



Toward A New Partnership In Responsibility Sharing



*An Overview of the 1996 Report on Strategic
Context of Responsibility Sharing*

A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense

April 1996

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Updated: 15 Jun 1998

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FOREWORD

I would like to introduce this Overview to the 1996 *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* by emphasizing the continuing importance of Congressional concern and attention to responsibility sharing issues with our allies. This support sends a clear message to our allies that if we are to maintain effective alliance relationships, they must be based on fairly shared roles, risks, responsibilities, and costs.

ALLIANCE IN EUROPE

NATO provides the single most important vehicle for the coordination of national security policies between the United States and our European allies, and continues to serve as an indispensable mechanism for the exercise of American leadership in support of our regional goals in Europe. As you know, NATO allies have been with us in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, and today we are working closely together in Bosnia. In addition, allied contributions to peacekeeping operations and economic assistance to developing countries around the world, including the emerging democracies in Central Europe and the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, significantly exceed U.S. contributions.

Allied activism in these areas belies the perception of a passive and inwardly-focused Europe. In fact, compared with other allies and friendly nations around the world, our NATO allies have long been more actively engaged in sharing the roles, risks, responsibilities, and costs of protecting U.S. regional and global interests.

JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Administration completed new cost sharing agreements with Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1995 which we believe are very positive and serve our shared security interests.

In October of last year, we concluded with Japan a new five-year Special Measures Agreement which will provide \$1.7 billion per year in host nation support for the life of the accord. Last November, we signed a three-year cost sharing agreement with the Republic of Korea which will increase the ROK's current direct cost sharing contribution of \$300 million by 10 percent each year to a total value of \$1 billion over the life of the agreement.


COOPERATION IN THE GULF

This year, for the first time, this Overview reports on the cooperative efforts of our friends in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The United States is expanding its involvement with the GCC countries by entering into formal arrangements for the prepositioning of equipment, access, and participation in combined exercises. In exchange, several GCC countries make major contributions toward offsetting the costs of

U.S. activities in the region, either by providing in-kind support or by funding the housing and maintenance of prepositioned materiel. An important example of this support is the \$372 million in direct and in-kind assistance paid or pledged by our Gulf partners in 1995 to offset the majority of U.S. incremental costs for Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

The Administration's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement is being manifest in new cooperative relationships around the globe. At the same time, however, it is clear that a single approach to responsibility sharing is unworkable. Some have suggested, for example, that the cost sharing approach adopted with our partners in the Pacific should be the benchmark for agreements with our NATO allies. Such proposals ignore fundamental regional differences of history, politics, security arrangements, and defense situations. As this Overview demonstrates, flexibility and innovation are the basis of successful cooperative arrangements. We must not confine ourselves to merely one approach to the broad range of security challenges facing us in the post-Cold War era.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Walter B. Slocombe". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letter of each word being capitalized and prominent.

Walter B. Slocombe
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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FRANCE

Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics	Value	Rank (Compared to 15 NATO nations, Japan, and Republic of Korea)
Gross Domestic Product (1995)		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$1,552 04 ...
Per Capita GDP	\$26,654 08
Defense Spending (1995)		
		Low _____ High
Total (Billions)	\$48.1 03 ..
Percentage of GDP	3.1% 05
Active Duty Military & Defense Civilian Personnel (1995)		
		Low _____ High
Total (Thousands)	606 04 ...
Percentage of Labor Force	2.4% 04 ...
Defense Capability Measures (1995)		
		Low _____ High
Ground Combat Capability Share/GDP Share	0.49	... 14
Aircraft Share/GDP Share	1.31 08
Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share	0.79 11

Peace Operations (1995)

		Low _____
		High
Total Personnel (Thousands)	0.5	
Personnel as a Percentage of Labor Force	0.0019% 07
Funding (Millions)	\$1,112	
Funding as a Percentage of GDP	0.0716% 02 .

Grant Aid (Cumulative 1990-1994)

		Low _____
		High
Total (Millions)	\$48,934 04 ...
Percentage of GDP	0.66% 04 ...

Host Nation Support/Defense Cost Sharing (1994)

Contribution..... Not Applicable

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GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions

Statistics

Value

BAHRAIN

Gross Domestic Product (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$5
Per Capita GDP	\$8,806

Defense Spending (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$0.2
Percentage of GDP	5.4%

KUWAIT

Gross Domestic Product (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$24
Per Capita GDP	\$14,994

Defense Spending (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$3.5
Percentage of GDP	14.2%

OMAN

Gross Domestic Product (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$11
Per Capita GDP	\$5,584

Defense Spending (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$2.0
Percentage of GDP	18.1%

QATAR**Gross Domestic Product (1995)**

Total (Billions)	\$7
Per Capita GDP	\$13,345

Defense Spending (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$0.9
Percentage of GDP	12.0%

SAUDI ARABIA**Gross Domestic Product (1995)**

Total (Billions)	\$129
Per Capita GDP	\$7,317

Defense Spending (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$13.3
Percentage of GDP	10.3%

**UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES****Gross Domestic Product (1995)**

Total (Billions)	\$39
Per Capita GDP	\$18,550

Defense Spending (1995)

Total (Billions)	\$1.8
Percentage of GDP	4.6%

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Overview: The Strategic Context of Responsibility Sharing

OVERVIEW

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF RESPONSIBILITY SHARING

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement includes three essential elements:

- **National security interests** represent the *ends* or *objectives* of our strategy. Since the United States has national security interests worldwide, our strategy involves commitments, presence, and responsibility sharing arrangements worldwide.
- **U.S. military forces** are among the most important *means* of implementing the strategy, and our forward presence is perhaps its most visible demonstration.
- **Allied contributions to security** represent important *dividends* of engagement--the degree to which our security goals are shared and our efforts reciprocated. This community of shared interests and goals makes our security arrangements strong yet flexible, efficient and effective politically, militarily, and economically.

This last item, allied responsibility sharing, cannot be divorced from the strategic ends and means which it supports, and is one measure of the scope and success of U.S. engagement. Indeed, by this measure, our strategy of engagement continues to be very successful--as documented in this Overview to the 1996 *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*.

Within the framework of our engagement strategy, the central tenets of the Administration's responsibility sharing policy are as follows:

- Responsibility sharing is an important but not paramount objective of our national security strategy. The foremost goals of