Project BioShield: Authorities, Appropriations, Acquisitions, and Issues for Congress

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January 22, 2010
Summary

Many potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents lack available medical countermeasures. In 2003, President Bush proposed Project BioShield to address this need. The Project BioShield Act became law in July 2004 (P.L. 108-276).

This law has three main provisions: (1) relaxing regulatory requirements for some CBRN terrorism-related spending, including hiring and awarding research grants; (2) guaranteeing a federal government market for new CBRN medical countermeasures; and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved countermeasures. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has used each of these authorities. The HHS used expedited review authorities to approve 5 contracts and 47 grants related to CBRN countermeasure research and development. The HHS used the authority to guarantee a government market to obligate approximately $2 billion to acquire countermeasures against anthrax, botulism, radiation, and smallpox. The HHS has also employed the emergency use authority several times, including allowing young children with H1N1 “swine” influenza to receive specific antiviral drugs.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) advance-appropriated $5.593 billion for FY2004 to FY2013 for CBRN countermeasures acquisition through Project BioShield. Subsequent Congresses have rescinded or transferred to other accounts approximately 19% of the advance appropriation. In FY2004 and FY2005, Congress removed a total of approximately $25 million from this account through rescissions included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447). In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), Congress transferred an additional $412 million to support countermeasure advanced research and development and pandemic influenza preparedness and response. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) transferred $609 million to support countermeasure basic and advanced research and countermeasure development. P.L. 111-117 also transferred the BioShield appropriation account from DHS to HHS.

Since passing the Project BioShield Act, subsequent Congresses have considered additional measures to further encourage countermeasure development. The 109th Congress passed the Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) which created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS. Amongst other duties, this office oversees all of HHS’ Project BioShield activities. The Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act also modified the Project BioShield procurement process. Questions remain regarding whether these changes have sufficiently improved countermeasure development and procurement.

The 111th Congress faces several challenging policy issues. Primary among them is assessing whether Project BioShield is successfully encouraging medical countermeasure development. A second issue is whether to allow additional diversions of the Project BioShield advance appropriation, a key element of the government’s market guarantee, to support other activities. A third is whether to broaden Project BioShield’s mandate beyond CBRN countermeasures in the face of other threats, such as pandemic influenza.
Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1
The Project BioShield Act .................................................................................................................. 1
   Expedited Procedures ..................................................................................................................... 1
   Market Guarantee .......................................................................................................................... 2
   Emergency Use of Unapproved Products ....................................................................................... 3
   Reporting Requirements ................................................................................................................ 4
Appropriations ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Acquisitions .......................................................................................................................................... 6
BioShield and BARDA ......................................................................................................................... 7
Policy Issues ......................................................................................................................................... 8
   Agency Responsibilities ................................................................................................................ 9
   Diversion of BioShield Funds for Other Purposes ..................................................................... 9
   Transfers for CBRN Countermeasure Research and Development ............................................ 9
   Transfer for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness ............................................................................ 10
Stockpile Management ..................................................................................................................... 10
Broad Spectrum Countermeasures .................................................................................................... 11

Tables

Table 1. Project BioShield Rescissions and Transfers ...................................................................... 5
Table 2. Project BioShield Acquisition Activity .................................................................................. 7

Contacts

Author Contact Information .............................................................................................................. 12
Introduction

Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the federal government determined that it would need new medical countermeasures (e.g., diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines, and other treatments) to respond to an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. Representatives of the pharmaceutical industry attributed the paucity of CBRN agent countermeasures to the lack of a significant commercial market. They argued that because these diseases and conditions occur infrequently, the private sector perceives little economic incentive to invest the millions of dollars required to bring treatments to market.

In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act (P.L. 108-276) to encourage the development of CBRN medical countermeasures. The 108th Congress also appropriated $5.6 billion to acquire countermeasures through Project BioShield for FY2004 through FY2013. Subsequent congresses have evaluated implementation of Project BioShield. In response to perceived problems with Project BioShield countermeasure procurement, the 109th Congress created the Biodefense Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417).

The 111th Congress continues to address several BioShield-related policy issues. These include whether to change Project BioShield agency responsibilities; whether to continue diverting BioShield appropriations for other purposes; how to replace stockpiled countermeasures as they expire; and evaluating whether this program has sufficiently encouraged the development of broad spectrum countermeasures.

The Project BioShield Act

To encourage the development of new CBRN countermeasures, President Bush proposed Project BioShield in his 2003 State of the Union address. The 108th Congress considered this proposal and passed the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276, signed into law July 21, 2004). This act has three main provisions. The first provision provides HHS expedited procedures for CBRN terrorism-related spending, including procuring products, hiring experts, and awarding research grants. The second provision creates a government-market guarantee by allowing the HHS Secretary to obligate funds to purchase countermeasures while they still need several more years of development. The third provision authorizes the HHS Secretary to temporarily allow the emergency use of countermeasures that lack Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval.

Expedited Procedures

The act relaxes procedures under the Federal Acquisition Regulation HHS must follow when procuring property or services used in performing, administering, or supporting CBRN countermeasure research and development (R&D). These expedited procedures decrease both the

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2 For legislative history of this law, see CRS Report RL32549, Project BioShield: Legislative History and Side-by-Side Comparison of H.R. 2122, S. 15, and S. 1504, by Frank Gottron and Eric A. Fischer.
amount of paperwork required for these expenditures and the potential for oversight. The act also increases the maximum amount, from $100 thousand to $25 million, for contracts awarded under simplified acquisition procedures. It also allows these purchases using other than full and open competition. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), HHS has used the simplified acquisitions procedure authority for five contracts. These contracts, all executed between 2004 and 2005 using funds from the National Institutes of Health, totaled approximately $30 million. The HHS stated that it has not exercised its authority to use other than full and open competition.

The Project BioShield Act authorizes the HHS Secretary to use an expedited award process for grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements related to CBRN countermeasure R&D, if the Secretary deems that a pressing need for an expedited award exists. The act limits this authority to awards worth $1.5 million or less. This expedited award process replaces the normal peer review process. Some scientists have expressed concerns that an expedited review process will reduce research quality. The normal peer review process provides proposals with greater scientific merit a higher probability of receiving funding, a factor potentially lost in an expedited process. According to HHS, it awarded 5 contracts and 47 grants through this expedited peer review process between July 2004 through December 2008. The National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) awarded these expedited grants within three to nine months after the application deadline.

**Market Guarantee**

The Project BioShield Act is designed to guarantee companies that the government will buy new, successfully developed CBRN countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The act allows the HHS Secretary, with the concurrence of the DHS Secretary and upon the approval of the President, to promise to buy a product up to eight years before it is reasonably expected to be delivered. Originally, HHS would pay a company only on the delivery of a substantial portion

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3 These contracts are distinct from the contracts using Project BioShield funds described later in this report (see “Acquisitions”). The HHS used these contracts to purchase treatments for botulism and internal radioactive particle contamination. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Project BioShield: HHS Can Improve Agency Internal Controls for Its New Contracting Authorities*, GAO-09-820, July 21, 2009, p. 7.


7 Grants that go through the normal peer review process typically take 9 to 18 months to receive funding. See http://www.niaid.nih.gov/ncn/grants/charts/timeline_resub.htm.

8 The SNS contains pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical supplies, and medical equipment to respond to terrorist attacks and other emergencies.

of the countermeasure. The Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) modified the Project BioShield Act to allow for milestone-based payments of up to half of the total award before delivery.\(^\text{10}\) Therefore, this guarantee reduces the market risk for the company and the milestone payments partially reduce its exposure to development risk (i.e., the risk that the countermeasure will fail during testing and be undeliverable).

The Project BioShield Act allows HHS to purchase unapproved and unlicensed countermeasures. It requires the HHS Secretary to determine that “sufficient and satisfactory clinical experience or research data ... support[s] a reasonable conclusion that the product will qualify for [FDA] approval or [HHS] licensing ... within eight years.”\(^\text{11}\) Because most drugs that begin these processes fail to become approved treatments, critics of this provision suggest that the government will end up purchasing countermeasures that may never be approved. To reduce the government’s financial risk associated with this provision, the act allows HHS to write contracts in which unapproved products may be purchased at lower cost than approved products. The HHS used some of these authorities when structuring each of the Project BioShield contracts discussed below (see “Acquisitions”).

### Emergency Use of Unapproved Products

The FDA and HHS designed their approval and licensing processes to protect people from ineffective or dangerous treatments. The Project BioShield Act allows the HHS Secretary to temporarily authorize the emergency use of medical products that are not approved by the FDA or HHS. To exercise this authority, the HHS Secretary must conclude that:

- the agent for which the countermeasure is designed can cause serious or life-threatening disease;
- the product may reasonably be believed to be effective in detecting, diagnosing, treating, or preventing the disease;
- the known and potential benefits of the product outweigh its known and potential risks;
- no adequate alternative to the product is approved and available; and
- any other criteria prescribed in regulation are met.\(^\text{12}\)

Such emergency use authorizations (EUAs) remain in effect for one year unless the Secretary terminates them earlier. The Secretary may renew expiring authorizations.

The HHS Secretary has issued several EUAs. Currently, EUAs permit use of five countermeasures to the 2009 H1N1 “swine” influenza\(^\text{13}\) outbreak: the antiviral influenza

\(^\text{10}\) For more on this law, see CRS Report RL33589, *The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417): Provisions and Changes to Preexisting Law*, by Sarah A. Lister and Frank Gottron.

\(^\text{11}\) 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b(c).


\(^\text{13}\) For additional information, see CRS Report R40554, *The 2009 Influenza Pandemic: An Overview*, by Sarah A. Lister and C. Stephen Redhead.
treatments Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and Relenza (zanamivir), N95 respirators, and two diagnostic kits to help identify cases of this disease. Another active EUA allows the distribution of antibiotic kits containing doxycycline hyclate to certain people participating in the Cities Readiness Initiative. One EUA has expired; the HHS Secretary issued an EUA in January 2005 allowing the vaccination of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel with a specified type of anthrax vaccine. This EUA expired in January 2006.

**Reporting Requirements**

The Project BioShield Act of 2004 requires the HHS Secretary to report annually to Congress on the use of some of the authorities granted by this law. The reports must summarize each instance that HHS used the expedited procurement and grant procedures and allowed the emergency use of unapproved products. The reports must explain why HHS needed to use these authorities. The HHS has produced three such reports to date.

This act also requires GAO to assess actions taken under authorities granted by the act, determine the effectiveness of the act, and recommend additional measures to address deficiencies. In July 2009, GAO published two reports in response to this requirement. The first report recommends that HHS improve some of its internal controls implemented for the expedited contracting procedures (see “Expedited Procedures” above). The second report determined that HHS has used Project BioShield to support development and procurement of CBRN medical countermeasures. This report contained no recommendations for improving Project BioShield.

**Appropriations**

The Project BioShield Act did not appropriate any funds. Instead, it authorized the appropriation of up to a total of $5.593 billion for procuring countermeasures from FY2004 through FY2013. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) appropriated this amount into a special reserve fund and provided explicit time windows in which the money could be obligated. P.L. 108-90 specified that $3.418 billion was available for obligation for FY2004 to FY2008. The balance of the advance appropriation plus unobligated funds remaining from

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14 Although the antiviral treatments had been previously approved for treating influenza, the EUA makes it easier to distribute these treatments and allows their use for infants and children younger than had been previously allowed.
15 For more information on these EUAs, see http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/eua/.
16 For more on this program, see http://www.bt.cdc.gov/crtl/.
FY2004 to FY2008 became available in FY2009 for obligation from FY2009 to FY2013. The Project BioShield Act specified that these funds are only for the procurement of CBRN countermeasures using the Project BioShield authorities and may not be used for other purposes, such as for grants to support countermeasure development or program administration.

Congress advance-appropriated the 10-year program but retained the power to annually increase or decrease the amount in the special reserve fund. Congress removed $25 million from this account through rescissions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447). See Table 1.

Congress has transferred funds from this account for other purposes. These transfers fall into two categories: those related to influenza pandemic preparedness and those related to CBRN countermeasures research and development. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) transferred to HHS $412 million from the special reserve fund. Of this amount, $137 million went to help respond to and prepare for pandemic influenza and $275 million went to fund countermeasure advanced development through the Biodefense Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA, see “BioShield and BARDA”).22 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) transferred $609 million to HHS. Of this amount, $305 million went to BARDA for countermeasure advanced development and $304 million went to the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to fund countermeasure basic research. See Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Project BioShield Rescissions and Transfers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>($ in millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer for Pandemic Flu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers for Advanced Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer for Basic Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of Rescissions and Transfers to Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Amounts rounded to nearest million.

In his FY2010 budget request, President Obama requested that the remaining balances in the special reserve fund be transferred from the DHS “Biodefense Countermeasure” account into the HHS “Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund” account. Congress approved this transfer through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117). These funds are to remain available for obligation through FY2013 for Project BioShield-related countermeasure purchases. Congressional appropriators estimated that after accounting for the FY2010 transfers

for basic research and advanced development, $2.424 billion remained available for Project BioShield acquisitions at the beginning of FY2010.\textsuperscript{23}

**Acquisitions**

The first Project BioShield contract was announced on November 4, 2004.\textsuperscript{24} The HHS contracted with VaxGen, Inc. for delivery of 75 million doses of a new type of anthrax vaccine (rPA) within three years. This contract was worth $879 million. See Table 2. On December 17, 2006, HHS terminated this contract because VaxGen, Inc. failed to meet a contract milestone.\textsuperscript{25} Subsequent contracts include:

- $690 million for 29 million doses of the currently approved AVA anthrax vaccine (Emergent BioSolutions, Inc.);
- $315 million for 65 thousand doses of Raxibacumab, a treatment for anthrax (Human Genome Sciences, Inc.);
- $144 million for 10 thousand doses of Anthrax Immune Globulin, a treatment for anthrax (Cangene Corporation);
- $505 million for 20 million doses of a new (MVA) smallpox vaccine (Bavarian Nordic, Inc.);
- $416 million for 200 thousand doses of botulinum antitoxin, a treatment for botulinum toxin exposure (Cangene Corporation);
- $18 million for 5 million doses of a pediatric form of potassium iodide, a treatment for radioactive iodine exposure (Fleming Pharmaceuticals); and
- $22 million for 395 thousand doses of Ca-DTPA and 80 thousand doses of Zn-DTPA, two treatments for internal radioactive particle contamination (Akorn, Inc.).

Thus, excluding the canceled VaxGen contract, HHS has obligated approximately $2.111 billion to date. Future targets for Project BioShield procurement include countermeasures against anthrax, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and radiation.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{23} H.Rept. 111-366, p. 1045.
Table 2. Project BioShield Acquisition Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Doses (thousands)</th>
<th>Cost ($ millions)</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Award Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthrax</td>
<td>rPA vaccine</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>VaxGen, Inc.</td>
<td>11/4/04; Cancelled 12/19/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AVA vaccine</td>
<td>28,750</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>Emergent BioSolutions, Inc. (formerly BioPort Corp.)</td>
<td>5/6/05; 5/5/06; 9/25/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raxibacumab</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>Human Genome Sciences, Inc.</td>
<td>6/19/06; 7/29/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anthrax Immune Globulin</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>Cangene Corp.</td>
<td>7/28/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallpox</td>
<td>MVA vaccine</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>Bavarian Nordic, Inc.</td>
<td>6/4/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botulinum Toxin</td>
<td>Botulinum Antitoxin</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>Cangene Corp.</td>
<td>6/1/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiological/ Nuclear</td>
<td>Potassium Iodide</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Fleming Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>3/18/05 and 2/8/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ca-DTPA</td>
<td>395</td>
<td></td>
<td>Akorn, Inc.</td>
<td>2/13/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zn-DTPA</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Announced Obligations:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Active Announced Obligations:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. This figure includes approximately $1.5 million that HHS paid to VaxGen, Inc. for mandatory security upgrades. When HHS terminated the vaccine contract, VaxGen, Inc. kept this amount, while the approximately $878 million for the vaccine became available for other BioShield procurements. Personal communication with BARDA, June 8, 2009.

b. This total does not include a $405 million contract for 14.5 million doses of AVA anthrax vaccine that HHS announced on September 30, 2008. According to HHS, this contract used Centers for Disease Control and Prevention funds rather than the Project BioShield special reserve fund. Personal communication with HHS, June 8, 2009.


d. Announced obligations minus $878 for the cancelled rPA contract (see note a).

**BioShield and BARDA**

Congressional policymakers have scrutinized the implementation and effectiveness of the Project BioShield Act since its enactment. In response to perceived problems with Project BioShield
countermeasure procurement, the 109th Congress created the Biodefense Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417).

Many congressional policymakers determined that Project BioShield had insufficiently encouraged the transition of promising basic research results into the product development stage. This period in development is often referred to as the “valley of death” because some seemingly promising products are not developed past this point due to lack of funding. As discussed above, Congress amended the Project BioShield Act through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act to allow HHS to pay up to half a Project BioShield contract’s value as milestone payments. Thus companies could receive payments while continuing to develop their promising products. Additionally, Congress created in BARDA a dedicated infrastructure to manage and fund advanced development and commercialization of CBRN countermeasures. In theory, BARDA funding can take those promising drugs from the basic research through the advanced development stage, which may include clinical trials. Congress created the Biodefense Medical Countermeasure Development Fund to pay for such advanced development contracts. Although this account is separate from the Project BioShield special reserve fund, Congress has repeatedly funded the advanced development account through transfers from the Project BioShield account (see Table 1).

Critics of government programs funding advanced development suggest that because of the high product failure rate in advanced development, the government will inevitably fund unusable products. In addition to removing the development risks traditionally borne by industry, directly funding advanced development inserts government decision makers into the countermeasure development process, a role critics argue is better suited to industry experts and entrepreneurs. Some critics would prefer to have the government set product requirements and have industry determine how best to meet them. As originally enacted, Project BioShield took this latter approach, an approach that Congress found insufficient in this particular case. Because advanced development activities generally take several years, it may take a few more years to determine if this change has yielded better results than the original Project BioShield.

In addition to funding the advanced development of countermeasures, BARDA manages HHS’ role in Project BioShield. BARDA leads the efforts to determine countermeasure requirements and executes all Project BioShield contracts.

Policy Issues

The 111th Congress faces several BioShield-related policy issues. These include whether to change Project BioShield agency responsibilities; whether to continue to divert BioShield funds for other purposes; how to replace stockpiled countermeasures as they expire; and evaluating whether this program has sufficiently encouraged the development of broad spectrum countermeasures.

Agency Responsibilities

As originally designed, three agencies had roles in Project BioShield procurements. The DHS managed the special reserve fund while HHS designed and executed the Project BioShield contracts. Both DHS and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) were required to approve each contract. In the FY2010 budget request, President Obama proposed transferring management of the Project BioShield special reserve fund from DHS to HHS. While considering this request Congress could have taken the opportunity to change other agency roles. Congress granted the President’s request to transfer the Project BioShield account to HHS through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), but chose not to change any other agency responsibilities.

Diversion of BioShield Funds for Other Purposes

One of the distinguishing features of Project BioShield is the ten-year $5.6 billion advance appropriation. Potential countermeasure developers considered the establishment of an advance-funded separate account dedicated solely to countermeasure procurement as integral to their participation in this program. The advance funding helped assure developers that payment for countermeasures they successfully developed would not depend on future, potentially uncertain appropriations processes. Although advance-funding the Project BioShield account may have provided some assurance of stability to developers, in practice, these funds have been subject to the annual appropriations processes. Subsequent Congresses have removed approximately 19% of the advance appropriation through rescissions and transfers to other accounts. See Table 1. These transfers fall into two categories: those related to CBRN countermeasure research and development and those related to influenza pandemic preparedness.

Transfers for CBRN Countermeasure Research and Development

Congress transferred $580 million from the special reserve fund to BARDA to support CBRN countermeasure advanced research and development. The Administration justified its requests for such transfers by asserting that these funds will support “future successful acquisitions of medical countermeasures under Project BioShield.”28 Thus, Congress could view such transfers as an attempt to improve the “lower than expected” rate of Project BioShield acquisitions.29 Congress also transferred $304 million to the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases for countermeasure basic research citing similar reasons.30 In FY2009, Congress set the precedent that research and development activities should be funded by transfers from the Project BioShield special reserve fund. In FY2010, Congress reinforced this precedent by approving another transfer for that purpose. This may suggest that similar actions can be expected for FY2011 and beyond. Annual transfers from this account to fund such activity would continue to lower the amounts available for procuring CBRN countermeasures, their originally intended purpose. If funding becomes a limitation to acquiring countermeasures,

30 H.Rept. 111-220, p. 194.
Congress could appropriate additional money for Project BioShield acquisitions.\textsuperscript{31} However, such a course of events might cause potential countermeasure developers to feel dependent on the actions of future appropriators, precisely the situation that establishment and advanced funding of the special reserve fund was designed to ameliorate.

Such funding transfers may modify the respective roles of the federal government and the private sector in Project BioShield. Congress originally designed Project BioShield to minimize the risk that the government would pay for countermeasures that fail during development (see “Market Guarantee” above). Congress expected developers to manage this risk, using the government-market guarantee to entice investors to fund countermeasure development. In the act, Congress attempted to assure such potential investors that the funding of this program was not subject to the annual appropriations process by providing ten year advance funding. Industry spokespeople reportedly have asserted that transferring money from this account weakens the ability of private firms to raise capital necessary to sustain long-term research and development for countermeasures and hinders potential participation in Project BioShield.\textsuperscript{32} However, transferring the funds to support advanced development may reduce the amount that developers need to raise, since the government could directly fund product development.

**Transfer for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness**

In FY2009, Congress transferred $137 million from the Project BioShield special reserve fund to HHS for pandemic influenza preparedness and response. President Obama did not request a similar transfer for FY2010. President Obama did request that the conference committee on the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32) allow the purchase of influenza countermeasures using the Project BioShield special reserve fund.\textsuperscript{33} Critics of this move charged that it would damage the biodefense countermeasure industry and “severely diminish the nation’s efforts to prepare for WMD events and will leave the nation less, not more, prepared.”\textsuperscript{34} The conferees declined to provide this authority.\textsuperscript{35} Similarly, in the Senate report to accompany the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (S. 1298), the committee “strongly urges” not using the special reserve fund to purchase influenza countermeasures.\textsuperscript{36}

**Stockpile Management**

All medicines, including those added to the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) through Project BioShield, have explicit expiration dates. The federal government does not allow the use of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{31} The House Committee on Appropriations has suggested that they would consider adding additional funds to the special reserve fund in the future. See H.Rept. 111-220, p. 194.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Spencer Hsu, “Bipartisan WMD Panel Criticizes Obama Plan To Fund Flu Vaccine,” *Washington Post*, June 8, 2009.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, June 2, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/supplemental_06_02_09.pdf.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} P.L. 111-32 and H.Rept. 111-151.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} S.Rept. 111-31, p. 96.
\end{itemize}
expired medicines. Countermeasure expiration raises at least two stockpile management issues: what to do with expiring countermeasures and how to replace them.

In 2007, the GAO suggested that HHS and DOD establish an inventory-sharing agreement that would allow DOD to use the HHS-stockpiled vaccine in its active troop anthrax vaccination program before expiration. These agencies subsequently implemented a shared stockpile approach for both for anthrax vaccines and pandemic influenza countermeasures. However, this shared stockpile solution only applies to countermeasures having other high-volume users. Countermeasures lacking similar high volume users may simply have to be discarded on expiration and replaced without compensation from other users.

Because countermeasures expire, HHS must procure a number of doses greater than that stored in the SNS at any given time. For example, HHS had to buy 29 million doses of anthrax vaccine to maintain a stockpile of at least 10 million doses from 2006 to 2011. To maintain a consistent readiness level, HHS may require additional periodic countermeasure purchases to replenish the stockpile as the countermeasures expire. Congress may consider whether such purchases should be funded through the advance appropriated Project BioShield account or through annual SNS budget authorities. Between 2005 and 2007, BARDA purchased the AVA anthrax vaccine using Project BioShield funds (Table 2). However in 2008, HHS switched funding sources for this vaccine and used SNS funds rather than BioShield funds to purchase an additional 14.5 million doses of AVA vaccine. BARDA adoption of this approach for all expiring stockpiled countermeasures may require increased annual appropriations for SNS procurements.

Broad Spectrum Countermeasures

Many experts contend that broad spectrum countermeasures, those that address multiple CBRN agents, would be the most valuable additions to the SNS. Such nonspecific countermeasures might be a defense against currently unknown threats, such as emerging diseases or genetically engineered pathogens. Furthermore, such countermeasures are more likely to have other nonbiodefense-related applications. The Project BioShield Act does not exclude procuring such countermeasures; however, it does require that the presence of another commercial market be factored into the HHS Secretary’s decision to purchase the countermeasure. The HHS has stated its interest in using Project BioShield to acquire new broad spectrum countermeasures.

38 Robin Robinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, HHS, testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, April 24, 2008.
40 Personal communication with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services staff, June 8, 2009.
41 Some broad spectrum treatments are available. For example, antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin can be used against several bacterial diseases. In contrast, antivirals that have similar broad spectrum properties or treatments that target common disease pathways such as sepsis could be valuable additions to the SNS, but remain targets for development. For a discussion of such countermeasures, see Gigi Gronvall, Jason Matheny, and Bradley Smith, et al., “Flexible Defenses Roundtable Meeting: Promoting the Strategic Innovation of Medical Countermeasures,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol. 5, no. 3 (2007), pp. 271-277.
However, Project BioShield contracts to date have specifically targeted individual threat agents, a strategy commonly described as “one bug, one drug.” Congress may decide that HHS needs further guidance or authorities to encourage the development and acquisition of new broad spectrum countermeasures.

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