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THESIS

**EMERGING THREATS AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM:
THE FORMATION OF RADICAL ISLAMIST
MOVEMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

by

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June 2005

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

Determining the conditions that lead to the formation of radical Islamist groups will help analysts and policy-makers prioritize countries within sub-Saharan Africa that may need monitoring to prevent the onset of indigenous terrorism. This thesis attempts to produce knowledge toward that end by determining causal variables hypothesized to be associated with radical Islamist group formation through inductive analysis. A narrative describing the formation of a radical Islamist movement in Kano, Nigeria is compared against a narrative describing the conditions in Zanzibar City, Tanzania, where radical groups have not formed. The goal of the thesis is to generate an initial understanding of the underlying conditions that cause radical group formation to help tailor U.S. policy goals toward fighting radical Islamist group emergence through prevention.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since September 11th, 2001 the United States, under the auspices of the Global War on Terrorism, has sought to find and dismantle any terrorist-related organizations that may pose a threat to its national security interests. Attention remains rightly centered on the Al-Qaida network and its affiliates, which pose the most serious threat to U.S. national security. Given that Al-Qaida associates are primarily from Middle Eastern countries, little attention is paid to the potential for a similar type of radical Islamist movement to form within Sub-Saharan Africa. This is not to say, however, that the U.S. is completely ignoring the continent. U.S. policy-makers are currently using the assumption that failed states are breeding grounds for terrorism to formulate Africa policy aimed at eliminating the underlying conditions that cause groups to emerge.¹ The 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* asserts that “America is now threatened less by conquering states, than we are by failing ones.”² Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner testified before Congress about the threat of the failed state in Somalia: “What better place for the seeds of international terrorism and lawlessness to take root?”³ A similar assertion is made by Dr. Susan Rice, who previously held Kansteiner’s job, in her testimony before Congress: “...we must recognize that regimes lacking legitimacy and failed states are convenient safe havens as well as breeding grounds for terrorists.”⁴ While this explanation seems logical, the empirical evidence suggests that failed states are in fact no more likely to generate radical

1 Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 85.

2 White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, September 2002, 1.

3 Walter H. Kansteiner III, *Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs*, Washington, DC, 6 February 2002. Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/7872.htm> [12 December 2003].

4 Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *Africa and the War on Global Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations*, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 15 November 2001, 8.

movements than non-failed states.⁵ Therefore, a closer examination of the conditions that lead to the emergence of radical groups is needed.

In order to study terrorist groups, researchers must identify whether they are interested in communist groups, socialist groups, right-wing groups, or a variety of other ideologically driven radicals. This thesis will focus on the conditions surrounding the emergence of the movements that pose the greatest threat to the United States today: radical Islamists. It must be stated that not all Islamic beliefs lead to radicalism. There are different kinds of ideologies that can be identified with Islamism, and for this reason, definitions need to be provided to ensure the reader is clear as to which belief is covered by this thesis and why. Islamist movements can be defined as “political opposition movements,” and sub-divided into three categories: religious, reformist, and radical.⁶

- *Religious*: Groups that reject state-sponsored Islam, and prefer a non-violent, grassroots approach to making society more Islamic, usually through religious education.
- *Reformist*: Groups that call for direct political action, using democratic or electoral processes to achieve a non-violent transfer of power.
- *Radical*: Groups that want to achieve quick changes in power and establish *shari'a* (Islamic Law), through any means necessary to include terrorist acts.⁷

This thesis examines the latter category, since it is the only one associated with the use of terrorism. Of the 74 terrorist groups identified in *Patterns of Terrorism 2002*, 37 have Islamist roots.⁸ The remaining groups do not fall into similarly distinct subcategories. Many lack any ideological platform beyond opposition to an incumbent government, and are defined as terrorist solely on the basis of their targeting of civilians.⁹ Thus, these

⁵ Rotberg lists eight failed states in the world, of these, only Somalia has actually “bred” a radical Islamist movement, the Al-Ittihad Al-Islami. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, and Weak States: Causes and Indicators” in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 10.

⁶ John P. Entelis, “Political Islam in the Maghreb” in *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*, ed. John P. Entelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 44-45.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*, (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publication, April 2003), 99-146.

⁹ For example, many of the terrorist organizations identified in Africa are not necessarily terrorist movements, but are rebel movements that employ terrorist tactics. Such an example of this is the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.

groups pose little if any threat to the United States or its interests. At the same time, every major terrorist attack against the United States in the past 10 years, with the exception of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 2000 Olympic Park bombing, has been associated with radical Islamist ideology.¹⁰ In particular, the attack of September 11th, 2001 by radical Islamists resulted in the greatest number of deaths from any single terrorist act in U.S. history.

Security reasons aside, radical movements are of more interest to this analysis than religious or reformist movements because the latter two generally do not advocate violence. For example, there are no known cases of an existing religious Islamist movement deciding to modify its charter and transform itself into a radical group, although religious movements sometimes do aid radical movements by means of religious and ideological indoctrination in addition to financial support. Non-Governmental Organizations, such as Al-Haramain, have been identified as supporters of radical Islamist movements such as Al-Qaida and Al-Ittihad Al-Islami through funding and other means.¹¹ However, Islamist NGOs do not actively run radical movements in their own names. While reformist movements do sometimes produce radical splinter groups, it is better to think of these as new movements in and of themselves. Generally, they operate independently from the parent organizations and claim terrorist acts in their own names.

For example, it is often cited that the Algerian Islamist reformist group Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) radicalized after the Algerian military nullified its electoral victory in 1992. However, the new group really was a separate, “unofficial armed wing” of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), taking on a radical mission.¹² Furthermore, the AIS did not perpetrate violence in name of the FIS, but rather in its own name. Thus, the AIS and other such radical splinter groups will be considered independent radical

¹⁰ These attacks comprise the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, U.S.S. Cole attack in 2000, and World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks September 2001.

¹¹ Department of Treasury, *Fact Sheet: Designations of Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Branches of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation*, 11 March 2002. [Available Online]: <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02031104.htm> [23 October 2003].

¹² *Ibid.*, 64.

movements. For all of these aforementioned reasons, this thesis deals with radical Islamist movements exclusively, rather than terrorist movements or Islamist groups in general.

Most of the literature regarding radical Islamism is focused on the Middle East and North Africa. A wide variety of perspectives on the sources of radicalism emerge from a review of that literature. Stephen C. Pelletiere's study of radical Islamist movements in Algeria, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories led him to conclude that radicalized movements began as moderate reform movements.¹³ Indeed, when studying some of the more well-known Islamist movements in Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia for example, one sees that such movements are led by relatively well-educated people from urban areas, who are dissatisfied with the government for one reason or another.¹⁴ Generally, such leaders try to engage the lower middle-class and university students to rally to their cause.

Others focus on absolute and relative levels of deprivation. For example, Mark Tessler argues that Islamic movements prosper in situations where "the supply of jobs, education, and housing has been unable to keep pace with demand," because this results in disenfranchised individuals, who are then more likely to support Islamist organizations.¹⁵ In addition to such absolute deprivation, Tessler also points to a sense of relative deprivation as an indicator of potential support for Islamist groups. These fundamentalist Islamist groups are relatively successful in recruiting followers in areas where the government is failing to meet the needs of a select group of people (whether it be for ethnic, religious, or other reasons) in terms of jobs and social services.

Max Taylor and John Horgan, writing from a psychological perspective, argue that the fundamentalist will translate his beliefs into behavior because he believes in the

¹³ Stephen Pelletiere, *A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), 1995, 2.

¹⁴ See Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, Trans. By Anthony F. Roberts, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 2002 and Mamoun Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*, (New York: Palgrave), 1999.

¹⁵ Mark Tessler, "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements" in *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*, ed. John P. Entelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 96.

truth of his religious prescriptions for society.¹⁶ Thus radical behavior is a necessary measure for Islamists, because it allows them to ease the feeling of discontent (in their terms, cognitive dissonance) caused by the disconnect between internal and external factors. In an example of this type of explanation, Nazih Ayubi suggests that Muslims in Egypt turned to Islamic organizations out of socioeconomic frustration.¹⁷ More specifically, Ayubi argues that alternative secular organizations are considered to be “imported and alien” while other political outlets of expression are banned.

Despite a variety of theoretical perspectives, none of these explanations have been systematically tested against the history of radical Islam in the Arab world. Their applicability outside the Arab world is even more uncertain. This thesis seeks to identify specific conditions under which radical Islamist movements form in sub-Saharan Africa. Since part of the U.S. strategy for combating terrorism involves “diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit,” the findings of this thesis should also contribute to refining antiterrorism policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁸

This thesis uses an inductive approach to identify conditions under which radical Islamists groups form, using case studies of Nigeria and Tanzania. Nigeria has been home to radical Islamist groups since at least the 1970s. Despite its many similarities to Nigeria (e.g., a long history of interaction with Islam, substantial Muslim populations, and similar political, economic, and social conditions), Tanzania has yet to generate any radical Islamist groups. The case studies employed in this thesis seek to identify critical factors that might explain these different outcomes. Chapter II will concentrate specifically on northern Nigeria and its history of radical Islamist movement formation. Chapter III concentrates specifically on Zanzibar (in Tanzania) to determine why radical groups are not forming there despite structural conditions similar to those found in Nigeria. Chapter IV will conclude by offering a theoretical explanation of radical group formation based on the findings of the case studies. The chapter also offers recommendations for refining U.S. efforts to combat terrorism in Africa.

¹⁶ Max Taylor and John Horgan, “The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic Fundamentalism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 37.

¹⁷ Nazih Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12, no. 4 (December 1980): 495.

¹⁸ White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, April 2003.

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II. RADICAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, and has the potential to become a hegemon in West Africa. Nigeria's porous borders, combined with the government's weak policing capability, make the country a possible staging point for future terrorist activities throughout the region.¹⁹ Currently, there are at least two radical Islamist groups active in Nigeria: the Islamic Movement and the Movement for Islamic Revival. In the past, there have also been other radical groups, such as the 1970s Maitatsine movement and the 1980s Izala movement under Sheikh Isma'il Idris. This chapter focuses on the Maitatsine, because it is the best-documented group.

Nigeria has a turbulent history, marred by periods of political, ethnic, and religious violence. These tensions still exist within the state today, and their roots can be traced back to the colonial period of the nineteenth century. In many ways, Nigeria's current problems have been problematic for over two hundred years. While this chapter is more concerned with finding the causes of radical Islamism, a general history of Nigeria will be provided to place the reader in the proper context.

Perhaps the best place to begin a history of the state as a whole is with British colonialism. Initial European interaction in pre-colonial Nigeria occurred primarily along the coast in the southern regions through slave traders and missionaries. The slave trade exacerbated ethnic differences, as Africans tended to enslave other Africans for profit. In particular, the Oyo Yoruba kingdom of western Nigeria in the 17th and 18th Century, followed by the Sokoto Caliphate of Hausa in northern Nigeria in the 19th Century, tended to provide slaves to European traders and other Africans respectively.²⁰ Of the slaves taken in the 18th Century from the region, over half appear to have been Igbo in

¹⁹ Peter M. Lewis, "Islam, Protest, and Conflict in Nigeria," *Africa Notes* 10, Center for Strategic and International Studies (December 2002): 3. Available [Online]: www.csis.org/africa/ANotes/ANotes0212.pdf [8 December 2003].

²⁰ Robin Law, "A West African Cavalry State: The Kingdom of Oyo," *The Journal of African History* 16, no. 1 (1975): 10 and David C. Tambo, "The Sokoto Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 9, no. 2 (1976): 203-205.

origin.²¹ These three ethnic groups, Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo, still make up the majority of Nigerians today, and they remain in the same geographical areas of the state.

The advent of British colonialism in the 19th Century eventually brought the slave trade to a close in Nigeria as palm oil became the sought-after commodity by European for use in soap and candles.²² In the quest to exploit the country for its palm oil resources, the British utilized ethnic divisions to administer governance. Using a system of indirect rule, the British let each region run itself under native authorities appointed by colonial administrators. The Hausa in the north continued to use the system of Islamic rule that had existed since the early 1800s while the Yoruba in the west had previous experience in government through their kingdoms. These preexisting indigenous institutions facilitated the building of British colonial administrations in the northern and western regions of the territory. In the east however, the British had to implement a system of warrant chiefs because no pre-existing form of centralized government existed within the Igbo communities.²³ Irrespective of the colonial administrative structures used in Nigeria, in all areas of the territory the overall system of indirect rule served to empower some natives (such as warrant chiefs), while taking away power from others (those who refused to cooperate with the British). This legacy of indirect rule found its way into the Nigerian federal system established at independence in 1960, thereby translating ethnic differences into political differences that would help pave the way for future radical Islamic movements in Nigeria.

The First Republic in Nigeria reinforced the system precedent of dividing the country along primarily ethnic lines. The republic itself was built along the lines of indirect rule, similar to the British method during the colonial period. The British initiated, through Nigerian representatives, the establishment of three federated regions under the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954. This federated structure of government continued with the Independence Constitution of 1960 and into the official establishment

²¹ David Northrup, "The Growth of Trade Among the Igbo Before 1800," *The Journal of African History* 13, no. 2 (1972): 232.

²² Patrick Manning, "Slaves, Palm Oil, and Political Power on the West African Coast," *African Historical Studies* 2, no. 2 (1969): 280.

²³ P.C. Lloyd, "The Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis," in *Nigerian Politics and Military Rule*, ed. S.K. Panter-Brick, (London: The Athlone Press, University of London, 1970), 4.

of the First Republic in 1963.²⁴ The regions coincided with each of the three major ethnic groups.²⁵ Each regional government had control over agriculture, education, health, and local government allowing for a large degree of autonomy. The federal government, located in Lagos, had control over defense, police, and foreign policy in addition to communications and transportation. Economics and education was a shared burden between the federal and regional governments. The Nigerian political system, however, relied heavily on the patronage system, whereby resources were distributed based on access to power. This access was obtained through political parties, which began as early in the 1940s and evolved through the 1950s. Political parties developed primarily along ethnic lines, as political elites reached out to their own communities for support. The Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) represented primarily Muslim Hausa constituents from the Northern Region; the Action Group (AG) represented primarily Christian Yoruba from the Western Region; and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCPC) primarily represented Igbo from the Eastern Region.²⁶ Thus ethnicity and religion became intermixed with politics, resulting over time in violence rooted in all three. As a result, Nigeria remains a conglomeration of different political identities that are usually divided primarily along ethnic lines.

Nigeria's religious differences, much like its political differences, are largely a result of different influences over its history. European missionaries who arrived in the southern parts of Nigeria largely converted the southern communities, including most of the Igbo, and nearly half of the Yoruba. The missionaries established Anglican schools that helped educate the children of the south, while those of the north had no similar level of education available. This in turn led the south to garner more resources than the north through the colonial period by being available to take on more administrative jobs. Additionally, once independence was achieved, most of the civil service jobs went to those in the south who were educated. Therefore, the largely Christian south was economically and socially advantaged as compared to the Islamic north. As a result, clashes occurred between Muslims and Christians over the years, though it is difficult to

²⁴ A. Oyewole, *Historical Dictionary of Nigeria* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1987), 87-88.

²⁵ Brian Smith, "Federal-State Relations in Nigeria," *African Affairs* 80, no. 320 (1981): 356.

²⁶ Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 474-512.

say whether religion or an expression of socioeconomic frustration was the primary source of friction. Despite these religious differences on a national level, the formation of radical Islamist movements in Nigeria did not spring from an anti-Christian platform, but one that was focused on reform at the local level. The implementation of *shari'a* in the north 2000, where most of the country's 55 million Muslims reside, threatens to further exacerbate a longstanding division within Nigeria along religious lines.²⁷

The focus of this chapter will be narrowed to the city of Kano in northern Nigeria in an attempt to understand why a radical Islamist movement formed in that city. It is first necessary, however, to sketch the history of Islam in Nigeria.

A. THE ADVENT OF ISLAM IN NIGERIA

Islam first entered Hausaland (the northern areas of modern-day Nigeria) as early as 1385 A.D.²⁸ There are written texts from the time period that report the coming of the *Wangarawa*, a group of Muslim gold merchants who sought to expand trade links throughout West Africa.²⁹ The *Wangarawa* brought with them the teachings of the Qur'an and are attributed with leading the first Hausa converts to Islam. Although conversion was driven, at least in part, by local traders' interest in obtaining lines of credit from the Muslims, the basics of the religion were transferred at that time.³⁰

Islam appears to have been introduced piecemeal into the region as evidenced by the Kano Chronicle, which details the history of the area. It records that until the mid-15th Century, the Qur'an, *'ilm al-fiqh* (jurisprudence), and the *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) were the only sources of knowledge of Islam. Missionaries from Mali then brought the "disciplines of *tawhid* (unity of God) and grammar."³¹ Additional

²⁷ "New Sharia Law in Nigeria," *BBC News Online*, 28 Apr 2004.

²⁸ Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, (London: Longman, 1984), 74.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Jean Ensminger, *Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 59-62. Ensminger shows how conversion to Islam among the Orma tribe in Kenya between 1920-1940 had a direct impact on transaction costs for local merchants by establishing lines of credit based on trust, which is key when trading in commodities such as cattle that may not instantly yield cash profits.

³¹ Cited in J. Spencer Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 132.

clerics introduced other customs and wrote discourses on Islamic issues over the next few hundred years, but a true push for Islam did not come until the advent of the Fulani Jihad of 1804-1808, led by Usamanu dan Fodio.

Dan Fodio was a Fulani preacher who aimed to bring Islamic reform to Hausaland between the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Specifically, dan Fodio entered the court of the Sarkin of Gobir, Bawa Jangworzo in 1781, possibly to tutor the royal family, but also in an effort to convert the Sultan from animism to Islam.³² Though Bawa was cordial to dan Fodio, he did so hoping to keep peace with the *mallams* (Islamic scholars). Dan Fodio did not promote a radical message during the reign of Bawa (which ended in 1791), but nonetheless through his preaching gathered followers throughout the community. Dan Fodio believed that the world was divided between two types of people, the Muslim and the non-Muslim. Additionally, he promoted a belief in only two types of government, the one of the infidel, and the one of the Muslim. He believed that if a Muslim ruled, then the country was predisposed to be just. In the absence of a Muslim ruler, the country was one of infidels.³³ Additionally, any ruler who called himself a Muslim had to practice *shari'a* to perfection, or he could not be considered a true Muslim. Since the rulers of the day in Hausaland embraced animism in addition to Islamic practices, dan Fodio did not believe they were Muslims, and therefore, he considered their policies to be anti-Islamic.

Dan Fodio attracted a wide variety of believers with his preaching, primarily because there were many people at the time who were dissatisfied with the government of the *sarkuna* (Hausa rulers). Some of the groups dan Fodio appealed to were the orthodox *mallams*, the Fulani pastoralists (Bararoji), the Hausa peasantry, and (to a lesser extent) the Fulani city-dwellers (Fulanin Gidda).³⁴ Islamic scholars were attracted to dan Fodio because of a shared belief that the Hausa rulers were unjust because they were not Muslim. The Fulani pastoralists were attracted to dan Fodio's criticism of the *sarkuna* for economic and social reasons. Since the Bararoji were primarily cattle-herders, they

³² Marilyn Robinson Waldman, "The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment," *The Journal of African History* 6, no. 3 (1965): 340.

³³ H.R. Palmer, "An Early Fulani Conception of Jihad," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 13, no. 52 (July 1914): 407.

³⁴ Waldman., 342.

depended on having grazing land to feed their flock. The Hausa taxed the Fulani for each head of cattle, and tried to justify it through the Qur'an by inappropriately associating the tax with the same that is paid by non-Muslims to Muslim rulers.³⁵ Economic reasons also seemed to be at the root of dan Fodio's popularity among the Hausa peasantry. The Hausa rulers taxed the peasantry indiscriminately and harshly, leaving the peasants feeling discontented. Dan Fodio's criticism of the taxes based on Islamic justification resonated with the peasantry since it addressed one of their grievances with the government.³⁶

A final group that supported dan Fodio (albeit to a lesser extent) was the wealthy Fulanin Gidda. The Gidda were concerned more with gaining political power than with existing economic disparities. Although the *sarkuna* appointed the Gidda as rulers over the Fulani, the Gidda were not considered to be on an equal basis with the Hausa rulers, nor could they ascend to the throne based on their ethnic background.³⁷ Dan Fodio's message resonated with the Gidda because he eventually proposed a toppling of the Hausa governments, thereby providing a way for the Gidda to gain political power.

During the time of Sarkin Barwa, dan Fodio had unfettered access to preach to not only the ruler, but to the people as well. Each of Barwa's successors (Yakubu, Nafata, and Yunfa) paid homage to dan Fodio, but none of them officially sanctioned his sermons. Sarkin Yunfa made the most concerted effort at eliminating Islam, which directly led to the *jihad*. Yunfa decided to threaten the use of force against dan Fodio and his followers in an effort to destroy the movement in 1803. A particular turning point came that year when, as a result of Yunfa's threats, some of dan Fodio's followers fled to the town of Gimbana and fortified it against attack.³⁸ Dan Fodio was called to the court at Gobir from Degel in an effort to force him to end the standoff over Gimbana. At some point after his return to the court, Yunfa decided to try to kill dan Fodio, but the *sarkin*'s

³⁵ M. Hiskett, "Kitab al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to 'Uthman dan Fodio,'" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 23, no. 3 (1960): 568. Clearly, the ideas put forth in this work are what dan Fodio perceived as exclusion against the various groups in northern Nigeria. Regardless, the fact that dan Fodio garnered followers that transcended class and ethnicity shows how a leader can use the Islamic identity to rally aggrieved parties for radical purposes.

³⁶ Waldman., 342.

³⁷ Waldman., 342.

³⁸ F. Daniel, "Shehu dan Fodio," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 25, no. 99 (April 1926): 280.

gun backfired. Afterward, Yunfa told dan Fodio how much he hated him, but allowed him to leave the court nonetheless. Yunfa's undoing came when he decided to take the town of Gimbana by force. His army killed many Muslims and took others captive, but on their march back to Gobir, they passed dan Fodio's home in Degel. Although it is unclear whether dan Fodio made a deal with the *sarkin* or simply convinced the army to let the captives go, the Muslims were set free in Degel under the condition that they would return to Gobir with dan Fodio.

Given the hostile nature of Yunfa at the time, it is no surprise that dan Fodio did not return to Gobir with his followers. Yunfa subsequently threatened to destroy Degel just as he did Gimbana, which caused dan Fodio and his followers to flee to the town of Gudu in February 1804.³⁹ Dan Fodio labeled this escape as a *hijra*, made reference to Muhammad's flight to Medina to gather strength prior to the onset of *jihad* against Mecca. This event was the true turning point for dan Fodio, as he began to write more earnestly of the need to replace the infidel rulers with just rulers through force. When further negotiations between himself and Yunfa failed, dan Fodio was elected to be the *Sarkin Musulmi*, the equivalent of what in Arabic is known as the *Amir-ul-mulminina*, or Commander of the Faithful.⁴⁰ He thus became the leader of a movement whose goal was to overthrow the existing government through force, and replace it with an Islamic state under *shari'a* law—the Fulani Jihad. Thus, the first radical Islamist movement in Nigeria was born.

The Fulani Jihad came to an end in 1808, having achieved many of its objectives. Dan Fodio established the Sokoto Caliphate as well as *shari'a* law in what is now northern Nigeria. The *jihad* also served to spread the religion from the Hausa/Fulani north, to the Yoruba in the southwest, converting nearly half of the Yoruba in the process. Had it not been for British colonials arriving and introducing Christianity in the south, further gains may have been made. Regardless, the religious division in Nigeria today remains largely a result of preexisting tension that was further exacerbated by the Fulani Jihad and the coming of European missionaries. Most of the Hausa/Fulani in the north

³⁹ F. Daniel, "Shehu dan Fodio," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 25, no. 99 (April 1926):, 281.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

are Muslim, while the Yoruba in the southwest are split between Muslims and Christians. The Igbo, located in southeast Nigeria, are primarily Christian since the *jihad* did not reach them.

Beyond the two major branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi'i, in Nigeria today there is a third branch known as Sufism (generally associated with Shi'ism). Sufism is a more mystical form of Islam, in which followers seek to attain a closer union with Allah through ritualistic prayers and dances. Sufi believers tend to follow the teaching of a particular teacher, and form brotherhoods (*tariqas*) around these beliefs. Dan Fodio's personal belief in Sufism ensured that Islam in Nigeria primarily took the form of Sufi brotherhoods following the *jihad*. Specifically, the Sufi brotherhoods of the Qadiriyya (which dan Fodio followed) and Tijaniyya became the most popular and economically powerful of all the Muslim theologies. This empowerment of the Sufi brotherhoods, coupled with the legacy of dan Fodio's successful *jihad*, provides the foundation for radical Islamism in modern times.

B. HISTORY OF THE MAITATSINE MOVEMENT

Nearly two hundred years after the end of the Fulani Jihad, a new movement emerged in Nigeria with a similar goal. The Maitatsine can be described as a radical Islamist group that sought to reject the modern world, while at the same time providing an outlet for those who suffered economic deprivation throughout the 1970s. In 1972 Nigeria was recovering from a three-year civil war (1967-1970) following an attempt by the Eastern region to form the breakaway state of Biafra. The war began as a result of ethnic and socioeconomic divisions between the Igbo of the Eastern Region, and the Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Region.⁴¹ Following the conclusion of the war, plans were made to return Nigeria to the civilian rule. The military ruler at the time, General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975), briefly allowed banned political activities to resume in

⁴¹ Although there are differing accounts of exact causes for the Biafra secession, the fact that mass killings of Igbo army troops, shopkeepers, and civil servants working in Northern Nigeria in May 1966 (and subsequent attacks in Sept) served to feed Igbo fears that they would be eliminated by the Northern-controlled military government unless they took secessionist action in 1967. For more detailed study of both sides of the Nigerian Civil War see Ntiyong U. Akpan, *The Struggle for Secession 1966-1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War* (London: Frank Cass, 1971) and Olusegun Obasanjo, *My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1960* (London: Morrison & Gibb, 1980).

1972 to discuss plans for a new constitution.⁴² Once Gowon realized, however, that the intense politicized ethnic divisions remained, he reestablished the ban on political parties that had originated under his predecessor, General Aguiyi Ironsi (who had ruled between January and July 1966).⁴³

Gowon's ban on political parties served to reinforce the position of the political elites in the northern Nigerian city of Kano at the time. They governed with the help of the Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqas*). Since the time of the Fulani Jihad, the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods had grown economically powerful through their success in the cattle and kola nut trade.⁴⁴ As a result of the Sufi's wealth and membership base, political elites sought to co-opt them. The Sufi brotherhoods were given more access to the benefits of the city such as housing and jobs in exchange for their support and cooperation. Any newcomer to the city would then have to work through this Sufi network to try and obtain the same benefits. Therefore, the arrangement worked out between the military and the *tariqas* ensured that as long as the *tariqas* were assured access to wealth and privilege, their members would continue to follow Kano's military governor. While this did not pose a problem for those who were already connected to the Qadiriyya or Tijaniyya, it excluded Muslims who believed other doctrines, or chose not to join the Sufi movements.⁴⁵ Therefore, Sufis were able to monopolize the local economy to the exclusion of other Muslims. Although there is no data available to establish the exact magnitude of this exclusion, hundreds if not thousands were unemployed, and thousands would eventually be drawn to the Maitatsine.

While access to jobs and other amenities was becoming increasingly restricted in the Northern cities to members of Sufi brotherhoods, the pressures in urban areas were

⁴² Eghosa E. Osaghae, *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence* (London: Hurst & Co., 1998), 70-71.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁴⁴ Abner Cohen, *Custom & Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 17-20. Cattle and kola nuts are perishable commodities when moving between northern Nigeria and southern Nigeria. Information is critical to ensure the seller brings the commodities to market at the time when the most profit might be made, or else the commodity may either die (from sleeping sickness in the case of cattle) or become spoiled (in the case of kola nuts). The Sufi brotherhoods excelled at passing this type of information to each other, which aided them in achieving economic success.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

increasing. For a variety of reasons, including Nigeria's oil boom, the pace of urbanization increased dramatically in the early 1970s. One result of this trend was an increase in social spending in urban areas, (the introduction of free education was just one of these programs).⁴⁶ Other funds were targeted to begin construction projects. The overall result was that the quality of life in urban areas appeared to be much better than that in rural areas, thus spurring a migration from rural to urban areas by people seeking jobs and education.

Along with this voluntary pull-factor, a nature-based push-factor was also operating. Between 1972-1974, Nigeria suffered one of the worst droughts in its history. This drought, which severely reduced the harvest for those years, forced small-scale farmers to find other means of survival.⁴⁷ As often happens during agrarian crises, many headed to the cities, though exact numbers are not known for these particular years. Housing and jobs could not keep pace with rural migration to the cities. As urbanization increased throughout the 1970s, migrants from the rural areas began to find themselves excluded from housing and employment. In the Kano region alone (not just the city of Kano), the urban population between 1963 and 1980 increased from 250,000 to 2,000,000, while only 50,000 were employed through industrial labor.⁴⁸ Given that political associations were banned at the time, new migrants who experienced economic deprivation could not rely on party politics to help change their conditions and quality of life.

In addition to the ban on political parties, the ability of the state to influence events in Kano remained minimal. Although there is no doubt the government was aware of the declining conditions due to the combination of drought and rural to urban migration, as it has already been illustrated, effective industry remained pitifully absent. Additionally, given the religious and ethnic differences between the North and South in Nigeria, any attempts by the state to change conditions in Kano would have been at a

⁴⁶ Julius O. Ihonvbere and Timothy Shaw, *Illusions of Power: Nigeria in Transition* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1998), 70.

⁴⁷ Michael Watts and Paul Lubek, "The Popular Classes and the Oil Boom: A Political Economy of Rural and Urban Poverty", in *The Political Economy of Nigeria*, ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Praeger, 1983), 108.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 111.

lower priority level. One example of the failure of the state to intervene in declining economic conditions can be seen in their handling of investments and returns. During the first five years of the 1980s, over 23 billion *naira* was invested into state enterprises. The net return on all those investments, over five years, came to less than 1 billion *naira*.⁴⁹ Additionally, industrial capacity had fallen to less than 40% over the same time period.⁵⁰ Clearly, even if the state had wanted to intervene, it seems highly unlikely that it could have made a difference given the poor economic shape it was in itself. As a result, one's economic condition in Kano completely depended on one's affiliation with the Sufi informal networks. As a result, many remained disenfranchised given their adherence to other forms of Islam.

The influence of a single man, however, would eventually turn the lower class of Kano into a fighting force organized to establish an Islamic state. They became known as the Maitatsine, one of the most volatile radical Islamist groups to ever emerge in Nigeria. The leader of the Maitatsine, a Cameroonian named Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa, was an itinerant preacher in Nigeria throughout the 1960s and 1970s.⁵¹ Marwa believed that the world was full of infidels, and that the only course of action was *jihad* to ensure an Islamic way of life. He rejected symbols of the new materialistic world, such as Western education and modern appliances, which he believed to be pollutants to Islam itself.⁵² Given that the Sufi elites had no qualms about obtaining material wealth, Marwa's disassociation with the modern world was his way of critiquing what he viewed as excesses by the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods. Despite his puritanical viewpoint, Marwa himself could be called a heretic by traditional followers of the Prophet Muhammad. Marwa was a critic of both the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad. He even modified Qur'anic text by replacing the Prophet's name with his own, changing the number of prayers to be said in a day, and changing the direction one would face while

⁴⁹ William Reno, "Old Brigades, Money Bags, New Breeds, and the Ironies of Reform in Nigeria," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 27, no. 1 (1993): 72.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Maitatsine is the Hausa nickname given to its leader, which means "he who curses others."

⁵² Raymond Hickey, "The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings: A Note," *African Affairs* 83, no. 331 (April 1984): 254.

doing so.⁵³ Marwa also had a reputation for being a powerful wielder of magic, and many, including the elites, would pay for his services to bring good luck to situations. Despite these heretical tendencies, Marwa considered himself a Muslim and used the Qur'an (albeit modified) as his source document for advocating violence.

Sometime during the 1970s, Marwa established himself as an *annabi*, or prophet of Allah. This act allowed Marwa to claim divine legitimacy since the Prophet Muhammad was considered to be the seal of the Islamic prophets. Marwa then formed and organized the Maitatsine by utilizing *almajiri*, a system in which followers attached themselves to a leader for Islamic teaching.⁵⁴ Parents sent their boys (aged 10-14 in the case of Marwa) to live with the teacher and travel with him across the country. The children were expected to beg from pedestrians to earn their living if the parents had no money to send. This system of organization established a hierarchical relationship between teacher and student, where the former had absolute authority over the latter. The organizational structure also allowed Marwa to gain fiscal resources to support and expand his group. The more students a teacher had, the more money he could make, and therefore the *almajiri* system could be used to exploit children for their earning potential. Regardless of whether Marwa had such intentions or not, he was receiving more than \$100 a day from his thousands of followers before the Maitatsine formed.⁵⁵ While Marwa was adept at using the *almajiri* system to gain followers, he also appealed to a broader base of urban residents who suffered economic deprivation at the time.

New migrants, excluded from the political and economic networks in Kano, often found themselves homeless, jobless, and ripe for the picking. They thus began to form an urban underclass that could easily be recruited to support extremist causes. As pointed out by Falola:

⁵³ G. Nicolas, "Guerre Sainte à Kano," *Politique Africaine* no. 4 (December 1981): 50. Trans. by author: "Il avait modifié le texte du Coran, remplaçant le nom du Prophète de Dieu par le sien, ainsi que l'orientation et le nombre des prières, et se livrait à des activités relevant de la criminalité et de la magie noire." Available [Online]: http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/004_SOM.HTM [8 November 2003].

⁵⁴ Hickey, 253.

⁵⁵ Report of Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1981), 298. Cited in Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1998), 149. This source will be referred to as RTKD in subsequent footnotes.

Marwa was able to tap this reservoir. Some were drawn to him directly by his preachings. Others were recruited by his followers, who sought new members in parking lots, railway stations, and other public places. To these homeless and poor migrants Marwa provided shelter, security, and alternative ways of negotiating the city.⁵⁶

The primary motivator for urban followers to join the movement thus seems to be exclusion from the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhoods that monopolized the distribution of resources in Kano. Not only did the brotherhoods control the political and economic relief mechanisms, but they also controlled the Friday mosques within Kano, thus denying non-Sufis from receiving relief from that venue as well.⁵⁷ Marwa exploited this condition by providing the soft landing that new migrants sought and had previously been denied. By December 1980, Marwa had gained at least a few thousand followers. Marwa was arrested several times during and after Gowon's reign for preaching without a permit.⁵⁸ Authorities insisted that Marwa's preaching was "not acceptable to the majority of our people as it is a total condemnation of the principles of Islam as accepted and practiced by the Moslems."⁵⁹ Confrontation ceased between 1975 and 1980, as followers of the Maitatsine secluded themselves in one part of Kano to pursue their own way of life in isolation. Over time, the Maitatsine sought to increase their land holdings by clearing out neighbors and illegally building on vacant lots. The Maitatsine refused to recognize the sovereignty of the Nigerian federal government and established an Islamic state under *shari'a* law within their enclave. The Maitatsine defended their territory, with military training provided by members who had previously been employed by the police or army.⁶⁰ Such a practice is consistent with the idea of *jihad*, which seeks to defend the faith against tyrannical government oppression through violent means.

⁵⁶ Falola, 148.

⁵⁷ Between 1978-1980 the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya controlled the Friday mosques in northern Nigeria, and were in a constant struggle with the more conservative Sunni Izala movement for control of the mosques. The Maitatsine movement enabled the Sufis to lump the Izala in with Marwa's followers following the riots, and thus retained control of the mosques until the late 1980s. See Roman Loimeier, "Islamic Reform and Political Change: The Example of Abubakar Gumi and the Yan Izala Movement in Northern Nigeria," in *Islamic Reform and Political Change*, ed. Eva Evers Rosander and David Westerlund (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 295-301.

⁵⁸ Nicolas, 58. Marwa was arrested in 1966, 1973, and 1975.

⁵⁹ *RTKD*, 170. Cited in Falola, 151.

⁶⁰ Falola, 145-146.

The turning point for Marwa came on November 26th, 1980. On that date, the governor of Kano, Abubakar Rimi, issued an ultimatum calling for Marwa to leave the city within fourteen days.⁶¹ Marwa responded with a call to all of his followers to join him and defend their way of life against the infidels. While it might be debatable whether or not the Maitatsine could be called a radical movement throughout the 1970s, there is no question that Rimi's letter sparked Marwa to call the Maitatsine to *jihad* in defense of their homes. According to Falola, Marwa "consolidated his defense base, prepared his followers for war, and stepped up Maitatsine harassment of the public."⁶² The stage had been set for the battle that would take place in December of 1980, known as the Maitatsine riots.⁶³

The violence started on December 8th, when the Kano police attempted to block the Maitatsine from preaching in an area known as the Shahuji Playing Ground, near the City Central Mosque.⁶⁴ The 150-man police force "discharged smoke shells to scare them off, but sect members suddenly appeared from every side and attacked the police with machetes, arrows, swords, daggers, and other deadly weapons."⁶⁵ Sheer numbers alone dictated that the limited size of the police force could not contend with the 2000-3000 members of the Maitatsine.⁶⁶ As a result, the Kano police retreated.

Emboldened by this victory, the Maitatsine decided to try to take as much territory as possible, and by December 19th they had gained control over the police station, public schools, and a mosque. Random attacks occurred against members of the public, who were considered infidels, including rapes and the murder of school children. Additionally, the Maitatsine took 50-65 hostages and held them in their territory.⁶⁷ The Maitatsine uprising was put down only when President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) called

⁶¹ Nicolas, 58.

⁶² Falola, 152.

⁶³ Although often referred to as "riots," given that the conflict began spontaneously, there is no doubt that the Maitatsine had planned to expand their territory in Kano previous to this incident. The riots provided the opportunity to follow-through with these plans.

⁶⁴ Falola, 153.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Niels Kastfelt, "Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria," *African Affairs* 88, no. 350 (January 1989): 84.

⁶⁷ Watts and Lubek, 144.

the Nigerian army to action on December 28th. Unlike the ineffective Kano police, the army troops quickly defeated the Maitatsine and killed Marwa in the process. Afterward, the official tally of deaths from the riots came to 4,177 (though many estimates are higher).¹

The Maitatsine fractured after Marwa's death in 1980. Various people tried to claim leadership, such as Musa Makaniki, who continued to lead supporters to cause death and damage (e.g., in March 1984 in Yola, where over 1,000 people died), but no leader controlled the entire movement as Marwa had. Although there were sporadic incidents blamed on the Maitatsine (Gombe 1985 and 1987; Lagos 1998), none produced the amount of damage that had occurred under Marwa's leadership.² Musa Makaniki was finally arrested in 2003, without a movement and without followers.³ Thus, the last remnant of the Maitatsine movement seems to have disappeared for good.

How do we explain the rise of the Maitatsine? Several factors seem to have been critically important. First of all, the coincidence of severe drought and an oil boom produced a flood of migrants to Kano in the mid-to late 1970s. This suggests that exogenous factors, beyond the control of any government, can create conditions that foster the emergence of a radical, anti-establishment organization. Specifically, in the case of the Maitatsine, exogenous factors (drought and oil boom) created rapid rural to urban migration in Kano. This rapid urbanization changed the demographic balance of Kano society, leading to an increased potential for structural exclusion if governments are not prepared to absorb such an event.

In the case of the Maitatsine, there was no capability for the Kano government to provide a soft landing to the new migrants, which meant they were left to the mercy of the informal networks in place at the time. These networks, in the form of the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods, monopolized the production of wealth and distribution of

68 Muhammad S. Umar, "Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s," *Africa Today* 48, no. 2 (Summer 2001), 130.

69 "Eleven Killed in Clash Between Police and Outlawed Sect," *Associated Press*, 26 April 1985; "New Conflict Between Police and Religious Group in Nigeria," *Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 19 February 1987; "Nigeria Fanatics Attack Police," *Toronto Star*, 28 May 1998.

70 Abayomi Adeshida, "Police Arrests Ring Leader of 1984 Maitatsine Religious Riot," *Vanguard* (Nigeria), 1 April 2003.

resources in Kano. New migrants could not obtain a job or housing without being a part of these informal networks. Lack of membership in these brotherhoods left the urban migrants economically excluded and with increasing numbers of urban migrants, this economic exclusion became intolerable as more and more people suffered its effects.

Thus, rapid urbanization created a large pool of unemployed, poor city-dwellers, who could then serve as potential recruits who were easily mobilizable by radical elements. The exclusion of this pool of new migrants from economic opportunities further exacerbated the problem, and facilitated their incorporation into new, radical networks.

Considering that the migration was largely beyond the control of the Nigerian government, this suggests that exogenous factors play a direct role in pushing exclusion to intolerable levels. At the same time, however, political and economic structures are not beyond a government's control, so the effect of exogenous factors will largely depend on how much capacity the state has to deal with unexpected crises that might lead to increased exclusion. Should the state have no capacity to deal with such exclusion, then the situation should be considered ripe for the formation of a radical movement, though it does not mean one will form. Additionally, depending on whether or not exclusion factors are within the government's capacity to control, differing networks of exclusion may occur. In the case of the Maitatsine, new immigrants to Kano faced the intra-Muslim network of exclusion due to the existing socioeconomic structure. At the same time, given the ban on political parties, a network of exclusion existed between the newly deprived immigrants of Kano and the government. Once again, these networks of exclusion do not guarantee the emergence of a radical group, but they do provide structures that can be exploited to move people to a radical ideology. Based on the evidence presented in the chapter, it seems that structures alone cannot form the movement, and that some allowance must be given to the effects of human agency.

A third conclusion inferred from the Maitatsine chapter, is that leadership was a crucial factor in the formation of the group. One individual, Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa, was able to exploit the conditions of exclusion that existed at the local level to gather followers to form his radical movement. The fact that Marwa consciously sought out

new migrants who could not find shelter or a job indicates that he had keen insight into how he could provide for the needs of the people. It is difficult to say if there was a specific quality about Marwa himself that should be highlighted, or whether as long as the message was the same, anyone could have filled his shoes and started a movement. The Maitatsine's fragmentation after Marwa's death gives, however, indicates that he did possess some personal qualities that helped draw followers to him specifically. A movement is a two-way street. Although a radical movement cannot form without a leader who can exploit structural conditions to gain followers, there must also be followers who are willing to embrace such a message. In this case of the Maitatsine, there is clear evidence to suggest that people joined the group for the material benefits offered to them, but whether or not those benefits kept them in the movement remains a mystery. Perhaps Marwa was able to lure them in with the material benefits, and then indoctrinate them into his theological beliefs over time. Perhaps followers felt a sense of social identity even if they did not believe in the doctrines. Again, it is impossible to know without further research, but it does suggest that the issue of leadership should be explored on an equal level with the idea of followership. Both variables would provide further evidence on how agency can interact with structures to form a radical movement.

The final conclusion that can be inferred from this chapter is that exclusion drove the Maitatsine to violence only when the group became the specific target of a government action. The ultimatum issued by Governor Rimi suggested that the Maitatsine would basically be removed from the social scene altogether in Kano. This type of direct threat to a group's existence might be seen as a tipping event that turns a radical Islamist movement to violence. Up until this point in the thesis, radical Islamist group formation has been presented as an event that is assumed to happen quickly. However, the evidence presented in this chapter from the Maitatsine suggests that followers of Islamist movements may not choose violence from the beginning, but instead are made radical by the exclusionary actions of others at the local level.

Overall, the evidence the Maitatsine case suggests that the formation of a radical Islamist movement is a process and not an instantaneous event. First, the history of Nigeria shows that the Fulani Jihad of 1804-1808 provided a basis for politicized oppositional Islam in the North. Once the government banned political parties in 1966,

patronage networks ran almost exclusively through the Sufi brotherhoods in Kano. These brotherhoods gained more influence once exogenous factors brought increased urbanization to the city. The sudden influx of new migrants directly led to a level of economic deprivation that could not be handled by the state. Therefore, those migrants who wanted housing and employment had to use the existing informal networks among the Sufi brotherhoods, which had the capacity to provide social goods. As a result, an excluded group of non-Sufi Muslims continued to suffer from economic deprivation. At this point, human agency, in the form of Marwa, stepped in to exploit these conditions. He personally appealed to the disenfranchised created from those immigrants excluded by the Sufi brotherhoods, which directly led to the formation of the Maitatsine. The disintegration of the group following Marwa's death illustrates that his personal leadership was a critical factor in formation. Finally, it is clear that the Maitatsine turned to violence as a direct result of government efforts to repress the group. Therefore Islamic opposition foundations, lack of political participation, exogenous push/pull factors, economic deprivation, a pool of potential recruits created by exclusion, personal leadership, and government repression are all factors that contributed to the formation of a radical Islamist group in Nigeria. Further research is required to assess the generalizability of these case-specific conclusions. If they hold up to analysis in other Sub-Saharan African countries, we will have significantly advanced our understanding the conditions under which radical Islamic groups form in this region. As a first step in this direction, chapter three considers the case of Tanzania, which has not experienced radical Islamic group formation, despite its many similarities to Nigeria.

III. ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION IN TANZANIA

Chapter II focused on conditions in the city of Kano, Nigeria to determine causes for radical Islamist movement formation there. The following case study of Zanzibar City, provides an initial test of the generalizability of the findings of the previous chapter. Specifically, it shows that in the absence of a history of politicized oppositional Islam, and with multiple informal patronage networks embedded within the city rather than resting exclusively with Islamic brotherhoods, radical Islamist groups did not form in response to exogenous economic shocks that occurred in 2003. The result of the analysis will be able to provide fruitful avenues for future research and implications for U.S. policy that will be addressed in Chapter IV.

There are three primary reasons for comparing Zanzibar City to Kano. First, they are both predominately Muslim areas in religiously diverse countries. Second, the estimated population of Zanzibar City is similar to that of Kano municipal area (roughly 200,000), making the level of analysis generally the same.⁷¹ Finally, just as exogenous shocks led to increased urbanization in Kano during the 1970s, similar events in 2003 have contributed to an already increased urbanization rate in Zanzibar City making the two cities valid comparisons to identify variables for further research.⁷²

Similar to Nigeria, much of the tension that exists in Zanzibar today can be traced back to its colonial history rooted from interactions in the 19th Century.⁷³ The British government itself became interested in Zanzibar in the late 18th Century as an ally to help protect maritime shipping interests between Britain and India. With the location of

⁷¹ The 2002 census listed the Zanzibar City population at 205,870 while the Kano Municipal Area is listed at 255,683 in 1999. Ministry of Health, *Kano State 1999*. Available [Online]: <http://www.kanoOnline.com/population.html> [8 June 2005].

⁷² Urbanization in Zanzibar City had been estimated by the U.N. to increase at 1.92% per annum for 2000-2005 and 2.37% per annum for 2005-2010 based on census data. However the Zanzibari government reported an overall growth rate of 4.5% for the area. Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unup>, Tanzania Central Census Committee, *2002 Population and Housing Census*, Available [Online]: <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/census/census/index.html> [8 Jun 2005].

⁷³ Since Zanzibar was its own state until Tanzania formed in 1964, the colonial history in this chapter will be limited to the Zanzibari inheritance while post-independence relationships will use Tanzania as the national level entity.

Zanzibar on the eastern coast of Africa, directly in the route of shipping lanes from India, securing influence over Zanzibar and protecting access to these lanes from pirates was a priority for the British. Arab traders, who were already established on Zanzibar from as early as 780 A.D., were masters of navigation in the Indian Ocean. They frequently brought back sought-after goods to the Middle East such as ivory, gold, amber, tortoise shells, cowry shells, rhino horns, gum, skins, wood, and slaves and knew the currents well.⁷⁴ Therefore, the British co-opted the traders, who were predominately Omani by the 18th Century, to help combat the piracy threat. The two parties signed agreements in 1798 and 1800 in an effort to protect British commercial interests, which became the foundation of British-Zanzibari relations.⁷⁵ However, the British would have their greatest impact in Zanzibar in the 19th Century in the waning days of the Omani Sultanate.

In 1828, Seyyid Said, who was the ruler of the Busaidi dynasty from Oman, decided he wanted to move the capital of his Sultanate to Zanzibar. He set up a government on Unguja Island, centered in “Stone Town.”⁷⁶ The arrival of the Omanis permanently changed the social demographics and power relations in Zanzibar, primarily through expropriation of land and the slave trade. When the Omani Sultanate arrived in Zanzibar, the Wahadimu were the majority group on Unguja.⁷⁷ In a forced negotiation

⁷⁴ C.S. Nichols, *The Swahili Coast: Politics, Diplomacy, and Trade on the East African Littoral 1798-1856* (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971).

⁷⁵ Norman R. Bennett, *A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar* (London: Methuen & Co., 1978), 16.

⁷⁶ Zanzibar itself is comprised of two major islands, Unguja and Pemba. There are several smaller islands within close proximity to both Unguja and Pemba that are also considered to be part of Zanzibar, but the major events of history have always occurred on the main two islands. As a matter of clarification, Unguja is also known as Zanzibar Island, and therefore it is sometimes used synonymously with the name Zanzibar. Of course, such a generality is technically incorrect, so Unguja will be used throughout the chapter to avoid confusion. The term Zanzibar will only be used when referring to both islands. Additionally, Stone Town is just one section of what is considered Zanzibar City today, so those two terms are not used synonymously.

⁷⁷ Zanzibar society is relatively heterogeneous. Africans, Arabs, and Indians are the three major ethnic groups, with Africans making up over 70% of the population. Africans are divided further into three major groups: Shirazis, ex-slaves, and mainland Africans who have immigrated to the islands. Shirazis consider themselves to be the descendents of the original settlers of Zanzibar, who were thought to be Persian. In reality, the Shirazis are of mixed Bantu and Arab blood. The Shirazi's, who are of mixed Africa and Arab blood and believe themselves to be descendants of the original Persian settlers of Zanzibar, ⁷⁷ make up the majority of the African population on Zanzibar, and further divide themselves into three different groups: Wahadimu, Wapemba, and Watumbatu. The Watumbatu come from Tumbatu Island off the northwest coast of Unguja, but they have also immigrated over the years to the northern and southern tips of Unguja and Pemba respectively.

with the head leader, the *Mwinyi Mkuu*, the Sultan essentially took over all external economic affairs and demanded a supply of labor and a head tax from the Wahadimu. In return, the Wahadimu were allowed to maintain their preexisting form of political governance.⁷⁸ During the 1880s the Arab aristocracy moved into rural landowning for clove production, migrating into land previously owned by the Wahadimu. In the resultant division of labor, the Arabs owned the plantations and the Wahadimu became servants, usually in the household or through share-cropping on the Arab land, due to a labor agreement made previously between the Sultan and the *Mwinyi Mkuu*.⁷⁹ As a result, a ruler-subject relationship developed between the Arabs and the Wahadimu, with class and ethnic cleavages reinforcing each other.

The Arabs created an additional ruler-subject mentality on the island by importing the slaves, which would have future repercussions. Besides establishing a ruler-subject relationship with the Wahadimu, the Arabs also imported slaves from the African mainland to help work their newly found clove farms in the 19th Century. Zanzibar had previously been a primary exporter of slaves for Indian Ocean consumers through 1822. The Moresby Treaty, which severely limited trading throughout East Africa, combined with the cessation of the West Africa slave trade, cut profits the Omani slave export trade in half forcing them to look for a new market.⁸⁰ The Omani Sultanate decided that slaves would be imported to Zanzibar itself to help work their newly acquired clove plantations. This introduction of mainland Africans as slaves, who were predominately animist, not only created a second ruler-subject mentality between Arabs and mainland Africans, it also reinforced the identity of the Wahadimu as indigenous Muslims creating a cleavage between the two groups of Africans as they worked side by side for the Arabs.

As British imperialism increased throughout the mid-nineteenth century in Zanzibar, Arab power and influence began to wane. The primary example of this downturn came when the British forced the Sultan to abolish the Omani slave trade in Zanzibar in 1873. The Sultan had the choice of either signing a treaty ending all slavery,

⁷⁸ Michael F. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 41.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁸⁰ Abdul Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices, & Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873*, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1987), 41-60.

or facing a British naval blockade of Zanzibar. Given that a hurricane the year prior had destroyed much of the clove crop on Unguja, and all but one ship in the Sultan's Navy, he had little choice but to accept the British ultimatum.⁸¹ Zanzibar became a British Protectorate in 1891 following the European Scramble for Africa, and slavery was no longer legal on Zanzibar at all by 1897. The newly emancipated slaves now had new choices at hand. The policy implemented by the British forced the freed Africans to find wage-earning jobs, continue working for their former masters, or go into subsistence farming. Many of the ex-slaves decided to continue to work under contract for their ex-masters while the Wahadimu continued their subsistence farming and worked the clove plantations only at harvest.⁸² Interestingly, the British abolition of slavery led to a decrease in labor for the clove plantations, which forced them to bring in more workers from the mainland to maintain the colonial economy, which was based on cloves. As such, the new immigrants, found themselves either working for large landowners (who were predominately Arab or Asian) or for merchants within the urban areas, where South Asians dominated the export sector.⁸³ Thus the onset of imperialism also exacerbated a preexisting class cleavage among Asians and Africans that continues until this day.

The British administration of Zanzibar through the Omani Sultanate continued to maintain the ethnic divide. The British progressed from a system of indirect rule over Zanzibar in the late 19th Century to a more direct influence in local affairs, such as deciding who would be the next Sultan at the turn of the 20th Century.⁸⁴ After World War I, the British moved toward a new policy of promoting increased state capacity within Zanzibar. Toward this end, they decided to empower a greater bureaucracy to help administer budgets, education, health, and other social services.⁸⁵ Perhaps the greatest legacy of this policy is that the administrators of this expanded government were not Africans, but Arabs. The British had always believed Zanzibar to be an Arab

⁸¹ Abdul Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices, & Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873*, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1987), 234-238.

⁸² Jacques Depelchin, "The Transition from Slavery 1873-1914," in *Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule*, ed. Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1991), 24-28.

⁸³ Bennett, 236. The Indians were members of the first chamber of commerce established in 1892, and held middle-level government jobs given their previous experiences with the British rule in India.

⁸⁴ Lofchie, 57.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 61-63.

possession, so they made no effort toward empowering Africans to take an active role in the government or to receive higher education.⁸⁶ This policy ensured that the minority would receive the benefits of education and jobs over the African majority. Furthermore, the British programs led to greater inequality between Arabs and Africans that exacerbated the preexisting divisions among ethnic and class lines, ultimately leading to revolution in 1964.

In January 1964, a mainland African, “Field Marshall” John Okello from Uganda, launched a revolution with the support of a few hundred civilians to wrest power from the Arabs. Okello drew his support primarily from other mainland Africans. He started his efforts toward a revolution with 330 recruits, and only 30 of those men hailed from Zanzibar itself.⁸⁷ Of course, many of Okello’s men had no formal training, so he also attempted to bring members of the Zanzibari police force on his side. He specifically targeted the mainland African members because he believed that many indigenous Zanzibaris were interrelated with the Arabs and could not be trusted.⁸⁸

Some accounts of the revolution give more credit for starting the revolution to the members of the Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League (ASPYL), than to Okello.⁸⁹ According to these historians, the ASPYL members decided to launch a revolution after becoming disenfranchised with the older generation of leadership within the party for not taking action after losing elections in 1963. Regardless of which version of history one accepts, the salient point is that the ASPYL did consist of primarily of mainland Africans, and there is no dispute that Okello himself led the disenfranchised members of this

⁸⁶ . Lofchie, 57.

⁸⁷ John Okello, *Revolution in Zanzibar* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), 115.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 119 and Don Petterson, *Revolution in Zanzibar: An American’s Cold War Tale* (Boulder: Westview, 2002), 42. A more persuasive argument however, is that he knew he could count on the support of the mainlanders because of a bizarre move by the newly independent Zanzibar government. Since the first Zanzibari government formed itself out of a coalition of Arab and Shirazi supporters, they did not trust a police force with non-Zanzibaris in the mix (who had previously been added by the British). Therefore, the government decided to arbitrarily dismiss inspectors and non-commissioned officers who came from the mainland. To add injury to insult, the government also refused to pay the unemployed policemen any funds to travel back to the mainland. These out-of-work policemen provided Okello the experience he needed to carry out the revolution.

⁸⁹ See Thomas Burgess, “Remembering Youth: Generation in Revolutionary Zanzibar,” *Africa Today* 46, no. 2 (1999): 29-50. Although most of Burgess’s evidence comes from Afro-Shirazi Youth League records themselves, there seems to be no dispute over the fact that Okello led members of this group in the revolution. Also see A.M. Babu, “The 1964 Revolution: Lumpen or Vanguard?” in *Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule*, ed. Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1991), 249-261.

organization into revolution.⁹⁰ Although Okello's own account of the events are chalked full of self-aggrandizement, the use of mainlanders to carry out the revolution, regardless of who deserves the most credit, once again illustrates the division that existed between the Shirazi and other Africans on Zanzibar.

The violence associated with the 1964 revolution primarily took place on Unguja, since that is where the Arab domination had the greatest effect on the Wahadimu and mainland Africans. Once Okello's forces succeeded in taking the island, several African leaders formed the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, which was led by Abeid Karume, himself a mainland African from Nyasaland (Malawi). In an effort to maintain his lock on power, Karume successfully exiled Okello, and subsequently met with Tanganyika President Julius Nyerere and agreed to form a union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika, thereby creating the modern country of Tanzania.⁹¹ From the start of this union, the Zanzibari government structures, including the presidency, were maintained by and subordinated to the national government of Tanzania. The Zanzibari government continues to make many fiscal and legal decisions for the islands, but it can be overruled by the national government.

Religious tension exists throughout Tanzania. In Tanzania as a whole, religious affiliations are evenly divided among Christianity, Islam and local Animist beliefs, while Zanzibar is 99% Muslim.⁹² Muslim-Christian tension occurs on the Tanzanian mainland, with religious tension on Zanzibar being almost exclusively intra-Muslim. A better understanding of the religious divides throughout Tanzania can be gained by exploring the advent of Islam into the region, and how it has competed with Christianity, Animism, and the dividing sects within itself. Additionally, a history of the advent of Islam can illustrate what role the religion has played in fomenting opposition movements that can be compared against the Nigerian movements later on in the chapter.

⁹⁰ See A.M. Babu, "The 1964 Revolution: Lumpen or Vanguard?" in *Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule*, ed. Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1991), 249-261.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 206-209. Petterson's account believes that the union happened primarily due to Karume's fear that there might be a pro-Communist takeover from a former ASP rival, Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu.

⁹² The CIA World Factbook lists the religious breakdown in Tanzania as 30% Christian, 35% Muslim, and 35% Animist.

A. THE ADVENT OF ISLAM IN TANZANIA

The earliest recorded history of Islam in Tanzania comes from the Muslim geographer Al-Masudi. In the tenth century, he wrote that the rulers of the island of Qanbalu (Zanzibar) were Muslims who had arrived as early as 750 A.D.⁹³ Archaeological evidence of the existence of a mosque dated 1107-1108 A.D. on Zanzibar corroborates the presence of Islam on the island.⁹⁴ The establishment of the mosque indicates that by the 12 Century AD, there was already a sufficient Muslim population in Zanzibar to finance the mosque's construction. Historical evidence suggests that between the ninth and twelfth centuries, merchants from the Persian Gulf were active in the area between the city of Siraf (in modern day Iran) and Zanzibar.⁹⁵ Omani merchants were the primary carriers of trade between East Africa and Siraf.⁹⁶ Although Omani interests were purely mercantilist in nature, as they sought Africans to meet the demand for slave labor in the Persian Gulf, they also brought Islam to the African coast.⁹⁷ Thus it seems likely that Islam was introduced to coastal Tanzania and Zanzibar during the same time period.

Followers of Islam in Tanzania today generally fall into one of three categories: Sunni, Ismaili Shi'ite (also know as Sevener Shi'ite), or Sufi. Although Islam found its roots in traders in Tanzania, the solidification of the religion as a whole did not take place until the Omani Sultanate brought it to the islands as part and parcel of the state. Since most Zanzibaris already practiced the religion to some extent, there was no resistance to having it become the official religion of the state. As the Omani Sultanate was not concerned with spreading Islam as much as its own wealth, it made no concerted effort in the 19th Century to convert the mainland Africans or establish a foothold in the inner portions of modern-day Tanzania. Aside from the focus on material wealth, another

⁹³ Neville Chittick, "Kilwa and the Arab Settlement of the East African Coast," *Journal of African History* 4, no. 2 (1963): 180.

⁹⁴ Randall L. Pouwels, "The Medieval Foundations of East African Islam," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 11, no. 2 (1978): 211.

⁹⁵ Thomas M. Ricks, "Persian Gulf Seafaring and East Africa: Ninth-Twelfth Centuries," *African Historical Studies* 3, no. 2 (1970): 349.

⁹⁶ J.C. Wilkenson, "Oman and East Africa: New Light on Early Kilwan History from the Omani Sources," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 15, no. 2 (1981): 281.

⁹⁷ Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices, & Ivory in Zanzibar*, 13.

reason for this lack of push is that the Arabs who led the Omani Sultanate on Zanzibar followed the Ibadi sect of Islam. This sect, which is neither Sunni nor Shi'a, believes that its followers are the only true Muslims.⁹⁸ The distinction is significant because the Ibadi sect believes that tolerance of other Muslims is acceptable, and they do need not to be converted.

While the Omanis in Zanzibar practiced Ibadi Islam, the Africans generally continued to be influenced by the Shafi'ite school of Sunni Islam. Consistent with the tolerance of Ibadi Islam, the Sultanate allowed Africans to use mosques built by the Ibadis to practice their Sunni beliefs, and made no effort to eradicate the animist traditions that were often integrated into the practice of Islam by local Africans.⁹⁹ As a result, opposition to the expropriation of land from the Wahadimu, and the enslavement of mainland Africans remained complete outside the religious realm. In other words, the politically salient divide in Zanzibar was not religious and economic, as it was in Kano, but ethnic and economic.

Many of the followers of the Ibadi sect were driven out during the 1964 revolution since they were generally Omanis tied to the Sultanate and the post-independence government. Thus, the political power that had been associated with the Ibadis passed from an Islamic sect to a secular government. Thus the three major branches of Islam were all that remained on Zanzibar. Exact figures of how many Muslims belong to each group are unknown, but the Sunni presence, particularly of the Shafi'i school of legal jurisprudence, tends to be followed by Arab and African alike. The Shafi'i Sunnis is generally considered the majority group of the three branches of Islam on Zanzibar. Although they are the majority, they do not have exclusive control over political or economic power among the Muslims in Zanzibar. The Ismailis (who follow the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader) do have such power however. The Ismailis tend to be from South Asian descent, making them a minority of the population. However, intermarriage with Africans in the last two decades has brought some diversification to ethnicity within

⁹⁸ M.N. Pearson, "The Indian Ocean and the Red Sea," in *The History of Islam in Africa*, Ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 49-50.

⁹⁹ Randall L. Pouwels, "The East African Coast, c. 790 to 1900 C.E." in *The History of Islam in Africa*, Ed. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 263.

their ranks.¹⁰⁰ Despite this limited representation among the population, the Asian Ismailis have the most control over the formal economy of Zanzibar. Most are merchants and the money-lenders who became established on the island during the time of the Sultanate.¹⁰¹ Of the numerous Sufi orders in Tanzania, the most popular are the Qadiriyya and the Shahadiliyya, an order which originated in the Comoros.¹⁰² As late importations to the Swahili culture, the Sufi brotherhoods only influenced a small proportion of society with no noticeable gains in political or economic power.¹⁰³ As such, the power of Islam resides predominately in the economic realm, but almost exclusively with the Ismaili sect given their dominance over the formal economy of Zanzibar.

The historical inheritance of Islam in Tanzania and its influence on the mobilization of radical groups is quite different from that observed in Nigeria. First, there is no historical basis for political opposition or forced conversion in Tanzania as compared to the Fulani Jihad. While the colonial influence helped exacerbate preexisting ethnic and religious divisions within Tanzania, the religious divide occurs at the national level, while the local level still experiences intra-Muslim rivalry. In contrast to Nigeria, it is not the Sufi brotherhoods who are the empowered Muslim group in Tanzania, but the Shi'ite Ismailis with their control over the formal economy despite their minority status among Muslims in the country. Thus, the foundation for radical Islamist movements in Tanzania has no historical precedent, but clearly there is an intra-Muslim rivalry that exists in the country. A closer examination at this rivalry at the local level is needed to help explain why no radical groups have formed to date.

¹⁰⁰ Akbar Keshodkar, "The Politics of Localization: Controlling Movement in the Field," *Anthropology Matters Journal* 6, no. 2 (2004): 4. Available [Online]: <http://www.anthropologymatters.com/journal/2004-2/index.html> [10 June 2005].

¹⁰¹ Zinnat Bader, "The Contradictions of Merchant Capital: 1840-1939," in *Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule*, ed. Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1991), 164-165.

¹⁰² Pouwells, "The East African Coast", 227-250.

¹⁰³ J. Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 97-98.

B. OPPORTUNITY FOR MOBILIZATION

This section will analyze the effects of an exogenous economic shock on Zanzibar City and how various communities responded to the problem. Examining how this crisis is dealt with in Zanzibar will provide an initial base of comparison against the Maitatsine movement in Kano, and further our understanding of why a radical group formed in Nigeria, but not in Tanzania. After a review of the economic shock of 2003 and its effects in Zanzibar City, I will consider whether the independent variables identified in the previous chapter can account for the absence of significant Islamic mobilization in this case. These factors once again are: a history of Islamist opposition, an exogenous economic shock, a pool of potential recruits created by political and economic exclusion, personal leadership, and government repression. We have already established that the first condition did not exist in Zanzibar. I have intentionally selected a time of economic crisis in Zanzibar in order to facilitate an analysis of the impact of the remaining endogenous variables -- political and economic exclusion, leadership, and repression -- on the likelihood of radical Islamist mobilization in response to economic crisis. Before looking in depth at the crisis however, it is necessary to present a background on the political and economic structures of Zanzibar City prior to the exogenous shocks as a basis for understanding the impact.

First, the regime type in Zanzibar City in 2003 was completely different than in Kano in the 1970s. Multiparty elections were outlawed in Tanzania (to include local Zanzibari elections) until 1995. Today, Zanzibar City is dominated by a two-party democracy, where the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the former single-party allowed in Tanzania, always comes out the winner during elections. Within the context of Zanzibar City itself, previous elections have led to allegations of stolen ballots along with irregular practices by the government-controlled Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC). The ZEC decided to rerun 16 of the 50 seats in the Zanzibar House of Representatives during the 2000 elections, all 16 of which came from within Zanzibar City itself. The run-offs resulted in a unanimous CCM victory within the city.¹⁰⁴ The Civic United Front (CUF),

¹⁰⁴ "Ruling Party Wins in Zanzibar," *BBC News Online*, 7 November 2000. Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1008511.stm> [8 November 2003]. The Organization of African Unity was among the organizations who denounced the elections as unfair.

which is the main opposition party, has become increasingly frustrated by this apparent cheating by the CCM, as it is continually denied access to political power. However, given that the CUF still has the freedom to assemble and bring a political voice to the people, there is no political exclusion as far as party participation is concerned. Upon further examination of the sources of relief within the city, it will be made evident that the parties certainly played a part in absorbing the exogenous shock, but that they were not the only source of social relief.

Placement within the socioeconomic economic stratification within Zanzibar City, prior to the 2003 shock, depended largely on one's ethnic background. The majority of the formal economy within Zanzibar City is dominated by two industries: merchant trade and tourism. The former sector, which is the most heavily dominated in the city, is almost exclusively controlled by the Ismaili South Asians. They are not only the merchant owners, but they are generally the money-lenders to other communities within the city as well. However, the Ismailis tend to take care of their own sect when it comes to social benefits first. Ismailis will routinely find housing for new arrivals to the island who are members of the sect. However, one must remember that the Ismaili sect is dominated by South Asians, who make up less than 5% of the population on Zanzibar, therefore such relief can be argued to be based on ethnicity in addition to religion. Regardless, since most Africans follow the Sunni traditions of Islam, they are effectively excluded from this formal employment network in spite of their non-Asian background. Of course, it is still possible to be informally employed by these merchants, but that will be covered in more detail later in this section.

The other dominant formal economic sector of the city is the tourist industry. This growing industry, which is predominately owned by foreign investors, tends to hire mainland Africans who are migrant laborers at the expense of the local Zanzibaris.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, the local Zanzibaris must turn to the informal sector to make money in order to survive. Unemployment in Zanzibar runs between 36-40%, and its impact is felt

¹⁰⁵ Birgit La Cour Madsen, "Islands of Development: What Do Poor Women in Zanzibar Get Out of Tourism Liberalisation?" *Report for Action Aid* (27 September 2003): 4. Available [Online]: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/540/press_release.html [12 Jun 2005]. Daniel Dickinson, "Tourism 'Bypasses' Zanzibar's Locals," *BBC News Online*, 17 February 2004. Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3493533.stm> [7 June 2005].

primarily among youths who make up over 50% of the population.¹⁰⁶ This figure in turn means that a significant number of citizens in Zanzibar City must somehow find work in the informal sector, and it is this excluded group of individuals who were most likely at risk for joining a radical Islamist movement following the exogenous economic shock of 2003.

Zanzibar experienced its most severe economic shock in 2003, when its two most important economic sectors, cloves and tourism, experienced simultaneous and dramatic losses. This shock only served to increase the number of unemployed looking for relief, and thereby added to the pool of potential recruits for a radical Islamist movement. A slump in the clove market led to a 60% drop in revenue, and a travel warning for Zanzibar produced a 30% drop in tourism in 2003. These hits directly led to the immediate loss of \$90 million and 1,000 jobs.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, while some new immigrants may have come from subsistence farms prior to moving to the city, they were now required to pay for their meals. Given the lack of employment associated with the 2003 shocks, combined with a 9% increase in food prices in 2003 (as compared to a 1.4% increase in other goods), new immigrants needed to find jobs or networks to help provide them with this basic survival necessity since they would have lacked consistent income to pay for the food.¹⁰⁸ In an effort to absorb the shocks, the unemployed youths had two primary sources of relief available to them: political party youth wings and the mosques.

The relief given to youths by the CCM and the CUF are virtually the same. Both parties organized youth wings that included paramilitary training, primarily in the form of unarmed combat.¹⁰⁹ This practice stems from a historical precedent of the ruling party

¹⁰⁶ Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, *Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan: Six Months Progress Report January – June 2004*, 15. Available [Online]: <http://www.zprp.org/0reports.htm> [7 June 2005].

¹⁰⁷ “Zanzibar Hit as Tourists Stay Away,” *BBC News Online*, 2 May 2003. Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2995965.stm> [3 Jun 2005]. While the clove market drop can be directly attributed to the decreased imports from Indonesia (which has turned to its domestic clove market instead), the tourist drop occurred as a direct result of U.S. travel warnings to the area. See Ibid, and “U.S. Issues Zanzibar Terror Warning,” *BBC News Online*, 11 January 2003. Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2648017.stm> [3 Jun 2005].

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰⁹ Judica Tarimo, “Govt Bans CUF ‘Military’ Training,” *The Guardian*, 2 April 2004. Available [Online]: www.ippmedia.com [8 Jun 2005]. The CUF uses the White and Blue Guards, while the CCM uses the Revolutionary Youth Wing. Note that all political parties were banned from having youth wings in 2004 due to alleged inter-party violence being carried out by youths.

using previous youth wings and the Young Pioneers (similar to the Boy Scouts of America) to help further party goals in exchange for government jobs in the future.¹¹⁰ While the members of today's youth wings were meant to be trained in techniques for providing security to party members, it has been alleged that the true intention of these wings is to train youths to disrupt elections.¹¹¹ While no alleged violence took place during 2003, both parties have blamed the other for pre-election violence in 2005 with the bombing of a CCM office and the burning of a CUF leader's home.¹¹² As such, turning to either party in 2003 was not done out of a need to express violence at the time (given that it was not an election year), but out of the need to receive some relief from the economic situation at hand.

A political network was not the only place relief for the urban youth to find in Zanzibar City. The more than 50 mosques within the city provided an excellent alternative to Muslims where they could find education, a meal, shelter, and potential job placement.¹¹³ At the same time however, the influx of new youths into the mosques gave potential radical leaders a captive audience from which they might lure in a willing pool of recruits through sermons aimed at generating hate and violence. Within Zanzibar, it is normal to have itinerant preachers (*tabligh*) travel from mosque to mosque preaching various sermons. Of particular concern in the current decade is the increase of radical preachers who follow Wahhabi schools of thought as opposed to the Shafi'ite school. The former preach an intolerant form of Islam that is particularly popular in Saudi Arabia (where it originated) and among radical Islamist movements such as Al-Qaida. After preaching such a message, the *tabligh* are reported to offer the chance for disenfranchised

¹¹⁰ For more details on the history of securing generational support from the youth, see Thomas Burgess, "The Young Pioneers and the Rituals of Citizenship in Revolutionary Zanzibar," *Africa Today* 51, no. 3 (2005): 2-29.

¹¹¹ Tarimo.

¹¹² Cathy Majtenyl, "Police Investigate Explosion in Zanzibar," *VOA News*, 25 April 2005. Available [Online]: <http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-04-25-voa42.cfm> [20 Jun 2005]. Note that 2005 elections are set for 30 October.

¹¹³ Mosques will distribute goods to Muslims in need and are generally the center for Islamic education in Zanzibar as opposed to separate *madrassas*. Additionally, many mosques participate in *daawa* (preaching) which can be linked to *zakat* (alms-giving) in that it involves helping the needy while spreading the message of Islam at the same time.

Muslims to join Al-Qaida while others may decide to become *tabligh* themselves.¹¹⁴ One of the most notorious *tabligh* to be recruited for Al-Qaida out of Zanzibar was Ahmed Ghailani, an alleged mastermind behind the 1998 Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi embassy bombings.¹¹⁵ At least one group has been inspired by such teachings, the Simba wa Mungu (Lions of God).¹¹⁶

The Lions of God are not a well-known group, and they only seem to generate press coverage when there is some sort of violence attributed to their name. The first attributed report of violence to them occurred in November of 2002 when they attacked women with canes who were dressed in tight dresses.¹¹⁷ The perpetrators reportedly came from the Makuti Mosque within Zanzibar City, and police presence increased as a result.¹¹⁸ Given that the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan occurred at the time, it seems plausible that sentiments among the conservative Muslim were running high, and variant of caning is common in other Islamic countries for minor infractions (most notably Saudi Arabia). This attachment of this group to assault women during Ramadan seems consistent. In late October 2003, two Christian women from the Tanzania mainland were attacked by Lions of God members for not adhering to the conservative dress code just after the beginning of the holy month.¹¹⁹ It was reported that most of the members of the Lions of God tend to operate in the Darajani business district.¹²⁰ This district is home to the local informal market where one can find just about any type of second hand clothes, local trinkets, and various foods and fowl. The young businessmen in the market are well-known for their adherence to Islam and its traditions. For example, chickens are

¹¹⁴ Chris Tomlinson, "Radical 'Tabligh' Recruit Fighters," *Washington Times*, 29 April 2004. Available [Online]: <http://washingtontimes.com/world/20040428-092454-8928r.htm> [8 June 2005].

¹¹⁵ He reportedly was recruited from Zanzibar and then received additional Islamic training in Pakistan, all funded by the Saudi government. For more details on Saudi funding of Wahhabi studies in foreign countries, to include \$1 million/year to build new mosques in Tanzania, see Lisa Beyer and David Van Biema, "Inside the Kingdom," *Time* 162, no. 11 (2003): 38

¹¹⁶ For clarification, this group has no connection whatsoever to a group in Iraq that uses a similar name, the Lions of Allah.

¹¹⁷ "Police to Grill Women Beating Muslim Clerics," *The Guardian*, 18 November 2002.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Ally Saleh, "Zanzibar Gang Targets Women," *BBC News Online*, 31 October 2003. Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3231717.stm> [3 Jun 2005]. From the author's personal experience, the dress code on Zanzibar is not a law, but it is an unspoken rule to dress conservatively whether you are a local or a tourist lest you offend somebody.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

killed at the only slaughterhouse in the market through the *halal* method which includes prayers and the draining of blood while facing toward Mecca.¹²¹ Given that the Lions primarily seem concerned with adherence to Islamic standards, it is inappropriate to say they are a radical Islamic group. They are simply conservative Muslims who use limited violence to maintain standards established by their faith. Since this group is cannot be defined as a radical Islamist movement, the question remains as to why the *tabligh* could not take the pool of potential recruits and transform them into a viable radical Islamist group form within Zanzibar City?

The primary reason is that the political and economic conditions did not provide enough justification for *tabligh* to create radical groups from the potential pool of recruits in Zanzibar City because of preexisting networks that could absorb the exogenous shock of 2003. The *tabligh* could not offer anything better for the Muslims of Zanzibar City, except to take out their frustrations and enact change through radical Islam along Wahhabi standards.¹²² It has already been demonstrated that the Zanzibaris do not have the historical inheritance of using Islam to effect violent change. Further complicating the recruitment of radicals is the fact that Zanzibaris were not subject to a tyrannical government that might justify the use of *jihad* to establish change.¹²³ There are no reports of the Zanzibari government conducting any repression against Zanzibari Muslims during 2003. Additionally, given the freedom of political parties to exist, and the freedom to assemble and train youth wings, Zanzibaris already had an alternative option for expressing discontent that does have historical basis. The *tabligh* clearly had no political justification in recruiting followers. Economically, while it certainly true that the Zanzibaris were excluded from the formal sector of employment by the Ismaili merchants and foreign-owned tourism, these same businesses provided informal employment to whoever brought in clients, regardless of ethnicity or religion. Nearly 37,000 are estimated to work in this informal sector while only 5,800 work in the formal

¹²¹ The author was given a personalized tour of the Darajani market and the chicken slaughtering process in September 2003.

¹²² Tomlinson. *Tabligh* encouraged Muslims to become more devout, support Al-Qaida, and join the fight against non-Muslims.

¹²³ *Jihad* is permitted by the Qur'an to overthrow tyrannical governments. See Surah 4:75.

sector.¹²⁴ Thus, economic relief through the informal sector was available for those who were willing to try. Clearly, the Lions of God followers worked within this sector given their association to the Darajani market district. Therefore, Zanzibari Muslims had the means to survive the exogenous shocks through endogenous networks. Thus, despite the appeals of the *tabligh*, the potential pool of recruits simply turned to the informal political and economic networks that existed within the city, thereby achieving the goal of urban survival without resorting to violence.

C. CONCLUSION

Tanzania lacks both the historical inheritance of oppositional Islam, and the degree of economic and political exclusion that were present in Nigeria at the time of the Maitatsine. While it is impossible to determine whether one or the other or both acted as a brake on radical Islamist mobilization in Zanzibar City at the time of the 2003 economic crisis, the analysis does suggest that future research should seek to test the impact of these factors more systematically. The exogenous shocks of 2003 easily generated an additional pool of recruits for potential Islamist mobilization, but the subsequent formation of a radical group did not occur. The best place to find these potential followers would have been in the mosques themselves, as people sought relief through the limited services provided. Thus, the exclusion that felt by the disenfranchised from the formal sector had been mitigated through inclusion in the mosque. While these people were in the mosque, radical *tabligh* preached Wahhabi-inspired sermons, which led the Zanzibari government to deport the fiery preachers. While the Lions of God may have been inspired by the teachings, the fact that they operated only during Ramadan as a religious group and not as a political group bent on overthrowing the government, suggests that the *tabligh* had no success in mobilizing radical followers. The answer as to why the followers did not mobilize is where future researchers can help. The ideas postulated in this thesis, lack of historical inheritance and the degree of political or economic exclusion seems to be the most logical variables to test in future studies. On the latter issues specifically, researchers must ascertain the informal networks that are available to excluded groups to help mitigate political and/or

¹²⁴ La Cour Madsen, 3-4.

economic crises. Such a study would then set the baseline for determining the degree of exclusion that is occurring in the country and how it might relate to radical Islamist group formation. However, until future researchers are able to validate or invalidate these variables, it seems prudent to list the implications that the findings of this thesis has on U.S. policy in Africa. By emphasizing a proactive instead of reactive solution, it is possible that the U.S., in cooperation with its African partners, can eradicate the underlying conditions that lead to radical Islamist movements. The final chapter of this thesis will propose solutions that should help prevent these groups from arising if the findings are correct.

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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Chapters II and III attempted to uncover why radical Islamist movements form by using an inductive approach through comparative case studies of northern Nigeria and Zanzibar. This chapter concludes the thesis by highlighting the findings obtained through the analysis, and applying them to current U.S. counter terrorism policy in sub-Saharan Africa. By utilizing the findings of the case studies, it is hoped a more tailored and effective policy can be applied toward the continent that will truly focus on diminishing underlying conditions of terrorism. Additionally, this thesis hopes to provide a starting point for developing a more systematic approach to understanding the conditions that lead to radical Islamist group formation. The overall goal is to stop radical Islamist groups from arising in sub-Saharan Africa, effectively ending the war on terrorism on that continent before it ever begins.

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The formation of the radical Islamist Maitatsine in Nigeria seems to have been caused by the interaction of several different factors. First, rapid urbanization in the context of drought and economic recession caused the ranks of the marginalized unemployed to swell suddenly. Second, the new Muslim arrivals economic opportunities were further limited by their exclusion from patronage networks controlled by Sufi brotherhoods. Third, channels for expressing discontent arising from social and economic marginalization were severely limited: political parties were banned, and social and economic outlets were controlled by the Sufi brotherhoods. In the absence of other alternatives, the limited relief offered by Marwa's personal movement became attractive. Thus, the Nigerian case suggests that an exogenous economic shock, exacerbated by the economic exclusion of marginalized urban migrants, created a pool of potential recruits for radical Islamist groups, but that the movement actually took shape only in response to the personal appeals of a radical Islamist leader. Zanzibar City underwent a similar exogenous economic shock in 2003 that led to a loss of jobs, increased food prices, and additional rural to urban migrations among the youth. The state had no capacity to

absorb the shocks and depended on local communities to deal with it themselves. It is here that the case studies illustrate the most striking difference. Where the Sufis had near complete control of the patronage system in Kano, it is clear that multiple avenues of political and economic relief existed within Zanzibar City to mitigate the economic crisis faced by many. While it is true that the Ismaili Asians controlled the formal merchant and foreigners owned the formal tourist industry, the native Zanzibaris who were excluded could still find employment through the informal sector. Additionally, inclusion could be found within political party youth wings and throughout mosques within the city where one could obtain training, education and a meal. Therefore, it is clear that the addition of multiple channels of relief within Zanzibar City helped mitigate the economic exclusion suffered by primarily the native Zanzibaris. As such, the cases studies suggest that the level of disenfranchisement in Zanzibar City was not as high as in Kano, thereby decreasing the size of the pool of potential recruits available for exploitation by a radical leader. Additionally, Tanzania lacks the historical inheritance of having Islamist movements enact violent change as compared to Nigeria, making it all that much harder for a radical leader to justify violent reactions in the name of Islam. The Lions of God, while certainly using limited violence against women who did not dress conservatively, is limited to a few youths who are overly zealous during Ramadan, and not a personalized movement bent on radical overthrow of the state. Therefore, it is hypothesized that no radical Islamist movement formed in Zanzibar City during the time of the economic crisis because informal networks were able to absorb the urban youth who suffered from the exogenous shock, thereby denying radical *tabligh* the political or economic justification needed to lure the pool of potential recruits into joining a radical Islamist movement in contrast to the appeals of Marwa to his recruits in Kano who had limited political and economic options.

Based on the analysis of both cases, it can be hypothesized that economic exclusion at the local level provides a pool of potential recruits that might be led to mobilize for violent or nonviolent opposition by a human agent. High levels of economic exclusion were associated with the emergence of the Maitatsine, while lower levels of exclusion in Zanzibar, a result of more complex relief networks, did not provide *tabligh* enough justification to produce a radical Islamist group. Since the exclusion and the

mitigating networks both took place within local, urban areas as opposed to the national level structures, such a finding suggests that scholars need to focus their analysis on conditions at the sub-national level to predict radical group emergence vice the emphasis on the national level that is prevalent in scholarship today.

Of course, since structural conditions alone did not produce a radical movement, it is also necessary to more fully develop the study of human agency and its ability to exploit the disenfranchised. The case of the Maitatsine appears to show that the violence exhibited by that group occurred as a direct result of the orders of Marwa. How is such a leader able to exploit conditions to the point it drives people to violence? It has already been suggested that if a society has the historical precedence of using radical Islam to enact change, then it may be easier to justify participation in such a movement. As such, future scholars may want to examine the relationship between historical inheritance and modern radical Islamist movements to determine if a correlation exists to help further the understanding of group formation. However, the idea of exclusion presented in this thesis provides one possible explanation for how disenfranchised populations become available for exploitation by a leader. Focusing future research in this direction will not only help us understand why radical Islamist groups form, but it will also provide factors that might be mitigated through proper application of U.S. policy in the region concerning the global war on terrorism.

B. CONCLUSION

The initial findings of this research suggest that U.S. counterterrorism policy in Sub-Saharan Africa needs to be refocused and refined. While initiatives to prevent "failed states" target national level political structures, the case studies suggest that local level social and economic structures may be more critical to the emergence of radical Islamist movements. As a result, some of these policy guidelines may have little or no effect on conditions that lead to radical Islamist group formation in Africa. The findings of this thesis suggest that U.S. counter terrorism policy should focus more on economic exclusion at the local level, and the inability of states and or informal networks to mitigate this phenomenon when it occurs. If the variables are truly interactive, an

increase in state capacity at the local level (vice the national level promulgated by state failure researchers), or an increase in the amount of informal networks providing social services will soften the blow of economic exclusion to the point where there is no pool or potential recruits to be exploited. The fact that economic exclusion observed in these cases occurred at the sub-national level, suggests that preventative policies should be targeted to providing better assistance to urban areas of sub-Saharan Africa that are experiencing rapid urbanization that cannot be absorbed by the state. At the same time, improving rural conditions by providing improved drinking water and housing might help mitigate the push factors that contribute to urbanization. It is possible that future studies might determine which cities in Africa are a priority for necessary support, and how the U.S. can directly intervene through USAID or other agencies to help improve sub-national structural conditions without offending the host nation government.

The following policies prescriptions follow from my findings. First, increasing democracy is a goal that *could* help prevent terrorist group formation in sub-Saharan Africa. Though many of the countries in Africa meet the minimalist definition of democracy, patron-client networks remain a critical element in state-society relations, and exclusion from these networks remains a potential source of radicalism. As the Nigeria case illustrated, the inability for new immigrants to obtain adequate work and housing due to their nonassociation with the prominent Sufi brotherhoods established a degree of economic exclusion that provided a pool of recruits for Marwa to exploit and radicalize. Additionally, with no other formalized social organizations to take in these disenfranchised workers (such as labor unions or political parties), a radical organization like the Maitatsine gained more members. Therefore in the effort to increase democracy, as a first step, the U.S. should try to encourage all African states to legalize political parties, give them freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. Many countries in Africa, while having political parties, do not provide them with the same degree of freedom as evidenced in Tanzania. Even though the parties technically exist on paper, true democratic participation is often times limited by the state. Ensuring

political parties exist, while having the additional freedoms of assembly and speech can break the justification of radical Islamists that a *jihad* is necessary to overthrow a tyrannical government.¹²⁵

Increasing state capacity is the second area where the U.S. should promote improvement within Africa, particularly at the local level of administration. Progress in this area would mean ensuring the provision of social goods such as liberty, security, welfare, and justice by the government in power.¹²⁶ The implementation of these political and civil freedoms would help eliminate the exploitable conditions of economic exclusion. Achieving such results at the sub-national level is undoubtedly a more difficult task than the previous goal of increasing democracy. However, it is clear from the case studies that had such goods been available in Nigeria, it seems unlikely a radical group could have formed in the absence of disenfranchised populations. For example, if the government in Kano had the capacity to ensure the welfare of the new immigrants, even at a minimal level, Marwa certainly would not have had as many recruits to bring to his cause. Additionally, if there was justice concerning equal opportunity hiring practices, it might have been easier for a non-Sufi to get a job, preventing economic exclusion based on religion. The same can be said of formal hiring practices in Zanzibar City, which are dominated by ethnicity. However enough relief existed through informal networks in Zanzibar City to absorb the economic shocks, when the government had no capacity to do so.

Since the primary cause of a pool of recruits being generated for exploitation by radical Islamists is hypothesized to a result of economic exclusion, U.S. policy should focus on mitigating this factor first. However, the idea of a free and fair democracy should not be neglected, as it is possible that political disenfranchisement might also lead to an available pool of radical Islamist recruits. Therefore, a new policy should try to meet the following recommendations in priority order:

¹²⁵ Freedom House, *Annual Survey of Freedom Country Scores 2005*. Available [Online]: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm> [20 June 2005].

¹²⁶ J. Ronald Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods," *World Politics* 18, no. 3 (1966): 421-426.

- Promote economic growth within Africa
 - Cancel all outstanding debts to give African countries a fresh start
 - Work with African governments to provide adequate tax incentives to lure foreign investors
 - Provide U.S. tax incentives for citizens who invest in Africa-based companies
 - Provide U.S. tax incentives for U.S. companies who provide capital improvements to African countries (such as building schools, computer centers, roadways, etc.)
- Increase state capacity to deal with exogenous shocks. Specifically work toward the following goals:
 - Increase sanitation, water, and housing within urban growth areas to provide quality of life.
 - Increase sanitation, water, housing, and educational opportunities within rural areas to mitigate the push/pull factors that lead to rural to urban migration
 - Support the formation of social organizations within urban areas to help soften the blow of new immigrants to urban areas
- Increase democracy, good governance, and rule of law. Specifically work toward the following goals:
 - Increase civil liberties in African countries by pressuring governments to privatize radio and print media through the linking of foreign aid
 - Increase political freedoms in African countries by pressuring governments to legalize multiple political parties and guarantee freedom of assembly
 - Provide monitors for all national elections, as well as local elections once a year to determine if free and fair elections are indeed being carried out
 - Continue to encourage decentralization of governments of Africa to the local level, but have them link national funding to good governance at the level, similar to the linking of foreign aid by the U.S. government to the national level government.

The goals presented above are achievable within a decade if proper emphasis is given to their implementation. Ideally, these goals would target the conditions that allow for economic exclusion to occur within urban areas, which are the breeding ground for

future terrorists. The United States must confront terrorism in Africa directly, by addressing the issues that appear to have led to the formation of extremist groups in the past. Vague policy goals addressing several issues that are unrelated to formation will only serve to divide funding to an area of the world that is already near the bottom of the U.S. priority list. Given the limited number of resources available, it is critical to ensure the recommended policies are directed toward the countries that have the potential to become the true terrorist breeding grounds of the future. By taking a proactive policy toward eliminating economic exclusion at the sub-national level, the number of disenfranchised people should decrease, thereby denying a potential radical leader the resources he or she needs to build a radical Islamist group. Therefore, it is imperative that scholars take the limited research presented here and expand upon it through further testing of the framework within an African context as well as expand upon the ways U.S. policy might be effective at the sub-national level. As research increases and more effective policies are identified, it may truly be possible to win the war on terrorism in Africa by ensuring it never begins.

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