shortfalls that began in the 1990s. The challenge of operating and maintaining older equipment is further compounded by the faster use rates, particularly among our aging KC-135 fleet of tankers, the C-130 airlifter, and the T-5 fueling tanker.

• I now turn to my good friend and colleague, our distinguished Ranking Member from California, Duncan Hunter, for any opening remarks that he would like to make.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNTIL RELEASED BY THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

21 March 2007
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

This is my third opportunity to appear before you as Commander of United States Strategic Command. As such, let me first thank you for the time, attentiveness and professionalism of your staffs as we have worked through some of the difficult challenges we face. The men and women of Strategic Command have performed superbly over the last year, demonstrating honor and dedication through long hours and deployments. We continued to transform our organization and capabilities over the past year, to better deal with traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive contingencies. As the national security environment continues to shift, we see other challenges on the horizon. We seek to adapt to the shifting national security environment by refining and fielding a "New Triad" of capabilities. Today I will outline how we intend to address the challenges we face and ask for your assistance.

CONTINUING TRANSFORMATION

When we met a year ago, we talked of progress toward transforming Strategic Command in the midst of conflict. We spoke of new functionally aligned organizations designed to improve our operational speed and progress toward a New Triad of capabilities. Finally, we attached particular importance to the threat posed by non-state actors, the need to tailor deterrence and focus on effects rather than kinetic solutions.

One year later, our functional components for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), network warfare, global network operations, information operations, integrated missile defense and combating weapons of mass destruction are each at or nearing full operational capability. In light of disturbing trends in the space domain, we further refined our components by splitting Joint Functional Component Command - Space and Global Strike into two individual
components, focusing on global strike and integration, and space operations. These functional components are also progressing rapidly and producing significantly enhanced operational results. This year the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOCWC) completed the stand up of four joint centers to facilitate the planning and execution of Information Operations. The Joint OPSEC Support Center, Joint Mission Support Center, Joint Electronic Warfare Center and Joint Strategic Communications Support Center were established to improve Information Operations throughout the Combatant Commands. We made progress in restructuring our legacy nuclear deterrent force in compliance with the Moscow Treaty. On the less positive side, we have debated, but made little gain in, filling a gap in our prompt global strike capability.

CONFRONTING TRADITIONAL, IRREGULAR, CATASTROPHIC AND DISRUPTIVE THREATS

The 21st Century opened with a violent attack on American soil reminiscent of our experience more than six decades ago at Pearl Harbor. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the attack of 2001 was unique in one important way; military combatants were not involved. Civilians and the image of America were the targets of calculating and fanatical terrorists. Unlike the past, attribution for this attack would not be credited to a single state or alliance of states. Rather, it would be attributed to non-state actors who were empowered by their ability to operate and leverage technology in a flattened world and were not deterred by the military tools with which we deterred others for the last 50 years.

As a world power, America's conventional and nuclear military capabilities remain second-to-none in deterring traditional threats, but our adversaries are predictably positioning themselves to avoid our strengths and exploit our vulnerabilities. Moreover, we live in a world in which traditional nation-states and alliances are asymmetrically
challenged by adversaries who are unconstrained by geographic boundaries or internationally shared societal and legal norms.

We are therefore preparing for immediate, potential and unexpected contingencies driven by these diverse adversaries who threaten America and its deployed forces, friends and Allies. These adversaries are pursuing the means for sudden and catastrophic strikes using WMD-armed ballistic missiles, or with little or no warning using WMD delivered by irregular means. They can also execute disruptive attacks in milliseconds using readily available, web-enabled communications and technologies from computers located anywhere on the globe.

SHIFTING NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGE

While we continue to focus on the need to deter non-state actors through effects-based operations and remain vigilant with regard to those nations that possess large inventories of nuclear weapons, recent events in Iran, Lebanon, North Korea and China, if unchecked, foreshadow future critical challenges.

Daily cyberspace intrusions into civil, military, and commercially networked systems; the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea, in open disregard of broad international opinion; the firing of rockets and cruise missiles from Lebanon and Gaza into Israel by Hezbollah and Hamas; the unannounced and irresponsible launch of North Korean missiles in the vicinity of Japan; and China’s controversial launch of an anti-satellite missile, which has subsequently endangered routine use of space, demonstrate the range of challenges facing America.

Today, we live in an Information Age where communication through cyberspace has forever changed and flattened our world. Free and open use of cyberspace has become an essential tool of the global economy and connects people throughout the world to each other. In fact, most Americans can no longer imagine a world without instant communications and
the freedom to access goods, services, and information at will. However, not unlike the targets of pirates or train robbers of the past, America is under widespread attack in cyberspace. Our freedom to use cyberspace is threatened by the actions of criminals, terrorists, and nations alike. Each seeks their own form of unique advantage, be it financial, political, or military, but together they threaten our freedom to embrace the opportunity offered by a globally connected and flattened world. The magnitude of cost, in terms of real dollars dedicated to defensive measures, lost intellectual capital and fraud cannot be overestimated, making these attacks a matter of great national interest. Unlike the air, land and sea domains, we lack dominance in cyberspace and could grow increasingly vulnerable if we do not fundamentally change how we view this battle-space.

Ballistic missile proliferation is a concern to free nations and will continue to pose a challenge to national security around the world. Introduction of nuclear weapons to the situation, particularly in the hands of regime leaders who openly seek to threaten or coerce their neighbors, presents an untenable threat to U.S. national security interests. It is clear that we must exhaust all possible diplomatic and economic avenues to solve the problem, but in the end, the DoD could be called upon to deter, reduce, or eliminate a critical threat to the security of America, its forces, friends, and Allies.

America’s defense strategy relies upon layers of capability that offer policy-makers maximum political-military flexibility. The first layer is our emergent missile defense system. This system, when mature, will not be an impenetrable shield, but it will reduce the likelihood of successful attack. Successful tests have thus far demonstrated our ability to overcome technical challenges and we have gained international credibility, but more work remains as we turn our attention to defense of
Europe and regional threats in Southwest Asia. Our second layer of
defense is offensive strike – defeat the threat. Policy-makers will first
seek to employ forward deployed general-purpose forces, normally available
in 3-5 days, given sufficient warning and range. Some conventional global
strike forces are capable of reducing or eliminating threats within 1-2
days, but if the threat is sudden or fleeting our only existing prompt
global strike capability employs nuclear ballistic missile systems. While
America possesses dominant conventional capabilities second-to-none, we
lack the capability to respond promptly to globally dispersed or fleeting
threats without resorting to nuclear weapons. As good as they are, we
simply cannot be everywhere with our general-purpose conventional forces
and use of a nuclear weapon system in prompt response may be no choice at
all.

Intentional interference with space-based intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and communication satellites,
while not routine, now occurs with some regularity. America’s ever
increasing appetite for space-based technical solutions for global
positioning, communications, and weather among others, if not properly
managed could become our Sword of Damocles – we must not become trapped in
this vulnerable position. Space is now a contested domain where, without
adjustments to our strategy, we may not be able to count on unfettered
access to space-based systems should others persist in their course of
developing counter-space weapons. Strategic Command believes that if we
are to ensure our freedom to operate peacefully in space, we must rely
upon a balanced acquisition strategy that employs a mix of some highly
specialized space-based systems and other less elegant but more responsive
space-based systems, and a global system of distributed terrestrial
networks to help avoid this undesirable trap and properly mitigate the
risk we currently face.
ADAPTING TO THE SHIFTING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – FIELDING THE NEW TRIAD

The diverse challenges facing America necessitate a mature strategy that reaches well beyond the blunt, cost-imposition approach of Cold War planners. This strategy must be equally adept at denying the benefits our adversaries might seek to gain and encouraging restraint even in conflict. We understand well that policy-makers will consider a range of options including diplomatic, military and economic. The Department of Defense will in turn consider options spanning offense and defense, kinetic and non-kinetic, conventional and nuclear, as appropriate to the political-military context. Strategic Command has multiple roles to play in peacetime and conflict, not the least of which is providing sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance upon which decision makers will act. We must ensure U.S. freedom of operation in space and cyberspace, connectivity sufficient to exercise global command and control, integrated missile defense, and upon order, provide kinetic or non-kinetic global strike. Central to this strategy is the New Triad, which remains the foundation for our strategic approach to global deterrence.

The New Triad is comprised of integrated offensive and defensive capabilities enabled by persistent global command and control (C2), robust planning and intelligence, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New Triad, when mature, will provide improved agility and flexibility in dealing with a wider range of contingencies. Our goals are to avoid undesirable competition, discourage proliferation, assure allies and deter aggression, particularly from WMD-armed adversaries, by maintaining sufficient strategic margin and flexibility vis-à-vis our competitors.

While the vision of the New Triad concept is sound and we have made progress, the shift in the global environment threatens to outpace the implementation timeline. Our ability to seamlessly integrate defensive
and offensive capabilities requires the more mature set of capabilities we are working toward. The remainder of this statement will outline the important roles of our various mission areas and highlight those needs we see as essential to meeting our goals.

**INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)**

Our Joint Functional Component Command - ISR has achieved full operational capability and begun adjusting our transactional model. Our current ISR capabilities and allocation processes were designed to focus on nation-states possessing traditional military capabilities and supporting infrastructure. Today we face adversaries who avoid our strengths and seek to attack through non-traditional means. Our ISR enterprise, designed to confront the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, is not optimized for either collection against, or analysis of, these new adversaries. Our initial assessment reveals that although we have increased the volume of collection, disparate sensor and requirement management procedures have resulted in redundant collections and system-wide inefficiencies, further stressing an over-burdened ISR enterprise. These inefficiencies inundate our analytical teams with volumes of data, rather than providing the right information at the right time. As a Department, we effectively meet less than one third of our Combatant Commanders’ war-fighter information needs through these outdated systems. At the same time, the National Reconnaissance Office manages collection of national-level intelligence requirements for the Director of National Intelligence. We have invested significant energy in strengthening this partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office in an effort to streamline and better integrate collection management.

Our objective is to optimize use of the Department’s ISR resources by eliminating requirements and collection redundancy, streamlining the process to deploy ISR assets, and conducting genuine assessment of those
operations. Our goal is an efficient global ISR enterprise, focused on achieving persistent collection capabilities against legacy and emerging threats through enhanced global sensor management of U.S. and coalition capabilities. We seek your support to improve our global situational awareness, and analytical capability to model and simulate the system of collection systems, spanning national, DoD, and coalition collection. Enhanced situational awareness and modeling and simulation capabilities will advance our ability to more effectively employ the assets we possess and move us closer to fully exploiting the data we collect.

**INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE**

Because the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and cruise missiles is serious, a credible missile defense capability is now an essential element of America's national security strategy. Even at this early stage of maturation, missile defense systems influence our adversaries' perception of the economic and political cost they must incur to pursue ballistic missile technologies. While missile defense as a defensive shield is important, its value as a dissuasive force or deterrent is proving far greater.

Our integrated ballistic missile defense program had an excellent year. Within a 90-day period we successfully intercepted ballistic missiles at low and high altitudes; in mid-course and terminal phases; and, in endo- and exo-atmospheric environments. We increased the numbers of our AGS tracking and engagement ships, GBIs in Alaska, and gained confidence through testing and deployment of the Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable (FBX-T) and Sea-Based X-Band (SRX) radars to Japan and Alaska respectively. At the same time, Sentinel radars and Avenger Air Defense systems participated in a combined NORTHCOM-MORAD training exercise in July 2006 to test our ability to rapidly deploy sensors and joint air defense systems to defend key assets against cruise missile attack.
The July 4th, 2006, North Korean missile launches spurred a limited operational activation of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and, as a result, helped us streamline our plans, tactics and procedures. We learned that the BMDS, procedures, and personnel performed well, and demonstrated a credible operational missile defense capability for homeland defense. An initial investment by NATO in construction of a BMD command and control system along with growing interest by countries throughout the world in hosting both radar and interceptor bases are testaments to this credibility. Japan has accelerated and expanded its cooperation program with the United States for ballistic missile defense, and South Korea recently committed to developing short-range ballistic missile defenses. We expect discussion of forward deployment of radars and interceptors in Europe to continue with our Allies as attention on the emerging threat in Southwest Asia grows.

As we move forward in the next year, more work remains. We must integrate air and cruise missile defenses with our growing ballistic missile defense system. Continued progress also requires further research, development, test and evaluation of individual components and end-to-end testing to validate sensor and shooter integration. Partnering with the Missile Defense Agency and the other DoD Service Components, we expect to further evolve the BMDS by adding new elements to the integrated sensor network. These elements will include cruise missile defense capabilities and extant intelligence collection sensors that will contribute to our situational awareness and overall integrated missile defense capability. In addition, the first two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites will be placed on orbit to demonstrate our ability to protect avenues of approach that can’t be protected by other means. We also plan to increase the effectiveness of our system by improving target discrimination capability through
integration of advanced algorithms in the Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable and Sea-Based X-Band radars.

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

We made progress in growing Information Operations Capabilities into core military competencies. We will continue to develop these and related Strategic Communications planning capabilities to ensure that all Joint Force Commanders gain and maintain the information advantage over our adversaries throughout the entire spectrum of regional and trans-regional engagement. As our capability centers, specifically for Electronic Warfare and Strategic Communications planning support, reach maturity, we will be able to provide trans-regional planning and integration support and strategic effects assessments responsive to the demands of the new Triad.

**CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS**

Earlier in this statement we noted that attacks in cyberspace are a matter of great national interest. Cyberspace has emerged as a war-fighting domain not unlike land, sea, and air, and we are engaged in a less visible, but none-the-less critical battle against sophisticated cyberspace attacks. We are engaging these cyberspace attacks offshore, as they seek to probe military, civil, and commercial systems, and consistent with principles of self defense, defend the DoD portion of the Global Information Grid (GIG) at home.

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace describes cyberspace as the nervous system of our country and as such, essential to our economy and national security. It describes a role for all federal departments and agencies, state and local government, private companies and organizations, and individual Americans in improving cyber-security. The National Security Strategy to Secure Cyberspace lays out a framework that seeks to deter our adversaries and assure our freedom of action in cyberspace.
Fundamental to this approach is the integration of cyberspace capabilities across the full range of military operations.

Strategic Command is charged with planning and directing cyber defense within DoD and conducting cyber attack in support of assigned missions. To date, our time and resources have focused more on network defenses to include firewalls, anti-virus protection, and vulnerability scanning. While generally effective against unsophisticated hackers, these measures are marginally effective against sophisticated adversaries. History teaches us that a purely defensive posture poses significant risks; the "Maginot Line" model of terminal defense will ultimately fail without a more aggressive offshore strategy, one that more effectively layers and integrates our cyber capabilities. If we apply the principles of warfare to the cyber domain, as we do to sea, air, and land, we realize the defense of the nation is better served by capabilities enabling us to take the fight to our adversaries, when necessary to deter actions detrimental to our interests. Our adversaries seek to operate from behind technical, legal, and international screens as they execute their costly attacks. If we are to take the fight to our adversaries, we will need Congress' help to find solutions to penetrate these screens.

**SPACE OPERATIONS**

Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as freedom to operate in the air and sea. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space-based capabilities. The United States considers space systems to have the right to pass through and peacefully operate in space without interference, not unlike that of transit through international waters. Consistent with this principle, the United States views purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights, and furthermore considers space
capabilities, including the ground and space segments and supporting links, as vital to its national interests. Recent events make it clear others may not share these values. Platforms costing billions of dollars to replace and the lives of astronauts from many nations are now at risk from debris left by China's recent ill-advised anti-satellite test.

Historically, space situational awareness (SSA) was focused on the cataloging, tracking, and monitoring of objects in space via the space surveillance network. Today it is clear we must have better space detection, characterization, and assessment tools. We require capabilities that enable rapid threat identification and attribution, facilitate a defensible architecture and provide fundamental shifts in space awareness. To this end, Strategic Command has created the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to ensure a more focused global command and control of our space operations and systems. We are in the process of co-locating and consolidating the Space Control Center and the JSpOC at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

We have provided, through the Secretary of Defense, a recommended plan for the establishment of an Operationally Responsive Space Office. The overall goals are to strengthen the nation's space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives. Our recommended guidelines were to increase and strengthen interagency partnerships to ensure a focused and dedicated unity of effort. Interagency partnerships provide opportunities to jointly identify desired effects, capabilities, and strategies. Departments and agencies will capitalize on opportunities for dynamic partnerships - whether through collaboration, information sharing, alignment or integration. To minimize the threat to our space capabilities now and in the future, we need continued support of programs that enhance our space situational
awareness, space protection capabilities, and satellite operations in order to preserve unfettered, reliable and secure access to space.

**GLOBAL STRIKE**

The devastating attack in September 2001 made it clear that we must engage our enemies offshore, or suffer further damage at home. To do so, we require a robust mix of capabilities tailored to a wider range of potential adversaries and spectrum of challenges than yesterday. The DoD has aggressively pursued this wider range of capabilities over the last decade by pursuing a highly effective mix of advanced conventional systems designed to take the fight to our adversaries with sufficient precision to enhance the credibility of our warnings and effectiveness of our strikes.

However, while the DoD deploys and when necessary employs these expeditionary forces around the globe, it is unlikely we can or will have forces in every place we need them at the crucial moment when we have an opportunity to deter or respond to an attack, be it conventional or otherwise. A timely response will be possible using these conventional forces if they are properly equipped and positioned in near proximity to the emerging threat. If our forces can’t be in position to respond rapidly, it is prudent to have the ability to defeat attacks or eliminate high value or fleeting targets at global ranges rather than suffering the consequences of an attack. We have a prompt delivery capability on alert today, but it is configured with nuclear weapons, which limits the options available to our decision-makers and may reduce the credibility of our deterrence.

The capability we lack is the means to deliver prompt, precise, conventional kinetic effects at inter-continental ranges. Several analytical efforts are underway or have been completed to assess mid-term options. For example, Air Force Space Command is developing a promising concept for a CONUS-launched conventional strike missile (CSM), which
capitalizes on the maneuverability and precision-to-prompt-effects offered by maneuvering flight technology to produce effects at global distances. Army Space and Missile Defense Command is actively working thermal protection and management solutions that can be effectively used across the range of potential advanced BCS solutions.

Unfortunately, the threat we face is more virulent and arrived at our shores earlier than expected. Because the threat has outpaced our search for solutions, we have examined many plausible alternatives and believe a near-term solution to deploy a precision global strike missile within two years of funding is essential to adequately defend the nation offshore. This near-term capability should be part of a larger strategy to explore, test and field other land, sea, or air-launched alternatives to produce effective mid (2011-2020) and long-term (2020 and beyond) solutions.

**Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**

For more than half a century we lived in a world in which the few major powers possessing nuclear weapons walked a cautious path of mutual deterrence. For years we have encouraged those nations retaining chemical and biological weapons to disavow them as the major powers did long ago. To its credit, Libya has raised its profile within the international community by divesting itself of weapons of mass destruction that did not and could not guarantee its security; it is too soon to know for North Korea.

Strategic Command's role is to integrate and synchronize DoD efforts in support of national efforts to combat WMD, on a global scale. Strategic Command is therefore actively engaged with the national laboratories, the Director of National Intelligence, National Counter-Proliferation Center, National Nuclear Security Administration, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, Regional Combatant Commanders and others to better coordinate, integrate and synchronize our collective
response to the threat. We provide support to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) initiatives, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). We recently completed a WMD Elimination Concept of Operations, and will soon activate a Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) to serve as the core of a Joint Task Force - Elimination (JTF-E), should such a force be required.

We ask for your continued support in helping us build on the successes realized through programs like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative. Resources that enable us to scale the attributes of existing programs to a global level, will provide global combating WMD capabilities by building global partnerships, using a global perspective, with the tools and metrics to judge value, and allow individual or regional WMD interdiction and elimination by host nation-state process owners. This process focuses on enabling "nation self help," where empowered nations are stakeholders and active participants in the fight to interdict and eliminate the threat of WMD. By participating with these nations, our actions reinforce their status as a sovereign state, elevate their standing, reinforce their status, and are a positive step forward for America as our partners develop and possess resident counterproliferation capabilities, providing advanced threat reduction and attribution forward from our shores while demonstrating a consolidated front to the threat.

**NATIONAL COMMAND AND COORDINATION CAPABILITY**

The world is fundamentally more complex than it was when our current point-to-point nuclear command and control system was developed more than 50 years ago. This single-purpose aging command and control system, while adequate to meet our nuclear mission, is not adequate to meet our broader national objectives. As we seek to sustain the essential core nuclear command and control system, we see an opportunity to transform this 1950s Cold War capability into a government-wide national communications
capability. To do so, we must take advantage of modern networked architectures.

At the outset, our strategy was two-fold, first to sustain our legacy nuclear command and control system and second to expand its capability to address a broader scope of military challenges. These investments would better integrate all elements of national power and increase our ability to quickly respond across a broader spectrum of military threats. However, our national experience in Hurricane Katrina made it clear that America needed more and we expanded the scope of our effort to improve the Nation’s ability to support civil authorities following disasters or other domestic events. The President has subsequently provided guidance to develop a robust, enduring, secure, survivable National Command and Coordination Capability that integrates our legacy nuclear command and control functions into a net-centric National Command and Coordination Capability. In support of these objectives, we have developed partnerships with the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and Director of National Intelligence.

The goal is to create a National Command and Coordination Capability (NCCC) that not only meets national command and control requirements, but can become the versatile and stable backbone of a nationally distributed network to meet other important homeland security requirements. Through an integrated and adaptive approach, NCCC will enable a responsive, universally collaborative and virtual environment for all users. We are well on the way to realizing this vision. Actions to date include modernizing our airborne components, distributing our ground components, and increasing network capacity.

**SAFETY, SECURITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE**

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense share responsibility for the safety, security, reliability, and
effectiveness of the nation's nuclear warhead stockpile and for the quality and responsiveness of the enterprise necessary to sustain it. During the last decade, our Nation invested in increasing our scientific understanding and extending the life of weapons designed and produced during the Cold War. To date, these efforts have successfully ensured the reliability of our weapons without the need to conduct nuclear tests. While this strategy has served the nation well, we recognize the current path of indefinitely relying on legacy nuclear designs refurbished through a series of life extension programs entails accepting significant future risks and potentially large costs, to reliability/performance, safety, security, and responsiveness points of view. For this reason, we support a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program as the best path forward to improve nuclear weapon safety, security, and reliability and advance our goal of the lowest possible stockpile levels consistent with national security.

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review described a need for a responsive production infrastructure, capable of responding to a strategic surprise, as part of its comprehensive nuclear strategy. The combination of the RRW program and responsive infrastructure investment are key elements of our overall strategy to further reduce our nuclear warhead stockpile to the lowest level consistent with national security requirements and move the Nation from an inventory-based to a capability-based risk management strategy. As the comprehensive strategy for the nuclear enterprise matures, the RRW program will replace extant nuclear warheads with increasingly modular and interoperable warheads that are safer, more secure, and highly reliable, as one element of a broader strategy to reduce our reliance upon nuclear warheads and more aggressively reduce our non-deployed stockpile. RRW designs will incorporate a broad suite of enhanced safety and security features that cannot be attained through the
life extension process. Modularity and interoperability remain top warfighter priorities for the RRW concept. These attributes will significantly increase the operational flexibility and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile and improve our ability to introduce new technologies and respond to technological and/or geopolitical surprise. We ask for your continued support of the RRW program as an integral part of the nation’s comprehensive strategy to meet national security requirements and encourage Congress to continue investing in the transformation of our aging nuclear infrastructure; it is a key element in the sustainment of a credible nuclear deterrent for the 21st Century.

CONCLUSION

United States Strategic Command is engaged in a wide-ranging campaign to provide support to all elements of the Department of Defense, assure our Allies, dissuade undesirable competition, deter our adversaries, and if called upon to defend our nation and defeat our enemies. We take this role very seriously and today present you with carefully thought out recommendations. Once again, thank you for your time, insight, and attentiveness to our views.
STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
AND
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

21 MARCH 2007
Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, and Members of the Committee: At its most basic level, winning the war on terror means defending our homeland. Homeland defense lies at the core of our national military strategy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) are separate commands that have complementary missions and work closely together to fulfill our homeland defense responsibilities. The Commands operate within a common security environment, predominately share a headquarters staff, and are dedicated to defending North America. We also share common values and understand the importance of carrying out our duties with a sense of urgency in the face of very real and present dangers. It is my honor to report to you on the current state and future direction of our Commands.

Homeland defense is the highest priority for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. As USNORTHCOM enters its fifth year, we are fully mission capable and ready to respond to the full spectrum of homeland defense challenges existing in the modern security environment. The NORAD Agreement, initially signed in 1958, was renewed in May 2006, when NORAD’s mission set was expanded to include maritime warning. NORAD has evolved from a cold war construct into an adaptive, flexible, and responsive bi-national organization that is ideally suited to address modern threats in the aerospace domain and contribute to greater awareness of threats in the maritime domain. The desired end state of our Commands is the maintenance of our nations’ ways of life and the defense and territorial integrity of North America.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are integral parts of an active, layered defense in which we seek to confront, early and from a safe distance, those who threaten our homelands. USNORTHCOM and NORAD operate in a changing, uncertain security environment. A range of asymmetric, transnational threats represent an immediate challenge for both Commands. These threats continue to be diverse, adaptive, and, by their nature, are difficult to predict. Potential
enemies will attempt surprise as they try to employ an array of persistent and emerging, catastrophic, and disruptive methods and capabilities, to include nuclear weapons. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will act in a timely, and when appropriate, coordinated fashion in concert with our international and domestic mission partners to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat threats.

USNORTHCOM must additionally plan for a military response to civil requests for support in response to natural or manmade disasters that affect the United States. Natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, wildland fires, or pandemics can overwhelm local responders and require significant contribution of federal military resources to support state and local response efforts to mitigate effects. Likewise, a successful terrorist attack, particularly one involving a weapon of mass destruction, may cause mass panic, environmental damage, and significant loss of life requiring substantial defense support of civil authorities. In catastrophic incidents, and as directed, USNORTHCOM will support civil authorities to help effect an integrated national response as quickly and effectively as possible.

**Plans**

We rapidly adapt homeland defense and civil support plans as circumstances dictate based upon current intelligence, and regularly exercise them across all domains with our domestic and international homeland defense partners. Over the last two years, we finalized the following plans:

- Concept Plan 3310-07, Aerospace Warning, Aerospace Control, and Maritime Warning for North America
- Concept Plan 2002-05, Homeland Defense
- Campaign Plan 2075, Regional Campaign Plan for the War on Terror
- Concept Plan 2501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
- Concept Plan 2505, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan
• Concept Plan 0500, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRN) Consequence Management Operations
• Concept Plan 2591, Pandemic Influenza
• Concept Plan 2707, Military Support to the U.S. Government Agencies for Caribbean Mass Migration
• Concept Plan 2400, Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region
• Concept Plan 2502, Civil Disturbance Operations
• Campaign Plan 2900, Strategic Communication

This year, we will focus our efforts to complete the following plans:
• United States-Canada Combined Defense Plan
• Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan

In addition to our current family of plans, we continue to advocate development of an overarching national homeland security plan that coordinates the pre-attack actions of the federal government. This plan, as advocated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, will clarify the distribution of effort among federal agencies, promote unity of effort, and reduce uncertainty in the overlap of responsibilities and capabilities among homeland security partners.

Training and Education

USNORTHCOM’s and NORAD’s comprehensive training and education program supports the mission of North American defense. USNORTHCOM’s defense support of civil authorities training programs have also become a national resource for homeland security and defense professionals as exemplified by the training of over 1,200 people in Fiscal Year 2006 in our defense support of civil authorities course.
Our Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium (HSDEC) has established a national homeland security and defense curriculum. Currently the organization has 183 charter and associate university members, including the American Association of Community Colleges with 1,154 members in 40 states, the Canadian Defence Academy, and University del Salvador, Argentina. The $1.8 million apportioned to HSDEC from Congress as part of the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Appropriations Bill is being used to sponsor research into our Commands' priority questions of interest, to develop an internship program for recruiting new defense and security personnel into government service, and for workshops to bring an academic perspective to our Commands' respective missions. We also seek to foster greater senior civilian leadership knowledge as USNORTHCOM and NORAD partner with the Naval Postgraduate School and civilian institutions in the development of a doctorate degree in the areas of homeland defense and security, with initial classes beginning in summer 2007.

To build on our already strong working relationship with the National Guard, we're continuing the Joint Force Orientation program, which is a cooperative training effort between USNORTHCOM, National Guard Bureau, Joint Forces Command and the States' National Guard Headquarters. The program enhances coordination, cooperation, and information sharing between the States' Joint Force Headquarters and USNORTHCOM.

**Exercises**

Each year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD sponsor two large-scale exercises—ARGENT SENTRY and VIGILANT SHIELD—and participate in over 30 smaller regional, state, and local exercises. We continually review lessons learned from past exercises and real-world events (such as Hurricane Katrina) and take corrective action when necessary. These actions are an integral part of our
exercise program. Our exercise scenarios have involved air (civil and military) incidents and attacks; maritime and port security; maritime interception operations; missile defense; support to law enforcement agencies for border security; consequence management in support of civil authorities; nuclear proliferation; nuclear weapons accidents; weapons of mass destruction attacks; and natural disasters.

Our civil support exercises are evolving to integrate fully with the Department of Homeland Security’s National Exercise Program and are now national events with the support of the federal government, regional organizations, and the private sector. We actively engage our training partners at every level of federal, state, tribal, and local government to employ the most comprehensive and realistic scenarios in order to achieve each participating organization’s training objectives. Our exercises are based on the 15 National Planning Scenarios and are accomplished in accordance with the National Response Plan and the principles of the National Incident Management System.

Last year, we developed and hosted six major Table Top Exercises (TTXs) and several additional smaller scale TTXs involving military, agency, and governmental participation at all levels. Examples of scenarios addressed during these synchronized TTXs include response to a major earthquake; terrorist use of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems against civilian airliners and DOD aircraft; and detection, tracking, and response to a ship-borne nuclear weapon detonated in a major U.S. port.

Canada, primarily through Canada Command, is a full partner in these exercises. Although we have rehearsed and executed trans-border missions, such as the 2006 Super Bowl in Detroit, we have yet to conduct fully combined exercises that occur across the northern border. We continually work with the Government of Canada and its Strategic Joint Staff in the air area
through numerous NORAD exercises that are conducted regularly in, and across, all NORAD Regions (Continental United States, Canadian, and Alaskan NORAD Regions). Canada Command and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Canada participated in the ARDENT SENTRY series of exercises for the first time in 2006.

We work with the National Guard Bureau to coordinate and synchronize major USNORTHCOM and NORAD exercises with the National Guard State exercise series, VIGILANT GUARD.

We support the DOD’s decision to reprogram Combatant Command funding for the Joint Exercise Program and Training Transformation from the Services into a Defense-Wide Account to be centrally managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The consolidation of existing funding into the Combatant Commanders' Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program will result in efficiencies that can be rapidly applied against training requirements for new mission areas.

**Intelligence Activities**

USNORTHCOM and NORAD maintain situational awareness and readiness around-the-clock to protect against a range of symmetric and asymmetric threats in all domains. The intelligence community supports USNORTHCOM and NORAD by providing actionable information needed for homeland defense operations. Timely and actionable intelligence is the most critical enabler to protecting the homeland at a safe distance. Threat awareness allows us to tailor our deterrent posture and convince adversaries that their objectives cannot be achieved by attacking our homeland and that any attack will result in an overwhelming response.

USNORTHCOM uses intelligence and threat information from other federal agencies to develop and maintain situational awareness of threats within our
area of responsibility and to facilitate a seamless handoff of threats to our homeland originating in other Combatant Commands’ areas of responsibility. These assessments and intelligence products are provided to USNORTHCOM components, subordinate commands and lead federal agencies. USNORTHCOM assessments are shared with the intelligence community by posting them to the National Counterterrorism Center Online secure web portal, and our own web portals at various classification levels.

A significant tool within USNORTHCOM and NORAD is the Joint Intelligence Operations Center North (JIOC-North), which is part of the intelligence community. JIOC-North provides predictive and actionable threat estimates and timely warning of worldwide threats against North America using fused all-source intelligence and law enforcement information.

To protect Americans’ civil liberties, intelligence received from the intelligence community is filtered through a well-established and disciplined Intelligence Oversight Program. This ensures we analyze, retain, and disseminate intelligence with a foreign or international terrorist threat nexus, and then only to the extent the intelligence is relevant to our missions.

**Homeland Defense Operations**

Should deterrence fail, we will access and assume operational control of forces that are trained and ready to respond and defeat threats directed at our areas of responsibility. Adaptability and flexibility are critical to our Commands’ ability to counter the modern threat.

**NORAD Sector Consolidation.** Prior to November 2006, the NORAD Continental Region was divided into three air defense sectors: the Southeast Air Defense Sector at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; the Northeast Air Defense Sector at Rome, New York; and the Western Air Defense Sector at
McChord Air Force Base, Washington. In November 2006, NORAD consolidated the Northeast and Southeast Air Defense Sectors into a single Eastern Air Defense Sector located in Rome, New York. We are standing up a robust Air Operations Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Piloting of the Battle Control System Fixed, a modernized, tactical-level command and control system, enabled this sector consolidation and will reduce manpower requirements.

In 2006, we conducted the following homeland defense operations:

**Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD).** USNORTHCOM is responsible for directing missile defense operations within our area of responsibility and Hawaii to defend the homeland, allies, friends and other national interests from potentially hostile acts. The GMD system achieved limited defensive operations capability in October 2004, was placed in an operational status in June 2006, and is available when needed to defend the United States’ and its allies’ infrastructure and population centers. Our missile defense crews are trained and our systems are ready to respond as necessary. In July 2006 the NORAD Integrated Threat Warning and Attack Assessment System immediately detected the launch of all seven North Korean missiles, tracked their trajectories, and watched as they landed in the Sea of Japan. The North Korean missile launch activities that occurred from May to July 2006 provided an excellent opportunity for USNORTHCOM and NORAD to coordinate with national senior leadership, other combatant commands, and assigned missile defense assets. The challenge now is to balance operations with research, development, test, and evaluation to ensure the architecture will evolve to defend against a changing threat. Continued funding of GMD is critical to this effort.

**Operation NOBLE EAGLE.** Since the attacks of September 11th, NORAD has supported Operation NOBLE EAGLE with airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, irregular air patrols, and the unique National Capital Region
Integrated Air Defense System. Over 45,000 sorties have been flown in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE, with the Air National Guard conducting over 70 percent of these sorties. We have adjusted our air patrols to achieve the balance between readiness and sustainability. In September 2006, the U.S. Coast Guard assumed the Rotary Wing Air Intercept mission to counter the light civil air threat to our nation's capital.

On October 11, 2006, minutes after the crash of a civilian light aircraft into a New York City building, NORAD scrambled several fighter and support aircraft to cities on the East and West coasts of the United States including New York, Washington, D.C., and Boston. Additional aircraft were scrambled over cities in Canada. The aircraft were dispatched as a prudent measure and in anticipation of a potential terrorist attack; they were airborne within minutes of the incident and remained airborne until it was determined the incident was in fact an accident. The quick reaction demonstrated NORAD's capability and preparedness to coordinate a swift, elevated, and large-scale defensive and deterrent posture.

Northern Sovereignty Operations. On September 28, fighters from Alaskan NORAD Region and Canadian NORAD Region were launched in response to Russian aircraft that penetrated North America's Air Defense Identification Zone. While the Russian air assets at no time violated U.S. or Canadian airspace, NORAD integrated air defense assets in and around Alaska and Canada were able to detect, intercept and identify a number of Russian Tu-95 Bear heavy bombers participating in an annual Russian air force exercise near the coasts of Alaska and Canada. This operation demonstrated our continued vigilance and readiness to defend North American air sovereignty.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

In addition to homeland defense, USNORTHCOM has a second core mission to support civil authorities with military capabilities that can rapidly
stabilize and improve the situation in the wake of a catastrophic event. The
USNORTHCOM support is in addition to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
response in their role as the DOD lead for Emergency Support Function #3,
Public Works and Engineering, which is executed independent of USNORTHCOM
control.

USNORTHCOM provides defense support of civil authorities primarily
through our subordinate commands: Joint Task Force Civil Support at Fort
Monroe, Virginia; Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region at Fort
McNair, Washington D.C.; Joint Task Force Alaska at Elmendorf Air Force Base,
Alaska; and Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) at Fort Bliss, Texas. In
addition, the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have established dedicated
Service Components for USNORTHCOM. These commands are: U.S. Army North
located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; U.S. Air Force North located at Tyndall
Air Force Base, Florida, and U.S. Marine Forces North located in New Orleans,
Louisiana. The Commander, Fleet Forces Command, located at Naval Station
Norfolk, Virginia is designated as the Navy’s Supporting Commander to
USNORTHCOM.

At the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM
supports primary response agencies as part of a comprehensive national
response to manage the consequences of an attack or a natural disaster, to
include a pandemic. Civil authorities are most likely to request our support
to draw upon unique military capabilities or to augment civilian responders.
Our ability to respond rapidly with the full range of military capabilities
to these requests can be critical in saving lives, minimizing human
suffering, and preserving infrastructure.

Successful and timely response includes anticipating and planning for
various types of requests that may arise in order to posture appropriate
military capabilities. As a lesson learned from Hurricane Katrina, Defense
Coordinating Officers and their supporting elements have been positioned in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. The Defense Coordinating Officers act as military liaisons to increase full-time coordination with state governments and the Adjutants General regarding disaster response planning and to facilitate the "Request For Assistance" process following a disaster. These Defense Coordinating Officers and their support staff fall under US Army North, a dedicated Army Service Component Command under the operational control of USNORTHCOM, which achieved full operational capability in October 2006.

In an effort to close the response gaps identified in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, USNORTHCOM undertook several efforts to improve defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM deployed military planners to work hand in hand with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--assisting FEMA's stand up of their Operational Planning Unit, a group intended to provide FEMA with a robust crisis planning capability for future disasters. Also last year, USNORTHCOM military planners deployed to the Gulf Coast Recovery Office in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and assisted the interagency effort in developing disaster preparedness plans in collaboration with state and local agencies of the Gulf Coast Region. Working with local, state, and federal participants and in accordance with DoD's direction, USNORTHCOM demonstrated unique military capabilities to provide situational awareness to senior leaders in Washington, DC, and at USNORTHCOM, as well as local first responders--a vital capability that provides disaster survey information quickly to decision makers and first responders. USNORTHCOM also developed several pre-scripted mission assignments that expedite the response of military personnel and supplies immediately after a disaster occurs.

National Guard. Over the past year, we have actively collaborated with the National Guard Bureau to improve communications, operational
synchronization, and training. Programs such as the Joint CONUS Communication Support Environment, which provides a comprehensive strategy for domestic military interoperable communications and information sharing, 24/7 connectivity to the National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center, and hosting the Joint Task Force Commanders’ Course at the USNORTHCOM headquarters improve our ability to seamlessly work together.

**Pandemic Influenza.** In August 2006, we completed our plan for addressing pandemic influenza and were tasked by the Secretary of Defense to be both the supported commander for pandemic influenza and the DOD lead for directing, planning, and synchronizing the DOD’s global response to a pandemic. USNORTHCOM has established a joint pandemic influenza team to carry out this critical mission and we have made pandemic influenza planning a top priority for 2007.

**Support to Law Enforcement Agencies**

Support to law enforcement is an important element in USNORTHCOM’s and NORAD’s mission to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat threats to the homeland, because of its direct applicability to the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Transnational threats include international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Federal laws and policies allow us to support law enforcement agencies by conducting operations to deter and prevent transnational threats. We further assist law enforcement agencies in their counterdrug mission. USNORTHCOM provides support to law enforcement agencies primarily through our subordinate command, Joint Task Force North at Fort Bliss, Texas. Terrorists have used smuggling networks and money laundering to achieve their goals and fund their activities. As we support law enforcement agencies in the fight against drugs, we also focus our efforts on terrorist organizations with a nexus to
drug trafficking. We support the GWOT at home by providing unique military capabilities to support civilian law enforcement agencies.

**Operation GULFVIEW.** This year, we expanded the role of USNORTHCOM’s subordinate command, JTF-N, to include integrative support to multiple law enforcement agencies with a focus on coastal border operations. In support of the U.S. Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley Sector, JTF-N planned and facilitated Operation GULFVIEW from February to March 2006. Designed to support and improve law enforcement interdiction of transnational threats in the maritime domain along the Southeastern Texas Coastal area of the Padre Island National Seashore, this multi-sensor, multi-agency operation expanded to include the contiguous land border within Rio Grande Valley sector’s border domain. This mission employed a DOD-funded coastal defense system designed to provide a command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance node capable of fusing multi-sensor, multi-source information into a common operational picture. In conjunction with this system, various Title 10 and Title 32 assets provided a multi-layered detection and monitoring environment designed to maximize law enforcement interdiction assets. This operation validated emerging maritime surveillance technologies, explored JTF-N capabilities in the maritime domain, opened lines of communication, and established productive relationships among the 29 interagency participants.

**Operation OUTLOOK.** In June 2006, JTF-N participated in Operation OUTLOOK, which involved multi-sensor DOD support to the U.S. Border Patrol’s Spokane Sector and other federal law enforcement agencies and interagency partners combining Title 10 and multi-state Title 32 military forces. Washington Air National Guard Counterdrug Task Force Title 32 forces provided detection support. Title 10 forces, under the command of JTF-N, provided ground-based, mobile ground-to-air Sentinel radars. DOD assets were used to
increase detection of low-flying helicopters and ground smuggling conveyances for transporting contraband between the U.S. and Canada.

**Operation KEY WATCH ALPHA and ABLE VENTURE.** Key Watch Alpha occurred from May to July 2006 in support of the U.S. Border Patrol's Miami Sector. For the first time, JTF-N worked closely with the U.S. Coast Guard's District Seven Headquarters as a parallel lead federal agency and once again employed a multi-layered detection, assessment, and awareness approach. Operation Key Watch Alpha incorporated multiple assets, both Title 10 and Title 32, in an effort to enhance law enforcement agencies' interdiction of smuggling activities along the Florida Keys and the Florida mainland approaches. JTF-N will continue to provide support in the maritime domain and recently concluded Operation Able Venture, a first-ever integrated mission in support of the U.S. Coast Guard in San Diego. These missions validate the need for monitoring of the approaches to, and enforcement of, our nation's coastal borders and are planned to continue in 2007.

**Operation JUMP START.** Along the southern border, USNORTHCOM and JTF-N have worked closely with the National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Border Patrol to ensure de-confliction with Operation Jump Start, which provides Title 32 support to the U.S. Border Patrol along the entire 2,000 mile border with Mexico. In a separate but parallel effort, JTF-N conducted numerous engineer support missions, primarily in Arizona and New Mexico, to construct barrier obstacles that restrict smuggling activities and roads in support of law enforcement agency effort. We will remain engaged with the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Border Patrol throughout Operation Jump Start and, where viable, will continue to support as requested by law enforcement agencies along the southern border.

**Tunnel Detection.** Applying DOD and intelligence community technology and intelligence analysis in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, JTF-N
supported the detection of four tunnels on the southwest border with Mexico. In conjunction with its homeland security and intelligence community partners, JTF-N continues its support of tunnel detection efforts along the U.S. borders. In September 2006, JTF-N co-hosted an interagency tunnel conference with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to enhance knowledge of tunnel detection technologies.

**Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operation.** Through JTF-N, unmanned aircraft systems were employed, operating solely in restricted military airspace, along the southwest border in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. USNORTHCOM is engaged with the Federal Aviation Administration to develop airspace procedures for unmanned aircraft systems to operate in the National Airspace System outside of full-time military restricted airspace to provide support to border control lead agencies and disaster response operations. While this is a complex issue, we remain confident that unmanned aircraft systems will be granted access to the National Airspace System in the near future to increase our ability to safely conduct critical homeland security operations and law enforcement support.

**Interagency Coordination**

Lessons learned from conflicts such as the first Gulf War and the Balkans indicated an increasing need for coordination between the military services as well as with other Federal government agencies. The attacks on September 11 and the resulting war on terrorism highlighted the need for military activities to be more closely tied to diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence sharing activities. In October 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed combatant commanders to integrate and synchronize activities of multiple civilian, state and federal government agencies and departments under a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACGs were made
a permanent part of each Combatant Commander's Staff. They facilitate two-way coordination and communication between military and civilian operations in each combatant command's area of responsibility.

At USNORTHCOM, we oversee an active JIACG composed of every element across the USNORTHCOM and NORAD staff and more than 60 resident or local representatives from DOD and non-DOD agencies. The JIACG meets as a broad corporate entity one to two times per month on topics pertaining to homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. Our JIACG, combined with myriad interactions with federal agencies, National Guard, state and local first responders, and countless local and private associates, contributes to information and knowledge sharing and to a collaborative approach to operations in our homeland.

Interagency operations are the next frontier of jointness and one that the United States should continue to foster. We continually add to our capable team of partners at USNORTHCOM and are optimizing collaborative relationship building to achieve our nation's homeland defense and security imperatives.

Interagency coordination permeates all of USNORTHCOM's and NORAD's activities. We harness the power of the JIACG to help us craft realistic, collaborative and workable plans and we provide the right support, at the right time, in concert with the right partners—always respecting the authorities of those states and agencies that we have been charged to assist through our operation.

In this complex interagency environment, we must also identify and transition meaningful technology that will strengthen homeland security efforts. Deliberative engagement is required across all levels of government and the private sector to support technology which enhances homeland defense and security capabilities. The acquisition and
implementation of standards-driven, effective technological networks will be
a catalyst to the development and sustenance of critical human networks
developed required to build our capacity along with those of our national and
international partners.

Interoperable Communications

During 2006, USNORTHCOM made significant strides in increasing
communications interoperability and improving communications planning and
response with our numerous mission partners, while posturing our subordinate
and supporting commands with rapidly deployable communications equipment for
use during contingency operations.

During the Defense Interoperability Communications Exercise in
March 2006, USNORTHCOM hosted 17 communications teams representing various
DOD, National Guard, Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
local first responder organizations. To further increase interoperability,
the Command also published an equipment technical standards document in 2006.
This document recommends the technical standards that units and mission
partners should adhere to when procuring new communications equipment.

Response operations in the wake of the 2005 devastating hurricane season
revealed a number of important lessons—the most critical of these was our
nation’s requirement for efficient and effective communications.

The results of the National Baseline Assessment conducted by the SAFECOM
Program, an entity within the DHS Office for Interoperability and
Compatibility, show that most agencies have developed, at the very least, a
minimum technological capability to achieve tactical interoperable
communications. However, each urban/metropolitan area has incorporated
different technology solutions because achieving interoperability is
dependent on the specific types of communications equipment and
infrastructures each agency has procured and currently employs. Therefore, a voice communications solution that would be considered ideal in one area could be unsuited for another. Currently, there is a shortage of pre-incident communications planning and coordination among state and local governments that impedes collaboration, sharing of critical information, and the ability of the federal government and USNORTHCOM to support state and local response efforts effectively.

To address communications shortfalls discovered during Hurricane Katrina, USNORTHCOM procured and employed interoperable communications packages that are ideally suited to our homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities mission sets. During exercise periods, we procured and employed several deployable, cellular-based communications suites that provide an autonomous infrastructure to extend communications connectivity in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. We also procured three Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video communications suites to augment or replace capabilities required during emergency response operations.

**Theater Security Cooperation**

USNORTHCOM Theater Security Cooperation activities contribute to the Secretary of Defense’s Security Cooperation Guidance’s top priority to build the capacities of allies and partners to help win the GWOT by enhancing coordination with our continental neighbors, Canada and Mexico.

American Servicemembers’ Protection Act sanctions not only prohibited equipment transfers, but encouraged Mexico to consider military purchases from other countries and the continuing restrictions on Foreign Military Financing and the Excess Defense Articles grant programs for Mexico dampens our ability to effectively counter transnational terrorism and narcotics
threats. Lifting these restrictions will have a significant impact on our homeland defense efforts with our southern neighbor.

**Conclusion**

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are part of a bi-national and interagency team dedicated to strengthening the security and defense of North America. We have finalized our homeland defense and civil support plans and are now looking at ways to improve continental defense. The continued evolution of the Commands is critical to our ability to provide a flexible, adaptable, and scaleable response to modern threats. USNORTHCOM and NORAD have synchronized our existing plans, directives, and major operations; established intelligence priorities; and prioritized other resources in pursuit of designated strategic objectives with regard to the GWOT. Activities and operations directed by USNORTHCOM complement and support the United States Government-led international effort to deny terrorist networks what they need to operate and survive. USNORTHCOM and NORAD contribute to the overarching national goals of countering ideological support for the enemy, disrupting and attacking the enemy, and protecting the American homeland.

Responsibility for protecting North America is divided among federal, state, tribal, and local governments. USNORTHCOM and NORAD coordinate closely with other government agencies to achieve integrated plans and operations. USNORTHCOM is maximizing cooperation with Canada and Mexico and thus enabling them to counter terrorism through bilateral partnerships. Additionally, we look beyond the established USNORTHCOM area of responsibility in coordination with U.S. Special Operations Command and the other regional combatant commands to institute a synchronized DOD global approach to disrupt transnational terrorists through continuous collaboration and a rigorous
program of exercises to enhance our ability to conduct homeland defense operations.

The core capability to accomplish our missions resides in our people. We must continue to ensure their welfare and that of their families. We are grateful to Congress for the support that it provides our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and their families, in their efforts to defend our Nation at home and abroad. Increases in pay and benefits, such as military housing upgrades, medical care improvements, and other quality of life enhancements, are clear indicators of the extent to which Congress values our service members. The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are dedicated to defending the United States and Canadian homelands against all threats. I am privileged to be a part of this outstanding team.
Statement of

General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF

Commander, United States Transportation Command

Before the House Armed Services Committee

On the State of the Command

March 21, 2007
INTRODUCING THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

Mission/Organization

USTRANSCOM, a unified combatant command (UCOM), serves as the "quarterback" of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JUDE), whose purpose is to project national security capabilities, provide end-to-end visibility of forces and sustainment in transit and rapidly respond to support joint logistics requirements. Through our component commands, the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and our national and commercial partners, we execute military and commercial transportation, terminal management, aerial refueling and global patient movement through the Defense Transportation System (DTS). In addition to our transportation mission, USTRANSCOM, as the Department of Defense (DOD) Distribution Process Owner (DPO), is making improvements that enhance the responsiveness of the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System for the DOD. As the DOD’s DPO, designated in 2003, redesignated in 2006, codified in the 2006 Unified Command Plan, and institutionalizing DPO’s responsibilities in DOD publications, USTRANSCOM is leading a collaborative effort with JUDE partners across the defense logistics community to increase the precision, reliability and efficiency of the DOD supply chain. By increasing collaboration, employing expeditionary tools and streamlined systems, adapting our business models and ensuring an appropriate mix of lift assets, we fulfill our obligations and “keep our promise” to our warfighters and the Nation, today and tomorrow.

KEEPING PROMISES TO THE NATION IN 2006

As we look to the future, we are mindful of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that 2006 was a challenging year. Our requirements in
support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Operation NOLLE EAGLE (ONE), 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) were 
noteworthy. AMC moved 1,394,485 passengers on deployment, redeployment, 
sustainment and rest and relaxation missions, an achievement accomplished in 
collaboration with our commercial industry partners, as they provided us with 
a cost efficient and effective means of moving our service personnel. This 
important relationship with our commercial industry partners allowed organic 
aircraft to airlift 526,611 short tons (stons) of vital cargo into the US 
Central Command (USCENTCOM) theater. Additionally, our C-17’s airdropped 360 
stons of critical supplies for coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Our aging airborne tanker fleet, a key force multiplier, also performed 
at unprecedented levels. AMC tankers delivered 128.94 million gallons of 
fuel to US and coalition aircraft in support of OEF/OIF. They also played a 
critical role in securing the skies over our cities in support of ONE. Our 
tankers flew over 500 sorties and offloaded 2.9 million gallons of fuel to 
replenish over 1,275 combat air patrol fighters and support aircraft guarding 
against terrorist attacks within our borders. This fall, our tankers 
launched on a minute’s notice to support fighter patrols over major US cities 
following the tragic civilian aircraft crash into a residential high rise in 
New York City.

MSC and SEAC’s contributions were equally impressive, as they delivered 
1,246,106 stons/24,094,118 square feet of cargo to both OIF and OEF. MSC’s 
point-to-point tankers also delivered over 5.79 million gallons of fuel 
supporting worldwide DOD requirements.

In USCENTCOM we worked in concert with our JDDE partners and rotated 37 
Brigade Combat Teams, eight Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF), and six Marine 
Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). Despite dynamically changing theater 
requirements, USTRANSCOM delivered 95% of personnel, equipment and cargo to 
final destination on time, meeting warfighter requirements.
In addition to force rotations, delivering armored vehicles, vehicle armor kits and improved personal body armor remained a high priority. This year we moved 6,000 armored vehicles, 600 armor kits, 1.4 million pounds of Bradley armor tiles, and 100,000 sets of body armor.

Close collaboration with USCENTCOM has enhanced our ability to understand requirements, forecast movements and develop better, more cost effective transportation solutions. Through the integration of our air and surface operations we were able to reduce the cost of transportation for the Services by over $60 million and free up strategic airlift assets for higher priority missions, providing greater flexibility to us and our customers.

Our ability to quickly respond paid dividends during the evacuation of American citizens from Beirut during hostilities between Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel. When requested by the Department of State (DOS) to assist in this effort, MSC contracted three commercial vessels to evacuate our citizens. These vessels combined with an interagency team of other transportation assets, moved over 12,000 personnel from Beirut to a safe haven in Cyprus where follow-on air transportation arrangements were made. In the midst of this operation, with the safe haven camp populations threatening to exceed capacity, AMC secured 30 additional wide-body commercial and 19 military aircraft to transport 1,833 American citizens from Cyprus to McGuire Air Force Base (AFB), New Jersey, and 6,873 passengers to Atlanta, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. A key to the success of this operation was the integration of the expeditionary Contingency Response Group (CRG) into the Joint Task Force (JTF) command and control structure. CRG personnel from McGuire AFB were some of the first on the ground in Larnaca, Cyprus, to open the port and assist the DOS and local personnel to establish command and control and ensure safe operations.

While operations in USCENTCOM remain the focus of efforts, we are mindful of USTRANSCOM's global mission to keep forces and sustainment flowing
around the world. In Germany, when a customs issue caused a backlog of critical cargo, USTRANSCOM acted immediately with USEUCOM, and negotiations with the German Government resulted in a streamlined, more efficient customs process.

In the US Southern Command (USOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), USTRANSCOM helped plan and execute 12 Detainee Movement Operations (DMO) from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to various points around the globe, resulting in 87 detainees being repatriated, or permanently accepted by partner nations. At home, USTRANSCOM responded to the devastating effects of wildfires. Working closely with US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), we provided firefighting support via Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve C-130s. These crews flew 538 sorties and released 12.9 million pounds of retardant, preventing millions of dollars in damage and saving countless acres of forest and wilderness areas. We also worked with USNORTHCOM to develop timely response procedures to airlift Homeland Defense Quick Reaction/Rapid Reaction Forces (QRF/RRF) using C-130s and C-17s.

Exercise support was yet another key way USTRANSCOM supported the geographic COCOMs. Exercises provide critical training and serve as a venue to review business processes, and explore/refine improved deployment and distribution processes. For example, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)-USNORTHCOM Ardent Sentry 05 exercise not only included lift of 1.656 passengers and 65.5 tons of cargo to support the employment of Homeland Defense QRF and Joint Task Force-Civil Support elements, it also exercised Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) elements. JTF-PO is an evolving joint expeditionary capability to rapidly establish and operate an aerial port of debarkation and cargo distribution node. This force includes command and control (C2), airfield and distribution assessment, rapid port clearance, in-transit visibility (ITV), and movement control elements for distribution operations. The US Pacific Command (USPACOM) exercises in the
Republic of Korea (ROK), Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement and Integration (RSOMI) and Uchi Focus Lens provided similar venues for USTRANSCOM to integrate new processes to better support the joint warfighter.

Perhaps the most important of all our missions, but the least heralded, is the movement of injured soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilians from the battlefield to world-class medical treatment facilities. This is a complex, time-sensitive, process requiring close collaboration with doctors, military hospitals and our aero-medical evacuation crews to ensure that combat wounded or injured personnel move at exactly the correct time to the correct place - and this process works superbly. In 2006 over 7,500 patients were moved in the USCENTCOM AOR and over 15,000 patients were moved globally.

Should the worst occur and a warfighter perishes in the defense of our nation, USTRANSCOM ensures the most dignified transport of the honored dead from the battlefield to their final interment. Recently enacted legislation changed the way we transport the fallen, and we have been working closely with the Joint Staff (JS), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Services to develop a transportation strategy that ensures our fallen warfighters return home on military or military-contracted aircraft with honor and dignity to the military or civilian airfield nearest the designated destination. To date, we have provided this transportation for 103 of our fallen.

**LEADING THE JOINT DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION ENTERPRISE TRANSFORMATION**

**Process and Systems Transformations**

As we conduct the missions of today, we are transforming the JDDE to meet both the changing environment of current operations and rapid global mobility and distribution requirements of the future force.

Guiding our transformation efforts is the DOD sanctioned and the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee approved Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept (JL(D)JIC). This keystone document directs the
development of joint capabilities to enhance the movement and sustainment of joint forces. Leading this important work is USTRANSCOM, exercising our responsibilities as the global mobility force provider and Distribution Process Owner.

The JDOE includes the equipment, procedures, leaders and connectivity necessary to conduct joint distribution operations. When fully developed, the JDOE will be a single unified enterprise with well-defined authorities, metrics, business rules, and integrated capabilities that can precisely and reliably see and direct the flow of forces and sustainment.

Transformation is driving us to rethink how we conduct business. We are moving toward arrangements with private industry that are geared towards performance and integrated customer focused solutions. An example of this business transformation is the Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative (DTCI). USTRANSCOM, in partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Military Services, is currently selecting a transportation services coordinator to manage DOD freight movements in the Continental United States (CONUS). This transportation services coordinator will have visibility of CONUS freight movements enabling load consolidation, use of more cost effective inter-modal solutions, and more intelligent scheduling. These improvements will increase the precision and reliability of freight movement which will lead to increased customer confidence, cost savings and more effective employment of our workforce. Use of a single coordinator will also help generate relevant metrics that can be used to drive continual process improvements across our distribution system.

Industry has experienced cost savings on average of 12 percent through partnering with transportation services providers. Today, seventy-eight percent of US companies and eighty-two percent of Fortune 100 companies use transportation management services. DOD is several years behind industry and we are acting now to capitalise on this industry best practice. Analyses
suggest cost savings in the fifteen percent range annually over the life of a 7-year contract. DTCI is an example of how we will leverage commercial best practices to provide best value to our defense customers.

Just as DTCI will improve commercial transportation, USTRANSCOM’s Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) concept is improving integration of strategic and theater distribution. This year we published the second edition of the JDDOC template which every regional CINCOM has used to tailor their organic JDDOCs. Currently, we are planning a third edition to include metrics, elaborate on forward deployed JDDOC operations and how enhanced JDDOCs can best address broad theater logistics issues.

As we work hard to increase the reliability and precision of our processes, the ability to measure system performance becomes increasingly important. This year we began measuring system performance through Integrated Distribution Lanes, where the warfighting customer defines the output of the distribution systems in terms of on-time delivery. USTRANSCOM, in our role as DPO, then takes appropriate action with our components, national partners, and services to ensure the logistics system, writ large, delivers the outcome defined by the warfighter. We are already achieving substantial improvements in delivery times, and we expect to make continued improvements to the largest and most diverse supply chain that exists today.

In the current high-paced operating environment, commanders need timely and accurate supply chain information to inform operational decision making. With this in mind, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics designated USTRANSCOM to be the Department’s functional proponent for Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and related Automated Identification Technology (AIT) implementation. Under the new designation, USTRANSCOM will execute an AIT implementation strategy and develop a corporate approach for use of these asset visibility technologies. Major responsibilities include developing an integrated AIT concept of operation to
provide end-to-end visibility, incorporating RFID and related AIT in the DPO architecture, overseeing data quality and performance using Portfolio Management methodology, championing funding and synchronizing RFID implementation.

We have already implemented active RFID technology at our strategic ports to provide COCOMs detailed tracking information on the movement of cargo throughout the transportation system and have begun passive RFID implementation at state-side aerial ports to improve tracking of air shipment cargo. USTRANSCOM is also evaluating the use of satellite technology to track container movements in the EUCOM AOR. Our goal on the AIT front is to craft a strategy that delivers the optimal AIT and corresponding logistics solutions which provide the warfighter with end-to-end visibility of forces and material moving through the DOD supply chain.

Given the ever increasing need for information, one key responsibility is the management of the portfolio of information technology (IT) systems which provide that information. Historically, IT resources have been managed and acquired as stand-alone systems rather than integral parts of a net-centric capability. This has the effect of allowing duplicative investment in systems or platforms that deliver the same or similar capabilities, limiting the ability to share information or fully incorporate doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and leadership factors. To mitigate this problem, DOD designated USTRANSCOM the Distribution Portfolio Manager (DPM).

Managing distribution systems as a portfolio of capabilities will align IT with the needs of the warfighter. This approach will provide the structure for a balanced strategy based on enterprise level planning, integrated architectures and warfighter proposed performance measures.

An example of this integration is the convergence of Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) Integrated Data Environment (IDE) logistics system and USTRANSCOM's Global Transportation Network (GTN). USTRANSCOM is partnering
with DLA and JS-J4 to bring these programs together under the same acquisition management framework. Converging these two systems will create a powerful environment for managing integrated supply, distribution, and logistics information. Another area of integration is the Port Management Automation (PMA) initiative. PMA will support integration of the Worldwide Port System and its manifesting functionality into the existing Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES) to achieve a single joint port operations and manifesting system. Convergence of these distribution systems will increase logistics information sharing across DOD, enhance customer visibility and reduce costs.

In collaboration with the Air Force and Defense Finance and Accounting Service, we are replacing outdated, unreliable billing and accounting processes and systems, transforming the financial management of our $5 billion enterprise with the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS). With implementation of Version 1.1 in FY07, DEAMS will provide the warfighter with near real-time accurate and reliable financial information. This cross-service application, when fielded, will set the standard for effective and efficient stewardship of Defense Working Capital Fund resources.

We are also modernizing our border clearance process by exploring an integrated system that will enable automated customs clearance in most if not all theaters of operation. We believe the single system will streamline the process, improve host nation confidence, and minimize cargo delays for the warfighter.

Finally, in the area of patient movement we are continuing development of the TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRACES). When fully operational in FY09, this system will provide direct support of DOD patient movement requirements and provide a web- and client-
based system capable of In-Transit Visibility (ITV), as well as trend analysis.

As with any similar effort, the maturity and completeness of our portfolio management strategy will produce results over time; however, we have already seen a substantial return on our efforts to date.

Organizational Realignment/Personnel Issues

Although vital to what we do, the JDEE is more than just processes and systems. It's really about people, and USTRANSCOM is focusing on initiatives that will provide for the needs of the warfighter. First, we are developing organizational structures, both in the distribution network and at USTRANSCOM, to enhance the responsiveness of the JDEE. We are developing deployable distribution command and control concepts, procedures, and associated doctrine to enable the combatant commanders to execute theater logistics operations with greater visibility, control, precision and efficiency. Functional elements like JTP-FO mentioned earlier and the Director Mobility Forces-Surface (DM4-S) were created to support deployment and distribution activities. The CM4-S will synchronize and direct movement of surface transportation resources, ensuring optimum throughput at ports of debarkation (air and sea) in the theater as prescribed by the Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander.

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process has presented USTRANSCOM the unique opportunity to establish a modern command and control structure. This important organizational realignment, in addition to achieving BRAC savings two years earlier, accomplishes several important things as USTRANSCOM looks to the future. First, it consolidates, at Scott AFB, the SSDC Command Center currently in Alexandria, VA with its execution arm currently at Ft. Rustis, VA. Second, it allows USTRANSCOM to consolidate acquisition and contracting into a single, acquisition center of excellence focused on delivering integrated logistics support solutions for our
customers. Third, it has enabled the creation of the Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center (JDAPAC) by consolidating analytical elements of USTRANSCOM, AMC and SDDC. This concentration of analysis and engineering expertise will offer unprecedented end-to-end distribution modeling and simulation capability, advanced operations research techniques, and sophisticated engineering tools to bear on complex distribution problems. In summary, by consolidating locations and concentrating joint business and analytical processes, BRAC will drive efficiencies and enhance DTS performance for the next 20 years. Availability of BRAC appropriations for personnel and military construction remains key to timely execution of this effort.

In parallel with BRAC transformation, we are transforming intelligence operations. In April 2006, USTRANSCOM established the Joint Intelligence Operations Center-Transportation (JIOC-TRANS) to enhance integration of intelligence, operations, and plans, to provide time-sensitive intelligence in support of global operations, and to strengthen our ability to conduct intelligence analysis. Focused on providing support to the deployment and distribution process, the JIOC-TRANS ensures intelligence capabilities and disciplines are optimally employed and synchronized within the defense intelligence enterprise.

The military’s strength is our people, and we must all make continuous improvements to the quality of life of our warfighters. Moving is a particularly stressful event for service members and DOD civilians, and damage to personal property makes it even more difficult. In response, SDDC is developing the Families First Program - a comprehensive program that revamps DOD household goods movements to include full replacement value for lost or damaged personal property. The program is also shifting practices by allowing customers to go online to rate transportation service providers,
obtain online counseling via the web, and file personal property claims directly with the transportation service provider.

We are also operating Patriot Express commercial passenger service between the continental United States and our forward operating locations. In the Pacific, we recently completed an OED-directed restructuring that eliminated a $13 million loss, while retaining this desirable transportation service to mainland Japan and Okinawa. This year, we are reviewing our European route structure and the protected bases that support CENTCOM movements.

Finally, to ensure the viability and vitality of the JDBE, we are developing joint logisticians - military and civilian personnel trained to manage deployment and distribution for warfighters in joint, inter-agency, and multinational environments. We are working with commercial industry, civilian institutions specializing in logistics education, and USJPFCOM’s Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability to develop training opportunities. Furthermore, we have teamed with the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to bring enhanced joint logistician training to the classroom, culminating in the graduation of 16 students with a concentration in Supply Chain Management in the class of 2006.

Maintaining Airlift Readiness for Mission Execution

In addition to world-class people, the reliability and precision of the JDBE depends on ensuring those people have world-class equipment to operate. As we look to the future, rapid global mobility will be a key enabler to the effectiveness of the joint force. As response times for forces shrink from weeks to hours, our ability to rapidly aggregate and then move operational capabilities forward will depend on versatile, ready and effective mobility forces.

However, much of our mobility force structure requires modernization or recapitalization, and my top priority is to work with the Air Force to
recapitalize our aging tanker fleet. The current fleet consists of 531 Eisenhower-era KC-135s and 68 Reagan-era KC-10s. The Air Force needs to recap its KC-135 fleet with the KC-X, as well as retire those KC-135s that are no longer able to fly or are mission ineffective. The replacement KC-X must be a multi-mission aircraft capable of multi-point refueling, have significant cargo and passenger carrying capability, and be equipped with appropriate self-protection systems. The next generation tanker, the KC-X, will not only fulfill its primary refueling role, but also provide an array of enhanced mobility solutions. A tailored cargo and passenger carrying capability will revolutionize our transportation options and mitigate wear on the C-17, C-5, and C-130s by decreasing force closure times and lessening the burden on our strategic lift fleet.

The KC-10 fleet remains a viable platform through 2040, but it must be modified to ensure the fleet can operate in the future global airspace environment. To this end, AMC has initiated a KC-10 aircraft modernization program that complies with international airspace requirements, addresses obsolescence concerns, and provides a growth path for future avionics upgrades.

In addition to recapitalizing the tanker fleet, AMC is modernizing the C-5 fleet. C-5 modernization will deliver needed capability to the warfighter through the year 2040, while improving force closure and increasing the number of available C-5s with its unmatched outsized and oversized, roll-on / roll-off capability -- at a substantially reduced cost of operation. The modernization includes avionics upgrades, new engines, and other reliability enhancements to increase aircraft availability, enable access to international airspace and foreign airfields, while reducing fuel consumption by up to ten percent and lowering operations costs. To effectively support the National Defense Strategy, we need the C-5's unique lift capabilities in combination with the C-17. In short, C-5 modernization
is an essential companion to the remaining C-17 procurement to meet known mobility requirements.

Another key component to our global mobility posture is providing regional COCOMs with theater aerial delivery and distribution capability. Air Reserve Component C-130 E/W/J personnel demobilization and C-130 structural fatigue place a burden on our capability to meet this critical requirement. Since October 2004, we have had 115 C-130s grounded or restricted due to problems with the center wing box (CWB). Over the past year alone, three Air Force C-130s were grounded and another 14 were restricted from normal flying operations. The Air Force has had near term success in repairing 17 of these CWBs and plans on repairing or replacing more, but this is not the permanent solution. Additionally, C-130 variants have experienced other challenges in the areas of noncompliance with global air traffic regulatory requirements, aircraft capability and sustainment, and long-term combat effectiveness. The Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) seeks to address these issues with standardized avionics upgrades. We would also ask that Congress allow the Air Force to selectively retire some of the oldest aircraft, allowing the Air Force to manage the new and legacy aircraft fleet to best effect.

While the C-130 remains a work horse for intra-theater lift, it does not fully meet the Joint Force need to go the "last tactical mile". The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) will be capable of meeting this joint force requirement. Procurement of the JCA, coupled with the repair and replacement of the CWB on select C-130s, will enable us to attain the right mix of aircraft to meet COCOM requirements.

Another tool in our tactical airlift arsenal is the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS). Currently under development, JPADS is the “Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)” of logistics, and gives us the ability to provide precision airdrop from higher altitudes, thereby dramatically
reducing the threat to our air crews and personnel on the ground. JPADS provides a four-fold increase in accuracy over previous ballistic airdrop systems and can deliver to multiple drop zones on a single pass. We have had 147 drops during OEF and will continue to collaborate with the Services to ensure the capability reaches its full potential.

The ability to rapidly offload cargo, while cannot be overlooked - and that ability resides in our Turner and Halvorsen loaders. We currently have funded for the full complement of 318 Turner loaders, but only 391 of 538 Halvorsens. USTRANSCOM strongly supports the Air Force acquisition of these remaining assets to properly outfit the Nation's air distribution "system".

Our entire air mobility and air refueling fleet is a critical capability in our nation's ability to project power. But the expertise on the ground which provides command and control, on-load/off-load capability, and ground maintenance in potentially hostile environments is equally important. AMC's capability to rapidly deploy into an austere, not totally secured environment, quickly assess an airbase and begin airfield operations is the Contingency Response Wing. This highly capable force multiplier also provides the core contingent, coupled with forces from the Army and eventually the Navy, to integrate air and surface lines of communications for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration in the form of Joint Task Force-Port Opening.

Maintaining Sealift Readiness

On the sealift side, our efforts parallel the air - targeted investments in readiness, recapitalization of aging force structure and improvements in how we maintain our organic fleet. We are in the process of "right-sizing" the strategic sealift fleet by transferring older, lower utility ships out of the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). Currently, the RRF consists of 44 ships, from a high of 102 in 1994. The funding that had been programmed for the maintenance of those retired vessels will now be used to
maintain and extend the service life of the remaining vessels, fund
enhancements to increase efficiency and safety, and leverage our commercial
partners to recapitalize lost capacity.

Vital to conduct any war or contingency is the requirement for enormous
quantities of fuel and USTRANSCOM is working with MSC to recapitalize their
aging tanker capability as well. International regulations and commercial
refinery standards limit the age of tankers loading and discharging at most
worldwide oil terminals to a maximum of 25 years. MSC’s fleet of T-5 fuel
tankers will exceed their useful age in 2010. In preparation, we are
pursuing the long-term charter of U.S. manufactured commercial tankers to
transport DDG fuel.

We are also looking forward to replacing our 40-year old Offshore
Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS) tanker this June. Replacing this OPDS
vessel with a modern technology ship will significantly enhance our
capability to support the warfighter with fuel over the shore when access to
ports is unavailable.

To further shore up our strategic sealift capability, we fully support
the Navy’s effort to exercise purchase options on the ships employed in the
Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program. Apart from the support they
provide for the Marine Corps’ prepositioning requirements, these ships have
the dual use of providing transportation capacity for surge and sustainment
missions. Each of the charters includes favorable purchase options.

**Maintaining Infrastructure Readiness**

USTRANSCOM is working with our national partners at the Department of
Transportation (DOT) to balance peacetime and wartime surface movement
requirements on the US highway system. Through our Highways for National
Defense Program, we are preparing for the reauthorisation of Surface
Transportation legislation required in FY 2010 by updating the Strategic
Highway Network. We are concentrating on congestion, condition, and capacity.
issues with our intermodal deployment routes. We will continue our close coordination efforts with DOT, the Federal Highway Administration, and the States, through the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials to identify defense requirements. We urge Congress to ensure that defense public highway needs are included in future national highway programs.

We are also focusing significant attention and resources on critical infrastructure supporting global mobility. Beginning in the late 1990s, USTRANSCOM, the geographic COCOMs, Joint Staff, Defense Logistics Agency, and the Services implemented a comprehensive plan to improve strategic mobility support capabilities. This year, USEUCOM and USPACOM En-Route Infrastructure Steering Committees approved over $1.2 billion in construction projects to upgrade fuel receipt and storage, fuel hydrant systems, ramps, and runways at 13 key installations.

We are looking to expand our reach into regions of increasing national interest and potential instability, most notably Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America. We participated in OSD strategy-led visits to all the regional COCOMs to better understand emerging contingency plans and to champion the need for mobility-capable cooperative security locations to support these plans. We also led the first Global En-Route Infrastructure Steering Committee to prioritize joint military construction projects to expand global mobility capabilities. Like the force structure that moves our forces, infrastructure is a cornerstone of our ability to project national power.

**Protecting our Forces**

Protecting our forces is also foundational to accomplishing our global mission. We are leading the DOD in integration of best security practices for securing and protecting cargo. Sharing force protection information is crucial and our Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP) is fostering
information sharing with the DOD, DOT, US Coast Guard, and the Transportation Security Agency. The CIP enables global mobility by mitigating identified risks to our critical worldwide physical and cyber transportation infrastructures. SDGC is working with the Association of American Railroads and other key commercial partners to obtain "secure" modes of communication. These same partners are being integrated into regular force protection meetings to facilitate community-wide infrastructure and force security.

Each of our components is also working to improve threat protection measures for their specific missions. At our seaports we are making improvements such as waterside barriers, security equipment and guard positions. AMC is pursuing the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures system in order to detect and defeat advanced, man-portable air defense systems which are the number one threat to mobility aircraft worldwide. To address the radar-guided missiles and anti-aircraft artillery threat, AMC will be fielding the Advanced Situational Awareness Countermeasures system. This system provides mobility aircrews the capability to avoid radar-guided threats and countermeasures to defeat threats when avoidance is not possible. To help secure our sealift assets, MRC is integrating Navy Embarked Security Teams. In the area of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive, we are working with the Joint Staff on individual protective equipment and related technological improvements.

As the Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSCOM supports all initiatives to authenticate drivers and workers in the distribution supply chain. In CONUS, interoperability between the Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) and the TSA Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) programs will eventually enable driver identity authentication via compatible biometric credentials at multiple locations, authenticating the identity of drivers as they move between forts, ports and bases. In the interim, SDGC will vet contractors and stevedores in conjunction with the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC) as MSC currently does for its ship's crew and associated support personnel.

Improved supply chain security includes protecting our Military Ocean Terminals. We must provide a trained and capable security force at adequate levels to protect critical infrastructure. Currently, SDDC augments security of commercial strategic seaports through contracts with local law enforcement and occasional utilization of Army Reserve military police personnel.

**Fiscal Stewardship**

USTRANSCOM, as a combatant command, is focused on effectiveness in our supporting role to the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs). However, we are at the same time decidedly mindful of cost.

USTRANSCOM is intensely aware of our role as stewards of a not insignificant portion of the Nation’s treasure. As such we are constantly looking to find efficiencies. This year we implemented a cost-management process that allows us to capture cost avoidance information across the enterprise. From October 2005 through September 2006, USTRANSCOM avoided $496.68 million in distribution costs: by shifting to less costly transportation modes; by incorporating challenge protocols which validate a customer's requests for high-cost transportation options; by scheduling efficiencies; and, by negotiating least cost transportation strategies with our Service customers.

**Maintaining Partnerships**

Critical to the success of any enterprise is mutually supporting relationships with partner organizations, and our enterprise is no different. A critical partner in our nation's ability to project and sustain forces is a viable Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Therefore, to ensure Craf's future viability, we have proposed legislation to incentivize our commercial airline partners to maintain the size and type of lift capability DOD needs in the future. This "assured business" initiative is designed to preserve the core
of our CRAF incentives by assuring business in an amount no greater than 80% of a five year average of peacetime commercial contracts in a "take or pay" arrangement. To further ensure CRAF's viability we enthusiastically support the Fly America Act (49 USC 40118) and the Fly CRAF Act (49 USC 41106).

On the cargo side, USTRANSCOM has awarded an International Heavyweight Express (IHX) contract to our commercial partners for cargo from 151-300 pounds. This fills a much needed customer requirement for an express freight option for items up to 300 pounds.

Through the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), the DOD obtains wartime sealift capability from commercial sources utilizing privately owned, US Flag vessels, US citizen crews and the use of these shipper's global intermodal networks. The success of this important national program is based on a two-way value proposition: for the DOD we receive assured access to vessels and intermodal equipment; we receive significant cost savings by relying on existing commercial capacity; and, we avoid significant up-front capital investment. On the commercial side, our partners receive payments under the MSP and priority access to US government cargoes. Unfortunately, recent budget rescissions to the MSP program have threatened this vital relationship, and we are engaged with others in the Executive Branch on that issue. As an additional measure to ensure a viable US maritime industry, we are investigating the feasibility of an assured business incentive for the US flag maritime industry that parallels that which we propose for the CRAF.

Finally, we are strengthening our relations with partner's strategic seaports through our involvement in the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN). The NPRN ensures military and commercial seaport systems are ready to support deployment of military cargo.

In an increasingly global environment we are operating with our allies to ensure smooth distribution operations. Currently, we dialogue with them to
exchange knowledge and determine how to best integrate our lift capabilities. Our allies in Australia, Canada and NATO plan to procure C-17 aircraft that will increase strategic airlift capability. Additionally, we are making excellent use of international agreements to further integrate our logistics systems with those of key allies. We have a Mutual Airlift Support Agreement with the Republic of Korea which provides access to Korean commercial aircraft to augment our own capacity in the event of hostilities in Korea. In addition, we use the acquisition and cross-servicing authorities provided by law to provide and obtain reimbursable logistic support in over 30 countries.

Looking Ahead

As the services evolve to meet future challenges, we must be in concert with them, anticipating their requirements for innovative mobility and distribution strategies. To meet those challenges we are exploring new ways to provide support to the future force.

In collaboration with our partners we are using our Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funding line to leverage emerging technologies. Two examples are the JPADS-Mission Planner, which makes possible precision delivery of sustainment to isolated areas in mountainous Afghanistan; and the Wireless Gate Release System, which automates the release of air drop bundles, doubling the C-130 JPADS delivery capacity and reducing damage to cargo.

We are also testing common modular containers and platforms that can be moved by sea, air or land transport without re-handling or repackaging; that can be quickly reconfigured for movement within a theater of operations; and that are equipped with tracking technologies to permit seamless movement through the global distribution system. Known as the Joint Modular Intermodal Distribution System, or JMIIDS, this Joint Capability Technology Demonstration is designed to improve end-to-end distribution from sources of supply to point of effect while reducing the logistics footprint in theater.
Likewise, we are implementing a single transportation tracking number - much like commercial industry - to more simply track material as it moves around the globe.

We are participating in the capabilities-based assessment for the role of Sea Basing spanning the range of military operations in the 2015-2025 timeframe. The success of Sea Basing relies heavily on advances in the areas of cargo handling, ship-to-ship cargo transfers, sea state mitigation through sea state four and high-speed connectors. The evolution of the Joint Sea Base further highlights the need for a high-speed surface connector to bridge the gap between high-speed airlift and low-speed sealift for transport of forces and sustainment. This is the capability we seek in the Joint High Speed Vessel initiative.

AMC is working on its Global Mobility Concept of Operations which outlines how future mobility forces will operate from now until 2025. The framework it lays out centers on five operational capabilities: airlift, air refueling, expeditionary air mobility operations, space lift, and special operations forces mobility.

With our military operations being conducted in austere locations around the globe, modernizing our theater airlift fleet with highly capable aircraft is vital. To illuminate this requirements array, we are conducting a study titled the Joint Future Theater Airlift Capabilities Assessment (JFTACA). This effort will provide an analysis of future joint theater airlift requirements to include fixed-wing, rotary-wing, potentially lighter than air, and precision airdrop capabilities.

**FINAL THOUGHTS**

As the Geographic Combatant Commanders reorient their capabilities and forces to be more agile in the Global War on Terrorism; to prepare for increasingly asymmetrical challenges around the world; and, to hedge against
uncertainty in the longer term, so must USTRANSCOM rethink our capabilities, forces and processes. We are implementing enterprise-wide changes to ensure that our organization, its processes and procedures support those GCC vectors.

Our DPO initiatives are paying substantial dividends now in effective support to the warfighter and in efficient use of our national resources. Our readiness and modernization initiatives will ensure the combatant commander’s ability to swiftly engage and defeat America’s enemies or provide relief to populations in need. USTRANSCOM will keep looking to the future and advocate systems and processes to move America’s military might at yet greater distances and speeds with a keen eye on cost, value and efficiency.

I could not be prouder of the USTRANSCOM team and our national partners. Today, we are supporting the GOMOT while providing consistent precision and velocity to ensure delivery of combat forces and humanitarian relief in support of National objectives. Together we are transforming the military deployment and distribution system, ensuring our nation’s ability to project national military power to engage America’s enemies or support our friends whenever and wherever the need may arise. In all of this, a promise given by us will be a promise kept.
POSTURE STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDS, UNITED STATES NAVY
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 110TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

21 MARCH 2007
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the environment in which we operate, the challenges we face, and what we are doing throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. I would like to begin by thanking the committee members, particularly those who have traveled to our region to gather first hand impressions. Most importantly, on behalf of all the members of the United States Southern Command, thank you, as a committee, for your continued support. We at Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) very much look forward to working with you and your staffs in the coming years.

Our mission is straight-forward: to promote security cooperation and conduct military operations with the 32 nations and 13 territories in the region to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Our mission enhances security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and, in so doing, ensures the forward defense of the United States. Our ability to accomplish this mission is significantly influenced by our understanding of the diverse environment in our hemisphere and the linkages that bind the Americas together.

LINKAGES

Our shared home is the Americas. We have much in common with our partners throughout the region; we share common interests and are dependent upon each other in many ways. There are numerous and compelling geographic, cultural, economic, political, and historical linkages that tie all of the nations of the Americas together and which must be understood in order for us to achieve our mission.

Nearly half a billion people live in the SOUTHCOM region – roughly one half of this hemisphere’s population. Our area of responsibility covers roughly one sixth of the earth’s surface
and is bounded by large bodies of water, making the maritime environment of great importance. The people of this part of the world have diverse and rich heritages and languages. A growing part of the population has strong cultural, political and economic ties to the United States. In 2000, for example, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that the number of Hispanics in America accounted for 12 percent of our population. Today the government estimates the figure as approximately 15 percent, with more than 40 million U.S. citizens of Hispanic origin. This figure is expected to grow rapidly in the coming decades, making the U.S. very soon the second most populous country of Spanish-speakers in the world. This significant cultural and human linkage between the U.S. and the region is underscored by the almost 15 million U.S. citizens who traveled to Latin America and the Caribbean in each of the past two years, with an almost equal number of our neighbors coming north.

The economic linkage between the nations of the Americas has risen dramatically over the last decade, with north-south trade comprising almost 40 percent of U.S. total global trade in 2005. Trade between the U.S. and SOUTHCOM’s partner nations in Latin America and the Caribbean increased 22 percent between 2004 and 2005, with considerable repeat growth last year; and further substantial growth is predicted as a result of the Free Trade Agreements we have with a number of countries in the region. In particular, we also currently have a unique and valuable opportunity to strengthen our economic ties to Colombia, Peru, and Panama through the passage of Free Trade Agreements with these key friends to foster economic security, stability, and prosperity there.

The U.S. also imports over 50 percent of its oil from the Western Hemisphere, with 34 percent coming from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2005 – outweighing the 22 percent imported from the Middle East. An important facilitator to this critical trade throughout the Americas is the Panama Canal, which sees almost 15,000 ships transit each year, of which two thirds are going to or from one of our coasts in the U.S. The canal, in effect, is the economic heartbeat of the Americas.
Panama recently passed an important referendum to expand the canal to allow for a projected twofold increase in throughput capacity, which would certainly build upon the growing economic interdependence of this hemisphere.

Beyond the cultural and economic linkages, perhaps the most important connection we share with the region is a social and political sense that respects democracy, freedom, justice, human dignity, human rights, and human values. We share the belief that these democratic principles must be at the core of what we accomplish in the region and that free governments should be accountable to their people and govern effectively. This common belief is most evident as expressed in the first article of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: “The people of the Americas have the right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. Democracy is essential for the social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the Americas.” The rest of this tremendous consensus document of the Americas goes on to further reinforce our shared values and our goal of strengthening representative democracy in the region. We have made great strides over the last two decades in helping democratic values spread, with all but one leader in the Americas having been democratically elected.

We are passionate about the linkages we share in this hemisphere. We at SOUTHCOM dedicate a good portion of our time to studying these connections, and we firmly believe that our region is inextricably linked to the economic, political, cultural, and security fabric of the United States. Understanding these linkages helps us make the best use of our resources in order to better secure the U.S. and to help extend peace and prosperity to the entire region.

**CHALLENGES**

Beyond the understanding of these critical linkages, we at SOUTHCOM also devote a considerable amount of energy to the study of the significant challenges confronting the region – challenges such as crime, gangs, and illegal drug trafficking as primary examples. These challenges
loom large for many nations in the region; they are transnational, adaptive, and insidious threats to those seeking peace and stability. By their nature, these challenges cannot be countered by one nation alone. Therefore, they require cooperative solutions involving a unified, full-spectrum governmental and international approach in order to best address them.

In many cases, the main source for these challenges stems from the underlying conditions of poverty and inequality that are prevalent in most of the area. According to 2005 United Nations statistics, about 40 percent of the region’s inhabitants are living in poverty, defined as an income of less than two U.S. dollars per day. Of that number, about 16 percent are living in extreme poverty – less than one dollar per day. Couple these poverty figures with the most unequal distribution of wealth for any of the world’s regions, and you have a catalyst for potential social and political insecurity and instability.

Stemming from these underlying conditions, illegal drugs and crime are the most pressing security concerns for this part of the world – and based upon the region’s proximity and linkages to the U.S., a security concern here at home as well. The Andean Ridge in South America is the world’s leading source of coca cultivation, and despite international efforts and record interdictions and seizures, the region still produces enough cocaine to meet demand here in the U.S. and a growing demand abroad.

A close corollary to the illegal drug trade is the alarming growth of criminal activity in the region – some of which is a byproduct of the drug trade but just as much stems from the region’s extensive poverty and inequality. Violence is now among the five principal causes of death in several countries in the area. The annual homicide rate for Latin America and the Caribbean is among the highest in the world, with 25 homicides per 100,000 people compared to Africa’s 22 and the U.S.’s 5.5. In Central America, Haiti, Jamaica, and major cities in Brazil, gangs and criminal violence are a security priority, with some gang population estimates reaching into the hundreds of
thousands. These gangs do not just pose a concern in Latin America. They have spread from Los Angeles and New York to around your homes in northern Virginia and my home in southern Florida. Members cross borders, moving drugs and money. This is an issue not just for our partners in the region, but for Americans on our own soil.

The costs associated with violence in the region are difficult to assess, but according to the Inter-American Development Bank, they were estimated as close to 15 percent of Gross Domestic Product across this part of the world in 2005. This inhibits efforts to alleviate the underlying conditions of poverty and inequality.

As stated earlier, we are fortunate as a hemisphere to have as neighbors democracies that virtually all share similar values with us. Unfortunately, poverty, inequality, and security challenges all contribute to a growing, frustrated expectation from the people for dramatic change. We have seen instances in some countries where “change agents” have successfully campaigned on themes of radical change, with promises of achieving sweeping results through unorthodox and unproven economic and political policies. We will closely follow any developments in the degradation or dismantling of democratic institutions in these countries and any security crisis that follows from destabilizing political and/or economic policies. In some cases, we have the complicated task of maintaining working relationships with a nation’s security forces in the face of antagonistic political leadership and attempts to spread anti-U.S. views and influence. This situation exacerbates the already difficult mission of achieving regional cooperation to address ever-changing and insidious transnational challenges.

COMMAND PRIORITIES

Within this diverse environment, with its compelling hemispheric linkages and its significant region-wide challenges, we at Southern Command have several key priority focus areas, discussed below.
First and foremost is the hostage situation in Colombia. Not a day goes by without our team focusing on the plight of Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes. These three men are American hostages who have been held captive by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) for over four years, having first been taken into captivity on 13 February 2003. The safe recovery of our countrymen is our top priority. We search every day for leads that will help bring these Americans home. Finding them is of utmost importance to SOUTHCOM.

Another focus area, associated with the hostage situation, is the overall security challenge in Colombia. Over the last decade, Colombia has achieved great success in its complex struggle for peace and security. Ten years ago, the headlines coming out of Colombia resembled the worst of those to come out of any war-torn country: beheadings, kidnappings, torture, and bombings occurred essentially daily. Through its own interagency efforts and a welcomed steady stream of resources and support from the U.S., Colombia has battled from the brink of chaos to a far better situation in terms of peace and stability. Last year marked the lowest homicide rate in two decades. At great effort, the government has established secure police force presence in all of its 1,098 municipalities, significantly deterring crime and terrorist incidents. This increased security presence, coupled with significant operational successes against the FARC, has contributed to the fastest sustained economic growth in a decade – over five percent annually for the past two years – and has encouraged a real sense of positive momentum for the entire country.

These hard-fought successes, however, need continued U.S. support and steadfast effort from the Colombian government in order to fully win the peace for the country. Southern Command continues to be a steady partner to our Colombian counterparts and is constantly striving to advise and assist them as they plan for the future. In addition to supporting Colombia, countering any expansion of FARC activity into neighboring countries is also part of our focus.
As in all Combatant Commands, support for the Global War on Terror is a major priority for SOUTHCOM. We remain vigilant and are constantly working with our partners in the U.S. interagency and with our partners in the region to keep our nation secure. I would characterize our region as being a highly-likely base for future terrorist threats. Members, facilitators, and sympathizers of Islamic terrorist organizations are present throughout the region. Hizballah appears to be the most prominent group active in the region, and while much of their activity is currently linked to revenue generation, there are indications of an operational presence and the potential for attacks. The Hizballah network in the region is suspected of supporting the terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 and again in 1994. We suspect that a similar operational support network exists today and could be leveraged in the future.

We have seen successes in mitigating Islamic terrorist activity in the region. Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina have made progress in working together to address terrorism and illicit criminal activity through the Tri-border Commission's 3+1 conference. A Regional Intelligence Center, located in Brazil and staffed by agents from all three countries, is nearly operational. Throughout 2006, countries in the region have taken action against terrorist-linked supporters and facilitators. In January 2006, Colombian authorities dismantled a complex document forgery ring with alleged ties to indigenous and Islamic terrorist organizations. Also in early 2006, Brazilian authorities arrested a suspect linked to the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination. We will continue to work with our partner nations throughout the region to maximize counter-terrorist successes and ultimately deny, disrupt, dissuade, and deter terrorist and terrorist-associated activities in the area.

Southern Command's most visible assignment in the Global War on Terror is conducted at the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo by Joint Task Force – Guantanamo. We conduct safe, humane, legal, and transparent detention operations in compliance with the laws of our nation, Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act, all interrogation operations comply with the interrogation techniques prescribed in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, and all detention and interrogation operations are conducted humanely. Both I and members of my staff make frequent inspection visits to our facilities at Guantanamo and we are in constant communication with the Task Force Commander.

As detailed earlier, a key challenge for the region is the spread and breadth of criminal activity and illegal drug trafficking. As a priority, we work with our counterparts throughout the region to assist them in their attempt to cope with the serious effect gangs and criminal activities have on their ability to govern. In some instances, due to a lack of enough trained law enforcement entities, countries’ militaries have been asked to assist in combating these violent gangs.

The situation in Cuba and any potential repercussions from the end of Fidel Castro’s rule are another set of our priorities. We are concerned that Cuba’s poor socio-economic conditions and repressive regime, combined with a leadership change, could spark mass migration, and we are ready to assist the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to respond if mass migration occurs.

PROMISES

As evinced by the already strong linkages we share as a hemisphere, we believe that if we were able to overcome the region’s challenges to security and prosperity, we would be able to unlock the true promise of the Americas: the promise of a secure, prosperous, and democratic hemisphere that works together to face threats to peace and stability.

The word ‘promise’ has two appropriate meanings for how SOUTHCOM approaches its role in the region and for our view of the future for this hemisphere. On one hand, a promise is a commitment honestly undertaken and executed by two or more parties. In this case, SOUTHCOM
is committed to lasting and beneficial partnerships with the countries in the region. Encouraging regional partnerships has been a cornerstone of our strategy for many years and a formal strategic objective for the last four years. Our "promise" entails fulfilling the commitment of being a good partner and pursuing better cooperative security arrangements in order to face together the tough challenges that confront us now and into the future.

Promise can also mean "potential" – the potential to do something vital and important; the potential to be something special and extraordinary. We believe that through lasting partnerships, we can help achieve the security conditions necessary to create the enduring basis for prosperity and healthy democratic institutions in this important region. This is the promise of a hemisphere free of gangs and drugs; free of human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism; free of repressive regimes; it is the promise of all of us together finding cooperative solutions to demanding security challenges.

Our goal at SOUTHCOM is simple: we will work with our partners to unlock this “Promise of the Americas.” Every day we strive to be engaged in a positive way with as many of our regional partners as possible, and in doing so, enhance the security of the United States while simultaneously enhancing their own security. The U.S. Southern Command strives to fulfill the promise of this region through military-to-military engagements that build the capacity of the nations in the region to protect their own sovereign territories. Given our close linkages, this increased capacity and stability will also provide a first line of defense for the United States.

In support of our goal, we employ a theater security cooperation strategy that calls for building host nation capabilities. Over time, these capabilities will ensure our partner nations have the means to control their borders and protect their citizens, while also deepening the roots of good governance. We also envision our partners being able to work together in a collective environment to be able to counter emerging and adapting threats. To this end, most of our military-to-military
engagement is in the form of training and education programs, joint exercises, peacekeeping, and other partnership programs.

**Education and Training**

Education, training, and military operations provide substance to our collective security agreements and contribute directly to building capability. Education and training are prerequisites to effective operations, while operations enable partner nations to protect and control their sovereign territories. Two institutions that provide formal education to nations in the Americas are the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.

The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) provides professional education and training – particularly in human rights – to select uniformed and civilian security forces of nations within the Western Hemisphere and operates in the context of the democratic principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States. Their curriculum is designed to foster mutual knowledge, transparency, confidence, and cooperation among the participating nations, as well as to promote democratic values, respect for human rights, and knowledge and understanding of U.S. customs and traditions. The student body of Western Hemisphere civilians and police personnel receives instruction in human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in a democratic society. Partner nations nominate students to attend this Defense Department school, and the State Department leads an interagency vetting process that examines each nominee prior to final selection.

The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is a regional academic forum offering strategic level defense and security cooperation, research, and dialogue for the promotion of effective security policies within the Western Hemisphere. The Center’s civilian and military graduates and partner institutions comprise communities of influence that work toward a more cooperative and
stable international security environment. The Center also facilitates NationLab Strategic Seminars at foreign national defense universities with a primary focus on national policy innovations for breaking the cycles of poverty, corruption, narco-trafficking, gangs, organized crime, and other key challenges in the region.

We have made tremendous progress in extending the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to partner nations throughout the theater. We truly appreciate Congress's delinking IMET from the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA). IMET's overarching training program, as executed by the Department of Defense, has trained tens of thousands of Latin American officers, enlisted, and defense civilian personnel, with graduates reaching the highest level of military and civil service. IMET is a key training program that, until Congress provided relief, had been subject to the provisions of ASPA. We are working vigorously to renew training opportunities throughout the region, including partner nations like Nicaragua, where an IMET graduate recently led the interception of 871 kilograms of cocaine.

As we seek to train the future defense leaders of our partner nations, we must also continue rigorous training of our own forces. The establishment of a Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program would consolidate all joint training initiatives and provide visibility and accountability in planning and executing our Joint exercise and engagement program. This program would make better use of existing training funds and provide the flexibility that is critical, given the complex and adaptive nature of our sustained operations in the Global War on Terrorism. CE2T2 funds are a consolidation of existing joint training resources and not a new or growth initiative.

Complementing formal education is a myriad of training exercises that improve capability and interoperability while building confidence and improving transparency. Medical readiness, disaster
relief, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime capabilities are all developed through a family of related exercises.

**Joint Exercises and Initiatives**

The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program provides training for U.S. Forces and provides tangible benefits to host nations in the form of medical clinics, schools, well drilling, and construction of rudimentary roads. As part of this program, Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) serve as a mutually-beneficial effort to improve medical treatment capacity of U.S. personnel while providing an invaluable service to citizens in partner nations who might otherwise never receive much needed treatment. U.S. medical personnel benefit by providing medical care in a challenging and often unique environment; local medical professionals develop closer relationships with U.S. medical personnel; and the population receives quality medical care. MEDRETEs create close human linkages amongst the people of our nations and generate tremendous goodwill towards the United States. In FY06 alone, our MEDRETEs treated 272,600 people and 41,000 animals and conducted 3,327 surgical procedures.

NEW HORIZONS are engineer-based humanitarian and civic assistance exercises that provide excellent training for U.S. forces and a tangible benefit to the nations in which the exercises are conducted. As an example, in 2006, a NEW HORIZONS project provided Peru with two clinics, one school, three wells and three MEDRETEs. We also conducted similar exercises in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Honduras, all benefiting the local populace and strengthening the ties that connect the Americas. The demonstrated goodwill and benefit generated by these exercises is immense.

Last year, 21 nations from the Caribbean and Central America came together for the FUERZAS ALIADAS HUMANITARIAS (Humanitarian Allied Forces) exercise to focus on regional cooperation and information sharing to prepare for humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
Fourteen military, government, and non-government regional organizations participated in this exercise. Emergency operations centers from the participating countries were linked to a single Partner Nation Network—a major step toward capacity building and information sharing.

The Humanitarian Assistance Program is another element of security cooperation that provides engagement opportunities for U.S. personnel while serving the basic social needs of the residents where exercises are conducted. Over 60 training projects in 22 countries were conducted in FY06 for $15.4 million, while another 116 projects in 25 countries are scheduled for FY07 with a budget of $13.2 million. These projects are conducted to contribute to the sustainment of regional partnerships.

FUERZAS COMANDO (Commando Forces) is a skill competition and senior leader seminar designed to enhance cooperation and trust between international Special Operations Forces while improving their training, readiness, and interoperability. A total of 15 countries from throughout the region participated in 2006. This exercise drew anti-terrorism experts from 15 countries who exchanged information and shared tactics, techniques, and procedures for counter-terrorist operations. FUERZAS COMANDO builds regional capability and supports our War on Terror efforts.

TRADEWINDS is a phased, joint, combined exercise that occurs throughout the Caribbean and is intended to improve the readiness of the Caribbean Basin nations to respond to transnational threats and disasters. Enhancing Caribbean regional capability supports the War on Terror and provides defense-in-depth for the United States.

PANAMAX is an annual multinational exercise tailored to the defense of the Panama Canal against asymmetric threats. For last year’s exercise, 17 nations from North America, South America, and Europe came together to work in unison to better prepare for today’s security challenges. The objectives of the exercise included the full integration of all participants into a
multi-national staff and concentrated on the Proliferation Security Initiative. This year we expect more than 20 participants.

Another key part of our military-to-military engagement strategy is our annual Partner Nation Communication and Collaboration conference that is hosted by a different partner nation each year. In 2006, it took place in Montevideo, Uruguay. This year we will gather in the Dominican Republic. This conference focuses on strategies to improve communication in order to respond to regional crises, such as disaster relief and peacekeeping operations.

**Peacekeeping and other Partnership Initiatives**

Peacekeeping, like MEDRETEs, crosses the boundary between training and operations. SOUTHCOM assists in enhancing the peacekeeping capacity of partner nations through the conduct of peacekeeping activities. The Department of State-funded and Department of Defense-executed Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is another excellent example of interagency cooperation. GPOI provides for the equipping and training of a multi-national Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) battalion of up to 650 soldiers from the Central American Armed Forces (CFAC). This battalion includes one infantry company each from Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. The GPOI program within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility also provides for the equipping and training of two specialized companies: a Military Police company from Guatemala and an Engineer company from Paraguay. These specific capabilities were requested by the United Nations. The CFAC battalion staff will participate in this year’s PANAMAX exercise as part of its operational preparation.

Yet another example of the peacekeeping operations ongoing within our region is the United Nations Stability Mission (MINUSTAH) in Haiti. Commanded by a Brazilian officer and manned by regional soldiers from many countries, MINUSTAH demonstrates the viability of our coalition approach to peacekeeping exercises and operations and the enduring value of regional cooperation.
This past year we held our first maritime Partnership of the Americas event. A portion of the GEORGE WASHINGTON Strike Group conducted unit-level training in the region where five partner nations conducted 24 community relations events in eleven countries. These countries included the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Honduras, and Trinidad and Tobago. We are planning a second Partnership of the Americas for 2007. In conjunction with this exercise, we will also leverage a world-wide U.S. Navy program called Project Handclasp that distributes humanitarian, educational, and goodwill materials to the needy in our partner nations. These materials are donated by the U.S. private sector and will be distributed by U.S. service members in conjunction with community service projects. This year we have received over 285,000 high-nutrition meals valued at over $70,000 through Project Handclasp for distribution throughout the region. We are also focusing this program elsewhere in the region to add impact to our outreach efforts.

We will deploy a U.S. Navy hospital ship (USNS COMFORT) to the Caribbean, Central America, and the Andean Ridge this summer to conduct theater security cooperation and humanitarian assistance operations. Like our MEDRETE exercises, these operations serve as a mutually-beneficial effort to hone the readiness skills of medical personnel of U.S. Armed Forces while helping to improve and save lives, reduce suffering, stimulate public health, and support the command’s theater security cooperation objectives. The COMFORT will visit various countries in a four-month deployment and treat as many as 70,000 patients. Non-governmental organizations, partner nation medical staff, and U.S. medical staff will work closely to aid those without access to medical service and build lasting relationships for the future.

In concert with the deployment of the COMFORT, we will deploy a U.S. Navy high-speed vessel (HSV SWIFT) to Central America and the Caribbean for six months this spring. The SWIFT would conduct training and exchanges with our partners in the region and participate in community
relations projects. The SWIFT deployment is part of a broader Global Fleet Station program designed by the Navy to provide flexible forward presence for theater security cooperation activities around the world.

The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a key tool in preventing terrorist groups from using our region as a staging ground for terror attacks against the United States and Partner Nations. CTFP goals are to build capabilities and capacity to combat terrorism and to develop a global network of "combating terrorism" experts and practitioners, all sharing common values, language, and understanding of the terrorism threat. The program is conducted through education and training seminars on intelligence gathering and sharing, senior level military education for both officers and enlisted soldiers, legal aspects in combating terrorism, civil-military responses to terrorism, countering ideological support for terrorism and its financing, and various maritime security procedures.

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is another example of successful collaboration that has had dramatic growth and benefit in our region over the past few years. The SPP links 20 U.S. states to 26 partner nations using the U.S. National Guard as the executive agent. In FY06, state National Guards conducted 149 separate events with partner nations. These events develop core competencies in regional military forces, promote the concept of citizen-soldiers as public servants, and reinforce our bilateral relationships.

Enduring Friendship is a regional multi-year initiative that provides maritime security assistance to select countries in the region. Enduring Friendship will strengthen partner nations' maritime domain awareness and operational capabilities to anticipate and respond to threats, maritime emergencies, and natural disasters, and will also enhance control over illicit trafficking lanes. This program will improve partner nation maritime command, control, and communications (C3)
capability; increase interoperability; and integrate maritime operational pictures, thus laying the foundation for maritime theater-wide information sharing and coalition operations.

The first of three Enduring Friendship phases focused on the Dominican Republic, Panama, Jamaica, and the Bahamas. Phase two will include Belize, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The Eastern Caribbean and the Regional Security Systems (RSS) countries will be in phase three. In conjunction with other SOUTHCOM efforts, Enduring Friendship will increase Western Hemisphere collective maritime security.

Our Enduring Friendship initiative greatly benefited from the recently approved Global Train and Equip authority approved by Congress. Last year, we were able to concentrate Section 1206 funds on two of our phase one countries, significantly accelerating our timeline to reach operational capability in these countries and giving us the flexibility to build a more responsive program. We plan on using this year’s funds, if approved, to jump-start our phase two countries, bringing much closer to fruition our goal of a vigilant and responsive maritime capability in this region so critical to our own security.

These Train and Equip funds have proven to be an extremely proactive tool for this and other initiatives at SOUTHCOM and have provided us with a truly responsive funding source for priority programs. As we develop our regional partnerships, it is critical to be able to dedicate resources quickly to build capability and/or capacity in response to emergent threats or during unique opportunities. The authority to train and equip ensures that we maintain this flexibility.

The ability to build the capacity of our partner nations and to respond quickly to unconventional threats would allow SOUTHCOM to better fulfill the cornerstone of our regional strategy: being steadfast, responsive, and lasting partners to help bring about the promise of the Americas. By fulfilling our promise, we will be enhancing our own security, with our capable partners in the
region responding to emergent threats and denying access and maneuver room for our nation’s enemies.

**Partnerships in the Region**

We have many examples of successful partnering with countries in our region. Since 2000, Colombia stands out as a true reflection of what steady partnership with the U.S. can achieve. Through collaboration, partnering, education, training, and operations supported by the U.S., Colombia’s military has grown by 27 percent since 2000, or 128,000 members, and by 2010 the national police are projected to increase their end strength by 25 percent, or 163,000 members.

According to the Colombian National Inspector General’s office, while the size of the security forces has grown in the past 10 years, the number of human rights allegations is down 67 percent thanks to an aggressive human rights program that now extends down to battalion level. Polling also indicates a high respect for the Colombian military among the populace.

Today, the Colombian military conducts sustained counter-narcoterrorism operations, developing actionable intelligence, protecting the national infrastructure, and enhancing civil-military cooperation in the context of their democratic security strategy. They do so consistent with the norms of international human rights and the rule of law. Colombia has dramatically improved security throughout its country and is poised for truly winning the peace for its democracy – among the oldest in Latin America.

Another positive example of regional partnership can be seen in Central America, where the System for Central American Integration Meeting of Heads of State met in October 2006 to identify and publish a plan of action for the Central American security priorities. The plan, published in November 2006, addresses how the region can counter organized crime, gang participation, illicit arms transfers, and porous borders.
Our emphasis within Central America is to build partner nation capacity to improve internal security, prevent illicit activity, and enhance regional stability. To do so, US SOUTHCOM leverages existing organizations such as the Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC) to improve the collective response of our partners and advance our security cooperation objectives. As members of CFAC, the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua work together to respond to threats throughout Central America and mitigate the effects of ungoverned space, porous borders, corruption, and organized crime. Outside of the construct of the CFAC, El Salvador continues to be a steady partner of the U.S. and is a champion of peace and stability in Iraq. Their Cuscatlán Battalion is currently on its eighth rotation to Iraq in support of peacekeeping and stabilization operations.

In the Caribbean, the Cricket World Cup is fostering collaboration among the participating nations on matters from threat identification to threat mitigation, including maritime port security and consequence management for possible chemical, biological and radiological attacks. The Caribbean Community, with our help, is working diligently to face these and other security concerns.

OPERATIONS

Ultimately, education and training translate to operational capability and, in our region, operations are conducted not from fixed, large U.S.-run bases, but instead from a combination of flexible U.S. and partner nation facilities. With our departure from Panama at the turn of the century, there was less emphasis placed on permanent basing and more emphasis put on the use of partner nation facilities from which counter-narcotics operations could be launched. Three such facilities, known as Forward Operating Locations, are at Manta in Ecuador; Comalapa in El Salvador; and Curacao and Aruba in the Caribbean Basin. These sites, which fall under the broader category of overseas facilities known as Cooperative Security Locations, are well forward of the
United States and are unique in that they are used only for counter-narcotics operations. We also maintain a forward operating site at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. We currently operate out of Apia in Colombia and are working with the Government of Colombia to increase access for counter-narcotics and other missions. These overseas cooperative locations are a cornerstone of our ability to operate in the SOUTHCOM region.

**Joint Interagency Task Force South**

Located in Key West, Florida, Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) is the nation’s crown jewel in addressing the challenges posed by transnational narco-terrorism and a model for interagency and partner nation cooperation. In a combined effort with the U.S. government interagency and our partner nations, JIATF South continues to disrupt record levels of cocaine bound for the U.S. and Europe. It conducts highly effective interagency operations by coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing scarce Department of Defense, interagency, allied, and partner nation resources. Most of our partner nations do not have the resources to devote exclusively to interdiction, yet their willingness and governmental cooperation increase each year as the negative effects associated with the illegal drug trade spread and as our collective successes in attacking illicit drug trafficking increase throughout the region.

The positive effects of everyone pulling together are clearly illustrated by the great successes JIATF South has achieved over the last six years of ever increasing record disruptions. The last three years alone resulted in cocaine disruptions of 219 metric tons (MTs) in 2004, 252 MTs in 2005, and 260 MTs in 2006. These numbers represent nearly a threefold increase in disruptions since 2000, and all of this is a result of continually improving our working relationships with involved U.S. Government entities and with our partner nations. However, today’s more robust intelligence picture of illicit drug movements also points to room for continued improvement. Intelligence suggests that some cocaine movements in JIATF South’s operating area go undetected.
each year because of a lack of an appropriate detection resource to respond to intelligence queuing, a real missed opportunity because nearly 90 percent of illicit drug movements that are successfully detected by JIATF South assets are eventually interdicted.

**Joint Task Force-Bravo**

Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) in Soto Cano, Honduras, represents the only permanently deployed U.S. forces in the region. JTF-B is a first responder to crises in the region and routinely conducts humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue, personnel recovery, and non-combatant medical evacuation operations. Their most recent humanitarian operation was the deployment of three helicopters in response to flooding in Panama as part of Task Force-Estamos Unidos. They flew six relief sorties transporting food, water, mattresses and petroleum products to disaster stricken areas. The familiarity of JTF-B crews and support personnel with the topography, communications systems, and movement corridors were instrumental in mission success. JTF-B is also a key contributor to our counter-narcotics effort, using their assets, regional knowledge, and professional contacts to facilitate local law enforcement and interagency interdiction of illicit drug trafficking. JTF-B has a long history of answering our partner nations’ calls for support during crisis – especially during hurricane season – and is a valuable asset to SOUTHCOM’s partnership and cooperation plans in the region.

**Joint Task Force Guantanamo**

Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, provides significant support to the overall Global War on Terror and ensures enemy combatants are kept off the battlefield while garnering information of strategic value for dissemination to national security decision makers. Over the past year alone, JTF-GTMO completed over 3000 interrogations and developed over 200 Intelligence Information Reports.
Currently JTF-GTMO detains less than 400 unlawful enemy combatants, down from a total lifetime population of approximately 800, in a legal, humane, safe, and transparent manner. Over the past year, JTF-GTMO hosted over 320 individual media representatives from over 220 outlets. We also work closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Detainees have communication with the outside world through mail and receive medical care and food service similar to that of the U.S. military service members who guard them. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 established procedures for trying unlawful enemy combatants for violations of the laws of war. While the conduct of such commissions is not our responsibility at SOUTHCOM, we provide administrative and logistical support to the commission process as directed by the Department of Defense.

INITIATIVES

Within SOUTHCOM, we are striving to transform into a true interagency organization. To facilitate this, we recently established a new directorate for interagency partnering, with support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State. This directorate’s goal is to develop a culture of robust partnering with the interagency, international, non-governmental, and private organizations to better integrate and focus national and international efforts to support security, stability and prosperity in the region.

Our efforts include coordination and synchronization with members of the interagency, academia, non-governmental organizations, think tanks, our senior leadership in the Department of Defense, and members of Congress and their staffs. These organizations formulate policy, allocate resources, develop strategies, and strive to ensure the U.S. Government shares a common vision and strategic objectives. It is in this arena that we seek to play a leading role in the transformation effort. The products of these key organizations shape the SOUTHCOM’s theater security cooperation strategy and provide vectors for our engagement.
U.S. Southern Command is also committed to experimentation and innovation. Experimentation provides a means to increase capability, capacity, and collaboration with the interagency and coalition nations in the theater. It is an integral part of our overall theater security strategy. Latin America and the Caribbean is an excellent region for innovation – for trying new approaches, new technologies, new applications of existing technologies, and new ways to combine capabilities. We will continue to seek out opportunities to incorporate experimentation into ongoing operations and exercises to increase the nation’s effective and efficient accomplishment of its objectives.

As an example of experimentation, we recently completed a Crisis Management experiment with multi-agency participation from the U.S., Argentina, and Honduras. This event provided a multi-national environment to collaborate with regional and functional experts to address three time-sensitive crisis scenarios: responses to a natural disaster, a chemical incident, and civil unrest. We will expand the experimentation audience in 2008 by combining the next crisis management experiment with a recurring exercise that trains and improves humanitarian assistance and disaster relief skills for approximately 150 personnel from 27 nations in the region.

We will also continue to bring innovative and experimental capabilities under development into Colombia, such as the ability to detect objects under dense foliage, use of unmanned systems, innovative data fusion, biometrics, and others for validation in an operational environment, as well as providing near real time support to the Colombian military from such cutting edge technologies.

CONCLUSION

We believe that the bilateral and multilateral education, training, and operations achieved through partnering with U.S. Southern Command are having a significant positive influence in the Americas. There is regional momentum to develop solutions to the challenges faced by the Americas. The Defense Ministers of thirty-four American nations met in October 2006 to examine the changing threat environment, both internal and external to the hemisphere. These Ministers
agreed that regional challenges need cooperative solutions and that the collaboration of virtually every nation is essential. They produced a consensus document that describes the region’s commitment to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and which firmly condemns all forms of terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational crime. The document also identified the need to strengthen cooperative mechanisms to counter these threats. This event reinforced the importance of partnering and highlighted the need for cooperative solutions for problems such as poverty, gangs, money laundering, human smuggling, counter drug activities and dealing with regional violence.

I would like to thank all of the Members of the Committee and all the Members of Congress for your support of U.S. Southern Command and the important work we are doing in Latin America and the Caribbean. While the likelihood of large-scale military combat in our region remains low, the importance of sharing ideas, economic activity, cultural exchanges, and conducting military exercises is quite high. In fact it is essential to creating a mutually beneficial security environment in this hemisphere, and we ask your continued support of our initiatives throughout the region.

In this vein, we are cautiously optimistic that Colombia is on the threshold of achieving its strategic objectives, but they will be heavily reliant on U.S. support for the next two or three years. The support from Congress has been invaluable for the past six years and we strongly encourage your continued support. Our initiatives include aircrew and maintenance personnel for helicopters, a robust logistics support system supporting JTF-Omega, Plan Consolidacion, and other ongoing support. In addition, we are seeking to provide the Colombian military with an automated on-line logistics system that integrates the supply and maintenance function of the Colombian military and national police. We are also trying to support to a modest depot level repair capability, fielding “Midnight Express” boats supporting riverine interdiction for the Colombian Navy on their North and Pacific coasts, and helping to establish the 2d Riverine Brigade on their Pacific coast.
We also appreciate your past support for several of our other initiatives, including expanded authority to conduct counter-narcoterrorism operations in Colombia.

We understand and appreciate the value of congressional support and are thankful for all you have provided for the command. I want to thank you again for delinking IMET from the ASPA sanctions. Your actions will enable us to re-engage hundreds of military personnel each year who would otherwise be denied an opportunity to benefit from U.S. military education and training.

While we deeply appreciate your support in this area, there are other areas for which we also seek assistance. As you know, the command is seeking congressional support for the construction of a consolidated headquarters facility in Miami-Doral for occupancy by 2010. The headquarters is vital for effective command and control of future joint, coalition and interagency operations that we conduct in the region. Our current headquarters complex lacks adequate space, is improperly configured, does not comply with anti-terrorism and force protection standards, and has dated communications architectures and expensive annual lease costs. Your support for this project is of tremendous importance.

The command received $110M in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for the region in FY06. FMF is a prerequisite for successfully funding many of the programs that enable military-to-military engagements that lead to long-term relationships. In addition, it enables partner nation capacity that, in turn, provides for defense-in-depth for the U.S. Partner nations prefer to buy U.S. military equipment for the quality and sustainment packages that accompany the purchases. We appreciate your continued support on this important program.

Finally, we ask your support for the proposed Center for Excellence in Human Rights. SOUTHCOM is the only Combatant Command with a dedicated Human Rights program. The authorities we would gain from this proposed language would allow SOUTHCOM to intensify our support to our partner governments in their efforts to eliminate human rights violations. The
protection of human rights is an essential step toward strengthening democracy in our neighboring countries.

As I mentioned earlier, it is in the context of geographic, social, economic, political and military linkages that we plan and execute the daily activities associated with our mission, and successful mission accomplishment for the command requires cooperation and reliable partnerships – partnerships based on commitment, based on a promise to this region of the world.

This Combatant Command is committed to being the strategic partner of choice in the region and will focus on the relationships necessary to do so. We will strive to invent new approaches in every area; from tactical execution to strategic engagement, from more efficient training methodologies to creative ways to improve resources.

I take great pride in our mission and in the exceptional men and women of the United States Southern Command. I know from first hand experience that today’s men and women in uniform are patriots of extraordinary promise. They are coming of age in this new century as the War on Terror unfolds; they watched the World Trade towers fall to earth with incomprehension and anger; and then reacted with fierce determination. They have made a promise to their country that they will stand the watch and fight for us to win the battle that is unfolding today. From the dusty streets of Baghdad to the mountain passes of Afghanistan to the tropics of Colombia to the cold foothills of Korea – they are fulfilling that promise. I am proud to serve with them in U.S. Southern Command.

I thank you for your support to the finest military in the world.

I am prepared to answer your questions.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 21, 2007
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stavridis, I understand that the Afghan National Interdiction Unit is attending an 18-week jungle commando course in Colombia. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I do believe that you may be referring to the Afghan Initiative, and I can certainly speak to that.

The Afghan Initiative was created to have Colombian counter-drug personnel share tactics, techniques, and procedures with their Afghan counterparts in prosecuting the war on drugs. To accomplish this goal, the governments of the United States, Britain, Colombia, and Afghanistan are coordinating various exchanges between Colombia and Afghanistan.

An Afghan delegation, headed by the Counternarcotics Minister, visited Colombia in August 2005. This delegation visited the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the Colombian National Police (CNP) Headquarters in Bogota. They also visited the CNP Training Center in Espinal to observe the Colombian Anti-narcotics Police Jungla Commando Course. This Afghan Delegation requested that a team of Colombian subject matter experts conduct a training seminar in Afghanistan.

The Colombian anti-narcotics police team visited Afghanistan in late July, 2006. The team included the Interdiction Chief and former Director of Anti-narcotics Intelligence, a fixed wing pilot and former Intelligence Officer, a Hughes 500 attack pilot, Head Instructor from the Anti-narcotics Police Training Center), and NAS Bogota Advisor to Jungla Airmobile Companies. Enroute to Kabul, the team had a three-day stopover in London where the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence provided briefings on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Upon arrival in Afghanistan, the team gave seminars to all key Afghan anti-narcotics officials (police, army, and ministry-level), the U.S. trainers and advisors in Afghanistan (Drug Enforcement Agency and Blackwater), UK Embassy Kabul personnel, the commander of the Kabul International Airport, and the rank and file members of the INL-funded Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU). The briefings focused on how Colombian police officers conduct their counterdrug operations. The Colombian police identified that personnel selection, training, organization, equipment, intelligence, and planning are the keys to success.

During the Colombian team’s outbrief to the Afghan Counternarcotics Ministry and U.S. Ambassador, Kabul, the Colombian team proposed three immediate follow-on exchanges:

1. Send five Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU) members to the Jungla Commando Basic Course in Espinal, Tolima (Feb. 12–June 16, 2007)
2. Send two Colombia Jungla School instructors to the Afghan NIU training center in Kabul (March 12–May 1)
3. Send the Commander of the Kabul International Airport and staff to Colombia to visit the CNP airport security and counternarcotics programs (June 2007)

In April 2007, INL asked that the Colombians conduct a six week seminar for 10 Afghan NIU members starting in September 2007. During a visit by Representatives Dennis Hastert and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to Colombia in May, 2007, it was also proposed to send five mid-level Colombian Anti-narcotics Police to Afghanistan to observe Afghan NIU operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Given the personnel end strength increases of the Army and Marine Corps contained in the Future Years Defense Plan, do you believe the conclusions and assumptions of the 2005 Mobility Capability Study remain valid in determining the Department of Defense’s mobility requirements?

General SCHWARTZ. The 2005 Mobility Capability Study was based on the 1-4-2-1 Department of Defense National Defense Strategy. The assumptions used for the MCS study have not been invalidated. The Army and the Marine Corps state the increases in their personnel end strength are focused on increasing home station dwell time. Therefore, unless the Services and Combatant Commanders identify a
change in their concepts of operations, the conclusions reached in the MCS will remain valid. The next MCS, anticipated to begin in early 2008, will fully incorporate any changes in plans and requirements as a result of the Service force structure end strength increases.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Air Force and the Army are contemplating procurement of a Joint Cargo Aircraft to complement the C–130 fleet and to increase efficiency of cargo capacity used during intra-theater airlift operations. What is the requirement, concept of operations, and what command authority will exercise operational control and tasking of both the Army and Air Force Joint Cargo Aircraft?

General SCHWARTZ. Various intra-theater studies are being conducted to explore the intra-theater demands to include the use of the JCA. The Intra-theater Lift Capability Assessment looked at in theater movement to the brigade rear. Additionally, the USTRANSCOM Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center is analyzing the movement forward from the brigade rear to the point of use and examining potential gaps and solutions for joint future theater airlift. The next Mobility Study, anticipated to begin in early 2008, should fully incorporate these analyses, and reconfirm the JCA requirement.

JCA employment concept has not yet been finalized. However, the Draft CONOPS states 'during wartime, JCAs will be assigned to a Unified Combatant Command structure, and while in this capacity, will support combatant commanders' directed operations, across the range of military operations. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) will have OPCON of all JCAs in the Joint Area of Operations. The JFC determines air capabilities/forces made available for joint air operations, in consultation with component commanders.'

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. I have proposed that retirees should qualify for Space-A travel at the category two priority level, and therefore, treated the same as authorized personnel on environmental morale leave status.

Can you comment?

General SCHWARTZ. I take seriously your concerns regarding the appropriate priority level for retirees participating in the Space-A travel program. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) was notified of your proposal and concerns. They are currently looking at possible courses of action in order to recommend a solution equitable not only to residents of Guam but also other retirees that might be in the same circumstances.