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FORMATION OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICY:

1947-1959

by

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Gregory S. Mazul

Abstract

Security assistance has played a vital role in the formation of foreign policy objectives throughout United States history. It is generally accepted that a formal security assistance program was initiated in the U.S. following the conclusion of World War II with the signing of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. From this point forward the U.S. would embark on a global attempt to shape the world political environment to suit our own national objectives and priorities. The period between 1947 and 1959 offers a unique look at the formative years of our national security assistance program both in terms of world events as well as debate surrounding the program. This thesis investigates the evolution of the program through an intensive historical literature review of major pieces of legislation and doctrines during the time period between 1947 through 1959.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Overview

There is no question that security assistance is crucial in the implementation of foreign policy objectives in the United States. It has been an important aspect of these decisions from its inception in 1947 (Schlesinger, 1985:xi). With the importance that has been placed on security assistance, however, has come a fair share of criticisms of the program.

Security assistance can be described as a method for promoting foreign policy objectives by countries such as the United States that possess both the military and economic capability to do so. It involves an exchange of materials, money, or equipment from one nation to another. As would be expected, many times the country supplying security assistance will benefit the greatest from the overall interests the exchange promotes. Very few countries have been in a position to offer substantial security assistance since World War II. The Soviet Union and the United States have been in perhaps the best position. There is a great deal a country could potentially gain from supplying other countries with aid. First, the country may gain influence that would allow for the projection of military power globally. This could come in the form of access to bases on foreign soil as well as an increased influence in the region of operations. A well

thought out security assistance strategy can also promote an economical way to support a country's military infrastructure (Semmel, 1982:268-269).

The years 1947 to 1959 marked a unique period in U.S. security assistance policy. Following World War II, the United States found itself confronted with the Soviet threat of expansion. In order to counter this threat the United States embarked on an aggressive security assistance program that would become a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. President Truman stated in his inaugural address in 1949:

In the conduct of foreign relations, the United States, like every other state, is concerned primarily with the achievement of those objectives of national interest which it conceives to be of paramount significance. If the management of our external affairs is to enjoy rationality, it must have goals that harmonize with, and supplement, the internal policies and programs of the Government, whether they may be the promotion of commerce and trade, the acquisition of territory or power, or the maintenance of peace and security. (Quoted in Defense Institute, 1995:1)

It is generally accepted that security assistance began in the United States just after World War II, during the Truman administration, as a tool used to shape our nations defense policy objectives. It has been used to accomplish multiple goals since its inception that promote U.S. policy objectives throughout the world. This includes enhancing allied nation's defense capabilities when the United States deems this course of action as consistent with our own objectives. It also includes economic support to allied and friendly nations for the purpose of strengthening their economies. Finally, security assistance has been used to maintain regional stability abroad in support of vital U.S. interests (Grimmett, 1985: 2).

Much understanding of the security assistance program during the years 1947 to 1959 can be gained from investigation of key legislative acts and doctrines established during this time period. The Greek-Turkish Aid Bill in 1947 is generally accepted to have been the first significant piece of security assistance legislation enacted in the United States. The bill called for both economic and military assistance to be provided specifically to the countries of Greece and Turkey for the purpose of preventing Soviet domination and control. The Mutual Defense Act of 1949 was the next significant piece of security assistance legislation enacted in the United States. It was significant because it created the Military Assistance Program within the United States which would be the first step in this country of providing substantial military assistance to countries all over the globe in support of foreign policy objectives. Perhaps the next major piece of security assistance legislation was the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which combined military assistance and economic assistance into one legislative vehicle, signaling the perception that both military and economic assistance work together to form security assistance policy. While the Mutual Security Act of 1951 created the Military Assistance Program in the United States, the Mutual Security Act of 1954 created Foreign Military Sales Credit program, perhaps indicating a transition from military assistance to foreign military sales as the primary method of security assistance execution (Grimmett, 1985: 2). The Eisenhower Doctrine served to expand security assistance in the United States geographically. The Middle East became the primary focus of concern among top U.S. policy makers. No matter what method was used to carry out security assistance policy in the United States, it was always tied to significant world events such as the expansionist views of the Soviet Union, the Korean War, or instability in the Middle East (Grimmett, 1985:37).

Key Terms

Security assistance. The term security assistance encompasses several different ideas and includes “various military and economic assistance programs for allied and friendly foreign countries conducted by the United States” (Defense Institute, 1995:5). Included in the concept of security assistance is the idea of transferring items from one country to another. These transfers can include defense services, training, equipment, or economic assistance. The basic idea behind this concept is that, if the United States can assist allied nations in their ability of providing their own self-defense, then our own national security interests will be enhanced (Defense Institute, 1995: 5).

Military assistance. General Robert Wood, United States Army, defined military assistance in the following way, as quoted in *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices*:

It is not economic aid, or development loans or agricultural assistance, or technical grants, or food for peace or the Peace Corps. It is not money given to foreign governments. It is not a contribution to the United States gold outflow. It is a program which provides military equipment and weapons and training to those allied and friendly nations which share our view as to the threat of international communism. It is a program which funds purchases from American industry for shipment overseas to the military forces of those countries which have the will and the manpower but not the means to defend themselves...It is an arm of the United States foreign policy. It is an extension of United States defense posture and at the bargain basement rates. It is predominantly in our own self-interest. (Hovey, 1965:v-vi)

Research Objective

Security assistance has been at the forefront of American Foreign Policy objectives since the end of World War II. It remains an important and cost effective way the United States can pursue its interests globally when compared to the cost the same policy decisions would bear on the military defense budget (Brandt, 1989:1). In order to realize and understand the importance of the security assistance program it is necessary to gain an appreciation for where it has been. By gaining a better understanding of how the security assistance program was developed in the United States, possible future problems that have occurred in the program throughout history may be able to be avoided. Perhaps the best way is to study the program from its inception during its formative years. Therefore the research objective of this thesis is to study the major historical events that occurred between 1947-1959, that impacted the United States security assistance program. In order to accomplish this, the following events will be analyzed:

- Greek-Turkish Aid Bill
- Mutual Defense Act of 1949
- Mutual Security Act of 1951
- Mutual security Act of 1954
- Eisenhower Doctrine

President's Committee to Study U.S. Military Assistance of 1959; also known as the Draper Reports

Although the Marshall Plan played a significant role in our nation's history, its role in the shaping of security assistance is somewhat limited. Therefore only a brief description of it will be presented without an extensive analysis of the subject matter.

Research Questions

- How did the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill impact security assistance?
 - How did the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 influence security assistance?
 - How did the Mutual Defense Act of 1951 influence security assistance?
 - How did the Mutual Defense Act of 1954 influence security assistance?
 - In what way did the Eisenhower Doctrine impact security assistance
- What were the key elements identified in the President's Committee to study U.S. Military Assistance of 1959?

Scope

The evaluation of this thesis will be limited to the major events impacting security assistance that occurred in our history between 1947-1959. Analysis will begin with the signing of the Greek-Turkish Aid bill and conclude with the President's Committee to study U.S. Military Assistance of 1959. It should be noted that only limited discussion will be provided concerning the Marshall Plan as its impact on security assistance is somewhat limited. The Marshall Plan provided economic assistance to Europe, which does constitute one aspect of security assistance, however, it did not reflect the military assistance aspect to security assistance.

Chapter 2

Methodology

Overview

The years 1947-1959 marked an important point in our history concerning security assistance. During this period much debate existed dealing with the role the United States would play in world politics and how best to accomplish this role. As mentioned in the previous chapter, security assistance as we know it today had its beginnings with the Truman Doctrine in 1947. During this time period an important shift took place in the way in which the United States carried out its security assistance policy. This shift was evidenced by an increasingly expanded role security assistance would play on foreign policy in the United States. Since this thesis is a historical analysis of security assistance during the years 1947-1959, examination of several of the key legislative acts and doctrines of the time period were deemed as the most appropriate way to conduct the research. To accomplish this goal, a historical literature search was used that would include analysis of the books, congressional documents, and other official documents that would be relevant to the time period.

A methods matrix was used to facilitate a logical approach that would be utilized in this thesis. This type of matrix organizes the data collection process necessary to answer

the question of what do I need to know? It then ties this process into a statement concerning the validity and reliability of the method utilized (Maxwell, 1996:81-85).

Table 1. Methods Matrix (Maxwell, 1996:81-85)

What do I need to know?	Why?	What data will give me the answer?	What will I do with the data?	Where do I get the data?	How/When do I get the data?	Reliability & Validity
Impact the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill had on security assistance	To draw conclusions of how this bill shaped security assistance	Reading the bill and research conducted from multiple sources concerning its impact	Identify key aspects from the bill that impacted security assistance	Books, government documents and relevant articles	Finish review of relevant data by April 15	Reputability of sources as well as triangulation method
Impact the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 had on security assistance	To draw conclusions of how this bill shaped security assistance	Reading the bill and research conducted from multiple sources concerning its impact	Identify key aspects from the bill that impacted security assistance	Books, government documents and relevant articles	Finish review of relevant data by April 15	Reputability of sources as well as triangulation method
Impact the Mutual Security Act of 1951 had on security assistance	To draw conclusions of how this bill shaped security assistance	Reading the bill and research conducted from multiple sources concerning its impact	Identify key aspects from the bill that impacted security assistance	Books, government documents and relevant articles	Finish review of relevant data by April 15	Reputability of sources as well as triangulation method

Impact the Mutual Security Act of 1954 had on security assistance	To draw conclusions of how this bill shaped security assistance	Reading the bill and research conducted from multiple sources concerning its impact	Identify key aspects from the bill that impacted security assistance	Books, government documents and relevant articles	Finish review of relevant data by April 15	Reputati on of sources as well as triangulation method
Impact the Eisenhower Doctrine had on security assistance	To draw conclusions of how this doctrine shaped security assistance	Reading the doctrine and research conducted from multiple sources concerning its impact	Identify key aspects from the doctrine that impacted security assistance	Books, government documents and relevant articles	Finish review of relevant data by April 15	Reputati on of sources as well as triangulation method
What method should be used in this research?	To add to the overall validity and reliability of the study	Dane, "Research Methods"; Maxwell, "Qualitative Research Design," Cooper and Emory, "Business Research Methods"	Use as method throughout the thesis	AFIT library	Already have the materials	Obivious

In writing the thesis I utilized the matrix illustrated in Table 1 to organize my thoughts concerning the approach to the research in an effort to simplify the process. I also used the matrix to contemplate the most appropriate method for conducting historical research.

An archival research method was deemed as the most appropriate method to conduct the study. An archival method is appropriate when the focus of the data collection process will be on gathering material previously written on the subject. This would include government sources, newspapers, books, and magazine articles (Dane, 1990:169). In fact, “archival research is any research in which a public record is the unit of analysis” (Dane, 1990:169).

Dane describes two forms of archival research, content analysis and existing data analysis. Content analysis, which will be used throughout the thesis involves using the content of messages to draw conclusions about its meaning. Dane points out that through this method of analysis, one should be able to draw the same conclusions as others when presented with the same material for study. Content analysis involves answering one of five basic questions: who, what, to whom, how, and with what effect (Dane, 1990:169-174). For the purposes of this thesis the question I will attempt to answer is: with what effect? This seems the most appropriate question to answer as the thesis is concerned with the effect different pieces of legislation and doctrines under analysis had on security assistance policy in the United States.

Research Sources

Research involves an organized approach which will provide information that can be used to answer the stated research questions (Cooper and Emory, 1995:16). Two types of data sources exist in research: primary data and secondary data. Primary data are used to answer a research question by analysis of original sources while secondary data involve the analysis of studies conducted by others (Cooper and Emory, 1995:240). This thesis

will utilize both primary and secondary data sources in the method of analysis. Primary data sources will be in the form of congressional hearings as well as documentation of the legislative acts themselves. Secondary data sources will be in the form of books, reports, and articles that will be used to gain insight into the debate surrounding the key pieces of legislation under consideration. The use of secondary data sources is generally accepted as an appropriate means of analysis when utilizing a historical method such as archival research (Cooper and Emory, 1995:241).

Research Plan

During the data collection process, I attempted to evaluate the contents and debate surrounding the key legislative acts and doctrines stated in chapter one. My thinking was that by gaining an understanding of the contents and debate surrounding the legislation, significant issues would begin to surface which would prove useful in the analysis of each act and its impact on security assistance.

Whenever evaluating secondary data caution must be used concerning how much confidence can be assigned to the accuracy of the data (Cooper and Emory, 1995:259). Since secondary data is often gathered with a preexisting objective in mind, the likelihood of finding bias in the conclusions is often increased (Stewart, 1984:14). To decrease the likelihood of error, the method of triangulation of data will be utilized whenever appropriate and possible. Silverman states, "Having a cumulative view of data drawn from different contexts allows us, as in trigonometry, to triangulate the true state of affairs by examining where the different data intersect" (Silverman, 1993:152).

In my research I attempted first to gain insight into the factors leading up to the period of history under investigation. This included a brief look at World War II and the reasons surrounding the beginning of the cold war. My research then followed a logical chronological sequence including discussion of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill of 1947, the Mutual Defense Act of 1949, Mutual Security Act of 1951, Mutual Security Act of 1954, Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, and the Draper Report of 1959.

Material obtained for use in this thesis was primarily obtained from historical references from the Air Force Institute of Technology library, Wright State University, the Montgomery Country library, the University of Dayton, and the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management library at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Numerous Inter-Library loans were used to obtain references from libraries outside this region. Sources of information were obtained from these sources to include books, newspapers, magazine articles, government periodicals, and journals.

The U.S House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Selected Executive Session Hearings as well as the Draper Reports proved to be valuable tools in gaining insight into the debate existing concerning legislation of the time period. These sources were able to provide much of the primary information utilized in this thesis.

The information gathered in this research process provided the necessary foundation used in analysis of key issues at the heart of security assistance during the time period. This research is intended to be a historical analysis of the security assistance program in the United States from 1947 to 1959.

Chapter 3

Literature Review

Overview

This chapter covers the information required to answer the research questions discussed in chapter one. The chapter is organized around the questions in the following topic areas: 1) Greek-Turkish Aid Bill; 2) Mutual defense Act of 1949; 3) Mutual Defense Act of 1951; 4) Mutual Defense Act of 1954; 5) Eisenhower Doctrine; and the 6) President's Committee to Study U.S. Military Assistance. These areas mark important historical milestones in the shaping of security assistance within the United States and should provide a solid foundation for insightful analysis into the impact of this era on security assistance (U.S. Security Assistance, 1985:183).

Review

Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. Following World War II, the United States went through a significant change in foreign policy. This change involved the United States assuming a more active role in world affairs than it had ever done before (Kaplan, 1980, iii). Perhaps the beginning of the Security Assistance program started with the introduction of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill of 1947. This bill marked the first time the United States committed both military and economic aid to foreign countries (U.S. Security Assistance,

1985:183). The introduction of the bill also marked the beginnings of what would become known as the Truman Doctrine.

After World War II ended, President Truman found himself with the difficult task of dealing with an aggressive Soviet Union that was becoming increasingly threatening to U.S. objectives. This was evidenced by the Soviets exerting pressure on both Greece and Turkey to gain further influence in the region. This action would eventually result in the president's request to Congress for \$400 million that would be provided to Greece and Turkey for both military and economic aid (Defense Institute, 1995:12).

Concern of Soviet domination of the entire Middle East was focused not only on Greece and Turkey, but on Iran as well. An agreement had been reached in 1942 between the British, Russian, and Iranian governments which allowed troops to be stationed in Iran until March 2, 1946. It was agreed by all countries involved that by this date all foreign troops would be out of Iran. However, not only did the Russian government not remove the troops by March 2nd, intelligence showed that the Russians were actually increasing troops in the country (Truman, 1956:93).

President Truman saw three strategic implications from the continued Russian military presence in Iran. First, there was the issue of Turkish security. Russia had repeatedly asked Turkey to make allowances for the defense of the Dardanelles along with territorial concessions over the last few months. The ability for Turkey to resist these pressures would only be compounded by Russian troop presence on another border should Iran fall prey to complete Soviet influence. If this were to happen, the Russians would have the ability to outflank the Turks if they so desired. Secondly, the President was concerned with the security of the oil reserves in Iran. He felt that Soviet control of this region

would seriously affect the balance of world power. Finally, what bothered the President the most was the way in which the Soviet Union was handling an agreement that was made with the Iranian government. The President felt that all nations no matter how large or small are due a certain amount of respect in terms of binding agreements or commitments from the other countries they enter into the agreements with. He felt that if any region in the world was to accomplish stability, a certain level of cooperation must exist between the countries in that region. The President felt that the Soviet Union was not acting in good faith by maintaining troops in Iran and was displaying a disregard for the United Nations in its attempt to bring a resolution to the conflict. Finally on March 24, 1946, after much political maneuvering, Russia announced that it would immediately remove all troops from Iran. However the threat of Soviet influence over Greece and Turkey remained at the forefront of strategic administration issues (Truman, 1956:93-95).

In February 1947, the British government provided the United States the justification necessary to become actively involved in providing the two countries with aid. Notes were provided to the United States from the British government which outlined several alarming trends. First, the notes stated that Greece was currently involved in a guerrilla war, in which the guerrillas were being supported by the communist governments of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Secondly, the notes detailed the fact that Britain was in the midst of an economic crisis and would be unable to provide any further assistance to the governments of Greece and Turkey as it had done in the past. Finally, the notes discussed the Soviet Union's attempts to gain influence over the defense of the Dardanelles, by pressuring the Turkish government (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. VI, 1976:307).

It should be noted that other factors influenced the decision to provide aid to Greece and Turkey besides the notes. The United States had been involved with Greek politics actively since the end of World War II. In 1946, the United States had supervised the national elections in Greece, as well as provided a loan from the Export-Import Bank. Many of these actions were the result of a growing administration sentiment to resist Russian expansion of influence throughout this region (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. VI, 1976:307-308).

The circumstances in both Greece and Turkey were unique in many ways and justify further consideration. The situation in Turkey was primarily a military issue, while the situation in Greece was more focused around political, economic, and humanitarian issues. Regardless of the fact the Truman administration treated the problems in both countries under a single legislative umbrella, they clearly “present different aspects of the problem and should be considered separately” (Reitzel, 1947:680).

Russia’s interest in Turkey had gone on for years as they felt the country was an important strategic objective for the Russian Navy having an exit point into the Mediterranean Sea. When Russia began pressuring Turkey for greater control over the Dardanelles the United States felt a response was necessary. On November 2, 1945, the United States provided the Turkish government with a note outlining three key principles that the administration hoped that any further agreement between the Russian and Turkish government would contain concerning control over the Dardanelles. The first was that all merchant vessels of all nations would have access to the Straits at any time. Secondly, all Black Sea power warships would have access to the Straits at all times. Finally, the administration hoped that access to the Straits would be denied to warships of non-Black

Sea powers except with permission of all the nations or special permission from the United Nations. In July 1946, the Russian government sent Turkey a proposal which essentially called for joint Russian-Turkish control over the Dardanelles. The United States viewed this as an attempt by the Russians to take control of Turkey. In the administration's view, they felt that once the Russian military had entered Turkey for purpose of defending the Straits, it would be only a matter of time until they used the troops in country to control all Turkish affairs. Turkey sought the United States' advice concerning the Russian proposal, and after much discussion rejected it and made it clear to the Russians that any attempt to gain control of the region by violence would be met with stiff military resistance. The problem with this was that the Turkish Army was very inadequately equipped and would need funds in order increase military capability to hold the Russians at bay in their quest for influence in this region (Truman, 1956:96-97).

The situation in Greece had a somewhat different origin. Following the war the country's political situation had broken down into two main factions. The first was a communist controlled group and the other was the political faction that remained under control by the king. The country's economic situation quickly deteriorated further during the fighting between the two political groups. Everyday life in Greece became a struggle for the people as factories were closed, jobs were lost and people feared for their lives. The desperate situation in the country played right into the hands of the communist groups (Truman, 1956:98). An internal economic collapse would almost certainly benefit the aspirations of the communist guerrillas. Reports received by the United States indicated that many of the communist guerrillas in the county had been trained in Yugoslavia,

Bulgaria, and Rumania. The reports went on to state that the efforts in the three countries were being supported by Russia (Truman, 1956:98).

The concern for the situation in Greece was enhanced when on March 30, 1947, the United Kingdom informed the United States that due to its own economic situation it would have to cease all support to the country. At the time, the administration believed that the only thing preventing a complete communist takeover of Greece was the British presence there. With this deterrent removed they believed it would only be a matter of time until the country was under communist control. This would be an important strategic implication for the United States because it would increase communist power in the Mediterranean. Also the administration felt that once Greece had fallen under communist control, the pressure on Turkey would increase dramatically (Truman, 1956:99-100). It was clear that the United States had to act quickly in order to prevent Greece from falling under communist rule.

This sense of urgency was reflected in a memorandum by Under Secretary of State Acheson to the Secretary of State concerning the observations in Greece of Ambassador MacVeagh, Paul Porter as head of an economic mission, and Mark Ethridge with the U.S. Investigating Commission. Porter had been sent to Greece by President Truman to provide the Greek government with expert advice on their economic situation after the Greeks had requested assistance (Truman, 1956:99). The Undersecretary wrote:

Reports from MacVeagh, Porter and Ethridge in Athens are unanimous in their alarm over the probability that Greece will be unable to maintain her independence. Determining factors are the probability of an imminent economic and financial collapse and the fact that Greek communists and the Soviet dominated governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, and

Bulgaria are making every effort to prevent any improvement in Greek internal affairs....The Greek foreign exchange position is so critical that no one can see at the present time how absolutely essential imports can be financed during the next few months....Unless urgent and immediate support is given to Greece, it seems probable that the Greek Government will be overthrown and a totalitarian regime of the extreme left will come to power....The capitulation of Greece to Soviet domination through lack of adequate support from the U.S. and Great Britain might eventually result in the loss of the whole Near and Middle East and northern Africa. (Department of State, Vol. V, 1971:29-30)

During the time that the bill was being introduced, there was a great deal of pressure to reduce both taxes and the size of the federal budget from Congress. The Senate at the time had just passed legislation that would reduce the size of the federal budget. These factors led to a great deal of opposition to the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. In order to counter these pressures, the Truman Administration devised a strategy that consisted of two primary points in order to gain support for the bill. First, President Truman was advised by Senator Vandenberg to play on the American citizens' emotions in his speech to introduce the bill by portraying the situation of Communist expansion as a very serious threat that needed to be dealt with. Secondly, the administration had the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of State meet with Congressional leaders prior to the introduction of the bill in order to outline the strategic implication that Soviet success in Greece and Turkey would have on U.S. interests (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. VI, 1976:308-309).

In a speech to Congress made on March 12, 1947, President Truman asked for \$400,000,000 in aid to be provided to Greece and Turkey. The President went on to say:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjection by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. (Truman, 1947:504-505)

On May 22, 1947, President Truman signed the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill into existence (Truman, 1956:108). In order to avoid the possible interpretation of hostilities towards the Soviet Union, the bill did not specifically make a distinction between military and economic assistance. The bill called for a \$400,000,000 authorization to be made in 1947, and \$225,000,000 to be made in 1948. Of the funding provided in the bill \$345,300,000 was eventually distributed to Greece in the form of military aid over the two years and Turkey eventually utilized \$152,500,000 in military aid. The remaining funds in both countries were used for economic assistance (Hovey, 1966:5).

The Greek-Turkish Aid Bill as mentioned earlier was to be the beginning of an extensive security assistance program within the United States. The current administration felt this type of program was crucial to stop Soviet expansionism as well as protect vital U.S. interests. The legislation had another significant impact on our nation's developing security assistance program. The bill required that the aid would be administered in the receiving countries of Greece and Turkey with the oversight of U.S. military advisors. By 1949, over 500 U.S. service personnel served in this capacity in Greece and over 400 in Turkey (Defense Institute, 1995:12). The Greek-Turkish Aid Bill eventually led to the

creation of what is known as a Military Assistance Advisory Group. Hovey defines this type of group as “The United States organization in most countries receiving military assistance charged with providing training and with administering other military assistance” (Hovey, 1965:294).

Most of the military assistance provided by the Greek-Turkish aid bill would come in the form of existing U.S. military stockpiles. The equipment was provided in the form of grants to the recipient countries and was never expected to be repaid as a loan would. The United States had significant excess equipment following the war and this seemed to be a practical solution to our involvement in military aid at this point (Defense Institute, 1995:13). This, however, would dramatically change in the future as surplus war materials in our nation dwindled and the scope of our military assistance program would expand.

Mutual Defense Act of 1949. Following the passage of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, the Truman administration felt that attention needed to be focused on the economic situation in Europe. Specifically, it was the administration’s belief that a program of strong economic support to Europe was essential for our country’s security interests. (Grimmett, 1985:4-5).

In a speech delivered at Harvard on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall presented the details of what would become known as the Marshall Plan. During his speech the Secretary had the following to say about the purpose of the plan: “The goal of the United States should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist” (Bickerton, 1978:374).

It should be noted however, the importance the administration placed on complete involvement by all the European countries taking part in the program for its success. During the same speech Secretary Marshall made this point in the following way:

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. (Department of State, 1950:1269)

President Truman asked Congress for \$17 billion for the plan to cover the years 1948-1952. This represented about 1.2 percent of the gross national product of our country (McCormick, 1985:42). The Marshall Plan was originally scheduled to take place over a four year period, however, it only was considered a separate program for three years. In 1951, the program was combined with other programs under the Mutual Security Agency (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. III, 1976:9).

While the Marshall Plan was intended to assist Europe with economic recovery for internal stability, it was clear that this form of assistance alone would not be the complete answer. Europe still had the very real threat of the Russian military to contend with and the United States needed to consider what role to play in this matter. Senator Vandenberg introduced a resolution into the Senate during 1948, which would allow the United States to participate in “Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements

for individual and collective self-defense” (Department of State, 1950:197). This resolution would be integral in the United States becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Another factor that had significant influence on the formation of NATO occurred in June 1948. During this month the Soviet Union attempted to force the west out of Berlin with the blockading of the city. To accomplish this they successfully blocked all land travel into and out of the portion of the city occupied by the United States, France, and Great Britain. To counter these measures, the United States embarked on the highly successful Berlin Airlift mission. The mission was so successful, that after only a year of airlifting in supplies, the Soviet Union ended the blockade. This event reinforced the idea that the Soviet Union would attempt to exploit any perceived weakness it saw in the European community to its advantage and assisted in the idea of the importance of collective security to the United States (Grimmett, 1985:5-6).

NATO was established on April 4, 1949, when twelve nations, including the United States formally signed the North Atlantic Treaty. This marked a turning point in U.S. policy (Grimmett, 1985:6). Gone were the days of isolationism which had allowed the United States to prosper in the 19th and 20th centuries (Kaplan, 1980:1); now the United States had made clear its intentions to carry foreign policy out to wherever its national interests might lie. With the formation of NATO the United States had committed itself to the defense of eleven other countries. The NATO alliance agreed that should one of the countries be attacked, this would be viewed as an attack on NATO as a whole and the countries would collectively make a decision how to respond (Grimmett, 1985:6).

While the Marshall Plan was intended to assist Europe with economic recovery, NATO was to provide for collective defense of the region. The military assistance program would serve to provide the capabilities needed to make NATO effective militarily. On July 23, 1949, President Truman signed the NATO treaty and forwarded his proposal for a program of military assistance to Congress. The President stressed to Congress that this funding was only to ensure an initial wave of defense in the event of a Russian attack. The majority of the aid was to consist of surplus equipment that were already part of the U.S. military stockpile. Another form of the aid was to come in the form of cash grants, which would be used for the recipient countries to increase their own capabilities to produce weapons. This aid was not to be tied into the European Recovery Program aid in any way. It was believed that the grant aid would be limited in nature as eventually the countries would develop their own capabilities to produce weapons (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol.V, 1976:8-9).

Testimony surrounding the bill at the time seemed to reflect a change in attitude concerning national strategic military strategy. The focus now seemed to be on the deterrence of Soviet aggression where in the past it had been on preparedness. The United States felt that with the introduction of NATO, coupled with economic aid from the Marshall Plan our own national security interests would be protected (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. V, 1976:9-10). Table 2 reflects the change in military assistance between the years 1947 and 1952. This expansion in security assistance funds coincides with the United States transition to a strategy of deterrence as a method for Soviet containment.

Table 2 U.S. Military Assistance

(Dollars in Thousands)

Year	Funding
1947-1948 (Greek-Turkish Aid Bill)	993,600
1950	1,117,023
1951	3,876,786
1952	4,157,367

(Source: Hovey, 1965:5, and DSAA, 1990)

The issue of China was brought up repeatedly throughout the debate concerning the bill by Representative Judd. He was critical of the President's policy toward China and felt that if the administration had focused as much attention on China as it was on the North Atlantic, communism would be defeated in this area. The administration's position was that Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime was given adequate aid and that their own problems stemmed from corruption and poor leadership (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. V, 1976:10).

On October 6, President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Act of 1949. Congress spent two months debating the actual contents of the bill, however, most of the debate surrounded administrative issues of the bill. These administrative issues primarily focused on cost and the appropriate definition for what would exactly constitute surplus material. The program objectives of providing aid to Europe, Iran, Korea, and the Philippines were to a large extent not questioned (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. V, 1976:11-12). The only significant debate centered on the need for a NATO strategic plan of defense.

This concern carries over into the actual wording of the Mutual Defense Act of 1949, Sec. 102, where the President is authorized to appropriate \$500,000,000 for the NATO countries. However, \$400,000,000 is not to be appropriated until, “the President of the United States approves recommendations for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area which may be made by the Council and the Defense Committee to be established under the North Atlantic Treaty” (Department of State, 1950:1357-1358). The Act also authorized President Truman to spend an additional \$500,000,000 on the North Atlantic Treaty countries to carry out the purposes of the act. This additional funding was granted to the president in the form of contract authority and allowed the President to distribute the funding by entering into contracts that would support the overall purposes of the act. Section 301 of the Act authorized the President to provide military assistance to Iran, Korea, and the Philippines in an amount not to exceed \$27,640,000. This represented a geographic expansion of the security assistance program from its origins with the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill to include the countries of Iran, Korea, and the Philippines. Representative Judd’s arguments concerning the situation in China received attention in the Act as well. The President was authorized to spend \$75,000,000 in China in order to support the spirit of the policies and principles of the Act (Department of State, 1950:1357-1359). Greece and Turkey were also to continue to receive assistance from this act as it provided for \$211,370,000 in continued aid to these countries (Department of State, Vol.I, 1976:398).

The Mutual Defense Act of 1949 was important in the history of security assistance for several reasons. First, it was the first piece of legislation that provided the authority to give significant military assistance to our NATO allies, as well as other areas of the world

we felt strategically affected the United States, such as Iran, Korea, and the Philippines. Secondly it established the foundation of our military assistance program for years to come (Grimmett, 1985, 7). As the following sections will illustrate our country's military assistance program remained a hot topic for debate of the next several years.

Mutual Security Act of 1951. The primary purpose of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was: maintenance of the security and promotion of the foreign policy of the United States through the provision of military, technical, and economic assistance to friendly countries. The intent in providing such assistance was to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to enable friendly nations to develop their resources in the interest of their security and the national interest of the United States, and to facilitate the effective participation of these nations in the collective security system. (Grimmett, 1985:10)

The Act also was the first to establish the authority to cover both military and economic assistance in one legislative act (U.S. Security Assistance, 1985:183).

Several significant world events played a role in the creation of this act. Perhaps most importantly, there was the Korean War. On June 24, 1950, the North Koreans invaded South Korea and with the invasion caught the United States by surprise (Weigley, 1973:383). The United States was not prepared to fight a ground war in this region. The principal conglomeration of U.S. forces in this area of the world were in Japan where proper training opportunities were constrained by the very geographic make up of Japan. The United States also found itself constrained by the lack of transport capability and the lack of allies in the region. Although Japan was considered an ally, it essentially contained little military capability (Hovey, 1965:9).

Throughout the conflict the United States was relied on by United Nations forces to provide the majority of logistical support. The funding for this support did not fall under the text of foreign aid but instead was classified as our own country's military spending. This situation arose out of the complexities associated with classifying and coordinating the different costing and logistic systems, given all of the different countries involved in the effort (Hovey, 1965:9).

The Korean War concerned senior U.S. leaders in that it provided a direct military challenge in Asia, conflicting with our own country's interests. The administration felt that if South Korea fell into communist hands the security of other U.S. allies in the region such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines would also be threatened. The United States felt that a strong stance in Korea would be necessary in order to counter a Soviet feeling of confidence regarding future expansionist activities (Grimmett, 1985:8). The concern over U.S. interests in Asia is reflected in the Military Assistance Program to this region as reflected in the following table:

Table 3. U.S. Military Assistance Program in East Asia and the Pacific
(Dollars in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Funding
1950	63,520
1951	241,132
1952	414,234
1953	424,822
1955	597,060

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

As the table indicates military assistance to Asia and the Pacific dramatically increased following the inception of the Korean War in 1950.

The Korean War affected security assistance in our nation in another way as well. During the years 1947-1950, much debate existed concerning the appropriate funding levels for our foreign policy program in the United States. Most of our efforts were focused on the region of Europe because that is where we viewed the greatest threat from the Soviet Union. However, with the beginning of the Korean War, this attitude started to change. The leadership within the United States began to feel that stronger defense capabilities were needed in Asia to counter a Soviet threat there as well. This adjustment in military spending was eased by the fact that in the short term significant funding was required to carry out normal wartime operations in Korea (Grimmett, 1985:8).

In many ways the Korean War was a catalyst for further globalization of the United States security assistance program. This is evidenced by the extension of collective security efforts between the United States and several countries during this time period. During 1951, the United States signed several treaties to include the U.S.-Japanese Treaty of 1951, U.S.-Philippines Treaty of 1951, and the ANZUS Pact of 1951, which included the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. A few years later the United States also signed the U.S.-Republic of Korea Treaty of 1953 (Grimmett, 1985:9). The following tables illustrate the changes in security assistance funding following the signing of the treaties mentioned above:

Table 4. Military Assistance to Japan

(Dollars in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Funding
1951	0
1952	0
1953	0
1954	32,455
1955	115,950
1956	184,580

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

Table 5. Military Assistance to the Philippines

(Dollars in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Funding
1950	13,817
1951	22,162
1952	47,348

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

Table 6. Foreign Military Sales to Australia

(Dollars in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Dollars
1950	0
1951	12,340
1952	7,520

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

Table 7. Foreign Military Sales to New Zealand

(Dollars in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Dollars
1951	0
1952	0
1953	8
1954	42

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

Table 8. Military Assistance to Korea

(Dollars in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Funding
1953	0
1954	0
1955	34,653
1956	435,035

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

As tables 4 through 8 reflect, security assistance was significantly increased to the mentioned countries following the signing of collective security agreements. Assistance to Japan did not immediately follow an agreement, however the aid once provided was substantial. New Zealand and Australia did not receive military assistance but did benefit from foreign military sales agreements with the United States. The most significant increase in aid can be seen in Korea in table 6. Once the Korean Treaty of 1953 was signed, military aid jumped from nonexistence to \$435,053 in only two years.

It can be said that the Mutual Security Act of 1951 created a direct relationship between our nation's security assistance program and collective security arrangements that we entered into with other countries. More specifically, "assistance from the United States would flow to those nations deemed vital to U.S. security and with whom the United States had concluded mutual defense agreements or arrangements" (Grimmett, 1985:10).

These treaties had several implications for the United States. To begin with it meant that we would assume a role of responsibility for our partners in the agreements that

previously may not have existed. It also meant that the United States would have access to military bases in these countries which would allow our country to further project power across the globe. Finally, the treaties marked a beginning of better cooperation between the United States and the other countries concerning both political and military matters (Grimmett, 1985:9).

At the conclusion of the Korean War the military production capabilities that had been produced as a result of the war were redirected toward producing equipment that would be essential to support our force levels in Europe. The responsibilities of equipping and training the Korean forces had shifted from our own defense budget to the military assistance program (Hovey, 1965:10).

During 1951, the focus of the aid program in the United States was shifting from economic to military goals. For this reason, it was felt that a greater emphasis should be placed on the overall coordination of the program in order to meet its intended objectives. To accomplish this goal, the President assigned all comprehensive responsibilities for the foreign aid program to the Secretary of State. A position of Director of International Affairs was created in January of that same year, tasked with the responsibilities of administering the program both within the Department of State and across other departments. Further, a committee of International Security Affairs was created that would have multiple agency representation, to include the Department of Defense. As it turned out several problem arose from this arrangement. Perhaps most significantly, the Congress did not recognize the increased role of the State Department in the coordination and administration of foreign affair activities. It was finally concluded that the arrangement of this committee would be ineffective and it was abolished in favor of raising

the responsibility of coordination of foreign aid to the presidential level (Hovey, 1965:134-135).

In order to accomplish this shift in foreign aid planning, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was created. This legislation essentially established the authorization for both military and economic assistance into one package. With the exception of the Export-Import Bank all planning and coordination for the United States foreign aid program would now fall within the umbrella of this key piece of legislation. The Act also called for the creation of the position of Director of Mutual Security within the Executive Office. The position called for the director to be accountable for all economic, military and technical assistance programs directly to the President. The Director would also be responsible for ensuring the proper control over all the funds that were allocated by the President as well as the distribution of all funds. The Act also called for the creation of a separate Mutual Security Agency which would be located apart from the Executive Office of the President, but would remain under the direction and control of the Director for Mutual security (Hovey, 1965:135).

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was signed by the President on October 10, 1951. The law allowed the President to authorize money to countries he felt vital to U.S. interests for the purpose of military, technical, and economic assistance. In Europe the President was authorized to appropriate up to \$5,028,000,000 for the purpose of military assistance and \$1,022,000,000 for economic assistance to countries of the North Atlantic Treaty. The President was also authorized to appropriate money to other European countries not covered by the treaty that he felt would be strategic for the defense of the North Atlantic area and the continuing security of the United States. Title II of the law

authorized the President to provide \$396,250,000 in military aid to Greece, Turkey, and Iran (United States Congress, 1952:373-375). While the countries of Greece, Turkey, and Iran were covered by this title, the President had the authority to provide assistance to other countries in the region if the following conditions were met:

the strategic location of the recipient country makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area such assistance is of critical importance to the defense of the free nations, and the immediately increased ability of the recipient country to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the area and to the security of the United States. (United States Congress, 1952:375)

President Truman could also provide this region with up to \$160,000,000 in economic and technical assistance under this section of the act as he felt appropriate (United States Congress, 1952:375).

Under Title III of the Act, \$535,250,000 was authorized in military assistance to the region of Asia and the Pacific. The wording in the Act specifies that this region would constitute the general area of China, which included the countries of the Philippines and Korea. Authorizations for economic and technical assistance of \$237,155,866 were also specified under this title (United States Congress, 1952:375-376).

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 authorized \$38,150,000 in military aid and \$21,245,653 in technical and economic assistance to be provided to the American Republics. The President was authorized to provide this money to nations in the Western Hemisphere that were participating in missions vital to the defense of this region and in accordance with our country's defense plans (United States Congress, 1952:377). The

table on the following page provides the country specific breakdown of military assistance to the American Republics in fiscal year 1952:

Table 9. Military Assistance to American Republics for FY 1952

(Dollars in Thousands)

Country	Funding
Brazil	26,900
Chile	6,700
Peru	3,700
Columbia	3,500
Uruguay	2,800
Ecuador	2,300
Cuba	600

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

As table 9 reflects, Brazil received significantly more military assistance than any of the other American Republics in fiscal year 1952.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 reflected the continuing expansion of our nation's security assistance posture. The following table provides an example of the expansion of the funding of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 into the American Republics for the first time. This also represented an expansion of the program in geographic terms.

Table 10. Military Assistance to the American Republics

(Dollars in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Funding
1950	0
1951	0
1952	46,500
1953	34,926

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

The assistance would be provided to all areas of the globe to shape world politics wherever U.S. interests may lie. The act also reflected an important administrative issue. For the first time since the war, our security assistance legislation was combined under a single act. Although the funding for military and economic assistance were clearly defined in the legislation, this still reflected an attitude that these types of aid, although different in intent, both helped to define our foreign policy.

Mutual Security Act of 1954. In 1952, the United States witnessed a changing of command as Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President. The country faced many problems at the time including the Korean War as well as a growing American dissatisfaction with the role the country was playing in foreign affairs. President Eisenhower appointed John Dulles to serve as his Secretary of State and Charles Wilson to serve as the new Secretary of Defense (Nathan, 1976:197).

During the latter part of 1952 the president traveled to Korea to carry out his campaign pledge to personally assess the Korean War. The President concluded from his trip that an expedient resolution to the war was necessary; however concern existed in the

administration that the Chinese and North Koreans would attempt to drag out any form of peace negotiations to their advantage. President Eisenhower decided that the United States would have to demonstrate through actions to the Chinese and North Koreans that it would be in their best interests to quickly negotiate a settlement to the war. The actions that President Eisenhower was referring to came in the form of both military action as well as political maneuvering. The United States discretely passed word to the Chinese and North Koreans that the use of the atomic bomb was not out of the realm of possibilities if a solution to the Korean War could not be found soon. The United States also began to bomb the hydroelectric dams in North Korea including dams on the Yalu River. These bombings were portrayed as targeting primarily the civilian population; the United States had projected a willingness to go to any length to bring an end to the war (Nathan, 1976:196-199).

In March 1953, Stalin died which would have significant impact on the worldwide communist movement and may have led to positive movement towards peace talks. Stalin was in many ways the ultimate symbol for communism around the world and his death led to significant transition within communist leadership. The Chinese government now had an opportunity to end the war without much direction from Moscow and they took the opportunity (Nathan, 1976:199).

A truce was signed July 27, 1953 that would ultimately bring an end to the Korean War. With the truce, the United States had promised South Korea that a Mutual Security treaty would be formed in which South Korea would receive significant military aid as well as economic assistance (Nathan, 1976:200). The war was finally over but the involvement of the United States in Asia was only beginning.

Following the Korean War the Eisenhower administration turned to a military strategy of deterrence in governing its policy to contain communism. The United States viewed the implied threat of an atomic attack on North Korea from our government as key in bringing about a resolution to the Korean War and felt that the military superiority that our country enjoyed at the time would be useful if applied to our nation's military strategy. As a result of the Korean War effort, the United States had moved significantly in front of the Soviet Union in terms of a nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union also did not enjoy the same capability to project their atomic assets that the United States did at this time. The United States enjoyed a significant advantage in the number of secure forward bases and also maintained an advantage in the delivery methods it could employ for its nuclear arsenal (Weigley, 1973:399-400). In October 1953, President Eisenhower approved policy formulated by the National Security Council that called for the United States military establishment to build the concept of nuclear capabilities into both tactical and strategic plans when their use would lead to desired military outcomes. Responsibilities for the containment of Soviet expansion had shifted in our country from conventional military forces to a concept of massive retaliation. The shift to a strategy of massive retaliation from that of maintaining sizable conventional forces for the purpose of prevention of Soviet expansion would significantly ease the fiscal burden on the United States defense budget (Nathan, 1976:205).

It can be argued that the establishment of a concept of massive retaliation in no way erodes the need for a strong security assistance program as the United States would still need forward bases for the purpose of carrying out this strategy to any corner of the globe (Jordan, 1958:253). It is accepted that security assistance to foreign countries has on at

least an informal level financed the use of military bases in other countries. The transfer of military and economic assistance were seen as payment for the use of strategically located bases that would allow the United States to project its military power across the globe. One example of this relationship occurred in Spain in 1953. At that time the United States signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Spain which allowed for the United States to build and jointly occupy several bases across the country (Brandt, 1989:185-187). As Table 11 illustrates, Spain received significant military aid following the signing of the agreement.

Table 11. . Military Assistance to Spain

(Dollars in Thousands)

Year	Funding
1952	0
1953	0
1954	137,351

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

As Table 11 indicates, significant military assistance was provided to Spain immediately following 1953, when the United States received an agreement to use bases in the country.

Another significant world event during the 1950s was the war in Indochina. Following World War II, the French found themselves with what seemed the impossible task of reestablishing colonial rule over Vietnam. During World War II the United States had supported the Viet Minh in their opposition to Japanese rule; however once the war

ended the communist-led Viet Minh were resistant to the French reestablishing control. They were determined to maintain their independence. This would ultimately result in 92,000 deaths and 114,000 wounded for the nation of France by 1954 (Nathan, 1976:208-212).

The Eisenhower administration had been supporting the French in their efforts to regain control in Vietnam and pressured the French to continue to fight when they seemed determined to negotiate a settlement to the war. President Eisenhower and his staff felt that the Indochina War was another attempt by the Soviet Union to spread communism throughout the world. Eventually France accepted a Soviet invitation to attend a conference with representatives from the Soviet Union, United States, Britain, France, and China concerning the conflict in Vietnam. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles immediately saw the possibility of a negotiated withdrawal of France from Indochina as having serious implications to the security of the Asia and the Pacific. They felt that once Indochina fell into communist hands, other countries in the this vital region of the world would be at great risk to succumb to the pressures of communism as well. The President, however felt that any commitment of US troops to Indochina could not be justified given the fact that the Korean War had just ended and the potential reaction of the American population. Ultimately an armistice was signed which was not endorsed by the United States which called for the country of Vietnam to be divided temporarily at the 17th parallel (Nathan, 1976:208-212). Secretary Dulles summed up the situation in Vietnam best by saying, “The important thing is not to mourn the past but to seize the future opportunity to prevent the loss in Northern Vietnam from leading to the extension of Communism throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific” (Nathan, 1976:213).

Although the Mutual Security Act of 1954 had been preceded by several significant world events discussed previously, it played a slightly less significant role in terms of security assistance than some of the previous mutual security pieces of legislation. One of the primary things that it accomplished was to combine much of the previous foreign policy laws into a single piece of legislation. In fact, the Act repealed some fourteen previous statutes to include the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, Foreign Aid Act of 1947, Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Mutual Defense Act of 1949, Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, and the Mutual Security Acts of 1951, 1952, and 1953 (United States Congress, 1955:861). The Act also called for the President to be given the ultimate authority to control the foreign assistance programs of the United States. This authority was in turn passed down from the President to the Secretary of Defense concerning military assistance and the Secretary of State concerning economic assistance (Hovey, 1965:137). This Act was also the first to establish the foundation for the sale of military equipment and supplies in which the President of the United States would maintain complete control over the process (Hildreth, 1985:74). The Act would ultimately be the basis for the beginning of a Foreign Military Credit Sales program in the US security assistance policy (US Security Assistance, 1985:183). This type of program would seem to be the next logical step in security assistance in the United States as surplus materials from World War II were dwindling. The years 1952 to 1958 demonstrated a shift in security assistance from a reliance on military assistance to an increasing reliance on foreign military sales (Grimmett, 1985:37-38). Table 12 illustrates this point.

Table 12. , Military Assistance vs. Foreign Military Sales

(Dollars in Thousands)

Year	Military Assistance	Foreign Military Sales
1952	4,157,367	98,992
1953	2,384,083	77,816
1954	2,133,639	91,578
1955	1,472,816	84,194
1956	2,173,631	133,104
1957	1,785,538	347,323
1958	1,208,424	313,522

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

The Mutual Security Act of 1954 authorized the President to provide military assistance in the form of grants or loans to nations that he deemed vital to the security interests of the United States. Under section 104 of the military assistance title President Eisenhower was provided with the authority to distribute \$780,000,000 to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the purpose of infrastructure programs to include the construction or acquisition of facilities (United States Congress, 1955:833-834).

Military assistance available to the President that could be provided to Europe amounted to \$617,500,000. This would constitute the most significant amount of military assistance provided to any region of the world under this law, reflecting the continued recognition by the administration of the importance of Europe to the security of the United States. The Far East and Pacific were authorized to receive \$583,600,000 in

military assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, signaling the growing importance this region was obtaining in the comprehensive security assistance program of the US. Finally, the President was authorized to provide \$181,200,000 in military assistance to the Near East, Africa, and South Asia as well as \$13,000,000 to the Western Hemisphere (United States Congress, 1955:835).

Section 106 of the law addressed the sale of military equipment and services. It stated, “The President may, in order to carry out the purpose of this chapter, sell or enter into contracts (without requirement for charge to any appropriation or contract authorization) for the procurement for sale of equipment, materials, or services to any nation or international organization” (United States Congress, 1955:836).

Chapter 2 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 detailed the funding that would be available to Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific in terms of direct military support. President Eisenhower had available \$700,000,000 to carry out the purposes of this chapter that could be provided to forces in the countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam as well as other countries that the President determined vital to the security of the United States (United States Congress, 1955:837).

Chapter 3 of the Mutual security Act of 1954 addressed funding for defense support. Defense support was defined as, “commodities, services, and financial and other assistance designed to sustain and increase military effort” (United States Congress, 1955:838). This chapter could provide \$46,000,000 in Europe, \$73,000,000 in the Near East, Africa, and South Asia, and \$80,098,195 in the Far East and Pacific region. Section 132 of the chapter outlined support that could be provided to Korea. President Eisenhower was provided \$205,000,000 that could be utilized in areas of Korea not under communist

control for the purpose of defense support as well as rehabilitation efforts (United States Congress, 1955:838).

Economic assistance provided in the Mutual Security Act of 1954 can be found under Title II of the statute. The purpose of this title was to maintain or enhance the political as well as economic stability of the regions funded. The Near East and Africa could be furnished \$115,000,000 in development funding while South Asia was authorized \$75,000,000 in funding provided Presidential approval (United States Congress, 1955:840-841).

The Mutual Security Act of 1954 was in many ways affected by the political environment it was created within. The United States had changed leadership electing a Republican President and the feeling in the administration was that the Soviet Union was on the decline militarily. The administration at the time felt that the United States enjoyed a significant advantage in our strategic nuclear capabilities which in many ways had led to the concept of massive retaliation as a strategy of deterrence against the Soviets. The Korean War had finally ended and the United States had witnessed communist expansionism in Vietnam. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration was pursuing the concept of a European Defense Community to enhance collective security against Soviet aggression. These events collectively were part of the fabric that Mutual Security Act of 1954 was created within.

Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. While much of the United States security assistance policy up to 1957 had focused on the defense of western Europe, the Eisenhower doctrine marked a change in policy to concentrate on yet another area of the world deemed vital to the interests of the United States—the Middle East. This would become the second major

doctrine of the United States since the cold war began (DeNovo, 1978:292). The doctrine was established through the signing into law what was know as the Middle East Resolution on March 9, 1957 by President Eisenhower (Crabb, 1982:153). The Middle East Resolution gave President Eisenhower the power to provide both military and economic assistance to any nation in the Middle East region that the President felt vital to the security interests of the United States. The Middle East Resolution presented to Congress on January 5, 1957, allowed the President to appropriate \$200 million dollars originally programmed into the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The resolution also went beyond pure monetary assistance. The President was also authorized to provide military forces to the defense of any nation in this region that he felt warranted U.S. assistance so long as that nation or group of nations requested the assistance and the country was being threatened by international communist influence (DeNovo, 1978:292). This marks a departure from the traditional definition of security assistance that has been presented up to this point, however, it is in no way less influential. Up to the Eisenhower Doctrine security assistance had been primarily focused on economic and military aid. The doctrine marked the first time the United States would promote its security assistance objectives through the possibility of U.S. military intervention abroad which was directly tied the wording of the Middle East Resolution.

The language of the resolution was perceived as vague in certain respects. First, the area of the Middle East was not clearly defined. Secondly, the language of the resolution did not define what would constitute international communist influence. Secretary of State, John Dulles, summed up the vagueness of the language of the resolution as “an attitude, a state of mind, a point of view” (DeNovo, 1978:292).

The world situation of the time helped shape the Eisenhower Doctrine. In 1949, following the Arab-Israeli War, the United States, Great Britain, and France signed the Tripartite Declaration. The intent of this agreement was to prevent an aggressive build up of weapons in the Middle East (DeNovo, 1978:293), as well as to prevent the use of force to acquire territory in this region. The three nations came to agreement on the basic principle that both Israel and the Arab nations should have military forces that would be capable of defending their land and maintaining internal order, but not offensive capabilities. The Tripartite Declaration also recognized the need for a balance of military power in the region in order to ensure political stability. If any of the nations in the Middle East were allowed to develop a military capability that exceeded the capability of their neighbors, the risk associated with military conflict would be increased (Eisenhower, 1965:22).

After 1951, the Truman administration attempted to concentrate on efforts to establish a collective security agreement in the Middle East which would stabilize this volatile region. Great Britain and the United States made efforts to establish a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) that would consist of the United States, United Kingdom, Turkey, France, and the Arab states, including Egypt. Egypt was, however, quick to dismiss the proposal and the other Arab states felt that the Western powers were trying to draw them into a cold war conflict in which they had no interest. For the time being, this type of defense arrangement would have to be postponed (DeNovo, 1978:293-294).

The country of Egypt played a key role in the political situation in the Middle East during this time period. The country became a dictatorship in 1952, led by Gamal Nasser.

Nasser's influence in the region was critical to the stability of the Middle East. His political influence over the peoples of the other Arab states was significant and led to a growing feeling in this region that a united Arab state would be beneficial. Egypt was also vital to the stability of the region for another reason. The Suez Canal was within its borders and with it came influence over the majority of the world's oil supply. During the year of 1955 alone, the canal was transited by more than double the amount of cargo that was shipped through the Panama Canal. This key waterway brought in approximately \$100 million in revenues every year, thirty percent of which was a net profit (Eisenhower, 1965:22).

During 1952, Secretary of State Dulles once again attempted to develop a collective security arrangement for the Middle East. Egypt, once again was not favorable to such an arrangement and Secretary Dulles had to change tactics. He concluded that the United States could accomplish the same objective of stability in the region with a security arrangement of the countries that were located closest to the Soviet Union. So, in 1955, the Baghdad Pact was established for this purpose. The Pact included the countries of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Great Britain. The majority of the Arab world regarded the pact as yet another attempt by the Western powers to manipulate the Middle East for its own purposes (DeNovo, 1978:294). Table 13 reflects the increased military assistance to the countries of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq during this time period.

Table 13. Military Assistance to Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq

(Dollars in Thousands)

Year	Iran	Turkey	Pakistan
1955	10,821	13,899	38,450
1956	21,189	183,682	162,171
1957	75,622	83,571	67,153
1958	95,210	144,763	83,181

(Source, DSAA:1990)

It appears once again that substantial increases in military assistance were provided to the countries of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq following the signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

Soviet influence in the region continued to grow and in 1955, when Egypt's President Nasser went to the Soviet Union to obtain arms, the potential for a crisis was further enhanced. Originally, Nasser attempted to obtain arms through the United States, however, his request was denied as it would be in violation of the Tripartite Declaration. An agreement between Egypt and Czechoslovakia was reached which was estimated to be worth \$90 and \$200 million. This caused immediate concern in the administration about what these arms would be used for (Eisenhower, 1965:24-25). This arms deal played a key role in the second Arab-Israeli War as well as the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 (DeNovo, 1978:294). President Eisenhower made it very clear after the Anglo-French invasion that the United States would side with Egypt if it came down to it and honor the Tripartite Declaration which stated that the United States would support any country that is subjected to aggression in the Middle East. The President was caught off

guard by the invasion and was equally perplexed by the secret nature that France, Britain and Israel had plotted the invasion of Egypt without consultation of the United States (Ambrose, 1984:356-358). Eventually, following the invasion and through pressure by the United Nations, sponsored by both the Soviet Union and United States, both the French, British, and eventually the Israeli forces withdrew from Egypt. Once again the Arab world viewed the actions by the Soviet Union as noble and did not recognize the influence provided by the U.S. These actions led President Eisenhower to submit his Middle East resolution in 1957 as he believed the actions by the Soviet Union were becoming more aggressive and their influence in the region was growing. The administration quickly adopted the belief that the only way to guarantee peace in the region would be to make the stakes too high for the Soviet Union to exploit. The administration felt that the Soviets were opportunistic in nature and would take advantage of any weakness they perceived (DeNovo, 1978:294).

The Eisenhower administration viewed this time period ripe for a Soviet push to gain control of the Middle East. Great Britain had long be regarded as the country in the best position to influence the political climate of the region; however their influence had diminished considerably following the invasion of and subsequent withdrawal from Egypt in 1956. The Baghdad Pact was not capable of offering a significant deterrent to the Soviet threat and the United States had little influence in the region. Based on this seemingly alarming situation, Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower met with Congress on January 1, 1957, to discuss the importance of the United States assuming a more active role in the region. President Eisenhower believed that the Middle East was extremely unstable and if the United States did not act quickly and responsibly, the Soviet

Union would use the opportunity to take advantage of the situation. The administration believed that the United States could not afford to allow the Soviet Union to control such a vital economic as well as cultural section of the world (DeNovo, 1978:295).

Eventually the Middle East Resolution, which would become known as the Eisenhower Doctrine would pass both houses of Congress and be signed into existence on March 9, 1957 by President Eisenhower (Crabb, 1982:153). Congressional approval came, however, with its share of criticism. It took the Congress two entire months from the time the President introduced the bill to approve it. In the House the debate focused on the administration's belief that communist hostilities was a significant threat in the Middle East. Many of the members believed that Secretary Dulles had not established this fact and had reservations based on it. The Senate was even more divided on the bill. Some in the Senate felt that the idea of Soviet aggression in the Middle East was exaggerated and that most of the conflict in the region was a result of country by country differences. They felt that this issue only tied in slightly with the issue of communism. Critics of the bill also stated that they felt the aid provided by the legislation would do little to resolve a pressing problem in this area of the world: quality of life for the people. They felt that the circumstances that individuals had to live in were one of the primary reasons for the political instability of the region. The legislation would only provide a modest improvement in this area, if any improvement at all (DeNovo, 1978:295-296).

The international reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine was both immediate and mixed. The strongest support came from both Lebanon and the Baghdad Pact. Both Syria and Egypt reacted negatively to it. The general feeling in the Arab world was resentment. A feeling of resentment for a Western attitude that the United States was going to come in

and fix all the problems in the Middle East. Eventually the United States would sign agreements with nine countries in the Middle East for assistance. These nations included Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia. The agreements would amount to \$119 million in aid of which over half would come in the form of economic assistance (DeNovo, 1978:296-297).

Following the creation of the Eisenhower Doctrine there were several world crises that the doctrine could have been applied to that would provide analysis of its effectiveness. One of these cases concerned Jordan. During 1957 Jordan experienced internal political turmoil. A large number of pro-Nasser Palestinians on the left bank of the country were protesting King Hussein's power. The pro-Nasser faction was sympathetic towards Soviet involvement in the Middle East. King Hussein was concerned about the growing Soviet influence in his country and felt that Egypt was secretly supporting the movement (DeNovo, 1978:297). The countries surrounding Jordan feared that if the government of Jordan would fall military action would escalate. This led Lebanon to request that the United States implement the Eisenhower Doctrine. The United States sent the Sixth Fleet into the eastern Mediterranean in a projection of power and resolve for the situation. Eventually, President Eisenhower publicly stated that the circumstances in Jordan would be governed within the context of the Eisenhower Doctrine as well as the Tripartite Declaration. The Jordan crisis would eventually stabilize and the administration announced that it would send \$10 million to Jordan in economic aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine (Crabb, 1982:177). It should also be noted that military assistance to Jordan was authorized for the first time in fiscal year 1958 for the amount of \$11,154,000 (DSAA, 1990:109).

The second situation in which the Eisenhower Doctrine was applied occurred in connection with Syria. During the middle of 1957, the Syrian government charged that the United States Central Intelligence Agency was interfering in their political structure. This led to the expulsion of several U.S. diplomats from the country. At the same time the Soviet influence in the country seemed to be on the rise. Syria was turning to the Soviet Union at an increasing rate for both economic and military assistance. This led President Eisenhower to become concerned with the possibility that the country would soon fall under communist control. The situation presented a complex set of circumstances for the administration. For the Eisenhower Doctrine to be invoked a country must come under international communist attack. It was apparent that this was not the case up to this point. Also, the United States had criticized the governments of France, Britain, and Israel concerning the invasion of Egypt within the year and stood to appear hypocritical if the Doctrine were implemented. Another requirement that appeared to be missing for the implementation of the Doctrine was the fact the Syria had never requested United States assistance in the matter. President Eisenhower attempted to deal with this potential criticism by stating that the country had been subjected to invasion by international communism and that the countries that surrounded Syria had requested the assistance from the United States. As it turned out the President never had to invoke the Doctrine in the Syria case (Crabb, 1982:177-180).

In 1958, Lebanon provided the third situation in which the Eisenhower Doctrine would be considered. In April of that year, President Chamoun announced that he would run for re-election which was in violation of the government's constitution at the time. This resulted in a significant amount of political turmoil in the country and would

eventually lead Chamoun to request that the United States invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine. The situation in Lebanon worsened and then on July 14, 1958, when the Iraqi Revolution occurred, bringing Iraq under military rule, President Chamoun appealed to the United States again. Other countries in the region also urged the United States to intervene in the situation, fearing that the political instability might spill over into other countries. President Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet into the Mediterranean and on July 15, the Marines landed. The President had also sent over four hundred planes and seventy ships to the situation. Soon after the U.S. forces arrived in Lebanon, the situation became stable. On October 25, 1958, the first of the American troops in the country began to leave (Crabb, 1982:181-186).

The situation in Lebanon was very unique indeed. It in many ways did not test the Eisenhower Doctrine. The country was never infringed upon by international communism in any way. In fact President Eisenhower and the administration downplayed the role that the Eisenhower Doctrine played in the situation when attempting to justify the need for U.S. military involvement in the area. In fact when the President announced the fact that the Marines were landing in Lebanon, he stated that their mission would be to protect the lives of the Americans that were in the country and to safeguard the country's freedom (DeNovo, 1978:299-300). The situation did in an informal way reflect a modification to security assistance policy in that it represented a formal U.S. military commitment to the stability of the Middle East. In certain aspects the security assistance program had extended beyond pure military and economic aid to include the threat of military force. When the United States withdrew its forces from Lebanon, it also in some respects

withdrew from the Eisenhower Doctrine as a guide for foreign policy in this area of the world (Crabb, 1982:186).

In many ways the Eisenhower doctrine was a logical extension to the foreign policy established under the Truman administration. What started as a containment policy towards communism in Greece and Turkey and then in Europe had simply now been applied to the Middle East. Secretary Dulles eventually would state that he felt that eventually the United States would be able to form a worldwide doctrine of containment against communist aggression and the Eisenhower Doctrine was simply the next logical step in that sequence (Crabb, 1982:165-166). The Eisenhower doctrine was at the very least a geographic expansion of territory receiving security assistance aid.

President's Committee to Study U.S. Military Assistance of 1959. President Eisenhower believed in the Mutual Assistance Program and its ability to thwart communism wherever it may challenge U.S. interests globally. This was demonstrated through his continued support for the program and the expanded role it had taken on in the Middle East during his administration. There was however opposition to the program, or at least its scope, in the United States. Some of this opposition came from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by William Fulbright. It was Fulbright's contention that too much emphasis had been placed on the military aspect of the security program, especially towards some third world nations such as Korea. Fulbright believed that these countries needed more economic assistance and less military assistance in order for their own economies to remain healthy (Hildreth, 1985:48).

These criticisms would eventually lead Eisenhower to appoint a committee in 1958 to study the Mutual Security Program in the United States from its inception through the

present day. The President was primarily concerned with obtaining an objective and independent look at the program along with recommendations that would ensure its continued positive role in shaping the world political arena in order to protect the interests of free people everywhere (Hildreth, 1985:45).

The study, which would eventually become known as the Draper Reports, was conducted beginning in November of 1958 and lasted for approximately nine months. The Draper Reports consisted of four reports to the President. The first addressed the need to enhance spending on the Military Assistance Program as well as the necessity to update the equipment of the NATO forces. The second report focused on the administration of the security assistance program in the United States. During the Korean War significant problems were revealed in mismanagement of the program concerning lost and stolen supplies as well as the inappropriateness of certain weapons that the United States was furnishing some third world nations. It was felt that these nations could not handle the significant technology gap that existed between the United States military systems and their own country's military capabilities. The third report dealt with the concerns over military aid being included in the Department of Defense budget along with recommendations concerning the adoption of multi-year authorizations to the funding process. The last report issued by the Draper committee involved the necessity of public relations for the success of our nation's mutual security program. The report outlined the need for the American public to be educated in the reasons for our mutual security program and its interest in our own national security and called for continued military aid to countries under communist pressure (Hildreth, 1985:46-48).

Further analysis of the Draper report will be presented in chapter four as it in many ways provides a insightful glance at the United States security assistance policy from its inception until 1959. It is felt that by gaining an understanding of the contents and recommendations of the report useful analysis of the substance of the other major Security Assistance Acts that were presented previously will be more clearly recognizable.

Chapter 4

Conclusions and Summary

Overview

The years 1947-1959 in the United States reflected in many ways the beginning of our nation's security assistance program. Key pieces of legislation along the way helped define what our national interests were in terms of foreign policy. In the previous chapter the focus was on the facts surrounding the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, Mutual Defense Act of 1949, Mutual Security Act of 1951, Mutual Security Act of 1954, Eisenhower Doctrine, and the President's Committee to Study U.S. Military Assistance of 1959. The focus in this chapter will be on attempting to answer the research questions presented in chapter one. Basically the objective will be to attempt to discover what each piece of legislation as well as the Draper Reports contributed to US security assistance policy. In order to accomplish this objective, I will attempt to present some of the debate, both for and against, of each piece of legislation and draw conclusions from it. Additionally the findings of the Draper Report will be discussed as it in essence reported on the status of the United States security assistance program up to 1959.

Research Questions and Conclusions

Question 1. How did the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill impact security assistance?

The Greek-Turkish Aid Bill provided much debate concerning the role the United States should play in foreign affairs. Perhaps this was due to the fact that it was the first major piece of legislation since the end of World War II that significantly focused on foreign policy. It was, in fact, a major commitment of the United States of both funding and involvement in international affairs that had not been undertaken in our country up to this time.

The majority of the supporters of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill cited the fact that it would prevent Soviet expansion as the primary reason for the necessity of the legislation (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. VI, 1976:309). The feeling in the administration was that the Soviet Union would attempt to exploit any perceived weakness to their advantage across the globe, with Greece and Turkey as perhaps a starting point for their expansionist policy.

Senator Vandenberg delivered a speech to the Senate on April 8, 1947 which characterized many of the supporting views of the bill. The Senator was in favor of aid for both Greece and Turkey and felt support for it was necessary in order to thwart Soviet Communist expansion worldwide. Vandenberg characterized the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill as a plan instead of a doctrine to deal with the problems that had arisen in Greece and Turkey discussed in chapter three. Senator Vandenberg felt that the aid to Greece and Turkey would not only be beneficial to the peoples of those countries but to the world as a whole. He stated that communist expansionism if left unchecked could eventually lead to the type of aggression that had involved the United States in two world wars. He stated that the bill was not targeted at being antagonistic towards the Soviet Union, but was in fact a guarantee for peace around the world. Senator Vandenberg repeatedly made the

argument that the only way to avoid war was to actively seek to prevent it (Vandenberg, 1947:51-53).

In his speech, Vandenberg realized that the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill as well as the Truman Doctrine would not in and of itself bring about the end of Soviet expansionist policy. He portrayed the United States role in future foreign affairs as a reactionary one in which each situation or crisis would have to be judged separately. The Senator also pointed out that assistance alone would not solve the Greek-Turkish dilemma. In his speech he proposed that the United States would have to work hard to resolve the adversarial relationship that it had developed with the Soviet Union since the end of World War II in order for progress to be made in Greece and Turkey. Also, he felt that the United States needed to share common grounds with the United Nations when it came to overall plans and objectives. Senator Vandenberg stressed that the United Nations had already recommended aid to Greece as well as support for aid from the United States as it alone recognized that it could not effectively deal with the turmoil in these two countries (Vandenberg, 1947:51, 55-56).

Perhaps one of the greatest criticisms of the bill was that it would somehow undermine the authority of the United Nations to effectively deal with the world political environment. This argument focused on the fact that the United States would act alone to intervene in world situations without the interests of the United Nations always in mind (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. VI, 1976:310). During a speech made before the Senate on April 10, 1947, Senator Pepper made the argument that if the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was passed it would “officially...brand the United Nations as a failure, and of no force or power to achieve the sacred functions for which it was founded” (Pepper,

1947:74). During congressional debate over the bill this argument was rebutted by the argument that the United Nations could not deal effectively with the Greek-Turkish situation. The justification for this argument was centered around two principal reasons. First, neither Greece or Turkey had been directly infiltrated by the Soviet military. Secondly, there was no violation of any treaty agreement concerning either of the two countries. Therefore the United Nations was somewhat limited in the role it could play in the Greek-Turkish dilemma. The argument summarized that the only way for both Greece and Turkey to resist communist expansion would be for the United States to become directly involved in providing aid to the countries in order to allow for the stabilization of the governments and economies involved (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. VI, 1976:310-311).

Senator Pepper, in his speech to congress also made several other arguments against the adoption of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. He expressed a concern over the fact that it would further divide the world into an east and west political division, which would be counterproductive to world economic recovery after World War II. The senator pointed out that many people around the world felt the legislation was merely an attempt by the United States to gain economic influence in expanding markets around the world. This argument basically focused on the fact that the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was not directed at ensuring democracy around the world, but was in fact an attempt to gain influence by America's largest corporations in markets previously not entered. Senator Pepper expressed concern over the amount of military assistance that would be offered in the bill, although made no argument concerning any amount of economic assistance that would be provided to Turkey and especially Greece. However, Pepper felt that economic assistance

could best be managed and distributed through the United Nations. Another key argument in Senator Pepper's speech to the Senate was that the aid provided in the bill should come in the form of loans and not grant aid. The Senator felt that the American taxpayer should not be automatically given the responsibility for paying other countries' debts. He felt that Greece and Turkey should both be given the opportunity to pay for their own economic recovery through a loan financed by the World Bank (Pepper, 1947:70-74).

The Greek-Turkish Aid Bill also fueled debate concerning the practicality of it to deal with the economic situation in Greece. Greece's economy was in a shambles after World War II and many critics of the bill felt that too much emphasis was being placed on the military aid aspects of the legislation. It was argued that communist influence in Greece was centered on the economic situation of the country at that time and no amount of military spending would alleviate this problem. The solution to this communist influence in Greece, it was argued, centered on the ability of the Greek economy to recover to a point in which its peoples would not be so easily recruited into the communist guerrilla movement. This, it was stated, could only be accomplished through economic aid to the government of Greece (McNeill, 1948:3-4).

The Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was an important milestone in the United States security assistance program. It was at the very least a first step in developing a massive commitment to prevent the spread of communism across the globe. This first step involved what seemed to be a very specific purpose: providing assistance to the countries of Greece and Turkey for the purpose of preventing communist expansion into these countries. This clear relationship that existed in security assistance legislation would not

last long as the program's focus would expand to every corner of the earth in the years to come.

Whether or not the administration at the time understood the implications of this first commitment of military and economic aid is not clear from analysis of the literature connected with it. It is clear, however, that the Truman administration felt that it was within the best interests of the United States to play an active role in the containment of Russian and communist influence worldwide. This objective was viewed as a top priority for the overall welfare of the United States.

The fact that the United States had significant surplus stockpiles of military equipment and supplies following World War II made the transition from a policy of isolationism to that of active communist engagement an easier process. It, in fact made sense for our country to provide military equipment to further our policy objectives globally if it would be in the form of excess materials and supplies. This was viewed as a small price to pay to promote peace and stability across the globe.

Question 2. How did the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 influence security assistance?

Another key piece of legislation in the formation of the United States security assistance program was the Mutual Defense Act of 1949. This Act marked the formal beginning of our country's military assistance program (U.S. Security Assistance, 1985:183). Through this Act the United States had reaffirmed its commitment to halt communist aggression worldwide and had expanded the scope of the security assistance program.

The primary debate surrounding the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 focused on the need for a unified European plan for dealing with an attack by the Soviet Union. The argument

also focused on the need for a clear command structure for NATO. The concern was that if the United States simply provided European assistance without formalized plans and strategies developed for the defense of Europe, it would simply be a waste of American taxpayer money. The argument was that the only way to truly prevent communist expansion was to resist it with a well thought out collective security arrangement. Some concern was also raised in Congressional debate that unless the United States required a well integrated plan for the defense of western Europe from the nations involved up front and tied appropriations in the bill to the approval of such a plan, it would be more difficult to obtain in the future (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. V, 1976:9,33). The concern over a unified plan for the defense of the North Atlantic region was carried over into the final wording of the Act which states, “\$400,000,000 shall become available when the President of the United States approves recommendations for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area which may be made by the Council and the Defense Committee to be established under the North Atlantic Treaty” (Department of State, 1950:1357-1358).

General Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, addressed the concern raised about the absence of a formalized plan for the defense of the North Atlantic by stating that he felt that time was essential to the proper management of the situation. The general stated that the funding that would be provided in the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 was only the first step necessary in providing Europe with the force structure necessary to counter the Soviet threat. He felt that it would be foolish to withhold the funding in the short term as the NATO alliance was already working hard to achieve the objective of collective security. He also stated that military plans were very dynamic in nature. The general suggested that there would never be a day in which policy makers in the United

States would be satisfied with a complete plan for the defense of Europe, because these plans would be constantly changing. He felt that this would be a long term, ongoing process in which aid from the United States would be vital (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. V, 1976:33-34). As table 14 indicates, military assistance funding increased substantially between the years 1950 and 1952 in Europe and Canada.

Table 14. Military Assistance Funding to Europe and Canada

(Dollars in Thousands)

Year	Funding
1950	1,040,309
1951	3,543,268
1952	3,562,461

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

Both the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill and the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 received overall public support. This came from the fact that most Americans were leery of Soviet intention following World War II. In fact the majority of Americans felt that the Soviet Union had every intention of dominating the world at every opportunity provided to them. The Truman administration did a good job of balancing the public's perception of a necessity for containment of the Soviet Union with the public's desire for fiscal constraint (Crabb, 1982:127-129).

As stated earlier the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 formally created our military assistance program in the United States. The United States had expanded its security assistance policy to include the North Atlantic, Iran, Korea, and the Philippines as well as

an extension of aid for Greece and Turkey. This represented a transition in our nation's security assistance policy. With the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, assistance had been provided for a very specific and well defined purpose: to prevent communist domination of Greece and Turkey. The Mutual Defense Act of 1949 reflects an attitude in American policy makers that the nation's security assistance program should begin to transition into regional security relationships. Emphasis was moving away from individual countries that would benefit from assistance from the United States to areas of the world that should receive assistance. This was evident by the emphasis that was being placed on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It appeared that the United States was now ready to engage communism globally and in any way necessary to defeat it. It would seem that the United States was forming world political sides as early as 1949, for the Cold War that would cause great conflict between the Soviet Union and United States for years to come.

Question 3. How did the Mutual Security Act of 1951 influence security assistance?

Significant debate concerning the Mutual Defense Act of 1951 was not evident through review of research material on the subject. This was perhaps due in part to the level of concern the Korean War raised for the necessity of a strong security assistance program globally for the purpose of containing communist aggression. The focus on security assistance in the United States in relation to achieving national strategic security objectives had shifted from a policy of containment in the North Atlantic area to include Asia as well as the Middle East.

While the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 formally created the military assistance program within the United States, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 served to expand this program (U.S. Security Assistance, 1985:183). The Mutual Defense Act of 1949, as

discussed in chapter three, served as one aspect of the collective security assistance program in the United States. The act focused on military assistance, while the Marshall Plan focused on economic assistance. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was the first piece of security assistance legislation that attempted to combine economic as well as military assistance in one legislative vehicle (U.S. Security Assistance, 1985:183).

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 also served to further enhance the regional breakdown of funding for security assistance from the United States. The act was divided into the regional areas of Europe, Near East and Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the American Republics. The act gave the President some flexibility to provide funding to nations not identified in the wording of the law if he so made the determination that it would be in the best interests of the United States (United States Congress, 1952:373-377). This is a slight modification from the Mutual Defense Act of 1949, which provided the President little opportunity to deviate from the countries scheduled for funding in the act to receive assistance (U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. V, 1976:575-580).

Based on this analysis it is concluded that the Mutual Defense Act of 1951 expanded the security assistance program in the United States beyond Europe to include almost every region of the world. The act gave the President additional flexibility by allowing him to provide assistance to countries that were not specifically identified in the law provided he could justify the need. The effect of combining economic and military assistance into one legislative act indicates a possible foreign policy attitude change in which senior U.S. leaders recognized that both types of assistance are interrelated in the foundation of security assistance objectives.

Question 4. How did the Mutual Security Act of 1954 influence security assistance?

The Mutual Security Act of 1954 was not as significant as other pieces of legislation discussed in terms of affecting policy. It served more as an administrative modification to the security assistance program within the United States. Perhaps the greatest contribution that the act made towards the security assistance program was the fact that it served to eliminate some fourteen different pieces of legislation and further established foreign policy in the United States into the mutual security program (United States Congress, 1955:861). The act also established the Foreign Military Credit Sales program in the United States (U.S. Security Assistance, 1985:183).

The Mutual Security Act of 1954 signaled a shift in priorities of the security assistance program from one in which economic aid was stressed in the beginning to a program in which military aid was the focus. The only areas specified for economic assistance within the act were the Near East, Africa, South Asia and the American Republics. The authorizations for economic assistance are minimal when compared with the authorizations for military assistance within the act (United States Congress, 1955:833-841).

Question 5. In what way did the Eisenhower Doctrine impact security assistance?

Many of the supporting arguments as well as criticisms of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Mutual Security Program in the United States were well defined in a statement to Congress by Secretary Dulles in 1958. The Secretary stated that President Eisenhower was asking for continued strong support for the program due to the important role it played in U.S. national security. The Secretary stressed that the Soviet Union was still a major threat to free people everywhere as it had gained control over 17 different countries in a period of only 41 years. The Secretary went on to say that the Soviet Union had

embarked on a new strategy for expansionism by promising economic as well as military aid to developing countries with the intent of exploitation. Most of the developing countries cited were in Asia and Africa. The Secretary explained that President Eisenhower was asking for \$510 million in military aid in 1959 for the NATO alliance as well as \$700 million for military aid to Asia. The President requested \$835 million for defense support with the majority going to Taiwan, Turkey, Korea, and Vietnam. The Secretary then went on to explain funding for a technical cooperation fund as well as a development loan fund. The President asked for \$142 million for the technical support fund for 1959 and stated that the authorization had already been approved the previous year for \$625 million for the development loan fund for fiscal year 1959 (Dulles, 1958:427-430).

One criticism of the security assistance program that Secretary Dulles pointed out was the perceived tremendous cost to the United States. Dulles pointed out that opposition existed in Congress based on this point with conflict existing between foreign policy objectives and domestic priorities. This argument was rebutted by Dulles by stressing the fact that the security assistance program in the United States does not cost very much. He based this argument on the fact that the majority of the aid provided to other countries ends up being spent in America. This resulted in jobs for Americans as well as money flowing back into our economy (Dulles, 1958:430-431). This conclusion by Secretary Dulles raises the question of whether the Security Assistance program in the United States had been intended to serve our own nation's economic objectives at some point. This would seem rather far fetched at its inception based on the specific nature of the program in terms of what countries receive aid and the tremendous economic aid that encompassed

the security assistance program. Perhaps as the security assistance program developed in the United States, however, the economic benefits from a well defined program was a necessity to its very existence.

Secretary Dulles also responded to the view that our security assistance program was only giveaway in nature by pointing out that without it several nations would have fallen under Soviet domination, which in turn would have provided momentum for the communist movement. He felt that providing funding for a healthy security assistance program was a small price to pay when compared with the military expenditures that would be required to sustain a military force in the event of war (Dulles, 1958:431).

Question 6. What were the key elements identified in the President's Committee to Study U.S. Military Assistance of 1959?

President Eisenhower stood behind the military assistance program in the United States and felt that the program had performed well to halt communist expansion globally. The President took exception with those who were critical of the military assistance program for their short sighted analysis of the world political climate. President Eisenhower pointed out that he believed had the United States not embarked on such an aggressive program of assistance the actual monetary cost to the united States would have been much greater. He supported this assessment by stating that the military assistance program actually had cost much less than the massive military build up that would have been required to accomplish the objective of communist containment (Hildreth, 1985:46).

Despite the President's support for the security assistance program in the United States he also felt an objective analysis of the program could be beneficial to the overall effectiveness of accomplishing its intended objectives. Therefore, in late 1958, President

Eisenhower established the Draper Committee to provide, “a completely independent, objective, and non-partisan analysis of the military assistance aspects of our Mutual Security Program” (Eisenhower, 1958:VII). The President expressed his desire for the committee to analyze ways in which the security assistance program in the United States could further promote U.S. security assistance objectives as well as enhance the strategic positions of nations friendly to the American cause (Eisenhower, 1958:VII).

The committee reported that the military assistance program had went through a significant evolution between 1947 and 1959. It had started as a program that transferred primarily excess equipment and supplies to nations for the purpose of communist containment. The committee went on to say that the current world political environment was much more complex and the weapons that were required by countries for their own defense were equally complex. The committee found that most nations were not able to produce the weapons needed for their defense internally, thus justifying military assistance from the United States (United States Congress, 1959:2). This made it much less difficult for the United States to project its interests globally. If we hold a certain military capability that other countries need, then we should be able to trade that assistance for increased influence across the globe.

The committee found that the military assistance program was in need of significant improvement in the way in which it was administered. The committee felt that the program was not as responsive as it should be to the needs of the countries receiving assistance and the national interests of the United States. They felt that this could be resolved through greater flexibility and timeliness that could be built into the administration process. The Draper committee felt that a method of continuous analysis

should be built into the executive department functions to determine which countries should receive aid. They recognized a danger that existed in the Mutual Security Program for certain programs to continue to be funded even though the need no longer existed (United States Congress, 1959:2). In its report, the committee provided two main recommendations:

The strengthening of the position of the State Department on the policy level of military assistance planning and an increased assurance of the conformity of the Military Assistance Program to foreign policy and to related assistance programs.

The focusing of responsibility on the Department of Defense for planning, programming and execution of military assistance within the framework of policy guidance laid down in the National Security Council and by the Department of State. (United States Congress, 1959:3)

The committee expanded on the two principal recommendations presented to provide specific recommendations that would satisfy the objectives. They are as follows:

Military assistance should be planned and programmed on a long term basis, covering a period of three and ultimately five years.

There should be a continuous authorization for the military assistance appropriation, in order to provide a sound legislative framework for multi-year planning and programming.

The military assistance appropriation should be placed in the Department of Defense budget, in order to center responsibility for administering the program more positively in the Defense Department.

Military assistance plans should be formulated within order of magnitude dollar guidelines to ensure feasibility and should be approved by the Secretaries of States and Defense before implementation.

The Department of State and the Ambassadors should participate at an earlier stage in the development of military assistance plans.

Military assistance planning and programming should be further decentralized to the United States Unified Commands overseas and to the Military Assistance Advisory Groups.

Provision should be made for more adequate consultation with recipient countries during military assistance planning.

The Department of Defense should have clearer operational responsibility for planning, programming and execution of military assistance.

The Executive Branch should assure that funds for the procurement of military assistance material are made available to the military departments more promptly after appropriation; the military departments, in turn, should accelerate procurement and supply actions to expedite actual deliveries overseas of military end items.

There should be established within the Defense Department a Director of Military Assistance.

There should be established within the Defense Department an independent evaluation staff.

Highly qualified and experienced personnel should be assigned to the program.
(United States Congress, 1959:3-4)

The committee found that world political environment that the United States was exercising its influence within had not significantly changed since 1947 in terms of a communist threat. The committee felt that both the Soviet Union and China were actively attempting to expand their sphere of influence throughout the world. The Draper reports also pointed to the conclusion that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remained the most important alliance that the United States was a member of. The report found that the European countries had benefited from both military and economic assistance provided through the United States and now maintained a sizable deterrent to Soviet aggression. Based on these conclusions the committee felt that both economic and military assistance funding levels needed to be maintained at their present levels at the very least (President's Committee, Vol. I, 1959:7-15).

First, the need for long range planning was perhaps evident simply by the significant debate that surrounded each years mutual defense authorization. No clear method of analysis existed for determining what criteria would be used in determining what nations would receive assistance and how much assistance would be provided. Immediately following World War II, the mutual security program in the United States largely had a great deal of support from the American public. As time went on and the program continued to expand a need started to emerge for a more efficient program. The recommendation provided by the Draper Committee provided a method to accomplish greater efficiency in the mutual security program in the United States. Efficiency through a clearer division of responsibilities between the Department of State and the Department of Defense as well as a long term planning model for the program. All these

recommendations focused on the security program in the United States becoming as responsive as possible to the needs and objectives of our nation.

Conclusion

It would seem that the foundation for the security assistance program in the United States was an attitude of containment within the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The containment of a an increasingly hostile Soviet Union to the foreign interests of the United States. This conflict fueled the attitude within the administration that an aggressive security assistance policy was the best approach to hinder communist expansion abroad.

Military Assistance played a less significant role in terms of the budget towards the end of the 1950s than it had at the beginning. This is illustrated in Table 15.

Table 15. Military Assistance as a % of DOD Budget Authority
(Dollars in Thousands)

Year	Percentage
1950	9.33
1951	10.99
1952	9.54
1953	8.68
1954	9.41
1955	3.92
1956	3.12
1957	5.62
1958	3.62
1959	3.66

(Source: DSAA, 1990)

Security assistance in the United States took on an ever expanding role from the years 1947 to 1959. Evidence of the expanding security assistance program is illustrated through investigation of the percentage of our military assistance program that was dedicated towards aid to Europe. In 1952, the United States dedicated almost 68 percent of total military assistance authorizations towards the defense of Europe, while by 1959 this number had fallen to only 34 percent (Hovey, 1965:76). This is significant considering the fact that security assistance to Europe had been based primarily on economic assistance in 1952 and was almost totally based on military assistance by 1956 (Jordan, 1958:237). This tends to suggest the increased importance the United States was

placing on military assistance to other areas of the world such as the Middle East and Asia.

The security assistance program in the United States also transformed from a program that primarily focused aid to specific countries, such as found in the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill to a program that gave the President greater and greater flexibility to provide assistance to countries in almost every region of the world. This could have reflected an attitude shift in senior policy makers that the program was long term in nature and would take years to accomplish its objectives.

With the recognition that the security assistance program was long term and in need of greater efficiencies, the Eisenhower administration embarked on studying the program from its inception. The conclusions reached by the Draper Reports were primarily focused on the administrative issues of security assistance such as a long term funding profile as well as a more defined understanding of responsibilities between the Department of State and the Department of Defense for the planning and execution of the program.

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