Federal Emergency Management Agency
Office of Civil Defense

FY 1989
Congressional
Civil Defense Testimony

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The following are the texts of statements delivered before Congressional committees in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Fiscal Year 1989 civil defense authorization and appropriation requests.

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Mr. Chairman, I appreciate appearing before you today to review the President’s FY 1989 request of $160.393 million for programs authorized under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended. Mr. Craig Alderman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is appearing with me to support that request.

Let me summarize at the outset the main thrusts of our 1989 request. We propose a realistic program both for 1989 and the out-years—involving modest levels of resources which we can reasonably expect to receive. We propose to develop a survivable infrastructure of civil defense systems essential to saving lives should the U.S. ever experience nuclear attack—an infrastructure which also can and does save lives week by week in the natural and technological emergencies which so often occur. In other words, we strongly support the “dual use” of systems developed under the Civil Defense Act.

We reported to you in July 1986 that U.S. civil defense capabilities were at a low ebb. That situation has not changed, and is due in part to the fact our existing physical infrastructure of emergency systems lacks the reliability and the survivability needed for a catastrophic disaster, including attack. A major thrust of our 1989 program will therefore be to improve the survivability of existing systems, a cost-effective approach.

Civil defense makes sense to the American people today just as it has for the past three decades. In 1982, for example, three surveys conducted by the Gallup organization showed large majorities in favor of civil defense—as was also true of surveys back to the 1950s.

A 1987 University of Pittsburgh survey showed that this strong support continues. Over 85 percent feel that providing protection in case of nuclear war is an important goal of civil defense—and almost 90 percent reject the idea that civil defense is not needed because there could never be a nuclear war.

The people are very well aware that a nuclear attack would be an unparalleled catastrophe. But over three-quarters of those surveyed agree that civil defense could save many lives should
nuclear war ever occur—and they believe we should have civil defense.

In short, the American people now believe—and have believed for more than three decades—that nuclear attack is not impossible and that if it should occur we would be better off with civil defense than without it. That, we believe, reflects sound wisdom and common sense on the part of the people—and it is our view as well. I think the views of the people regarding civil defense can be summed up in one word, prudence—the same motive which leads us to put smoke detectors in our homes, to use seat belts when we drive, and to pay scores of billions of dollars each year to insure ourselves against a variety of risks.

About three-quarters of those surveyed saw the Federal Government as having the major responsibility for attack preparedness. While a number of the respondents also saw supporting roles for State and local governments, and for community volunteers, they clearly viewed the Federal Government as having the key role to play in dealing with the hazards of attack. Incidentally, nearly three-quarters of those surveyed reject the idea that civil defense could lead to a “false sense of security,” making nuclear war more acceptable. Also, the survey indicated the people strongly favor nuclear arms reduction agreements, and they see civil defense as not being in conflict with such agreements—views which we share, since both contribute to the goal of national survival.

At the same time, the people see civil defense as extremely important in providing protection in case of peacetime emergencies. Nearly 90 percent feel that protecting people from natural and technological disasters is an important goal for civil defense.

I think it is fair to interpret the foregoing views as supporting our approach to the dual-use issue. We develop and deploy civil defense systems—in cooperation with State and local governments—based upon their importance to the national defense. We must further assure that they are reliable and are kept ready to function in case of major disaster. Once these systems have been developed to address the attack hazard, they can be used—and they should be used, and they are used—in peacetime emergencies.

As I said to the Subcommittee in the 1988 hearings a year ago, this makes sense from every standpoint, starting with economy and dual use of scarce tax dollars. It saves lives and property in the emergencies which threaten some of our people, in some jurisdictions, nearly every week. And using civil defense systems in real emergencies stresses and exercises those systems and staffs, improving their readiness.

There is, in fact, a great community of interest between the Federal Government and State and local governments—one which is much larger than one might conclude from those infrequent occasions when the dual-use issue breaks into the news. This results from the fact that most elements of the civil defense program produce capabilities which are needed for peacetime and attack-caused disasters alike. These include the National Warning System, State and local warning and communications systems, emergency operating centers from which local and State staffs direct lifesaving operations, protection stations of the Emergency Broadcast System through which key officials provide advice to the people in emergencies of all kinds, and the matching funds which support nearly 6,800 State and local emergency management personnel in some 2,700 jurisdictions throughout the country.
I think the current program embodies a balance which is acceptable and beneficial to all parties. Our primary concern is to develop capabilities which are reliable and which can save lives in the event of nuclear attack. In a number of cases this means providing attack effects protection for the infrastructure systems which are used all the time in peacetime emergencies, but which lack attack survivability. Of course we take care to design and deploy the elements of the program so that—in the language of 1980 amendments to the Act—they are insofar a possible "...adaptable to help deal with natural disasters and other peacetime emergencies."

That the States are in accord with this approach is shown, I believe, by the fact that all States have signed FY 1988 Comprehensive Cooperative Agreements. These stress improving attack preparedness while recognizing that the systems developed under the civil defense program are also of great value in peacetime emergencies.

Let me turn now to the program we are proposing to improve emergency preparedness throughout the country. As I outline our 1989 request, I will point out the dual-use application of most of the systems and capabilities in peacetime disasters, and also what must be done to improve their survivability so they can continue to function in the event of an attack or catastrophic disaster.

The Administration’s civil defense program is based on National Security Decision Directive 259 on civil defense, approved by the President on February 4, 1987. A new emphasis in NSDD 259 is to develop plans and preparations in peacetime for expanding civil defense by "surge" actions in time of increasing international tension. The purpose of this is to defer as many costs as reasonable to a time of rising tension, as opposed to developing full in-being capabilities in peacetime. We will therefore develop a base from which shortfalls could be made good, to the maximum extent that time allowed, by surge actions.

A civil defense surge would require perhaps two to twelve months, less for some capabilities and systems, more for others. Some systems, of course, are not surgeable and must be in place, such as the National Attack Warning System or protection stations of the Emergency Broadcast System. These also contribute to the protection of the people in peacetime disasters.

NSDD 259 stresses the dual-use benefits of civil defense by directing that the program "...continue to support all-hazard integrated emergency management at State and local levels, to the extent that this is consistent with and contributes to preparedness of the Nation in the event of an attack...." The NSDD’s emphasis includes two general areas which have substantial potential for saving lives in both peacetime and attack emergencies, combined with minimum expenditure requirements.

The first priority area is State and local crisis management. This means improving the survivability of our constitutional fabric of government, including the ability to communicate among governments and to the public in emergencies of all kinds. The purpose of this emphasis, in simplest terms, is to put governments in position to support and assist their people in an attack emergency just as they do today in a tornado, a hurricane, or a technological disaster. To do this, governments must be able to remain in operation so they can warn their people; broadcast lifesaving information to them; direct operations such as rescue, firefighting and debris
removal; and communicate to higher levels to request help. Major program elements involved include warning systems, protected radio broadcast stations, and emergency operating centers or EOCs.

The EOCs are coordination centers, with the necessary communications, from which civil governments direct operations in emergencies of all types. The day-to-day operations of a local fire department are usually directed from the central fire station, those of the police department from the police station, and so on. Supporting the people in a disaster, however, requires more coordination between all elements of civil government than is needed in normal times.

Experience shows that key officials and their staffs must be co-located in a survivable emergency operating center with communications to field units, to neighboring jurisdictions, and to higher levels of government. There must also be communications to the Emergency Broadcast System, so advice can be given to the people. The use of emergency operating centers by local and State governments is routine in tornadoes, hurricanes, and hazardous materials spills, and their staffs are composed of emergency professionals such as fire and police chiefs, health officers, and communications technicians and dispatchers. To coordinate operations in a disaster, these people must work in a single facility, the EOC, rather than in their separate headquarters as they do in normal times.

Our concern is to assure that EOC staffs, who support their people effectively and often in peacetime emergencies, could do so as well in event of attack—which means assuring survivability. To this end, in FY 1988 we shall be working with one prototype State, yet to be selected, to develop a fallout-protected EOC capability, including an alternate EOC away from probable target areas. In 1989 we intend to extend the program to additional States, building upon our experience with the 1988 prototype. We shall be seeking lowest-cost opportunities; for example, by developing alternate EOCs in existing structures.

A further essential in providing for the safety of the people is to be able to communicate emergency advice to them rapidly and reliably. This capability is provided by the Emergency Broadcast System. Stations of this system are activated well over 1,000 times each year from local Emergency Operating Centers to warn the people and tell them what they should do to protect themselves from tornadoes, hurricanes and chemical threats.

It is obviously of even greater importance that EBS stations be able to provide the same kind of advice to the people in a catastrophe. We want to assure the ability to communicate to the public in any catastrophic disaster, including attack, but at the present time we cannot give them that assurance. Due to minimal funding of our broadcast station protection program through 1987, we are extremely concerned about the survivability and reliability of those stations. We will be providing the necessary protection and emergency generators to 10 key entry-point stations in 1988 and our request will extend this in 1989 to the remaining 20 entry-point stations and to 55 additional relay stations. This will begin to provide a reliable capability to get emergency information and advice to our population in time of catastrophic disaster.

Warning is another key ingredient of crisis management. The National Attack Warning System—or NAWAS—was established, as its name reflects, to warn State and local governments of an attack upon the United States so they
can in turn warn their people. But this system, which would not exist but for the attack threat, has tremendous dual-use benefits in peacetime emergencies. In a recent 12-month period, NAWAS was used over 1,600 times to warn State and local governments of tornadoes and other peacetime threats and emergencies.

State and local warning systems are used to pass on to the people the warning provided by NAWAS. Our 1989 request thus includes a substantial increase in matching funds to keep existing State and local direction, control and warning equipment operational.

There are additional elements of State and local crisis management capabilities which—though not without application in peacetime disasters—are needed primarily for attack protection. These include protection for broadcast stations and for emergency operating centers against the electromagnetic pulse effects of nuclear detonations, as well as a minimum-essential system of radiological defense personnel and instruments to assess the fallout hazard created by an attack, as a basis for broadcasting advice to the people on shelter protection.

Our 1989 request will support progress in both of these areas. Protection for Emergency Broadcast System stations will include protection against electromagnetic pulse, or EMP. As for emergency operating centers, only 147 existing local EOCs meet all criteria to assure that they could continue to operate under fallout conditions in an attack emergency. However, there are 488 more which lack only EMP protection.

We will therefore give priority to providing EMP protection to these otherwise fully qualified EOCs, starting in 1989, since by doing this we will more than quadruple the number of local EOCs able to continue operations to support their people under fallout conditions. This is a highly cost-effective endeavor, since it costs only some $12,000 to provide EMP protection to a typical EOC. It also reflects the emphasis I mentioned earlier, to apply 1989 funds to improving the attack survivability of facilities and systems which are needed and used frequently in peacetime disasters but which cannot now be relied upon to operate under attack conditions.

The disaster at Chernobyl underlined what we have been stressing for years— instruments are essential to assess a radiological hazard, which can be detected by none of the human senses. Research and development in 1988 and prior years has provided the basis for procurement of a limited number of radiological instruments for the crisis management requirements of State and local governments. This will in turn allow the development, starting in 1989, of a base for mass production during a surge period of the far larger number of instruments which would be needed by the population during the shelter and post-shelter periods, should an attack occur. Our training program similarly provides for training a limited number of radiological defense personnel in peacetime plus developing a base for training over 1.5 million additional radiological monitors during a surge period.

In sum, our aim in the area of crisis management is to put State and local governments in position to support and advise their people in an attack emergency and to enhance their capabilities in the area of natural and technological disasters. They must be able to direct emergency operations—also to broadcast lifesaving advice to the people on how to make best use of the large amount of fallout protection in existing homes and large buildings, when they can leave shelters as fallout intensities decline, and where food, water and other essentials are available. Finally, successful Federal operations for the continuity
of civil government require a corresponding capability at the State and local levels.

The second priority area specified by NSDD 259 is improving population protection capabilities, including emergency planning as well as information for citizens on practical things they can do to avoid injury or death in emergencies of all types. Action by an informed citizenry is the bedrock foundation of any protection program, and this applies in the case of nuclear attack as it does to tornadoes, hurricanes and other peacetime emergencies. This truth is recognized in countries such as Switzerland, Denmark or the USSR with large in-place programs, but which still put great stress on training and information for their people. And informed citizen action assumes even greater importance in a program such as we propose.

What we are talking about more concretely is information on what people can do to increase their odds for survival if they are threatened by tornadoes, hurricanes, or attack. To illustrate with a peacetime disaster, if a tornado threatens a town, the local government should have a warning system to alert the people to the approaching danger. But whether a given individual survives or dies depends critically upon what he or she does after being warned—and this depends on knowing what to do. A person who has gone to the basement of a house struck by a tornado has good odds for escaping injury—but one who remains upstairs has all too high a chance for injury or death.

In an attack emergency too, a person's odds for survival would depend in great degree on knowing what to do and taking prompt action. People would need to know about such things as the fallout effects of nuclear weapons, how existing homes and larger buildings can provide fallout protection, and what to take to a shelter.

Therefore, a key aim is for State and local governments to be able to let their people know in time of crisis where existing shelter can be found, and how to improve it where necessary. Most people do not give much thought to such matters in normal times—but when international tensions rise, so does public demand for survival information.

We saw this phenomenon during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Contrary to some perceptions, the people did not show signs of "panic." Rather, they asked practical and down-to-earth questions such as, "Where can I find a shelter for myself and my family?" When Afghanistan was invaded we started getting requests for survival information—and a normal two-year supply of radiological defense manuals was gone in 30 days.

Informed action by citizens could save millions of lives in an attack emergency—by making use of protection which now exists in larger buildings and in homes. But our present capability to provide the necessary information to the people is nearly nil.

Our 1989 request thus provides for an expanded effort to provide information for the people on threats, including nuclear attack, which may affect their localities and on actions they can take to improve their odds for survival. We intend to stress the development of standby materials to be disseminated by the mass media should a crisis arise and escalate—the time when experience shows the people seek survival information.

Surveys indicate that the American people are overwhelmingly in favor of this emphasis on getting survival information to them. In the 1987 survey I mentioned earlier, 93 percent of the people felt that an extremely important civil
The defense goal is to provide information so people can help themselves respond to emergencies. This tells me we are on the right track with this common-sense proposal.

A related initiative specified by NSDD 259 is volunteerism—to encourage citizens to help prepare themselves, their families, and their communities for emergencies of all types, including attack. Many communities now make good use of volunteers in their civil defense programs and in peacetime disasters, and we believe this can and should be extended to many more.

This too is supported by the public. When asked to rate the idea of self-help groups for emergency preparedness, about three-quarters thought this was a good idea. Regarding voluntary participation in civil defense, about three-quarters said that if courses were available they would be willing to take training in civil defense subjects, also that they would volunteer to participate in a community preparedness program.

I have tried in these remarks to touch on the highlights of the civil defense program we are proposing. It is one which will put us on the road to substantially better preparedness for attack and peacetime emergencies alike. Some additional details appear in Tab "A" attached, including the ways in which the 1989 budget is structured to reflect the NSDD 259 emphases.

To sum up, we propose a realistic program to improve emergency preparedness starting in 1989, at a resource level of $160 million. If approved, this request will lay the foundation for steady progress in the outyears.

The program we are proposing will begin to meet the responsibilities of government as well as the expectations of the American people. It makes sense to the States by striking the right balance between preparedness for a catastrophe we all hope will never occur, nuclear attack, and the natural and technological disasters which do occur all too often. It makes sense to the Administration. I hope it will make sense to you as well, and that you will approve our $160.393 million request for 1989.

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to respond to any questions you and other Subcommittee members may have.
The 1989 request totals $160,393,000, and begins improvements in the directions specified in the new National Security Decision Directive on civil defense (NSDD 259) approved by the President on February 4, 1987. The revised program supports the State and local emergency management infrastructure, while developing a base from which capabilities could be improved by "surge" actions in time of increasing international tension and focusing priority on improvements in: (1) State and local crisis management capabilities to support the population in emergencies by providing lifesaving advice on protection from fallout and where food and other essentials are available and by directing lifesaving operations; (2) population protection, including information for citizens on actions to avoid death or injury in emergencies of all types; (3) encouraging and supporting volunteerism by citizens in emergency preparedness; and (4) developing life support plans to provide food, water, and other essentials to sustain survivors.

State and Local Emergency Management: ($58.275M) An increase of $2.850M over FY 1988. Assists in supporting State and local emergency staffs of some 6,800 in 2,680 jurisdictions. Increases the number of military reservists supporting State and local governments to 675 (vs. approximately 450 now funded).


Population Protection: ($14.293M) An increase of $2.900M over FY 1988. Supports approximately 190 State-level planners to assist local staffs in developing emergency plans. Supports shelter surveys in the States and adds summer-hire college students trained as Shelter Survey Technicians to reduce per-building average costs. Initiates volunteerism and life support activities noted above.

State and Local Direction, Control and Warning: ($10.793M) An increase of $6.923M over FY 1988. Provides $5.000M to develop State and State alternate fallout-protected Emergency Operating Centers, taking advantage of lowest cost opportunities. Upgrades approximately 75 Emergency Broadcast System stations (backup generators, etc.), to provide information and advice to the public in time of emergency. Also supports State and local warning and communications systems and provides electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection.

Research: ($0.900M) An increase of $0.600M over FY 1988. Develops plans for "surge" improvement of civil defense capabilities in time of escalating tensions.

or in time of escalating international tension. Develops "surge" training deployment plans.

Telecommunications & Warning: ($21.675M)
An increase of $4.798M over FY 1988. Continues current warning and communications programs. Substantially completes procurement of high-frequency radios begun in FY 1984, to link the States, national and regional locations, providing radios for States and regional locations still lacking this equipment.

Salaries and Expenses: ($28.255M) An increase of $0.893M over FY 1988. Continues FY 1988 Federal staffing; no additional workyears are requested.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed Civil Defense Program for Fiscal Year 1989. As in previous years, I can assure you that this program has the endorsement and support of the Department of Defense. At the outset of this testimony, however, we must acknowledge disappointment with the direction that Civil Defense funding and programming have taken in recent years.

In last year's hearings, we were hopeful that sufficient resources would be made available to initiate new programs to begin implementing the National Civil Defense Policy, which had been expressed in NSDD 259. This policy was the outgrowth of extensive deliberation within the national security community; and, when fully implemented, it will provide an effective, yet affordable, civil defense posture for the Nation. Therefore, we strongly reiterate our belief in the need to fund civil defense programs at the minimum level of $160 Million for FY 1989, as the Administration has requested. While the Nation's need for a realistic and comprehensive approach to preparedness for all forms of attack must evolve over many years to come, we believe the Civil Defense Budget request for FY 1989 represents an initiative by the Federal Government to begin leading and supporting an effective State and local civil defense effort.

To place this Department of Defense testimony in perspective, I remind you that the Department of Defense and National Security Council share responsibility for oversight of FEMA's Civil Defense efforts. That responsibility derives from mandates we received several years ago, from both the President (in Executive Order 12148) and the Senate Armed Services Committee, to ensure that:

- Civil Defense planning continues to be fully compatible with the Nation's overall strategic policy, and
Legitimate needs of national security not be unintentionally subordinated to disaster relief in programming.

In compliance with your instructions, we have provided annually for your committee’s consideration, a written assessment of FEMA’s proposed program, together with an analysis of the data upon which our assessment is based. For FY 1988, we saw some ground for optimism in the requested funding level, which was approximately the same as the request for FY 1989. However, we were disappointed with the program capabilities actually afforded to FEMA and the States through this year’s appropriations. Our reports to the respective Committee Chairmen today, therefore, restate our thinking on specific program improvements and needs.

The Department of Defense works directly with FEMA’s Region structures through Continental U.S. Armies and Navy and Air Force Planning Agents, and with the States through Army National Guard State Area Commands. Our activities provide military support to civil authorities for peacetime response to natural disasters, as well as preparedness for attacks on the United States and its territories and possessions; and we have been enhancing DoD planning and response capabilities in those areas in recent years. Yet, we are aware that our military capabilities to meet many needs of the States for emergency assistance in peacetime actually mislead the civil sector in its reliance on the availability of similar capabilities during a period of crisis, mobilization or war.

Through our extensive and continuing interface with the Federal preparedness activities at the region level, and with the States, we know that the Civil Defense Policy adopted in National Security Decision Directive 259 is both viable and acceptable to those levels of government.

The States obviously would like to receive far more in terms of Federally funded assistance. Yet, we believe they recognize that some modest but steady and well-thought-out program growth—which emphasizes State responsibility, preparedness for “surge,” public information, and development of volunteerism—is in the Nation’s best interests because it makes good sense and is affordable for the long term.

The Armed Services and Defense Agencies have participated in numerous planning and training sessions in the field, and have begun revision of their military plans, for the purpose of ensuring full support by Defense Components for the NSDD’s emphasis on Federal assistance to revitalized State and local civil defense programs. We, therefore, have a strong basis for confidence in our ability to meet the civil defense objectives established by NSDD 259—provided that a reasonable level of Federal funding support is provided for FY 1989 and sustained over time.

Now, I would like to place the Defense Department’s strong support for civil defense in general, and this FY 1989 proposal in particular, in a strategic perspective. First, let me restate a premise you all understand very well: America’s basic defense policy, since World War II ended nearly 43 years ago, has been to protect the vital interests of this Nation and our Allies by deterring aggression, and particularly by deterring any attack on the United States. For deterrence to succeed, we must continue to convince potential adversaries that the cost of aggression will exceed any possible gain.

We must continue to deter the Soviet Union from any temptation to use its awesome military power, especially its capability for strategic nuclear attack on the United States. To do so, we must ensure that we have the means, and the
national will, to respond effectively to aggression, or to coercion of any kind, which threatens our vital interests.

Deterrence requires both offensive and defensive capabilities to counter the full spectrum of threats. This requirement presents a difficult challenge, given the magnitude and complexity of the threat and our defense resource constraints. Thus, while the essential foundation of U.S. deterrence remains our strategic offensive forces—our conventional forces, and a mix of active and passive defense programs, including civil defense, also are necessary to address the total threat.

Our defense policy increasingly must seek to prevent any coercion of the United States, and its allies and friends, since coercion of Free World decisions could give our enemies the benefits of victory without the cost of war. —And, the means of coercion, as well as identification of the nations and groups who could use those means to gain their objectives, have increased in number and complexity in recent years.

Any major crisis involving the United States and the Soviet Union has the possibility of escalating to strategic nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. This Administration's arms reduction initiatives have set in motion processes which may in time remove that spectre of terror. Yet, until the possibility of nuclear exchange is removed, it could impose the most severe test imaginable on this Nation's cohesion and willingness to withstand coercion—particularly in the absence of any viable and credible civil defense program.

NSDD 259 focuses on civil defense requirements of government at those levels closest to the people, as its policy seeks to implement the Civil Defense Act of 1950 to meet the threats of the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, we find that the basic premises stated in the 1950 Act are sufficient statements of national will and authority to meet the needs of the foreseeable future. The detailed civil defense programs with which those statements are implemented are revitalized by the FY 1989 proposal in order to allow them to mature in time to meet the threats of the 1990s.

The Department of Defense perspective emphasizes, in our interface with the civil sector, the Civil Defense Act's definition of "attack," which requires preparedness to address threats of any form of attack on the United States, including attacks from sources that we know today as international or state-sponsored terrorism, as well as strategic nuclear attack. We also recognize that preparedness for all forms of attack is consistent with the 1981 addition to the Act, which permits capabilities acquired for attack preparedness to be used to meet other dangers to the community in the form of natural and technological disasters. Our emphasis on preparedness for all forms of attack is well received, even in those States which have expressed opposition to planning and training primarily for response to a massive nuclear attack.

NSDD 259 realistically recognizes that neither the public, nor the Congress, nor foreseeable Federal budget priorities, will support development of civil defense capabilities comparable to those maintained by the Soviet Union or Switzerland. Thus, the Department of Defense deters nuclear attack primarily through our capability to place any potential attacker's homeland at an unacceptable level of risk regardless of the nature of the attack.

While maintaining our primary responsibility to protect the Nation through military readiness and deterrence, we also support, to the extent our resources permit, the development of a nation-
wide civil defense infrastructure that will be capable of rapid expansion in a national security emergency. This includes developing the existing planning structures with FEMA and the States, the commitment of Reserve military officers to several civil defense related programs, and an ongoing study of our ability to create larger numbers of civil defense and home defense forces from obligated military retirees if a world or national crisis justifies that action.

The proposed FY 1989 Civil Defense Program implements NSDD 259 by increasing incrementally the Federal Government's capability to help State and local government and volunteer leaders prepare to help their populations and institutions survive through a surge of emergency preparedness measures during a period of increasing worldwide tensions and the probability of war. We have historic examples of such a civil defense surge in the extraordinary funding of civil defense in response to the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises of the early 1960s. Those crises resulted in new programs, some which resulted in lasting improvements in our civil defense capabilities, while others were poorly planned and relatively wasteful. We must ensure that any future civil defense surge is well planned and efficiently executed.

In recognition of the increasingly complex threats, FEMA and other Federal departments and agencies are cooperating to develop plans and mechanisms, by which we can recognize, analyze, and respond to the inherently ambiguous warnings of enemy preparations for war. In that context, the capability to surge civil defense is one feature of a national capability for graduated and flexible response to any level of threat, including warnings of the possibility of nuclear war. Our success in preparing for a civil defense surge, however, would not avoid the risk of some attacks inside this country in what we view today as low intensity conflict. In that context, civil defense programs must build capabilities to save lives if attacks occur, with little or no warning, in more localized areas of the United States.

The Federal Government must support the State and local civil defense leadership by providing the kinds of information, training, communications and emergency preparedness support that is not available at those levels of government. The Civil Defense Act of 1950 requires that Federal funds be spent in consonance with the obligation of the National Government to protect the population against attacks, giving emphasis and priority to the undeniable possibility of a nuclear attack. NSDD 259, and FEMA's proposed Civil Defense Program for FY 1989, sustain programs that provide essential assistance to the States for attack preparedness. They also recognize the reality that the use of some attack preparedness facilities and resources to respond to natural and technological disasters can provide training, testing and development of capabilities that would be useful in any disastrous circumstance, including response to a nuclear attack.

The Department of Defense views the proposed FY 1989 Civil Defense Budget as facilitating a much-needed start to re-build a realistic National Civil Defense Program. In testifying today, we emphasize our belief that popular support for essential aspects of civil defense can be a reality for the long-term if the proposed FY 1989 Civil Defense Program is sustained and developed to meet the basic State and local needs for preparedness to meet any form of attack. However, we observe in particular the significant need to employ well all FEMA capabilities for civil defense research that are afforded by the proposal, and all international and domestic sources available without additional cost to the Government, to facilitate new and broadly acceptable
approaches to build and sustain popular support for civil defense. In the Department of Defense, we are aware of an extraordinary need for public awareness of, and preparedness for, the real risks to the population that could result from our engagement in any armed conflict today; and we believe a credible civil defense program is essential for such preparedness.

A National Civil Defense Program complements our military efforts to make all war and terrorist-type attacks less likely by reducing their potential effectiveness for destruction or coercion. We continue to support the approach of FEMA to balance attack preparedness and all-hazards protection; and our programs of Military Support to Civil Defense recognize that goal. Yet, we cannot fail to recognize the obvious risk to the Nation from efforts to deny the reality that nuclear attack can occur and to limit civil defense planning to non-nuclear incidents. Such a denial risks undermining our national will to preserve our way of life in the face of coercion, even if our lack of preparedness is never tested by an attack.

The proposed increase in civil defense spending for FY 1989 over FY 1988 remains very small as a national commitment to needed protection for the Nation’s population and its institutions. The proposed level of commitment to civil defense does not lessen the vulnerability of large segments of our society—its population, its infrastructure and its industry—to devastating effects that would occur in nuclear war. Yet, this budget will accommodate a flexible use of the available Federal resources to revitalize a framework for assisting the State and local jurisdictions in continuing enhancement of their ability to respond to attacks and other catastrophes, as permitted by the Civil Defense Act.

Summing all together, FY 1989 can be a watershed year for reality in perception of civil defense as a source for pride and achievement at local and State levels, and as an institution worthy of Federal support and the involvement of the people. The funding requested for FY 1989 will represent a visible commitment by the Congress; and that commitment must be taken seriously by all who observe or share in its expenditure.

We believe the Civil Defense Program proposed for FY 1989 is in accordance with the President’s policy, and that its application of the requested resources is a wise beginning point for national attention to the real needs of civil defense. The Department of Defense will continue to work actively to support FEMA and the States in the revitalized civil defense activities. We, therefore, endorse the proposed FY 1989 Civil Defense Program as meeting the criteria and intent of Executive Order 12148 and the Civil Defense Act of 1950; and we urge that the Congress fund the program as proposed.

THANK YOU.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:

On behalf of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), thank you for this opportunity to discuss the proposed budget of the Federal Emergency Management Agency for Fiscal Year 1989.

NEMA is a professional organization whose membership includes State directors of emergency management, professionals and volunteers from the emergency management community, public safety officials, and industry representatives from throughout the United States and its Territories. The Association actively promotes principles and programs to improve the interaction of all elements of the public safety community to form a cohesive infrastructure for the protection of the public against all hazards, man-made or natural.

First, let me state that the FEMA budget is of vital concern not only to the State directors of emergency management whom I have the honor of representing today, but also to the hundreds of local emergency management directors throughout the Nation. As you know, the continuing viability of State and local emergency programs depends, in considerable measure, upon funds provided by the Congress through FEMA to support these programs. I want to make it clear at the beginning of my statement that NEMA is strongly supportive, in general terms, of the proposed FEMA budget. There are some comments and suggestions we would like to offer, however, which in our opinion, will serve to more appropriately distribute the total funds requested.

Before I address the FEMA budget I would ask to digress slightly and address what we feel is, and should be, a separate issue—funds to support the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 or Title III of the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, more commonly referred to as SARA.
This Act imposes numerous, continuing requirements for planning, training, reporting, compliance monitoring and recordkeeping on State and local governments. Because emergency managers are already trained and experienced in these areas, the brunt of these requirements has fallen on the shoulders of our organizations—without the provision of necessary additional resources required to accomplish the job. In FY 1987 and 1988 EPA received five million dollars to conduct Title III SARA training activities which were passed through to FEMA. While these dollars were welcome and did provide for some of the required training, they were but a “drop in the bucket” toward accomplishing the entire task. Further, FEMA requested another five million dollars in its FY 1989 budget to continue these training activities. This request was not recognized by OMB. The facts of the matter are that Congress passed these Acts, Congress generated these requirements; therefore, Congress should also be the one to provide the funds for this program which could amount to as much as 25 to 50 million dollars nationwide. We do not want FEMA to have to take funds from any of its other programs to support Title III and SARA. Additional funds are necessary over and above what is currently proposed for FEMA. Neither FEMA nor we should be expected or required to accomplish this significant task without being provided the additional resources necessary to do so.

It is encouraging to all of us that the Administration has requested an increase in the FEMA budget, $27 million, for FY '89. This is certainly a welcome step in the right direction. For too many years, FEMA’s annual appropriation has been either reduced, or at best, provided little or no increase. These reductions, either in actual dollars, or through inflation, were felt most at the State and local levels of emergency management.

This negative impact is especially apparent in the Emergency Management Assistance (EMA) program. The purpose of this program is to provide Federal funds on a 50 percent Federal, 50 percent State and local, matching basis to support a cadre of professional, trained, and experienced emergency managers at the State and local levels. The effects of insufficient funding in this one program are several and most serious. NEMA recently conducted a survey of EMA requirements to which 28 States responded. This survey revealed that the total EMA shortfall (including new requirements of $2.8 million) (Federal share only) is $18.3 million. This substantiates that the current share ratio in these 28 States is $2.00 State and local to every $1.00 Federal, not $1.00 for $1.00 as is intended by the program. Since FEMA distributes available EMA funds to the States on a proportionate basis, it is reasonable to assume that these statistics apply nationwide. The detailed results of the survey are attached to this statement.

While we appreciate the $2 million increase which is proposed for the EMA program, the above figures clearly illustrate that this increase falls far short of what is required to restore funding of this program to its intended 50/50 share ratio. Enhancement of existing programs cannot be accomplished, and program expansion by bringing new, qualified organizations on board, is out of the question. There is a real need to put more dollars into this program now. There are two possible sources of funds to accomplish this. We would first propose that $3 million be taken from the Disaster Relief program which has had a $125 million increase proposed and add it to EMA, increasing the Civil Defense budget to $163.4 million. If Congress would not be amenable to this proposal, our second proposal would be to reduce the $4.4 million dollar increase which has been proposed
for the FEMA National Radio System by $3 million, and adding that $3 million to EMA, thus giving us an overall EMA increase of $5 million.

In general, NEMA does not advocate increasing the funding of one FEMA program at the expense of another. All programs are important and all require and deserve increased funding over and above that which is currently proposed. In particular we do not want any programs reduced that will have a direct effect upon the monies made available to State and local governments. However, there should be an exception in this case. Since the Disaster Relief program is in effect contingency type funds, a reduction in this program could easily be accomplished. If there are disasters of such magnitude and number that additional disaster assistance funds are required, Congress would have to act on this anyway. The National Radio System program, while important, has been under development for several years. One more year’s delay will not cripple us. Either of these programs would be a possible source of funds. EMA on the other hand, is the grass-roots program which provides the basic foundation of the entire emergency management program. Any progress in bringing this vital, fundamental program up to its required level of organization and accomplishment will provide significant, positive results.

FEMA has been under continuous pressure for many years to bring the EMA program to its desired level. Many blame the formula, but it is not to be blamed. Formulas don’t fit every situation. A revision to the current formula may resolve some shortages but it would invariably create other shortages. There is only one solution and that is adequate funds to meet current requirements and to allow for growth, now and in the future.

A second major issue is the stipend for students attending courses at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) in Emmitsburg, Maryland. In recent years, there have been efforts to reduce or eliminate this stipend. FY 1989 is no exception. While there is still some stipend money in the FY 1989 budget, it is not funded at 100%. FEMA proposes to require a one-third State and local cost share for FY 1989 and to eliminate the stipend altogether by 1991. NEMA strongly supports 100% Federal funding of student stipends and urges the Congress to fund this program at 100%.

The figures indicate that attendance at EMI was down in FY 1988. NEMA believes that this was not due to a decrease in interest but to the fact that the Federal budget was not passed until January. Although we feel that EMI does an overall good job in presenting valuable instruction to members of the emergency management community, we do feel that due to attendance being down substantially, they have accumulated enough inhouse funding to sustain this program at 100% because we are only talking about $344,000. It is difficult for all concerned, FEMA, EMI and State and local governments to plan and participate in an education program while operating on a continuing resolution.

Also, it is extremely difficult to gear up an annual program, get it operating at the maximum level, and accomplish your objectives when four of five months of the program year have elapsed before you know for certain what your resources are. There is no doubt that attendance at EMI will continue to drop, if the stipend is reduced below 100%, and drop drastically if it is eliminated entirely. Few States, if any, can afford to make up the difference and funding the attendance of students at EMI is certainly beyond the capabilities of the vast majority of our local governments. In order for EMI to continue to perform its vital mission, it needs an approved
budget in place, well in advance of the Fiscal Year and Federal funding of the student stipend at 100 percent.

While these two issues are of primary concern to NEMA, the other FEMA programs deserve comment as well. The proposed increases in most of these other programs as well will serve to indicate that deserved attention is being paid to the needs of emergency management.

There is a severe shortage of modern radiological detection instruments in this Nation. Increased funding in the Radiological Defense program will help to improve this situation by allowing the production of needed dies and casts to provide the industrial base with a surge production capability for these instruments.

It has been several years since any significant amount of money has been made available to the State and Local Direction, Control and Warning (S&LDCW) program. Emergency Operating Centers (EOCs) capable of sustained, independent functioning are vital to a jurisdiction’s success in effectively coping with a disaster situation. There are more than 500 EOCs throughout the United States that only need minor upgrading, e.g., EMP protection, emergency water supply, emergency broadcast station link, to bring them to “fully qualified” status meeting all FEMA requirements.

Another element of the S&LDCW program is the Emergency Broadcast System. Improvement of this system is also sorely needed as it has been allowed to deteriorate due to lack of funding over the years. The EBS network was activated 2390 times last year with varying degrees of success. Effective functioning of this system is vital if our citizens are to be provided timely information concerning emergency and disaster situations.

An effective training and education program is also essential. The importance of the student stipend has already been discussed. This program covers many other training efforts, correspondence courses, State-conducted training, workshops, seminars and emergency public information just to name a few. It has been years since any emergency public information has been published. The old materials have been exhausted. Most are outdated. The additional money earmarked for this program should allow for the printing and distribution of much needed maps, pamphlets, brochures and other materials. All of these training elements serve to better prepare our professionals, both paid and volunteer, and our citizens, in emergency management techniques.

Up to this point, it has been an unusual experience to address the benefits, however limited, that will result from increased funding. Three programs, Earthquake, Hurricane and Fixed Nuclear Facilities, have had decreases proposed from the FY 1988 operating plan. NEMA opposes these proposed cuts. A substantial increase may not be warranted; however, cuts in these programs will only lead to a deterioration of the results attained thus far. Once a program has been approved and implemented, adequate funds are required to assure its maintenance, otherwise it will wither away from neglect. Once again, these proposed cuts should be restored with additional funds, not at the expense of other Civil Defense programs.

As president of NEMA, I have had the privilege and pleasure to talk with many people, representing many varied groups, but with a common interest in civil defense: Senators, Congressmen, Congresswomen and their staffs, FEMA officials, State and local directors and their staffs, industry representatives, local officials and private citizens. It is clear to me that there is
a definite demand, however unspoken, for an adequate Civil Defense system in this Nation, a system which I regret to say we do not have. There are some bright spots I must admit. Our cadre of professionals are dedicated, experienced and well trained. The planning effort in most States is excellent. Certain local organizations are outstanding. Our volunteers, as always, are loyal and hardworking and provide us with a capability that money could not buy. But these occasional and widespread successes do not constitute a nationwide system. Unfortunately, the reason is a continuing lack of money and other Federal support. Until a few years ago, Civil Defense could receive surplus military property at no charge. This is no longer the case. This property must now be purchased. This source of equipment should be once again made available to Civil Defense.

I have already discussed the shortfalls in certain Civil Defense programs. I would now like to illustrate how Civil Defense spending has fared in recent years. In terms of 1988 constant dollars, Civil Defense funding reached a high in 1965, during the Kennedy Administration, of 492.2 million dollars. Since then there has been a steady, marked decline. The low was reached in 1980 during the Reagan Administration when only 152.7 million dollars, once again in 1988 constant dollars, were provided. This is an astounding 339.5 million dollar decrease—68%. It is a tribute to those dedicated individuals who have endured these trying, disheartening conditions that we have any semblance of a Civil Defense system at all.

However, a sudden infusion of 300 or 400 million dollars is not the answer. Even if that were possible, which we all know it is not, it would be a physical impossibility for most States and local governments to spend their share of that much money in a single year. We need a period of sustained, steady growth to counteract the period of sustained, steady decline we have just experienced.

You, ladies and gentlemen of the House of Representatives, are continually examining and debating many important issues that bear upon the security and economic well-being of not only the United States but many foreign nations as well. I submit it is time for Congress to examine our Civil Defense program. There is no reason to debate the issue. The issue is clear. This country and its citizens deserve and require an adequate Civil Defense system. We need to determine our total requirements. We need to determine where we are. We need to determine what our objectives are and how we are to obtain them. Then the Congress must provide the necessary resources.

At the same time, a clear and consistent dialogue must be created between the Congress and the Administration. It appears to me that the signals between these two bodies are mixed. It appears that the Administration is getting a signal that the Congress is unwilling to consider an increase in the Civil Defense budget. Therefore, the Administration is requesting only those funds it thinks the Congress will agree to, not the amount that is needed, and possibly not even the amount that the Congress may be willing to approve. As part of this examination process, the Congress must tell the Administration in clear, certain terms that Civil Defense is a vital program which has the support of the Congress. The extent to which Congress is willing to provide funding for the program must also be indicated.

It is time we stopped fooling ourselves. I have been involved with Civil Defense for 29 years. I have enjoyed the few good years and have struggled through the numerous bad ones. I can assure that we are barely maintaining a sem-
blance of what an effective Civil Defense pro-
gram should be. We are not prepared for a
nuclear attack. We are not prepared for a con-
ventional attack. We are not even prepared for a
terrorist attack.

Earlier I expressed appreciation for the increased
funding that has been proposed for Civil De-
fense. This must not be mistaken for satisfaction
for it is not. The world is well into the age of
space, computer and satellite technology. Civil
Defense on the other hand has barely progressed
beyond the tin helmet, arm band and flashlight of
the World War II air warden. You only have to
examine the equipment of our local organiza-
tions. Many of their vehicles are of World War
II and Korean War vintage. Their radios have
vacuum tubes, not even transistors, let alone
printed circuit boards. Except in a very few of
our larger cities, computers are nonexistent in
Civil Defense organizations. In fact, many don't
even have a copy machine. Of those commu-

nities that are fortunate enough to have them, their
warning devices consist of outdoor, electrically
activated sirens, once again World War II tech-
nology. There are much more modern devices
available, but there is no monetary assistance
available. Even in this year of proposed in-
creases, this program element, which also in-
cludes communications, is only to be funded at
$350,000, a sum which will buy essentially
nothing when you consider that one siren can
cost over $10,000. I could cite numerous in-
stances in which lives could have been saved had
local governments been able to spend a mere few
hundred dollars to install or improve their warn-
ing systems with encoders and decoders. But the
funds were not, and still are not, available.

It is well to provide funds for the dies and casts
so that industry can make advanced radiological
detection instruments during a surge period. I
say we need these instruments now. They need
to be manufactured, distributed and placed in the
hands of the people who will be using them so
that their use will be familiar should the need
arise. It may very well be that there won't be
time to accomplish all of this during a crisis.

The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) needs
to be thoroughly re-examined. Perhaps EBS
participation should be mandatory, not volun-
tary, and a station licensing requirement. Too
ten an EBS station will be hardened to provide
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection and
there will later be a change of ownership or
attitude, and this station will withdraw from the
system. This is a waste of scarce Federal dollars.
In the State of Georgia we regularly conduct
statewide EBS tests. We have yet to have the
system work to our satisfaction. There are gaps
in the system because participation is voluntary.
There are lapses and breakdowns because station
personnel are not adequately trained.

FEMA requires that an Emergency Operating
Center have EMP protection, among numerous
other criteria, in order for it to be "fully qual-
ified," that is meeting all FEMA requirements.
However, there are no engineers in the Federal
Government available to FEMA to provide the
expertise, guidance and assistance necessary to
accomplish this critical, highly technical require-
ment. Further, there is no help currently avail-
able from the private sector.

Another program, the National Warning System
(NAWAS) has also been permitted to gradually
deteriorate due to lack of funding. NAWAS is
composed of circuits leased from AT&T. Its
primary purpose is to provide an attack warning.
NAWAS termination points (drops) may be
100% Federally funded or funded on a 50/50
basis with EMA funds. There has been no
increase authorized in the number of 100%
Federally funded drops in many years. As EMA
funds are already short 34% of current requirements, many shared drops are being eliminated by local organizations. The lease expenses of this system have increased steadily and dramatically since AT&T divestiture despite FEMA’s considerable efforts to negotiate lower costs. One organization has reported that its lease costs of $110 per month in 1984 for two drops have risen to over $680 per month in 1988. Needless to say, that particular county is going to cut its capability in half. We are fortunate it is not dropping out entirely as numerous other jurisdictions have done.

FEMA has recently issued new guidance which authorizes State and local emergency management organizations to acquire and establish computer systems for Civil Defense purposes. This program is to be accomplished on a 50/50 share ratio. As yet, no funds have been made available. This then is an empty, meaningless program like many others. Until such time as funds are provided, few local jurisdictions will be able to afford developing a computer capability for Civil Defense.

These are but a few examples, Mr. Chairman, as to why Civil Defense needs to be examined. If we are to have a viable, effective Civil Defense system we must acknowledge this as a high priority, develop our goals and objectives and then vigorously pursue them.

In conclusion, I thank you for the privilege of representing NEMA before the Committee. NEMA is most pleased at FEMA’s initial success in attaining a proposed increase in its FY 1989 budget. Although it falls far short of the monies needed to provide the Emergency Management and Civil Defense capabilities that are deserved by the citizens of this Nation, it represents a long needed and most welcome step in the right direction. NEMA strongly urges this Committee and the Congress to support this budget. We also urge favorable consideration be given to those increases in specific areas that we have proposed—increases with additional dollars, not increases at the expense of other FEMA Civil Defense programs. This Nation has but a handful of paid emergency management professionals when compared to its hundreds of thousands of volunteers. We must have the equipment, the facilities, the programs and the training to attract, and then keep, these volunteers. NEMA realizes that we can never get all that we ask for, even though it is needed. It is difficult to understand, however, why support to our citizens should be limited, or as in previous years continually allowed to decrease, when we provide a blank check, limitless resources and require no accounting in assisting foreign governments when they experience disasters. Our Nation and its citizens expect and deserve our best efforts in emergency management, the extent and success of which are greatly dependent upon the resources provided by the Congress.
My name is Avagene Moore, and I am the President of the National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management (NCCEM). I am the local emergency manager from Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee.

Originally established as the United States Civil Defense Council in 1952 the name was changed to the National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management several years ago to reflect the all-encompassing responsibilities of the membership. We are a non-profit organization primarily composed of local emergency managers/civil defense directors from across the country and are charged with saving lives and protecting the property of our citizens on a daily basis. Our members are involved in all phases of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery of disasters. The association’s membership also includes professional/technical individuals and others interested in a broad field of emergency management.

Our testimony complements and supports the National Emergency Management Association’s testimony.

Today we focus on that portion of the FEMA budget identified as “Civil Defense” as it relates to State and local government. It is this category in FEMA’s budget where one finds the program elements which pass Federal funds through to States and localities. The local-State-Federal infrastructure incorporates all hazards, man-made or natural, across the United States. The Fiscal Year 1989 FEMA budget has been sent to Congress and requests $160,393,000 for activities under this portion of the law. This request level reflects the dual-use nature of the program and tries to incorporate and meet the objectives of National Security Decision Directive 259.

The National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management supports the FEMA budget request for 1989 with several specific enhancements that require additional dollars, not reprogrammed dollars. In reviewing funding trends for the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, one can consider the analogy of viewing a healthy
young athletic body then and today finding an aged or crippled body carrying forth the challenge of meeting the needs of our Nation as it seeks to cope with disasters of all types.

We support the budget request because we view this budget as a trend toward meeting the future needs of our Nation. It is a start. However, we couple this support with the following specific recommendations:

- The Emergency Management Assistance Program funds only partially support the localities and must be increased to help deal with the current need. The $58,275,000 request needs to be raised approximately $10 million. The suggested $10 million increase does not meet the present need, but will help the total infrastructure of the Nation's emergency management program begin to meet the current needs. It is a shared cost program. We ask only for reasonable support from the Federal level.

- Under the Training & Education provisions the stipends must be fully funded. The Federal Government does suggest a 1/3 local 2/3 Federal program this year. The long term Federal goal is a three-year phase out so that local governments pick up the total cost three years hence. This fails to recognize that local governments currently pick up expenses as their personnel attend classes at the Emergency Management Institute. Local government resources now cover expenses related to the absence of their employees as they attend courses, and there are also expenses not presently covered under the FEMA stipend program.

- The Earthquake and Hurricane Support Programs must be fully funded. The $4,030,000 request for the earthquake program should be fully funded to the Fiscal Year 1988 level and raised by $445,000. The hurricane program which requests $831,000 in Fiscal Year 1989 must be increased by another $65,000. Again, these are additional dollars that are being requested in the FEMA budget.

- The Radiological Emergency Preparedness program should not be funded through taxing local utilities. The FEMA budget should incorporate enough funds to meet the needs of FEMA's responsibilities.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the programs which are incorporated under its aegis have suffered great budgetary reductions in past years. The magnitude of the overall reductions, from a base year of 1984 alone, reflects a great assault on this Nation's programs designed to help cope with our Nation's disasters. We seriously regret these deficiencies as we on the front lines attempt to provide meaningful public protection programs.

Our testimony reflects a different approach to the FEMA budget than in recent years. I want to address another area of concern to this committee and to the U.S. House Appropriations Committee as well. NCCEM supports the integrated emergency management system concept—all hazards approach—in regard to overall emergency management.

At a general business session of the association on March 2, 1988, the association passed the following resolution:

"WHEREAS the members of NCCEM are
involved in dealing with all types of disasters, and

"WHEREAS the objective of NCCEM is to provide an organizational structure by which local government can best prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from all disasters,

"THEREFORE, be it resolved that NCCEM supports the integrated emergency management— all hazards approach to all emergency management programs."

This resolution was passed unanimously.

I believe this resolution reflects a strong support for the local-State-Federal infrastructure that has been developed to deal with and cope with all of the Nation’s disasters. In part the all-hazards approach recognizes that by planning for and dealing with emergencies and disasters which occur day-to-day better prepares us for the ultimate attack related disasters. An integrated emergency management program strengthens our ability to contend with any and all disasters that can befall our communities and country.

In conclusion, I would like to make one final note in support of our request for additional funding to FEMA in the specific areas enumerated in our testimony. Disasters of the future will only be more complex and challenging for our Nation’s emergency managers/civil defense directors. A disaster, be it natural or man-made, that occurred in a community 20 years ago would be much worse today. The higher concentration of civilian personnel and property that exists as our population grows will only complicate matters and require greater response capabilities. If we are to meet this challenge, additional funds, resources and training will be required.