THE VALUE OF DOCTRINE FOR A DEVELOPING ORGANIZATION

by

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Border security has become an increasingly public topic since the events of September 11, 2001. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is one of the Department of Homeland Security’s largest and most complex components, with a priority mission of keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the United States (U.S.). It also has a responsibility for securing and facilitating trade and travel while enforcing hundreds of U.S. regulations, including immigration and drug laws. When CBP was created, the majority of the existing organization came from two legacy agencies, U.S. Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. CBP continues today, six years after this merger, to have difficulty synergizing its activities. Research has shown that policies have not been amalgamated, strategies are not aligned and missions are not yet integrated. There is evidence to suggest that CBP has a great deal of improvement to make before achieving synergy. This thesis argues that doctrine development would be of great value to the organization, but CBP must first become a learning organization, which includes much more than just doctrine.
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ABSTRACT

Border security has become an increasingly public topic since the events of September 11, 2001. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is one of the Department of Homeland Security’s largest and most complex components, with a priority mission of keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the United States (U.S.). It also has a responsibility for securing and facilitating trade and travel while enforcing hundreds of U.S. regulations, including immigration and drug laws. When CBP was created, the majority of the existing organization came from two legacy agencies, US Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. CBP continues today, six years after this merger, to have difficulty synergizing its activities. Research has shown that policies have not been amalgamated, strategies are not aligned and missions are not yet integrated. There is evidence to suggest that CBP has a great deal of improvement to make before achieving synergy. This thesis argues that doctrine development would be of great value to the organization, but CBP must first become a learning organization, which includes much more than just doctrine.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1  
   A. BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................2  

II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................7  
   A. DEFINITIONS FOR DOCTRINE .............................................................................7  
   B. MILITARY DOCTRINE ..........................................................................................8  
   C. OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING DOCTRINE ......................11  
   D. EXECUTIVE DOCTRINE ......................................................................................11  
   E. RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE .....................................................................................13  
   F. CBP STRATEGY AND POLICY ...........................................................................14  
   G. DOCUMENTATION INTERNAL TO DHS AND CBP ............................................14  
   H. COLLABORATION, TRUST AND LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS..........................15  

III. A DISPARATE LEGACY, A FRAGMENTED FUTURE ............................................17  

IV. DOCTRINE, POLICY AND STRATEGY .................................................................25  
   A. COMPONENTS OF DOCTRINE .........................................................................25  
   B. DOCTRINE VS. POLICY ....................................................................................26  
   C. DOCTRINE VS. STRATEGY ..............................................................................27  
   D. DOCTRINE, POLICY AND STRATEGY—WHAT IS THE CONNECTION? .............28  
   E. APPLICATION OF DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS TO CBP ............................................29  

V. KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ..........................................................................31  
   A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ......................................................................................31  
   B. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................31  
   C. DOCTRINE WITHIN A LEARNING ORGANIZATION ..........................................35  
   D. DOCTRINAL THEMES ......................................................................................37  
      1. Theme #1: Major Organizational Challenges for U.S. Customs and Border Protection ..............................................................37  
      2. Theme #2: What is CBP’s Common Conceptual Framework? ...........................40  
      3. Theme #3: Guiding Principles for CBP .............................................................41  
      4. Theme #4: Operating Concepts under the Guiding Principles .......................42  
      5. Theme #5: Lessons Learned ...........................................................................43  
      6. Theme #6: CBP’s Unity of Purpose ................................................................44  
   E. CONFUSION AMONG US ..................................................................................46  
   F. ANALYSIS .........................................................................................................46  

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................51  
   A. FINAL THOUGHTS .............................................................................................56  
   B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY ...............................58  

APPENDIX .....................................................................................................................61
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>CBP Organizational Chart</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>OBP Sectors vs. OFO District Offices</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>FEMA Regional Map</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>The Engine of Change (From: Petraeus, 2009)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area Of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APHIS</td>
<td>Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPETS</td>
<td>Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System</td>
</tr>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration Services</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Doctrine</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency’s</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>INA</td>
<td>Office of International Affairs</td>
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<td>INS</td>
<td>Immigration and Naturalization Service</td>
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<td>LFC</td>
<td>Lead Field Coordinator</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Office of Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<td>Office of Air and Marine</td>
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<td>OBP</td>
<td>Office of Border Patrol</td>
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<td>OFO</td>
<td>Office of Field Operations</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 2003, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has conducted multiple homeland security missions and activities that require coordination among its offices and partners to address a spectrum of threats. Accomplishments have been made to harmonize border security operations at the field level within CBP. To enhance the collective border security effort and to eliminate gaps in operational mission performance, clear lines of authority must be established, approaches and terminology standardized and collaborative plans and policies developed through leveraging best practices; essentially, what doctrine is supposed to do. Doctrine, in this context, can be defined as a shaping instrument. It facilitates readiness and increased efficiency and effectiveness by standardizing ideology and applying that to practices. Doctrine shows “how” partners can align their processes and procedures in coordinating activities, which serves to institutionalize an organization’s unifying principles and priorities. Doctrine is a guide, not a set of hard and fast rules.

Securing America's borders from those that would do it harm is CBP’s top priority. CBP deploys the U.S. Government’s largest law enforcement work force to protect America at and between the Ports of Entry. A Port of Entry is a term used to describe a legal point of entry into the U.S. from a foreign country at the international boundary. A Port of Entry includes locations considered as functional equivalents of the border, such as an airport. Between these legal points of entry lies a vast open area where illegal cross border activity is possible. The U.S. Border Patrol agency patrols this area. The scope of this mission represents an enormous responsibility for CBP—one that requires communication and collaboration via a defined structure from the CBP Commissioner cascading down to the agents in the field.

The bottom line is that no doctrine exists to link CBP strategies; different planning methodologies, reporting formats, and terms of reference also exist. The CBP headquarters environment currently fosters independent strategic, operational and tactical planning, limited operational and intelligence function, independent budget formulation,
independent chains of command for reporting and leadership purposes, as well as independent program and policy direction. In short, each component office performs all of these functions solely for their individual purposes with little attention paid to integrating with the rest of the organization or interest in knowing if a better way exists to accomplish these tasks.

**CBP Organization Chart**

Figure 1.  CBP Organizational Chart

**A. BACKGROUND**

Approximately 20 component offices comprise CBP. Each office not only has the overall mission of CBP to address, but has distinct individual responsibilities as well. Unfortunately, each component does not fully understand nor adhere to a common set of principles that could serve as “glue” to bind the current division. The lack of a unified CBP prevents a broad, comprehensive and integrated approach to border security. For instance, CBP has differing areas of responsibility throughout its field organizational
structure. The Office of Field Operations (OFO) and the Office of Border Patrol (OBP) geographical field offices (a designated geographical area that encompasses several Ports of Entry) and sector boundaries (a designated geographical boundary that encompasses a number of border patrol stations) are not aligned. In addition, a number of policies have yet to be updated with language that applies to the merged organization rather than the legacy agency from which it came. For example, two separate unions exist within CBP; one for the Border Patrol, specifically, and another for the rest of the organization. Also, incongruent performance ratings systems exist within the organization, and a policy has not been developed to standardize that process as of yet. Due to the many varied functions of the organization, a standardized performance rating system has not been established. Some component offices use a pass/fail performance rating system with little incentive for an employee to strive for a particular goal; as none has been established for them. No specific performance requirements are built into the rating system to work toward or accomplish these goals, as the rating system is generic. In the senior executive levels, the performance measurement system is much more efficient in describing specific goals and objectives to be attained by the employee, which is specific to an employee’s required obligations within a component.

CBP uses strategy and policy to provide guidance. In Protecting America; U.S. customs and border protection 2005–2010 strategic plan, CBP outlines its strategy. The issue is a lack of focus on inter-related functions. In other words, what one component does is related to what other components do in relation to the overall mission. The accomplishment of CBP to meet its goals and objectives depends on the success of its components as a whole, not individually. Each agency under CBP understands and works toward accomplishing the overall mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S. However, nothing exists to describe how to perform functions collaboratively and the policies and missions of the component offices do not facilitate the integration of tasks and purpose.

CBP's Strategic Plan describes ways in which each component should become more effective and efficient in accomplishing its mission. The plan calls for integration of federal inspection elements at the Ports of Entry, which include combining immigration
and customs authorities into one officer position, but provides very little direction or guidance on how to overcome the legacy of very different existing positions in the agencies from which Congress created CBP. The contexts of the mission and culture of their parent agency uniquely defined the positions of Immigration Inspectors and Customs Agents and Inspectors.

The theory behind combining the separate, legacy border agencies into a singular Customs and Border Protection agency was to create an agency-wide law enforcement and national security culture establishing a unified primary inspection at all U.S. Ports of Entry. However, the results of the merger may not have adequately supported the sum of all the previous missions. CBP's mission is, to say the least, complicated and expansive. CBP must not only protect the borders from the entry of terrorists or their weapons, but is charged at the same time with facilitating the movement of legitimate trade and people.

The strategy attempts to define a common theme among all the component agencies by defining ways in which CBP intends to accomplish its missions. The Plan proposes that all components accomplish their facilitation goals by gathering advance data regarding incoming and outgoing people, conveyances and goods, which improve targeting and use technology to leverage resources (CBP, 2005, p. 2). The Plan also proposes to improve on traditional approaches, innovative regulations and technologies. Innovative trade-related activities covered such diverse goals as protecting American businesses from the theft of their intellectual property rights (copyright laws) and unfair trade practices; regulating and facilitating international trade; collecting import duties; enforcing trade laws related to admissibility (certain fruits and vegetables are not allowed into the U.S. from particular pre-designated countries); and, collecting the appropriate revenue and maintaining export controls. New technologies would also enhance CBP’s other traditional missions, which included apprehending individuals attempting to enter the country illegally; stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband; protecting agriculture and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases; and, processing all people, vehicles and cargo entering the U.S. (CBP, 2005, p. 3).

Thus, CBP's mission statement expressed the desire to become an integrated, single border agency. It states,
We are the guardians of our nation’s borders; We are America’s frontline; We safeguard the American homeland at and beyond our borders; We protect the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror; We steadfastly enforce the laws of the United States while fostering our nation’s economic security through lawful international trade and travel; We serve the American public with vigilance, integrity and professionalism. (CBP 2005, p. 4)

The framework for CBP’s efforts is organized around four conventional areas: Strategic Goal—a high level statement of what needs to be achieved; Objectives—specific statements of what is to be accomplished within the goal; Strategies—specific actions to be taken to reach an objective; and Performance measures—what is to be accomplished by executing the strategies (CBP, 2005, p. 13).

Although the plan focuses on what CBP is supposed to do, the goals to accomplish, and the priorities to be pursued; it does not provide a set of guiding principles, ethical guidelines, crosscutting values, and shared outcomes commonly defined as success throughout the merged agency. In short, it does not provide a strategic basis of reasoning and action shared by all components. A doctrine for border governance is missing, which leaves the various CBP components with few fundamental principles upon which to collaborate and succeed together.

The intent of this research is to determine the value of doctrine as applied to CBP as an organization. The research consists of reviewing existing policy and strategy as evaluated from various perspectives within CBP and across the government. The research examines how the development of a border doctrine is necessary to support shared policies and objectives leading to enhanced operational performance.

This thesis serves to fill a gap in research regarding border security doctrine, as very little is presently published on the subject. Much literature exists on strategy and policy in relation to border security; yet, the subject of a doctrine has not been breached. The significance of this thesis to future research efforts is that it provides the basics; what doctrine is to border security, whether it is useful, and whether CBP is at a point where the development of doctrine is feasible. Future research could focus on the actual development and implementation of a border security doctrine.
It is the desire of the author to provide the Assistant Commissioners and the Commissioner of CBP the immediate consumers, a comprehensive explanation of the benefits of doctrine for CBP, and create a sense of common identity among the CBP components, as well as discuss the conditions under which this doctrine could be developed. This study identifies gaps and analyzes existing policies, missions and conditions currently inhibiting CBP from achieving universal organizational success.

The intent of this study is to determine the challenges CBP is facing due to the merger, and identify behaviors and systems that can improve the conditions within the organization, as well as explain how CBP can develop itself into a learning organization.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The following is a review of the available literature related to doctrine, collaborative activities and the issues surrounding why organizations cannot or do not function well internally, and in addition, how these issues can be improved. This literature review also provides information available concerning border security. The review is divided into categories describing the available literature regarding definitions of doctrine, military doctrine, other literature on doctrine, literature about collaboration, learning organizations, trust and existing Border Security Strategy.

A. DEFINITIONS FOR DOCTRINE

Multiple definitions for doctrine exist. Doctrine is defined by Webster’s dictionary as “a principle or body of principles presented by a specific field, system or organization for acceptance or belief.” From the organizational perspective, doctrine is those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession. Principles are described as basic truths, laws or assumptions; rules or standards of behavior; fixed or predetermined policies or modes of actions. Doctrine is also described as the codifications of what a profession thinks and does whenever the profession’s membership performs in the usual and normal way (Tritten, p. 1).

The major U.S. military branches use the definition from the *NATO Logistics Handbook*, which cites doctrine as fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application (NATO, 2008). According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2008), doctrine is to be used as guidance whenever possible, but those applying the mechanism in a real world situation have the leverage to use the strategic means necessary to accomplish their task.

Doctrine has also been defined as what is believed concerning the best way to conduct military affairs (Drew & Snow, 1988, p. 163). According to Drew and Snow, two important words occur in this definition, believe and best. “Believe” suggests that
doctrine is the result of an examination and interpretation of available evidence, and also suggests the interpretation can be changed should new evidence surface. “Best” connotes a standard; a guide for those who conduct military affairs. Doctrinal beliefs are described as interpretations of changing evidence (Drew & Snow, 1988, p. 163). Note that the source for this information is over 20 years old. However, the basic ideas presented do not appear to have changed significantly.

B. MILITARY DOCTRINE

The most common sources for doctrine relate to military doctrine; likely due to the military’s widespread publication, use and attention to doctrine. The U.S. Military devotes entire institutions to doctrine development, such as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). An agreement in large part exists among sources as to the definitions, applications and uses of doctrine to guide actions, as well as some dispute as to whether joint or individual service doctrines are better applied to military operations; the resulting conclusion being that they both have something to offer to an organization.

Joint doctrine is defined as fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated (working in concert with one another) action toward a common (shared among the participants) objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint doctrine does not replace or alter a commander’s authority and obligation to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances. Joint doctrine focuses on how to think about operations, not what to think. The purpose of doctrine is to aid thinking, not replace it (Joint Staff, 2008, p. 12).

According to Lieutenant Colonel William Furr (1991), to some people, doctrine consists of broad principles that reflect “the way in which the organization and its members think and respond to events.” To others, doctrine tells them specifically how to fight. As a result of these different expectations, doctrine is viewed as either too specific and limits options or too general and states nothing useful. These attitudes were displayed
shortly after the advent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and since the Joint Staff has attempted to come to grips with this issue, however, different perspectives still exist. These perspectives occur because the individuals who participate in the process are products of their service, and the services are extensively diverse, “none clearly predominant, each reflecting to its own degree the fact that the United States is at the same time a maritime power, an aerospace power and a continental power” (Furr, 1991).

In 2005, a report was written about a study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on defense reform entitled *The Second Goldwater-Nichols Act*. The project had three phases. Phase one dealt with civilian, joint and service balance, budgeting, national security personnel and interagency relations. Phase two dealt with force capabilities, regional and functional command issues, defense acquisition, military education and other matters. Phase three dealt with military command structures, acquisition and Guard and Reserve issues. The report recommends, based on changes in the world since the implementation of the original Goldwater-Nichols Act, the creation of a Joint Requirements Oversight Council to create a capability for generating conventional forces requirements. This report also recommends that the Joint Forces command should work more closely with regional commanders to build more capacity in these commanders by moving requirements creation out of service-centric processes.

Within the military, in addition to the use of joint service doctrine, each branch of the military has their own doctrine specific to that branch. Since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a growing body of joint doctrine has guided U.S. military actions, such as the *Joint Intelligence Doctrine for Support to Joint Military Operations* (DoD, 1986). However, a parallel reduction in individual service doctrine has not

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1 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, caused a major defense reorganization. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and Secretary of Defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders. Since 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has made tremendous changes in the way the Department of Defense (DoD) operates as joint operations are the norm, for example in the Arabian Gulf, Zaire, Haiti, and Bosnia. Implementation of the act is an on-going project with Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and Joint Vision 2020 (2000). Both documents emphasize that to be the most effective force, it is necessary to be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, remains the key to operational success in the future.
occurred. J. J. Tritten (2008, p. 4) argues that this reduction has cultivated doctrinal conflict and inefficiencies in the doctrine process, which he says affects the entirety of the American military organization. On the other hand, it can be argued that value may also lie in retaining individual service doctrine, as the individual military services do not perform all operations jointly.

Doctrine is designed to be fluid and change over time depending on the possible existing circumstances (Davenport & Prusak, 2000). Military doctrine has changed more than once over the years. Davenport and Prusak (2000) claim that this change typically occurs after an experience that exposed gaps in the existing doctrine. The military began performing After Action Reviews (AAR) in a program aimed at knowledge management. The AAR program identifies lessons learned. The exercise involved an examination of what was supposed to happen in a mission or action, what actually happened, why a difference existed between the two, and what could be learned from the disparities. Results from the AAR were quickly incorporated into Army doctrine, or its formally documented procedures and training programs (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 1).

CBP’s component offices perform after action reports/reviews related to a multitude of events, from Congressional testimony to Operations Orders, but no defined system for collecting, reviewing and implementing lessons learned from those after action reviews exists.

The literature available for military doctrine is for the most part the same from one branch to the other. The military branches all appear to have a doctrinal development process, as well as an office and individuals whose sole responsibility it is to develop such processes. One challenge encountered while performing the literature review was gaining access to the doctrinal documents themselves, as well as determining what they say in simple terms. To overcome this restriction, it was necessary to find individuals possessing this knowledge and access. Several current and former military officers assisted in providing this information, which led to a greater understanding of the doctrinal documents without the necessity of reviewing each one.
C. OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING DOCTRINE

_USAWC guide to national security issues, Vol. I: Theory of war and strategy_, June 2008, provides an overview of past and present military strategy. The works within the publication focus on the military, diplomacy, economic strategy, space and air and land power. Many of the papers offer policy recommendations, while others provide overviews without suggestions but strive for a better understanding of past concepts of strategy. Of particular interest was a paper discussing the relation of doctrine to theory, networks, systems and subsystems. The literature described enemies as systems, and how if one attacks the enemy by taking out the leadership, they may succeed in bringing down the system—if it is a centralized system. The literature is useful in determining what parts of a system or network are essential for function and survival, as well as indicating that those with a loose or decentralized organizational structure, such as a cartel or terrorist organization, may not be ideal for the type of warfare that attacks only the leadership. In essence, organizations cannot survive on leadership alone since they are systems with interrelated “rings,” and to win a war, so to speak, forces should take a systems approach, attacking the rings of the system that make most sense depending on the variables at that time.

D. EXECUTIVE DOCTRINE

The Federal government has historically issued executive doctrines for institutionalizing a change in the ideology behind international military affairs and diplomatic efforts. For example, the _Monroe Doctrine_ proclaimed that European powers could no longer colonize or interfere with the affairs of the newly independent nations of the Americas (Monroe, 1823, p. 1). This doctrine eventually became a longstanding principle of U.S. foreign policy. Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, drew upon a foundation of American diplomatic ideals, such as separating from European affairs and the defense of neutral rights. The _Monroe Doctrine_, introduced on December 2, 1823, stated that further efforts by European governments to colonize land or interfere with states in the Americas would be viewed by the United States of America as acts of aggression requiring U.S. intervention (Tremblay, pp. 133–134). The _Monroe Doctrine_
asserted that the Western Hemisphere was not to be further colonized by European countries, and that the U.S. would not interfere with existing European colonies or in the internal concerns of European countries. This doctrine was issued at a time when many Latin American countries were on the verge of becoming independent from Spain, and the U.S., reflecting concerns echoed by Great Britain, hoped to avoid having any European power take Spain's colonies (Herring, p. 153).

In the 1940s, the U.S. began to see a change in international affairs and the need for a change in theology, once again. With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the U.S. would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations threatened by external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the U.S., to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts. Truman argued that the U.S. could no longer stand by and allow the forcible expansion of Soviet tyranny into free, independent nations, because American national security now depended upon more than just the physical security of its territory. Instead, in a sharp break with its traditional avoidance of extensive foreign commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere during peacetime, the Truman Doctrine actively committed the U.S. to offering assistance to preserve the political integrity of democratic nations when such an offer was deemed to be in the best interest of the U.S. (Department of State, 2009).

The Bush Doctrine also exists which simply stated, is a commitment to preemptive war against terrorists groups, ineffective states that facilitate terrorist groups, and rogue states that sponsor terrorist groups (Ollivant, 2004, p. 4). This doctrine was issued in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The phrase initially described the policy that the U.S. had the right to secure itself from countries that harbor or provide aid to terrorist groups, which was used to justify the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. It was deemed that the group from which the terrorists were directed, Al Qaeda, was being given free reign to operate in Afghanistan and that the government of Afghanistan was harboring its leaders. It was a change to the existing doctrine that required a conventional military threat for the U.S. to take military action against the
government of another nation. Later, the doctrine came to include additional elements, including the controversial policy of preventive war, which held that the U.S. should depose foreign regimes that represented a potential or perceived threat to the security of the United States, even if that threat was not immediate; a policy of spreading democracy around the world, especially in the Middle East, as a strategy for combating terrorism; and a willingness to pursue U.S. military interests in an independent way (Allen, 2007, p. 2003; Levin, 2006).

These executive doctrines resulted from a perceived need for change in the overall approach of the U.S. in foreign affairs. A change in the international atmosphere or environment had occurred and the response was to address that environment in a manner that required the issuance of an overarching fundamental guidance statement of sorts. The intent of the doctrinal statements was not to describe how it was to be done, tactically or operationally, but instead, to describe the ideal or the theological beliefs.

E. RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE

Examples of religious doctrine exist as well. Christian Doctrine, for example, began its development as early as A.D. 325 with the First Council of Nicaea, which was a council of Christian bishops who convened in Nicaea in Bithynia (present day Iznik in Turkey). For the first time, an attempt was made to attain consensus in the church through an assembly representing all Christendom (Kieckhefer, 1989). The reason behind the meeting of the council was to clarify for Christians the foundational beliefs and subsequent acceptable behaviors of the religion and to provide clarity, guidance and consensus. According to Erwin Iserloh’s publication, *The theses were not posted: Luther between Reform and Reformation* (1968), in 1517, Martin Luther filed his Ninety-Five Theses with the Catholic Church. Luther used these theses to show his displeasure with the Roman Catholic clergy’s abuses, primarily concerning indulgences and confessions. Taking the lessons learned from Luther’s theses, the Catholic Church responded in 1545 with the initiation of the Council of Trent, which is considered one of the most important councils of the Church (Wetterau, 1994), and resulted in a change in doctrine. This example is provided to demonstrate that doctrine is used to define commonality and
fundamental beliefs, and is developed and published in an effort to institutionalize these fundamentals throughout an organization, as well as showing the process by which doctrine can be changed or altered when circumstances exist that require a change.

F. CBP STRATEGY AND POLICY

The Strategic Plan for CBP identifies six strategic goals, which are further supported by the strategies and strategic goals of the component offices that comprise CBP. These offices prevent terrorism at Ports of Entry and between Ports of Entry, unite as one border agency, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, protect America and its citizens, and modernize and manage the agency (CBP, 2005, p. 13).

The number three strategic goal is that of “unifying as one border agency;” the desire for a unified culture of its own and the aspiration of a common framework from which to draw and operate. The challenge for CBP is in identifying shared border security principles and collective best practices, as no literature is readily available, which describes them specifically.

G. DOCUMENTATION INTERNAL TO DHS AND CBP

While searching for other literature regarding doctrine or other unifying efforts within CBP, this research uncovered doctrinal efforts within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other initiatives relative to integration within CBP currently underway.

The endeavor internal to CBP was an executive leadership driven effort in which the component office heads were tasked by former CBP Commissioner Basham to research the organization in an effort to discover why it did not run as efficiently as it could. One particular part of that research was in the area of Mission Integration. The goal of this portion was first, to determine where the gaps were in integrating the organization, why those gaps existed, and second, develop answers or processes as to how they could be improved. The Mission Integration effort uncovered several different areas in which CBP needed improvement or change. One particular area was that of conflicting definitions of what border security meant between the component offices. In
other words, border security to the Office of Field Operations did not appear to mean the same thing as it did to the Office of International Affairs. One of the purposes for creating doctrine was to settle on clear and unified definitions, which, in this case, could very well be “border security.” Another area, in which this group of individuals determined that CBP was experiencing difficulty, was the area of branding. The opinion was that CBP was not represented as an organization by a recognizable brand, such as Coca Cola or FedEx.

Branding is discussed further in the body of this thesis. While not doctrinal, so to speak, it does resonate with the indoctrination factor for CBP. Once CBP acquires its identity, it can educate people about branding, and relay that through a brand, CBP can feel it has made an accomplishment toward integration.

The members of the DHS Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate are currently involved in the development of doctrine for that component of DHS. The draft document outlines DHS’ philosophy for improved coordination of homeland security mission activities across the department and with its partners. As stated by the doctrine office, this is the first major step in a series of departmental doctrinal publications. Homeland security operations coordination doctrine states support for the Secretary’s goal of achieving “One DHS,” emphasizes partnerships at all levels, and strengthens operational effectiveness. Application of these doctrinal concepts to operations is expected to augment the accomplishment of the Secretary’s priorities, to include counterterrorism and domestic security management; securing our borders; smart and tough enforcement of immigration laws; preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters; and maturing and unifying DHS.

H. COLLABORATION, TRUST AND LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS

Much of the literature regarding collaboration, learning organizations and trust centered on the common themes of leadership and systems thinking. As well, many articles, books and other reference material pointed to a common source expert for much of the information, Peter Senge. Both learning organization and collaboration literature cited Senge. All three of the concepts were interdependent on the others for success.
According to Peter Senge (1996, p. 1), two views on leadership exist, “no significant change will occur unless it is driven from the top,” or conversely, “little significant change can occur if it is driven from the top.” A GAO report (2003, p. 2) entitled, *Results-oriented cultures: Implementation steps to assist mergers and organizational transformations*, asserts the former view—that transformation must be driven by top leadership, and that it must set the direction, pace and tone, which unites everyone behind a single mission. Collaborative concepts are moving toward the network or systems approach. Boundaries are less visible in today’s environment. Collaboration and cooperation are two of today’s biggest buzzwords with command and control taking a back seat, often seen as negative and too structured. According to Jeff Luke, (1998, p. 33), public leadership “is a type of leadership that evokes collaboration and concerted action among diverse and often competing groups toward a shared outcome.”

The majority of available literature related to doctrine and border security is in military doctrine. All branches of the military have developed their own doctrine, which is used consistently to guide their operations (FAS Military Analysis Network, 2009). The available research regarding Border Security Strategy suggests that more work needs to be done. Further development of a border security doctrine requires the examination of the combination of a component office’s missions, strategies, historical experiences and consensus. The largest weaknesses found in the literature were the absence of border security doctrine references and recent (less than 20 years ago) sources for doctrinal research not related to developing military doctrine. However, publications with information related to collaboration and successful organizational models, which are both necessary for doctrine to be developed and for it to work in application, exist. Since doctrine development includes a combination of collectively determining best practices, principles and a common conceptual framework, collaboration and trust are essential.
III. A DISPARATE LEGACY, A FRAGMENTED FUTURE

The majority of CBP’s components existed in agencies and departments originally established hundreds of years before the current merger. The U.S. Customs Service, for instance, was created in July 31, 1789 upon the signing of the Tariff Act. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was born decades ago after bouncing around various Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce and the Department of Labor before coming to reside in the Department of Justice. Upon the merger in 2003, CBP leaders strived to attain a unified “one face at the border” outward appearance and atmosphere. The theme, “one face at the border,” attempted to give the general public the appearance that CBP was joining all of its immigration and customs forces together to unite and better protect America’s borders. From that point forward, the leadership and creators hoped to be regarded both inside and outside as one unified agency. However, there was some resistance, which was not entirely unexpected.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the creation of DHS constituted the biggest government reorganization in American history and the most substantial reorganization of federal agencies since the National Security Act of 1947. The latter Act placed the different military departments under a Secretary of Defense and created the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency. DHS easily surpassed that scale of reorganization. It incorporated 22 federal agencies into a single organization, merging their diverse functions and responsibilities (Perl, 2004, p. 176).

On March 1, 2003, DHS absorbed the INS and, in doing so, divided it into separate enforcement and services functions and agencies, such as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). INS' border enforcement and facilitation functions were also consolidated into DHS, merging functionally with the U.S. Customs Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (formerly in the Department of Agriculture) into the new CBP.

These immense reorganizations occurred with little preparation, re-education and re-training, or even communication. Components were thrust together, with now partial
functions and missions, into agencies for which no shared histories existed, with little experience working together and no cultural direction that defined new principles or values. New employees continued to be trained in separate academies and assimilated into offices that worked as if the merger had not occurred. In the academies, new employees spent upward of 15 weeks in activities specifically designed to train them as employees of the pre-merger, legacy component offices. The employees ate, slept, and attended classes as a group. Office of Field Operations employees were in the CBP Officer Academy that others have documented retained strong orientations toward either an INS or a customs legacy. Border Patrol agents continued to attend the Border Patrol Academy.

These academies are located separately on opposite sides of the country. Cross training opportunities do not exist at the beginning of a career. It is difficult to learn one job, its authorities and the laws, which govern and agent or officer’s daily activities and then attempt to teach the new officers and agents that the specific job they perform is only one part of a larger organization with a larger mission. CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents are not socialized in one another’s jobs until they meet, if they meet, once they are deployed to their ports and stations in the field. Even then, it is from a distance with little to no first hand experience of what the other does on a daily basis or how their jobs intertwine.

The legacy Animal and Plant Health Inspectors’ (part of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service [APHIS]) job was also rolled into the CBP Officer position. These inspectors, however, do not perform a law enforcement function and are not armed, even though they wear the same uniform and badge as any other CBP Officer. These inspectors are scientists with advanced degrees in biological sciences (including botany, entomology and plant pathology), agriculture, natural resource management and chemistry. They are primarily responsible for the inspection of animals and plants imported into the U.S. Their focus is often on keeping pests and dangerous bacteria out of the country.

In addition to the other difficulties faced with a merger of this size, the CBP Officer position combined both immigration and customs authorities into one position
from two separate specialties. Shortly after the merger, legacy immigration and customs inspectors underwent a training program to learn the responsibilities and laws of whichever function they had not performed. In other words, immigration inspectors had to learn customs laws and how to enforce them. Customs inspectors were required to learn immigration laws and how they were to be enforced. One could assume that few legacy employees would be pleased to be drawn from the jobs they had chosen to pursue and forced into a position in which they had no choice.

Many of the component offices’ employees still refer to themselves as their legacy agency or they identify themselves as an employee of CBP with the caveat that they are from legacy immigration or legacy customs. As well, employees who do not perform the law enforcement functions within CBP (civilian employees, e.g., administrative assistants, program analysts) do not attend an academy at all and they rarely receive an orientation regarding CBP as an agency.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found in a study conducted in July of 2003 that the key to a successful merger is the people (GAO, 2003). Typically, unsuccessful mergers fail because they do not adequately address the wide variety of people and cultural issues. Throwing together the different cultures and expecting them to simultaneously identify with the organization that is CBP and work together seamlessly was an unrealistic expectation. Ironically, GAO's study was conducted and published around the same time as the merger of CBP was being planned. It is unknown if the architects of CBP had this information before them or whether they were experienced in merger processes. It is likely that the environment and expectations within the US. at that time inhibited the proper considerations throughout the merger process. Americans wanted results, they wanted something done that gave the impression their government was fixing what was seemingly broke and had allowed the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to happen. The creation of both DHS and CBP were arguably politically motivated.

Currently, a very fragmented approach exists to address the following areas as a whole organization. The areas of interest are border threat, tactical and operational intelligence sharing, prosecutions (thresholds are different for OFO and OBP cases), resource allocation (what is the priority for allocation and how is that determined),
analysis of seizures (only OFO does this), documenting operations (OBP has a system called Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System (BPETS), while no other component office within CBP uses such a system) and human resources. This prevents the alignment of the components for integrated operations.

For example, a comprehensive approach to border security threat assessments does not exist. Each component office may conduct its own assessment, but these are typically not integrated with the larger intelligence picture and few avenues are available for sharing intelligence information in a timely manner with other stakeholders.

Not only are the approaches disjointed, in addition, the areas of responsibility for each component office of CBP are not aligned with one another, making it very difficult for full integration to be accomplished. The OFO District Offices, which include several ports of entry in specified geographic areas, do not align with Border Patrol Sectors, which concurrently include a number of Border Patrol Stations. The overlap of these offices makes it difficult for resource allocation, collaboration, organization of joint tactical operations and regional cooperation.

This structure, as it stands, allows for cooperation, but not necessarily integration. Figure 2 depicts the disparate areas of responsibility; the blue lines define the OFO Field Office boundaries and the black lines define the Office of Border Patrol’s sector boundaries. For example, it would be very difficult to establish regional offices or regional integration (components ability to work seamlessly), as the areas of responsibility for the existing components do not match. The logistics alone would require double the personnel to accomplish integrated operations, as incidents are not likely to occur within a neat and comfortable boundary that CBP designates as its AORs. For instance, hurricane Katrina was one instance where several different sectors and district offices were affected. The hurricane affected no less than five OBP Sectors and three OFO Field Offices, each of which did not have one common location to which to report. As a result of this confusion, a Field Coordinating Officer position was established to coordinate all of the information arriving from different areas. This position serves the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) region. The U.S.
is divided into 10 regions, which covers multiple CBP Sectors and Field Offices. For this particular incident, the FCO served FEMA region six (see Figure 3).

Figure 2. OBP Sectors vs. OFO District Offices

Figure 3. FEMA Regional Map
As another example of non-congruent activities within CBP, the Office of Border Patrol utilizes an operational requirements-based budget planning process, as well as corresponding metrics to assess its accomplishments by fiscal year. The budget is designed based on operational requirements as determined by the field commanders for each sector. The requirements can be anything from tactical infrastructure, such as roads or fencing to technology, such as cameras or ground sensors to personnel. The requirements are determined based on the level of operational control the requestor intends to achieve with those resources. The operational control is the metric used to measure the effectiveness of the use of the funding and resources provided. However, CBP’s Office of Field Operations budgetary planning does not include metrics as associated with its requirements, and the majority of the other component offices of CBP follow different budgeting formulation structures. OFO focuses on customer service and wait times as primary measurements of effectiveness. It is difficult to compare wait times and control of the border. Prioritization becomes an issue. This lack of a compatible structure relates to doctrine. To develop doctrine, an organization must have synergistic and congruent policies before a doctrine can be established.

The operational requirements-based budgeting process is considered a best practice in the Office of Border Patrol, as the leaders believe that the inclusion of metrics assists in the justification of their budgetary requests. Simply stated, the Chief of the Border Patrol says to Congress, “if you give us “X” amount of dollars, we will give you a specified level of control within a designated area of the border.” To convince Congress that an organization is deserving of a particular amount of funding, the organization must prove its worth to Congress and the taxpayers. Congress is supposed to represent the American people, and as such, is essentially spending America’s money. It is vital, therefore, for a department or an agency to validate their requests. If they do not provide adequate evidence that taxpayer money is being spent and actually achieving results, Congress can and has denied budgetary requests.

Yet, within CBP, no guidance is currently available on this issue, on doctrine, policy or otherwise. The Office of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) guidelines are the only guidelines available to the component offices with regard to developing
budgetary requests. However, those requirements are open to interpretation and no established format exists for CBP as an organization. If a component office has not submitted a clear and concise product, it is more difficult for the larger organization to filter through the information and justify the requirements without that justification being provided already. Standardization creates efficiency. Without a standardized mechanism to validate budgetary requests, the larger organization is less efficient in explaining its overall requirements.

To begin the process of developing a common conceptual framework or an overall organizational doctrine, CBP first must align its internal networks; they must be able to talk to one another, learn from one another, to develop trust and collaborate. Doctrine is said to provide guidance and standardization to optimize and integrate an organization, which encompasses the ideology of what an organization is and how it behaves.
IV. DOCTRINE, POLICY AND STRATEGY

Doctrine is defined by Webster’s dictionary as “a principle or body of principles presented by a specific field, system or organization for acceptance or belief” (Webster.com, 2009). The major U.S. military branches concur with the definition from the NATO logistics handbook, which cites doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives” (NATO, 2008). Doctrine is a concept that has been used in reference to religious organizations, the military and large corporations. It encompasses the fundamental principles that guide an organization and shape its efforts. Doctrine is said to help establish standard roles and procedures among stakeholders, both within and outside an organization, to enhance information flow and coordination, and to facilitate decision making at all levels.

Doctrine shapes how an organization operates to execute a strategy, describes where it comes from, what an organization’s beliefs are and what it has determined is the best way to do business. Doctrine serves to articulate what is important to an organization or enterprise.

A. COMPONENTS OF DOCTRINE

Generally, doctrine is built upon guiding principles and operating concepts. Guiding principles provide a framework for how multiple organizations achieve unified, collective action, and are the basis of reasoning and action for an organization to coordinate operations. Operating concepts are the means by which the guiding principles are applied, and describe the how, when, and degree of integration that can enhance coordination. Some examples of guiding principles from the draft Homeland Security Operations Coordination Doctrine are Unity of Effort and Clear Roles and Responsibilities (DHS, 2009, p. 9). Unity of Effort within a particular organization, according to DHS, is achieved through the chain of command, policy and statutory authorities and established procedures. The aim of Unity of Effort is to achieve collective outcomes. Even though stakeholders may have different individual missions, unifying
effort when working together toward a shared objective results in greater protection for all. Clear Roles and Responsibilities must be understood and respected by components of an organization, especially when activities involve more than one entity. It is important to prevent duplication of effort, and as such, avoid wasting resources. Coordinating operational activities requires each stakeholder to understand its own and its partners’ roles and responsibilities clearly.

Doctrine is designed to be taught, understood and executed. To be effective, it must be absorbed and applied. Lessons learned are used to update doctrine, which is a feedback mechanism that helps the organization reinforce what does and does not work. Doctrine facilitates the organizing of forces tailored for a specific operation.

The process for the development of doctrine has historically been time consuming and laced with bureaucracy. It is necessary for leaders to have vision and develop trust. They must be constantly surveying the horizon with a visionary approach to what is next. In this manner, doctrinal development will be ahead of a change in the operating environment; thus, making operations more proactive and efficient rather than reactive, which helps to negate the possibility of missing something.

B. DOCTRINE VS. POLICY

Policy and doctrine are closely related, but fundamentally, they fill separate requirements. Policy is directive, can assign tasks and can create new roles and requirements for new capabilities. Policies are regulations that describe the rules of application of particular resources; for instance, firearms policy or pursuit policy for law enforcement purposes. The policy lays out the rules or procedures of who can deploy the resource, under what circumstances and the steps to take after its deployment, such as reporting requirements. A doctrinal principle related to a policy of this particular specificity would be very vague unless it was within tactical doctrine. Different levels of doctrine exist, which range from overarching organizational to tactical. The military refers to tactical doctrine as Field Manuals, which is very specific in nature. Doctrine enhances operational effectiveness by providing authoritative guidance and standardized terminology on topics of relevance (Joint Staff, 2008, p. 13).
Doctrine is reflective of policy, but the policies must be integrated. Rules of engagement, for example, would be directed by policy; however, doctrine is something larger, broader. Doctrine does not typically establish policy, but rather policy guides doctrine development. In the Joint Doctrine Development System (Joint Staff, 2008), the purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces. It states specifically that Joint Doctrine will not establish policy. In other words, an organization cannot change the rules to fit who they are fundamentally or how they behave to achieve their mission—an organization is required to follow policy unless an express need exists for it to change, which can take an immense amount of time and effort.

C. DOCTRINE VS. STRATEGY

Doctrine and strategy also serve different purposes, but they are linked. Strategy states the overall goals and objectives. When a tactic or technique is part of a strategy—doctrine helps it establish its identity and what it does as it institutionalizes and codifies the strategies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (2008) state, “Joint doctrine establishes a link between the ends (what must be accomplished) and the means (capabilities) by providing the ways (how) for joint forces to accomplish military strategic and operational objectives in support of national strategic objectives.” Joint doctrine is also said to supply information to senior civilian leaders responsible for the development of national security strategy as to the core competencies, capabilities and limitations of military forces. It also provides other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations an opportunity to understand the roles, capabilities and operating procedures used by the U.S. military better, which is said to facilitate coordination (Joint Staff, 2008, p. 14).

Conceptually speaking, doctrine and strategy are linked in that doctrine provides the framework by which a strategy is accomplished. The strategy employs the means by which the organization intends to accomplish its mission. Doctrine is occasionally referred to as strategic doctrine, which is likely due to the connection between the two concepts. Strategy is defined by dictionary.com (2009) as the science or art of combining and employing the means of war in planning and directing large military movements and
operations; or a plan, method, or series of maneuvers or stratagems for obtaining a specific goal or result. It is further described as the *utilization*, during both peace and war, of all of a nation’s forces, through large-scale, long-range planning and development, to ensure security or victory. Strategies are typically developed using doctrinal concepts as guidance. However, a strategy can also initiate a change in doctrine or the development of a new doctrine. For example, when General Petraeus and his troops encountered the insurgency warfare in Iraq, they quickly realized that the existing doctrine for conventional warfare (“shock and awe,” technology, such as the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA)), and the subsequent strategy, or means of applying military force, was inadequate to accomplish the goal of getting Iraqi cities under control. The doctrinal principle is that the U.S. military conducts ‘Revolutionary Military Affairs’ and the strategy is that it uses technology, such as aircraft and heavy artillery to accomplish its goal. The military was clinging to a flawed operational model that misidentified the center of gravity in a counterinsurgency environment. To change the doctrine and address the insurgency, first, the military commanders in the field on the front lines changed their strategy, and later, that bottom up initiative led to the Counterinsurgency Doctrine (COIN) development (Rotmann, Tohn, & Wharton, 2009, p. 13). Since General Petraeus had also participated in the operational environment, and brought his junior leaders to the doctrine development table with him, he was able to understand first hand the changes that needed to be made.

D. DOCTRINE, POLICY AND STRATEGY—WHAT IS THE CONNECTION?

In theory doctrine, policy and strategy are hierarchical. Doctrine is the ideology that idylllically guides the development of policies that then regulate the application of laws in executing strategies. However, in practice, the process is cyclical and an organization is required to know its rules or policies to develop what it is and what it believes. In addition, changes in one arguably affect the other.

A change in policy or strategy can drive a change in doctrine. Thus, any change in doctrine that may be proactive and through visionary thinking can drive a change in
strategy, and maybe policy, if that is deemed necessary. Doctrine is a way to institutionalize foundational beliefs, which are then applied to strategy and tactics. When the doctrine is applied to what an organization does, the doctrine itself may be driven by a change in the strategy. Doctrine is a foundation for strategy and policy but also a function of what the overall strategy would be. When a strategy is not completely successful based on the doctrine or guidance it is following, this may lead to a change in the doctrine to make it possible to accomplish the strategic end.

E. APPLICATION OF DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS TO CBP

In the case of CBP, strategy exists as do guiding principles and operating concepts, but they just have not been institutionalized or codified. When a tactic or technique is part of a strategy, doctrine helps the agency establish its identity as it institutionalizes and codifies the strategies. For example, within CBP, the Office of Air and Marine is relegated as a support component; this would be a doctrinal concept as it defines their role within the agency. The strategic plans are then developed with this concept in mind and in line with organizational policies or rules, and then the goals and objectives of the strategy are accomplished by using that framework as a guide.

According to a Professor of Behavioral Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, “without doctrine, you train and operate on an anecdotal basis. When changing how an organization does business, as it applies to strategic and operational activities, the change needs to be institutionalized and codified so that it survives and is then implemented and taught throughout the organization.” This process plays an important role in succession planning, which is arguably one area in which CBP has not managed success. Currently, if a new Commissioner were to take control of CBP, he or she could very easily decide to “change the way CBP does business” based on a political whim. With doctrine, it is more difficult to make sweeping changes unless a definite need arises for change based on evidence gathered during the strategic application of the doctrinal principles.
In the case of border security, visionary thinking is absolutely imperative as CBP is the frontline against mechanisms of terror entering the U.S. This is not meant as strictly applicable to tactical operations, however. Consideration of policy, budgetary and other administrative operations are also subject to the same cyclical processes and should not be excluded from an overarching doctrine, which are support components within the organization and the operational components cannot function appropriately without them.
V. KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the key points and consensual issues uncovered through the research. It identifies six key themes, drawn primarily from an analysis of interviews, discussions, and analysis of internal function within the organization. The interview questions focused both on what the respondents’ understandings were of doctrine as well as their views as to what a Border Security Doctrine may include, at least in theory.

A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

See the Appendix for the interview questions posed for this thesis.

B. METHODOLOGY

Utilizing qualitative methods, the researcher is able to characterize, interpret, or appraise the event being studied and offer the advantage of providing a descriptive narrative of the inquiry process in a natural setting. For this study, guided interviews, document analysis, and literature review are used to address the questions posed. Data, when reviewed, may suggest an area for clarification during interviews.

The data collected were derived from interviews, personal experiences and written documentation, including published literature and internal documents to DHS and CBP. The document analysis, when available, is used to validate the responses elicited during the interviews.

The sampling was purposeful as the research focused primarily on interviews of individuals within U.S. Customs and Border Protection with specific knowledge and experience in policy and strategy creation and implementation. Threats to reliability posed by subject bias are handled by careful description of those who provided the data. This description includes information relevant to the subjects, and the decision process utilized in their selection. Agreement to participate was voluntary. Known leaders throughout the organization were chosen for the interviews since they are considered
visionary thinkers with a great deal of concern for the well-being of the organization that is CBP. The individual interview participants are not identified to maintain anonymity of the subjects. The condition of anonymity creates an environment in which a free and honest exchange of ideas can occur.

Verbatim accounts of the information elicited, as well as descriptive narratives are used. Although interpretive comments may be added, the primary data remains as accurate as possible. This study employed the use of audio recordings of the interviews, which assists in increasing reliability.

Validity is concerned with the accuracy of research findings. The researcher uses interviews, qualitative data collection and analysis, as well as a review of available literature relative to the topics under study. This process addresses the limitations of a single data source or single researcher’s bias. Although these criteria may not address all the threats to reliability and validity, they are appropriate methods to ensure that the study data are credible, verifiable, consistent, and meaningful.

Interview data allows the researcher to assess the perspective-sampled population and to elicit information about those factors, which cannot be observed. For this study, a guided interview approach is used. The author identified topics and issues to be covered in advance, and also decided the sequence of the questions during the course of the interviews. Questions regarding present experiences and activities provided descriptive data that led to eliciting greater detail and establishing a context for opinions, feelings, and interpretations. The questions reflect a non-judgmental and neutral rapport. The researcher was interested in the respondent’s experience; not to convey approval or disapproval of said experience. In other words, no judgment or implication in the questioning suggested the interviewees were right or wrong, but instead, the questions were formatted to draw information from these experiences.

Anonymity and confidentiality are ethical concerns for all researchers. No identifying data is reported in this study. Participants are informed of the purpose of the study and that a possibility exists of identification from the descriptions or quotations
used in the study. As a result, the issue of confidentiality and anonymity is negotiated with the participants prior to the interviews. Respondents may choose to terminate their participation at any time.

Six persons were interviewed; four executive level leaders (Assistant Commissioner or equivalent for a component office) from within CBP, a mid-level manager within CBP, and a Professor of Behavioral Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University.

One reason for interviewing a former member of the military was that CBP is considered a para-military organization by many. CBP is organized in a manner that resembles a military organization. For instance, the operational component offices within CBP could be likened to the branches of DoD). The OBP and the OFO could be likened to the Army or Marines, as they are the ground troops. The Office of Air and Marine (OAM) is an organization much like the Air Force and the Navy concerning their operational perspectives. The component offices also follow a chain of command model and their operations could be described as a hybrid of both military and law enforcement activities. CBP’s missions and operations are comparable to military missions. It has a defense posture along the borders of the U.S. and is tasked with protecting the Homeland from terrorists. The National Guard, a military organization, also performs law enforcement functions under the auspices of drug intervention. Law enforcement and military operations often cross paths, especially in the federal arena. CBP’s role is larger than enforcing the criminal laws of the U.S.; it is homeland security, both nationally and internationally.

Another reason for interviewing a former military officer and War College professor was that the use of doctrine is widespread throughout DoD, which possesses Joint Doctrine that then cascades down into individual doctrines for each branch of the military with respect to their distinct expertise. The idea was to gain the military perspective as they seem to have the most obvious and current experience with the concept.
The research included interviews with executive level leaders within CBP. These leaders include the Office of Field Operations, Office of Border Patrol, CBP Office of Air and Marine, the Office of International Affairs (INA) and an interview with a mid-level manager within OBP, as well as a discussion with the director for development of doctrine for the DHS Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate. The director’s contribution provided the research objective insight as to the overall departmental responsibility for operations and planning to include department level border security planning.

The U.S. Border Patrol provided insight as to the specific principles that address the physical border and its protection between the Ports of Entry. An Assistant Chief from the Office of Border Patrol provided a leadership perspective more closely aligned with operational or tactical focus. The representative from the OFO provided the perspective from the Ports of Entry with regard to trade, commerce, and legal or illegal entry of persons and contraband. CBP OAM is an integral part of the border security posture as its provides support to the other components of CBP through the coordinated use of integrated air and marine forces. The INA strives to extend U.S. borders by implementing programs and initiatives that promote anti-terrorism, global border security, non-proliferation, export controls and immigration and capacity building.

The data generated through qualitative research can be enormous. A systematic method of analysis can facilitate the task of assessing meaning. The first step in content analysis is to review all data for completeness and quality, and to identify any potentially incomplete areas. Any missing data is collected prior to continuing the data analysis. Any themes are identified and the data is then organized around these themes. Any information of interest that emerges during data collection is defined and examined. This process helps address any contradicting explanations.

Data were collected through personal interaction and observation by the researcher concerning the manner in which U.S. Customs and Border Protection functions today using no more than policy and strategy, with little formal guidance beyond the legacy documentation. In the researcher’s daily activities within the department, the opportunity existed to attend meetings and planning sessions that
required participation of individuals from separate functions of DHS and CBP. The collaborative activities of these work groups were observed, as well as any issues that arose regarding standing policy and strategy, and the analysis of that information determined if an overarching agreed upon facet of principles would be useful in facilitating those efforts. These observations assisted in advancing the goals of this research by providing current situational information and real life examples of when and how a guiding doctrine could be realistically developed and implemented.

A descriptive narrative summarizes the data in reference to the research questions posed in this study, which includes explanatory statements concerning identified relationships, similarities, and differences. An attempt is made to specify how the data relate to broader areas of interest. The data is also analyzed within the political context of the Border Security environment.

C. DOCTRINE WITHIN A LEARNING ORGANIZATION

The professor from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University was the first interviewee, who defined doctrine very simply as the basis or the foundation. He went on to explain it as both the theoretical and practical basis for determining what to do and how to do it. He confirmed the literature had expressed doctrine as a codification of principles, procedures, tactics and techniques that provide the basis for training and ongoing operations. From his perspective, which is the military perspective, doctrine is the foundation, but it is also responsive and cyclical. Doctrine is certainly not static and for it to be effective, soldiers and members of units must learn and rehearse doctrinal principles on a continual basis.

During the interview, the respondent described a concept recently introduced by General Petraeus called the Engine of change. General Petraeus led the effort of the most recent change in Army Doctrine. His publications have included material related to the counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Figure 4 is a pictorial description of the process of developing and changing doctrine, and how it relates to an agency as a learning organization (Petraeus, 2009).
An explanation of the pictorial follows; however, some parallel observations should be explained. In attempting to understand the concept of doctrine, it can be related to the concept of theory. In fact, theory is described as a belief or principle that guides action or assists comprehension or judgment; a particular concept or view of something to be done or of the method of doing it; and a system of rules or principles (dictionary.com, 2009). According to Clayton K. S. Chun, (2008, p. 295), theory can provide a framework to consider how to approach a problem. It can assists in considering issues or questions that need to be solved before making detailed approaches toward developing a strategy, which is very similar to the concept of doctrine.

The engine of a change model represents a systems model and an evolutionary process. Therefore, changes in doctrine drive changes in leader development, which drive changes in collective training, which drive changes in operations, which drive lessons learned as the doctrine is applied, which then drives more changes in doctrine, and the iterative cycle continues. These four components of the learning organization are represented as cogs within this diagram. The process of driving change in an organization is dependent upon all the cogs being in alignment, and if a cog is out of alignment, the
change process breaks down until it is brought back into alignment. For example, if leader development does not change in response to changes in doctrine, then the rest of the cogs do not turn, and the organization does not then make changes in collective training, conduct of operations, etc. Thus, the change process breaks down. The *Engine of Change* is also about how and why doctrine is changed, which in the model, is shown as a change necessitated by lessons learned (feedback). In the absence of feedback, it can be argued that little incentive exists to change doctrine, and according to the professor, doctrine most often does not change unless there is a perceived need for change.

D. DOCTRINAL THEMES

The following information identifies the major themes recognized throughout the interviews. The majority of the data for this portion of the study were drawn from the interviews of senior and mid-level officials within CBP. The represented component offices of CBP are the Office of International Affairs, Office of Field Operations, the Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, the Office of Air and Marine and the Office of Border Patrol. The remaining source for the data lies within the author’s daily observations and analysis of the organizations’ inner workings, policies and strategies.

1. Theme #1: Major Organizational Challenges for U.S. Customs and Border Protection

When asked to identify major organizational challenges for CBP, one of the respondents identified branding; what is portrayed to the general public and its own employees is “not done well.” He went on to explain that the employees are CBP even though they have separate functions. The interesting thing about this concept is that depending on the perspective, there is either ‘One CBP’ or a CBP as a joint organization, much like the joint military operations and functions. CBP can be seen as an organization comprised of separate, yet cooperative functions that serve the larger organization jointly.

Current efforts exist to define CBP as ‘One CBP;’ to have only one symbol or brand that expresses it, one name, one academy, *one identity* resulting in something likened to a submersive indoctrination (to teach somebody a belief, doctrine, or ideology
thoroughly and systematically). To quote one interviewee: “Indoctrination has to be done better.” He was referring to that at the current time; CBP has separate academies for the training of its component offices. The Office of Border Patrol has one academy, OFO has another and OAM has yet another, none of which is coincidentally located in the same place. Even today, legacy attitudes are expressed throughout the academy experience to many employees. This is not specific to CBP. In his thesis, *Immigration and customs enforcement: dysfunctional not by design*, Phillip Wrona (2007, p. 65) describes this anomaly within ICE. He cites an interview in which a research participant describes the academy experience; “…training at FLETC in 2004 and 2005 was the same. In training, we had to sit around and listen to disgruntled legacy Customs Agents bad mouth INS and everything that happened…” The CBP offices of OFO and OAM may have similar academy experiences. OBP did not undergo as much of fundamental reorganization during the merger; they were left largely intact and the day-to-day operations for Border Patrol Agents have not changed significantly. However, OFO experienced the same reorganization as ICE. They combined Customs (Title 19) and Immigration (Title 8) authorities into one position—the CBP Officer. It should be noted that an additional position was amalgamated into the title of CBP Officer, even though it is not a law enforcement position, that of the agricultural inspector position. The uniform and same badge are the same; however, they are scientists, not law enforcement officers and do not carry a weapon.

Although this thesis does not delve into the current academy atmosphere, the fact remains that while individuals are hired by CBP as an organization, by the end of their academy training, they have had only about a week of exposure to the organization known as CBP. The rest is component office specific with a large element of indoctrination and team building in identifying with that specific office, which is seen as a significant gap in the opportunity for the organization to develop a mindset of allegiance and identity to CBP.

Another organizational challenge identified was the general misunderstanding or even knowledge of the overall mission of CBP. As one participant stated, “As long as your goals, missions and objectives are known, your organization is solid, if people don’t
know them, they should.” This, in turn, enables the organization to bring to bear the best of its capabilities in response to an event synergistically. According to this same interviewee, at the field level, few people know the broader vision, mission, which is attributed to a breakdown at the local leadership level. This breakdown was a second area identified as one in which CBP has an opportunity to educate its employees. If CBP does not bind its efforts, people or thinking, they can lose sight of the real priority.

In continuing the identification of organizational challenges, one of the participants stated, “in order for synergy to occur strategies need to align.” In yet another instance relative to this thought process, the participant stated, “you have jurisdictions and multiple agencies with differing entitlements and authorities.” In a separate interview of an individual at a mid-level manager position, “each component has its own culture, identity and institutional memory and those tend to separate rather than align.” Evidently, even at the middle manager level, there is the acknowledgment that CBP is not unified. Repeatedly, the terms align and synergize are used to describe what should be rather than what is. The need for visionary thinking and planning of how “it” should work was also a common theme among respondents.

A significant topic broached was that of infrastructure. The common theme is that infrastructure as a whole for the entire organization before the merger and today is still largely outdated and antiquated. The fact of the matter is that before the advent of the Secure Border Initiative, little attention was paid to the lack of technology and infrastructure that supported the legacy agencies, which now comprise CBP. One participant put it very well by saying, “we’re doing a 21st century job in a 19th century environment.” The volume of traffic, both legal and illegal, that CBP handles on a daily basis cannot be supported by equipment and infrastructure originally implemented in the 1940s or even the 1990s. With the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), cross border traffic increased exponentially. The Ports of Entry simply cannot sufficiently support today’s volume of traffic. Progress is being made, but only for one component office at a time, and at an alarmingly slow pace.
2. **Theme #2: What is CBP’s Common Conceptual Framework?**

When asked, “does CBP have a common conceptual framework?” the participants had difficulty in answering. The question was intended to draw out what the leaders in CBP thought its conceptual framework was. Instead, the respondents focused on what CBP did not have rather than what could emerge as common ground. The clear commonality was the absence of commonality. Some of the answers were: “Keep bad things and bad people out of the country,” “We have it in terms of an overarching strategical document, but we have yet to reach the unified approach outcome,” “We are still dealing with legacy cultures/doctrine,” “We need to put together the best practices,” “Capabilities have not merged,” “We have incongruent Areas of Responsibility (AOR) boundaries,” “CBP is far from optimal with regard to our lay down.” These comments suggest that collaboration among the component offices is severely lacking, especially in the policy and administrative functions. It also highlights that not much has changed in the six years since CBP was created. People are still complaining about the past, describing what should have been done, rather than taking the initiative to make those things happen. Their daily activities are fraught with extinguishing internal fires rather than unifying the agency.

Difficulty in coordinating operations is one of the challenges faced by an organization without a common framework. This research, of course, focused on border security operations. The answers given on this subject were very blunt and given with a great deal of emotion, and appears to be a contentious issue within the organization. The problems identified included incongruent AOR boundaries, which make it logistically difficult to organize collaborative activities. As one senior leader stated very directly, “we are not one CBP when it comes to coordination.” Other complaints included the fact that CBP has varying capabilities, yet the component offices do not yet have congruent rules and authorities under which those capabilities can be exercised. One particular interviewee indicated that among the operational component offices of CBP, a sense of competing priorities and a literal competition for operations exists, as there are
overlapping authorities and lanes cross very easily. He stated, “money follows credit and therefore credit becomes the goal of an operation rather than the security of the nation.” This is contrary to the edifice of collaboration.

3. **Theme #3: Guiding Principles for CBP**

The next key theme is that of guiding principles. As one participant stated, “fundamentally they are part of the problem—due to historic functions. We have non-congruent policies with how to deal with a security threat. Ex: Use of Force.” The interviewee was referring to the new mission of CBP upon its creation, that of protecting the nation from terrorists and terrorist weapons. An illegal alien, even when a criminal, or a drug smuggler, is completely different from a terrorist. The objectives are different, and therefore, the legacy policies that guide CBP’s actions concerning law enforcement threats are not sufficient to handle a national or homeland security threat. This participant continues to state that the rules of engagement are significantly dissimilar. Instead of being reactive to an illicit border crossing, CBP should be proactive in deterring a terrorist threat. Many of the other participants answered along the same lines. The common themes seemed to form a thread.

According to the participants, initially, as a guiding principle, CBP should use a risk management approach through defense in depth, while fully coordinating and integrating to neutralize the cause and effect. As an example, an OFO Officer’s actions can affect a situation in which a Border Patrol Agent or Air Interdiction Agent is later involved. It was largely agreed upon that coordination should be seen as a key guiding principle. Also mentioned were integrity, professionalism and a sense of honor and service, which are the core values for CBP as presented in its Strategic Plan. It is possible that these core values can be instilled in and expected of the employees of CBP, but they are not necessarily satisfactory as guiding principles. They do describe what CBP is at least in character, which may help to frame doctrine in the future, but would not suffice as stand-alone principles.

These participant responses serve as evidence that a misinterpretation of what doctrinal guiding principles should be exists. Principles and values differ in that
principles are a personal or specific basis of conduct or management; in other words, a guiding sense of the requirements and obligations of correct conduct. Values are the ideals, customs, and institutions of a society toward which the people of the group have an affective regard; as such, are closely related to ethics as any object or quality desirable as a means or as an end in itself (dictionary.com, 2009). Values may guide the behavior of an individual but they are not authoritative; they are qualities that the organization would like for its employees to embrace. Guiding principles are the basis of reasoning and action for organizations to coordinate operations. Some examples from the draft DHS OPS Doctrine are Unity of effort, clear roles and relationships, inclusive horizontal and vertical coordination, flexibility in execution and maximum information sharing. The interviewees’ answers suggested they understood and supported what existed, but were not yet versed in the elements of doctrine, which is very different from what has already been done. There was a lot of the ‘what’ rather than the ‘how’. Many participants gave answers, such as “defending the border” and “deny criminal organizations and terrorists…” or “applying the best resources we have to the biggest threat.” The question is then, how do the employees, as an organization, do these things? Is there a common approach, a best way? When these questions were asked, the answer was unequivocally, no, which has not yet been identified and implemented by the organization as a whole.

4. Theme #4: Operating Concepts under the Guiding Principles

The most relevant answer to the question of what operating concepts might be were stated as such, “even though the offices can appropriately work independently, they should still coordinate their operations so that when they need to work collectively, it is much easier to do.” Other participants struggled to identify with this concept and largely depended on their component office expertise for examples. One participant suggested as an operating concept; closing the gap between homeland defense and security. He continued to explain that to know what is going on in the larger terrorism picture, CBP must first work through the clutter that comprises most of the border security problem, and then eventually, be able to focus on what it is possible to do to negate the more significant threat—that of terrorism. A headquarters level manager, although not
executive level, also associated with his component office in stating; “OBP has the detect, identify, classify and respond mindset, I’m not sure what the others have,” which speaks volumes to the lack of intra-component knowledge and collaboration at least at the headquarters level. It may also suggest that other component offices either have not fully developed their strategies or they have not educated others in them. One part of an organization should familiarize itself with its neighbor stakeholder responsibilities.

Evident throughout the study was differing ideas as to the guiding principles within the organization. This is a disturbing finding, as it seems that the executive leaders for CBP do not appear to agree on the organization’s guiding principles. Another concerning discovery was that a general inability to identify operating concepts supporting the guiding principles’ application exist. Thus, it is possible to infer either that it was not explained well enough or it is not something discussed within this organization. It was also somewhat difficult to identify with the larger CBP organization, and many times, if answered at all, the interviewees depended on the institutional knowledge of their respective offices rather than looking beyond or outside that knowledge.

5. **Theme #5: Lessons Learned**

A vital cog in the *Engine of Change* is the incorporation of lessons learned. It is beneficial for lessons learned to be located at one central collection point, as well as the people collecting them to have knowledge of field operations so that they can then provide direct feedback to doctrine developers. CBP does not possess a mechanism by which lessons learned are centrally collected, analyzed and then applied to existing strategies. Changes occur very slowly in the broader organization. One participant described the operational level use of lessons learned by stating: “operationally—hot washes are used; it is done on a small scale at the local level.” In addition, another participant stated that CBP has not been as disciplined in implementing findings—except for hurricane activity. The Lead Field Coordinator (LFC) function resulted from those lessons learned. Yet another participant admitted, “we don’t do this well as an organization;” referring to the collection and implementation of lessons learned. When
asked how CBP could incorporate lessons learned to keep the process going, one interviewee suggested that CBP ensure a rotation of senior leadership through different positions, both at headquarters and in the field, as well as through different component offices, which would be similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act to which the military is subject. For a soldier to be promoted to a particular level, it would be necessary to serve in a capacity different from the originating branch of the military. However, unless a particular leader is involved in the collection and implementation of lessons learned in particular, it is uncertain as to how the rotation of leaders affects this process. The value in the rotational assignments may be more applicable to gaining a better understanding or appreciation of the other functions of CBP.

6. Theme #6: CBP’s Unity of Purpose

To address the aspect of doctrine as a valuable instrument for CBP, the participants were asked to describe how the larger theoretical concept of doctrine could be used as a tool for establishing a unity of purpose within CBP and to provide their thoughts as to the value. The general consensus relied on leadership involvement, especially high level leaders. A leader that could conceptualize, sell, gain buy in and facilitate the entire process—a catalyst—was described as key to the long-term result. It was assumed by some participants that as long as there was high-level buy in, the concept should cascade down. One participant stated that CBP missed the opportunity at the merger to address the identity and unity concerns, and they are missing the opportunity now at the beginning of a person’s career, but that it was not too late to fix it. What unity of purpose can do is provide awareness for employees of whom they are as an agency and not just focus on their particular role, although with the understanding of how their role plays into the larger, broader view.

The conversations then turned to the foundational role of doctrine to institutionalize standard roles and procedures. The participants were asked to identify whether this would benefit CBP. The common theme running throughout the interviews was, “it is an area that we don’t do a very good job in right now.” One participant made a very fundamental statement, “the value is in achieving more than we are now.” The
general consensus centered on the belief that anything would be better than what exists today. The next question then was how this could be done and how training might be used as a vehicle for incorporating the institutionalized roles and practices. It is known throughout the government that certain training exercises are not well received and not respected. It boils down to going through the motions. These exercises are not taken seriously, and therefore, the original intent of the training is lost. For doctrine, changes to doctrine and implementation of doctrine to be accepted, one participant suggested that when the employees can see the outcome of their efforts, both from an organizational level and from their perspective, it is then possible to gain their support. By giving them evidence that their efforts are achieving a greater good, it cultivates a consciousness of the bigger picture. This learning is beneficial in leadership development in that it communicates the organization’s intent and describes a person’s role in achieving the desired end state. The participants also agreed that training must be a sustained effort. The organization experiences a large amount of turnover and progression. For the process to have value, it must be sustainable and meaningful.

Finally, the participants were asked as to whether they believed there was value in doctrine for border security. The answer was a solid yes. The participants continued to explain that this organization is in need of something to sustain it. One participant suggested that it not possible to ever go wrong by thinking about the science, the theory. He continued to state that doctrine is an equation to define a system. His description very closely resembled Petraeus’ *Engine of change*. He continued to say, “doctrine is like a system with moving parts, each of which has to be working in synergy with one another for the whole system to function. The underlying principles of how things work is defined in the numbers and you can’t make the systems better or different without understanding the science. Doctrine is what describes how those things best work on their own and collectively.”
E. CONFUSION AMONG US

The major themes identified centered on the interview questions, which are major organizational challenges for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP’s Common Conceptual Framework, Guiding Principles for CBP, Operating Concepts under the Guiding Principles, Lessons Learned, and CBP’s Unity of Purpose.

Although the research focused on the perspective from the broader border security view, the respondents still referenced their most comfortable and expert experience. The interviewees clearly held different views regarding what border security meant within their specific offices’ role. Thus, it was evident that there was not much unified border security experience from which to draw. This situation gives validity to the social identity theory. Each individual identified with the group with the most commonality to them. When looking outside that group, they did not appear to grasp the commonality as much, and as such, were very protective of and reliant on their individual offices’ identity.

F. ANALYSIS

There are efforts within DHS to develop different levels of doctrine. The United States Coast Guard (USCG), DHS Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate (OPS) and FEMA Operations are a few of the known agencies that have recently developed or revamped their doctrinal documents. This poses the question whether this is becoming a trend within DHS or whether there is an express need for doctrine throughout the organization. One inference drawn from this knowledge is that because both DHS and CBP are new with regard to the combination of stakeholders within both organizations, and the fact that both were created in an incredibly short amount of time, an express need exists for a coordinated and unifying effort, which results in a product that is adopted by their components, to recognize, institutionalize and codify common ground.

CBP senior executives are currently engaged in a leadership development effort entitled CBP’s Future State Initiative. According to one Assistant Commissioner interviewed within CBP, eight future state initiatives have been identified for further development and consideration, which include CBP’s organizational alignment, common
office/common campus, air and marine mission, building a leadership team for the future, long-term impact of border patrol expansion, mission integration, training for the future and institutionalizing CBP’s Guiding Principles. These topics identified throughout this study are regarded as broken, even still. The Mission Integration effort mirrors many of the same aspects of the function of doctrine. In doctrine development, however, all levels of employee input are considered and involved. The current mission integration project involves only senior executive leaders at the headquarters level. As identified by the mission integration team, a great need for unified CBP policies exists, which was also identified by the participants of this study.

Regarding the guiding principles initiative, the hope exists for it to be adopted by CBP component offices. However, no function is built in to measure or teach the implementation of the principles or to codify and institutionalize them. Even though the future state initiatives included several of the same executives interviewed for this study, they did not identify with the developed guiding principles when asked what the guiding principles of CBP would include.

Many of the initiatives will take a great deal of time to implement, although the benefits are thought to outweigh the costs. For example, co-location of CBP offices in a campus-type setting would likely increase the efficient use of facility space, which is lacking and expensive, and seek to encourage cooperation between CBP component offices. Yet, it is necessary to consider certain issues with existing policies, practices and plans for each of the initiatives. Having worked in CBP since its beginning and prior to the merger, the author is confident these efforts will experience significant dissention, as change is difficult; especially, without clarity in intent and a socialization of the concepts before they are enacted. This issue is particularly evident when considering the issues still faced by CBP’s component offices as demonstrated in the interview results. The missing link in the future initiatives effort is the operators; those who will be affected the most by changes. Significant changes, such as these, must include all levels of the organization. People and consideration of cultures is of utmost importance because although the merger is six years old, these matters were not considered in 2003. Thus, to fix the problem, late consideration is better than never.
As introduced previously, General Petraus’ *Engine of Change* diagram describes a learning organization as a system, or an engine. All of the parts or cogs of the system must be working in synchronization for the engine to perform correctly. The parts or cogs of the engine include doctrine (theory), leader development (understanding), collective training (application) and lessons learned (feedback).

This change process enables an organization to become a learning organization, always changing and adapting. The design of a learning organization is that the learning and development processes do not have to be top down in application. There are initiatives that occur at the tactical level, and on occasion, their same concepts can be applied at the organizational level. The important factor in the development process is to include individuals from all levels within an organization. The military has embraced this theory and included generals, field commanders and doctrine developers when considering change. Practical information is obtained from those who are currently or have recently experienced tactical level involvement. The majority of experience, good ideas and best practices do not reside in the headquarters office building. An organization must leverage all of its assets.

The application of systems thinking to CBP is that the organization cannot transform into a synchronized system until significant improvements are made. Arguably, the weakest part of the system for CBP is in doctrine; however, advances must be made in all areas before CBP would be suited to begin doctrine development.

With doctrine, survival does occur from one administration to the next. In a highly political environment, such as the one in which CBP is situated, this is a critical factor for survival of the organization over time. Changing doctrine requires recognition of a break down in one of the cogs; it is not done at the whim of a regime change. Doctrine seeks to institutionalize best practices and provide a foundation for an organization. With the expectation of a new commissioner for CBP, anything currently ongoing may be halted as was done with the activities under review for DHS. When Secretary Napolitano became head of the department, she initiated a major policy and strategy review, which has essentially stalled a large majority of ongoing efforts.
In practice, the offices within CBP generally work well together at the tactical level, as evidenced by the many unified efforts that have and are currently occurring. One example is the San Diego sector’s maritime enforcement effort. This is a combined effort among not only CBP offices, but also other components within DHS. The direction for this effort is predicated on the DHS strategic goals of awareness, prevention, protection and organizational excellence through partnerships (DHS, 2004). The goal of this strategy is to unite the fundamental principles that guide the full range of response activities and capabilities present within each sector of the department in this particular geographic area. Agencies commonly bound by traditional organizational boundaries also share common responsibilities—DHS San Diego components share responsibility for maritime threats.

The collaborative team focuses its efforts on achieving the following strategic goals of establishing and employing a common threat based operational picture; establishing intelligence fusion through interagency intelligence sharing and collaboration; identifying and supporting interagency resource requirements and new technology necessary to accomplish missions; supporting and participating in interagency planning; and identifying and implementing joint training opportunities.

The overarching goal in this strategy is to allocate the resources that cover the participant agencies’ inter-related requirements, and as such, enable the development of planning that addresses recognized common threats. These partnerships further refine and enhance the ability of the participating agencies to respond effectively to a significant event within the San Diego area.

Throughout the collaborative effort, it is essential that leadership, trust and an understanding of each organizational culture be recognized so that the working relationship can be sustained and enhanced. This conglomeration of agencies is managed by the San Diego DHS Senior Guidance team, which includes five senior level executives from the USCG, CBP/OBP, CBP/A&M (two: one air and one Marine), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Investigations (ICE OI). The agencies meet on a regular basis and develop operations plans that integrate each of the participants’ activities and resources. This has been a successful ongoing effort since 2007.
The difference between field level and headquarters level activities is, in large part, relationship and ego based. The field level operators have common interdependencies, and while they are implementing higher-level strategies, they have found a way to work through their differences. A sharing of command, resources and intelligence on a daily basis exists. In other words, the right hand knows what the left is doing and they can coordinate activities and avoid redundancy while at the same time multiplying their effectiveness.

The overarching theme of the questioning and research was to identify doctrine would have value for border security, for CBP. Clearly, the answer is yes. There was, nonetheless, a general consensus that “we are not there yet,” meaning that although there is a recognized need to have a unified and common perspective, CBP as an organization, has not yet accomplished that task.

It is inherently difficult for people to change, and resistance to change quite often undermines a potentially valuable effort. Dissention among the ranks has become an issue. It is incredibly important to get to the root cause of dissent within an organization and then deal with the issues as appropriate. For example, while working on a project, one stakeholder may come to a meeting with the attitude of just not liking the concept of whatever is being discussing. If asked, “Why don’t you like it?” and the answer is that it costs too much money, or it is too hard, it will take too long, then it is up to the leaders or facilitator of the project to make the value clear to the stakeholder. It takes both time and effort for many people to come around to new or different ideas. There are instances in which the dissention cannot be dispelled. Nonetheless, it is crucial to get to the root of the issues, and hopefully, make the contributors comfortable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to examine the value and application of doctrine for border security, specifically for U.S. Customs and Border Protection and to determine how CBP can become a learning organization, which then has the capacity to approach the development of common overarching doctrine properly. Through interviews and other research activities, such as reviewing and analyzing available literature and doctrinal documents, this thesis has argued that the process under which doctrine is created and the result of that process; the codification and institutionalization of the best practices for CBP as a whole would be of great value to the organization.

No effort to develop doctrine for CBP as an organization has been undertaken. CBP must meet particular milestones before beginning the process of developing doctrine. It seems that currently, CBP is not ready, as it has yet become amalgamated in their missions or policies, which are necessary steps before developing doctrine. As evidenced in many of the interviews, the organization is fragmented, missions and policies are not integrated, and to develop doctrine, a common conceptual framework, these issues must first be tackled. The question, then, is how can this be done? Where is the starting point?

Senge (1990 p. 484) explains that people are taught to break apart problems or fragment the world to make tasks more manageable. When things or organizations are fragmented, it is difficult to see the consequences of individual actions. The connection to the larger whole is lost. David Bohm (1990) stated, “when we try to see the bigger picture, it is much like reassembling the fragments of a broken mirror to see a true reflection... when we give up this illusion, we can then build learning organizations;” an organization in which its people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire. According to the learning organization concept, organizations that are to excel in the future will be those that tap into their people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels. CBP must tap into their components commitments to the larger organization and leverage those commitments to create a wholly effective agency.
General Petraeus’ Engine of Change describes a learning organization as one in which doctrine is a fundamental part of the system. In addition, the Engine of Change has a component for leadership development or training. At this point, the doctrine is codified and taught to the organization. CBP is not currently structured to teach its strategies or policies in any manner. After the academy, little training occurs beyond first level supervisory training, which is limited in scope and contains very little about CBP as an organization. Leadership training is primarily reserved for upper management (GS-14 and above) and is very competitive and there is no guarantee it will positively affect a career. No established career path exists for an employee to follow to obtain a certain level. It is not entirely possible to know where the choices made will lead within the organization.

On another point, it is clear that CBP, out of need, rather than obligation, must be collaborative. Does everyone always win when collaborating? Not necessarily, but collaboration is critical to success when an organization has significant interdependencies, overlapping responsibilities, mutual interests and a common mission. An interest is not the same as a position. One component office can support its interests while also accommodating another’s interests through collaboration. Successful collaboration depends on many factors. One of the most important prerequisites for collaboration to be successful is the presence of a catalyst. This concept is discussed by Ricardo S. Morse, PhD, in his article, developing public leaders in an age of collaborative governance (2007), as well as in the Starfish and the spider literature, in that a catalyst is a person who can move along a process, whether centralized or not, and then assist in making it successful. CBP interviewees agreed that change must be ushered along, with top-level buy in. A catalyst can assist in gaining both top-level and field-level cooperation.

According to Morse (2007), to make collaborative efforts successful, leaders must build support both of and from the larger group. They must persevere in their efforts and dispel misperceptions. He describes several leadership attributes and characteristics from a number of sources that lead to a successful collaborative leader. One such attribute is that of systems thinking. Systems thinking involves thinking about impacts on the future,
thinking about ripple effects and consequences beyond what is immediately concerning, and thinking in terms of issues and strategies that cross functions, specialties and professional disciplines (Luke, 1998, p. 222). This concept is a direct parallel with the considerations of CBP in becoming a learning organization that engages in multiple collaborative efforts.

Morse (2007) also suggests that it is crucial to institutionalize the collaboration appropriately and build a network to maintain and strengthen the commitment beyond the existing stakeholders, i.e., succession planning. At this point, doctrine fits into the equation. Learning organizations discuss a network or systems approach as a “discipline for seeing wholes” (Senge, 1990, p. 486). Senge continues to describe how businesses and human endeavors are also systems, that “you can only understand the system of a rainstorm by contemplating it as a whole.” Systems thinking itself is considered a conceptual framework—one that has been developed over many years to explain patterns and help in learning how to change them effectively. It is only possible to understand the full application of CBP when contemplating it as a whole. What does CBP stand for, how do they accomplish their tasks and who leads them to the goal line?

Another critical collaborative leadership behavior or attribute according to Morse (2007, p. 11) is the ability to facilitate trusting relationships among partners or stakeholders. Collaboration it would seem is dependent upon trust. Participation must be between trusted individuals who have both the authority and knowledge to speak for an organization. When the people around you are both credible and competent, then trust is nearly automatic.

Arguably, trust within an organization is vital in establishing systems and working together toward a common goal, in this case the security of the American people. Steven M. R. Covey introduced in his book, The speed of trust, the concept that levels of trust have either taxes or dividends within an organization. The lower the level of trust, the higher the tax on productivity and conversely, the higher the level of trust, the more dividends are experienced with a result of higher productivity at a lower cost—the cost being beyond monetary. An organization can have a strong strategy and the ability to execute it, but without trust, the net result can be either destroyed by a low-trust tax or
multiplied by a high-trust dividend. Evidence of this exists in CBP in the competition for resources, as well as operations and credit for those operations mentioned during the interviews.

CBP can be characterized with regard to a trust tax, and based on the research for this thesis, as having an incredible amount of bureaucracy and redundancy in systems and structures, hidden agendas, unnecessary hierarchy, incredibly slow approvals, and most of all, misaligned systems and structures all of which result in dissatisfied employees and stakeholders (Covey, 2008). The question remains then, how can they rebuild or in most cases, just build trust between the component offices so that working together is a positive experience with a positive outcome? According to Covey (p. 36), most people have the ability to restore trust. Understanding intent is a key factor in rebuilding trust. Walk the talk, talk straight, make intentions clear and leave agendas at the door; these are a few of his suggestions in building or rebuilding trust. Leaders must lead, be accountable, admit their mistakes, move on and follow through—the same can be said for those not in leadership positions, per se. Leaders are present at all levels within the organization. The current situation within CBP does not foster trusting relationships, partly because no doctrine exists and partly because there is a struggle for control, each of which feed on the other. With doctrine, the organization would have clear roles and responsibilities, clear authorities, clear areas of responsibility and a common framework from which to draw.

Author Peter Senge (1998, pp. 486–487) describes several disciplines, or “technologies” of a learning organization, systems thinking, personal mastery, mental model, and building shared vision. He asserts that the one of the disciplines, the Fifth Discipline as he calls it, is that of systems thinking. The discipline integrates all of the rest. Systems thinking keeps the other disciplines fused together so they are coherently used and understood.

According to Senge (1990, p. 490), systems thinking requires the other disciplines to reach its true potential. Building shared vision promotes an obligation to the long term. Mental models focus on the openness needed to realize inefficiencies in current viewpoints. Team learning develops the skills of the larger group of people to seek the
larger picture, which is beyond personal perspective. Systems thinking puts into perspective the subtle aspects of a learning organization for the individual, who realizes there is something larger, yet is a part of what makes it work. This is the heart of the learning organization—the realization that individuals are connected to the world, not separated from it. The realization of interconnectedness, that not all of the organizations’ problems are from outside, but also come from actions that individuals take. It is cause and effect. The choices made today do affect tomorrow and they do affect more than just individuals; be it individual component offices or individual people.

Few organizations have sustained themselves without a shared vision, without goals, without common mission or shared values. Successful learning organizations have had the ability to instill throughout their workforce a deeply shared common identity and concern for the organizations future.

An expressive need exists for CBP to become a learning organization, an organization whose people continually develop their aptitude to create the results they truly aspire to, where new and open thinking is cultivated, and where people are continually learning how to learn together. There are no simple answers or shortcuts to accomplish this task. The challenge for the organization is that this requires imagination, perseverance, dialogue, profound caring and a willingness to change. CBP must also learn to use collaboration to its fullest effective extent, and not just for collaboration’s sake, but to gain results, to reach outcomes rather than outputs.

Being part of a learning organization requires one thing in particular to be effective—Metanoia—a shift of mind. Senge describes this as an awakening of shared intuition and direct knowing of the highest. Metanoia describes the quintessential paradigm shift where a person moves convulsively from one understanding to something completely different. It has also been described as a profound transformation, a change at the innermost core (Burke, 2008). Metanoia is beyond what most people consider learning to be. Learning has become synonymous with taking in information, but really learning something requires a fundamental shift in mind; a movement toward knowing; an ah-ha moment. It is possible to read a book about a topic, for instance, on how to ice skate, but a person has not truly learned how to ice skate until able to do it.
Then, there is the factor of trust. Without it, any process can be slow and arduous; with it, processes move faster and goals are accomplished. According to Covey (2008), when working with trusted individuals, it is much easier to take their efforts at face value, and thus, minimizing bureaucracy. Covey (2008, p. 1) also asserts that trust is the one thing, that if not present or removed, can destroy the most powerful of anything, be it a relationship, a business or a government. How is it possible then to trust someone who is trying to undermine an individual or go behind his or her back? Those types of people cannot be trusted. One reason for this undermining within CBP is the lack of the institutionalization of clear roles and responsibilities. For example, CBP OAM has a support responsibility to CBP component offices, as well as other agencies within DHS; however, there is a struggle ongoing for OAM to become its own operational component with more of a proactive enforcement role. Nevertheless, they are depended upon to support the enforcement components. The Border Patrol Sector Chiefs maintain tactical control of the air assets located within their sectors, yet are frequently at odds with those in physical control of these assets for various reasons, including other missions they are requested to perform.

A. FINAL THOUGHTS

The differences that can be realized upon the completion of and throughout the process of improving CBP not being achieved today are mission integration, standardization, operational integration, establishing clear roles and responsibilities, trust between components of CBP, learning as an organization, unity of purpose, indoctrination, and defining fundamental principles. This last chapter proposes a set of recommendations leading to the successful adoption of these innovations.

Why doctrine? Doctrine answers not only the what, but also the how, to include the following: Why does an organization exist as an entity? What is the focus and how to achieve the goals? How to behave as an organization? What is the best way to do that?

Doctrine is an equation to define a system—a system with moving parts, each of which has to be working in synergy with one another for the whole system to function. Systems thinking is key to developing into an organization that can learn from itself and
others. Becoming a learning organization that is practiced and successful in collaboration would enable the offices within CBP to integrate policies and strategies based on a common approach and set of principles as opposed to maintaining their independent status quo, in which CBP components continue to follow legacy approaches and policies that predate their amalgamation into one agency. General Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, USAF (1996) during the Air Force Air and Space Doctrine Symposium, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, stated, “while doctrine can be useful in intellectual debates and can provide a valid input for future force programming, its primary purpose should be to guide (author’s emphasis)…its real value lies in providing our people a coherent framework (author’s emphasis)….”

Failure to create a common framework that rationalizes the wide variety of policies, procedures and strategies among the offices within CBP will likely result in the continuation of a fragmented agency unable to accomplish the increasingly important mission of border security.

It is not the intent of this thesis to recommend the component offices of CBP should in any way lose or renounce their individual identities. Those identities possess many aspects, however, that are common. The very nature of the organization is interdependent and collaborative. Not one component of CBP can possibly perform all the tasks and assignments for which CBP is responsible. The component offices are subject to laws that determine their authorities. OFO can only perform their law enforcement functions at the Ports of Entry, unless it can verify a nexus to the border. Conversely, the laws governing the Border Patrol Agents’ authorities allow them to perform their functions between the Ports of Entry and throughout the U.S. Everyone is working toward the same goal—that of securing America’s borders. This can be done much more efficiently and effectively through collaborative effort. It has been said that it is not the product but the process that is most valuable. In other words, those engaged in the collaborative formation of a common project learn a great deal about their organization as a whole, its gaps, and its interdependencies and how one component can compliment the others.
The problem with doctrine when it is meant to apply to a large group of people is that people do not all believe the same thing. They can read the same material, have similar experiences, and arrive at different conclusions. The problem amplifies itself when dealing with people who have not been taught the same lessons or experienced similar circumstances. People come from different backgrounds and experience different life lessons, yet when given the opportunity and with an open mind, strong leadership and a shared vision, they can agree on basic fundamental ideas that shape their organization.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY

DHS’ San Diego area Senior Guidance Team construct could serve as a model for how to apply unified command and operational synergy to the headquarters element of CBP. They have developed a task force with initiatives and actions that insure effectiveness while eliminating duplicative effort. San Diego has also introduced a border security doctrine that contains overarching principles and is predicated on targeted enforcement, operational discipline, and above all, unity of command.

It is the recommendation of the author that CBP designate a specific division or section for integration purposes. This effort is essential for the organization to develop synergy. The Engine of Change model should be applied to CBP for this development process. If CBP took this model and began to use it, several things would have to happen. Organizationally, a training structure needs to be developed to support the codification of the doctrine. The level at which this training should occur is at the very beginning of the supervisory ladder. It is important for ground troops also to understand their organizations foundational ideology as well, which can be introduced at the academies on a basic level. No secondary or “officer” level training is available within the agency. The USCG has an Officer Candidate School, which prepares candidates to serve effectively as officers in the USCG. Applicants must be in their senior year at, or hold a baccalaureate or higher degree, from an accredited college or university (uscg.edu, 2009). CBP only requires a specified amount of time in service and a qualifying score on the promotional assessment test to advance to a management position. The advent of this sort of management school would promote higher education among CBP employees, and while
it is not necessary to have the same requirements as the USCG, but in an effort to be more competitive later at higher levels within the Department, it would certainly be beneficial. It is recommended that CBP research the development of this sort of opportunity for its mid level managers.

Also, the organization would need to develop an entity that collects, organizes and creates lessons learned for the component offices. This would also assist in determining best practices, and thus, the cycle continues. This office or section may also benefit from instruction in becoming a learning organization, as well as doctrine development. The department is currently engaged in doctrinal development and may serve as a subject matter expert for CBP if requested. The division or section could be located in the Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination as this is already an interdisciplinary office within CBP; however, it must include operational components as well as administrative components, from senior level executives to operators from the field level. The assigned personnel must have intricate knowledge of the internal functions of the organization that is CBP and a broad perspective with vision, as well as practical experience. The participants should start with the disjointed and non-complimentary policies and structures within the organization; for example, overtime pay, retirement systems and the area of responsibility (AOR) alignment (sectors vs. field offices). This effort requires a fundamental policy review for the organization.

Future areas of study include doctrine development, succession planning to continue the effort, as well as an effort to examine the training and implementation functions of doctrine. CBP is not currently structured so that training of doctrine, policy or strategy is easily facilitated. It could most practically be introduced at the basic training level and then again at the supervisory levels.
Border security doctrine would serve as a set of guiding principles for agencies and offices with border security responsibilities and enable each individual agency to benefit from the actions of the others. In doing so, they provide for the American people a finer sense of overall homeland security in that the citizens of this country can be confident that their border enforcement operations are working with synergy to support one another and provide the blanket of security that America sleeps under each night.

Learning is not attained by chance; it must be sought for with ardor and attended to with diligence—Abigail Adams
APPENDIX

Interview Questions

“Doctrine” encompasses the fundamental principles that guide and organization and shape its efforts. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. Doctrine influences how policy and plans are developed and carried out, how departments and agencies are organized and trained, and how equipment is procured. It promotes unity of purpose, guides professional judgment, and enables responders to best fulfill their responsibilities. Doctrine links theory, experience, experimentation and practice.

1. What do you see as the major organizational challenges today in Border Security?
   a. Operational Challenges?
      i. Is there a connection between those, please explain.

2. Does CBP currently have a common conceptual framework? Please explain.

3. Guiding principles provide a framework for how multiple organizations achieve unified, collective action. They are the basis of reasoning and action.

4. Is it important to codify those principles,
   a. To institutionalize them?

5. Operating concepts are the means by which the Guiding principles are applied.
   a. Describe operating concepts for Border Security.

6. Doctrine is created in large part by applying lessons learned from real life, field/tactical experiences. How can this be done in the construct of Border security?
   a. Is there currently a method for collecting lessons learned, applying them to existing strategies and policy and making changes while also institutionalizing them?


10. Do you see value in doctrine for Border Security?
LIST OF REFERENCES


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   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

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