In the confusion of effort that has resulted from trying to deal with homeland defense in the complex contemporary global security environment, strategic considerations have played little part in the debate and actions pertaining to national and global security. The general result in the United States has been the ad hoc and piece-meal crisis management of security affairs. That approach, in turn, has led to ad hoc, piecemeal, and less-than-desirable results—and high personnel, monetary, and political costs. As a consequence, virtually all the contributors to this anthology either call for or respond to a call for clear policy direction—and a strategy and organizational structure that provides the basic guidance regarding how to better defend the United States and its global interests.

Separately and collectively, the contributors to this compendium analyze specific problems of national security, and implicitly and explicitly come to grips with the idea of what the Honorable John Hamre calls a unifying field theory of homeland defense. In this closing chapter, we argue that this would involve the development of a theory of deterrence to replace the theory of containment; a thoughtful reorganization of federal and state security management, coordination, and implementation structures; and farsighted research and planning mechanisms to give decisionmakers and policymakers viable political-military deterrence options as they pertain to the various discrete actors that threaten the American
homeland and American interests today. We intend to establish the philosophical underpinnings and a beginning point for a field theory from which to achieve the vision necessary for greater success in safeguarding the American homeland. In that connection, we must remember that, in the highly integrated global system, global defense is homeland defense. Finally, it is also helpful to remember that “the enemy may be us.”

The Need for a Paradigm Change.

Perhaps the greatest threat to U.S. national security is the danger that we Americans do not easily change our thinking to coincide with the changes in the world around us. America’s principal defense priority for more than 40 years was the management of low-probability, high-intensity nuclear conflict, with a primary focus on Europe. Yet, ironically, nearly all the armed conflicts during that time were classified as low intensity, and took place in the Third World. Now, in addition to traditional regional security issues, an array of nontraditional threats—from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional ethnic and religious conflict, a hundred different varieties of terrorism, and criminal anarchy to completely nonmilitary threats such as trade war, financial war, new terror war, and cyber war—challenge the United States at home and abroad.

The United States faces a challenge to change perspectives. We need an organizing paradigm to assist us clarifying our global leadership role, and our internal and external purposes and courses of action. One message is unmistakable. The emerging global order has given the United States the longest period of economic prosperity anyone in the current generation can remember, but the end of the Cold War era conflict did not signal the end of all global conflict. Indeed, just the reverse is proving to be true. It is becoming quite clear that if we want to preserve the present prosperity and continue to benefit from it, we must
pay for it and nurture it. Thus, U.S. interests, within the fragile and interdependent global community, demand a peace enforcer—the proverbial iron fist encased in a velvet glove. This does not mean that the United States must be directly involved all over the world all the time. It does mean, however, that the United States must rethink and renew the concept of deterrence. In much the same way that Kennan’s Containment Theory of Engagement was conceived, philosophical underpinnings must be devised for a new theory of engagement to deal more effectively with more diverse threats to the American homeland and its interests abroad from unpredictable directions, and by more diverse external and domestic state and non-state actors.

Some Additional Considerations that Help Define Threat and Dictate Response.

When we think about the possibilities of conflict, we tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable U.S.-centric vision—a situation with battlefields that are well understood, with an enemy who looks and acts more or less as we do, and a situation in which the fighting is done by the military—somewhere else. We must recognize, however, that in protecting our interests and confronting and influencing an adversary today, the situation has changed. We can see that change in several ways.

1. Ambiguity. First, the definition of “enemy” and “victory” is elusive, and the use of “power” against an enemy to achieve some form of success is diffuse. Underlying these ambiguities is the fact that contemporary conflict tends to be an intra-state affair (i.e., not an issue between sovereign states). It can be one part or several parts of one society—to include the American society—against another. Thus, there are virtually no rules. In these predominantly internal wars, there is normally no formal declaration or termination of conflict, no easily identifiable enemy military formations to attack and destroy, no specific territory to take and hold, no single credible government or political
actor with which to deal, no legal niceties such as mutually recognized national borders and Geneva Conventions to help control the situation, no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending authorities will be honored, and no commonly accepted rules of engagement to guide the leadership of a given law enforcement organization.

2. The Need to Redefine “Enemy,” “Power,” and “Victory.” Second, the ambiguous political-psychological-moral nature of contemporary conflict forces the redefinition of long-used terms. The enemy is no longer a recognizable foreign military entity or an industrial capability to make war. The enemy now becomes an internal or external individual actor that plans and implements violence, and exploits the causes of violence. Power is no longer simply combat fire-power directed at a traditional enemy soldier or industrial complex. Power is multi-level and combined political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, military, police, and civil bureaucratic activity that can be brought to bear appropriately on the causes as well as the perpetrators of violence. And, victory is no longer the obvious and acknowledged destruction of military capability, and the resultant “unconditional” surrender. Victory, or success, is now—more and more, and perhaps with a bit of “spin control”—defined as the achievement of “peace.”

3. A “New” Center of Gravity. These ambiguities intrude on the “comfortable” vision of war in which the assumed center of gravity has been foreign enemy military formations and his industrial capability to conduct war. Clausewitz reminds us, however, that in places subject to internal strife, the hub of all power and strength (i.e., center of gravity) is leadership and public opinion. Our energies should be directed against these. Thus, in contemporary intra-national conflict, the primary center of gravity may change from a familiar foreign military concept to an ambiguous and uncomfortable domestic leadership and public opinion paradigm.
4. Conflict Has Become Multi-organizational, Multi-lateral, and Multi-dimensional. Fourth, conflict is no longer a simple military to military confrontation. Conflict now involves entire populations, and parts of populations. Conflict now involves a large number of indigenous national civilian agencies, other national civilian organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and sub-national indigenous actors involved in dealing politically, economically, socially, morally, or militarily with complex threats to national and international security and well-being. And, those are just the “good guys.” The number and diversity of “bad guy” players can be as large. As a consequence, an almost unheard of unity of effort is required to coordinate the multi-lateral, multi-dimensional, and multi-organizational paradigm necessary for success on either or all sides of contemporary conflict. That ideal has not often been achieved in the past. Nevertheless, in the new and infinitely more complex global situation, governments, their civil and military/police components, and various other actors involved in such endeavors must find ways and means to work more effectively together.

5. Contemporary Conflict is Not Limited; It is Total. Finally, contemporary nontraditional war is not a kind of appendage—a lesser or limited thing—to the comfortable vision of war. It is a great deal more. As long as opposition exists that is willing to risk everything to violently take down a government, destroy a society, or cause great harm to a society—there is war. This is a zero-sum game in which there is only one winner. It is, thus, total. This is the case with domestic factions, other governments, rogue states, Maoist insurgents, Osama bin Ladin’s terrorists, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, Mafia families, Southeast Asian warlords, or Serbian ethnic cleansers—among others. This is also the case with the deliberate “financial war” attack planned and implemented by owners of international mobile capital that generated the Southeast Asia financial crisis and inflicted devastating injury on
Asia’s “little tiger” countries. Their nonmilitary financial actions caused socio-economic-political devastation that could not have been exceeded by a regional war. This is also the case with the systems analyst, software engineer, scholar, or 16-year-old “hacker” that can impair the security of an army or a nation electronically as seriously as a nuclear bomb. Finally, as one more example, it must be remembered that Germany’s former Chancellor Helmut Kohl breached the Berlin Wall with the powerful deutsche mark—not aircraft, artillery, armor, or infantry.

These are the internal and external deterrence realities for now and into the next century. Everything else is illusion.

**Deterrence, and Preventive and Public Diplomacy.**

In the anarchic environment of global politics, regardless of perceived intent, what one state or political actor does will inevitably impinge on another. That action will affect some beneficially, others adversely. Mutual dependence means that each political actor must take others into account. Interdependence affects nothing more powerfully than it does security. The result can be a vicious downward action-reaction spiral that takes the global community into instability, violence, chaos, and the inevitable destruction of stability, peace, and prosperity. As a consequence, political actors have always tried to deter others from engaging in activities considered to be harmful, or to encourage actions thought to be beneficial. A major problem in all this is that the anarchic environment of global politics allows each political actor to be the only and the final judge of his interests and actions. Again, it must be remembered that this caution also applies to illegal internal factions.

The Primary Rules. Here is where preventive and public diplomacy comes into play. The general rule would be that decisionmakers and policymakers must carefully calculate possible gains and losses, and when the case warrants,
apply pre-planned indirect and direct deterrent measures earlier rather than later. If done earlier, this implies the initial and intense use of low-cost diplomatic and civilian resources and military support units to ensure the deterrence message has adequate back-up. If applied earlier, preventive measures may reduce tensions that if left to fester could lead to deadly results. If done later, this normally implies the initial and intense use of high-cost military combat units to respond to a worsening situation. If applied later, preventive measures may turn out to be either irrelevant or counter-productive. Ultimately, however, the only viable test for indirect or direct preventive action sooner or later is national self-interest. In any case, the basic logic of the application of preventive and public diplomacy is unassailable—the sooner the better.

Deterrence, then, is not necessarily military—although that is important. It is not necessarily negative or directly coercive—although that, too, is important. Deterrence is not necessarily exercised against a foreign state or non-state actor—and that is very important. Deterrence is much broader than all that. Deterrence can be direct and/or indirect political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and/or military-coercive. In its various forms and combinations of forms, it is an attempt to influence how and what an illegal internal or a foreign enemy or potential enemy thinks and does. That is, deterrence is the creation of a state of mind that either discourages one thing, or encourages something else. Motives and culture, thus, become crucial. It is in this context that political-psychological communication—and preventive and public diplomacy—become vital parts of the deterrence equation.

Intermediate Rules. In that context, the deterrence “Rule of Thumb” must move from traditional U.S.-centric values, and determine precisely what a hostile foreign or militant domestic leadership values most. The “deterrer” must then determine precisely what a hostile leadership values most—and identify exactly how that cultural
“thing”—whatever it is—can realistically be held at risk. Conversely, a new deterrence “Rule of Thumb” must also consider what a hostile leadership values most and—as opposed to the proverbial “stick”—identify precisely what “carrots” might also be offered as deterrents.

In the chaos of the “new world disorder,” the threat of devastating attacks on the United States and its interests at home and abroad perpetrated by the former Soviet Union, China, and other nuclear powers still retains a certain credibility. As a result, the deterrence and preventive diplomacy task is to get into the minds of these diverse political actors, and to find viable ways and means of convincing them NOT to use nuclear or any other kind of weapons against us or anybody else in the global community. Moreover, the threats associated with the growing sophistication of biological and chemical war, and cyber war, are intensifying. At the same time, other “nontraditional” threats and menaces emanating from virtually a thousand different internal and foreign political actors with a cause—and the will to conduct asymmetrical warfare—are spreading havoc throughout the global community. And, again, the deterrence task is straight-forward. Culturally effective ways and means must be found to convince these “nontraditional” domestic and foreign players that it is NOT in their interest—whatever it may be—to continue their negative behavior.

Advanced Rules. Success in deterrence cannot be reduced to buying more or better military and police forces and weaponry, to superior intelligence, to genius in command, or to relative morality. Deterrence can work only if the intended deterree chooses to be deterred. There is no way that any kind of deterrence can be guaranteed. The problem is that deterrence is a dialectic between two independent wills. As a consequence, probably the single most important dimension of deterrence is clarity of communication between deterrer and deterree. As we rethink contemporary deterrence, we must not think of
ourselves as much as “warfighters” as “conflict preventers.” Thus, it is incumbent on the United States and the rest of the global community to understand and cope with the threats imposed by contemporary nontraditional actors, think “outside the box,” and replace the old “nuclear theology” with a broad deterrence strategy as it applies to the chaos provoked by the diverse state, non-state, and intra-national and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear threats and menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.

What Is To Be Done?

The United States and the rest of the international community will inevitably face horrible new dilemmas at home and abroad that arise from the chaos engendered by the contemporary global security environment. They center on the traditional threat that stems from current and potential nuclear powers, and the many smaller—but equally deadly—nontraditional threats that are generated out of the unevenness of global integration. Clearly, the current “business as usual” crisis management approach leaves much to be desired in the context of a multi-polar world in which one or a hundred “irrational” political players are exerting differing types and levels of lethal power.

As has been suggested above, the United States needs (1) a central unifying deterrence concept to replace “containment;” (2) a thoughtful reorganization of the national and sub-national security management, coordination, and implementation structures to better deal with the complex new world; and, (3) farsighted research and planning mechanisms to give decisionmakers and policymakers viable options for deterring and/or reducing the scope, intensity, and duration of contemporary violence. Such a prioritization of effort is not a matter of “putting the strategic cart before the deterrence horse.” It is a matter of making it clear where the horse and cart are going, how they
are going to get there, and what they going to do once they arrive.

In that connection, it is important to remember that the intent of these recommendations can only be secured as a result of constant improvements in the types and levels of action we develop in pursuit of a higher quality of global and domestic stability and peace than we now enjoy. The challenge, then, is to come to terms with the fact that contemporary security—at whatever level—is at its base a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police effort. The corollary is to change from a singular military-police approach to a multi-dimensional, multi-organizational, and multi-cultural paradigm.

This may be accomplished within the context of a holistic implementation of direct and indirect “offensive” (i.e., proactive preventive diplomacy) and “defensive” (i.e., generally military) actions. Defensive action involves sustained coercive deterrence of threats to national interests, and, in certain instances, is relatively short-term. It primarily involves military and other civilian security efforts that are intended to stop parties in conflict from killing or moving against one another. Offensive action is generally mid to long-term. It is primarily civilian and political-economic-psychological, but is likely to have to be coordinated with defensive military or police measures. It focuses on prevention of crises, and—when appropriate—follows up the defensive enforcement of law and order with coordinated efforts to diminish or remove the social, economic, and political causes of instability and its resultant violence. This kind of pre or post-crisis action initiates the steps necessary to reform or develop political, economic, and social institutions, procedures, and attitudes that generate the foundational elements required to address America’s central strategic vision—that of global engagement to foster legitimate civil society, economic prosperity, and durable peace.
Implementing the extraordinary challenges of reform and regeneration implied in this call for a paradigm change will not be easy. But, they are basic security strategy and national and international asset management. That will, as a result, be far less demanding and costly in political, military, and monetary terms than continuing a singular crisis management and generally military approach to global and domestic security that is inherently a long-term political problem. By accepting these challenges and tasks, the United States can help replace conflict with cooperation and to harvest the hope that a new deterrence paradigm for a more peaceful and prosperous tomorrow offers.