HOW TO PREPARE THE NATIONAL GUARD’S LEADERSHIP FOR SUCCESSFUL VENTURE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

by

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The National Guard (NG) will be the first military force on disaster scenes in the United States. If the NG is to respond as efficiently as possible, the NG leadership must be educated on preparation for and response to disasters. Research questions used were: how to overcome the gap in disaster-response knowledge, and what are the topics on which the Department of Defense (DoD) should specifically educate the NG leadership? What has caused this education gap and how can the NG leadership overcome it? Survey and interview responses revealed that gaps exist in what the NG knows about the state response process and knowledge of what the civilians expect from the military. A review of the existing education opportunities available to the NG showed that none covered the state process. Using the military decision-making process, courses of action were developed to correct this education shortfall. Recommendations included the development of a one-week course to address the state response process, DoD acknowledgment of the civil support mission, and the assigned and funded ability of the NG to educate and train on the civil support missions.
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ABSTRACT

The National Guard (NG) will be the first military force on disaster scenes in the United States. If the NG is to respond as efficiently as possible, the NG leadership must be educated on preparation for and response to disasters. Research questions used were: how to overcome the gap in disaster-response knowledge, and what are the topics on which the Department of Defense (DoD) should specifically educate the NG leadership? What has caused this education gap and how can the NG leadership overcome it? Survey and interview responses revealed that gaps exist in what the NG knows about the state response process and knowledge of what the civilians expect from the military. A review of the existing education opportunities available to the NG showed that none covered the state process. Using the military decision-making process, courses of action were developed to correct this education shortfall. Recommendations included the development of a one-week course to address the state response process, DoD acknowledgment of the civil support mission, and the assigned and funded ability of the NG to educate and train on the civil support missions.
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I. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

A. INTRODUCTION

Disaster response is an increasingly important mission for the National Guard (NG). This importance is evident when reviewing the NG involvement in the aftermath of 9/11, assisting in the recovery activities following Hurricanes Katrina, Gustav, Ike, and fighting of the California fires. The NG has taken a role in providing security and assistance in the mitigation of potential disasters, as well as assisting in the recovery from disasters, whether from natural causes or from the nation’s enemies.

This recent experience in disaster response from the state to the national arena has exposed a problem that has hindered the effectiveness of NG responses and will continue to do so if left uncorrected. A gap exists between what NG leadership should know and what it does know about response to disaster. This is due to the new emerging role in homeland security, civil support, and the continual focus on the war-fighter mission; just to name a few causes for the gap. In spite of the fact that this lack of education, specifically for homeland security and civil support mission, has always been an issue for the NG, the missions prior to 9/11 were smaller in scope and required simpler, less complicated responses than what is now becoming the norm. With the NG’s increasing involvement in responding to disasters on a national level, its operations have become more complex in size and scope. The requirements for more and tighter synchronization have magnified this shortfall in education to the point where it is now a significant issue. Because disaster responses are becoming bigger and more costly, the NG leadership must know the response process for both state and federal levels through which the military is called to assist the civilian authorities for a smooth response operation. No longer can the military, NG included, have personnel learn “on-the-job” about how to respond or rely on having just a few personnel know the response process. All of the NG leadership must be educated on civilian operations in disaster response, if the NG’s supporting role is to be
better coordinated and effective in working with the civilian responders. In order for the NG to succeed in homeland security missions, the leadership should be trained and educated\(^1\) in homeland security and civil support.

**B. THE PROBLEM**

Currently, both the state and federal levels of government have processes and procedures in place for civil authority disaster response. If the NG is to provide timely and effective support and/or response, it must understand how it will fit in, how its response efforts are being planned, and last, how its mission will be carried out in order to stay free of financial or legal difficulties while still providing effective response to disasters. Learning the process in the midst of responding to a disaster can result in a slow and confused response that could painfully compound the disaster. The NG leadership must understand the variations in the methods of response and assistance across the response spectrum based on military duty status, the nature of the event, and the differences in state and federal laws pertaining to military involvement. If this is achieved, then the NG would be able to provide a quicker and more effective response to disasters in order to support the American citizens. Mr. Gene Pino, the Training and Exercise Director for NORTHCOM, made this point during his welcoming comments at the Ardent Sentry (Exercise) Mid Planning Conference 27 January 2009, “To lead, a leader must be knowledgeable; leaders must know the architecture they will fall in on. Leaders must understand how the nation [state] will respond to a disaster or they will fail” (Pino, 2009). This supports the point the NG must understand and educate on how the nation and state respond to disasters.

Neither the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) nor the Department of Defense (DoD) has fully articulated a doctrine for homeland security. Consequently, the DoD has yet to develop missions and requisite training that would support such a doctrine. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has recommended that DoD

\(^{1}\) Webster’s New World Dictionary defines trained as “verb, 3. to instruct so as to make proficient” and educate is defined as “1. to develop the knowledge, skill, or character of, esp. by formal schooling; teach;” or in simpler terms used by Admiral Art Cebrowski “you train for the known and educate for the unknown.”
develop a strategy for utilizing the NG in national emergencies. The GAO specifically recommended that “the Secretary of Defense develop and submit a strategy to Congress for improving the Army National Guard’s structure and readiness and clearly define the Guard’s role in homeland defense and providing Support to Civilian authorities” (GAO 05-21, 2004, p. 5). As the role of the NG becomes better defined, then the education and mission requirements can be better delineated and developed.

Currently, the status quo of the NG is that it is organized and directed to meet its federal mission requirements, which is almost exclusively directed to wartime missions and not to the education of soldiers and airmen in ways to respond to domestic disasters. A GAO report explained, “DoD generally organizes, trains, and equips the National Guard for only the federal missions it leads…National Guard forces that may have to take on homeland security missions are not organized, trained, or equipped specifically for these missions” (GAO 05-21, 2004, p. 14). This means that the military may provide at best a slow or a poor response to disasters by not possessing or being able to provide the appropriately educated personnel. Because of the lack of knowledge resulting from this gap in disaster response education among NG personnel, they may not completely understand the problem nor be able to speak or understand the same technical language used by various local, state, and federal responders when responding to domestic missions. These gaps in knowledge result in higher response costs derived from longer times on duty, poor performance due to lack of knowledge, prolonged suffering of the citizens, and the potential loss of life. If the military had a comprehensive list of roles and missions, it could develop specific training and education programs to ready units for completion of these vital missions and roles.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Education of the NG leadership on disaster response process, homeland security, and civil support missions will help the NG leadership to perform better and fulfill its role efficiently. In turn, it can communicate this knowledge to the rest of the NG and provide guidance on education and training the soldiers and airmen to perform these missions. In the DoD, and specifically the NG, there is a very low percentage of
leadership that understands how the civilian authorities respond to a disaster and what their expectations are for the NG or DoD when military personnel are requested. The primary research questions are:

- To overcome the gap in disaster response knowledge, what are the topics on which the DoD should specifically educate the NG leadership?
- What has caused this education gap and how can the NG leadership overcome it?

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

Improving the NG’s response capability will not only help the states’ response capabilities, but it will ultimately enable the NG to accomplish the overall missions of homeland security and civil support, or DSCA. This improvement will speed the response, reduce costs and ease human suffering. Improving the states’ response capabilities may reduce the federal government’s response requirement and expenses.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of reference material supported the premise that the NG receives insufficient education to efficiently meet its mission requirements in homeland security and DSCA. Government commission reports such as the Gilmore Commission, Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports, journal articles, and military war college theses all contribute to the development of the argument for creating education for the NG leadership.

The Gilmore Commission Report of 2003 recommended that the Department of Defense develop a list of homeland security missions specifically designed for the NG. The thought prompting this recommendation is that the military could then develop training programs to ready the NG units for these missions. In 2003, DoD followed through with this recommendation and requested a mission task list from the DHS, but no mission list has been developed as of this writing.

At least three GAO reports have addressed the need for education and training for the NG to perform the homeland security missions. The first report, *Reserve Forces*:
Action Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Overseas and Domestic Missions (GAO-05-21), presented the argument that “Guard personnel may lack the type of training and equipment that would facilitate an effective and timely response to future homeland security threats” (2004, p. 5). Several findings from the GAO reports specifically recommended that the DoD provide training for the NG in its mission of homeland security.

The second report, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges (GAO-06-1109T), stated that personnel readiness, in general, is deficient due to the cross-leveling (moving of military personnel from one unit to another unit) of soldiers to fill units deploying for overseas missions. The report mentioned the need for training as well and described the necessity to “identify the National Guard’s capabilities to perform these missions [homeland security] and any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training that need to be addressed to perform these missions successfully” (GAO-06-1109T, 2006, p. 12).

The third report, Reserve Forces: Observation on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges (GAO -04-670T), reiterated the second GAO report on readiness issues due to transfer of personnel and equipment to support the overseas mission. The report also stated “readiness for homeland security missions is unknown because DoD has not fully defined requirements or homeland security missions or established readiness standards and measures for them” (GAO -04-670T, 2004, p. 2).

These GAO reports indicated that while there is agreement for requiring training in homeland security by the military in general and the NG in particular, both the DHS and DoD have failed to reach any agreement on the homeland security missions for which the military should train.

Several articles touched on the suggestion for change in the NG mission or role, but mostly just as a peripheral issue. The articles focused mostly on what the authors considered the most pressing issue, that of equipment. In Lieutenant Colonel Kristen Cox’s article, “The Evolving Role of Reserve Components in Homeland Security,” her
main argument was that the reserve components must change in structure, training, and missions to properly perform the homeland security missions; “…the National Guard…should modify their organization and training to include a priority mission to prepare and deploy in support of homeland security missions” (2007, p. 46).

In Colin Robinson’s article, “Homeland Security Requirements and the Future Shape of the Army National Guard,” his main argument was that the Army, including the National Guard, must increase in size and realign its organizational structure to better perform its homeland security mission. His stated belief is that “the Army has not yet re-optimized its auxiliary forces to deal with the possibility that it might have to suddenly send tens of thousands of troops to maintain public order and provide assistance in a large city grappling with a catastrophic terrorist attack” (Robinson, 2003, p. 2).

Timothy Lowenberg, the Adjutant General for Washington State, wrote an article that “The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security,” and that “The United States enters the 21st century with unresolved questions about what our national defense and homeland security strategies should be” (2004, p. 7). He further makes the point that officials at the state and federal levels still have policy issues to be resolved in the use and application of NG forces.

Several military war college theses have addressed topics dealing with the changing role of the National Guard in DSCA and the organizational requirements as part of the transformation of the National Guard. The monograph by Major Kristina Emmons, Specialized Regional National Guard Brigades—The Army’s Federal Disaster Response Force, raised the concept of creating regional response brigades within the National Guard to respond to homeland security missions. Other writers discussed the DSCA process and recommended improvements at the federal level for response training as well as the need of the National Guard to adapt for the future roles in the area of homeland security.

Current literature revealed that there is no assignment of missions for the NG in response to homeland security, civil support, and DSCA. Although authors of this literature have identified a need for education and training for the military, specifically
for the NG, they made no recommendations as to what the educational requirements are or should be. The fact that the authors made no recommendations may point to their lack of understanding of what the potential missions and assignments may be. This failure to understand what missions may be required for the NG leads to the corresponding vacuum of education and training that if filled would enable the NG to conduct appropriate response measures. Logically, then, this lack of preparation for potential missions will cause a poor, slow response to disasters. The military, and specifically the NG, must know what missions it will be expected to perform so it can prepare for a better-coordinated response.

F. METHOD

Several potential information sources already exist and can provide details of military educational and training requirements. The first source is the NG’s Directors of Military Support (DOMS), who are the focal point and the action personnel for the NG when it supports the civil authorities at the state and territorial levels. Along with the DOMS, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is another potential source of data. A third data source is NORTHCOM, DoD’s leading command for homeland security, civil support, and DSCA. The last source of information comes from the recent graduates of the Naval Postgraduate NG Certificate Program.

The primary method for collecting data from the above named sources was the Delphi survey. Because so little information currently exists in this area of research, the Delphi survey, with its iterative process, provided the data and analysis of responses from NG participants who directly work in the area of homeland security. The initial sampling data was provided by survey of the 54 states and territories NG DOMS. Their input was very significant because the DOMS in each state and territory are in positions to possess the necessary experience and expertise to be the focal points for the areas of homeland security and DSCA. Additionally, the Current Operations (J3) and Training Branch (J7) personnel provided information from the National Guard Bureau level with regards to the personnel and training available for disaster response training.
The second part of the research strategy was to conduct a survey of the recent (2007) graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School’s National Guard Certificate Program. Because these military personnel have just completed the program, their insight in the adequacy of the program proved to be very valuable and timely to this thesis.

The third part of the research strategy was to conduct interviews. Interviews were conducted with NORTHCOM personnel to gain their perspective on the education required for the NG to perform civil support missions. NORTHCOM, as the DoD’s lead agency responsible for providing military support of civil authorities, should certainly be viewed as a proponent of required education and training of military forces enabling quick and effective response. An interview was also conducted with the United States Property and Fiscal Officer, the federal government agency responsible for the control of expenditure of federal funds and use of federal property within the states. This federal officer, who is responsible for managing the regulatory aspects surrounding the expenditure of federal funds within the states and oversees the states’ use of federal property, provided insight into the contribution that these regulations on expenditure and use have with the gap in education.

G. THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter I introduces the problem, which is a lack of education in the area of civil support missions for the military and the NG specifically. It also describes the manner in which this thesis will analyze and suggest remedies to eliminate this gap.

Chapter II discusses the causes of the gap in disaster response. There is a review of the NG history and duty status. It also presents a description of the resources and the several courses currently available to NG leadership. The courses are the USARNORTH DSCA course, Joint Forces College Homeland Security Planners course, NGB JOC 101, several FEMA courses, and Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program. The chapter goes on to discuss the causes of the education gap, from new homeland security, the federal response process, DoD not taking on the civil support mission, and DHS not providing mission or tasks for the military.
Chapter III reviewed the survey and interview data collected. The questions are divided into the topic areas that will follow in the thesis. The questions are listed with the percentages and an explanation of the data followed by quotes that indicated a sampling of the responses.

Chapter IV deals with challenges and process to close the education gap. From the process, the NG should know to close the gap to the changes in policy to allow the gap to close.

Chapter V lists the recommendations and describes the proposed steps of implementation to close the gap. This is also the summary of the thesis.

H. DEFINITIONS

The following are definitions for purpose of this thesis.

Gap: The distance between what the National Guard knows presently and what it should know for the homeland security and civil support mission.

National Guard (NG) Leadership: A military member of the Air or Army National Guard serving as a platoon leader, officer O-1, a platoon sergeant (E-7, or higher) is considered leadership for this thesis.

Homeland Security (HLS) (as per DoD): HS related military operations inside the US and its territories, through limited in many respects, fall into two mission area: HD-for which DOD serves as the [lead federal agency] LFA and military forces are used to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and [civil support] CS-for which DOD normally serves in a supporting role to other agencies by providing military assistance to civil authorities at the federal, state, and local levels. (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. II-1)

Figure 1 (below) illustrates DoD concept of homeland security and how its mission fits into this concept.
Homeland Defense (HLD) (per DoD):

HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. DOD is responsible for homeland defense, which includes mission such as domestic air defense….DOD is the lead or primary agency. (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. vi)

Figure 2 (below) illustrates the different missions under the two missions of DoD.
Civil Support (CS) (as per DoD):

DOD’s role in the CS mission area consists of support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement within the scope of restrictions required by the Posse Comitatus Act and other support approved by the Sec Def. (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. vi)

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) (as per DoD):

Employment of military forces within the US, its territories, and possessions, under the auspices of CS, typically falls under the board mission of MACA. MACA mission consist of three mission subsets. These mission subsets consist of: military support to civil authorities (MSCA); military support to civilian law enforcement agencies; and military assistance for civil disturbances. (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p. ix)

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) (as per DoD), also known as Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA):

MSCA refers to support provided by Federal military forces, DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and DOD agencies and components in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents to include terrorist threats or attacks, major disaster, and other emergencies. MSCA missions consist of DOD support for US domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement, civil disturbances, and other activities. (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p.ix)
Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA) (as per DoD):

The use of the military in law enforcement roles is a sensitive topic and restrictions apply to such use. Military forces performing in this role support the lead Federal agency and other supporting agencies and may be armed depending on the SecDef decision. Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) may include, but is not limited to national special security events, support of or combating terrorism, support of counterdrug operations, maritime security, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and general support (training support to LEAs/loan of equipment/personnel and expert advice). (DoD JP 3-26, 2005, p.ix)

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MSCDIS) (as per DoD):

The President is authorized by the Constitution and statutory laws to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and riots, and provide federal supplemental assistance to the states to maintain law and order. (JP 3-26, 2005, p. ix)

I. CONCLUSION

This chapter introduced the problem, which is that, the NG leadership is lacking in education of the disaster response process used by civilians. The research questions were explained as well as the significance of this research, a review of the available literature. The method to collect more data by survey methods was explained. The chapter description, which sets forth the thesis and defines words and phrases utilized by DoD, is intended to help the reader understand the terms.
II. CAUSES OF THE GAP

This chapter will explore the gap in disaster response education for the NG in the area of homeland security and civil support. The exploration will begin with the background on the NG history, missions, and duty status. This chapter will then review the homeland security courses that are available for the NG. Finally, this chapter will explore the factors that contribute to this gap in disaster response education and will establish the need for the education to eliminate the gap.

A. BACKGROUND ON NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSE

1. History

The National Guard of today traces its roots to the Massachusetts colony in 1636 when a group of citizens formed a militia to defend their colony in the new world against marauding Indians and natural disasters. Later, the U.S. Constitution addressed the issue of a militia in several places, the most noteworthy being in Article II, Section 2, which stated, “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States” (U.S. Constitution, 2006, p. 11). The important point from Section 2 is the phrase “when called into the actual Service;” which is viewed as the basis for the current Title 10 duty status. Elsewhere in the Constitution, there is a clause that all powers not expressly given to the federal government are considered to be powers of the states; this clause provides that the state militias fall under the control of the state governors until called to federal service. The militia of the Constitution is the National Guard of today.

2. Mission

The NG is unique among the military components in that it has two missions and serves under two Commanders-in-Chief: the President and the respective state governor. The NG is normally considered a state asset until federalized in a Title 10 status. The
The federal mission of the NG is to support the Presidential and national military objectives and to provide ready forces for mobilization. The National Guard must always be prepared and ready to go to war.

The NG supports the DoD’s two missions, the primary mission being homeland defense and the secondary mission being civil support. The following quote from *Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security*, from DoD lists the two missions:

The Armed Forces of the United States support the NSHS [National Strategy for Homeland Security] through two distinct but interrelated mission areas—homeland defense (HD) and civil support (CS). HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. …DOD’s role in the CS mission area consists of support to US civil authorities. (JP-3-26, 2005, p. vi)

The NG is provided federal funding for what normally works out to one weekend a month and 15 days of annual training each year to support the DoD primary mission: homeland defense.

Civil support is the broad all-encompassing term used to describe the support that the military provides to the civil authorities for homeland security. Civil support includes military assistance to civil authorities, military support for civil authorities, military support of civilian law enforcement, and military assistance for civil disturbance (defense can be substituted for military). Each of these DoD missions has different requirements, applications, and restrictions. Although it seems logical that these terms, meanings, and implications of those missions would be explained in detail to the NG leadership during the education process, the current education intended for NG does not cover these areas.

The state mission is to support the governor by providing trained and equipped forces. The governor looks to the NG as a last resort, before going for federal assistance, to protect life and property, to maintain peace, order, and public safety.

3. **NG Response to Disasters**

The NG, with its “Minute Man” response of “come as you are, quickly” mentality, has traditionally responded and performed to the best of its abilities to
accomplish its missions with what it has on hand. However, the NG cannot continue to rely on this type of performance and hope to accomplish newer, more complex missions quickly and economically. A quote from the third Gilmore Commission, Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capability for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, supports this point, “We as a nation cannot afford to respond to terrorist attacks on our soil on an ad hoc basis after an attack has commenced” (2001, p. 51). At the time of the report, terrorism was the biggest concern; while this is still true, the NG is also concerned about all hazards and cannot respond without being educated on how to respond to each type of hazard or emergency. The nation deserves and requires better than this and demands a fast and effective response from the NG in the midst of a disaster. Leadership should never opt for the hope that the NG can respond effectively to all disasters; the NG should be educated to respond effectively to a variety of disaster types. In the final analysis, hope that response will be adequate to meet the challenge should never be the strategy of choice.

4. Response Process

If the NG is to perform both homeland security and civil support missions, any gaps in the education of its personnel pertaining to these missions must be identified and filled before the NG can perform effectively. Because the NG is expected to respond to state-level disasters, the NG will be the first military responders to any disaster in the United States. To understand this impact of the NG domestic deployments on disasters within the United States, one needs only to look at the number of NG members on duty. On 3 December 2008 there were 4,760 Guardsmen doing domestic operations consisting of State Activity Duty and Title 32 missions and 136,166 Guard members activated in a Title 10 status around the world (Guard Knowledge Online, 2008). There are over 4,700 National Guard members fulfilling domestic missions across the United States; this could be an average number deployed for domestic missions for any given day. The following quote from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to Senate Armed Services Committee supports the increase in NG involvement in support to civil authorities.
The demand for Guard support of civil authorities here at home remains high: For example, the ‘man-days’ that Guardsmen have spent fighting fires, performing rescue and recovery, and other duties increased by almost 60 percent in 2008 as compared to 2007. (Gates, 2009)

DoD, in its publications, has noted that the NG will respond to disasters it stated, “The NG, when in state status, is normally the first military responder to civil support incidents that require resources beyond the capabilities of local and other state-level emergency response organizations” (JP 3-26, 2005, p. II-13). The NG will not only be deployed before and after any active duty Title 10 force deployments, but it will also be deployed to disasters where Title 10 forces do not deploy. As military responders, the NG offers more versatility in its deployments to disasters than does the active duty Title 10 forces, not only because of the Posse Comitatus Act ² but because NG members are spread across the nation and are found in every major city.

For the NG to best support a state request, the NG must be knowledgeable of the state’s process of managing disaster and also how the state officials will request assistance. NG deployment for emergency response must always begin with a request for support, which is always initiated at the local or community response level. This approach is supported in the National Strategy for Homeland Security as indicated in the following quote from the “Respond to and Recovery from Incidents” section:

One of the fundamental response principles is that all incidents should be handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. The initial response to the majority of incidents typically is handled by local responders within a single jurisdiction and goes no further. When incidents exceed available resources, the local or Tribal government may rely on mutual aid agreements with nearby localities or request additional support from the State. (DHS, 2007, p. 33)

When local authorities are incapable of handling the crisis, they then forward a request for assistance to the state, which initiates the state-level response:

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² Posse Comitatus Act is a law passed by congress in 1878 to prevent the Army from being pressed into service as a posse for the local sheriffs. DoD has interpreted this that federal Military (includes all services) forces can not enforce federal laws.
State governments have the primary responsibility for assisting local governments to respond to and recover from disasters and emergencies. When an incident expands to challenge the resources and capabilities of the State coordinate requests for additional support. (DHS, 2007, p. 33)

It is at the state-level response when the NG is first tasked to respond in one of three statuses: State Active Duty, Title 32 Status as a state asset, or in Title 10 as a federal asset. In turn, when the state is incapable of handling the crisis, a federal-level request for assistance is made by the state to the federal government. The federal government sends in FEMA and other agencies to respond to the crisis. These responders, including the NG, must be equally trained and exercised at all response levels.

5. NG Duty Status

To understand the NG response process, the NG must be totally cognizant of the different duty statuses in which the NG personnel can be deployed. As previously mentioned, the NG can be called out under three different types of duty status. Much of what the NG personnel can do when called up for assistance depends upon their duty status, disaster declaration, and state and federal laws. Each duty status has separate and distinctive provisions or restrictions related to what duties the NG can legally perform.

State Active Duty status (SAD) is the least legally restrictive status; the governor has command and control over his or her NG. Under this status, the state has to pay all costs associated with the activation. Depending on the state laws and governor’s provisions in the disaster declaration, the governor can waive state policies, procedures, and also grant law enforcement officer status to the NG. When in SAD status, the NG members are governed by state laws and have the least restrictions on the missions they may perform.

When the NG is activated in Title 32 status, the federal government activates the NG and pays all costs associated with the activation, yet the state governor maintains command and control. In Title 32 status, state laws or the governors disaster declaration determine what missions the NG can perform or if it has law enforcement status.
The last and most restrictive duty status for the NG is in Title 10 status; the federal government activates, assumes command and control of the NG, and pays the costs associated with the activation. Additionally, the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of federal troops to enforce civil laws, applies to any NG member in Title 10 duty status.

B. REVIEW OF CURRENT EDUCATION COURSES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND CIVIL SUPPORT

Currently, limited courses exist that are specifically related to civil support for either the NG or the military in general. The Gilmore Commission, Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capability for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, makes a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to provide training to the military for supporting civil authorities:

We further recommend that the secretary direct the military departments to institute specific training in military units most likely to be involved in military support to civil authorities and to expand military involvement in related exercises with Federal, State, and local agencies. (Gilmore Commission report three, 2001, p.51)

This commission realized the need for the military to educate and train for the response in the area of support to civil authorities.

A review of the courses offered in homeland security, civil support, or defense support for civil authorities revealed the courses discussed below provide some coverage of the concepts that the NG leadership should understand if it is to provide an effective response to a disaster. The following courses are reviewed and explored in more depth below: the Army North Defense Support of Civil Authorities course, Joint Forces Staff College Homeland Security Planners course, NGB Joint Operation Center (JOC 101) course, and FEMA courses.
1. **USARNORTH Defense Support of Civil Authorities Course**

The Army North (USARNORTH) Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) course is taught in three phases. Phase One, which is a distance learning phase, consists of three parts. Part I of Phase One covers incident management and National Response Framework (NRF). Part II covers DSCA, including the operational phases and the DoD’s role. Part III covers “preparedness, guidelines, planning scenarios, Universal Task list, and Target Capabilities.” (USARNORTH G7 Training, 2008, p 29) The intent of Phase One is the development of “awareness, comprehension, and competence of Defense Support of Civil Authorities” (USARNORTH G7 Training, 2008, p 29). The distance learning phase, which requires about eight hours to complete, also requires the completion of each of the following FEMA courses: ICS-100, An Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS); ICS-200, Basic ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incident; IS-700, National Incident Management System (NIMS) An Introduction; and IS-800, NRF An Introduction. Students are required to pass an exam at the conclusion of Phase One before proceeding to Phase Two.

Phase Two is a one week of face-to-face session of classes, small group discussions, and exercises with practical application of the instruction on DSCA “focusing on inter-governmental and inter-agency response” (USARNORTH, 2008, p. 29).

Phase Three provides the student with the changes in DSCA concepts, “strategy, and doctrine in Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness” (USARNORTH, 2008, p. 29). The course is intended for “senior military officers, DOD civilians and their staffs” (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 8-3) and focuses only on the federal response phase, not on the state response process.

2. **Joint Forces Staff College Homeland Security Planners Course**

The Joint Forces Staff College Homeland Security Planners course is a 40-hour homeland security course with interagency focus. One-half of the student makeup of this course is comprised of military mid-grade officers (O-4 and O-5) and the other half is
compromised of interagency participants of similar grades. The course is designed to cover the national level, DoD, and homeland security interagency processes in homeland security policy, strategy, and plans. The course is only taught a few times a year and enrollment is limited.

3. NGB Joint Operations Center 101 Course

The NGB Joint Operations Center 101 course is taught by contractors with extensive experience in the Florida National Guard, and its response capability. The course focuses on how to run a Joint Operations Center in a disaster setting. The first two days of the week-long course cover basic aspects of DSCA concepts at the state level and the manner in which the response process is managed by means of the Joint Operations Center.

4. FEMA Courses

A search of the FEMA web site shows that the agency offers three courses with some relevance to the NG’s needs. The first course, IS-230 Principles of Emergency Management, has several topics of interest. Unfortunately, less than 50 percent of the topics listed in the syllabus appear to have any relevance to the NG. Most of the lessons address the full spectrum of emergency management from prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation; unfortunately, only response and some recovery aspects apply to the NG. The second course, IS-292 Disaster Basic, is designed to provide a basic knowledge of FEMA disaster programs. Only two of the ten lessons appear to have relevance to the NG: Government Response to an Incident and Response Operations. The rest of the course covers the incident command structure. The third course, IS-208 State Disaster Management, is designed to cover the disaster assistance process. Two lessons appear to have relevance to the NG: Disaster Sequence of Events and the Declaration Process. The rest of the course covers assistance related programs.

The NIMS courses have value to the NG as they assist the NG in understanding its role and place in the response process. These courses are available on-line and take approximately three hours per course to complete. As an introductory course in Incident
Command System, ICS 100 An Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS), covers the history, features, principles, and structure of ICS. It also explains the difference between Incident Command System and the NIMS. ICS-200 Basic ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incident covers leadership, management, functional areas and delegation of authority, and management by objectives. IS-700 NIMS An Introduction introduces NIMS, covers purpose, principles, components, and benefits. ICS-800, NRF An Introduction, covers the concepts and principles of NRF.

5. Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program

The original intention of the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program, now discontinued, was to teach this program in each state and have it hosted by a college or university through a certificate program designed to educate not only NG personnel, but first responders as well. Upon successful completion, this program provided a certificate and 12 credit hours that could be applied towards a master’s degree program, which the student could complete as time permitted. This program consisted of four graduate-level courses of three credit hours each: the Foundations of Homeland Defense and Security; Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Homeland Defense and Security; Collaboration to Integrate, Strategic Planning, and Organizational Imperatives in Homeland Defense and Security; and Special Topics in Homeland Defense and Security. The states of Missouri and Arizona were designated as test states. Unfortunately, NGB concluded this pilot program and left it to the individual state schools and state NG headquarters to implement further. Appendix II has a more detailed review of each of the four courses.

Regrettably, the courses available for the NG seem to focus primarily on the federal-level process with little attention given to the state process. The gap in education is very apparent as seen by the limited number of courses, their content, and availability to the NG leadership. The state process of response is the process that the NG leadership will use first and must also understand. DoD recognizes that the NG will be the first military units at the disaster. For the NG leadership to receive the necessary education, its
leaders have to attend many courses and filter the information to find what is relevant to the state process, which is not an efficient way to learn and only adds to increased training time and costs.

C. SUMMARY OF FACTORS CAUSING THE GAP

This section will explore the causes of the gap and the reasons why the gap exists. The gap is affected by DoD policies that support the homeland defense federal war-fighting mission almost to the exclusion of the education for the civil support mission. The following is a discussion of these shortcomings and causes.

1. New Process/Concept/Organization Called Homeland Security

In 2002, the federal government underwent a major reorganization with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. This creation also brought together many agencies in the federal government that dealt with disaster mitigation, response, recovery, and prevention. With this new organization came several new concepts or strategies to better organize the federal government process in dealing with threats to the nation from terrorism to disasters. One of the problems with the creation of the new organization was the determination of its role; this has affected its interaction with other organizations. Nevertheless, this new organization has moved forward the process for dealing with terrorism and disasters to a new level. The creation of a DoD combatant command, Northern Command (NORTHCOM), to deal with the nation’s homeland defense and civil support missions also contributes to the change in the process. DoD and the NG are still trying understand the roles played by the newly created entities, adjust to the changes, and develop the doctrine and education needed to prepare for the new process, all while fighting two wars and the coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security.

2. Changes in Federal Response Plan also Affects the State Process

Up until the writing of the Federal Response Plan after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, there was no federal plan on how to respond to a disaster. Disasters were left to the
local entities and states to solve with minimal assistance from the federal government. The aftermath to Hurricane Andrew was the first time the federal government developed a plan on how it would respond to disasters, giving the states a process and expectations. The passing of the Stafford Act in 1988 and Economy Act in 1933 helped to refine the federal government response process. Many years later, the next major re-write of the federal plan came about with the resulting National Response Plan in 2004; in 2006 there were revisions, and it was later modified to the current National Response Framework in 2008. These progressive developments in the federal response process have caused the response process to grow and become more complicated, meanwhile disasters are becoming larger. These changes have also influenced or changed the state’s process. Neither DoD nor the NG has kept up with these changes and developments in the response process. Neither DoD nor the NG has provided education on the response process to their respective leadership. Therefore, the leadership is responding to a process without a complete knowledge or understanding of the process.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive Five (HSPD-5) has mandated that all responses to a disaster will now be managed under provision of the NIMS and the NRF. The NG response will be less than optimal if the NG leadership does not understand this or has not incorporated this knowledge about responses into its leadership training. Since local and state responses/reaction/mitigation will be well underway and the NIMS and NRF systems will be fully functioning by the time the NG responds, the NG should understand not only the process and the terms, but also how it can successfully integrate into the process and operate within the NIMS and NRF environments. A time of crisis is not the time to learn the process, as this will only slow or delay any response, thereby allowing needless suffering and increasing the cost of the disaster; neither of which is acceptable. To avoid such an occurrence, either DoD or the NG should provide education on this process to their leadership.

3. **DoD is Reluctant to Accept the Civil Support Mission**

DoD has participated in civil support mission only when directed to by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Because of its focus on war-fighting,
DoD has demonstrated a reluctance to accept the civil support as a primary role. In its fourth report, the Gilmore Commission made the following quote to addresses this point.

While the military participates in numerous missions to support civil authorities each year, the Department of Defense does not count this support as its primary mission. Warfighting is the Department’s primary mission and takes priority unless the Secretary of Defense directs otherwise. (Gilmore Commission Report #4, 2002, p 89)

Due to this reluctance, DoD has not put much effort to educating the military and specifically the NG on this mission.

Karen Guttieri, author of the article entitled *Strategic Insight, Homeland Security and US Civil-Military Relations*, indicates DoD’s reluctance to assume the domestic missions:

Given that the military seems to have the most to gain by empire-building in homeland security, a model of bureaucratic politics might predict the military would advocate for a large domestic role. Instead, the military establishment, including the civilian secretary of defense, is strongly resisting domestic orientation. (2003, p. 1)

Accordingly, the services focus on the federal mission and have either resisted the pressure to direct at least some training to the civil support or domestic missions.

DoD continues to place civil support missions as a second priority, even to the point of not allowing the necessary supplies to be obtained for civil support missions. DoD does not want to commit any resources, e.g., funds, to the civil support missions. The following excerpt from a GAO report confirms this:

Consistent with this strategy, DOD’s current policy [DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Jan. 15, 1993)] prohibits, unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense, procuring or maintaining any supplies, material, or equipment exclusively for providing military support to civil authorities. (GAO-08-311, 2008, p 19)

Because DoD does not place a priority on domestic missions, Congress may have to legislate that DoD develop tasks and educate its personnel on these tasks and this mission. Neither the former SecDef Rumsfeld nor the present SecDef Robert Gates has
given any indication of any change in this philosophy. However, Guttieri indicated this point, “Although Secretary Rumsfeld has shown no reluctance to push for transformation in structure and operations, however, when it comes to homeland security, he has sided with the uniformed services to preserve their insulation from domestic operations.” (2003, p. 5) Guttieri’s statement reinforces the point that DoD is reluctant to become involved in homeland security or civil support missions.

4. National Guard Trains for the Homeland Defense Mission

Unfortunately, because NG current training and education are entirely directed for homeland defense, no education is provided for the civil support mission. The Defense Appropriations Act provides funds to meet the federal mission of DoD to educate, organize, and administer the NG for the “go to war” or homeland defense missions. According to the DoD, “The US military organizes, trains, and equips forces primarily to conduct combat operations” (DoD, JP 3-26, 2005, p. IV-2). DoD’s own joint publications focus only on the combat operations of homeland defense. A GAO report addressed the funding for the NG, “Currently, the vast majority of the National Guard’s personnel, training, and equipment is provided for its federal war-fighting mission with funding appropriated to the Department of Defense” (GAO-08-311, 2008, p 1). The GAO report noted the DoD primary focus and expenditure of funds is directed at the homeland defense mission.

The NG is traditionally included in the federal missions as the NG personnel are trained to fight wars and focus on the homeland defense mission. It is in this area that the NG receives its primary funding from the federal government. As a result, the civil support mission is traditionally not a high priority and receives little concern or emphasis. Karen Guttieri, author of the article entitled Strategic Insight, Homeland Security and US Civil-Military Relations, supports this point, “The US military traditionally has been uncomfortable contemplating domestic operations” (2003, p. 3).

The Gilmore Commission Reports, published in 2003, recommended that the DoD develop a list of missions on which to train the military, and more specifically, the NG. The fifth commission report states:
Furthermore, there should be a well-coordinated, clearly defined set of roles and missions for the military, including the National Guard, under which the military is expected to support state and local government in response to terrorism, as well as other hazards. (Gilmore Commission Report, 2003, p. 390)

With these roles and missions clarified, the military could then develop and implement education programs to ready units to accomplish these missions and roles.

5. **Appropriate Use of Federal Funds**

Congress has enacted laws that control how funds are spent. The Anti-Deficiency Act is one law that specifies how funds are to be used. Under its provisions, any use of federal funds for any purpose other than what the funds were appropriated for constitutes a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. This restriction prevents the use of federal funds for state missions or for purposes other than their intended use. Congress has enacted statutes that prohibit the DoD, including the NG, from supplementing its funds from non-appropriated sources. Before the NG could use funds from other sources, e.g., state funds, NG personnel would have to be placed under a different duty status. For example, if the state were to provide funds for training, the NG personnel would have to be in State Active Duty status to perform the training, not in a federal status. NG can only train state missions in state status and federal mission in federal status. However, because it cannot train in a federal status, this results in the need for additional weekends of training.

Funding is also a contributor to the gap. Part of the problem is in the way money is authorized and allocated; little to none of it is used for the civil support mission to support the states. The funding the NG receives is designated for the homeland defense missions. The Gilmore Commission Report Number Four supports this point with this recommendation:

That the congress expressly authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide funds to the governor of a State when such funds are requested for civil support planning, training, exercising and operations by National Guard

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3 Anti-Deficiencies Act is a law that congress uses to control the expenditure of federal funds. It provides guidance on what is and is not legal or authorized spending procedures. It also provides penalties for violation.
personnel acting in Title 32 duty status and that the Secretary of Defense collaborate with State governors to develop agreed lists of National Guard civil support activities for which the Defense Department will provide funds. (2002, p. 99)

If the collaboration with the state governors were to happen, or if the funds could be used for the NG to train on missions for homeland security or civil support, this education gap would be reduced.

The NG is funded almost exclusively from the federal government for both equipment and pay. The area where the state pays a part is in the facilities; the state owns the land the armories sit on and pays up to 25 percent of the construction costs and a portion of the armory maintenance, but these responsibilities can be waived by the federal government. Due to this funding support from the federal government, the focus of the NG is driven by the federal funding guidance, concurrently causing its focus to be also on the federal mission of homeland defense.

6. **DHS and DoD Have not Collaborated on Common Missions**

DHS has not provided DoD with the necessary missions it expects the military to conduct when responding to any requests for homeland security or civil support. Without guidance or direction from higher headquarters, subordinate headquarters are left to determine for themselves what are valid missions or tasks. Without direction from DHS and DoD, many states are accepting state missions that may not meet this criteria. Each state makes its own determinations, some of which may be outside permissible parameters. The following statement from the GAO reinforces this point:

DoD concurred with our recommendation to establish the full range of the National Guard’s homeland missions, to identify the capabilities needed to perform those missions and develop a plan to address any shortfalls, and to establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard’s homeland security missions. (GAO-05-21, 2004, p. 31-32)

Without guidance, the NG cannot assess its readiness or develop the education requirements to ready the NG leadership to accomplish its missions.
In 2001, the Gilmore Commission found that DoD was waiting for DHS to establish the requirements for military support in homeland security; DHS has not done as of 2008. In Appendix K of *Statuses of Previous Advisory Panel Recommendations*, from the category of “Role of Military,” the following supports this statement, “To date (2001) there have been no requirements established by DHS for the military to support homeland security missions” (Gilmore Commission, 2001, p. K-12). In addition, in 2002 the Gilmore Commission declared, “According to DoD, NORTHCOM cannot conduct comprehensive planning for civil support until DHS establishes civil support requirements” (Gilmore Commission Appendix K, 2002, p. K-12-13). The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves continues to find that DoD and DHS have not included the NG in the planning for civil support responses:

The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security have not yet acted adequately to integrate DoD and NG Leadership into national preparedness and response planning activities. (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 13)

When DHS was asked by members of the GAO for an explanation of the reluctance to commit resources, its response was:

DHS and planning team officials explained that DHS coordination plans consider National Guard forces to be either a part of the state response effort or the federal DOD response effort and that the state or DOD would conduct this detailed planning. DHS’s role is to provide guidance and recommendations for states and federal agencies to consider and it does not have authority to direct the state or other federal agencies to perform specific emergency response duties. (GAO-08-311, 2008. p 15)

DHS maintains that the planning and preparation of NG missions and readiness for those missions is the requirement for DoD or for the states. Such a viewpoint seems odd, perhaps because they do not understand the process for response. One would think if DHS is in charge of responses as the lead federal agency, it would want to have input concerning the planning and education of its response elements. In short, neither DHS nor DoD appear eager to take on the responsibility of providing resources or training of the NG in civil support, homeland security, and disaster response missions.
The guidelines from the Gilmore Commissions and Commission on the National Guard and Reserves are very beneficial for the NG. If the recommendations can be implemented, this information can be used to establish appropriate education and training requirements for NG leaders. While the NG already has developed regulations and procedures for DSCA in a vacuum, the development of civil support mission requirements and training missions has stopped at the federal level. Consequently, no direction is currently available to guide the NG support for the states and local authorities in civil support. A GAO report emphasized this point, “…readiness for homeland security missions is unknown because DoD has not fully defined requirements for homeland security missions nor establishes readiness standards and measured for them” (GAO-04-670T, 2004, p. 2). The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves noted in this report that DHS has yet to provide DoD with the requirements needed for mission analysis by DoD; “DHS has not demonstrated a commitment to assuming its responsibility as the lead agency for identifying the requirement that the DoD must meet to adequately perform domestic civil support missions” (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 13). Before the NG is ready to respond with increased success for civil support missions, the NG must have definitively defined requirements for homeland security missions and understand the civilian environment in which it will operate.

The argument can be made that because of the involvement of the military forces, that DoD should take the lead and inform DHS what the military will do for missions and direct the training of units that would support civilian authorities, rather than waiting for responses or being directed by DHS. This raises the issue about DoD staying out of the disaster response missions and instead focusing on the homeland defense mission.

7. DoD/Services Controls and/or Determines the Education Priorities

DoD determines the doctrine, and in order to comply with that doctrine, each service determines its own education and training needs. DoD and related service
components have determined that the education and training requirements must be the same for not only the active duty military branches, but also for the Reserve and NG. According to the GAO:

DoD generally organizes, trains, and equips the National Guard for only the federal missions it leads. …As a result, National Guard forces that may have to take on homeland security missions are not organized, trained or equipped specifically for these missions. (GAO-04-670T, 2004, p. 14)

Current federal training requirements and programs restrict or take precedence over the few available homeland security or civil support educational opportunities provided for the NG to obtain this needed education. DoD/service components have focused on training programs for the homeland defense mission and have not determined what, if any, training is needed for civil support missions. At the present time, few civil support training programs are available to either the NG or other components of the military. Furthermore, whatever knowledge or experience is needed to overcome this shortfall generally has been learned on-the-job during civil support responses. Lessons learned through past responses have shown that this type of learning is not effective nor is the desired method to develop disaster preparedness.

The NGB receives funds for the development of training programs from the Departments of the Army and Air Force. Most training funds are used to send NG personnel to existing training programs, which focus on homeland defense missions. Because funds for the development of new training are limited, NGB J7 (the joint training branch) must determine the priority for funding training needs. When funding is reduced, the priorities change and guidelines emerge, restricting what programs will be funded; these are usually the federal efforts. The focus on the federal mission is a natural and normal follow-up to the funding source, as the NGB is tasked to provide personnel to accomplish the federal homeland defense mission through funds appropriated by the federal government.
8. New Mission Requires Non-Traditional Military Education

Performing homeland security missions will require educational processes and techniques different from those currently used to educate the NG leadership. This non-customary training is in contrast to the current “go to war” training. According to the GAO:

Some homeland security missions could require training and equipment, such as decontamination training and equipment that differ from that provided to support war-fighting missions. ...National Guard personnel may lack the type of training and equipment that would facilitate an effective and timely response to future homeland security threats. (GAO-05-21, 2004, p. 4-5)

The GAO report continued on with the following comments that support its recommendation:

NG forces may be expected to perform missions that differ greatly from their warfighting or traditional state missions and may require different equipment, training, and specialized capabilities than they currently possess. Homeland missions, such as providing large-scale critical infrastructure protection or responding to weapons of mass destruction events in the United States, could differ substantially from conditions expected on the battlefield or from more traditional state mission, such as responding to natural disaster or civil disturbances. (GAO-05-21, 2004, p. 26)

This statement pointed out that GAO sees a difference in education needs between homeland defense and the civil support mission.

The following excerpt from the GAO stresses the point about the control of education priorities, in addition to other relevant points:

Efforts to restructure the National Guard are focused on its primary federal mission and do not address the individual state Guard’s critical role in homeland security. As noted earlier, DOD planning and resourcing for National Guard units has assumed that homeland security tasks can be accomplished with personnel and equipment supplied for the wartime mission. However, in the new security environment, the assumption that Guard units can perform their domestic mission with personnel and equipment trained for overseas missions needs is questionable. (GAO-04-670T, 2004, p. 21)
This assessment indicates that any change in mission will require changes in education of NG leadership. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves noted the lack of DoD programming or budgeting for NG use in the civil support or domestic mission. The commission was critical of DoD’s apparent assumption that the wartime mission can be transferred to domestic missions. It stated, “Department of Defense has neither explicitly programmed and budgeted for civil support missions nor adequately equipped the National Guard for its domestic missions, relying on the flawed assumption that they are derivative of its wartime missions” (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 13). The DoD has the philosophy that the homeland defense mission training and its funding are sufficient to cover the civil support missions. In 2008, a Government Accounting Office report addressed this point with the following:

DOD does not engage in planning to identify the resources required for the National Guard’s civil support mission because it assumes most of those needs can be met with its warfighting capabilities and that planning to identify requirements for state-led missions is the states responsibility. (GAO-08-311, 2008, p. 4)

DoD assumes the traditional war-fighting mission and new missions of civil support are the same or similar enough that additional training or education are not needed, which several commissions or agencies do not agree with.

The Gilmore Commission (2003) listed many recommendations, several of which were directed at the DoD. One of the more noteworthy recommendations the commission suggested was that the SecDef institute specific civil support training for NG units which are involved in support of civilian authorities, “We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct specific new mission area for the use of the National Guard for providing support to civil authorities for combating terrorism” (Gilmore Commission, 2001, p. x). The Gilmore Commission noted a shortfall in education or training for the NG even as the focus then was just on terrorism; the same still holds true as the NG focuses on all hazards. Moreover, the commission recommended that the NG expand its involvement in civil support exercises at all levels:

We further recommend that the secretary direct the military departments to institute specific training in military units most likely to be involved in
military support to civil authorities and to expand military involvement in related exercises with Federal, State, and local agencies (Gilmore Commission, 2001, p.51).

If the training the Gilmore Commission addresses were to occur this would help the NG to understand the problem and develop the necessary education.

9. Available Time for Education

The NG’s recent transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve brings a strain on the NG members as each member must balance the time commitments required by the military, civilian careers, and family needs. In order to maintain equilibrium for the NG member, it is imperative to consider education that meets the requirements of the military, but still offers reasonable time for the NG member to remain at the civilian job and with the family. Accordingly, education must be appropriately planned by DoD to meet these criteria—needs of the military, but consideration for the individuals. Performing additional education or training requires Guardsmen to commit more time away from their families or from their full-time job, which is often difficult for them to do or justify, some will not do the additional education therefore not solving the problem.

Due to the on-going war, the current deployment rates have taken their toll on the NG members. Many NG members have been deployed for overseas service and have returned to be mobilized for civil support missions. The families, employers, and soldiers are experiencing many strains and stresses due to extra time commitments.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter identified and explored the existing gaps in NG disaster response education. The first section explored the NG history, mission and duty status. One of the gaps in NG preparedness is the lack of education available to the NG concerning homeland security or civil support missions. It is worth noting that most of the current available courses address the federal mission support requirements and not those at the state level, which compounds the gap. Correlating influences that contribute to this gap
in education are the current funding requirements, current policies, and new or changing missions. One GAO report opposed the DoD’s viewpoint that the current education and training for the homeland defense mission is sufficient for the homeland security mission and recommended changes in training specifically directed to homeland security. Understanding the causes for the gap in education points to ways in which to eliminate or reduce it.
III. SURVEY AND INTERVIEW DATA

The first part of this data collection consisted of surveys conducted with the NG Directors of Military Support (DOMS), NGB personnel, and recent graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program. The NG DOMS were selected as a survey group as they are the most knowledgeable in the NG in the area of homeland security, civil support, and DSCA. The recent graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program were queried for their views on the course to determine the strengths, weaknesses, and benefits.

The second part of the data collection consisted of interview with the NG advisor to the Chief of Staff for NORTHCOM to understand their perspective and the United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) was interviewed in order to clarify NG’s use of federal funds.

A. SURVEY OF DOMS

This survey explores what NG DOMS officers from across the country and NGB representatives view as important topics for educating the NG leadership concerning homeland security. The DOMS, who are the NG experts in each state on homeland security issues, were asked their opinions on educational topics dealing with the response and preparation for NG deployment to disasters. National Guard Bureau Current Operations (J3) and Training Branch (J7) personnel were included on the survey with the DOMS as well. Two surveys were used for this data collection. The first survey directed questions to the DOMS regarding each state’s NG viewpoints on the need of education for NG forces in the areas of homeland security, civil support, and DSCA. Twenty of the 50 DOMS responded, resulting in a response rate of 40 percent. The second survey delved deeper into the DOMS’ understanding of the need for the education: if there is a gap or not; why, where, and how the education should be conducted; and who should receive the education.
B. SURVEY OF NPS NG CERTIFICATE PROGRAM GRADUATES

A survey was conducted of the graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate pilot program. The states of Missouri and Arizona were the two states that offered the pilot program and had a combined total of 19 students who completed the class. Five respondents completed the survey, a 26 percent return. Their overall assessment of the program was very positive.

C. INTERVIEW OF USNORTHCOM ADVISOR

The author conducted an interview with the NG Advisor to the Chief of Staff for NORTHCOM to discuss his perspective on education topics for homeland security for the NG. The advisor not only shared his perspective on NG involvement with DoD’s primary homeland security proponent, NORTHCOM, but he also responded to questions concerning what educational topics the NG should emphasize for the leadership to study in order to accomplish the emerging homeland security, civil support, and DSCA missions. These responses provide a glimpse into the current mindset of NORTHCOM regarding the sort of education the NG should receive in preparation for the homeland security and civil support missions. He articulated that in order to achieve a successful operation by all participants responding to an incident, prior relationships must be developed and fostered so all involved, particularly the NG, can understand the system or differences in processes. He reiterated the need for NG leadership to know and understand the developing theme of homeland security topics.

D. INTERVIEW WITH USPFO-NE

An interview was conducted with the United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO). Each state has a USPFO who is viewed as the in-state resident expert on money policy. The USPFO is a Title 10 officer assigned to each state and territory at the NG Joint Forces Headquarters (state NG headquarters) to oversee the management and control of federal funds, equipment, and facilities for the federal government.
E. SURVEY AND INTERVIEW DATA

The following are the results of the survey and interview data by topics. The topics will be used throughout this thesis. The numbers in the tables (see tables below) indicate the percentage of individuals who chose that response.

1. Educational Topics and Levels

- Q1: What educational topics should the National Guard emphasize for the leadership to accomplish the emerging homeland security and defense support for civil authorities (civil support) missions?

The responses to this question indicated that there is a need to understand the state, as well as the federal process for response, specifically in these areas: JFHQ-State, State specific Emergency Management structures, EMAC, Stafford Act, Anti deficiency Act, Role of NGB, Another respondent commented on the FEMA Independent Study (IS) courses and the ability to be certified in emergency management:

FEMA offers a series of IS courses work that leads to a certification in emergency management. Would recommend TAG down to DOMS take much of if not [all to] obtain the certification. It provides great insight into the understanding of how civil agencies are going to plan and respond to events.

One respondent suggested the topic of policy and legislation for homeland security/homeland defense and roles and responsibilities for all levels of government agencies; an understanding of these areas would improve the response by the military.

What the DOMS stressed is the NG leadership must first be educated on the processes utilized at the state and federal levels for civil support missions, specifically defense support of civil authorities, before it can provide disaster response with desired efficiency and fully coordinated within the civilian parameters of management and control. The NG must understand the lines of authority as derived from the Constitution concerning the national strategies, the implications of the NRF, the Stafford Act, the Economy Act, and all legal/constitutional provisions that affect the NG response. The
Stafford Act and Economy Act are two laws that directly affect how the federal government responds in a disaster response; this also affects the response of the state and state agencies.

- Q2: What changes or additions in the formal education should Department of Defense make to educate the National Guard to meet its emerging homeland security and defense support for civil authorities (civil support) role?

This question focused on the specifics of DoD education to include changes to meet the emerging role. The respondents indicated, “exercises with the state and local government rather than in a vacuum”. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents indicated a need for a course for this new mission: “They should develop a separate course, or series of courses. It should also be focused on middle and senior leadership, the people who are making the policy decisions and are the interface between the military and state governments.” One respondent wanted to bring back a course NGB taught that covered the DOMS area. The last respondent indicated there should be doctrine on the immediate response and difference between the different status; the respondent argued:

Officer and NCO leader development courses should begin to include immediate response doctrine and the differences between Title 10, 32 and SAD. This should also be part of active duty course work also. ICS, NIMS, and the federal response framework would be great additions to intermediate und upper level educational courses like ILE [Intermediate Level Education].

Each state’s NG DOMS and NGB representatives were asked to address the educational topics and instructional courses that should belong in a course along with their level of importance for inclusion in a homeland security educational program for the NG. Each participant was asked to rank criteria from one to five (one being highest priority) based on importance to NG leadership. Table 1 below lists the results in priority order. The numbers in the boxes indicate percentage of respondents that chose that level of importance.
Table 1. DOMS Topics Survey Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>#1 priority</th>
<th>#2 priority</th>
<th>#3 priority</th>
<th>#4 priority</th>
<th>#5 priority</th>
<th>Ranking: (1=High)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Protection</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland security doctrine, policy, structure, purpose</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles of federal, local, and state organizations in homeland security</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic planning for homeland security</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland security issues, duty status, laws, regulations</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Incident Management System (NIMS)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise planning</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology in homeland security</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special topics such as border security, public health, Islam</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each DOMS was provided the option to list other areas that they felt were important, resulting in the following list (not in any specific order):

- Training and response;
- Emergency response (all hazard);
- Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC);
- Intelligence oversight;
- Search and rescue (SAR);
- Community support;
- Joint Operations Center (JOC) operations;
- National Guard Bureau (NGB) communications
- Joint Terrorism Taskforce (JTTF) interface;
• Chemical biological radiation, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
• State intelligence fusion centers
• The importance of NG personnel completing the ICS (Incident Command System) course;
• CBRNE planning and preparation.
• Q3: What specific educational areas do you believe should be addressed in leadership preparations for National Guard members supporting homeland security activities/missions?

Forty percent of the respondents indicated a requirement for education in NIMS, 25 percent of the respondents indicated a need for a course for the DOMS in DSCA, 15 percent mentioned a need to understand the role and relationship with NORTHCOM, 10 percent indicated a need to understand the NRF, and 10 percent referred back to question on education topics. Although the responses may seem random, they point out the vast array of topics that are of concern to the DOMS. In responding to the need for courses, one respondent indicated a need for a course early in the NG career due to the importance of the mission:

We need to have courses that solders can start taking early in their career that deal with Domestic Operations. Just like being a infantry soldier, there are courses that prepare you for each phase of your career, we have nothing for one of the most important roles we play as National Guard Soldiers.

This response points out that DOMS understand a need for education for the NG in homeland security and civil support. A respondent addressed the need for an updated curriculum or recertification to maintain proficiency and to understand the domestic operational law and stated, “There is no updated curriculum or ‘recertification’ that occurs to maintain any level of proficiency. …More training and awareness on domestic operational law should be a fundamental aspect of any DSCA training—not just for SJA/JAG [military lawyers].” This touches on another point about curriculum accreditation, which is lacking for a uniform standard. Another responder indicated a 40 or more hour course was needed; the respondent argued, “A 40–80 hour course that
covers all subjects identified in [Table 1] above. The course should be designed and tailored to leaders/planners at the Operational and Tactical levels.” One other respondent indicated a requirement for “a thorough understanding of the Constitution.”

- Q4: What specific educational areas do you believe should be addressed in leadership preparation for National Guard members supporting defense support to civil authorities in missions or activities?

Responses ranged from needing partnership and relationship building to joint/interagency coordination, consequence management, exercise design, and incident command system. Another respondent stressed the support side to the missions for the military, by pointing out that “ICS is the first and most important with the realization that National Guard and DOD is supporting and NOT running it.”

- Q5: What other areas or topic would you add to this program? (This and the next two questions refer to the NPS NG Certificate Program)

While one respondent indicated that he “would not change anything,” while others wanted about more terrorism, national security, and counter terrorism. On the topics pertaining to terrorism, one suggested more time on the threat and motivation of terrorists. Another respondent added the topics of NIMS and NRP as important.

- Q6: In your understanding, are there areas of homeland security in which more education is needed? What are the areas?

One hundred percent of the respondents indicated there is a need for more education as NG leadership does not “get it,” and the civilian sector does not understand the role of the NG. The following quotations provide an insight to their perceptions of the problem. One respondent articulated, “Absolutely. I don't think the average M-Day [mobilization day, traditional NG member] commander has the right knowledge of their role in HS and the importance of being prepared for that mission—especially in large scale responses such as pandemics or regional outbreaks / terrorists / catastrophic occurrences.” Another respondent commented that homeland security education needed more focus; the respondent indicated, “All areas of Homeland Security should be given more educational focus.”

- Q7: In your understanding, are there areas of DSCA in which more education is needed? If so, what are the areas?
One hundred percent of the respondents indicated that there were more areas in which education is needed, such as in exercises, the command and control process, definition of the responsibilities, and intelligence sharing. The following quote by one respondent identified what they all thought the junior officers needed, which was an understanding of DSCA. The respondent indicated, “I think this is an important area that company level guard leadership should have some understanding of.” The other quote indicated that because the “traditional members of the Guard” presently do not understand DSCA, they should receive the education in order to understand it. The respondent explained:

I'm confident in saying that the majority of our traditional members in the Guard, at least on the Air side of the house, are not familiar with DSCA at all. This is a major problem that could be easily be addressed through the ancillary training program.

- Q8: During the NORTHCOM interview, the following question was asked: What educational topics should the National Guard emphasize for the leadership to accomplish the emerging homeland security and military support for civil authorities (civil support) missions?

He responded:

Recognize the importance of developing sound working relationships with mission partners before an event. Learn and understand cultural differences that can prevent successful collaboration, communication, and coordination with mission partners. How military leaders (DCOs, JTF Commanders (State and Federal), JTF staff members (State and Federal), JDOMS/DOMS, etc. can garner/solicit support from mission partners to conduct successful interagency operations.


He pointed out the need for the NG to have effective interoperability with its civilian counterparts and to understand how they operate. This understanding would improve the NG response, and while the education programs are improving, a shortfall
that still exists in educating “military members” on the state process. He went on to list topics for education, most of which have been listed before as important. In addition, he did bring up the point of understanding the national strategy for homeland security, defense, and civil support.

- Q9: What changes or additions in the formal education should the Department of Defense make to educate the National Guard to meet its emerging homeland security and military support for civil authorities (civil support) role?

He responded:

All DOD members who may be involved in conducting DSCA missions or those who conduct interagency coordination should be required to complete FEMA courses on ICS, NRF, NIMS, and MACS. Additionally, completion of the ARNORTH conducted DSCA course should be mandatory for all DOD personnel who may have a potential role in conducting DSCA operations.

Rather than incorporate into service school curricula, DOD should consider offering incentives for service members to complete on-line and residence courses already offered by DHS and FEMA.

While these recommended courses would be excellent for NG leadership, the drawback of these courses is that they only cover the federal process and do not address the state level process. The state process should be developed in order to give the NG leadership a better understanding of both the federal and state processes during a response. This point was mentioned in other survey answers.

- Q10: At what educational levels(s) do you believe this education programs should be provided to be most effective for the National Guard in your state e.g., certificate, associate, undergraduate, or graduate level and why?

The following were the responses to this question (Table 2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Educational Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43
Seventy percent of respondents selected an advance degree. Ninety percent of the respondents indicated there is a need for a degree program. One respondent had an interesting observation based on his experience about NG leadership becoming more interested when they are exposed to this education; they want to learn more. The respondent indicated that:

I believe it is a mix of all four. I have not found people interested in HLS when openly approached, however when they are exposed then they become such more interested. So I believe that a program structured with certification on through graduate level would be the most successful.

A reason why this respondent indicated an advance degree was best might be due to the NG leadership having degrees already and the time requirement for an advanced degree is quicker with a certificate or graduate degree than a bachelor’s degree. Another respondent indicated a certificate program would be best due to the fact that “staff positions for our Domestic Operations branch rotate frequently”. This may be due to the Army culture, which moves officers every two to three years; the Army officers in DOMS positions would normally be the majority of the occupants. A certificate would be the fastest degree option for participants to obtain due to the quick rotation. This again may be due to the limited time requirement to obtain a degree.

Q11: Should DoD teach this material in their education programs or should public or private colleges and universities teach this more effectively?

The following were the responses to this question (Table 3):

Table 3. DoD or Public/Private Colleges/Universities Teach the Course?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public or Private</th>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>No Option</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A respondent who selected a public system touched on the point that the NGB should be the lead agency, as active duty does not see the state level response and therefore does not understand the process, respondent indicated. He stated, “Public/private universities would be more effective. If done by DoD, NGB should be the proponent, as the active component does not understand how the majority of
situations, those which do not elevate above state level, are handled.” Another respondent indicated that DoD should be the agency responsible to instill the education and include a additional skill identifier, and stated “DoD courses as introduction. ASI [additional skill identifier] could be another mechanism to get the knowledge into our work force.”

- Q12: How willing would you be, personally, to work on a bachelor’s degree in homeland security?

The following were the responses to this question (Table 4):

Table 4. Willingness of DOMS to Complete Bachelor’s Degree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Number</th>
<th>Highest Priority</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Less Important</th>
<th>Lowest priority</th>
<th>Not answered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent answers</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A reason for the low rating could be that all officers in the NG are required to have a bachelor’s degree; the DOMS are senior officers and would already have a degree. Five percent of the recipients were interested in a bachelor’s degree and 70 percent had little interest.

- Q13: In your opinion, how willing would members of the National Guard in your state be willing to work on a bachelor’s degree in homeland security?

The following were the responses to this question (Table 5):

Table 5. Willingness of Soldiers to Complete Bachelor’s Degree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Number</th>
<th>Highest Priority</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Less Important</th>
<th>Lowest priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent answers</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question inquired as to DOMS opinion whether or not the other NG members would be interested in a bachelor’s degree. Again, the priority was low; most of the enlisted have a bachelor’s degree by the time they are in leadership positions.

- Q14: How willing would you be, personally, to work on a master’s degree in homeland security?
The following were the responses to this question (Table 6):

**Table 6. Willingness of DOMS to Complete Master’s Degree**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Number</th>
<th>Highest Priority</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Less Important</th>
<th>Lowest priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent answers</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers and percentages improve when asked about earning a master’s degree, and the percentages are evenly split between a priority and not a priority. In the military there is no requirement to obtain a master’s degree. Some states may use a master’s degree as a preferential factor in placement for positions. Those who have worked in the field of homeland security may understand the need for more in depth education.

- Q15: In your opinion, how willing would members of the National Guard in your state be to work on a master’s degree in homeland security?

The following were the responses to this question (Table 7):

**Table 7. Willingness of Soldiers to Complete a Master’s Degree**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Number</th>
<th>Highest Priority</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Less Important</th>
<th>Lowest priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent answers</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers improve, indicating the respondents believed the priority for members in the state is to obtain a master’s degree. This might be due to the potential benefit gained for the traditional NG members, as their civilian employers may view them more favorably because of the higher education. A reason for only modest support for the masters program may be due to the fact that all officers are required to have a bachelor’s degree and there is little benefit for NG leadership to obtain a higher degree.

2. **Gaps in Education**

- Q16: Do you see a gap in education between DSCA, HLS, and the “go to war” missions? What are the gaps?
The respondents to this question indicated a gap exists. The following quotations express their points of view on this question:

- More emphasis on the ‘go to war’ education. That makes DSCA/HLS less important or a ‘side-bar’ to many.
- There is no formal education for DOMS in the NG. That is the gap.
- Missions that may be assigned via HLS may be quite different from the typical training of ‘go to war’ missions. Unit type coding and training need to include potential missions for DSCA/MSCA.
- Yes. Gap lies in formal DHS sponsored education given to military officials. Can't play DSCA if you don't know the rules.
- Civil-military interface and the understanding of being in a support role.
- Q17: What do you see as the reason for this gap?

This question brought out short and pointed responses like the following:

- Funding is based on ‘go to war’ mission and not DSCA/MSCA.
- No DoD emphasis on readiness for DSCA at unit level.
- Lack of experience by senior active Army leaders.

The last respondent touched on the issues of the force behind the military education, the war-fight mission, and the lack of understanding of the NG other missions.

The respondent argued:

Our military education is based on fighting an enemy and being the responsible agency for taking that fight to the enemy, AKA Title 10. DoD drives training and has for years to serve that purpose. The military does not necessarily understand how to be a partner in response, Title 32 or SAD. DoD policy makers are Title 10 focused and have no provisions for the guard to be the lead in this effort.

- Q18: Do you have suggestions on how to reduce or eliminate this gap?

This question gave a few glimpses of potential solutions, such as re-establishing the training that the NGB had previously provided for the DOMS, funding training for the HLS mission, making the training mandatory, and having additional Title 10 slots for
NG leaders. One respondent indicated the changes in the Defense Authorization Act are on the right track. This respondent stated, “Recent changes in the FY08 Defense Authorization are the way ahead, and I would say that CNGB [Chief of National Guard Bureau] must be a voting member of Joint Staff.”

- Q19: The following question was asked during the NORTHCOM interview: Do you see a shortfall in the education for the National Guard in responding to homeland security missions? If so, in what areas? If not why?

Below is his response:

Yes, but it is improving. The biggest shortfall in education is learning how to conduct successful interagency operations for domestic incidents with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. This is a huge challenge for most military members because they do not understand how their civilian counterparts train and organize for preparedness (pre-event) and response (post-event) activities in the homeland. Although we all have an interest in saving lives, minimizing suffering, and protecting critical infrastructure, our cultures, terminology, and doctrine are different.

He pointed out the need for the NG to have effective interoperability with its civilian counterparts and to understand how they operate. This understanding will improve the NG response, but as he pointed out, while the education programs are improving, a shortfall still exists in educating “military members” on the state process. He went on to point out there are differences in culture, terminology, and doctrine.

3. NPS NG Certificate Program

- Q20: What benefit do you anticipate having completed from this program?

The respondents indicated that they gained a better knowledge, understanding, and appreciation for the missions of homeland security and civil support. Forty percent indicated a competitive advantage, such as “12 hours towards a post graduate degree,” as benefits of completion of this program. One respondent anticipated now having a better understanding of the issues and how to better provide the support. The respondent indicated; “Having a better working knowledge of homeland security and the issues surrounding it. Understanding support to civil authorities more.” Another anticipated
understanding the role in homeland security and the future missions, stating, “Better understanding of the role the ARNG [Army National Guard] plays in Homeland Security and better chance of ‘doing the right thing’ to support that mission in future assignments.” Having a better understanding for the complexity of homeland security and homeland defense was anticipated by one participant, who stated, “I now have a much greater appreciation for the complexity of HLDS [homeland defense and security].”

- **Q21:** Would you recommend this program to other members of your state?

When the graduates were asked the question, their responses were overwhelmingly positive. One hundred percent responded in a yes or stronger. For example, one exclaimed, “Absolutely!!! It’s vital our leaders (officers and Sr. NCOs) understand the importance of their mission and are planning ahead to ensure a quick response when our communities need us.” Another respondent indicated respondent learned there was a lot to learn when exposed to the education. He remarked, “Without question. I didn't realize how ignorant I was in my understanding of HLDS until I completed this program.”

- **Q22:** Would you recommend this program to other states?

The responses were the same; 100 percent responded positively. One indicated there is a benefit for senior leaders in the NG as well: “Yes. This course is very beneficial for any senior leadership in the guard.”

- **Q23:** Because of this course, are you better equipped to perform homeland security mission in your state? In what ways did this course accomplish this?

One hundred percent of the respondents indicated “yes” they are better able to perform the homeland security and civil support missions in their state after completion of this course. The accomplishments were, as leaders, they had a better understanding of the “why” during the event; the “complexities and concepts,” including the understanding of the “interdependence” of all levels of responders; and the military process for support. One respondent indicated this helped him to “think outside the military box”. He stated,
“Yes. The course explained the various participants in homeland security, opened perspectives and caused us to think outside the military box to develop and resolve issues.”

- Q24: Did this course help you to understand the Guard’s role in homeland security? In what ways did the course do this?

  One hundred percent of the respondents indicated, yes, they have a better understanding of the NG role in homeland security. The course expanded their knowledge of the NG role in homeland security, the border security issues, the NGO [non-governmental organizations] involvement and the understanding of the civilian hierarchy, lines of communication and authority, as well as the limitations of the NG.

- Q25: Because of this course, are you better equipped to perform Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission in your state? In what ways did this course accomplish this?

  Eighty percent answered, “Yes, without question.” The remaining 20 percent gave an indication that they better understand the concepts and role of DSCA. One respondent gained an understanding of the insight into the military’s role as well as the public’s “lean toward the military for order” view; the respondent stated, “Yes. The NIMS course and understanding the support role of the ARNG in DSCA was important. The public always leans toward the military for order, discipline and direction which is contrary to this mission.” Another respondent indicated a better understanding the knowledge to mission accomplishment; the respondent explained, “Yes. I now understand the roles, abilities and restraints of the many participants. This knowledge is key to accomplishing missions.”

- Q26: Did this course help you to understand the Guard’s role in defense support of civil authorities? In what ways did the course accomplish this?

  Again, 80 percent responded “yes,” and 20 percent indicated the belief that the class discussion could have been expanded further. One respondent indicated a better understanding of how respondents fit into the response to natural disasters by explaining,
“We talked about so many things from Pandemic Influenza to natural disasters. Missouri has experienced their share of ‘state emergencies’ in recent years. This course helped explain why we were there and how we fit in.”

- Q27: Any other comments or observations about this course?

Eighty percent responded to this question with favorable comments. One respondent stressed that the students must understand the time commitment needed for this certificate program and indicated:

Ensure students understand the commitment they're making. We had almost a 50% drop rate from the start of the course between Phoenix and Springfield. A few were for deployments. Most were for lack of time and/or keeping up with assignments...

The other respondents gave a variety of comments regarding the value and need for this program. For example, one said, “I really enjoyed this class and I have benefited from it in many ways. I hope that your state would see the benefits as well. Good luck”. Another respondent indicated that he understood that the program was being “canceled” and that such cancellation will be a mistake, as he explained:

I believe it was Gen. McKinley that stated that ‘Defending our homeland is job one’. Yet, as I understand it, the NGB has cancelled funding for this program. I think that is a critical mistake that we will pay for down the road.

One respondent stated this program should be directed towards those NG officers working in the DOMS area: “Yes. I think this should be encouraged for National Guard Officers especially those working in the DOMS or those type of positions.”

Their responses indicated the need and desire for more education and their overwhelming approval of this program that provided much-needed education. Although some comments indicated that it was a tough program, the overall assessment was that the education was well worth the effort.
4. Local Responders Participate in Education

- Q28: Would having other responders (local, tribal, state, and federal; EMS; fire, law enforcement) as participants in this course bring value to the course? In what way?

One hundred percent of the respondents indicated that having other responders would be of benefit, and two of them made strong positive indications. One respondent indicated that this would add value to the course and would provide an opportunity to meet the people that they would work with in a disaster. The respondent stated, “Yes—this would bring added value to the course. It only makes sense because these are the people we will work with during a disaster.” This respondent, who was a student from NGB, commented on the limited experience:

YES! I was one of three NGB Soldiers in the course. Everyone else was a Missouri Guardsman. The breadth and depth of experiences/knowledge outside the MOARNG [Missouri Army National Guard] was limited. Having outside agencies included would have fostered the relationship needed between the agencies and expanded the knowledge base within the class.

The last respondents indicated other participants would expand the discussion and experience, as one respondent stated:

Yes. It would allow a broader discussion. We were limited because the majority of the class participants had limited experience and knowledge of homeland security and defense. Persons in civilian employment would balance the military aspects.

5. Use of Funds

The issue on use of funds is still problematic, because even if the money is available, the NG must still have express authorization to use the money for the specific purpose for which the funds were designated. If the use is not authorized for a particular purpose, the funds cannot be expended, as the use would become a violation of law. In short, the user must have basic authority to commit the money, as it can only be utilized for the purpose for which it was given.
In short, there are three main conditions that must be met in order for the NG to spend federal money: 1) must have the money; 2) must have the authority to spend it; and 3) must spend it for the right purpose. Unless all three conditions are met, any expense of the money will cause violations.

6. **Readiness Impact on NG for the Federal War-Fighter Mission**

- Q29: What effect will this education program have on readiness for the federal war fight mission?

The following were the responses to this question (Table 8):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the respondents were very positive with their responses; there were no negative responses. One respondent stated that the education will improve the NG response: “Will enhance it. The line between Federal and Civil Support missions is no longer clear. They need to complement each other.” Another respondent added the education will improve effectiveness in dealing with local and state missions as well as the overseas mission because “It enables military personnel to work with civilian government at the State and local level. This can translate into better relations when dealing with local governments overseas, such as community support in Iraq.” Another respondent, who had a slightly different view on the positive effect dealing with the overseas mission, pointed out that “The guard has always had the ability to be flexible and in many cases in the asymmetric fight in Iraq guard units have performed better. This will only improve the guard and reserve forces ability to understand a more dynamic ‘war fight.’”

7. **Different Education**

- Q30: What similarities exist in the National Guard capabilities and/or education for federal “go to war mission” and the homeland security or defense support for civil authorities or civil support missions?
Seventy percent of the respondents indicated similarities exist between the different missions, particularly in the areas of planning, coordinating, logistics, security and transportation. One respondent brought up the point about the funding the NG receives, all of which is intended for the “go to war mission” and none for the DSCA mission. One respondent stated that the capabilities overlap but the integration is different: “Capabilities overlap tremendously. Mechanisms for integrating those capabilities are distinctly different.” Another respondent felt that the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and Incident Command System (ICS) are similar, explaining that the difference lies in the state laws controlling the employment of NG, “MDMP and ICS are similar and most guardsmen can understand the basic concepts. It is the differences that exist within each state’s unique set of laws that govern our employment.”

8. **DoD Priority**

- Q31: What is the priority of effort between homeland security, defense support for civil authorities, civil support missions? Why?

Below is the response:

For DOD, Homeland Defense (HLD) remains a top priority. However, OIF and OEF are taking center stage and often referred to as the “away games” for DOD HLD requirements. There is broad recognition within the National Guard and at USNORTHCOM that the majority of our time and effort will be dedicated toward conducting DSCA. Several strategic-level documents (NSS, NDS, NMS, SPG, QDR, etc.) highlight DOD priorities and drive the inter-related systems used to develop, capture, and program/budget for DOD requirements and resources.

The NG Advisor listed the priority for DoD as homeland defense. The NG Advisor also indicated that there will be more time spent on DSCA for the NG and USNORTHCOM. This point will be addressed later in this thesis.

**F. CONCLUSION**

This chapter reviewed the survey data from the DOMS and recent graduates of the Naval Postgraduate NG Certificate Program and their views on NG education in the homeland security and civil support. The interview data was also discussed. Each part of
the data was categorized by the topics used later in this thesis. In their response to the educational topics, respondents gave comments aiding in developing a prioritized list of topics, thoughts on who should attend, and the value of different degree programs. While the need for education is evident, one main point noted was the lack of education on the state response process. The next area discussed was reasons for the gap in education and what types of programs could be initiated that would most efficiently eliminate this gap. The inclusion of civilian first responders in these programs would contribute to a shared understanding of the civilian and military members’ roles and responsibilities in a response and aid in reducing the gap. The next topic addressed the NPS NG Certificate Program and the value the students received from the completion of the course. The last topic addressed the use of funds, impact on readiness, and the perceived DoD priority. These topics generated several areas of discussion, the primary points of which will be addressed in the next chapter.
IV. CLOSING THE GAP

This chapter will first examine the challenges in closing the gap and then the benefits derived from the various ways to close the identified gap. Several considerations included in the discussion of how to close the gap are current policies, available education, acceptance of new missions, and mission assignment. This chapter will also look into the impact this education will have on readiness and time commitment for the NG. The last part will explore several potential courses of action to close the gap in education.

A. THE CHALLENGES IN CLOSING THIS GAP

The process of researching this area revealed several challenges leading to the gap in education pertinent for the NG in preparing for its new missions. Opportunities to consider in closing the existing gap include: the DoD acceptance of the civil support mission, funding, education priorities, lack of coordination between DHS and DoD, and the impact on readiness. This section will discuss these considerations in closing the gap.


One of the challenges for the needed education of the NG is how the state process for disaster response is established. The federal government has directed that all disaster response will be conducted in a consistent manner and that several concepts be developed and implemented. Using the survey data to assist in determining area of importance, the DOMS were asked to rate topics as to their importance. The results of their ratings show the following priorities, with 1 being the top priority:

1. Critical infrastructure protection;
2. Homeland security doctrine, policy, structure, purpose;
3. Roles of federal, local, and state organizations in homeland security;
4. Strategic planning for homeland security;
5. Terrorism;
6. Homeland security issues, duty status, laws, regulation;

Interestingly, these topics tie in very closely with those covered in the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program. Continuing with the survey data, the respondents were asked questions about their views on these topics. The responses to the questions identified the following as areas in which the NG should be educated, as shown in the response from a respondent:


Responses to survey question when asked what changes should DoD make to educate the NG the respondent gave the following comments:

All DOD members who may be involved in conducting DSCA missions or those who conduct interagency coordination should be required to complete FEMA courses on ICS, NRF, NIMS, and MACS. Additionally, completion of the ARNORTH conducted DSCA course should be mandatory for all DOD personnel who may have a potential role in conducting DSCA operations.

A common belief is that all DoD personnel should take the above listed courses to understand how the homeland security process works. The problem is, except for the USARNORTH DSCA course, there is no organized method to obtain this education except by independent study, and independent study only happens when an individual has an interest in this area. Most military personnel have so many other education courses to complete in both formal and distance learning settings that they have neither the time to seek this education nor the incentive to do so.

The areas mentioned above are what drive the current state response process and the system used to manage a disaster. Because the NG provides the first military
responders, these military members must know the response process in order to be quick and effective in providing the capabilities needed by the locals in overcoming the disaster.

2. Educate on the State Response Process

The National Response Framework is the federal plan on how to respond to disasters in the nation. This has changed how the states will respond to disasters. The following statement from the report *Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe Ready or Not* stresses this point, “A National Response Framework describes how the federal government will work with state, local and tribal governments as well as the private sector and nongovernmental organizations during domestic incidents” (Wormuth and Witkowsky, 2008, p. vi). The NG has not been trained on this process or any of the other changes by the federal or state governments. This is one of the key reasons for the gap in education for the NG.

To assist the NG in understanding homeland security at the state level, curriculum should be developed that will educate the NG leadership in the disaster response process and their role as responders to a disaster. This will allow the NG leadership to conduct a mission analysis on its part to develop the training to accomplish the mission. To meet this objective, the education received by NG leadership should be taught consistently across the country and presented in a relevant manner as noted in the survey responders, (under the educational topic section, Chapter III) to the NG citizen-soldier’s constraints of time, family, and civilian career. This education can be achieved by developing educational courses to address this need and the topics addressed in the research. During a review of the existing courses available in homeland security several possible options for presenting this education to the NG members were revealed.
3. **DoD More Readily Accepts the Civil Support Mission, Assigns to the NG**

DoD continues to resist accepting the civil support mission and continues to focus on the homeland defense mission. The statement by Wormouth and Witkowsky supports this and suggests the need for change:

…the next administration should make very clear that DoD will no longer hold the civil support mission at arm’s length and will be expected to play a very significant supporting role in the aftermath of a catastrophic event—a role that will require that DoD resource, train, and equip its forces accordingly. (2008, p. viii)

Wormuth and Witkowsky (2008) point out the need for DoD to train its forces for the response process. Because the NG forces are the first to be committed to a disaster response, educating and training them in the appropriate response measures is a requirement. The writers also went on to say, “…DoD will be expected to play a significant supporting role in catastrophe, working within the HSPD-5 framework” (Wormouth and Witkowsky 2008, p. viii). This concept ties in with the previous comments about training the NG on HSPD-5, NRF, NIMS; currently, the NG does not train on this. A safe assumption is that the country will continue to experience disasters of all sizes and will need agencies to help respond to include the military, specifically the NG.

Currently, DoD’s focus for education and training is on the homeland defense mission and fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Closing the gap in education caused by the exclusive training on homeland defense will necessitate DoD to accept its role in homeland security or civil support missions, establish mission priorities, and apply funds to these missions. This is pointed out in the Commission on the Guard and Reserves in “Recommendation Two:”

Congress should codify the Department of Defense’s responsibility to provide support for civil authorities. This statutory language should include the acknowledgment that responding to nature and man-made disasters in the homeland is a core competency of DOD, of equal importance to its combat responsibilities. Congress should also clearly state that DOD should be prepared to provide the bulk of the response to a
major catastrophe that incapacitates civilian government over a substantial geographic area and that DOD should initiate the necessary planning, training, and coordination for such events. (2008, p. 14)

DoD can task this requirement to the NGB to work this project and provide information to the SecDef. DHS must work with DoD in identifying the tasks DoD will be responsible for accomplishing when the military is deployed for a civil support mission directed specifically for the NG. The GAO, Gilmore Commission, and Commission on the Guard and Reserves have all addressed the need to shift support to the civil support missions to include the application of money and education. Congress may have to continue to urge DoD to accept, plan for, supply resources, and prepare for the civil support missions.

DoD can more readily accept this mission and give the priority of response to the NG with the active duty military serving as a backup as needed. This is the reverse process DoD uses for the homeland defense mission; the active duty have the priority and the NG backs them up as needed. An easy way that the NG could receive training would be for DoD to authorize the NG to train on the civil support mission during the one-month training assembly per year. This training would greatly support the NG capacity in providing and improving disaster response. If DoD accepts the mission and would work to allow funds to be used for this mission, the education and training would work for both the state and federal mission, and the NG could train for the federal civil support mission and use the education during state responses. This would help eliminate one of the gaps in the education for NG.

4. National Guard Trains for the Homeland Defense Mission

The NG priority is to train for the homeland defense mission; this is driven based on the purpose for which funds are received and guidance is received from DoD. This could change if DoD were to accept the civil support mission.

In 2004, when the Rand Arroyo Center researchers explored how the Army could react to homeland security missions, they came up with five possibilities, the first of which addressed the argument within this thesis. The researchers stated:
Possibility 1: The National Guard is inadequately prepared because of its focus on conventional warfare.

Army response 1: Improve National Guard homeland security capabilities by providing funds and facilitating the sharing of state assets. DoD funding would be provided for training that enhances a state’s homeland security capability. Legislative changes would facilitate use of one state’s soldiers in another state by making laws uniform and extending legal protections to guardsmen performing homeland security. (Rand, 2004, p. 1)

The above excerpt points to the idea of using federal funds to help the NG train for the state mission, which could also be used as the federal mission for civil support.

5. Appropriate Use of Funds

The Rand excerpt above addresses several points regarding funding that is of significance for this section. This section addresses the possibility of directing funds to support the state missions, develop training/education for state homeland security, and change existing laws governing the use of NG personnel across state lines. Per the interview with the USPFO in Chapter III, the three main conditions for the use of federal funds are that the federal government would have to give the money to the state NG, give the state authorization to use or spend the federal money for state use for the NG to do state-level training, and allow the NG to utilize the money for the intended purpose.

The appropriate use of funds may be the most complicated change that must happen in order for these educational programs to succeed. The laws and policies on the use of funds will have to be changed or modified by Congress to allow the NG to use federal funds in order to train for civil support missions that the NG would perform in either a State Active Duty status or a Title 32 status. In order for this to occur, Congress would have to approve the use of funds for this purpose when it decides on the appropriation of funds.

The other option is that if DoD accepts the homeland security or civil support missions and assigns them to the NG, then the NG could train for the federal mission that could also be used to support the local and state authorities. If each unit in the NG could
be authorized to spend up to 16 hours (one weekend drill) performing education and training for potential civil support mission, this preparation would be an initial step in preparing the NG to conduct such missions and close this gap. Presently, for NG units assigned a civil disturbance mission, one weekend a year is allotted for them to train for that assigned mission. These units are trained to conduct the mission in all three duty statuses and will be activated before Title 10 troops are sent to the mission site. Just as each state is allowed to conduct civil disturbance training, each state should be allowed to assign civil support missions to its NG units based on the assessment of need.

6. Lack of Collaboration Between DHS and DoD on Common Missions

DHS has not yet collaborated with DoD on the civil support missions that they will expect DoD to support. Without this collaboration, it is difficult for DoD to perform the mission analysis needed in order to develop the education and training standards and then disseminate those to the NG to accomplish. The following statement supports this point: “According to DoD, NORTHCOM cannot conduct comprehensive planning for civil support until DHS establishes civil support requirements” (Gilmore Commission 2002, pp. K-12-13). Several commission reports previously mentioned have addressed the need for this collaboration, but DHS has not completed this task. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves noted in its report that DHS has yet to provide DoD with the requirements needed for mission analysis by DoD; “DHS has not demonstrated a commitment to assuming its responsibility as the lead agency for identifying the requirement that the DoD must meet to adequately perform domestic civil support missions” (2008, p. 13). To close this gap, Congress may have to pass legislation to force compliance or tie collaboration to funding in order to achieve completion of this task. These points were noted in the Commission on the Guard and Reserves in “Recommendation Five,” as listed in the Executive Summary:

In accordance with S1815 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, should generate civil support requirements, which the Department of Defense will be responsible for validation as appropriate. DOD should include civil support requirement in its programming and budgeting. As part of their effort, DOD should
determine existing capabilities from all components that could fulfill civil support requirements and rebalance them where appropriate (consistent with their other obligations), shifting capabilities determined to be required for state-controlled reposed to domestic emergencies to the National Guard, and shifting capabilities currently resident in the National Guard that are nor required fore its state missions but are required for its federal missions either to the federal reserves components or to the active duty military, as appropriate. (2008, p. 15)

The commission recommended changes in funds and for the DoD to accept the mission of civil support. There have been several commissions that have noticed the same basic points that are gaps in the education and mission that must be corrected.

7. Readiness Impact on NG for the Federal War-Fighter Mission

Readiness is extremely important to a military unit; anything that distracts from readiness is legitimately eliminated. Commands and/or careers are decided on the ability of units to be ready to complete the mission. While it can be argued that education in homeland security necessarily detracts from the war-fighter mission, this training should have minimal effect on unit readiness. It will be important for new personnel to obtain this education to help them understand their positions and to perform the duties more efficiently. The education could potentially enhance readiness by providing better-educated military personnel who are able to see the bigger picture, understand the mission better, and can adapt more quickly to a changing environment. This education will produce better leaders for the NG and create more capable units by increasing their readiness in the homeland security arena. In response to the DOMS survey, question 29, asking about potential effects education would have on readiness, 70 percent of respondents said it would have a positive impact, while 30 percent said there is no impact on the federal war-fighting.

B. THE EDUCATIONAL OPTIONS

This research has focused on the educational requirements for the NG in the area of response process and the new mission for homeland security, civil support, and DSCA. During the interview with NORTHCOM’s NG advisor, he suggested the following
educational topics: “Defense Support of Civil Authorities is DODs responsibility under the National Response Framework IAW HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 (including the recent annex 1)” (McClellan, April, 2008). This research has uncovered a gap in the education of the NG in these new mission areas. Further review has identified some areas that have contributed to the gap.

1. Need for Education

A review of the courses offered in homeland security, civil support, or DSCA revealed there are few opportunities for the NG leadership to obtain education in these areas. Given the recognized lack of education for NG leadership in civil support, it is clear that the leadership would benefit through an increased understanding of its role in the response process and the missions under the umbrella of civil support. To achieve this, a standardized education for the NG that is presented in a consistent and user-friendly manner must be developed. Unfortunately, the educational opportunities available to the NG are few in number due to limited courses, student quotas, and the required time for the courses. Often the amount of time needed for the NG members to attend the education programs that are currently available is prohibitive, given the fact that many of the NG members needing to take the courses are employed full-time in the civilian sector. Time for education is always at a premium and challenging to find; on the other hand, the cost for not educating personnel is very high. The importance of this education means that time must be found. In short, the few courses available do not have enough relevance or depth of material to educate a sufficient number of NG leaders across the nation to the degree needed before responding to a disaster.

2. Education on State Process

For the NG leadership to understand its role in homeland security or civil support missions, there are some topics on which they should be educated, all of which were reviewed earlier in Chapters II and III as part of the survey data. A significant point taken from this data is that the NG should have a course that covers the state process of disaster response. Responses to question one asking for suggested education topics that
the NG should emphasize for the leadership indicated the topic of the state level response was a high priority. One respondent to the question eight (dealing with what educational topics the NG leadership should emphasize to accomplish the homeland security mission) replied, “Recognize the importance of developing sound working relationships with mission partners before an event. Learn and understand cultural differences that can prevent successful collaboration, communication, and coordination with mission partners.” The NG mission partners will be the state personnel; it is important the NG understand state priorities and have a good working relationship with state personnel in order to be successful. One response to question 13, which probed the perceived willingness of NG members within the various states to work on a bachelor’s degree, was:

The biggest shortfall in education is learning how to conduct successful interagency operations for domestic incidents with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. This is a huge challenge for most military members because they do not understand how their civilian counterparts train and organize for preparedness (pre-event) and response (post-event) activities in the homeland.

This indicates the importance in educating on how the state process works to reduce confusion during the response. Also noted above is the point that the NG must work with first responders and emergency management personnel. The respondent went on to say there is a difference in culture, doctrine, and terminology between the military and other agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, which must be understood and addressed before the response to a disaster can be successful. In reference to question 2, proposing changes or additions to DoD offerings of NG education in order to meet the homeland security role, indicated a need for education on the state response process. A review of current courses offered shows that state disaster response is an area not covered in the current courses in the DoD inventory. This need could be filled by a 40-hour course.
3. Education Delivery Options and Methods

The first option is to develop a course similar to USARNORTH Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) course, but with the objective to cover the state response process and related issues. This option will be referred to as the short course. A potential topic outline for this course is listed in Appendix I.

The second option is an advanced degree option which is intended to develop an understanding of homeland security, the NG’s role and its expectations as well as those of civilian authorities. If the advanced degree option is to have any value beyond the short course, any course work done should be accredited for or credited toward an advanced degree program. The ideal course would be the combination of a program similar to the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program, adding the above short course at the graduate level and developing more courses that would allow the students to earn a master’s degree in homeland security. Responses to the DOMS survey, question 10, dealing with the levels at which this education program should be directed to be most effective for the NG, included the following thought:

I believe it is a mix of all four [degree options]. I have not found people interested in HLS when openly approached. However, when they are exposed, then they become more interested. So I believe that a program structured with certification on through graduate level would be the most successful.

Other responses tended toward supporting a certificate program as being the best option due to the fact that “staff positions for our Domestic Operations branch rotate frequently”. Ideally, allowing first responders and emergency management personnel to participate in both options along with the military would increase the learning as well as networking opportunities. This interaction would allow for the establishment of trust before the disaster, a common understanding of each others’ roles, and the appropriate response processes. All the survey respondents from the NG Certificate Program agreed that having other responders at the course would benefit the participants, as brought out by their responses to question 28, if having other responders as participants in the course would bring value to the course. Their answers were: “Yes—this would bring added
value to the course. It only makes sense because these are the people we will work with during a disaster”. As a result of these responses, these two options will be explored more in depth later in this chapter.

A justification for the advanced degree option is that the military now requires all officers to have a bachelor’s degree before receiving a commission. As a result, the advanced degree options will be of interest to the officer core. By the time the enlisted reach the leadership level of E-5 to E-7, most have completed a bachelor’s degree also. Responses to question 10, dealing with the education levels that would be most effective for the NG, showed these results: 30 percent of the respondents indicated a certificate was sufficient, 25 percent chose a graduate degree, and 15 percent said a combination of all four options was preferred. An advantage of the advanced degree option is that the degree program can be completed in a few years by going part-time to obtain the needed hours versus a bachelor’s degree which requires four years going full time. The bachelor’s degree option is not conducive for the NG leadership. Respondents of the survey point out their preferences very clearly. Question 12, which probed the willingness of respondents to work on a bachelor’s degree in homeland security, revealed that 75 percent of the respondents selected a bachelor’s degree as being of “low importance to the NG”. In regard to the advanced degree option, it has many inherent problems to overcome, e.g., finding colleges that would support this option, time required to work the issues, and finding qualified instructors. In general, respondents also displayed low interest towards an advanced degree program, as revealed by their answers to the survey data questions 14, their willingness to work on a master’s degree in homeland security, and 15, the willingness of NG members to work on a master’s degree in homeland security. Responses were almost equally split between an advanced degree being or not being a priority. Consequently, based on the research data derived from the responses, the continued pursuit of the advanced degree option is not recommended, leaving the short course options as the more viable ones.
C. COURSE OF ACTION PROCESS

1. Process

To compare the different options, this thesis will use the Army course of action comparison process used in the military decision making process. The course of action comparison consists of several steps which will be outlined below and developed in the next sections. The first step is to develop the comparison criteria which are the dominating or governing factors that will help determine the suitability and feasibility of the courses of action. In the development process, some comparisons are used to cover broad areas and may not be very sound in detail but is still an option; hence, the reason for the process to determine the suitability and feasibility. The second step is the comparison method or process and display of the comparison. The last step is the recommendation based on the comparison.

The comparison criteria are the major important points that will determine the suitability and feasibility of one course of action over another. This weighting factor is normally designated at the start of the development of courses of action based on factors that the higher organization determines to be significant. The criteria used for the comparison will be:

- Time to implement program is defined as the amount of time required to develop and implement the program nationwide, or to make the educational programs functional or operational.

- Time commitment by students refers the amount of time taken away from the family and employer in order to complete the educational program as well as the student time required to complete the program.

- Throughput of students is the estimated number of students who can be educated on the material in the least amount of time.

- Depth or quality of education is determined by the applicability and usefulness of the educational material and the depth to which the students are exposed to in the education program.
Impact on readiness is the effect the education will have on the units, NG, state and their capability to integrate quickly when needed for a disaster or for the current war effort.

Expense to establish program refers to the start-up costs of the program as well as the sustainment costs.

Educational value to NG is defined as the degree of value that the knowledge gained will have for the response and civil support missions of the NG.

The comparison method or process is the application of the criteria to the course of action and applying a number of one, two, or three; a lower number is a better rating, a higher number is a less desirable rating; and each is based on the analysis. Justification will be used to allow the reader to understand the points and agree or disagree with the assigned points. Given that this is a subjective part of the process, the more people involved in completing the comparison will improve the outcome. The last step is to make a recommendation based on the display method which presents a decision matrix for each of the courses of action compared. Justifications will be given as to why one was selected over the others. The last part of the chapter is the comparison of the different COA options’ using the same process.

2. Short Courses COA and Comparison

There are several possible courses of action (COA) for closing the gap, all of which provide standardized education to the NG leadership. The option explored is the short educational course that would consist of a distance-learning phase followed by a one-week in residence phase. Both phases would focus on the local and state response process for the NG leadership. This section will explore each possible COA based on the short course and provide a comparative analysis of each. There are four developed COAs that will be addressed below.
a. **COA 1: USARNORTH Develops or Incorporates This Course into Its DSCA Course**

The first COA, the short course, would be a stand-alone course based on the same concepts as the USARNORTH DSCA course. An alternate option is to incorporate the short course with the USARNORTH DSCA course, as the USARNORTH DSCA course is a close fit for meeting the needs of the proposed NG short course. This inclusion would cause problems for the DSCA students as it would extend the second phase by another week. This additional time and the relevance of the material for some participants may negatively impact current attendees who cannot stay the added days. Under this COA, USARNORTH would manage the course with the net result that NGB would have limited control of this course’s content.

The advantages for this COA include the already existing set-up for phase I of the distance-learning program, as well as the update system in phase III, both of which would be very beneficial to this course. Question 2 of the DOMS survey intended to identify changes or additions DoD should make to educate the NG for the homeland security role, brought a range of responses indicating that NIMS rated as a priority for necessary education for the NG. The NIMS requirement for the USARNORTH DSCA course would meet this need, as the interview with the NORTHCOM advisor indicated NIMS being equally as important. He stated, “Understand and become familiar with HSPD-5, HSPD-8, National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident Management System (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS)…” The USARNORTH DSCA course could be required as a prerequisite to cover these phases of information. This COA would provide another opportunity for NORTHCOM via USARNORTH to coordinate with NGB for the course development and instruction. Opening up the state-level course to all first responders and emergency management personnel would expand the field of participants, provide greater value to the homeland security community through consistent education across all levels, and offer a means for all participants to become knowledgeable on common concerns. All responses to the survey question 28, which queried if having other responders as participants in the course would bring value to it, showed this as a very beneficial option. Ultimately, this would benefit the nation by
bringing all types and levels of responders together instead of only the military and DoD civilians, as is now the case with the USARNORTH DSCA.

A disadvantage for this COA is that NGB would have diminished ability to make any modifications to the course. The states also would not be able to modify the course to cover their specific laws and process. Another disadvantage of this course is that it would not be available to first responders or emergency management personnel at local and state levels. An alternative would be that if USARNORTH developed a separate course and deliver it in the states, the states could be given a block of time for the state specific laws and allow first responders or emergency management personnel to attend. Unfortunately, there is little or no motivation for USARNORTH to implement this COA.

b. COA 2: NGB Develops and Teaches Program

The second COA would be for the NGB to develop an educational course and teach it in the states. NGB should teach this course as it would apply directly to the NG civil support mission. The course should address issues that pertain to the missions required at the state level and the state process utilized in facilitating response as this is part of the identified gap in education. NGB should take the lead, as the Active Duty (DoD) does not understand or have experience with the state-level response. Responses to DOMS survey question concerning who should teach (DoD or colleges) this course more effectively, 42 percent indicated DoD, 28 percent indicated both, and 15 percent indicated public or private colleges or universities. Responses supported the following argument for NGB being the proponent of the education: “If done by DoD, NGB should be the proponent, as the active component does not understand how the majority of situations, which are those not elevated above state level, are handled.”

Taking the course on the road to the states’ NG headquarters would also allow local and state first responders and emergency management personnel to attend this course, which would help them to understand the process of coordinating their work with the NG personnel and to become familiar with the military ways of operating. This course, if offered around the country, would help to reduce travel costs and time away
from home for the participants. This course should be developed and taught with a block of instruction that would be modified to fit each state’s unique situation and laws. NGB should establish this program with a specific distance-learning course to prepare the students for a face-to-face session. The USARNORTH DSCA course could be required as a prerequisite for admission into this course to cover the Phase I and III material. The requirement to complete the National Incident Management System courses (ICS 100, 200, 700, and 800) should also be included for the distance-learning phase I. NGB could contract this course out for the development and instruction with its oversight.

Advantages for this COA are increased access for NG leadership to the education, reduction in cost, and provide a consistent presentation across the country. An appealing advantage for NG personnel is the reduction in the time that NG leaders would be away from work and families, yet it would still allow them the opportunity to receive the necessary education to understand the NG’s state role in civil support missions. If this course is conducted at the state level, then this would allow the development of close working relationships with the other responders. NGB would assume the costs related to development and implementation of the course. Disadvantages of this COA are the time and money required to set up this option.

c. **COA 3: States Develop and Teach Program**

The third COA would be for each state to develop and instruct an educational course with guidance from NGB on required topics, thus allowing the states to have specific focus on their particular state laws and processes. The advantage of this COA is that each state could specifically tailor its program to meet its unique needs and practices. By controlling who attends this course, the state would have the capability to allow local and state first responders and emergency management personnel to participate. This should be coordinated between the NG J7 training, the DOMS, and the state emergency management agency. The disadvantages of this COA are, first, that the states would have to develop their own detailed program, which would demand time and resources that they do not have; and, secondly, there would be little consistency in the
training across the nation, as each state would probably conduct this course differently. Finally, each state would have to develop a method to update past students on any changes to the process or procedures used.

d. COA 4: Do Nothing

The fourth COA is to do nothing and not make changes in the present status quo. This would require the NG leadership to learn by experience or by seeking out the courses on its own and piecing the needed information together to accomplish the mission. No advantages were revealed during this analysis. The disadvantage for this COA is it does not close the gap in the demonstrated need for this education.

3. Short Course Comparison Decision Matrix and Justification

The comparison criteria and justification for the various COAs for the short course are explained in the following section, a lower score is better (see Table 9).

a. Time to Implement Program

Table 9. Short Course Decision Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>COA 1</th>
<th>COA 2</th>
<th>COA 3</th>
<th>COA 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time to implement program</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time commitment by students</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throughput of students</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth or quality of material</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on readiness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expense to establish program</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational value to NG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- COA 1 program was rated as 1 because little time would be required to add this course to the already existing instructional materials.

- COA 2 program was rated as 2. Although National Guard Bureau would require more time to develop this course, it could still use the USAR NORTH course as a prerequisite for enrolling in this course, as well as a tracking system to verify completion of prerequisite course.
COA 3 program was rated as 3 because more time and personnel would be required for the states to develop the program and so the disadvantages heavily outweigh any of its advantages.

COA 4 was rated as 3; doing nothing does not close the education gap, this still entails a cost; that the cost is in time lost and expended human capital trying to cope with the status quo.

b. Time Commitment by Students

COAs 1-3 were all rated as 1, and there was not a significant variation in time commitments; there was not any advantage for any specific COA.

COA 4 was rated as 3 because learning the material by sorting through multiple courses consumes time.

c. Throughput of Students

COA 1 was rated as 2 because the addition of a second week to the program taught by USARNORTH, which would potentially reduce the number of students attending this program.

COA 2 was rated as 1 because this course if National Guard Bureau should be able to set up this one week course quickly. By taking this course to the state will increasing the number of students who can attend and complete this course.

COA 3 was rated as 2 because 54 states and territories would be required to set up this course, which could potentially create variations of the materials and focus of the course instruction.

COA 4 was given a 3 because having to seek out the information would require a time commitment that most NG personnel would not pursue in order to find the information, the courses or have the time and/or financial ability to attend.

d. Depth or Quality of Education

COA 1 was rated as 2 because USARNORTH would have problems finding the information to develop the course so that it would include the instruction for the NG at the state and local levels. However, since USARNORTH has demonstrated quality of
instruction in the development and delivery of its own course, it should be able to continue the same quality for a NG course.

- COA 2 was rated as 1 because the National Guard Bureau should have the best information and the best experience to draw upon in the process during the developing the course content. The National Guard Bureau has access to more resources for developing courses than the states and should be able to provide quality course development.

- COA 3 was rated as 2 because the states would undoubtedly all vary the course’s construction and content. Finally, tempo of development and implementation would be determined by the states’ limitations of resources and staff.

- COA 4 was rated as 3 because of the need for the NG students to find the required education pieces by sorting through many courses. The number and variety of courses available would no doubt vary in quality of education, and thus diminishing their overall value to the NG which requires consistency in subject matter across the nation.

e. Impact on Readiness

- COAs 1-3 were rated as 1 because there should not be differences in the effect of the NG’s readiness.

- COA 4 was rated as 3 since this option would require increased travel for the student in order for them to take courses to gain the required education.

f. Expense to Establish Program

- COA 1 was rated as 1 because the addition to an already existing course should have minimal effect for the program’s development.

- COA 2 was rated as 2 since the National Guard Bureau would have to develop a program, which involves new expenses. Although NGB may opt to hire a contractor to develop the course, expenses for the development would still have to be met.

- COA 3 was rated as 3 due to the fact that the states’ development of the course would involve the great expense. Having the states develop this would multiply the NG development expense by 54 times (the number of states and territories).
COA 4 was rated as 3 because the DoD to have students search for the necessary courses and to travel to those sites, which would increase the expenses for travel.

g. **Educational Value to the NG**

- COA 1 was rated as 2 because USARNORTH may potentially have difficulty understanding the implications and differences of the response means at local, state, and federal levels. Since USARNORTH personnel do not work at the state level, they do not have a strong incentive to develop this course addition.

- COA 2 was rated as 1 because the National Guard Bureau should better understand the need for this education, and they should also accordingly produce the valuable education that the NG leadership requires.

- COA 3 was rated as 1 since each state’s knowledge of its own response process and its understanding of the differences between the different response modes of operations would aid in the development of a valuable course. As each state recognizes the need for the education to fill the gap, each would be motivated to develop its own course.

- COA 4 was rated as 3 because this option would have little value to the NG due to the amount of work and time required to obtain the education.

The total for COA 1 is 10, COA 2 is 9, COA 3 is 13, and COA 4 is 21. Following the process established earlier, the preferred COA is COA 2, which is National Guard Bureau establish this one-week course. The categories of throughput of students and depth or quality of education were the two determining factors in this COA.

4. **Another COA: Implement the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program**

This is another course of action that does not fit into the short course options but is worth taking a look at as an alternate COA to close the gap in NG education. The Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program, offered to the NG leadership in two trial states but then discontinued, provided valuable training and arguably should be returned to educational offerings for the NG. In the survey of the
Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate participants, all respondents answered “Yes” to questions 21 and 22 asking if this program would be recommended not only to their states, but to all states. In regard to question 24, if the course aided in understanding the Guard’s role in homeland security, 100 percent of the respondents agreed that the course was beneficial in gaining understanding the NG role in homeland security. Eighty percent of respondents indicated this course help them to understand the NG role in DSCA. One recommendation is that the National Guard Certificate program could be modified with the addition of the short course option at the graduate level to produce a program specifically for the NG and all military personnel in general. This program could also be offered to first responders and emergency management personnel as well.

Because the course has already been developed, NGB would only have to find instructors to teach this program. This course could be taken on the road to states for a reduction in travel and other costs. NGB or state NG could work to have colleges and universities in the state grant graduate credit for this program. This COA would also allow the colleges and universities to analyze the demand or need for a homeland security master’s degree program in their regions.

If the Naval Postgraduate School would not certify the instructors to teach this program and grant graduate college credit, then NGB would be required to seek college credits from another institution. This program would not be of value without offering graduate college credit. Because the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate program has already been developed, the advantages for this COA are the quick start-up time with fewer expenses. This would require less time away from work and families on the part of students, and it would increase student flexibility by allowing more time to complete a master’s program at a local college or university. Although this program already focuses on what the NG leadership should know to accomplish the civil support mission, some minor adjustments in the curriculum might be needed. The disadvantages for this COA are that this course would not offer a master’s degree for the NG leadership, and depending on who certifies the course for graduate college credit, the credit may or may not transfer, which would negate the advantage of this program.
The comparison criteria and justification for the Naval Postgraduate School NG Certificate (NPS NGC) program are explained in the following section (see Table 10).

Table 10. NPS NGC Decision Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>NPS NGC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time to implement program</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time commitment by students</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throughput of students</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth or quality of education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on readiness</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expense to establish program</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational value to NG</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. **Time to Implement Program**

NPS NGC was rated as 2 as this COA incorporates a developed program of instruction proven to be successful. Initiating this program would be an easier option.

b. **Time Commitment by Students**

NPS NGC was rated as 2 because this option would require some amount of time for completion, and it is specific to the needs of the NG.

c. **Throughput of Students**

NPS NGC was rated as 1 because this course has already been developed and could be initiated quickly into the colleges and universities who would be willing to accept it.

d. **Depth or Quality of Education**

NPS NGC program was rated as 1, since this program has already been tested, and the surveys conducted indicated it was very valuable to the NG.
e. **Impact on Readiness**

NPS NGC was rated as 1 because the shorter course would be more focused on needs of the NG, and if the colleges and universities in the home states would offer this course then the long period of time students are away from their units would be eliminated.

f. **Expense to Establish Program**

NPS NGC was rated as 1 because the course is already established, which reduces the initiation expenses for colleges and universities. This option would allow colleges and universities to explore the need and requirements to offer a master’s degree program in homeland security with minimal expense.

g. **Educational Value to the NG Program**

NPS NGC was rated as 2, while it does not produce a master’s degree, this option would start students on the process to obtain one if they desired to.

The total for NPS NGC, was a 10, this COA is close to tying with the short course options of NGB develop a course.

D. **CONCLUSION**

This chapter has reviewed possibilities and COAs on how to close some of the gaps in NG education. It also reviewed the need for this education on the state response process and ways to deliver this education. The challenges to closing the gaps derived from funding issues and DoD’s reluctance to accept the civil support mission were explored. The last section listed some of the more likely COAs with their advantages and disadvantages, all of which will be analyzed with the end result of one COA being selected as the preferred option. The next chapter will address the recommendations on how to close the gaps.
V. SUMMARY

This chapter will summarize the research questions directed to identifying reasons why the gap in education for NG leadership in the area of homeland security, civil support, and DSCA exists and what steps can be taken to close it. The argument presented in this thesis is, if the gap in education is closed, then the NG will provide a faster and more efficient response based on improved knowledge, skills, and integration with civilian authorities in future disasters. Because of these improvements, the NG will better serve the state and nation.

This thesis explored reasons why the gap in the education; this knowledge gap became particularly obvious during recent major natural disasters beginning with the Hurricane Katrina response. While there has always been an issue with this lack of education, the disasters requiring responses were smaller and made less headline news than did those that have occurred recently. As disasters become bigger, more costly, and require more personnel on both the civilian and military sides to manage, the NG leadership must be knowledgeable of the roles NG personnel are expected to fill if the process of providing military support for civilian authorities is to function smoothly.

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Research questions initially presented at the beginning of this thesis were:

- To overcome the gap in disaster response knowledge, what are the topics on which the DoD should specifically educate the NG leadership?

- What has caused this education gap and, by knowing the cause, how can the NG leadership overcome it?

The first research question focused on what education topics the NG requires to better understand their role in response. Chapter II delved into the many programs, courses, and materials that are currently being provided for education available to the NG. One area that was brought to light was the missing education on how the state response process works and how the NG will fit into that process. The second part of this
question referred to what changes DoD should make in order for this education to meet the needs for the NG. In order to discuss what changes may be needed in order to make recommendations; the thesis explored the courses that are currently being taught about homeland security, civil support, or DSCA and their advantages and disadvantages.

The second research question focused on the causes of the education gap and possible solutions in overcoming it. This research revealed that there were gaps in the education. In reviewing the causes, it became evident that homeland security is an emerging concept with new missions that neither DoD and nor the NG have addressed adequately in order to perform them effectively. The development of federal response plans, DoD’s reluctance to accept civil support missions, and the failure of DHS to coordinate with DoD on expected missions have all contributed to the gap in disaster response education.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A Short Course Should be Conducted within the States in Order to Promote Maximum Education of NG Personnel

Obviously, the gap can be closed by providing education to the NG leadership, but the challenge is to determine the topics to be included and who will provide this education. The recommendation for reducing or eliminating the gap in the NG education is the development of a short course as explained in Chapter IV. This one-week course focuses on the state process for the deployment of responders to a disaster. This program could be run similarly to the USARNORTH DSCA course. This course should require a distance learning phase before attending the resident phase. The completion the NIMS courses should also be included in the distance learning phase.

This course should be developed and taught under the control of the NGB, with a block of instruction for each state to cover its unique situation, procedures, and specific legal parameters. The course should be taken on the road to the states for instruction and allow first responders and emergency management personnel to attend; this would help to establish trust and understanding between agencies regarding each other’s roles in a
disaster. Such an all-encompassing state response course would benefit both the federal and state level governments, but it would be most appealing to NG members.

The advantages of this COA are the quickness that the NG leadership can receive the needed education and the capability to meet the needs of high student volume across the nation. The disadvantage for this COA is that it does not provide an intensive course of study; it only meets minimum education requirements. Nevertheless, this course will enable the NG leadership to offer an increased capability for more rapid and efficient response to emergencies. Appendix I is a list of potential topics for this education.

An alternate educational process to help close this gap would be for the NGB to reestablish the Naval Postgraduate School National Guard Certificate Program. This certificate program could be taught in the states and should include not only NG leadership, but also first responders and emergency management personnel. Including all responder groups would help to establish mutual trust and understanding of each other’s respective roles in a disaster. The only shortfall in this program is that the state process for disaster response is not covered, although this could very easily be remedied with the addition of the short course.

2. DoD should Accept the Civil Support Mission and Assign It to the NG

In DoD’s view of homeland security, its main mission is homeland defense, and its secondary mission is civil support. As addressed in Chapter IV, DoD should more readily acknowledge the civil support mission and assign it to the NG. This recommendation will eliminate many of the gaps because of the increased federal funding and training resources made available to the NG. Because the civil support mission will continue to change to meet the challenges of homeland security, continual modification of the education must necessarily occur. If the NG leadership is to continue to have a vital role in homeland security, its leaders will require new education to prepare them to meet those changes in the civil support missions.
3. Change Laws to Allow the NG to Use Federal Funds in Support of Civil Support Missions

Policy and statutory changes may have to be made to allow federal funds to be used for the civil support mission. Funding should be authorized for use by the NG for the civil support missions. A GAO report touched on the issue of funds use.

...federal funds have not typically been provided to DOD specifically for the National Guard’s civil support missions unless directed by statute. Instead, DOD planning has generally assumed that if the National Guard is prepared for its warfighting role it is prepared to respond to a disaster or emergency at home. (GAO-08-311, 2008, p 18)

If funds are authorized for the NG to use for their civil support missions, then the gap may be considerably narrowed which, in turn, would result in a better educated NG that is more capable of protecting the country.

To accomplish this, Congress would have to amend the language in the Defense Appropriation Act or designate funds specifically for homeland security or civil support mission for the NG. Guttieri reinforces this point, “Unless Congress forces the DoD to focus on the home front with targeted financial legislation, it seems unlikely that the military will shift its priorities” (2003, p. 2). The other option would be for Department of Homeland Security to provide funds to DoD for the homeland security or civil support mission for the NG.

Federal funding is important in this specific aspect. All NG units have the potential to serve as responders for a disaster response or for a civil support mission in their state or in support of other states. It is important that these units be granted one weekend a year to train on missions that their state determines to be important or has a high potential for activation and response to disaster in their state and region. The staff at the state level could identify missions and tasks the units could be expected to perform and train on to prepare for a response. This should also allow NG unit leadership to participate in local or state emergency management exercises. As these exercises are at the state level, states cannot use federal funds or federal training time for NG leadership to participate in these exercises. Lieutenant General Blum, former Chief of the NGB,
stated, “The National Guard has a close, on-going, and continuous relationship with the first responders at state and local levels that is essential to provide the response that the American public expects and deserves” (2007, p 13). The lack of participation with the civilian first responders could potentially inhibit the desired development of knowledge and trust between the local emergency managers and the NG before a disaster response is necessary.

Federal funds should be allowed for use to support the training for the assigned civil support missions. The normal cost for this one-weekend training and any special costs for the training should be allowed in order to support the mission. In the majority of cases, the costs would fall under normal weekend training costs. In short, federal funding that is normally authorized for allowable training costs as cost of doing business should also cover the training necessary for NG to complete civil support missions. Another option is that if DoD acknowledges the homeland security mission with concurrent civil support tasking and assignments to NG, then this will help resolve the issue. This education will apply to both federal and state missions.

C. CONCLUSION

The research questions identified two of the main causes of the gap in education: the reluctance of DoD to acknowledge the civil support mission and the inability to use federal funds to train the NG in civil support missions. Recommendations point to the change in education for the NG if it is to be ready to respond to disasters. If neither the DoD nor the NGB educates the NG leadership, then the status quo will not change. The NG will continue to experience problems in responding to disasters, as is succinctly stated in the following assessment:

Without a workforce that has the skills and experiences to operate across all the dimensions of homeland security-prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery-the nation will not be able to protect itself against future catastrophes or manage them when they do happen. (Wormuth and Witkowsky, 2008, p. viii)

In the end, protection of the nation and its civilians is the primary goal of a government and it’s military. In order to accomplish this goal, the government must set
the conditions that allow the military to function effectively. Because the military, and specifically the NG, has evolved to be a first responder to natural and manmade disasters to give civil support, the NG must be provided the necessary education and funding in order to facilitate its abilities when called up for support of civilians in disaster response.
APPENDIX I. SHORT COURSES OUTLINE, STATE RESPONSE
HOMELAND SECURITY AND CIVIL SUPPORT

1. Introduction,
   a. Instructors
   b. Topics
   c. Importance

2. Lines of authority
   a. Constitution
      i. President authorities
      ii. Congress authorities (Controls, disasters are local)
      iii. Militia
   b. National Security Strategy (NSS)
      i. Prevention, first priority
      ii. National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD)
      iii. Presidential Decision Directives (PDD)
      iv. Executive Orders (EO)
   c. National Military Strategy
   d. Unified Command Plan (JP 3-26, A-6)
      i. Combat Commanders, NORTHCOM
   e. National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS)
      i. Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD)
      ii. National Planning Scenarios (NPS)
      iii. Target Capabilities List (TCL)
      iv. Universal Target List (UTL)
   f. National Response Framework
      i. FEMA
      ii. ESF
         iii. Special capabilities (CST, CERFP, Aviation)
   g. National Incident Management System
   h. Civil-Military Relationship (Theory)
3. Terms and definitions used in this arena
   a. Homeland Defense
   b. Homeland Security
   c. Civil Support
   d. DSCA

4. National Guard Duty Status, Duties, Authorities, Controls
   a. Title 10
   b. Title 32
   c. State Active Duty
   d. Joint Forces Headquarters Mission Statement, (meaning and implications)

5. Civil Support (Fed Terms) explanation
   a. Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) include Consequence management, DODD 3025.15
   b. Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA/DSCA) DODD3025.1
   c. Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA)
   d. Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACD) DODD 3025.12

6. Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) DODD 3025.15

7. Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA/DSCA) DODD3025.1 Process, first military used at state level.
   a. Support, not take control, legal government in charge, supplement
   b. Levels of responsibilities
   c. Procedures
   d. Rules
   e. State process
      i. Governor, Military Dept, NEMA, Disaster Declaration (Legal authority, Funding)
      ii. EMAC
      iii. State EOC
iv. Military JOC
v. Gap fillers
vi. Roles and capabilities of each NG service, missions, culture
vii. Military preparation to support, family, preparedness
viii. JRSOI
ix. LNO
x. Response time, immediate response

f. Other State Roles
g. Federal Process
   i. Stafford Act
   ii. Economy Act
   iii. Disaster Declaration (Legal authority, Funding)
   iv. FEMA / DHS organization
v. Disaster Field Office,
   Principal Federal Officer (PFO)
   Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)
   State Coordinating Officer (SCO)
   Joint Field Office (JFO)
vi. Other Federal Roles
vii. Deploy Federal Troops, President, Sec Def Approval, JDOMS
   Defense Coordination Officer (DCO)
   Defense Coordination Element (DCE)
   JTF
h. Immediate Response
   i. Exercises
   j. Interagency coordination

8. Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA)
   Counter Drug

9. Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACD) DODD 3025.12
   Reaction Force
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APPENDIX II. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL NATIONAL GUARD CERTIFICATE PROGRAM COURSES

The Foundations of Homeland Defense and Security. This course was designed to provide the “knowledge required of the homeland security professional” (Supinski, Syllabus -NS 3181, 2007, p. 1) in the areas homeland security and homeland defense. The course had four subject areas: The terrorist, policies and procedures, key players from federal to local levels, and lastly, legal issues involved, including the NG. The five major learning objectives for this course were: 1. To understand the terrorists and why they hate the United States; 2. To learn and apply the federal policies and procedures; 3. To increase awareness of organizations involved, from federal to local levels, their roles, and how they relate to others in this process (how the states call out the NG); 4. To interpret and analyze problems and issues in this area; and 5. To build the students’ understanding of each subject area (Supinski, Syllabus -NS 3181, 2007, p. 1).

Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Homeland Defense and Security: Collaboration to Integrate. This course was designed to analyze the different agencies’ roles, responsibilities, policies, and missions, as well as their interaction with other agencies tasked with homeland security and homeland defense. The course had four subject matter areas: civil-military relations; interagency operations; intelligence fusion; and local, state, and national exercises. The seven major learning objectives for this course were: 1. To expose students to civilian agencies’ roles and responsibilities in homeland security; 2. To review the civil-military relations and legal issues; 3. To understand the NG role at the state level in civil-military affairs; 4. To understand the National Incident Management (NIMS) and intelligence community (IC); 5. To understand how the NG commands function in this arena; 6. To explore how the state and national levels share and fuse intelligence; and 7. To review exercises from local to national levels (Supinski, Syllabus -NS 4882, 2007, p. 1).

Strategic Planning and Organizational Imperatives in Homeland Defense and Security. This course was designed to provide an overview of “comprehensive planning and organization to integrate and mobilize all levels of government and private sector
response” (Supinski, Syllabus NS 4756, 2007, p. 1). The course had three areas: joint planning, critical infrastructure protection, and border operations. Five major learning objectives for this course were: 1. To understand the National Response Plan/Framework; 2. To review and assess the state and local planning; 3. To review national preparedness and capabilities; 4. To determine critical infrastructure/key resources and apply risk assessment; and 5. To review border issues, policies and process (Supinski, Syllabus NS 4756, 2007, p. 1).

Special Topics in Homeland Defense and Security. This course was designed to provide an understanding of National Response Plan (NRP); National Incident Management System (NIMS); the process for local, state, and federal involvement; and the application of the process to NG involvement. The course has three areas: NPR and NIMS application; local, state, and federal interoperability; and special topics. The three major learning objectives for these courses were: 1. To review applications of NRP and NIMS in the area of homeland security; 2. To review current topics in homeland security and homeland defense; and 3. To apply lessons learned by the NG through a concept-of-operations exercise (Supinski, Syllabus NS 4920, 2007, p. 1).
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California

3. Major General William H. Etter, Director Joint Operations (J3)  
   National Guard Bureau  
   Alexandria, Virginia

4. Director Joint Training (J7)  
   National Guard Bureau  
   Alexandria, Virginia

5. Major General Timothy Kadavy, Adjutant General of the State of Nebraska  
   Nebraska Military Department  
   Lincoln, Nebraska

6. Colonel David Zwart, United States Property and Fiscal Officer State of Nebraska  
   National Guard  
   Lincoln, Nebraska