THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS IN ROMANIA: CIVIL-MILITARY CHALLENGES BEYOND A “MILITARY RELATIONSHIP”

by

Valentin Simion

March 2008

Thesis Advisor: Donald Abenheim
Second Reader: Richard Hoffman

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# The Presence of the American Troops in Romania: Civil-Military Challenges Beyond a “Military Relationship”

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**Abstract:**

This thesis analyzes the civil-military relations of the growing U.S. military presence in Romania and the implications of this development for bilateral relations beyond the barracks and the maneuver field. By the implementation of the “Agreement Between Romania and the United States of America Regarding the Activities of United States Forces Located on the Territory of Romania,” the presence of the American troops on Romanian territory will have both positive and negative civil-military consequences. The history of U.S. and other foreign bases on European soil and other parts of the world in the 20th century sustains this conclusion and provides an area for inquiry. The areas of policy, economy and society will raise critical issues because of the social, cultural, legal and administrative, and other differences and dissimilar ways of perception and understanding of the requirements of strategy and policy.

The overall goal of this thesis is for those officials responsible for the issues of policy associated with the guest forces in the host nation to approach their task best so as to avoid or minimize the political and operational negatives, and hence avoid the bi-lateral problems that have affected host countries elsewhere in Europe as well as the wider world, while at the same time emphasizing the positives and lessons learned from previous experiences. Such is in the U.S. national interest, as well, and this latter concern is no less present in the author’s mind as a guest of the U.S. in the authorship of the present study.

This thesis has the potential to be a small but vital piece in solidifying U.S.-Romania relations in both civil and military affairs as such has unfolded since the 1990s.
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Valentin Simion
Colonel, Romanian Army
BS Transportation, Military College, Pitesti – Romania, 1983
Technical Support, High Military Studies Academy, Bucharest – Romania, 1995

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March 2008

Author: Valentin Simion

Approved by: Donald Abenheim
Thesis Advisor

Richard Hoffman
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

1. Statement of Purpose

The present study analyzes the civil-military relations of the growing U.S. military presence in Romania and the implications of this development for bi-lateral relations beyond the barracks and the maneuver field. By the December 2005 implementation of the “Agreement Between Romania and the United States of America Regarding the Activities of United States Forces Located on the Territory of Romania” referred to as “Access Agreement” (AA) in the following pages, the presence of the American troops on Romanian territory will have both positive and negative civil-military consequences. The history of the U.S. and other foreign bases on European soil and other parts of the world in the 20th century sustains this conclusion and provides an area for inquiry. The areas of policy, economy and society will raise critical issues in the social, cultural, legal and administrative areas. This will happen because of differences in perception and understanding of the requirements of strategy and policy.

2. Major Questions and Arguments

This thesis will answer the following overall question: which are the most sensitive areas of civil-military concern in the basing of the American troops and what are the possible political and social solutions in dealing with them? Another question that is relevant to this research: what are the implications for Romanian politics and society of the agreed-to presence of U.S. military in Romania? Or, perhaps to state it more simply: what are the primary hopes and concerns of Romanian citizens regarding their national security and that of Europe in a wider sense? At the same time, this thesis will strive to cover the lessons learned from the experiences of other countries that have hosted U.S.
military bases. Finally, this study seeks answers as to how one can reinforce the potentially positive aspects of such stationing, while minimizing the potentially negative aspects.

The presence of American troops on Romanian territory should not be seen as just a military issue in the operational sense or strictly related to the purview of the Romanian Ministry of Defence (MOD) alone. The presence of U.S. troops engages a host of interagency, national and local questions, both internally and externally, as well as matters that are social, economic, and financial. Obviously, there is no area of politics and society that will not be affected by even a modest presence of U.S. troops in Romania, including the central and local authorities who will be involved in this bi-lateral relationship.

A skeptic may argue that this theme is not really a classic issue of civil-military relations as that term is normally used. But the reality is that an interaction between Romanian society and the American troops will certainly have implications on Romanian civil-military relations and the fate of its young democratic political culture. The issues related to the U.S. military may be projected onto its Romanian counterpart, and the military in ensemble may be made responsible for any dysfunction, misunderstanding or mismanagement.

This thesis will deal only with the most significant civil-military problems and will try to identify those issues at both national and local levels. The research will focus on selective contingencies, experiences, and results relevant to the Romanian case.

It is the belief of this author that the future is strongly anchored in the past, and to a certain extent, may be predicted and somehow better controlled if the record of the past informs those who must manage the questions of war and peace that are so much a part of the violent present.

B. IMPORTANCE

The search for the sources of success in one case of local civil-military relations with U.S. forces rather than that of a more problematic episode requires a focused comparison of the respective countries’ experiences of such stationing in the past and
present. This comparison will provide the necessary conclusions and lessons learned for the Romanian civil political authorities and policy makers, as well as the Romanian MOD, in order to avoid problems in the most sensitive areas and make this partnership successful.

Part of the bi-lateral security arrangement, the presence of the U.S. military in Romania may have both negative and positive effects, and while the positive consequences will generate mutual benefits and shared security, the negative ones may cause bi-lateral discordance and opposition from the Romanian population and its political actors. From a U.S. perspective, the basing in Romania might not be as welcome, by a part of the civil society, as the Department of Defense has heretofore expected and such a disappointment and even backlash would hurt U.S. and NATO military effectiveness in a time of crisis. This thesis may not cover all of the general aspects and proportionally view both angles (American perspective and Romanian perspective) since it has the Romanian authorities as a primary audience, but it will capture the most representative ones.

It is expected that the Romanian MOD will be the most involved institution in implementing this bilateral agreement. However, the civil authorities should not leave the burden entirely on the shoulders of the military. The Romanian MOD, as a designated authority in implementing the AA, should be supported by all of the ministries, organizations, and agencies, which have certain responsibilities in specific areas. Moreover, a common body invested with the necessary authority should function at the right level in order to be able to solve all the obligations assumed by Romania.

The basing of the U.S. troops is a very important issue, especially regarding the relations between the two parties, which is why this relation should function on a partnership basis and not on a customer-service provider basis.

From studying the compromises chosen by other countries in dealing with the presence of American troops on their territories, this thesis will identify the most successful ways that have been adopted, by identifying the level where leading
organizations dealing with such bilateral relations has been placed in the national political military system offering the necessary feedback in reforming the existing system.

C. THE OVERALL GOAL

Thus, the overall goal of this thesis is for those officials responsible for the issues of policy associated with the guest forces in the host nation to approach their task best so as to avoid or minimize the political and operational negatives, and hence avoid the bilateral problems that have affected host countries elsewhere in Europe as well as the wider world, while emphasizing the positives and lessons learned from previous experiences. Such is in the U.S. national interest, as well, and this latter concern is no less present in the author’s mind as a guest of the U.S. in the authorship of the present study.

This thesis has the potential to be a small but vital piece in solidifying U.S.-Romania relations in both civil and military affairs as they have unfolded since the 1990s.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. General Considerations

The real question when dealing with a foreign military presence on a national territory is whether this policy brings benefits to all parties or not.

The literature offers a large amount of work dealing with this subject. Especially in the mid 90s, after the end of the Cold War, the issue of a military presence on other states’ territories attracted more scholarly interest.

A second main observation suggests that the existing literature identifies mostly three areas of impact: security, economics, and societal/environmental themes.

2. A First School of Thought’s Approach

There is a school of thought, which claims that the foreign military presence in other countries is necessary and is a benefit for both partners. While the hosting countries have economic, financial and security advantages, the occupied country satisfies its
political, security and military needs, and the relation between the involved countries is a
symbiosis. Even more, the host nation has collateral benefits in saving money that that
state should otherwise spend for maintaining its own military forces.

Harkavy,¹ Sharp,² and Duke³ describe the motivations of a host nation in basing
foreign troops on their territory in their work.

**a. Economic and Financial Issues**

Harkavy argues that economic incentives drive basing choices. In
providing basing rights, foreign aid appeared to be an important ingredient in the
willingness of Greece, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. Receiving rents for
bases or even trading favors are part of the equation. The example offered by Sharp
makes crystal clear that an American withdrawal would impact the German economy,
since the presence of U.S. troops during the 1990s accounted for 0.5 of its GNP. Clark
offers a clear picture of the benefits for the Europeans’ economy generated by the U.S.
military presence: “The numbers come to 65,000 personnel for the Army, 34,000 Air
Force, 10,000 Navy and Marines, and 3,500 reserves, all embraced within a budget of
some four billion dollars.”⁴ Another example from Japan by Masaaki, “The Okinawan
economy was almost completely dependent upon revenues from activities related to the
U.S. military...”⁵ and continuing in the same tone “…Okinawa became an import
economy dependent upon the U.S. military presence. The authorities saw to it that the
daily necessities were imported from Japan wherever possible, so that the U.S. dollars
invested in base construction became a source of foreign currency revenue for the

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³ Duke Simon., *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University

⁴ Wesley K., Clark, “The Role of U.S. Forces in Europe”, *The Future of The American Military

⁵ Masaaki Gabe, "Okinawa Summit No Solution to U.S. Military Base Issues." *Japan Quarterly*
postwar Japanese government through the people of Okinawa.” Giarra sustains the American presence in Japan, which in his opinion generates not only problems but also benefits: “These bases have to be seen locally less as the problem and more as the solution, with respect, for example, to development plans and economic expansion.”

Fisher's comment is self explanatory when talking about the economic perspective for Germans, concerning the downsizing of the American bases: “There would be a commensurate loss to the German economy.”

Giarra supports his argumentation, regarding the economic benefits of the Japanese population, with the fact that rents paid to landowners of domains used by the bases are considerable to them, since their property otherwise has no value.

Giarra also notices that the population concerns, regarding the environment, have no support: “Some observers, Japanese and American, insist that the fewer Marines on Okinawa the better. Modernization and technological advances may promote the trend toward fewer troops in any given unit, but fewer Americans does not necessarily equate to a better environment.”

b. Hosting Country’s Issues

However, the countries must understand that this situation is not permanent and that they should contribute to the general security, as Gordon sustains: “It is time to halt the reduction of resources dedicated to defense—the so-called peace dividend—and face up to the reality that in this still dangerous world security never comes cheap.”


9 Paul S. Giarra.

A second image approach is related to security; for instance, from the military strategic point of view the presence of the foreign troops has a high level of importance in providing security. As well-known journalist John Hamre has asserted, “The U.S. Army needs to be in Europe today because it represents the connective tissue that holds together the security structure of Europe.”\textsuperscript{11} The same conclusion is offered by Masaaki when talking about the U.S. military presence in Japan “…the U.S. military bases in Okinawa are crucial to security in the Far East, including that of Japan.”\textsuperscript{12}

Furthermore, Giarra intrinsically links the security of Japan with the presence of the American troops and its involvement:

U.S. forces in Japan are critical to that nation's defense as well. The support, or lack thereof, of the Japanese government for the American bases has important ramifications for the security of Japan and for the bilateral relationship. Most broadly, Japan benefits from the global missions assigned to U.S. forces based in the country. The fact that Japanese support, in turn, is vital to their ability to operate as far away as, for instance, the Persian Gulf animates Japanese foreign policy and tends to align U.S. policies and actions with Japanese interests. They reinforce each other, to Japan's benefit.\textsuperscript{13}

Part of the host countries’ security issue, the military common training and cooperation, building common confidence, as well as the infusion of the new technologies for modernizing national armed forces is another of the benefits available for the hosting countries. O'Hanlon sees more benefits in extending trust through cooperation beyond the bilateral relation in a possible regional partnership when he affirms that, “Maintaining a powerful Japan-U.S. alliance not only helps keep both countries safe and deters aggression in the region, but also provides a nucleus for military collaboration that may be extended some day to involve other countries, possibly including China, in a strong multilateral security structure.”\textsuperscript{14}

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\textsuperscript{12} Gabe Masaaki.
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\textsuperscript{13} Paul S. Giarra.
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c. Sending Troops’ Country’s Issues

A second division in the security realm, views the issue from the sending troops’ countries’ point of view. Representative authors are most concerned about politico-military interests and the changes in the overall security landscape that a withdrawal of the troops may cause. By advertising against a withdrawal, they sustain the presence of the foreign military bases on other countries’ territory as necessary and beneficial for both parties.

Mochizuki\textsuperscript{15} and Giarra\textsuperscript{16} propose the same idea, when considering the U.S. presence in the Japanese strategic area, as an important factor of the security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region.

Involved in the polemic regarding the withdrawal of the American troops from Okinawa, Giarra argues against those who promote the disagreement of civil population:

There is no consensus among Okinawans on the bases; since the employment of Okinawans on U.S. bases is not inconsequential, there is even a sizable, largely silent constituency in favor of the status quo. With their members' livelihoods at stake, the base employees' unions want the installations to remain, and they did not participate in major demonstrations against the United States in the fall of 1995.\textsuperscript{17}

From the point of view of the host society, this school of thought includes the idea that the presence of the military in a foreign country may have additional roles, such as building and transforming the society. These ideas are presented and sustained by scholars such as Petra Goedde, John Lamberton Harper, and to a certain extent Victoria de Grazia.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{16} Paul S. Giarra.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

3. A Second School of Thought’s Approach

In opposition to the previous opinions, there are scholars who sustain that the presence of the foreign troops in a country generates issues that are against the interest of both parties involved.

Judging from the U.S.-Europe perspective, the patterns of interaction of ideas, mentality, politics, society, economy, and culture remain generally misunderstood, especially in the Euro-Atlantic sphere of strategic studies. For instance, no one can seriously assert that the “globalization” and “Americanization” are new in the manner propagated during the 1990s, and to what extent they affected the U.S.-Europe relationship.

The Western democracies have dealt with each other, as they struggle with the challenges of collective security, and collective defence in the past, and present. But this common path is not all about harmony and mutual agreement; further more, it can be iterated that mechanisms of hostile interaction between Europe and the U.S. have existed for a considerably longer period than from 1945. From the late-19th century, a permanent dispute exists in the ways Europeans regard Americans and vice versa. Patterns of mutual perception and misperception have always played a crucial role in shaping of policy on the both shores of the Atlantic.

These ideas are merely presented and sustained by scholars such as, Andrei S. Markovits, Philippe Roger, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Timothy Garton Ash,19 who provide an overall assessment of the anti-Americanism in Europe.

In this school of thought, there are two distinctive categories: the first one deals with the point of view of the hosting countries and the second one with those that have based troops abroad.

a. **Hosting Country's Issues**

In the first category and dealing with societal issues, Nelson illustrated the skepticism of the Europeans regarding the American commitment in Europe especially in the Vietnam War era, when he described the picture of U.S. bases as “becoming stations in the route of Vietnam and populated by loutish, hash-smoking, malcontent soldiers.”

In the actual period the rising of the opposition to the presence of foreign troops in some countries, like Germany for instance, is well captured by Gordon: “The September 2002 German election, where for the first time in the postwar period a leading candidate concluded that major electoral gains could be had by running against the United States, should be taken as a warning that American unilateralism could indeed come at a price.”

This kind of reaction might very well have been the result of resistance to the American hegemony and affirmation of national independence in dealing with the specific issues.

The opposition to the presence of foreign troops on the national territory has came to its zenith in Japan as described by publicists like French, Lacey, and Johnson after “…September 4, 1995, when three American servicemen abducted and raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa.”

If in Europe the fall of the Berlin Wall was the event marking the end of Cold War, in East Asia this was the event that triggered the same situation. Not having a political implication, the rape and the events linked to this (hesitation of the American military authorities to hand over the suspect) signified the end of the Japanese’ patience.

Regarding this social problem, Sims adds: “Japanese and Western historians have said that in the aftermath of World War II, American troops raped

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21 Philip H. Gordon.

thousands of Okinawan women without reprisals. The historians said that while hundreds of rape cases have been documented, most have gone unreported for fear of retaliation and shame.\textsuperscript{23}

The example offered by Lacey is emblematic: “Zenko Nakamura, 53, an activist who is fighting the relocation of an American Marine base, said, ‘I'm disappointed that the president [Clinton] didn't mention what Okinawans care most about -- sexual crimes committed by American servicemen.’”\textsuperscript{24}

In his appeal for withdrawing the American bases, Pollard describes the essence of the population’s anger by saying that “… the history of the U.S. military in Okinawa is one of expropriated agricultural lands; crashes and near collisions of jets and Osprey helicopters; danger from munitions during live-fire exercises; sexual assault; theft; noise pollution near schools; and threats to endangered species of coral, fish, birds, and other animals.”\textsuperscript{25}

In the economical realm, Zimmermann\textsuperscript{26} pictured the financial interrelations and interdependence as well the reluctance of receiving countries in paying the price by adjusting their own monetary policies.

\textbf{b. Sending Troops’ Country’s Issues}

From the economical point of view, but from an American perspective, the presence of the troops abroad has more economic and financial implications and disadvantages. Among those who see the presence of troops outside the U.S. as futile, Johnson, Mochizuki, O Hanlon, and Pollard are the most representative authors.


In his suggestive article named "Go-banken-sama, go home!" Johnson observes:

The Cold War is over. Stationing U.S. troops in Japan, mainly in Okinawa, is pointless, divisive, and expensive. … All this would serve America's interests and return American forces to places where bases have been closed, such as Hawaii and California. And it would gain the support of the American public because it is a policy toward East Asia that is fiscally and morally defensible.27

Sustaining Johnson's idea, Mochizuki simply noted: “President Clinton should take a hard look at the U.S. force structure in Japan. One thing he would discover is that 20,000 U.S. Marines are no longer needed there.”28

Moderate in his approach, O'Hanlon considers that any reduction should certainly consider the security related matters: “Anyone who argues for a significant reduction in the physical presence of the U.S. Marine component in Okinawa -as I do- should be prepared to explain how that can be accomplished without harming Japanese or U.S. security interests in the region.”29

The reality shows that the presence of foreign troops on other states’ territories generates both positive and negative consequences. At the same time the general picture shows that while at the central level, mainly politically represented, the attitude may be positive, at the local level the society may encounter different conditions, which if not well evaluated may generate opposition in most cases. The discrepancy between the political and social is more evident where the central authorities do not back up the local ones in dealing with a foreign military presence. It is also true that the level of nuisance is directly proportional with the number and size of the bases. Another issue that should be mentioned is the discrepancy between the expectations of civil society and the reality. The bigger the difference is, the bigger the level of disappointment grows. A

27 Chalmers Johnson.
29 Michael O'Hanlon.
realistic approach from the beginning would certainly offer the opportunity to understand the complexity of this subject and identify the communality or differences of countries in dealing with the basing of foreign troops.

4. Overall Literature Assessment

While a large part of the literature involves extensive polemic, some well presented books stand out, written by authors like Duke, Treverton, Zimmermann, Williams, Nelson, Harkavy, Goedde, and Sharp. Not all authors agree on the subject of maintaining/withdrawal of the foreign bases on/from other countries territories, and the description of the causes or possible solutions over the dispute are not always clearly enunciated; few authors treat the subject in an impersonal manner, oscillating from a positive to a negative approach. Few authors offer any advice that might be used by one of the parts. However, a careful reading of the literature can provide data, which, as a last resort may help us formulate possible solutions.

The overall consideration is that the existing literature identifies three areas of impact: security, economics, and societal/environmental. This thesis will focus on these three areas while dealing with them from the perspective of different countries.

E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

1. Methodology

This thesis will attempt to find an answer to the research question by providing an analysis of civil-military relations, as case studies, in countries that have hosted American troops on their territories, as independent variables in comparison to the most significant areas of concern and their rate of success as dependent variables. The main causes that affected the success or failure (less success) in chosen areas, together with the specific conditions that have generated a certain pattern identified in case studies will help to round up and complete the conclusions and lessons learned. Those will also contribute in shaping the final recommendations and proposals to the Romanian authorities. The previous successful structures (in terms of organizations) and systems (in terms of
communication, flow of information, decision making, control, and execution) used by other countries in their relationship with the American troops may help the Romanian authorities in remodeling the present structure and system assigned to the implementation of the AA.

As country case studies, Germany, and Japan (Okinawa) have been chosen under the following considerations:

1. These two countries have an extensive experience in hosting American troops on their territories.
2. Both of them have been situated at the boundary of NATO, and similar to Romania’s case, this could have generated additional security issues and challenges.
3. These two countries are part of different geographical, strategic areas, which creates different problems driven by the zonal conditions.
4. The two countries are part of two different cultures, which expands the area of research by involving more national caveats.
5. The two countries are part of different political-economic systems, which, by diversification, generate a larger number of conclusions and lessons learned.

2. Sources

A variety, of as much as possible primary, and secondary scholarly sources will be used to present the case studies and support the hypothesis. Whenever possible, secondary sources will be traced to primary documents, and the most objective and credible primary sources will be used.

As primary sources in researching this thesis, interviews will be conducted with local authorities from the areas where the troops will be located. This will offer a perspective from the local community point of view, as well the major expectations and uncertainties linked to the presence of the American troops. At the same time, this author will try to obtain information directly from USECOM and USAREUR, both being involved in the bilateral decision making political-military body, so called the Joint
Committee. This approach will try to investigate the American standpoint regarding the civil-military relations between the American troopers and the civilians in the bases’ areas.

F. THESIS SYNOPSIS

This thesis is comprised of five major sections. The first section will cover the general debate and the overall questions and arguments. The second section covers the background on the issue: a general introduction of the basing in Europe followed by the reasoning of moving the existing bases to the East. The new concept of bases location will picture the new approach of the American military authorities dealing with new political, strategic and economic challenges in finding viable solutions. A retrospective of the recent Romanian concerns regarding the presence of the American troops will set up the scene for further, more detailed discussions.

The third and fourth sections address the issues of Japanese and German experiences in hosting American troops on their territories. A careful analysis of the positive and negative aspects in the security, economic and social/environmental realms reveals the general lessons learned and conclusions as well as the particularities of each country in both civil and military relations.

The fifth and last section summarizes the implications that both the civil and military authorities should take note of and recommends specific actions and measures that both may take in minimizing the negative and maximizing the positive aspects of the bilateral relations in order to make the U.S.-Romanian partnership successful.
II. THE RE-STATIONING OF U.S. MILITARY BASES IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: ROMANIAN EXPECTATIONS AND CONCERNS ABOUT POLICY AND STRATEGY, IN DETAIL

Even an all-powerful America will need Europe's political support, military bases, cooperation in international organizations, peacekeepers and police, money, diplomatic help with others, and general good will.\(^{30}\)

Philip H. Gordon

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter covers the background to the re-stationing of American troops within Europe since the mid 1990s. In particular, this chapter discusses the new garrisons in Romania, under the American “lily pad” basing concept, taking into account the new security and defense challenges in the Southeastern European area and its glacis. The overall picture is then completed through an examination of Romanian society and an appreciation of the most important issues: the civil society and the basing of allied troops on national territory.

The American military relocation in Europe occurs as part of the reformed security approach in the face of asymmetrical threats to the NATO of today. The present examination of the location of troops at the Black Sea coast, NATO’s Eastern border, will certainly reveal politico-military, military strategic, and economic issues, and calculations made by American political and military institutions. The desire to reorganize U.S. bases in continental Europe has been an old one, yet given powerful, new energy by the post 11 September 2001 transformation of U.S. forces, which included the putative abandonment of the kinds of garrisons as still found in the Federal Republic of Germany in favor of the kinds of bases and facilities connected with U.S. forces in the Pacific realm, i.e. the so-called “lily pad” concept of a stripped down infrastructure. To be sure, a handful of political, strategic and economic issues are connected with this ideal as applied to the real world context of Romania in NATO and the EU.

\(^{30}\) Philip H. Gordon.
The makers of strategy in the U.S. Department of Defense have envisaged the “lily pad” basing concept as a new formula for enabling an effective operational response of the U.S. military forces, in wartime, across the face of the globe. The new system should make the positioning of materials and equipment, training and common military exercises easier for the troops without the unnecessary expenses and political burdens of the system forged in the 1950s.

The new basing conception may be, in short, described as follows:

As the Army transforms to an expeditionary force, a new concept called “lily-pad” basing is being developed for basing troops overseas. Under this concept, the United States would not have permanent, large-scale military installations in another country. Instead of building its own bases as it has in the past, the Army would use other countries’ existing facilities. It would have only a skeletal staff and an agreement with the host country that the base could be used as a forward operating base in a time of crisis. These “lily-pad” bases would be austere training and deployment sites often in areas not previously used for U.S. bases.31

An understanding of the AA (Access Agreement as defined in Chapter 1) official framework and the steps made towards its implementation will help us to determine the level of involvement of the political and politico-military levels in the formalization of this partnership and its success in practice.

A retrospective of the recent Romanian expectations and concerns regarding the presence of the American troops will set the stage for a further, more detailed discussion in the following chapters.

Romania, as the vanguard of both NATO and EU in the new century, has to deal in the Black Sea region with a variety of asymmetric challenges and threats, starting with Russia’s hegemonic tendencies and its political, military and economic countermeasures, and ending with the proliferation of terrorist activities, drugs, arms and human trafficking. Furthermore a correct evaluation of Romanian expectations and concerns will ensure “food for thought” and further focusing in the discussions in the next chapters.

It should be said that the garrison of the Mihai Kogalniceanu (MK) base has received special attention in this chapter, being the first and most important location where the American forces will be based. The opening of the MK military base will be examined within the assessment of other possible locations for the American military, bases to be used in Romania.

Furthermore, one should note that the overview of the news and information presented by the Romanian and international mass media comes primarily from the June-September 2007 period when the MK base opened and the first military common exercise, “Proof of Principle” organized under AA’s auspices took place. By doing so, the author tried to capture the most representative information, which in his opinion should illuminate the most accurate public attitude concerning the public opinions and sentiments toward the establishing of the first American military presence on Romanian territory.

B. THE AMERICAN MILITARY RE-STATIONING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A NEW EUROPE

In the wake of the present crisis, the location of American troops in Romania represents a new approach in dealing with the asymmetrical threats, which NATO encounters today. The location of troops at the Black Sea coast, NATO’s Eastern border, has many politico-military, military strategic, and to a certain extent, economic implications that demand special analysis.

From the political-military point of view, this relocation occurs amid the enlargement of NATO, the construction of the wider European Union and the rise of jihadist terrorism in the 21st century. Esther Schrader, a journalist with the Los Angeles Times, reports that the rise of the opposition to U.S. policy and strategy among the Western European countries and the openness of the new post-1999 NATO members in hosting the American troops will result in certain changes of NATO’s military bases in

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Europe. It is a fact that the actual split of Europe was rooted in the past opposition of "Old Europe" (citing U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s words) concerning the war in Iraq. In the same article, she notes that in the wake of the initial phase of the Iraq campaign in 2003 that “privately, however, senior military and civilian officials at the Pentagon say the speed with which the Defense Department is moving forward with its plans in Europe is being driven in a large measure by tensions with Germany, France and Turkey.”

George Allen, a former American statesman and journalist, offering the same point of view, has remarked that:

Now is the time for the US to re-evaluate its bases in Europe. It should do this not to punish any ally, who did not agree with it, or simply to reward its newest allies, but to serve its own strategic interests. The new democracies of Europe offer the opportunity, strategic advantage and shared values that will help us to win the next conflict - or deter it altogether.

Secondly, the relocation of the American troops occurs as part of a new military strategy, which is in accordance with the new American foreign policy of promoting the democratic values in the world. The future involvement of the Alliance could be summed up simply: “If the U.S. and its allies are to prevail in a Global War on Terror it will most likely be involved in more Iraq -and Afghanistan-type scenarios in the future.”

Part of this new thinking advocating the re-basing of the American troops, and figuring the changes within Europe’s relations, Jeffrey Fleishman adds that “yet it is clear that Bulgaria and Romania, which are closer to the Middle East and the Caucasus and

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34 Esther Schrader.


supported the U.S. war in Iraq, are Washington's newest darlings in Europe. Germany, which houses 84% of all U.S. troops on the continent, has lost much of its strategic cachet.\(^{37}\)

Copley has embraced the same idea when capturing the strategic importance of this movement to the East: “Strategically, this will make the new strategic alignment - in a sense, a 'new NATO' far more strategically responsive to the Middle East and Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Maghreb (North African states).”\(^{38}\)

He also noted:

The United States Government is working toward completing plans for the movement of virtually all of its forces based in Germany [more than 112,000 U.S. troops are based in Europe and about 80% of them spread in Germany] to new bases in the Balkans: in Serbia-Montenegro, Bulgaria and Romania. The move has profound political, strategic and economic consequences, including formalizing a schism in NATO which will ultimately lead either to its reduction in scope or a redirection of its activities.\(^{39}\)

Trying to find an answer to the question “Can the Army’s new method of expeditionary operations be supported using the 'lily-pad' basing concept?”\(^{40}\) triggered new experimentation in Eastern Europe, in 2005, as presented by Captain David C. Chandler, JR, the commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 37th Transportation Command, in Kaiserslautern, Germany:

Soldiers of the 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) in Kaiserslautern, Germany, sought to answer that question. Their task was to deploy several hundred soldiers from Illinois to an austere location in Eastern Europe; provide those soldiers with food, fuel, and supplies; and allow them to train in preparation for a notional follow-on deployment to a combat or peacekeeping theater of operations. The operation took place in the Novo


\(^{38}\) Gregory R. Copley.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

\(^{40}\) David C. Chandler, Jr.
Selo Training Area in central Bulgaria in July and August 2004. About 1,300 soldiers, contractors, and host nation workers participated.41

And the answer was:

The lessons learned during this exercise will play a key role in conducting future exercises and planning for future basing in Eastern Europe. From its experience in Bulgaria, the 37th Transportation Command determined that it could adapt quickly to handle such missions in the future. The Bulgarian military and civilian communities were eager to work with U.S. forces. Their flexibility helped make the operation a success in both training and international relations. Task Force Log also showed that the Army’s expeditionary force concept could be supported logistically and operationally.42

A third implication points to the economical aspects of relocation.

As William Safire, a well known American author and political columnist, iterated, starting in the mid 90s, the U.S. was attached to the idea of reducing military expenses not only by closing military bases on American territory but also by reducing the deployment of its own troops in Europe. As an alternative, redeploying a certain amount of troops in less expensive areas, and improving the stationing and rotation planning, could be considered. And, as the author states, there are feasible solutions:

By cutting the number in half, by rotating the troops every six months, thereby obviating the need for dependents' schools and extensive support facilities; and by moving the bases south and east toward low-cost Hungary, southern Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, the Defense Department could spread our military techniques and equipment throughout the alliance and train with fewer environmental constraints at far less cost.43

Summarizing all these three categories of consideration, George Allen concluded the following ways of action:

The first one is represented by positioning the troops closer to the present military threats from Middle East and Caucasus, being well understood that southern and eastern borders of Europe are the new boundaries for the

41 David C. Chandler, Jr.
42 Ibid.
terrorism. The second one is defined by the fact that despite German and French opposition of hosting US troops on their territory, countries like Romania are welcoming them. In such countries the political will and governments are backed up by the will of their population. And the third but not less important the bases located in this part of the world are cost-effective. … A garrison near Bucharest would cost less than one near Bonn.44

C. MOVING EAST – THE U.S.A. “LILY PAD” BASEING CONCEPT APPLIED TO EUROPE

The future troops’ basing in Eastern Europe has many putative strategic advantages. The Pentagon's strategic planning has envisioned the recent expansion of its interests across Central Asia, and in this new context, the relocation into Eastern Europe will enhance the possibilities for action, and “…the U.S. military will span the globe as never before.”45 This idea is not new since the U.S. forces spanned the globe in the 1950s, but reiterate the need of a better representation on the European continent in accordance with the new U.S. strategic interests.

Ian Fisher noted the idea expressed by Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields, deputy commander of the United States Marines in Europe, that "Iraq did provide an opportunity for Romania to demonstrate its capabilities, more so its willingness, to cooperate … [a]nd Romania stepped up to the plate "46 and then he assumed:

The next step may be more permanent bases here [i.e. SE Europe]. Nothing is official and military officials here and at the Pentagon stress that planning is in its earliest stages. But, in short, the plans envision a reduction in the forces in Germany in favor of smaller bases in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Far East and Africa -- all filled with rotating troops poised to strike quickly. The model is quite different from the permanent communities in Germany; soldiers would likely arrive alone, living in spartan quarters … Officials say that up to 3,000 American soldiers could operate there at a time.47

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44 George Allen.
45 Esther Schrader.
47 Ibid.
According to the former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Marine Gen. James L. Jones, former commander of U.S. forces in Europe, 2003, the vision of the new bases in Europe, presented by Esther Schrader, is the so-called "lily pad" distribution: “… the new bases, ports, airfields and training grounds would be staffed with limited numbers of highly mobile units that would be deployed without their families for six-month rotations. They would be able to jump from country to country on a moment's notice.” An assertion that may or may not be true in fact. Such bases could also be used for positioning materials and equipment and for training and common military exercises as well. Schrader then cites the same military official:

I don't think we're talking about building another Ramstein [i.e. the major USAF base in western Germany] or another ... large installation where you have the small-town USA come with it, like families and schools and everything else," Jones said in Washington this week. "But what we're trying to do is develop a family of bases that ... can go from being cold to warm to hot if you need them, to be very efficiently and economically built.

Situated at the same pole, Jeffrey Fleishman in his May 2003 article, "U.S. Forces in Europe Set Sights East, South; Realignment plan would mean drastic changes for the continent and the troops stationed there” presents the same point of view when citing another military officer: "'We're not going to build any more little Americas,’ said Wald, deputy commander of the U.S. European Command. He was referring to the sprawling bases, such as those near Heidelberg and Ramstein that provide 130,000 U.S. military dependents with playgrounds, schools, supermarkets and family housing compounds named for famous Americans such as Mark Twain.”

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48 Esther Schrader.
49 Ibid.
50 Jeffrey Fleishman.
D. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES FORCES LOCATED ON THE TERRITORY OF ROMANIA

1. General Considerations

In the last decade, the civil-military relations in Romania underwent significant and radical changes associated with the end of the Ceausescu regime and the enlargement of NATO and the EU. Democratically elected civil authorities gained control over the military system, which changed the basis of the civil-military relations from the parameters of the Warsaw Pact to those of NATO. Since 1989, when important steps have been made toward the country’s democratization, the external policy was concentrated on Romania’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic organization and European Union. These two main organizations were regarded by Romanian elites as the only ones that could help Romania in its development and to gain its rightful place within the European community. These aspirations of becoming a western country and a free democracy have been regarded by Romanians as primary goals after fifty years of communism and Soviet influence, and the only way of assuring the future of the country.

Through accession to NATO in 2004 (and sequentially to EU in 2007), Romania has achieved not only its necessary level of security, but also the possibility of playing an active role on the European continent and in the world.

As previously stated, the basing of American troops in Romania takes place under new circumstances that envisage the new challenges of NATO in accomplishing its new role and mission, according to a new strategic planning, and in a new dimension of European political changes. Romania, as many other countries, has supported the War in Iraq, which, Ian Fisher\textsuperscript{51} noted, has provided an opportunity to demonstrate its capacities and its willingness to be integrated in NATO and closely cooperate with the American troops.

\textsuperscript{51} Ian Fisher.
These new conditions extrapolated to the Romanian society may generate new challenges to the civil military relations and result in a new framing of Romania’s international relations and security.

2. The Formal Framework

It is clear that the relocation of the U.S. bases, in Romania, has Romanian political support in the realm of the parties and public opinion, as expressed by the Romanian Minister of the Defense: “The signing of the 2005 Access Agreement concerning the use of military facilities in Romania by the USA armed forces was a political decision of undeniable importance, which gave fresh impetus to the development of bilateral relations.” The international press captures the same idea: “Local opinion polls show that the hospitality of these governments reflects the will of their people.” The political support made possible the negotiation and signing of an important set of documents related to the AA ruling this bilateral relation and setting the conditions and rules governing the presence of the American troops in Romania.

An important step was the set up of the Joint Committee, the official document being signed from the Romanian side by the State Secretary Corneliu Dobritoiu in the beginning of summer 2007, at the U.S. European Command HQ in Stuttgart. The creation of this body made possible the civilian oversight of the activity, allowing for common Romanian-American consultation regarding the different application domains of the AA. At the same time, this organization ensures the implementation of the bilateral agreement. Under this committee a number of subcommittees and working groups, comprised of specialists and experts from the entire governmental institutional interagency constellation, will work together with the American counterpart to facilitate American troops’ training and instruction. Additionally an interdepartmental commission at the State Secretary level was formed in order to conduct better and more timely responses to the American requests.

53 George Allen.
The accord between Romania and the USA regarding the activities of the American forces stationed in Romania will be enforced by an inter-ministerial committee made up of 14 secretaries of state from almost all the ministries and the head of the Central Office for Special Matters. The establishment of the new structure was approved, by decision, at the Government meeting on Wednesday. “The committee will work as a forum of dialogue and decision-making of the representatives of the institutions with competence in the field, for the purpose of facilitating the implementation of the Accord, and will have the role to organise and co-ordinate all activities for implementing it,” reads a Government press release.54

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**Figure 1. Joint Committee Interrelationship**

State Secretary Corneliu Dobritoiu explained: “This commission has been formed to support the American partners’ requests, which may cover a large diversity of domains, from custom procedural regulations, environmental protection, work and

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employment procedures, penal jurisdiction, and others, which are not in the MOD’s competence." The same official has pointed out that at the MOD level, two specialized organizations are functioning in order to ensure the smoothness of the cooperation process.

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**Figure 2. Romanian MOD relationship flow**

One of them which functions at the Department for Defence Policy and Planning’s level, the Coordination and Monitoring Center of the Access Agreement Implementation, represents the MOD’s interface with the American partner and the national institutions; and the second one, the Technical Secretariat at the GS level, holds responsibility at the military working level for the direct liaison with the military components and cooperation for accomplishing the necessary support for the training and basing activity. As shown on the presented charts, the Romanian MOD has developed a

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network at the national level (Fig. 1), which makes possible the involvement of all the responsible ministries and national agencies in relation with the American partner through a Joint Committee, and at the MOD level (Fig. 2), an internal relationship flow, which is able to aggregate all the subordinate military structure in providing the necessary support. The network at the national level involves all three related levels: political, political-military and military.

This structure ensures the involvement of the national policy makers, the related agents of the executive power and the MOD’s internal structure. The design of this system is to ensure the civil control, oversight and the efficiency of the process as the required trinity of the civil-military relations in achieving the civil paternity and the transparency of the military actions in relation to the implementation of the AA. Another positive aspect for implementing such a framework is the fact that this makes possible the access to all the resources, political tools, and decisional factors, which otherwise may hamper the implementation process.

3. The Implementation Process

Parts of the implementation process of the AA, 19 (or according to other latter sources 20) separate domains of discussion and negotiation have been identified by the MOD as designated authority together with EUCOM. This process was necessary to harmonize the provisions of the AA with the Romanian laws and legislation. Those domains were:

- Joint Committee;
- Command & Control Relationships;
- Movement of vessels, vehicles and aircraft;
- Foreign criminal jurisdiction and military discipline;
- Real estate;
- Claims procedures;
- Official tax exemption;
- Custom procedures;
- Delivery and support of medical services;
o Mortuary affairs services and the U.S. armed forces regional medical examiner;
o Military service/support activities;
o Security;
o Communications;
o Environment matters;
o Contracting procedures and status of contractors;
o Local civilian labor rights;
o Aerial training;
o Land maneuver and training; and,
o Pre-positioning of defense equipment, supplies and materiel.

The negotiation of these domains followed the same path by involving the respective responsible institutions (ministries, agencies, organizations) at the national level, for assuring the necessary expertise and for creating the related responsibilities. In this process some of Additional Implementation Arrangements are already in place, signed and functional, and some of them are still in the signing or negotiation process.

Referring to the negotiation process the *Nine O’clock* publication has iterated:

Corneliu Dobritoiu, the chief of the Defence Policy Department of the Ministry of Defence, and General-Major William Catto, Chief of Staff of the United States European Command (EUCOM), signed last week eight implementation arrangements. They are part of the Agreement between Romania and the United States regarding the activities of American troops stationed on our territory. According to a MoD press briefing, by signing these documents, the framework for the planning, organising and conducting training activities has been established in accordance with the Romanian legislation. Also settled was the way in which specific implementation problems would be applied as part of the Access Agreement signed on December 6, 2005 and ratified by Law 268/2006.56

The situation of these arrangements was presented in the *Stars and Stripe* military publication as it stood in mid-August of 2007:

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“Even as the first rotation of U.S. troops arrives in Romania as part of a historic deployment, the former Soviet bloc nation and the U.S. are working out details on how their shared military facilities will operate for years to come. Eight agreements were signed last month in Bucharest, the Romanian capital, while another nine have been agreed upon by negotiators.”

In the same article, a detailed list of what was concluded is provided with some additional explanations:

Agreements signed by the U.S. and Romania for military training in Romania and some of the areas they cover:

- Land training: Training that can be done, ordnance used.
- Air training: Airspace rules, safety procedures, training calendar.
- Medical: Governs who can treat whom, as well as hospitalization, payment and insurance issues.
- Mortuary affairs: Performance of autopsies; issuance of death certificates; custody and disposition of bodies.
- Security: Gate access, ID cards, use of firearms, surveillance, rights to arrest.
- Communications: Radio frequencies, construction of receiver sites off-post.
- Environment: Pre-usage site surveys, hazardous materials storage, disposal and cleanup, real estate management.
- Command relationships: Interactions between U.S. and Romanian commanders, areas of responsibility.

… and what is coming next:

Agreements made but not yet reviewed and signed by proper authorities include:

- Criminal jurisdiction.
- Claims.
- Tax exemption.
- Customs.
- Integrating of military support activities (postal, etc.).
- Contracting.
- Local-national labor.

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58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
It should be noted that there is an increased interest shown by the civil society around this activity, and at the same time, in response to that, the openness of the military institutions in informing the public. The transparency adopted by the Romanian MOD ensures the civilians to have direct access to the process and offers the necessary information in assessing the achievements in implementing this bilateral agreement.

At the national political level, the AA is viewed as a contextual component and as a follow up of the Romania-U.S. Strategic Partnership signed ten years ago on 11th of July 1997 by the former Romanian President Constantinescu and President Bill Clinton, which elevated the relations between the two countries. The strong commitment made at that time by Romania made possible the definitive conversion of the Romanian society in its way of building a strong democracy and the definitive rupture with and withdrawal from the Russian sphere of influence.

The importance of the AA is not only critical from the practical point of view, but also from a political and psychological point of view, as American Ambassador, Taubman, states in the July 4 edition of the Azi: “this year the common Romania-American military facilities will function, a tangible symbol of a solid alliance between our countries.”

E. OPENING THE FIRST BASE

1. Possible Locations for the American Troops

The initial evaluation and offer of the possible locations for the American troops on the Romanian territory included the air bases from Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK), Fetesti, Buzau, Timisoara (Giarmata), Campia Turzii (Luna), the training area from Babadag, and the maritime base from Constanta (see Fig. 3).60

The AA also includes some other facilities offered for common use by the Romanian troops and the American counterpart at Cincu, Smârdan, and Malina, which

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are training sites used in the past by Romanian Armed Forces. All of these locations presented attractive geographic, strategic-military, and social-cultural characteristics.

Figure 3. Possible locations for the American troops on the Romanian territory

Their infrastructure has been identified as adequate for the purpose of basing American troops, requiring minimum investments for setting up or modernization. These locations have optimal storage capacity, are connected to the transportation network (road, rail, air, and naval), and allow the set up of a logistic system in a very short time, having a broad presence of private companies and entrepreneurs in their area. The areas where these are located have natural water sources and are not exposed to natural hazards (earthquakes, hurricanes, inundations, etc).

The American counterpart showed particular interest in the locations particularly situated in the Southeastern part of Romania (Dobrogea), which includes all of the requirements for the American troops: good training facilities, live-fire ranges, good accommodation facilities, and good recreation resorts. Additionally, the MK and Fetesti airports, Constanta seaport and rail hub, permit a quick inflow and outflow of troops in emergency cases, plus this area being the nearest located to the Black Sea allows the
interconnection with the other bases from Turkey, Bulgaria, and even the Middle East. It should be added that Dobrogea is closest located to the troubled areas from Transdniastria, Middle East, Caucasus, and Balkans.

2. The “Mihail Kogalniceanu” (MK) Military Base

The MK base, which includes facilities both for the U.S. Army and Air Force, a compound including a former military garrison (the 34th Mechanized Brigade) and an airport (both for military and civil purposes) used by the Romanian armed forces, has been the first base to be open in Romania.

The consideration of using Romania for basing troops first came in the spring of 2003 when Turkey decided against it involvement in Iraq. The MK Airport was a viable alternative solution, for refueling and supplying of the American troops, to the Turkish facilities.

The newspaper *Stars and Stripes* cited by the Romanian mass media, asserts the fact that “Romania has put at the U.S.A.’s disposal its aerial space during the Iraq war, at a critical moment when Austria and Turkey have refused that, and Romania has supported the Iraq and Afghanistan missions with troops.” The same source added: “Romania, … has sustained an intense lobby in the last few years for obtaining not only American funding, but also Washington’s favors, proving herself an exemplar ally in the war against terrorism.”

The first contingent of the U.S. military forces was scheduled to arrive in the second half of the summer of 2007. Part of the bilateral agreement was to grant the Americans access to some of the Romanian Armed Forces’ fire ranges and to initiate common instruction and training with the Romanian military personnel. The first planned common exercise was called “Proof of Principle” and was scheduled to take place between August-October of the same year.

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62 Ibid.
The coming of the first soldiers at the MK military bases near Constanta has not passed unnoticed: “The arrival of these soldiers is an important political and military event, given that Romanian soldiers will have the opportunity to train next to their American colleagues at the highest NATO standards,” said Minister of Defence Teodor Melescanu. Because the Romanian public perceived that Romania was offering its bases to the American military, an explanation was needed. The State Secretary Corneliu Dobritoiu, who wanted to make clear the real scope of the American presence, made this public:

… there will be no American bases on the Romanian territory. Even very often there are opinions expressed by different people that there will be U.S.A. military bases on Romanian and Bulgarian territory, this is completely out of discussion; what this is all about is about common instruction and training for the American troops together with the military of these two countries, which provide the basing facilities. Romania retains the ownership of all the terrains, military bases, and other facilities that are going to be used. As part of the deal the U.S.A. having access to these facilities may modernize them according to their standards and minimal life conditions.

The common training of the Romanian troops with their American counterparts, as an essential benefit for the Romanian Army, has received special attention from the civilian society and the Romanian mass media. The common military exercises “Carpathian Summer 2007” and “Proof of Principle” have received vast attention and space in newspaper columns. It is worth mentioning the Stars and Stripes: “Both countries want to build their military ties, and that goal goes beyond the colonels and officers to the ground - pounding Army grunts not too far removed from boot camp. During the Proof of Principle Exercise, Romanian and U.S. troops are integrated, not

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64 Razvan Belciuganu.

65 An off station training exercise in Romania at the Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase that involved Airmen from Ramstein Air Base, and took place at the end of July 2007.

66 The bulk of the nearly 900 American troops taking part in the exercise came from the Idar-Oberstein, Germany-based 1st Battalion, and 94th Field Artillery. The Romanian soldiers were from the 341st Infantry Battalion.
segregated as they often are during multinational training events. They are sleeping, eating and training together every day until the closing ceremony in late October.\textsuperscript{67}

According to the first estimate made by the American and Romanian parts, the MK base should accommodate, on a regular basis, no more that 2000 soldiers. Information disseminated from a variety of sources may present a different view as is the case of information provided in the Romanian newspaper \textit{Adevarul}: “The Pentagon will constitute a number of brigades comprising of about 4000 men, will send an expeditionary Corps in Romania, to Constanța, and another one in Bulgaria.”\textsuperscript{68} This kind of information is ambiguous and may imply the fact that in Romania will be stationed about 4000 American troops, and judging by the title (U.S. expeditionary Corps at Constanța) someone may draw the conclusion that the purpose of the American troops’ presence in Romania is to be used for combat missions. Another source estimates the presence of the American troops at 3000: “From 2005, when the Romanian state signed the accord for hosting American military forces on its territory, numerous investments have been made at the Kogalniceanu base, which is designated to accommodate approximately 3000 U.S. Army soldiers.”\textsuperscript{69} The newspaper \textit{Azi} in its early August 2007 edition published the same amount.

The number may vary and it could be that in the future there will be some new estimates, which may be needed to cope with the real strategic needs of the Pentagon. There are some discrepancies between different mass-media sources, which may puzzle the Romanian public; that’s why any change needs to be carefully argued and to be very solid.


\textsuperscript{68} Viorica Marin, “Corp Expediționar SUA, la Constanța” [U.S. Expeditionary Corps at Constanța], \textit{Adevarul}, June 20, 2007.

\textsuperscript{69} Maria Petrean, “Americanii vor Investi 34 de Milioane de Dolari la Kogalniceanu”, [The Americans Will Invest 34 Million Dollars at Kogalniceanu], \textit{Gardianul}, August 01, 2007.
F. ROMANIAN EXPECTATIONS

1. General Issues

The overall assessment of the feelings of the Romanian civilian society regarding the American presence in their country can be described by the administrative representative of the county [Constanta] that will host most of the troops: “The major concern is to speed up the Americans' coming here,” said Gheorghe Martin, the prefect of the Constanta area. ‘We've been waiting for the Americans for 50 years. Now that they are here, can we really ask ourselves if they are welcome?’70 This question is really embedding the aspirations for the good of the Romanians, especially in economical terms as well as the intrinsic concerns of the relationship. Mr. Martin’s allusion has its roots in the stories passed from generation to generation about the fact that during WW II, Romanians were expecting the American troops to liberate them. Unfortunately it did not happen, so the frustration of being left to Russian discretion was also passed from a generation to another.

In a study released by the Romanian National Defense College, Vasile Popa71 analyzes the different perspectives of the U.S. troops’ relocation to Romania’s national territory. When talking about advantages, the author mainly deals with the new geostrategic implications driven by the troops’ proximity, and their central positioning from a zonal, continental, and global perspective in relation to the new areas of NATO’s interest. This aspect has been already covered in the second part of this chapter. At the same time, he parallels his conclusions to the fact that the presence of the American troops will provide the necessary security for making Romania a stable country and, implicitly, more attractive to foreign investments. Gregory R. Copley is attached to the idea that the American presence at the Black Sea coast has implications in certain areas

70 Ian Fisher.
such as security when he argues that, “… more significantly, the deployment of U.S. forces in the Balkans would provide a level of U.S. political support and, in a sense, protection of the host states.”

Copley also argues that the relocation of the American bases to Eastern Europe has certain economic implications:

Most of the 65,000 Army troops in USEUCOM have been based in Germany. It is anticipated that as many as 40,000 could be based, in the future, in the Balkans, providing a significant economic injection into the local economies, quite apart from infrastructural development (and the additional impact of Air Force and Naval basing).

The improvement in the security is intrinsically related to the economic activity growth at both national and local levels and will represent the focal point of this part of the chapter.

Obviously, the cooperation and interoperability through common training of the Romanian military with the U.S. troops will be achieved. The advantages of this bilateral military relationship are expressed in both international and national mass media. The Romanian newspaper *Jurnalul National* of July 2007 published an article called “Vin Americanii!” [The Americans are coming!], presenting both the economical and military advantages related to this issue.

2. The Economic Expectations at the National Level

In his 4th of July speech, the American ambassador at Bucharest, Mr. Taubman, pointed out that the actual Romanian-American partnership-- beyond the opportunity of common training of the two armed forces-- has further implications not only in the security realm but also in the economic one. He said that, “Every month, an increasing number of American companies come to Romania; more American investors declare

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72 Gregory R. Copley.
73 Ibid.
74 Razvan Belciuganu.
their trust in Romania’s future.”\textsuperscript{75} And on the same occasion, Taubman declared: “I have expressed this opinion before, but I want to stress it again: America has no better friend than Romania.”\textsuperscript{76}

At the same time, Romanian premier, Calin Popescu Tariceanu, stressed the importance of the Romanian-American Trade Chamber (AmCham), a new forum that has made its contribution to the rising economic growth Romania has enjoyed in the past few years, and its goal of promoting new investments and economic partnerships.

In the last ten years, Romania has experienced a series of American investments, and a series of American companies have opened their business in Romania, especially in the food area. As the Romanian President Traian Basescu declared, this process “has been developed and still is developing, not only what we have now from the beginning, McDonald's, Pepsi Cola, and Coca Cola, which have strong investments in our country, but also the soft industry, even we talk about Oracle or Microsoft, and we hope that in a very short time, a matter a few weeks, one of the most important of the American construction holdings will be represented on the Romanian market.”\textsuperscript{77} Most probably the Romanian president was referring to RMS Investment Ventures, whose president recently declared: “We committed ourselves to open a 100 million [dollars] investment, which will start the American business’s snow ball in Romania.”\textsuperscript{78} The Romanian president has also pointed out, on different occasions, that Romania gains from the American presence not only talking from a military perspective, but also from an economic point of view. “Romania’s efforts, some publicists say, has been rewarded with a 10 years agreement signed with Washington from two Romanian bases to be used by Americans, which presumably involves 100 million dollars in investments.”\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{75} Alexandra Babiciu, “Taubman, Onorat că Găzduiește Serbarea de 4 Iulie într-o Românie Membră a UE, Lucru Promovat de SUA” [Taubman Honored to Celebrate 4\textsuperscript{th} of July in the EU’s New Member Romania, Whose Membership was Supported by U.S.], MEDIAFAX, July 04, 2007.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} The speech of the Romanian president, Traian Basescu, on the TV channel ANTENA 3, broadcasted on July 04, 2007, 18:53 hours.

\textsuperscript{78} Anonymous, “Investitorii Americani vor sa Refaca Infrastructura Capitalei” [The American Investors Want to Rebuild the Capital’s Infrastructure], Ultima Ora, July 05, 2007.

\textsuperscript{79} Alina Neagu.
3. The Economic Expectations at the Local Level

The areas where the bases will be located will have some economic advantages. This is regarded as a positive development, and the Americans should know that this is what locals would expect.

According to State Secretary, Corneliu Dobritoiu, “the economic benefits will be first of all at the local authorities’ level: local contracts for goods and services, the local employment for functioning of the base, and for necessary construction of the local and zonal infrastructure’s elements. At the same time, the American presence will help on promoting tourism capabilities of the zone, with a substantial impact for the near future.”\textsuperscript{80} The MEDIAFAX press agency has opined that, “The deployment of forces at Kogalniceanu brings jobs for 550 Romanians, with another 50 jobs possible as supplementation as soon as the operations start.”\textsuperscript{81}

In the year 2007, some money has already been injected at the local level, for a series of constructions and infrastructure improvement, and the plans were expanded as more troops were coming. In the second half of 2007, The United States was more and more involved in the preparation process of the designated bases (especially the MK Air Base), according to the arrival schedule of the troops. For modernizing the facilities that will be used by the American troops, “a 35 million dollars budget has already been approved, on top of another 28 million. Since the beginning, at Mihail Kogalniceanu, 30 million dollars have been spent for modernizing the runway.”\textsuperscript{82} Maybe at the macro level these sums are not very significant, but they make a difference at the micro level, playing a major role in developing the local area, providing jobs and increasing the level of local business.

\textsuperscript{80} Razvan Belciuganu.
\textsuperscript{81} S\âmziana Ionescu, “Peste o Mie de Militari ai US Army vor Veni să se Antreneze la Constanța” [Over 1000 U.S. Army Troops are Coming to Constanta to Train], MEDIAFAX, August 09, 2007.
\textsuperscript{82} Alina Neagu.
G. ROMANIAN CONCERNS

1. Background

Referring to the above-mentioned study, Popa approaches the vulnerabilities of Romania and the main ones are envisioned as being the following:

a. Deterioration of Romania’s Zonal and Continental Relation

In this context, Popa sees the positioning of the new bases as a countermeasure to the Russian Federation’s growing control and hegemonic aspirations over hot spots such as Transdnistria, Chechnya, and Abkhasia.

The Russian interest in this part of the world is aimed at the control of natural resources and especially of that of energy resources. In this context the Russian reaction will be one of opposing the proximity of NATO troops to its borders and sphere of influence. The nuclear proliferation may increase in the Black Sea’s area, and a possible rocket missile threat may be directed towards Romanian territories. Romania will represent in this equation the vanguard of both NATO and EU, being situated at the contact between those organizations and Russia’s hemisphere of influence.

It is the belief of this author that, on the European continent, a pro-American Romanian policy may alter the relations between Romania and those EU countries opposing the U.S.’s hegemonic tendencies (Germany, France, and others).

b. Terrorist Threats on National and Local Security

This subject envisions two main issues:

(1) Reorientation of the terrorist activities towards Romania as a follow up of the closer U.S.-Romanian collaboration.

After Romania joins the EU in 2007, the activity of illicit organizations of drug, arms, and human trafficking will intensify on Romanian territory, which will continue to represent the main segment of the second Balkan route toward the EU. Popa is of the opinion that the terrorist organizations will take advantage of chemical
and biological weapons’ development, using these kinds of weapons as a primary means in their attacks against the U.S.’s partner states. At the same time the author draws attention to the necessity of improving defense against cyber and informational attacks.

(2) Possible terrorist attacks targeting the military bases or other strategic objectives.

The same study mentions that after 2007 the flux of immigrants entering Romania will grow, increasing the possibility that more terrorists will successfully cross the borders thus increasing the risks of terrorist attacks. Those attacks may target the American bases and national strategic objectives.

c. **Social [and Environmental] Issues**

Formation of a black market (drugs, arms, human trafficking) around the bases and local security degradation is seen as the main problem. The study estimates that around the American military bases a “colorful fauna” comprising drug dealers, arm and human trafficking brokers may appear, gravitating towards the “prosperity” mirage of the Americans. This situation may negatively influence the local society and may generate the extension of drug use among the civilians. At the end of the road, local security may be affected by the struggle between different gangs for controlling the local market.

It is the opinion of this author that the environmental issues are very closely linked to the social ones, and because of that, they should be evaluated together.

These three main points may constitute the framework for a succinct analysis regarding the possible threats and problems Romania may face in the context of hosting American troops on its territory.

2. **Deterioration of Romania’s Zonal and Continental Relations**

a. **Black Sea Region**

The Black Sea region is now seen as the main route of terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, and weapons of mass destruction’s transit to Europe and the Western World. In this context the U.S. is very concerned about limiting these threats and building
a defensive common policy. The actual situation in this area is not as simple as it may appear, especially because of the most recent developments. And the fact is that today Turkey, an old American ally, has joined its efforts with Russia in blocking American influence and involvement in the area. This new Turkish policy has to be placed in the context of the Montreux Convention, back in 1936. According to this, Turkey retained control of Bosforous, and any war ships not belonging to the riverane states are not allowed to stay in the Black See area more than 21 days. As is understood, the American presence in Romania and Bulgaria is limited to an Army representation, missing a Navy component. In this context, as noted by Barcin Yinanc in the *Turkish Daily News*, the Americans try to neutralize the Montreaux Convention’s regime through support received from these countries and more than that, Romania is seen as “…assuming the role of the Trojan Horse at the Black Sea coast.” The American initiatives to combat terrorism by extending the allied “Active Endeavor” operation in the Black Sea area has been frequently rejected by the Turkish-Russian tandem. More than that, this situation has put more pressure on the NATO-U.S.-Turkey relations. Turkey has based its explanations on the fact that the naval forces present in the Black Sea area are enough to perform their job, and the extension of the NATO presence in this area is redundant. As a follow up, in 2004 the BLACKSEAFOR initiative was created, representing the common efforts of six neighboring states in this area, compensating the necessity for action and common planning.

Turkish support to the Russian opposition is even more difficult to understand because Russia will certainly try to maintain its influence in the area and to counter Turkey’s objective of becoming an energetic center and playing a role in the routing of resources from the Caspian Sea area to Europe. It is clear that Turkey sees--through an increased American influence in this area-- the “diminution” of the Montreux Convention, or even the necessity followed by the possibility of reviewing it, which

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83 The views presented in the original article “Wars for Hegemony at the Black Sea” of the Turkish author Barcin Yinanc in *Turkish Daily News* has been cited in the Romanian newspaper *Romania Libera*, July 05, 2007.
“Ankara would avoid with any price.” 84 It is paradoxical to see Turkey backing up the Russian policy in this area, when it is remembered that one of the reasons that Turkey joined NATO was the contest of the Convention by Russia. Since the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Turkey has regularly tried to involve the U.S. in the region to counterbalance and reduce Russia’s influence on the ex-soviet countries. But today Turkey acts in an opposite manner, maybe fearing the American involvement and access in the Black Sea’s regional affairs. Most probably Turkish interests are driven by “so little to gain, and so much to lose” toward the American interference in this area, when considering the fact that a revision of the Montreaux Convention may re-discuss the status of Bosforous, and an American involvement in the area would place Turkey in a position as a second role player regarding the energy market and the policy decision making process.

The Romanian position has been re-iterated by the president to the country’s commitment, and “…he is convinced that together with the American and European partners this region will be transformed in a security, and democratic zone, and will represent a future alternative source of energy for Europe.” 85

This mixture of economic and political interests, which drives the actions of the countries in this area, creates even more complications concerning the regional relations’ landscape. The historical agreements and relations that played a role in defining the countries’ relations for more than fifty years are not anymore valid. It is obvious that Romania tries to rearrange these through the American prism, but this new approach will inevitably generate further tensions and contradictions.

'I think it’s in our interest (to join with the U.S.),’ the country’s then-defense minister told National Public Radio in 2003. ‘I think the risk for our national security coming from the area of the Middle East or Central Asia or the Black Sea implies that we should take responsibilities in that

84 The views presented in the original article, "Wars for Hegemony at the Black Sea” of the Turkish author Barcin Yinanc in Turkish Daily News has been cited in the Romanian newspaper Romania Libera, July 05, 2007.

85 Alexandra Babiciu.
region and participate in international relations … This is very important for a country that is defining its political role in the world, its strategic role, its military role.\textsuperscript{86}

\textit{b. Russia}

When referring to the zonal international relations, the Romanian mass media has captured the new swing of the Russian politics towards the basing of the American troops in Eastern Europe. A July 2007 edition of the \textit{Tricolorul}\textsuperscript{87} raises concerns regarding the Russian opposition to the new bases in Romania, while in the same month the \textit{Romania Libera} newspaper published an article called, “Rusii nu digera bazele SUA” [The Russians do not digest the U.S. bases]. Citing the Russian Prime-vice-premier Serghei Ivanov, the Romanian newspaper \textit{Azi}\textsuperscript{88} presents the Russians’ opinion that the new bases in Romania represent a new “Wall of Berlin” built by Americans in this part of the world. Russia’s suspension of its participation in the CFE (1990 Conventional Forces in Europe treaty) has triggered headlines such as, “[Putin, re-begins the Cold War.]”\textsuperscript{89} According to the State Sub-secretary for European Affairs, Daniel Fried, “the existence of American bases in Romania and Bulgaria are not against CFE treaty.”\textsuperscript{90}

The “military bases in Romania” theme was discussed in the June 2007 pages of \textit{Romania Libera} (“Prin Ochii Lor” [Through their eyes], \textit{News In} (“Bazele SUA din România și Bulgaria au contribuit la decizia Rusiei privind CFE – RIA” [U.S.A.


\textsuperscript{87} Anonymous, “Relații Dintre SUA și Rusia se Degradează in Mod Periculos” [US-Russia Relations are Dangerously Worsening]: [HOME EDITION], \textit{Tricolorul}, July 24, 2007.


\textsuperscript{89} Toni Dumitriu, “Putin Reincepe Razboiul Rece:[HOME EDITION].” [Putin is Resuming the Cold War], \textit{Evenimentul}, July 15, 2007.

bases from Romania and Bulgaria have contributed to Russia’s decision regarding CFE]), Adevarul (‘Rusia intoarce spatele NATO’ [Russia turning its back to NATO]), and many more.

Esther Schrader captures the anachronism of the situation succinctly, “With its clear military supremacy, the Pentagon feels free to flex its muscle with little regard to the diplomatic consequences of moving into Russia's backyard …”91 The situation may evolve, since the presence of the bases in Romania affects Russian interests: “Moscow's opposition to U.S. bases in Eastern Europe is likely to be overcome in the longer run. This will further exacerbate Russia's already acute perceptions of NATO as an obstacle to restoring its military might and global influence.”92

Similar opinions have been found in other mass media sources such as: Azi93 (17 July 07 edition), Realitatea TV (14 June 07 08.21 emission), Cotidianul94 (15 June 07 edition), etc.

Russia sees the opening of the new bases in a larger context, which is linked to the new plans of anti-missile capacities in other European countries. “The presence of so many U.S. troops in Europe has triggered open criticism from the Kremlin, which recently accused the U.S. of embarking upon a new arms race by setting up bases in European countries and by planning to install elements of an anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.”95

In speaking about the Russian opposition to the opening of the new military bases in Romania, Defence Minister, Teodor Melescanu,

91 Esther Schrader.
95 Alecs Iancu.
… reiterated that the arrival of American troops in Romania will not present any security risks for Russia, on the contrary, it is likely to increase regional security. Melescanu added that Moscow’s objections against the presence of American troops in Romania must not be discussed through press statements or reports, but in the NATO-Russia committee, which has already had a meeting on the issue last week.  

In a recent interview, State Secretary Corneliu Dobritoiu, declared that there is a direct link between the presence of the American troops on Romanian territory and national security: “… no matter the size, the American presence in a zone brings security and safety.” Referring to the concerns of different countries he added: “I do not think that the presence of 1700 people in any zone may change the zonal balance of power, especially when we talk about the presence of people with standard equipment, and no sophisticated ones.” The State secretary was certainly referring to the discussions held in Wien within the frame of the CFE treaty, and especially to the Russian delegation’s position regarding the touch of the Russian zonal interests brought by the American presence. The Romanian official considers that the presence of the American troops would actually increase the zonal security, including Russia. From a theoretical point of view, the presence of the U.S. military may inflict additional security risks in this region, “but presently there is no information about any possible concretization of such kind of risks, especially taking into account that this kind of thing did not happen until now in Romania.”

In a July edition, the Romania Mare, in the article “Yankee, cărați-vă acasă!” [Yankees, go home!] used a more radical tone, adding that the American presence on the Romanian territory is nothing trouble because besides the danger of terrorist attacks, now Romania has to face the strong riposte of Russia, which “has put Romania on its black list.” In the same article the author asks: “Wouldn’t it have been

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96 Alecs Iancu.
97 Razvan Belciuganu.
98 Ibid.
99 ROMPRES, “Ministrul Apărării Anunță că Soldații Americani vor Sosi în Bazele din Constanța la Sfârșitul Lunii August” [The Minister of Defence Announces that the American Soldiers will Arrive at the Bases in Constanta at the End of August], June 20, 2007.
better to keep our neutrality? Now, Romania is a bumper between two unmerciful nuclear forces, which observe on each other to strike decisively: America and Russia.”

c. Russia’s Supporters

The Russian position may be supported by Ukraine, which may fear that in the context of NATO-Russia quarrel, “its own dispute with Romania regarding the status of the Insula Serpilor [Snakes Island]”100 may be brought up.

The decisions Russia makes these days may pull back the European security achievements. The Romanian TVR1 TV channel has broadcasted the idea that Russia will seek support on the Asian continent to counterbalance the American military expansion in the Black Sea area: “military analysts foresee the formation of a new alliance of forces in the Caspian-Caucasian zone, as a counterbalance to the presence of American troops in Romania and Bulgaria.”101 McDermott sustains this hypothesis in his article about the SCO [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization] Peace Mission 2007 exercise:

Vitaliy Shlykov, a member of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council in Moscow, advanced the view that Peace Mission 2007 must be understood in the wider strategic context of the difficulties that emerged in Russia’s relationship with the West. President Putin had promised unspecified countermeasures should Washington proceed with plans to base components of its missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Shlykov suggested: “The claims of the United States and NATO to primacy in the world should have some counterweights. There is no doubt that today Russia needs allies, especially in a region as complex as Asia. In this sense, the statement by the chief of the General Staff can be viewed as a perfectly normal reaction by the Russian authorities to the mounting tension in the world. Not a single state can get along today without allies. We are responding to America’s aspirations to world hegemony by various means, of which the infusion of the SCO military-political vector is just one” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 10, 2007).102

100 Simona Haiduc, “Speriați de Romania” [Scared by Romania], Curentul, June 06, 2007.
101 Centrul de prevenire a conflictelor, [Conflict prevention Center] TVR1, July 14, 2007, 19:05 PM broadcast.
d. Issues Over Energy and Natural Resources

The importance of the Black Sea region also has economic valences and involves energy related interests, as discussed by Mr. Bruce Jackson:

Today, the member states of the European Union import approximately 50% of their energy needs; by 2020 imports will rise to 70% of consumption. This increase will be delivered to Europe across and around the Black Sea region, on routes such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. These facts so impressed the heads of state of member states of NATO that at the Istanbul Summit in July 2004 the NATO Joint Communiqué recognized that the Black Sea region was an essential part of Euro-Atlantic security.103

The Russian interest in this part of the world is aimed at the control of natural resources and especially at those of energy resources. “A major focus of Russian policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus has been to gain more control of natural resources, especially oil and gas, in these areas.”104 In this context, the cards played by Russia in Europe are not only political or military, but also economic. Since Europe is dependent on the Russian exports of energy, natural gas, and oil, Moscow has found political leverage in conditioning the distribution and the terms of contracting its resources.

Recent situations when, due to “uncontrolled accidents,” the delivery of natural gas was stopped, became clear indications of Russia’s interests, intentions, and “solutions” in delivering political messages to the “naughty” neighbors. Regarding this new situation the Romanian president, Traian Basescu, has addressed the Romanian position: “we will never accept the idea of using the energy as an instrument of political pressure’ …a direct allusion to the ‘on-off faucet’ strategy, which Russia uses in its energy related relations with Europe.”105 As an energy resources owner, Russia gained an important upper-hand in its relations with the most influential European countries. Giving

103 Bruce Jackson, “The future of Democracy on the Black Sea region,” testimony given before the Committee of Foreign Relations, subcommittee of European Affairs, March 08, 2005.
favors or punishing countries with high-energy prices is another policy maker on the European continent. “Moscow succeeded through the energetic contracts made with some important states of the European Union, to ensure not only its budget consolidation, but most of all resurrection of its great power status.” Some authors are of the opinion that through this policy, “Russia intends to deepen the schism between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe feeding the disputes, destabilizing and twisting the political-economic landscape of the continent.”

It might be that someone may argue either Russia is playing “hard ball” or even is bluffing about any possible countermeasures; in any case Russia’s position complicates the things in the Black Sea area. For sure, Putin knows that “nice guys finish last” and will continue to complicate the political, economic and military issues in this area.

3. Terrorist Threats on National and Local Security

When speaking about the local security of the new bases, the American side is more precocious and skeptical in advancing a low security threat level. The American standpoint is that it is important to raise the issue that the American troops may represent a target for terrorist attacks, and such a situation will certainly affect part of the civilian population. Even in the operational concept, the new basing framework has more value; the bases’ vulnerability is much higher just because they are reduced, as Fleishman suggests: “Smaller, more scattered bases would give the U.S. quicker access to a wider swath of the world, but they may antagonize militant organizations that view them as symbols of American hegemony. U.S. officials are concerned about the possibility of making U.S. troops more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.…”

In the same realm of international relations and security, another concern is that the bases in Romania will be used for launching attacks against Iran, which will

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107 Ibid.
108 Jeffrey Fleishman.
contribute to the degradation of security. A January 2007 edition of *Romania Libera* launched the supposition that the new bases in Romania would be used for attacking Iran. The same suppositions are made under the title “Evenimentele se precipita: America vrea sa atace Iranul de pe teritoriul Romaniei!” [Precipitate course of events: America wants to attack Iran from Romanian territory!], by the newspaper *Tricolorul* in its July 2007 editorial. The same newspaper made public the information that large quantities of military equipment are stocked on Romanian territory and, according to their sources, the purpose of this is not for training but for war. The *Romania Mare* agreed: “military war equipment and ammunition necessary for the hot zones from East and Middle East may be observed inside of the airport [MK] perimeter.”

The situation is unrelieved since the American approach to this issue, even based on diplomacy, does not exclude such a possibility. Relevant to this point is the Kessler presentation of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s point of view:

A day before a deadline for Iran to suspend controversial nuclear work, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Thursday sought to allay fears here and in other European countries that the United States plans to use bases in Europe to attack Iran." I know this is on people's minds," Rice said at a news conference after attending a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. While all options remain on the table, she said, "We are committed to a diplomatic course that should, with enough unity and with enough strength and with enough common purpose, make it possible to convince the Iranian government to change its course."112

The new mutations in the Turkish policy towards Iran, after the latter seemed to reverse its own policy and began to back up Turkey’s bombardments of PKK in the north of Iraq, may complicate relations in the Middle East. As shown in a recent poll, the

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111 Radu Comanici, “Pe Aeroportul Mihail Kogalniceanu Americanii au Instalat Aparatura si munitie de Razboi” [The Americans have Deployed war Equipment and Ammunition on Mihail Kogalniceanu Airport], *Romania Mare*, July 11, 2007.

Turkish people have changed their favorable position regarding Iran, with about 10% in less than two years. As inserted below, Iran may struggle for a new ally in this part of the world especially now when the U.S.-Turkey relations seem to cross a rather difficult time over the Armenian Genocide Resolution issue, which recognizes the deportation of Ottoman Armenians during World War I as genocide.

Since the Iraq war, however, Iran has recalibrated its Turkey policy. In an effort to break its own growing strategic isolation, Tehran has wooed Ankara on a number of fronts. Iran has not only ceased supporting the PKK, it has begun to actively combat the group. According to media reports, Iran frequently bombs PKK camps inside Iraq. Turkish sentiment toward Iran has warmed up significantly in response: according to a 2006 poll by the German Marshall Fund, 43 percent of Turks hold favorable feelings toward Iran, compared to 34 percent in 2004.113

And the picture would not be complete without mentioning the recent Russian threats made in connection with its suspension of participation in CFE. “Evgheni Volk, the Heritage from Washington Foundation president [chairman] believes that Moscow is heading towards a new Cold War: ‘Russia’s threats have materialized, and Russia may go further on and reposition the targets for its nuclear missiles in Europe, as it did back in the 70s.’”114 Besides being a direct response to the new American projects in Poland and Czech Republic, the actual threats in fact include Romania and Bulgaria. “On the background of the rising critics made by the Russian president Vladimir Putin regarding the American expansion in Europe, at the Vienna conference on revising the CFE treaty, Russia advances the problem of U.S. bases in Romania and Bulgaria, with Putin repeatedly denouncing their installation in Romania and Bulgaria, and recently threatening these two countries as being in the collimator of the Russian missiles.”115

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114 Toni Dumitru, “Putin Reincepe Razboi Rece” [Putin is Resuming the Cold War], Evenimentul, July 15, 2007.

115 Luminita Bogdan, “Rusia Vede Pericole in Bazele SUA din Romania” [Russia „Sees” Danger Coming From the US Bases in Romania], Gardianul, June 13, 2007.
The words of a former NPS student, Adriana Murariu, very well describe the actual situation that Romania faces today in defining its zonal policy in the context of the attributes and responsibilities assumed as a member of NATO and EU.

Romania is situated in southeast Europe, in a region that has been repeatedly torn apart by insecurity and instability. In this highly security-challenged environment it is difficult to maintain a consistent foreign policy without losing some of the imperative attributes that make the difference between being a reliable partner and a swing one. Maintaining the country’s dignity, pride, and honor, while preserving its specific characteristics, and still being able to influence the decision process, requires integrity, which, unfortunately, is often not an attribute of international relations.116

The AA bilateral agreement, even though partially under the NATO umbrella generates additional challenges, which, as already shown in this part, complicate the political, diplomatic, military, economic, and security landscape in the Black Sea region. Respecting the agreements, norms and responsibilities derived from its multidimensional membership qualities will certainly interfere with others’ interests and cause reactions from neighboring countries, especially Russia. As already shown in the beginning of this chapter, Romania may face challenges not only from the East but also from West. It might be very simple to put it in the way that “the friends of my enemies, are my enemies” when thinking of the dissensions between U.S. and the “Old Europe,” and figure out that Romania may be challenged by some of the EU’s members in its political, economical, and other fields related integration.

Performing the responsibilities assumed subsequently in 2004 (NATO membership), 2005 (AA), and 2007 (EU membership), Romania peruses its policy of becoming a trustworthy and reliable ally and partner, in a very volatile environment.

4. Social and Environmental Issues

a. Wrong Start or Bad Luck?

The preamble of a possible civil-military conflict on the local level, has been largely treated by national and local press, such as, *Cotidianul*,117 *Evenimentul Zilei*,118 and press agencies, such as ROMPRES,119 MEDIAFAX,120 and TV stations, such as, PROTV121 and REALITATEA TV122 when two American soldiers were involved in a fight in the Constanta area. The *Stars and Stripes*, talking about the same incident, reported: “The cultural exchange got off to a rocky start, though. In June, a major and a master sergeant with the U.S. Southern European Task Force, in Romania for a week as part of an advance party, made headlines after an incident in a bar that in the Americans’ view started because of a scam.” The incident started when the American servicemen, refused to pay the bill after having a few shots in a bar, arguing about the fact that the amount was too high for the quantity and the quality of served products and services. The soldiers were “evacuated” by the bodyguards, after some verbal and physical wrestling.

The presence of American troops in Romania is covered by the newspaper *Romania Mare* in a more radical and pessimist tone, in its July 2007 edition, in the article

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120 “Militari Americani, Bătuți la un Club din Mamaia Fiindcă au Refuzat să Achite Nota de Plată” [American Soldiers Knocked in a Mamaia Club After Refusing to Pay Their Bill], MEDIAFAX, June 19, 2007.

121 “Bătaie cu Militari Americani” [Fight Involving American Soldiers], PROTV, 19 June 07, 08.02 AM emission.

122 “Doi Militari Americani Implicati într-o Bataie la Mamaia” [Two American Soldiers Involved in a Fight in Mamaia], Realitatea TV, 19 June 07, 11.32 AM emission.
“Yankei, cărați-vă acasă!” [Yankees, go home!]. The American presence is seen as the generating cause of inevitable “drunkenness, rapes, fighting, scandals.”

b. Corruption and Countermeasures

The corruption, as a social phenomenon, has not been overlooked. Stars and Stripes has published the information that “according to Transparency International’s 2007 report, Romania is the most corrupt country in European Union.”\(^{123}\) In relation to this aspect, in a most recent article hosted by the same publication, it deals with a special case where there are suspicions that the Americans have been overcharged: “That apparent endemic corruption may be one reason why two unprepossessing wooden observation towers, recently placed on a firing range now used by American soldiers in an exercise of U.S. Army Europe’s Joint Task Force East, cost 13,000 euro — or more than $9,000 each. Or maybe not. ‘Lumber is expensive,’ said Troy Darr, JTF-E spokesman.”\(^{124}\) In this context the American representatives at the military bases sites took additional measures, which sometimes imposed on the wrong people, may hamper the good relations with local contractors. Even though this case was a typical press “fire alarm,” the disagreement was closed by the declarations of the U.S. Army’s representative: “‘Preventing fraud is a key concern for the Army regardless of where we conduct contracting operations,’ Bruce Anderson, a U.S. Army Europe spokesman, wrote in an e-mail. ‘We remain vigilant for any indications of fraud. To date, we are aware of no indications of contractor fraud within JTF-East.’”\(^{125}\)

According to the same publication “…it has been recommended to the American personnel from Mihail Kogalniceanu, not to use their credit cards, restrictions on going outside the base, and participation to only officially organized trips to the area.”\(^{126}\) This kind of behaviour will certainly be noticed by the local community and may generate wrong interpretations, as Americans thinking about themselves being a

\(^{123}\) Alina Neagu.

\(^{124}\) Nancy Montgomery.

\(^{125}\) Ibid.

\(^{126}\) Ibid.
“superior race,” who do not mix with the locals. Such behavior offers an unwelcome contrast to the behavior of U.S. troops in the golden age of such stationing elsewhere in Europe in decades past.

c. _Nobody Should be Above the Law_

Other publications do not welcome American troops, reminding the population of the tragic car accident in which the well-known Romanian singer Teo Peter died, an accident where an employee of the American Embassy in Bucharest was involved. The titles like “Romania invaded by a 1000 colleagues of Teo Peter’s killer” or “U.S. soldiers who break the law cannot be trialed”\(^{127}\) and “U.S. soldiers enjoy immunity before the Romanian laws”\(^ {128}\) are certainly aiming at the fact that the American, Christopher VanGoethen, who was involved in the accident and apparently guilty, escaped Romanian justice by being brought back to America for trial, escaping a prison sentence. “For the American soldiers, Romania represents NML, which means ‘No Man’s Land’…”\(^ {129}\) said the newspaper _Cronica Romana_. And the same publication concludes: “For any kind of ‘indiscipline’ the American soldiers may be prosecuted only over the ocean, by the American martial courts, which, of course cannot punish them in favor of some ‘collateral victims’ from Eastern Europe. The concrete proof, the un-revenged death of Teo Peter, still stands.”\(^ {130}\) A similar case happened five months later when another American military personnel, Steven Craig Fischer, crashed into an old person on a marked crossing. The victim died the second day in the Constanta hospital. Similar to the first case, the second American left Romania after three weeks with no restriction.

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\(^{130}\)Ibid.
d. Environmental Concerns

Environmental protection is another interesting area of discussion. Some of the authors have taken this area into consideration as being another important criterion in the U.S. decision-making process of redesigning the American military presence in Europe.

But U.S. military dollars and jobs will gradually leave Germany and may become windfalls for economically struggling Eastern European countries that are more politically welcoming and have less strict environmental laws. The Pentagon has long complained of the millions of dollars it spends each year to comply with environmental regulations.131

Even though Fleishman’s note presents a relatively positive approach to the permissively environmental legislation in Eastern Europe, it may trigger disputes in the future when these countries align their policies to European standards. Some of the first signals regarding the environment have already been inserted in the Romanian publications. The newspaper Tricolorul has shown that ”the American bases installation in Romania and hosting military common exercises could produce a lot of damage to Romania, judging not only from a international military perspective but also in the realm of public security and healthiness.”132 The author counts all possible hazardous implications further along in the article: pollution, vibrations, phonic pollution, and all possible range of accidents from possible plane crashes or aviation and artillery live fire. The author is also concerned about the closeness of the military ranges to the Danube Delta ecosystem protected by international laws.

e. The American Bases - a Hazard for Romania

It can be said that some publications may use information solely for the purpose of producing sensational news. In any case it seems that everything linked to the American presence, especially around the opening day of the first base, captures the attention of a large number of newspapers, TV channels and radio stations. There is no

131 Jeffrey Fleishman.
chance that an emergency landing at a military base would pass unnoticed. And certainly the space used and the amount of the information factors would double. This was the case of the incident that happened on the 24th of July 2007, during the common military exercise, “Carpathian Summer 2007,” when an American C-130 Hercules airplane emergency landed due to technical problems. The explanation offered after the exercise -- that the incident was part of a rescue mission simulation -- was received with skepticism, and only few newspapers have hosted this variant. The incident itself was interpreted on a large scale, and the titles of the articles are enough to picture the entire range of feelings: “Two American planes have urgently landed in Romania,”133 “Failed Mission,”134 “A U.S. Air Force plane landed urgently on Mihail Kogalniceanu airport,”135 and “American planes 'out of order”136, or “U.S. ARMY aircraft have been giving us headaches lately”137, as well as “Worries for a Hercules C 130”138 and so on and so forth. From these titles alone, one may imagine different sentimental inducements felt by the public at-large: compassion, guiltiness, anger, confusion, fear for safety, annoyance, and so on.

In such an environment, the worries of some of the local politicians about the possibility of plane crashes may sound justified: “[because] not everybody is happy about the arrival of ‘Uncle Sam’s’ soldiers. In a recent press conference, the PRM leader from Constanta, Radu Comaneci, expressed his worries about the risks of airplane incidents, which may “generate real catastrophes for locals.”139

137 Anonymous, “Avioanele Armatei SUA au Început sa ne Dea Dureri de Cap” [US ARMY Aircraft have been Giving us Headaches Lately], Tricolorul, July 24, 2007.
139 Maria Petrean.
f. **Easy Money Syndrome**

The rising of prices in the real estate business represents another aspect of the social implications. This issue is possible when one takes into consideration the increased purchasing power of the Americans, and the fact that some locals may make calculations of making quick money based on the assumptions that the American guest will be “forced” to pay higher prices for those terrains or facilities situated in the vicinity of the base or valuable through their exclusivity. According to the *Gardianul*, “…for terrains the square meter’s price has risen over 100 times in the last four years.”

This situation would be good for doing business, but certainly will eliminate the competitiveness on the local market since none can compete with the Americans. Until now, nobody was interested in acquiring properties in Mihail Kogalniceanu; however, the American competitiveness may generate negative feelings and anxiousness vis-à-vis the idea that the Americans dictate the prices and terms in the local real estate business. The same publication asserts that, “[f]or the local people, the opening of the base brings the hope of overnight profits.”

Another aspect of the relation between the civil society and the American soldiers, which may actually generate conflicts, is represented by the perception of the Americans’ ease with which they spend money. Just a small segment of the local population may be able to afford to spend the amount of money that a regular American soldier can afford. This “easy come, easy go” attitude may generate envy. A series of articles already point in this direction. An article in the newspaper *Azi* brought the following news: “... the American soldiers are ready to spend a lot of money for feeling the sea breeze. They have laid their eyes on a luxury residential complex, a couple of steps away from the beach in Mamaia resort. It is about 46 luxury villas, surrounded by high concrete fences.”

As everybody may notice the word “luxury’ is repeated to make the point very clear that the Americans are aiming high. The second information to notice

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140 Maria Petrean.
141 Ibid.
is that “high concrete fences” surround the villas. Why? To ensure privacy, so the ordinary people cannot glance inside? These are the kind of thoughts that may cross people’s minds, making them feel helpless and “small.” For sure, this kind of media opinion does not do any good toward building a mutual trust and cooperation. And when this kind of information is completed with titles like “The American soldiers socialize with the ‘parachutes’ from Constanta” the recipe for failure in the civil-military relations is guaranteed.

\[ g. \quad \text{Other} \]

Some of the news may even induce feelings of paranoia within the society, talking about spying, surveillance and underground missions of the surveying aircrafts and helicopters: “Our sources have notified us about the fact that the Americans do nothing else but practice economic espionage and identification of the strategic perimeters.”

The presence of the American troops in this part of the world is based on large public support, but the officials have to be aware that there is always a part of civilian society which will oppose it.

Knowing the political affinity of the countries in this part of the world, it may be worthwhile to cite Kessler’s description about the Bulgarians’ opposition to the American presence on their territory:

\begin{quote}
Rice will sign an agreement Friday with the Bulgarian government to use three military bases in its territory, part of a plan to shift U.S. troops from large bases in central Europe to smaller bases closer to the Middle East. Nearly 5,000 protesters marched on the U.S. Embassy Thursday to denounce the agreement. Opinion surveys indicate that a majority of people here oppose the deal.
\end{quote}

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143 A Romanian term for naming prostitutes.
145 Baietii cu ochi albastri [blue eyed boys], “Elicopterele SUA Survoleaza (si Spioneaza!) Zi si Noapte, Teritoriul Romaniei” [US Helicopters Fly (and Spy) on the Romanian Territory Day and Night], Ultima Ora, August 07, 2007.
146 Glenn Kessler.
H. SUMMARY

As identified in this chapter, location of the American troops in Romania takes place under specific conditions and creates radical changes on the European continent. The opposition among the Western European countries and the openness of the new NATO members in hosting the American troops has triggered certain changes of NATO’s military presence in Europe. The tensions between the U.S. and Germany, France and Turkey on one hand, and on the other hand the necessity for getting American troops closer to the Middle East and the Caucasus, together with the fact that the eastern borders of Europe are the new boundaries for terrorism, had imposed the adoption by the Pentagon of a new realignment plan, which meant drastic changes for the continent and the troops stationed there. Of course, beyond the political and strategic reasons are also economic interests in reducing the costs for the basing of the American troops, which would be possible by using cheaper locations in Romania and Bulgaria.

The new conditions extrapolated to the Romanian society may generate new challenges to the civil-military relations and result in a new framing of Romania’s international relations and security.

The political support made possible the negotiation and signing of the AA, and an important set of documents related to the AA ruling, the Romania-U.S. bilateral relation.

The development of a network at the national level made possible the involvement of all the responsible ministries and national agencies in relation with the American partner through a Joint Committee, and at the MOD’s level an internal relationship flow, which was able to aggregate all the subordinate military structure in providing the necessary support. This new cooperation and control system has made possible the civil control, in achieving the civil paternity and the transparency of the military actions in relation to the implementation of the AA. Another positive thing in building up such a framework is the fact that this makes possible access to all the resources, political tools, and decisional factors, which otherwise may hamper the implementation process.
The opening of the MK military base should be seen as an efficient interconnection system with the other bases from Turkey, Bulgaria, and even the Middle East, and for no reason should it be seen as a supplement or a replacement of the bases from Turkey. It is the obligation of Romanian military policy to promote this idea taking into account the new context of Turkey’s zonal and continental relationship with the U.S.

It should be made very clear by the military informational sources about the status of the common use of the military site by both American and Romanian armed forces. The fact that Romania retains the ownership of all the terrains, military bases, and other facilities that are going to be used should be made very clear to the civilian mass media and population. The necessity of transparency and correct informing of the civilian population on the scope and number of the American troops in Romania is very important and should be the attribute of the military press.

The Romanians intrinsically relate the improvement in the security generated by the presence of the American troops to the economic activity growth at both national and local levels, and less to other asymmetric threats.

Regarding the foreign investments associated with the presence of the American troops in Romania, it should be said that maybe at the macro level these sums are not very significant, but they make a difference at the micro level, playing a major role in developing the local areas and providing jobs and increasing the level of local business. The American counterpart should be aware that any misunderstanding or syncope in this area might generate a degradation of the civil-military relations, in a sense that the American presence could be seen as a burden and not as an advantage.

Another conclusion is that the cooperation and interoperability through common training of the Romanian military with the U.S. troops represent another positive aspect of this partnership, and the Romanian military should take full advantage of this opportunity. A rotation of the Romanian troops involved in the common training activities would be a good idea.
While the Romanian expectations are most revealed in the economic realm, the Romanian concerns are concentrated in three main areas: deterioration of zonal and continental relations, terrorist threats on national and local security, and social and environmental issues.

In the realm of the zonal and continental relations, it should be mentioned that Romania, as the vanguard of both NATO and EU, has to deal in the Black Sea region with different asymmetric challenges and threats, starting with the Russian hegemonic tendencies and political, military and economic countermeasures, and ending with a possible proliferation of terrorist activities, drugs, arms and human trafficking. The increase of nuclear proliferation in the Black Sea’s area, and rocket missile threats represent another major threat. Since Europe is dependent on the Russian exports of energy, natural gas, and oil, Moscow may use the energy as an instrument of political pressure. This will certainly generate future challenges for our country. It should be also mentioned the fact that a pro-American Romanian policy may alter the relationship between Romania and those EU countries in opposition with the U.S. (Germany, France, Turkey, and others). The AA bilateral agreement, even though partially under the NATO umbrella generates additional challenges, will certainly complicate the political, diplomatic, military, economic, and security landscape in the Black Sea region.

Regarding the internal and local security, the American troops may represent a target for terrorist attacks, and such a situation will certainly affect part of the civilian population. In this context the central and local authorities should pay increased attention to this aspect, and take the appropriate measures for improving the security. The idea that “things such as terrorist attacks never happened before in Romania” could be a bad excuse for not acting.

The presence of the American troops in this part of the world is based on large public support, but the Romanian officials have to be aware that there will always be a part of civil society opposed to it. It should be noted that there is an increased interest shown by the civilian society around this activity. At the same time in response to that, the openness of the military institutions in informing the public should continue.
All levels of the Romanian society should be aware of the fact that the presence of the American troops on Romanian territory will have both positive and negative civil-military consequences. The history of U.S. bases on European soil and other parts of the world sustains this conclusion and provides an area for inquiry. There will always be areas of policy, economy and society that will raise critical issues because of the social, cultural, legal and administrative, and other differences and dissimilar ways of perception and understanding of the requirements of strategy and policy.

The study of the Japanese and German experiences, and a careful analysis of the positive and negative aspects in the security, economic and social/environmental realms will reveal some general lessons learned and conclusions as well as the particularities in both civil and military relations. Some of them may be valuable for Romania in learning how to manage the good things and avoid bad experiences.
III. THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN AND
THE SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS:
OKINAWA CASE STUDY

We Americans like to believe that Japan remains our closest of friends. The U.S. security treaty with Tokyo is, as former Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield said, the United States’ ‘most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.’ We depend on Japan not only to buy our Treasury bills and supply us with Toyota hybrids but also to be our land base to contain the potential ambitions of China.147

Michael Zielenziger

A. INTRODUCTION

The U.S.-Japan security alliance is one of the few actual alliances that has lasted more than 60 years. During this period this alliance went through many ups and downs, which make this case one which is worth studying. The literature in this field is very well represented offering a tremendous amount of knowledge. A study of the Japanese experience of host nation posture, especially in Okinawa, and a careful analysis of the positive and negative aspects within in the security, economic and social/environmental realms will reveal some general conclusions about the experience of stationed U.S. forces. Further, this case speaks to the particularities in both civil and military relations, which in the last chapter may help in drawing valuable conclusions and lessons learned for Romania’s case. At the same time, one should keep in mind those specific aspects of history, policy, and strategy that make such a comparison somewhat unconventional for an analysis of the host nation relations to stationed U.S. forces. One might object that studying an extra European case is unwarranted, what with the practice of NATO and whatever putative differences operate between one side of Eurasia from the other. However, since the model of the U.S. forces in Asia loomed large in the arguments of the U.S. re-stationing concept of the time between 2002 and 2005, a European might do well to consider this particular case and its important political details.

A retrospective view of the historical background of the U.S. military presence in Japan starting with the post WW II period and the analysis of the legal framework of the American military’s presence in Japan will ease the understanding of the past’s influence and the defining of the formal, and to a certain extent informal, relations between the U.S. and Japan at the official level, and between the U.S. military presence and the civilian society. The struggle of the Japanese society toward becoming a “normal nation” will complete the general security landscape and will help one to understand the most recent actions of the Japanese government.

The size of the financial Japanese contribution through the Host Nation Support (HNS) to the overall financial issues of basing the American troops in Japan will allow one to draw conclusions regarding the development of this bilateral relationship. The roots of the HNS, in connection with the political process in the realm of the society’s perceptions, and its evolution in the realm of argumentation for continuing or reducing Japan’s financial contribution, may complete the picture of the alliance’s trajectory and future possible developments.

The study of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, both under the American administration and the Japanese after the 1972 administration and its influence on the rising of national sentiments is relevant in understanding the local feelings, position, support or opposition to the American presence.

The literature’s arguments of maintaining versus reducing the presence of the American bases are valuable in defining the political context of the security requirements and challenges for the U.S., Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region. By implication, these records have something to say to those who are unaware of the political issues of allowing the U.S. forces to be stationed on national soil and can act as a stimulus for reflection in the hope of managing or lowering the inevitable frictions in such bi- and multi-lateral relations.

The interests of the U.S. and Japan and their accompanying convergence or divergence, are in fact, political backgrounds of the future of the alliance between Japan and the U.S. An important impact in re-defining the security alliance has the local
administration and society’s opposition to the military presence especially after the end of the Cold War and the 1995 time period. The arguments and events that triggered the process of rethinking the bases of the bilateral U.S.-Japan security partnership are important in drawing additional and completing the conclusions.

A special attention in this analysis is paid to Okinawa’s dilemmas (in contrast to those of Korea, or formerly the Philippines or the case of the former West Germany), through the lens of public opinion and the central and local press’ and mass media’s influence on it. The complexity of the Okinawans’ concerns and problems caused by the presence of the military bases, their impact, explanation, and relevance in shaping the relations of the locals with the American servicemen, together with issues linked to the necessity of changing the legal status of the American presence in certain areas (mostly related to the Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA]), are important points in understanding the past evolution, the actual status, and to a certain extent the future of the American-Japanese human relationship.

There are methods of policy to improve the current situation, which require special attention from both the U.S. and Japan up to the senior-most political levels. The Security Alliance is too important for these two countries and for the Asia-Pacific area to be adrift. Both countries have much more to gain from this bilateral relationship, which is very important for closer cooperation in the future, and the identification and appliance of viable solutions to the problems that this partnership faces, as this chapter argues.

In writing this chapter, this author, among other sources, has built on some of the findings, interpretations, conclusions, and proposals formulated by two former Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) graduates, as well as on their personal observations and experiences from being deployed in Japan: Keith W. Allen (2003), and Giuseppe A. Stavale (2004).
B. THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

1. Historical Background of the U.S. Military Presence in Japan after World War II

The political and social community of fate between Japan and the U.S. armed forces well predates the U.S. occupation of Japan in the wake of the Second World War. Indeed, the arrival of U.S. naval vessels in what had heretofore been a closed society marked a milestone in modern Japanese history. It was Commodore Perry and his "Black Ships," in their mission to open Japan, which “encouraged modernization and the introduction of Western culture”\(^\text{148}\) in this country.

Matthew C. Perry's mission to Japan in 1852-54 may have been America's greatest diplomatic triumph of the 19th century. Perry succeeded not only in his primary mission of obtaining a treaty with the previously isolationist Empire of Japan (the Treaty of Kanegawa), which included Japanese agreement to care for shipwrecked sailors and establish coaling stations for American ships, but he also opened the door for a future U.S.-Japan trade relationship.\(^\text{149}\)

For the purposes of this study, however, the presence of the American bases in Japan is essentially related to the World War II aftermath. “Literally and figuratively, the American bases in Japan are a legacy of World War II. When the conflict ended, U.S. and Allied forces occupied Imperial Japanese Army and Navy bases on the four main islands-Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu-and on Okinawa.”\(^\text{150}\)

The defeat in the war in the Pacific left Japan in a precarious condition. During this war about 700,000 civilians were killed, “all of Japan’s major cities, except for Kyoto, were destroyed by Allied bombings,”\(^\text{151}\) the industry was destroyed, and the agriculture suffered a large step backward. The Japanese society suffered from the lack of

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\(^\text{150}\) Paul S. Giarra.

basic products, and the population was starving. When the allied forces took over the country, starting in September 1945, the population was tired of war, morally devastated, and the political class was incapable of ruling the country. “Policy for the occupation of Japan was governed by the Allied Far East Commission, which was established in Washington, D.C. in early 1946. The three primary objectives of the occupation were: demilitarization, democratization, and rehabilitation of society.”  

Politically, Japan was put under the supervision of an Allied Council, whose main task was to provide advice on policy execution to the occupation forces. The preeminent figure of that period—“General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) and was responsible for overseeing the occupation.” The imprint of his personality influenced the reforms and political decisions until 1947. His major contribution was reflected in the adoption of the Japanese constitution, especially for the provisions of article 9 on the 3rd of May 1947. Since then its provisions have shaped the Japanese view of the world and war. This article stated:

…aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim …land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 

As a direct consequence, over the last 60 years Japan has relied on the American presence on its territory, which fully assumed the responsibility for Japan’s national and regional security.

Until 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was enforced, Japan was under the Allied Occupation. But this was not the case for Okinawa, which, not unlike the four power sovereignty in Berlin (and earlier in Vienna and Trieste) continued to be, until 1972, under direct U.S. administration. “The U.S. government explained that it was necessary to maintain the U.S. military presence there in the interest of peace and security.

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152 Keith W. Allen, 11.
153 Ibid.
in the Far East-including Japan, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula."\textsuperscript{155} The U.S. military presence in Okinawa was also viewed as a "cork in the bottle,"\textsuperscript{156} for preventing Japan from rearming or becoming a military power and returning to militarism.

Paul Giarra, a well-known specialist in Japan’s policy and former head of DOD’s Japan Desk, emphasized the importance of Okinawa in the equation of the American presence in this part of the world:

Whatever the rationale, the United States deployed its armed forces in Okinawa for the defense of Japan and the rest of the Far East and distinguished Okinawa from the rest of Japan to give them greater freedom to act. Even after Okinawa's reversion to Japanese administration in 1972, the island prefecture has maintained its crucial role as "host" to the U.S. military and a key element in Pentagon strategy.\textsuperscript{157}

In the years to come after 1972, Okinawa gradually became the most populated part of Japan with stationed U.S. forces, especially because of Tokyo’s policy of relocating the troops from the mainland bases and their consolidation on Okinawa. The conflicts in that area that involved the U.S. also influenced the numbers and the positioning of the American troops on Okinawa:

After the end of the Korean War, the United States substantially reduced its military forces from Japan's main islands in 1957 and 1958 as a prerequisite to extension and revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960. Some of those troops were reassigned to Okinawa, … During the Vietnam War, the functions of the U.S. bases in Okinawa were reinforced, which contributed to further concentration of the U.S. forces in Japan in Okinawa-a situation that has continued to this day.\textsuperscript{158}

But these actions, beyond increasing the number of troops stationed on the island triggered the process that made possible the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

In the late 1960’s, Japan’s support for U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam drew criticism from students, the media, and large segments of the population. This resulted in almost daily protests throughout Japan. In

\textsuperscript{155} Paul S. Giarra.
\textsuperscript{157} Paul S. Giarra.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
1969, the Nixon administration responded to the protests by announcing the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. This decision “healed a festering wound and demonstrated that the United States had no territorial ambitions in the Pacific, in stark contrast to the Soviet Union, which continued tenaciously to hold on to the Northern Territories.”

2. The Legal Framework of the American Military’s Presence in Japan

After termination of the Allied Occupation through the San Francisco Treaty, the legality of the American presence in Japan had its roots in the provisions of the security treaty signed in 1951 and the 1954 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

In 1960, the 1951 treaty was modified, the Mutual Security Treaty (signed on 19 January 1960) was ratified, and basically, since then,

… remains in force up to the present without any revisions afterwards, stipulates that the U.S. has an obligation to support Japan if Japan is attacked (Article V). Japan has an obligation to provide the U.S. with "facilities and areas" in Japan, so that the U.S. forces can protect Japan and maintain international peace and security in the Far East (Article VI). Japan has also an obligation to support the U.S., if the U.S. bases or the U.S. forces operating in the “territories under the administration of Japan,” are attacked (Article V).

The “facilities and areas,” in other words, designates the military bases and ultimately the rights for basing to the U.S. troops.

The same year SOFA was agreed upon between the U.S. and Japan stating the use of “facilities and areas” in Japan by the U.S. military. This document also regulates “…the legal status and other administrative matters of the U.S. forces and their personnel stationing in Japan. SOFA is a bilateral administrative agreement under Article VI of the

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161 SOFA was concluded in 1954, and then modified, updated, and ratified in 1960.
Security Treaty, which obliges Japan to grant the U.S. the right to ‘the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.’”162

The use of the bases by the American troops is not unrestricted, as Japan reserves the right to veto major American deployments into the country, operations from it, and major changes in U.S. equipment there. In an exchange of notes dated 19 January 1960, the day the Mutual Security Treaty was signed, Japan stipulated and the United States confirmed that "concerning the implementation of Article VI [of the Mutual Security Treaty, i.e., operations not directly in the defense of Japan]: Major changes of the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan."163

Anyone talking about this alliance should envisage the asymmetrical aspects, which are rooted in the Japanese constitutional constraints dictated by the provisions of Article 9. At the same time anyone should notice the special zonal security environment, and the sensitivities between Japan and Korea and China regarding past Japanese militarism. Last, but not least, the anti-militarism and anti-war sentiments of the Japanese civil society, which play a significant role in the political behaviour of this country are beyond legal obligations of any treaty or modification of a treaty dealing with military matters.

As a result, non-military contributions of Japan including the provision of land for the U.S. forces and military contributions of the U.S. including maintenance of deterrence against enemy forces have dominated the security relationship. Having this clear demarcation both as a cause and an effect, military cooperation did not begin until the late 1970s and the scope of cooperation was limited.164

In July 1954, in its attempt to institute its own self-defense capabilities, Japan created its Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces (SDF). But it took another 40 years

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162 Tatsuro Yoda, 51.
163 Paul S. Giarra.
164 Tatsuro Yoda, 50.
for Japanese political decision-makers to legalize the official framework of supporting the U.S. troops in the vicinity of Japan, which is a very sensitive area.

For example, the Japanese government adopted the Constitution which prohibits the use of force other than solely for self defense. Until the late 1990s, the Japanese government did not have a legal framework to support the U.S. forces in a conflict near Japan, because of the difficulty to make such a legal framework under the Constitution. In a sense, by establishing the legal framework and relaxing the Constitution’s constraint on the use of force in the 1990s, Japan increased its autonomy.165

3. Debate on the U.S.-Japan Alliance, in the Context of the Japanese Struggle of Becoming a “Normal Nation”

Since after the Cold War, defining the national security in the regional context has been more difficult for Japan, a country that struggles to find its place and role in the world. The absence of a common enemy, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, made more and more officials and academics foresee a possible disagreement in the near future between U.S. and Japanese over the regional and security issues. The absence of an imminent threat questions the need of any security alliance, and particularly the U.S.-Japan alliance; “Justifying policymaking by saying no threat is visible will gnaw away at the roots of the defence alliance,’ Tomohisa Sakanaka, head of the Tokyo-based Research Institute for Peace and Security, cautioned in a recent newsletter.”166 Beginning in 1990 the U.S.-Japan alliance went through increasingly hard times especially due to the fact that by the disintegration of the Soviet Union the alliance lost its principal mission. The new situation required a reassessment of the alliance’s core missions. One main inquiry that began to concern the Japanese public was the continued necessity of a large U.S. military presence in Japan. Moreover concerns about the way this alliance would work during wartime were raised: “… the security alliance is a consultative relationship with no unifying apparatus for wartime decision-making.”167

165 Tatsuro Yoda, 26-27.
The restrictive provisions of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution contrast with the economical power of the country and to a certain extent limit its diplomatic and political influence in relation to the outside world. While the economical power situates Japan at second place in the world—its political influence is diminished. If gaining political influence was not a priority during the Cold War, when the primary objective was economical reconstruction and growth “…under the security blanket of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance,” currently Japan concentrates on gaining its rightful place in the world’s hierarchy. Japan is determined to become a “normal nation” in order to achieve “the international respect and power it feels it deserves.”

The Japanese started to realize that the only possibility for gaining this respect is to change the perception that Japanese security and diplomatic policy are subordinated to the United States. According to Giuseppe A. Stavale, a former NPS student, Japan started also to realize the differences:

This alliance, however, put Japan in a position where its foreign policy was subordinated to that of another country. Japan realizes that this is in part due to the security alliance not being reciprocal with the United States, as it is between the United States and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The necessity of modifying the legal bases, which regulates Japan’s national security, has recently been a priority of the Japanese officials. Official statements have also targeted the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

At the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 2001, the participants made statements about Article 9 and its influences on the collective defense as well as implications in the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Talking about Japan’s rights in building a collective self-defense, despite the ban self-imposed by Article 9 of the constitution, former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa called for ending those restrictions “…in the interests of a more effective


169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.
Japan-U.S. alliance and a greater ability to adapt to changing realities.”171 At the same conference, in his official statement, Shintaro Ishihara the Governor of Tokyo asked for end of the Security Alliance and for reassessing the bilateral partnership.

To apply the metaphor of a book to Japan’s postwar history, we can call the years up to the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty the prologue, and the 50 years from its signing to the present the first chapter. It seems about time to start shaping the next chapter of our postwar history…Japan can take the initiative in proposing to the United States that the two countries annul the Japan-U.S. security treaty…We should change the treaty so that the Japanese people are in an equal partnership with the Americans in a way of which they can be proud.172

Japan seeks to increase its influence in Asia as part of its political objective, and will challenge the American interests in this area. “Japan needs to strike a politically sustainable balance between its bilateral priorities vis-à-vis the United States and its regional interests.”173 Under this scenario, “…Japan would maintain strong defense ties with the U.S., but also seek to expand its influence in Asia by charting a security policy that might, at times, be at cross-purposes with Washington.”174

There are three main objectives that Japan is pursuing on the way to becoming a “normal nation.” First, special attention is paid in Japan regarding the future of its national defence, including the revision of its constitution. A second objective aims to achieve a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Third, Japan would consider the transformation of the Japanese Defense Agency into a full ministry.

Interpretations of the constitutional provisions that ban Japan from being proactive in relation to its legal rights for self-defense that is granted to all nations under the United Nations’ charter became more realistic and attempted to reinterpret Article 9. According to James Brooke, “The peace constitution does not mean that the country has


to be pacifist. Just to be on the receiving end of an attack is not what our Constitution had in mind. Just to wait for another country’s attack and lose thousands and tens of thousands of people, that is not what the Constitution assumes.”\(^{175}\)

Relying on other actors to provide security is seen by Shigeru Ishiba as a national irresponsibility: “Japan is waking from a prolonged state of heiwa boke, or peace senility, induced by more than half a century of the United States taking on the role of Japan’s ultimate protector.”\(^{176}\)

The Japanese politicians envisage that “…gaining a permanent seat on the Security Council is the quickest way for Japan to gain the respect and power they believe they deserve.”\(^{177}\) The former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali foresaw that including Japan on the Security Council may have positive results; “… he believes Japan’s permanent seat could have a stabilizing effect on U.S. hegemony, and advance the cause of democratization.”\(^{178}\) But for the politicians it is obvious that “[a]s long as Japan’s security and diplomatic policy are beholden to the United States, it is unlikely it will gain sufficient support from other nations to achieve its permanent seat.”\(^{179}\)

Part of the becoming a “normal nation” process includes an increased will of Japan to use its Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) for missions other than those directly related to homeland defense. Over the last 15 years, the use of the SDF has assumed more missions in U.N. peacekeeping, counter-piracy operations, and support for the U.S. War on Terror. These new roles have contributed to higher visibility in the world and increased legitimacy of the use of the Japanese military.

Despite the fact that many Japanese are in opposition to the development of SDF and assuming the likelihood of more offensive missions, and believing that it is in


\(^{176}\) James Brooke.


\(^{179}\) Ibid.
violation with the constitution, the SDF benefits from having one of the largest military budgets in the world. Despite the fact that Article 9 prohibits the use of SDF for offensive military operations, in the last period the SDF conducted bilateral and multilateral military exercises with the U.S. and other nations for practicing and maintaining its skills. One of the major discussions in Japan debates the support provided by SDF to U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

This new approach has zonal echoes, since Japan’s neighbors still remember the Japanese imperialism and its expansionist policies. Despite these reactions, “[h]owever, a growing number of Japanese citizens feel the SDF support operations are necessary if Japan wants to become a ‘normal nation’ and maintain its influence on the international stage.”

C. JAPANESE HOST NATION SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL ISSUES

1. Japanese Host Nation Support (HNS) Roots and Evolution

Under the provisions of the security treaty Japan has no obligation for sustaining the stationing of the American troops on its territory. “Simply put, Japan provides bases to the U.S. without cost to the U.S., and the U.S. pays the cost for operation of forces in the bases. This forms the basic principle of the cost sharing between the U.S. and Japan about the U.S. stationing forces.” But starting in 1978, Japan’s Host Nation Support (HNS) started as an exception to this principle, as a part of burden-sharing by paying some of the operational expenses related to the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan. These costs represented expenses that had to be done in local currency, such as paying the salaries for the Japanese civilian workers employed by the U.S. military bases. These costs were related only to peacetime support and, to a certain extent, were aiming to decrease the costs for maintaining the military bases. Since then those costs continued to increase until the mid 1990s, additional costs such as utilities expenses (electricity, water and gas) being added. Starting in 1978 the HNS for the U.S. forces in Japan has been

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180 Keith W. Allen, 30.
181 Tatsuro Yoda, 51.
negotiated on a step-by-step basis every five years and concluded by adoption of special agreements through so-called Special Measures Agreements (SMA).

Figure 4, a snapshot from Tatsuro Yoda’s work *Recalibrating Alliance Contributions*,\(^{182}\) shows the evolution of HNS, which continually increased until 1995.

![Graph showing Host nation support as percentage of Japan’s GDP (1978-2003)](image)

**Figure 4.** Host nation support as percentage of Japan’s GDP (1978-2003)

Related to the evolution of HNS, Figure 5\(^ {183}\) shows the evolution of local labor cost and its share between the U.S. and Japan. Japan’s share continuously increased, and by 1995 reached the 100 percent limit.

\(^{182}\) Tatsuro Yoda, 51.

\(^{183}\) Snapshot from Tatsuro Yoda, 56.
The first resolution to share part of the costs was made by the former Minister of the Defense Agency, Kanemaru, who decided to pay part of the salaries of Japanese civilians working with the American bases. First explained as “Omoiyari Yosan” (Omoiyari means sympathy and Yosan means budget in Japanese), this cost sharing appeared as part of the defense budget for supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance. The former minister took advantage of a semi-legal artifice, “Omoiyari,” which expressed Japanese’ sympathy for the U.S. efforts in protecting Japan from an external military aggressor. This was semi-legal since under the SOFA provisions there were no legal obligations for Japan to make any financial contribution.

Related to this issue, Okazaki Hisahiko, a former diplomat and ambassador, wrote an opinion article in a newspaper:

The "omoiyari" budget was conceived in the realization that Japan, being unable to cooperate with the U.S. through the use of force, should cooperate financially as much as possible. I do not think that this money-centered approach can be continued indefinitely because the alliance could be endangered if Japan watched from the sidelines when U.S. soldiers shed their blood in a military crisis in a surrounding area. In the present circumstances, however, money is the only thing Japan can provide in
place of a direct military contribution. We should realize the grave implications of stinting on such financial support.$^{184}$

2. Reducing Versus Maintaining the HNS

The public opinion around this issue has changed since 1978. Some people think that the Japanese financial contribution is too thin in comparison to the security advantages, others argue in favor of decreasing or even terminating this financial burden. Tatsuro Yoda, citing Michael Green, who is a political scientist and expert on Japanese politics, said that at the Council of Foreign Relations that he

... touched on the HNS negotiation in his comment on events on U.S.-Japan relations in the 1st quarter of 2000. He defends the HNS arguing that the size of HNS is only less than 0.25% of the Japanese government’s budget, the USFJ [the U.S. Forces in Japan] uses most of the HNS for paying the salaries of Japanese workers at the U.S. bases in Japan and uses a very small proportion of the HNS for building recreational facilities.$^{185}$

The majority who argues against the Japanese HNS contribution recalls the fact that “Japan does not have any obligation under the security treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement to support the USFJ financially. Within the people identified with those types of negative views, some ask for revision of HNS, including a decrease of the size, while others ask for its end.”$^{186}$

In a 1998 article in Foreign Affairs, Hosokawa Masahiro, a former Japanese Prime Minister, while recognizing the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, advocates for the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Japan and downsizing of HNS:

As the common threat presented by the Cold War diminishes, it is natural for the Japanese people to be skeptical of the U.S. military presence. The American military bases cost Japan $4 billion annually. If foregone rent and other revenues are included, Japan’s annual burden jumps to $5 billion, at a time when the Japanese government faces a serious financial crisis. In terms of cost-sharing, Japan bears the largest burden among U.S.

$^{185}$ Tatsuro Yoda, 246.
$^{186}$ Ibid., 248.
allies for maintaining U.S. forces, with Germany and South Korea paying $60 million and $290 million, respectively. By a 1995 Special Measures Agreement, Japan is committed through the year 2000 to pay the salaries of 24,000 civilian employees at the bases, the utility costs, including energy, water, and communications, and most of the construction expenses. This burden to Japanese taxpayers hangs like a darkening cloud over the future of the alliance. Japan should honor the 1995 agreement but put America on notice that it will not renew the agreement in 2000. It is the business of statesman, not bureaucrats or generals, to plan for the future. The U.S. military presence in Japan should fade with this century’s end. The time has come for the leaders of Japan and the United States to discuss an alliance fit for the next century.187

In his work, Tatsuro Yoda presents a position of the Japan contribution according to the Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense 2003 published by the U.S. DOD. According to this source, “the size of Japan’s HNS ($4.62 billion) is largest among all the U.S. allies and much larger than that of Germany ($862 million) or South Korea ($805 million), which are the second and third largest contributors respectively.”188 According to Yoda “[t]he large sizes of HNS for those countries reflect the size of U.S. stationing forces: 71,434 in Germany, 39,691 in Japan, and 37,972 in South Korea as of December 31, 2001. Japan’s share of U.S. stationing costs (79 percent in 2001) is also high compared to other U.S allies, for example, Germany (21 percent) or South Korea (39 percent).”189 Figure 6190, shows that Japan has the highest contribution among the top 10 U.S. allies.

188 Tatsuro Yoda, 56.
189 Ibid.
190 Snapshot from Tatsuro Yoda, 57.
In 2004, in a speech to journalists, Lieutenant General Waskow, Commander of the U.S. Forces, accentuated the importance of NHS to the USFJ:

Now let me talk about us – the men and women of the US Forces, Japan. In support of our security relationship, the US has more than 58,000 military personnel assigned to Japan. These military members are supported by approximately 5,500 DoD civilian employees and more than 25,000 Japanese workers. When you add in another 52,000 family members to our overall population, you can see that we have nearly 140,000 people devoted to the Japan – U.S. security alliance. U.S. forces are dispersed among 88 facilities on Honshu, Kyushu and Okinawa. The cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan is well in excess of $8 billion a year. Of this amount, the government of Japan generously pays approximately half of the cost – in excess of $4 billion a year.191

Beyond all these opinions, the fact is that over the past sixty years, “Article 9 has provided the political cover for Japan to rely on the American security umbrella for its protection, while concentrating its finances on economic development.”192

The U.S. defensive umbrella has enabled Japan to limit its defense burden to 1% of its GNP since 1976. This allowed Japan to focus its resources on economic growth.193 This

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193 Keith W. Allen, 14.
allowed for the ensuring of political stabilization in Japan, which was one of the central themes of the United States’ policy in Japan after WW II.

D. OKINAWA’S BURDEN

1. U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa Between Years 1945 - 1972

Okinawa, the largest island of the Ryukyu Islands, is Japan’s most southwestern prefecture. The Ryukyu Islands is comprised of more than 60 other smaller islands, which are also part of the Okinawa prefecture. Okinawa, which is the most important island in the archipelago, has a slim shape, measuring about 135 kilometers, and its wideness varies between 4 to 28 kilometers. “The name ‘Okinawa’ has an interesting origin: the word itself means ‘sea rope.’ The early inhabitants visualized Okinawa, when viewed from a distance, as looking like a piece of rope floating on the ocean.”

Okinawa is the most heavily populated island of the Ryukyu Archipelago. “The principle economic activities are agriculture, fishing, food processing, and the manufacture of textiles and pottery. U.S. military bases and tourism are also important to the economy. Naha, on the southern end of the island is the most populous city and major port.”

In the history of World War II, the Battle of Okinawa from 1945 is remembered as one of the major battles of the war and the bloodiest one in the Pacific. The records of this battle state an estimate of over 120,000 killed, of which about 100,000 were civilians. These figures represent over one third of the total of the island’s inhabitants at the time. Okinawa was the only place where there was a land battle in Japan during WW II and what remains in the Okinawans’ common memories that "[t]he Okinawa victims were not only killed by bombs and shells, but also by the Japanese military." At the end of WW II the Japanese government used Okinawa as a shield for protecting the mainland. “The

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long, bloody Battle of Okinawa left enduring scars on the memories of the people of Okinawa. Adding to the betrayal, the U.S. military administration of Okinawa continued until 1972 with Japanese government approval. All this history is still deeply etched in the collective memory of the people of Okinawa.”

From an historic perspective between Japan and Okinawa,

[t]his background is in many ways a history of discrimination against Okinawans by the rest of Japan—a discrimination felt strongly by the many older Okinawans who have lived through it. It may be said that Okinawa, like Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, was a victim of Japanese colonialism, for the Japanese government was brutal in its subversion of the indigenous culture and language of Okinawa and in forcing the people of Okinawa to assume a Japanese identity.

Okinawa was left under the authority of the U.S. military after 1951, when Japan regained its independence by concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S. Japan Security Treaty. By the time Japan was joining the World community, Okinawa was transformed into an advance post in fighting the spreading communism from Asian countries such as Soviet Union, China, and North Korea.

2. U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa after the 1972 Reversion to Japan

The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty started in 1965 when the former Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato who “… visited Okinawa and began to press for the return of Okinawa to Japan. Okinawa's reversion to Japan was realized on May 15, 1972. Still 25 years since the reversion to Japan, Okinawa, occupying only 1% of the land area of Japan, is the location of 75% of the U.S. military bases in Japan. There remain many issues concerning the bases.”

Even after 1972, Okinawa remained the place with the heaviest concentration of U.S. military bases in Asia. The military bases occupy up to 19.3 percent of the total area of the

198 Ibid.
island of Okinawa, and here are stationed more than 50 percent of the total U.S. military personnel deployed in Japan. According to the *New York Times* July 21, 2000 edition, “The islands, which have a population of 1.2 million, are home to about half of the 45,000 United States military personnel in Japan. Okinawans maintain that they bear an unfair burden because their island, which is less than 1 percent of Japan's total area, contains 75 percent of the United States military facilities in the country.”200 But the military presence is not limited only to bases; “Together with the more familiar military bases are other facilities that include jungle warfare training sites, communication stations, recreational facilities and housing compounds.”201

![Figure 7. The footprint of U.S. military bases on Okinawa today or in former times](image)


201 Paul S. Giarra.
Figure 7 shows the footprint of the U.S. military bases, training camps and other facilities on Okinawa Island, and other close locations. Giuseppe A. Stavale, citing USFJ Online [home page on-line] shows that actually the number of Americans in Okinawa tends to increase when taking into account other categories; “The total number of U.S. military personnel on Okinawa fluctuates slightly, but tends to be under 30,000 active-duty members with about 24,000 family members and civilian personnel.”

When one thinks about Okinawa’s history and corroborates it with the total numbers of the American troops present on this island, one may understand why Okinawans “… see themselves as a Japanese colony leased to the United States.” The burden of Okinawa may also be figured when taking into account that even though this island accounts itself only for 0.6 percent of the total landmass of Japan, it actually provides a 23.5 percent of the total land required for U.S. bases in Japan.

Okinawans feel that the rest of Japan has solved the problem of hosting American bases by putting this burden on their shoulders:

While the rest of Japan expresses sympathy for Okinawa, it espouses a not-in-my-backyard attitude towards relieving Okinawa of some of the U.S. military bases. Over the years, Okinawans have called this unequal distribution of forces, consumption of scarce land, incidents and accidents involving U.S. military personnel and other problems, real or invented, a “burden.” Okinawans assert that they have shouldered an unequal share of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, which provides a security blanket for all of Japan, for too many years and that this burden must be lessened if not equally shared by mainland Japan.

There are more and more voices that are claiming a change of security’s approach in the frame of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, a reduction or a complete withdrawal of the American troops from Okinawa. These arguments started after the end of the Cold War and have amplified over the years.

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203 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 28.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid., 28-29.
Back in 1996, the U.S.-Japan summit between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro was the first high-level meeting to re-address the issues of Japan’s security:

Despite the rhetoric about regional security, Clinton and Hashimoto did very little to map out a joint security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region. Just confirming the objective of regional stability is much too vague to guide concrete policy. Given the uncertainties, an American military presence in the region remains an important component of such a strategy. But while necessary, this presence is by no means sufficient to deal with the complex challenges that confront the region. A more comprehensive approach is required that integrates diplomatic and economic instruments of policy as well as military ones. An effective U.S.-Japan strategy for regional security must address three critical tasks: deterrence, crisis response and crisis prevention through mutual reassurance and threat reduction.206

The rhetoric around this summit also included sharp controversies: “President Clinton should take a hard look at the U.S. force structure in Japan. One thing he would discover is that 20,000 U.S. Marines are no longer needed there”207 – affirmed Mochizuki and his collaborators. “The Cold War is over. Stationing U.S. troops in Japan, mainly in Okinawa, is pointless, divisive, and expensive”208 – added Chalmers. The same author accused the U.S. of a kind of political myopia failing to act in accordance with the new political landscape: “The end of the Cold War in East Asia differs from Europe in that the Soviet Union acquiesced to its loss of 'superpower' status; in contrast, the United States has chosen to act as if nothing much has changed.”209

Even though the security treaty was seen as important for both countries and “…essential to Japanese security, yet Okinawa pays the highest price for it.”210

209 Ibid.
has borne the defense burden not only for Japan, but also for the entire Far East. “It is thus not surprising that the people of Okinawa have found this burden oppressive and have sought a full withdrawal of U.S. forces from their islands.”

3. Pros for Maintaining the American Bases

First of all, there are opinions that regard the American military presence in Japan as a direct factor for guaranteeing the security of Japan itself and for keeping the zonal balance of power. Usually those advocating these things invoked the importance of the security alliance for both countries, and for the East Asia and Pacific region. Paul Giarra is one of the preeminent voices in the choir:

These bases, in any reasonable calculus, are essential to the current and future security equation of the region. They are vital to the defense of Japan, to the security and stability of East Asia, and to American security and political and economic strategy both in East Asia and globally. The value and indispensability of the Japanese bases-which represent, aside from the fixed-in-place U.S. forces in South Korea, the last major concentrations of U.S. military power between Guam and the Persian Gulf-balance the powerful American contributions to the security relationship, and they give substance to Japan's role as an alliance partner.

The same analyst sees this alliance as a primary source for reinforcing the bilateral relations between Japan and the U.S. and, to a certain extent, the support of the American bases is a valuable tool for projecting the interests of Japanese foreign policy:

U.S. forces in Japan are critical to that nation's defense as well. The support, or lack thereof, of the Japanese government for the American bases has important ramifications for the security of Japan and for the bilateral relationship. Most broadly, Japan benefits from the global missions assigned to U.S. forces based in the country. The fact that Japanese support, in turn, is vital to their ability to operate as far away as, for instance, the Persian Gulf animates Japanese foreign policy and tends to align U.S. policies and actions with Japanese interests. They reinforce each other, to Japan's benefit.

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211 Paul S. Giarra.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
Michael O'Hanlon, extending the idea of the alliance, intrinsically linked to the stability of the “Asia-Pacific region” by looking at this issue through a magnifying glass of possible future benefits in constructing trust and cooperation in this part of the world:

The U.S. presence in Japan has been fairly lean for quite a while, especially when viewed against the importance of the alliance to both countries and the volatility of much of the Asia-Pacific region. Maintaining a powerful Japan-U.S. alliance not only helps keep both countries safe and deters aggression in the region, but also provides a nucleus for military collaboration that may be extended some day to involve other countries, possibly including China, in a strong multilateral security structure.214

Revitalization of the bilateral alliance and promotion of defense cooperation, as well as the potential of multilateral cooperation, were seen by other authors as crucial in dealing with the zonal security challenges.

In Japan, an aversion to military involvement and an obsession with economic expansion impede the nation's ability to pursue a more balanced foreign policy that synthesizes sober geopolitical analysis and the potential of multilateral cooperation. In this sense, the challenge of East Asian security is as much a problem of American and Japanese domestic politics as of international relations.215

The military presence in Japan has more direct implications for the U.S. itself and the projection of its political and security policy regarding the Asia-Pacific area. To a certain extent, even America’s credibility is at stake:

For the United States, American forces in Japan and Okinawa are emblematic of the American determination to preserve the advantages and political leverage that come from keeping its military forces forward deployed. Basing U.S. forces in Japan keeps American defensive boundaries on the Asian littoral instead of in the eastern Pacific. Strategically, the United States cannot afford to withdraw significant forces from Okinawa, for which no realistic and viable alternative exists. American influence and political and security policy in Asia depend upon


215 Mike Mochizuki.
these forces remaining where they are. To agree to remove or reduce those forces would put American credibility at significant risk.\textsuperscript{216}

In this context Giarra is of the opinion that, “[w]ithdrawal of these forces would do more than complicate the local strategic situation, causing consternation throughout the region and necessitating recalculation of the American role.”\textsuperscript{217}

Talking about Okinawa in the security context “…the U.S. military bases in Okinawa are crucial to security in the Far East, including that of Japan.”\textsuperscript{218}

However, for Okinawa the “pros” are not all about security. The most important advantage is related to the economic side. Taking into account that the island’s economy relied chiefly on agriculture and tourism, “[t]he Okinawan economy was almost completely dependent upon revenues from activities related to the U.S. military until reversion to Japanese administration.”\textsuperscript{219} After WW II “…Okinawa became an import economy dependent upon the U.S. military presence. The authorities saw to it that the daily necessities were imported from Japan wherever possible, so that the U.S. dollars invested in base construction became a source of foreign currency revenue for the postwar Japanese government through the people of Okinawa.”\textsuperscript{220}

The economical benefits that Okinawa enjoys in hosting the American troops are quite significant. Unfortunately after more than 60 years of U.S. presence on the island there are fewer and fewer of those who remember the days before the arrival of the Americans. People live routinely with the presence of the bases and cannot imagine how things could be without them; “…overwhelming majority of Okinawans do not realize the direct, tangible benefits of having U.S. forces stationed on Okinawa.”\textsuperscript{221} Giarra argues

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{216} Paul S. Giarra.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{221} Giuseppe A. Stavale, 31.
\end{itemize}
that “[t]hese bases have to be seen locally less as the problem and more as the solution, with respect, for example, to development plans and economic expansion.”

At the local level the reality is that,

[O]ver 12,000 Japanese nationals on Okinawa are employed on U.S. military bases, either funded by the Government of Japan or the United States government, or through non-appropriated funded (NAF) activities, such as Morale, Welfare, Recreation (MWR) and other similar organizations. For the most part, these are well-paying jobs with handsome benefits and are fiercely competed for by the local populace. There are many other tangible economic benefits that Okinawans do appreciate and enjoy which is a direct result of U.S. forces being stationed on Okinawa. It is estimated that the U.S. military presence injects about $1.4 billion into the Okinawan economy or at least 5 percent and as much as 10 percent of Okinawa’s Gross Prefectural Product (GPP).

Okinawans see the dark side of this presence more and more and request the reduction or even the termination of the bases on their island. The opinions aren’t however unanimous: "People living near the bases feel the most opposition," said Seizaburo Miyagi, a 65-year-old survivor of the war who spoke in his small tatami factory. 'Of course you will hear some people speak out against the Americans, but everyone doesn't feel that way.'

4. Arguments for Downsizing the U.S. Military Presence

In the past the American military presence in Japan had not suffered large fluctuations and “[a]s in Europe, in Japan the massive postwar American presence diminished only slowly. Any consideration of large-scale withdrawals ended with the onset of the Korean War and the militarization of Cold War containment.” Any fluctuation in this timeframe marked the developments driven by the confrontation between the world’s superpowers; it was the case of the Vietnam War when the

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222 Paul S. Giarra.
223 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 31.
225 Paul S. Giarra.
American presence in Japan decreased in the beginning as a follow up of massive deployments in supporting the war, and then increasing back due to the redeployments from the war.

A short look over the military presence in Japan will help in understanding the dynamics of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The analysis uses the data available in Figure 8 and specially deals with the period of the Vietnam War and early 2000.

![Figure 8. Number of facilities and acreage of the U.S. bases in Japan (1967-2001)](image)

As a first observation it may be noticed that the number of facilities and acreage of the U.S. bases in Japan decreased until 1972 due to the deployment of troops in the Vietnam War. Year 1972 has special significance for Okinawa, being the year when this part of Japan was reverted to Japanese administration. The process started “[i]n the late 1960s, [when] Japan’s support for U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam drew criticism from students, the media, and large segments of the population. This resulted in almost daily protests throughout Japan. In 1969, the Nixon administration responded to the protests by announcing the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty.” But the reversion

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226 Snapshot from Tatsuro Yoda, 170.

227 Keith W. Allen, 15.
process had its disadvantages for Okinawa, because “[t]he number of facilities and acreage increased after the jurisdiction of Okinawa returned from the U.S. to Japan in May 1972. The Japanese government provided a part of the land for U.S. bases after the return of jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{228}

From 1972 until the late 70s there was a reduction trend on the number of locations and use of the land by the American bases but “…reduction was due to consolidations of bases and returns of areas which were not critically important to the activities of the stationing forces.”\textsuperscript{229}

After this period the American presence diminished only slowly without spectacular changes until mid 1990s. This period is important because it marks the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November 1995.

There was also a major political advance on the reduction of U.S. bases in the mid 1990s. After the anti-U.S. bases protests spread in Okinawa in September 1995, the U.S. and Japan established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November, 1995. As a major item for reduction, the U.S. and Japan agreed in April 1996 that the U.S. would return the Futenma Air Station in Okinawa “within the next five to seven years.” The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) approved the SACO final report on the reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa in December 1996. According to the SACO final report, approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002 ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.\textsuperscript{230}

Even though there wasn’t too much progress made in putting the adopted decisions in practice, the establishment of SACO marked a new era in the presence of American troops in Japan. It proved that both countries were open to discussing the issue of the bases and to taking into account the public demands for reduction.

Although the U.S. and Japan agreed on the return of U.S. bases totaling in 5,002 ha (about 50 square kilometers), there was not much progress after the SCC in 1996. Among the 11 areas to be agreed to be returned, only the Aha Training Areas (480 ha), and part of the Camp Kuwae (38 ha) were already returned as of June 2004. The return of the Futenma Air Station

\textsuperscript{228} Tatsuro Yoda, 169.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid., 170.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 170-171.
deadlocked because of the opposition in Okinawa to the relocation plan accompanying the construction of a sea-based facility.\textsuperscript{231}

Even though the committee made the decision in December 1996 to return Futenma within the next five to seven years, at the term expiration in December 2003, the issue was still pending.

The creation of SACO also had another effect: while discussing the reduction it was difficult to bring up any further discussion about increasing the area for the bases in the future, taking into account the opposition of local government and people.

5. Okinawans’ Opposition to the Presence of American Bases

The Okinawans opposition to the presence of the American bases on their land has roots back in 1953 when, the “U.S. Civil Administration began land expropriations in support of the strengthening of the bases. The Okinawan resistance to the land requisitions was strong, igniting an "island-wide struggle" whose momentum continued to gather steam under the "Reversion Movement."\textsuperscript{232} Back in 1972 the decision made by the Japanese government in granting additional land for basing the American troops was part of a trade to reduce the bases on the mainland of Japan, which also hurt Okinawa’s feelings. The issue is that such decisions were made up side down without taking into account what Okinawans really wanted and want: “… 'I am worried that leaders like President Clinton will come to Okinawa and make a speech thanking Okinawans for accepting the military bases,' Mr. Tamaki [Yashikazu Tamaki, an Okinawan assemblyman] said. 'That would be like rubbing salt into the wounds of Okinawans, because the reality is, we don't want the bases.'”\textsuperscript{233}

The Tokyo administration began to realize, especially after 1995, the fact that the Japanese opposition grew stronger fed by the historical context and the events which

\textsuperscript{231} Tatsuro Yoda, 171.


marked people’s lives, as was the case “… on September 4, 1995, when three American servicemen abducted and raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa.”234

Gabe Masaaki observed that “[t]he intensity of the Okinawan outcry belatedly stirred the Japanese government into the realization that it could no longer hope to maintain U.S. bases in Okinawa against popular sentiment.”235 The protest against the American presence in Japan grew in intensity after the end of the Cold War and reached its zenith in 1995. After this year the Japanese society began to sympathize with Okinawans, and question the reasons of the American presence: “Demands for a withdrawal of U.S. bases, however, now also come from mainland Japan. ‘The bases are here for political reasons - to scare other countries in Asia,’ says Yoshiko Matsuda, a nun from Tokyo who came for the protest.”236

The echoes questioning their presence in Japan, and demanding the withdrawal of the troops, were heard from the other side of the Pacific as well: “All this would serve America's interests and return American forces to places where bases have been closed, such as Hawaii and California. And it would gain the support of the American public because it is a policy toward East Asia that is fiscally and morally defensible.”237

After 1995 a few of the American and Japanese analysts agreed on a necessary gradual downsizing. Terashima Jitsuro, in a more moderate manner, "…proposes that Japan consider a gradual scaling down of the U.S. military presence in Japan…”238 – while Michael O'Hanlon opined: “I believe that the United States should offer to fundamentally restructure its Marine Corps presence in Okinawa Prefecture.”239

234 Chalmers Johnson.
235 Gabe Masaaki.
237 Chalmers Johnson.
239 Michael O'Hanlon.
At the end it must be said that there is no full consensus between the Okinawans regarding the withdrawal of the bases from the island. There are at least two categories that are either silent or supporting the current situation: the workers employed with the bases and some of the landlords of the expropriated lands.

The first category “[w]ith their members' livelihoods at stake, the base employees' unions want the installations to remain, and they did not participate in major demonstrations against the United States in the fall of 1995.” \(^{240}\) And the second category, the landlords receiving rents, especially when their property has modest inherent value,

[o]wners of otherwise worthless land depend upon these payments, sometimes exclusively, and they do not want the land returned. Even when the property does have value, there is seldom consensus on its future use among the hundreds of landowners of large tracts. These resist return as well, since rent received is better than the certain impasse that would follow reversion. \(^{241}\)

At this point it should be added, for the sake of accuracy, that the opposition against the military bases has not reached an overwhelming majority in the polls back in 1995; “[a] non-binding, prefecture-wide referendum was held in Japan's Okinawa Prefecture on reviewing the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. Only 53% of those voting agreed with the referendum.” \(^{242}\)

E. OKINAWA’S DILEMMAS

1. Public Opinion in Okinawa

In Okinawa the public opinion is sensitive to events that happen around the military bases. Giuseppe A. Stavale caught this aspect very well in his thesis. The main argument that the author brings to attention is the so-called “connect-the-dots” experience, which affects Okinawans’ judgment. He defined this attitude as follows:

\(^{240}\) Paul S. Giarra.

\(^{241}\) Ibid.

... Okinawans will see [a] case as the latest in a long string of similar incidents and accidents, some of which, from the Okinawan perspective, had been brushed aside and gone unpunished by American officials acting in accordance with an antiquated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).243

A second argument brought to attention refers to the press attitude and role in influencing public opinion. As already argued in chapter 2 of this thesis mass media has an important role in influencing the public and creating an opinion, which most of the people will follow. The same author emphasized the following:

The Japanese media, particularly on Okinawa, warrant attention as they are likely to degrade the views towards U.S. forces. “The influence of the press on Japanese public opinion and also on political circles is substantial…”244 Professor Robert D. Eldridge of Osaka University recognized the tendency of the local media in Okinawa to report effectively from the “viewpoint of local residents, particularly under adverse conditions,” but added that constant reporting of only negative issues and no coverage of issues that would place U.S. forces “in a favorable light” open the Okinawan media to claims of being biased.245

Ilene R. Prusher sustained the same point of view, citing the words of “Kyunosuke Meguni, an Okinawan political analyst … ‘Most of the crimes in Okinawa are committed by native Okinawans. If a woman goes to the police to report an assault committed by a Japanese man, it will only make three lines in the newspaper.’”246

The opinion of John W Kingdon is very much applicable to the Okinawan society, which is very sensitive to any unusual event, or an official or changes of status related to the American bases:

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243 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 29.
245 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 40.
246 Ilene R. Prusher.
Problems are often not self-evident by the indicators. They need a little push to get the attention of people…. That push is sometimes provided by a focusing event like a crisis or disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem, a powerful symbol that catches on, or the personal experience of a policy maker.\textsuperscript{247}

The following Figures 9\textsuperscript{248} and 10\textsuperscript{249} will help in drawing some conclusions.

![Graph showing number of newspaper articles on anti-American sentiment in Japan (1985-2002)](image)

Figure 9. Number of newspaper articles on anti-American sentiment in Japan (1985-2002)

As noted, in Figure 9, which presents the dynamic of the number of anti-American articles in the Japanese press between 1985 and 2002, there are few peaks. The first one in the 1990s is directly linked to the Gulf War and represents the receptivity of the society to this worldwide event. The anti-Americanism has a direct correlation to the anti-war sentiments of the society. The second peak in 1995 is an immediate consequence of the rape of a schoolgirl by three U. S. servicemen. The same anti-American sentiment associated with an anti-war reaction may be observed in 2001 when Operation Enduring Freedom was initiated.


\textsuperscript{248} Snapshot from Tatsuro Yoda, 135.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid, 79.
Figure 10 shows the number of newspaper articles written on the HNS in the Japanese mass media between 1984 and 2002. It is easy to observe that interest is much higher in 1987, 1988, 1990, 1995, and 2002, the exact years that the SMAs had been discussed and approved in the Japanese Diet (the Japanese legislature). This second diagram adds more proof to the fact that Japanese public opinion is event-driven. On the other hand, the more attention the press pays to an issue directly linked to the American military bases or security treaty, the more the attention of the public-at-large on that specific issue grows.

Figure 10. Number of newspaper articles on Host Nation Support (Asahi newspaper, 1984/1-2002/6)

The subjective way that the press presents that issue induces a specific understanding or related sentiments. Giuseppe A. Stavale offers a good example in his thesis:

Okinawans and mainland Japanese alike are not familiar with the details of the SOFA and are thereby prejudiced against U.S. military presence when they hear or read pejorative details such as the “refusal” of U.S.
military authorities to transfer custody of a suspect without reporting the context of the refusal or the procedure agreed to in the SOFA.250

Up to this point, this subchapter has presented the way Okinawans perceived and dealt with the problematic issue of the American military presence on their island. Despite the fact that there were misunderstandings and exaggerations along time, there are still problems that affect the civilians and the normal activity around the American bases, and they cannot be overlooked. In the following section, this author will try to survey the multitude of events and incidents that normally occur in any military activity. He will try to present the most significant ones that left a deep trace in people’s conscience or influenced the Okinawan sentiment towards the American personnel.

2. Okinawan Community’s Concerns and Problems

Vincent Kelly Pollard synthetically presented the problems Okinawans faced:

… the history of the U.S. military in Okinawa is one of expropriated agricultural lands; crashes and near collisions of jets and Osprey helicopters; danger from munitions during live-fire exercises; sexual assault; theft; noise pollution near schools; and threats to endangered species of coral, fish, birds, and other animals.251

This excerpt summarizes in just a few words over 60 years of American military presence’s history, revealing the social and environmental problems that occurred during this period.

There is a long list of authors and articles that are treating this subject. In the following pages those, which are most representative, are presented.

Thom Shanker, talking about the social problems, wrote:

The governor of Okinawa petitioned Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld … to reduce or relocate American military bases on this strategic Japanese island, and urged removing large numbers of American marines to reduce crime here. The Okinawa petition contends that 5,157

250 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 41.
crimes were committed between 1972 and last December [2002] by American troops, the Pentagon's civilian employees working here or their dependents. Of those, 533 were "heinous crimes such as murder, robbery and sexual assault," the Okinawa government said.252

Ilene R. Prusher, talking about Okinawans’ feelings towards the American troopers explained, “…that many here don't think that thousands of young U.S. soldiers make good neighbors. The local grievance list is long, including environmental pollution, a high crime rate, and a longing for the return of lush hilltops and beachfront property that are taken up by the bases, which cover 10 percent of the Okinawan land.”253

“Yes, Okinawa, more than elsewhere, in addition to occupying existing bases U.S. forces constructed extensive facilities on property expropriated from local landowners.”254

Some of the authors are of the opinion (as previously presented under pros for the presence of the bases) that there are people in Okinawa who are “happy” to receive rents for their expropriated lands, yet there some others who would like to have their land back:

Though Mr. Tzukiyama and some 3,000 others here receive government compensation for territory that was confiscated for the bases, he says they'd rather have their land back. "We have to rent the land we live on, and my house is too small," says Tzukiyama, holding his nine- year-old son's hand. When he was that age, he says, American troops raped a schoolgirl he knew.255

Special attention has been paid in the literature to the rape case that happened in the fall of 1995. The incident triggered a huge wave of protest and was the trigger for the establishing of SACO in November 1995. As a second consequence the Okinawans started to ask for the revision of SOFA, which in their opinion allowed felons who committed such crimes to escape unpunished: “The size of the demonstration in October

253 Ilene R. Prusher.
254 Paul S. Giarra.
255 Ilene R. Prusher.
1995, to protest the incident and to ask the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement was the largest in Okinawa, 85 thousands, after the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972.\textsuperscript{256}

The size and intensity of protests made analysts attribute global valence to this event, as Chalmers Johnson did:

The Cold War in Europe ended in 1989 when the people of Berlin defied their overlords and began to dismantle the wall that divided their city. The Cold War in East Asia began to end six years later, on September 4, 1995, when three American servicemen abducted and raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa.\textsuperscript{257}

Referring to this kind of crime, “Japanese and Western historians have said that in the aftermath of World War II, American troops raped thousands of Okinawan women without reprisals. The historians said that while hundreds of rape cases have been documented, most have gone unreported of fear for retaliation and shame.”\textsuperscript{258} Even more so, there were people who saw the sexual crimes in Okinawa as occupying the first place in the crime’s hierarchy; “Zenko Nakamura, 53, an activist who is fighting the relocation of an American Marine base, said, "I'm disappointed that the president [Clinton] didn't mention what Okinawans care most about -- sexual crimes committed by American servicemen.”\textsuperscript{259}

For a certain segment of the population, the way the Americans behaved or made their presence acknowledged, played an important role in defining their position or better said opposition: “[s]till, for many Okinawans, reservations about the American bases come down to their seeming domination of the landscape and the nuisances that creates:

\textsuperscript{256} Tatsuro Yoda, 136.
\textsuperscript{257} Chalmers Johnson.
the thudding clatter of helicopter blades, the roar of jets taking off and landing, and the lumbering trucks that aggravate the traffic congestion here."²⁶⁰

Not as a direct consequence but probably influenced by the presence of the bases, "[t]he island also has its share of social problems. Okinawa's unemployment rate is twice the national average. It has Japan's lowest household savings rate and lowest per-capita income, and highest teenage pregnancy and divorce rates."²⁶¹

To all these issues the miscommunications or wrong signals sent by officials may crucially influence the public opinion and make decisions for the “undecided people”:

In the midst of all this bad news, the Marine commander for Japan, Lt. Gen. Earl Hailston, inadvertently stoked local anger when an e-mail message to his officers was leaked and published in a local newspaper. It denounced Okinawan political leaders who "falsely claim to be our friends," calling them nuts, "and a bunch of wimps." For Gov. Keiichi Inamine, a conservative politician who has long been considered a supporter of the United States presence in Okinawa, General Hailston's remark was the last straw.²⁶²

But the problems of Okinawans are not only about social and environmental issues; they are present also in the economic area.

Until 1972, the year of reversion to Japan’s administration, the Okinawan economy revealed a fragile economic structure, which was very much influenced by and dependent on the revenues directly linked to the bases activities. “This structure was artificially inflated after the war as a result of construction for the U.S. military bases in anticipation of an extended U.S. presence in Okinawa. In essence, Okinawa became an import economy dependent upon the U.S. military presence.”²⁶³ Okinawa became an

²⁶² Ibid.
²⁶³ Paul S. Giarra.
instrument in Tokyo administration’s hands for making money, a source of foreign revenues from the U.S. expenses necessary for constructing, maintaining and sustaining its military bases.

After reversion, “…the Japanese government formulated an economic development program for Okinawa under the slogan of – ‘Construction of a Peaceful and Cheerful Okinawa.’ The 10-year program-currently the third-was intended to raise the prefecture's per capita income, then slightly less than 60 percent of the national average, and to restructure the prefecture’s economic base to encourage expansion of local manufacturing capabilities.”264 This modus operandi had its benefits in the beginning; “That money has helped improve infrastructure and educational, medical and other welfare facilities. But, instead of encouraging a self-sustaining industrial sector, it has made Okinawa's economy heavily reliant on public works subsidies.”265 As a direct consequence, “…the prefecture has depended upon capital investment from the central government. [and over the years] Okinawa has almost no significant manufacturing industry, while its service sector, largely dependent upon sales of imported goods, and its construction industry, which depends upon public works projects, are disproportionately overblown.”266

Very often, local officials blamed the U.S. military presence of being the source of all their problems: “In his petition to Mr. Rumsfeld, the Okinawa governor wrote that ‘incidents and accidents caused by U.S. military personnel, and environmental problems stemming from the bases, have created enormous impact on people's lives, while the facilities became the outstanding hindrance to urban development and economic promotion.”267

The tourism in Okinawa was not very well developed, because of the island’s exposure to hurricanes, but it was still part of the local economy. After 9-11, the

264 Paul S. Giarra.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 Thom Shanker.
Okinawans were concerned about a reduction of their profits from tourism, due to the fact that this activity was “vulnerable due to the fear of terrorism directed at the U.S. military bases.”


As already presented under the previous section of this thesis, the incidents and accidents caused by the Americans and their activity related to the bases have generated calls for the reduction of the burden on Okinawa and the revision of the SOFA. A very good reference on the subject is the thesis of Keith W. Allen a former NPS student:

Several air accidents have killed Okinawans and several prominent crimes by U.S. service members, including the 1995 and 2001 rapes of Japanese citizens, have inflamed the calls for decreasing the U.S. military burden on Japan and a reform of the Status of Forces Agreement to allow Japanese prosecution of any military member accused of a crime against a Japanese national.

Okinawans were particularly concerned on the retention, custody, and handling of the suspects involved in the incidents because “Okinawans will see the case as the latest in a long string of similar incidents and accidents, some of which, from the Okinawan perspective, had been brushed aside and gone unpunished by American officials acting in accordance with an antiquated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).”

According to Miyagi Etsujirō, after the rape in September 1995

Okinawans are particularly critical of Article 17, Clause 5(c) of SOFA, which concerns the custody of American suspects. Japan has jurisdiction, but if suspects are in the hands of U.S. authorities, they remain with them until indicted by Japanese authorities. Okinawans argue that all suspects over whom Japan has jurisdiction should be handed over to Japanese authorities on arrest to expedite investigation and to place suspects under restraint as stipulated by Japanese law. In the past, three American suspects, while in custody on a U.S. base, fled to the United States, where

268 Thom Shanker.
269 Keith W. Allen, 22.
270 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 29.
they were arrested months later. This raised Japanese suspicion that pretrial custody on base may be too loose.\textsuperscript{271}

After the 1995 protests caused by the rape incident, “U.S. authorities agreed to transfer the custody of individuals suspected of having committed heinous crimes, such as murder and rape, prior to indictment by Japanese courts, called ‘sympathetic consideration.’”\textsuperscript{272} Both the Japanese and U.S. authorities agreed to revise the SOFA and the way it was implemented. Unfortunately, due to the differences on the concerned parties’ views, and to the dissimilar perceptions regarding the scope and the way of revising this document, this is still a pending issue and too little has been accomplished.

Related to the SOFA reformation, other complaints of Okinawans refer to the U.S. authorities’ immixture in the sovereignty of Japan. A good example is “…the crash of a Marine Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter on August 13, 2004 and the subsequent handling of the crash scene. Again, OPG [Okinawa Prefectural Government] officials and the media criticized the U.S. military for its handling of the incident and accused the U.S. side of infringing on the sovereignty of Japan by not allowing Japanese authorities to examine the wreckage, which was on Japanese territory.”\textsuperscript{273}

The conflict has been fueled in the past by the way the Okinawans’ complaints were treated and the way the answers were submitted back to the complainers.

These bureaucratic responses were perceived as the standard and stagnant party line attached to lofty ideas that hold no significant meaning to the common Okinawan. As a result, some Okinawans felt that their complaints were not taken seriously. Today, many Okinawans still feel that their complaints are not taken seriously, which may contribute to consternation among a larger segment of the Okinawan community when another incident or accident occurs, no matter how significant or whether real or invented.\textsuperscript{274}


\textsuperscript{272} Giuseppe A. Stavale, 41.

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., 33.
F. MEANS OF POLICY TO IMPROVE THE HOST NATION/STATIONED FORCES RELATIONSHIP

From studying the available literature on the Okinawa case six main possible ways were identified for improving the bilateral U.S.-Japan relations on the security alliance, the image of the American military presence in Okinawa, and the relations with the local authorities and the civil society.

- A better promotion of the political, military strategic, and zonal security importance of the bases;
- Gradual reduction of the American presence;
- A stronger cooperation with the Japanese Self-Defense Force;
- Positive contribution to the local economic development;
- Promotion of a “good neighbor” policy and improvement of communication with the local community;
- Improvement of the U.S. personnel policy and cultural awareness.

1. A Better Promotion of the Political, Military Strategic, and Zonal Security Importance of the Bases

The key for continuing an effective American military presence in Okinawa (and Japan) is a successful reconciliation process between Tokyo’s central authorities and Okinawa’s local administration. As long as there is friction between the decisions taken in Tokyo and the local administration’ willingness to implement them, the presence of the American troops will be undesirable, and the local societal resistance will continue to increase.

The fact that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is in benefit of both countries must become a central theme on both governments’ political agenda. The public should know and be convinced on the fact that this alliance “…concurs on the threats to the national interests of both nations and that a strong security alliance must be maintained to guard against those threats and maintain stability in East Asia.”275 During the years the

275 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 77.
American presence in Japan has been a successful political and military tool in deterring any aggression against Japan, and that is a fact that nobody can deny. But if the public in Japan does not perceive the fact that those bases are directly indispensable, and important for its own national security, the degradation process of the bilateral relationship will continue.

As already implied in this thesis the Japanese public is very sensitive and sympathetic to the mass media, so a better understanding, by the ordinary people through a sustained media campaign, of the bases’ functions and attributes will help in perceiving the reality and reduce the tensions. “Furthermore, few civilians can appreciate the importance or extent of military contingency plans. Bases in Okinawa, which may seem under-utilized on a normal day, in a crisis would overflow with troops, equipment, and materiel.”\textsuperscript{276} In the same context of better informing the civilian society “[c]risis and wartime roles for bases will have to be explained more fully to the public, to the prefectural government, and to the government of Japan.”\textsuperscript{277}

2. **Gradual Reduction of the American Presence**

Some of the political analysts are of the opinion that a reduction of the troops from Okinawa is possible and must occur in the future. But this process should take place only on the basis of a premeditated plan based on reality and necessities. Okinawa’s case is very important and should receive close attention, since the “Okinawan base issue in particular is a bellwether of the future of American presence in East Asia and the western Pacific. The base ‘footprint’ in Okinawa can and should be further reduced, in a carefully constrained and deliberate process.”\textsuperscript{278} An ongoing reduction process may diminish the resistance of the population and help to win “the hearts and minds,” and at the same time, a fundamentally different way of perceiving the presence of the bases may change the political climate in the near future.

\textsuperscript{276} Paul S. Giarra.
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
There are opinions that are skeptical regarding the benefits of the reduction vice a complete withdrawal: “Some observers, Japanese and American, insist that the fewer Marines on Okinawa the better. Modernization and technological advances may promote the trend toward fewer troops in any given unit, but fewer Americans does not necessarily equate to a better environment.”\textsuperscript{279} In the possibility of a future desire of keeping the bases, modernization and use of the new technologies may allow a continued reduction without harming the operational capabilities, but to a certain point; in running and keeping control of such capabilities, when they are not completely removed, the human element is strictly necessary and central; it can not be completely replaced.

3. A Stronger Cooperation with the Japanese Self-Defense Force

The integration of the bases with the Japanese Self-Defense Force, and physically stationing the Japanese units “…in what are now exclusively American enclaves…”\textsuperscript{280} would generate many advantages; “…it would positively affect bilateral interoperability and the effectiveness of the alliance. More importantly, it would reverse the tendency of Self-Defense officers and Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) officials to dismiss issues surrounding United States installations as exclusively American problems.”\textsuperscript{281}

Related to the same issue, in his thesis, Stavale brings a few strong points to attention:

In coordination with the United States, discussion should be initiated for establishing training detachments as tenant commands on U.S. bases in Japan. Having Japanese units on U.S. bases in Japan may help by putting more of a Japanese face onto the installation and assist the JSDF by providing them with better facilities. This creates the opportunity to make a Japanese officer the Deputy Camp Commander of U.S. installations and even use Japanese resources and troops to assist in force protection. Colonel Yamaoka believes that this should be pursued and stated that Japanese officers could act as a buffer between local community concerns and U.S. military officials.\textsuperscript{282}

\textsuperscript{279} Paul S. Giarra.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{282} Giuseppe A. Stavale, 94.
The integration of the JSDF seems to be a good option for the Americans and their Japanese counterpart, making such alternative profitable for both parties. A closer cooperation may be the vehicle for a future zonal Asia-Pacific cooperation as Keith W. Allen, a former NPS student suggests in his thesis, “…the U.S.-Japan Alliance could serve as the foundation of a multilateral security regime in Asia that would include the United States, Japan, the PRC, South Korea, Australia, and the ASEAN states.”

4. Positive Contribution to the Local Economic Development

For a better perception of the American presence in Okinawa, the point of bases’ contribution to the local economic development must be made clear. A better promotion of the size of the contribution and what it means at the local level would certainly improve the public’s perception.

The number of working opportunities and the level of employment with the American bases are figures that count in the surroundings of the bases, and as previously shown in this thesis, there are people who care about this and have positive feelings. Their influence in the local opinion should be cultivated and enforced by other means as a better representation of the American position in the local press. In Okinawa the number of locals employed with the bases (as part of the HNS) is quite impressive: “[a]s of March 2004, GOJ employed 8,813 Japanese nationals as base employees throughout all U.S. military bases on Okinawa.”

Another opportunity for contributing to the economic development was the fact that American bases transformed some military billets (which could be performed by the local workers) into civilian jobs fully subsidized by them. “Since 2001, the Marine Corps has provided an additional 357 full-time positions as bus drivers and cooks in support of Marines on Okinawa.”

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283 Keith W. Allen, 8.
284 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 90.
285 Ibid.
Some of the measures for contributing to the general effort came from the Japanese central authorities. The adoption of Okinawa Promotional Special Measures Law, in 2002, made possible the establishment of the Okinawa Special Free Trade Zone, which is the only one free trade zone in Japan. The reason for this free trade zone establishment was “…to encourage business enterprises to establish facilities in Okinawa and promote trade.”

According to the 2002 declaration of Governor of Okinawa Prefecture,

The location that offers the most advantages as a site for trade and commerce industries is the Nakagusuku Bay Port Development District Special Free Trade Zone, the only free trade zone in Japan. Enterprises setting up operations in this district are supported through generous incentives such as a 35% corporate income tax exemption and youth employment development subsidies.

5. Promotion of a “Good Neighbor” Policy and Improved Communication with the Local Community

In treating this subject this part heavily relies on the personal experience of Mr. Stavale, and his conclusions as a military policeman, acknowledged in his thesis at NPS. Back in 2004 he was of the opinion that a large responsibility on improving the relation between the U.S. military personnel and local community in Okinawa resided with the U.S. Department of State (DOS), which had to continue its efforts, “…outside ordinary diplomatic dialogue to implement programs or take actions which could strengthen the security alliance and facilitate understanding between the U.S. military and local communities or, to counter biased and inflammatory media coverage has been mild.”

The efforts to improve the communication and local image of the bases should not be addressed only in English, which actually keeps informed the military personnel, the small American community, and few of the local English speakers. “There are many outlets on U.S. military bases to keep English speaking people informed; however, the


\[287\] Ibid., 1.

\[288\] Giuseppe A. Stavale, 113.
surrounding communities of U.S. military bases in Japan are dependent on their local media sources, which are more often biased against the U.S. military and do not offer the whole story or counter-balancing stories to issues and events.”

Under these circumstances Stavale presented a few countermeasures that seemed viable for improving not only the communication but also the level of knowledge of the locals, and intrinsically the image of the Americans:

- Make base newspapers bilingual in order to keep Japanese base employees and their families informed;
- Make all U.S. military websites in Japan bilingual;
- Consider having a Japanese speaking announcer on the Okinawa-based Armed Forces Network;
- Establish an international school, [and granting access to the locals];
- Provide native English speakers to aide the Japanese teachers in teaching English;
- English teaching program in schools and the prospects for expansion, volunteerism at orphanages, and beach clean-ups.

These small steps together may have a big impact from the micro to macro level in improving not only the local image but also the bilateral relations at the security treaty level:

… U.S. forces in Japan must be considered in strategic terms but smaller ways towards becoming better neighbors, through localized efforts, should not be dismissed as insignificant contributions to the overall maintenance of the alliance. In order to be better understood and accepted among the communities in Japan, U.S. forces must re-think their actual presence and weight them against the impact and sensitivities of their host nation neighbors.

Another point, which was raised by Mr. Stavale, referred to the improvement of informing the local community about the activities performed by the military, standards, and safety rules. An example of a successful handling of a situation was the incident “…of an alleged .50-caliber machine-gun round fired from a U.S. Marine Corps range (range 10, in the Central Training Area) and landing in a farmer’s pineapple field in

289 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 90.
290 Ibid., 77.
northern Okinawa in June 2002.” This incident caused complaints from the local community regarding the hazards of firing live ammunition. Interesting was the way that this incident was handled by the U.S. military authorities:

This prompted Marine Corps officials to host a briefing and demonstration of the safety measures taken by the Marine Corps for Okinawan community leaders and investigators in order to ease their safety concerns posed by conducting live-fire on the training ranges. The investigation concluded that there were “no witnesses nor scientific evidence to prove that it was a stray round from [Marine Corps] ranges,” and leaving many officials, both American and Japanese, to believe that the .50-caliber machine-gun round was very old and perhaps a war remnant.

The conclusion here is that through an open dialog many problems may either be avoided or explained to the local community.

Another aspect refers to the passing rights of the civilian through the military bases, when this fact simplifies aspects of the normal life, like shorting the way to school. The example of the German experience from Berlin is self-explanatory: “[a]nother Shimada Commission [chartered in 1996 by the former Prime Minister Hoshimoto] proposal would be to permit students on their way to school to transit base facilities. Even the Soviets in Berlin allowed Americans such privileges.”

These are just a few examples of what can be done with just little efforts.

6. Improvement of the U.S. Personnel Policy and Cultural Awareness

In many cases the objective conditions generate problems. But still there are subjective conditions that are responsible for the remaining part. On this side, the human factor plays an important role. The way people are trained and educated and the way the U.S. military conducts its policy of personnel are factors that play an important role in Okinawa.

291 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 32.
292 Ibid., 32-33.
293 Paul S. Giarra.
The first issue is the lack of continuity at both soldiers’ level and at the command level. At the soldiers level “…appears to be the short amount of time many U.S. service members serve on Okinawa and in mainland Japan. This is particularly true for the Marine Corps, which deploys units from the United States to Okinawa on six-month cycles under the unit deployment program (UDP).”294 The author argued that a six-month period is too short for the servicemen to get in contact with the local community and be aware of the local customs. In this case they fail to be “good neighbors.”

In regard to the command level the same author explained:

The lack of continuity is also prevalent among senior military personnel. Due to the very nature of high operational tempo and needs of the individual services, personnel frequently rotate billets and are unable to foster mature, professional relationships with local officials. Furthermore, constant rotation of billets effectively handicaps the ability to create the in-depth knowledge and expertise required to handle delicate issues rooted in deep historical context and perpetuates the perception that the U.S. military lacks consideration for the interests of the local populace. This perception undermines gestures of goodwill and attempts to be a good neighbor by the U.S. military.295

A good example of remedying this situation was the decision taken by the Marine Corps to apply, starting with 2004, the DoD’s standards “…for permanent change of station (PCS) assignments to Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan, which are 36-month tours for those accompanied by family members and 24-month tours for those who are not accompanied by family members.”296 The author adds:

[this]new policy aimed at sustaining operational readiness but carried the by-product of creating an environment where Marines had the time to get to know the community they live in and become a more responsible member of that community. Specifically, the policy was changed to create greater continuity, unit stability and individual maturity, cultural knowledge and familiarity with local and regional military forces, governments and private citizens, and to improve knowledge of continuing operational requirements.”297

294 Giuseppe A. Stavale, 30.
295 Ibid., 31.
296 Ibid., 89.
297 Ibid., 88.
Another pertinent observation was that “the common denominator in crime and incidents involving U.S. service members on Okinawa is intoxication and underage consumption of alcohol.”\textsuperscript{298} In making this observation the author relied on his former experience: “Through my observations and experience as a military policeman, there are higher occurrences of incidents involving younger (18-20 year old) male, service members who are stationed on Okinawa without their families and for less than a year.”\textsuperscript{299} Taking into account those statements it would be wise for the U.S. military to revise its alcohol consumption policy. It is true that it may restrain some of the individual rights, but on the other hand may avoid many problems. Another possibility might be to limit the places where the American servicemen may go. It has two advantages; first it would be easier for the military policy to keep under control a limited number of locations, and secondly would avoid troubles for military personnel entering a “wrong neighborhood.”

Special attention should be paid to the cultural training and building up of the cultural awareness to the new comers. Being aware of the local norms, habits, rules, and customs may have the advantage of avoiding a lot of misunderstandings, mistakes or even conflicts between the American military personnel and locals. As Stavale observed, problems may have had roots because the “…cultural training of Marines reporting for duty on Okinawa may be flawed.”\textsuperscript{300} It might have envisaged the amount of training, the thematic, the time when this was performed (in the accommodation period, when the new incomers had jet-lag, and their attention was diminished), the professionalism of the trainers, etc. It is true that there will always be room for improvement, but paying greater attention paid to this “small” issue may save a lot of time, manpower, and tension afterwards.

\textsuperscript{298} Giuseppe A. Stavale, 37.
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid., 88.
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid., 92.
G. SUMMARY

The U.S.-Japan security alliance is a one of the few modern security and defense alliances that lasted more than 60 years; therefore, the general conclusions as well as the particularities in both civil and military relations, help in drawing valuable conclusions and lessons learned for Romania’s case or even those of other nations who host U.S. forces in the 21st century. The analysis of the legal framework of the American military’s presence in Japan, and the new developments intending the revision of those documents (including SOFA) are valuable grounds for further interpretation of future trends, which may occur someday in similar alliances. Asymmetrical aspects, which in the Japanese case are dictated by the constitutional constraints dictated by the provisions of Article 9, can play a significant role in generating contradictions of policy, strategy, society and economy. In Japan’s case, the need for revision of its constitution regarding its national security triggers necessary modifications in any other related official documents, including the bilateral agreements.

The changes in the geo-strategic situation and the system of states may trigger a redefining of any security arrangements. The need for rethinking of the U.S.-Japan security alliance after the end of the Cold War has been living proof of such circumstances. This need may also take place in the realm of change of the external policy or identification of other internal or external political priorities. The new Japan’s reorientation of its policy on gaining its rightful place in the world’s hierarchy, completed by its struggle to become “a normal nation” is evidence of such a conclusion. Part of this process which extends the timeline— the affirmation of the Japanese SDF— may play a significant role. The latest new missions assumed by SDF (UN peacekeeping, counter-piracy operations, and support for the U.S. War on Terror) may lay the necessary ground for improving cooperation with U.S. troops. In Japan’s case an improved cooperation seems to be a valuable solution for resolving some of the actual problems. Moreover extension of this cooperation to a multilateral level may solve part of the zonal security problems and increase mutual trust with countries like China, North Korea, Russia, etc.
The U.S.-Japan security alliance is an important tool for both countries. Beyond serving the U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific area, it currently satisfies the security needs of Japan. In this context it is in the interest of both countries to be more politically implicated in finding viable solutions for developing this alliance.

The Okinawans’ resistance to the presence of the American troops has historical, political, economic, and social roots. The discriminatory treatment this part of Japan received from Tokyo’s central political power added to some particular conditions has generated first local-- and than more and more national disagreement. The central theme of this opposition is the 1953 and then the 1972 land expropriations in support of the strengthening of the bases in Okinawa, imposed first by the U.S. Civil Administration and later by the Japanese government. The large presence of the American troops in Okinawa generates unhappy sentiments as Okinawans see themselves as a Japanese colony leased to the United States, or that Japan has solved the problem of hosting American bases by putting this burden on their shoulders.

The problems generated by the American servicemen, or by the activities occurring inside or around the bases, cover almost the entire spectrum. Some of the problems are due to subjective conditions and others are due to objective conditions; however, all of them are seen by the locals as a so-called “connect-the-dots” experience, which affects Okinawans’ judgment in a negative way. The collective judgment is that each incident is a long sequence of similar incidents, which will never stop. The Japanese society is sensitive to events that happen around the military bases and is heavily influenced by the subjective and often slanted way the press presents them. Being sympathetic to the mass media induces a more fully objective understanding of the incidents and how they relate to the public.

Establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November 1995 proved that both countries were open to discussing the issue of the bases and to taking into account the public demands for reduction. The creation of SACO has had another effect: the fact that while discussing the reduction it was difficult to bring up any further discussion about increasing the area for the bases in the future, without taking into account the opposition of local government and people.
Japan’s financial contribution through the HNS is the largest among all the U.S. allies. However, the U.S. defensive umbrella has enabled Japan to limit its defense burden to 1% of the GNP since 1976. Mainly the HNS covers the salaries for the Japanese civilian workers employed by the U.S. military bases (“Omoiyari Yosan”) and costs such as utilities expenses. The HNS is negotiated every 5 years and concluded by adopting a special agreement through the so-called Special Measures Agreement. The next term is in 2008, and according to the facts presented in this chapter it might be that the anti-American movements will rise again.

The economy of Okinawa is closely related to and influenced by its military bases. While on one hand there are certain benefits, on the other hand there are certain troubles generated by their presence. As benefits there may be listed the relatively high numbers of local employees with the bases, the rents paid to the landlords, construction industry, contracted services, etc. Many difficulties were generated by a wrong economic policy adopted by Tokyo: the development program for Okinawa had as a consequence Okinawa’s dependence upon capital investment from the central government and made Okinawa's economy heavily reliant on public works subsidies. The contracting method practiced by the bases inadvertently resulted in the fact that Okinawa has almost no significant manufacturing industry, while its service sector, largely dependent upon sales of imported goods, and its construction industry, which depends upon public works projects, are disproportionately overblown.

The events of September 11 have generated fears about a reduction of Okinawan tourism profits. Local nationals fear becoming a target of terrorists because of their close proximity to U.S. military bases.

Particular concerns are expressed by Okinawans regarding the SOFA and the legal status of the American troops in Okinawa. Okinawans are particularly concerned about the retention, custody, and handling of the American suspects involved in the incidents and accidents because in the past some of the suspects “had been brushed aside and gone unpunished by American officials acting in accordance with an antiquated SOFA.” After the 1995 protests, a partial solution to this situation was the “sympathetic
consideration” through which the “U.S. agreed to transfer the custody of individuals suspected of having committed heinous crimes, such as murder and rape, prior to indictment by Japanese courts.”

Another concern of the Japanese public is related to the U.S. authorities’ immixture in the sovereignty of Japan, invoking the way that official investigation of accidents was conducted.

Some of the problem has been the way the answer to the locals’ complaints was handled by the American officials, and the bureaucratic responses by the Americans complicated the situation so as to be hardly understood by the common people. The feeling was that they were not taken seriously.

An aggravator of this status was the fact that in some cases there were miscommunications or wrong signals sent by officials.

The ways of improvement presented in the last part of this chapter, may constitute useful tools for improving the circumstances, not only for a U.S-Japan security alliance, but also for similar partnerships.

‘The U.S.-Japan security alliance is one of the few alliances, which lasted more than 50 years...’301 (concluded Tatsuro Yoda in his dissertation at the Pardee RAND Graduate School), and it would be a pity that such a viable bilateral relationship should be harmed by such issues of policy and diplomacy that statesmen and soldiers can well avoid or ameliorate with due reflection, tact and intelligence.

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301 Tatsuro Yoda, 48.
IV. THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY AND THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

The role of American military forces there [Germany] has evolved considerably over the decades -- from occupying a defeated enemy to deterring Warsaw Pact aggression to symbolizing Washington's post-cold-war commitment to remain militarily engaged in Europe. Along the way, the size of the American presence has evolved as well. In the nearly 15 years since the Berlin Wall fell, United States force levels in Germany have dropped by roughly 75 percent. Further reductions should not be ruled out. But the Pentagon's current plans are unduly drastic, unfortunately timed and suspiciously motivated.302

The New York Times

A. INTRODUCTION

The history of the American military presence in Germany has been very much linked with the history of NATO. Such has unfolded through years of the Alliance’s development, the struggle for the defence of the Western free world, crises which affected the course of events, and interactions between the allies. The relations between the U.S. and Germany after WW II evolved from one of hostility to that of alliance in semi sovereignty and then to sovereignty, influenced by the other European countries’ actions and their economic and political interests over more than forty years. The context of such a relation was not placed under a military dimension only but also under a strategic, security and political framework. The fate of West Germany was central to the

cold war and the U.S. presence in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the U.S.’ political influence was a vital part of this strategic reality.303

Since the end of WWII when the tension between the collective security aspirations and those of the collective defence defined the “transatlantic bargain” or “…how to engage in a long-term commitment from the United States for the security of Western Europe,”304 NATO has undergone different periods in trying to identify and achieve long-lasting peace. From 1945 until 1948, the Atlantic policy hanged from the liberation of Europe to its defense against the Soviet Union. The NATO allies went from occupiers to the architects of western defense in the nuclear age and the integration of the FRG into the alliance. In the aftermath of WW II the government of the United States clearly made the point that European security and its economic recovery, as an important feature of defence, vitally affected the security of Americans who in another generation had turned their backs on Europe. In this way the point was made crystal clear that “…the security of North America, Europe, and the free world were inseparably bound.”305 In the early post war period “…the Marshall Plan and the Vandenberg Resolution, paved the way for a U.S. political and military commitment to defend Western Europe.”306 The U.S. and its Western partners expressed that “deterrence and containment, rather than reassurance and engagement, would be the preferred means of dealing with the potential Soviet adversary.”307


305 Ibid., 13.

306 Ibid., 14.

307 Ibid., 20.
According to Stanley Hoffmann, a leading U.S. scholar of France and trans-Atlantic relations in the 20th century, there are three distinct phases prior to 1989 in the history of Germany interlocked with the Western Europeans:

The first phase lasted from about 1947 to the mid fifties:

It saw the consolidation of two blocs in the two halves of Europe, and that included the communization of the East. It was the phase during which West Germany made what was not at all a preordained choice: to achieve the rehabilitation of Germany through belonging to the West, rather than to put reunification first. This was also the period in which Western European integration, starting first with six countries, was begun – largely as a way of overcoming the old Franco-German antagonism. And there was a very carefully preserved ambiguity about where this Western European experiment of six countries would go in the long run. It started as a kind of pragmatic, functional federalism. Western Europe was rather preoccupied with itself, more than with the outside world.308

The second phase, or the phase of the clashes between different plans, lasted from the mid fifties throughout the early seventies:

There was the Atlantic design of the United States, and particularly of John F. Kennedy, who favored a federal integration of Western Europe, but only as long as it was within an Atlantic framework in which the United States would essentially set the directions for Europe in foreign policy and defense. This design was, of course, based on the assumption that a division of Europe would persist. Against this there was a Gaullist design, which clashed with Kennedy’s at every juncture. The General was hostile to any kind of federalism for Western Europe because he thought that this would primarily serve American interests.309

The last phase, the third one,

... the longest, which lasted throughout the seventies and much of the eighties, had two main features. One was that Atlanticism continued; to parody a Bushian expression of last year, we could call it Atlanticism-plus. It was an Atlanticism that was less confrontational than before, since there was now a détente with the Soviet Union, but that still was based on the assumption of a continuing division of the continent. Indeed, the West

309 Ibid.
Germans explicitly acknowledged that division in the deals they made with the Soviets in the early seventies. An acute crisis over the deployment of American missiles in Europe in the early eighties, in fact, made this Atlantic perspective more confrontational again.\(^\text{310}\)

After this period, the end of the Cold War definitely marked by the Malta summit in December 1989, and by the emblematic fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, began a new period within NATO’s reform of collective defence and security by defining the new areas of partnership and enlargement as working tools opposed to the idea that the end of the Soviet-American antagonism would mark the end of NATO. This is the period of the political confrontations in Europe, which brought Germany at centre stage and rethinking of the geographic location of American troops around the world.

This timeline of the American presence not only in Germany, but also in Europe, as proposed by Hoffman seems to be convenient for a structural approach because it reveals the most important intervals.

Before coping with this however, a retrospective of American military bases and presence in the Federal Republic of Germany after WW II will set the background for discussions.

**B. THE AMERICAN MILITARY BASES IN GERMANY: PROCESS AND DEVELOPMENTS**

1. **The Initial Set-up**

The history of the American military presence in Germany begins immediately after the end of WW II when,

\[\text{after the final defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945, the triumphant \}}\]

\[\text{Allied Forces divided Germany into four military sectors, each of them} \]

\[\text{administered by one of the main allied partners-the United States,} \]

\[\text{England, France, and the Soviet Union. The U.S. forces took control of the} \]

\[\text{Southern and Central-Western part of Germany, today’s federal states of} \]

\[\text{Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse. } \text{\textsuperscript{311}}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{310} Stanley Hoffmann.} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{311} Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas Klemmer, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in Germany, Scope, Impacts, and Opportunities”, Bonn International Center for Conversion, report 4, June 1995, 10.}\]
The initial set-up is still present in today’s patterns “because of the original 1945 occupation zone, approximately 94 percent of U.S. civilian and military personnel are still located in the Southern and Southwestern German federal states of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate.”

Figure 11 shows the actual American bases in Germany, and it can easily be observed the preponderance of their presence in the south-western part of the FR Germany, U.S. troops had begun their presence in western Germany as part of the occupation and made a transition in the late 1940s and early 1950s into so-called stationed forces, as part of NATO. So the United States stationed permanent ground

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312 Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas, Klemmer, 12.
troops (initially four divisions) in Germany as a trip wire to deter Soviet fait accompli invasion stratagems.\textsuperscript{314} Further, the presence of the four divisions, as well as tactical air forces was offered by the U.S. as a reassurance to France that the armament of the FRG in the wake of the Korean War would unfold sensibly and sanely.

2. Dynamics of the American Presence

The transformation from this occupying force to the bulwark on the inner German border stands at the outset of this analysis. “As relations hardened between the Cold War adversaries, Germany became the primary potential battlefield for World War III, and U.S. troop levels tripled from 1950 to 1953. Every year for nearly four decades, one-quarter of a million troops were billeted in West Germany…”\textsuperscript{315}

As Figure 12\textsuperscript{316} suggests, when one considers the half a century of U.S. presence in the zones of occupation and the FRG, the total number of American troops stationed in Germany was over 10,000,000 personnel in total over the period of 1950-2000. This fact accounts for the highest number of deployed troops among the several countries who have hosted American servicemen and women since the close of the Second World War.

So if in 1950 the total number of the American servicemen in Germany was 97,820, the next year it doubled at 176,084, and by 1955 it tripled to 269,260.

Since then the number has stayed between 200,000 and 250,000 military personnel, and only after the end of the Cold War, by 1993, has the number dropped to 105,254.


\textsuperscript{316} Snapshot from Tim Kane.
The total number of American troops stationed in Germany

In 2000, just 69,203 American military personnel remained. Since 2000 the total number of American troops stationed in Germany has stayed around 70,000 servicemen. (2000 - 69,203; 2001 - 70,998; 2002 - 68,701; 2003 - 74,796; 2004 - 76,058; 2005 - 66,418)\(^{317}\)

The order of battle in the FRG grew especially with the 1961 Berlin Crisis and then began a process of reduction, with the "Big Lift" exercise in 1963, followed soon thereafter with the Indochina war. The total of American troops had significantly decreased only during the Vietnam War, which “… had a dramatic effect on U.S. force

levels in the Federal Republic of Germany. By 1968, two thirds of one division and a
cavalry regiment, 28,000 troops, had redeployed back to the United States to support its
Vietnam commitment.318

Using the data from Figure 13,319 it may be iterated that except for Vietnam,
Germany has hosted the highest number of American troops, which stayed at high levels
for about 40 years (1955-1993).

![Five Largest Overseas Deployments, 1950-2003*](image)

* Data for 1951 and 1952 are estimated.
Source: Author's calculations, based on annual records from the U.S. Department of Defense Directorate for Information Operations and Reports.

Figure 13. Deployments between 1950-2003

3. The Restructuring of the American Presence in Germany

After the end of the Cold War, the American presence in Germany evolved as the
military strategic situation on the European continent changed. If during the Cold War,
U.S. troops were strategically located to stop a Soviet and Warsaw pact invasion by tanks and aircraft into Western Europe, what with the departure of Russian forces from the territory of the united FRG by 1994, the drawn down of U.S. forces which had actually begun in 1991 at the time of the Gulf War could proceed apace. The widespread infrastructure, the number of bases, landing strips and runways, and training areas for supporting such a large amount of conventional forces were not required anymore. “In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld listed multiple reasons for reworking the overseas military basing dispositions. He argued that the current arrangements were ‘seriously obsolete,’ oriented to deter and fight the large standing militaries of the Warsaw Pact in Europe rather than the current threats.”

As Pawel Piotr Zduniak, a former NPS student, argued in his thesis back in 2005, the “American forces in Germany are not positioned to meet the coming challenges of the 21st century. With the increasing need for operability outside Europe, bases in the heart of unified Germany no longer serve the strategic purpose they did during the Cold War.”

The same author supports the idea that “…the present American base structure in Germany is no longer efficient. This military configuration was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy--the Soviet Union--during the Cold War era.”

Back in 2004, Raymond A. Millen (currently assigned as the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute), described the situation of the American bases in Germany:

Although Germany offers extraordinary personal and professional rewards, military service in Germany can be a trial. Decaying living and work facilities in pre-World War II casernes require vast expenditures for maintenance and renovation. Even though it would be cheaper in the long run to raze existing casernes and build anew, this option has never been

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322 Ibid., 2.
exercised adequately. Living and working conditions remain spartan and
demoralizing, especially when soldiers happen to see the modern German
casernes. The scattering of brigade and smaller units throughout Germany
in small casernes hampers coordination, training, and logistics, as well as
creating a redundancy in supply and administrative services. Training and
readiness issues suffer the most though. Few casernes possess a maneuver
training area. The vast majority of units must conduct annual training
(sometimes less often) at Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, or Baumholder for
range qualification and some maneuver exercise training. Far from
routine, unit rotations to these training areas require extensive preparation.
Weeks of coordination and preparation are required for rail movement,
wheeled convoys, in processing (establishing ammunition and supply
accounts, signing for billets and maintenance facilities, drawing
ammunition, and range control certification), and outprocessing (clearing
the above accounts, cleaning and turning in issued property and items,
initiating property accountability procedures, and billets and maintenance
facility inspections), and rail and convoy deployment back to home
station. Under this morass of bureaucracy, less time and effort is spent on
training than getting to the training areas and back.323

A change was needed, and the American government began to realize that the
basing of its troops in Europe had to be adjusted:

What is being considered the largest change in America’s troop
deployment plan since World War II had its beginnings in the early 90s at
the end of the Cold War. In 1990, President Bush was beginning a re-
alignment of stationing in conjunction with a major cutback of the total
world force. The U.S. Army cut more than 500,000 troops overall and
lowered the number of troops in Germany by 125,000.324

The new configuration of the American presence in the world started right after
the end of the Cold War and affected Germany also:

...between January 1990 and February 1995, the U.S. Department of
Defense announced twenty rounds of overseas base closures. The
operation of the 953 installations has been ended, reduced or placed on a
standby status; eighteen of those rounds affected 636 installation sites in
Germany. The majority of the U.S. installations involved in the
redeploying process have been Army facilities (556 sites), while 80 sites
belonged to the U.S. Air Force Bases. During this period, the U.S. Army

323 Raymond A. Millen, “Reconfiguring the American Military Presence in Europe,” The Strategic
324 Ryan J. Fayrweather, “Political Impact of Strategic Basing Decisions,” NPS Thesis, Monterey,
December 2004, 73.
abandoned some of the most powerful symbols of the Cold War, including Check Point Charlie, as well as the rest of its 42 Berlin facilities, all three Fulda border observation points and other holdings in that strategically important passage.\textsuperscript{325}

In Germany “[t]he U.S. Air Force cut more aggressively in the early rounds than did the Army. From 1990 to 1994, the United States withdrew approximately 28,500 Air Force soldiers and civilians, marking a significant 60 percent reduction.”\textsuperscript{326}

After 2000 the presence of the American troops in Germany entered a new era regarding its relocation. “The process of redeploying the present U.S. military structure from Germany is closely connected with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.”\textsuperscript{327}

On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a program of sweeping changes to the numbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations, now known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) or Global Posture Review. Roughly 70,000 personnel would return from overseas locations from Europe and Asia to bases in the continental United States (CONUS). Other overseas forces would be redistributed within current host nations such as Germany and South Korea, while new bases would be established in nations of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa.\textsuperscript{328}

According to the advanced planning, “…the biggest changes would happen in Europe, where the military would shutter nearly 200 facilities and ultimately draw down roughly 40,000 troops (from 105,570 as of June 2005). Some of the forces remaining in Europe would periodically deploy from bases in Germany for temporary duty to locations in Romania, Bulgaria, or Central Asia.”\textsuperscript{329}

Regarding Germany, there will still be troops based-- especially where the conditions are good, and there is no need to re-invest for modernizing or adapting the existing infrastructure. “It would retain some of the large 'main operating bases,' as

\textsuperscript{325} Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas Klemmer, 17.  
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid., 22.  
\textsuperscript{327} Pawel Piotr Zduniak, 2.  
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., 6.
Ramstein AFB in Germany, which have all of the comforts of the United States — family housing, schools, supermarkets, convenience stores, theaters, and populations in the tens of thousands.\(^{330}\)

The process of restructuring its military bases is not yet complete for the American troops, and developments will continue to occur in the near future. Conversely, there are critics who doubt the actual possibilities of relocating the troops from Germany:

But such plans are unlikely to amount to much. The Pentagon's planners do not really seem to grasp just how many buildings the 71,702 soldiers and airmen in Germany occupy and how expensive it would be to build bases to house them elsewhere. Lt. Col. Amy Ehmann in Hanau, Germany, has said, "There's no place to put these people" in Romania, Bulgaria or Djibouti, and she predicts 80% will end up staying in Germany.\(^ {331}\)

C. OCCUPATION, 1944-1955, MILITARY GOVERNMENT, NATION BUILDING, AND THE REHABILITATION OF GERMANY

1. After the Period of WW II and the Start of the Cold War

The U.S. presence in Germany began in 1944 with the battle for Aachen and its subsequent occupation. This event was followed several months later by the total surrender of Germany and the advent of the zones of occupation among the four victors. At the end of WW II the entire area of Europe stood in ruins. The situation was even worse in the defeated countries like Germany, which had spent its entire human and economic resources in sustaining the war efforts.

In 1945, entire stretches of Western Europe lay in ruin. In Germany, as well as in most of the continent, railways, bridges and communication lines were totally destroyed. More than a million and a half Germans had been killed in action; an additional two million were missing and another half million were prisoners who would not likely return. Industrial

\(^{330}\) Pawel Piotr Zdniak, 5.

production, key to any recovery, had slowed to less than half of what it had been in 1938; in Germany it was close to nonexistent.\textsuperscript{332}

The German population had no necessary means for a decent existence and the following period until 1948 marked an important reversion of the American presence: from an occupation to that of security building, postwar reconstruction and further of an alliance protection force. The immediate period after war’s end was very important due to the fact that the Americans left their imprint in building up a completely new society:

Between 1945 and 1949 Germany was exhausted and in need of every conceivable form of assistance; the American army controlled the whole population and Washington could presumably accomplish whatever it wanted. It was a great opportunity for political reform, social engineering, and cultural transformation all of which would serve the interests both of America’s democratic ideals and its postwar foreign policy.\textsuperscript{333}

The split of not only Germany but of the entirety of Europe, in two blocks, played a significant role in the foundation of West Germany in the spring of 1949. The visible tensions between the U.S. and its Western allies, the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw pact followers set the scene for a new kind a confrontation: the Cold War. The establishment of the Iron Curtain was the new policy within Europe, and the initial mission of the American troops in Germany was now configured into a new protective dimension:

Growing tension between the Soviet Union and the other Allied Forces quickly dominated post-war policies in Germany. Fear of assault on both sides of the Cold War border helped in the evolution of the role of foreign forces in Germany from one of occupation to one of protection.\textsuperscript{334}

The confrontation between the two worlds resulted in the necessity for unity and cooperation among all countries against the “Red Terror.” Ash’s words have the power of describing, in a condensed form, the essence of western unity/singularity: “The West stood for freedom, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. These good things, they


\textsuperscript{334} Pawel Piotr Zduniak, 7.
thought, had grown mainly in the West and distinguished us from others.” A new civilization emerged from the profound belief that the world could be a better place and every single man has the same rights and should be free. The transplant of the American beliefs on a fertile European post war conscience gave birth to a new civilization, “in the grand narrative of ‘Western Civ.’, [where] the West began in Europe and ended in the hands of America.”

2. The Creation of the Federal Republic of Germany

This new situation paved the way for West Germany to become a “normal nation” and an equal partner, though the effort was arduous and not without setbacks. “With America’s announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the introduction of the Marshall Plan, and impending merger of the Western zones of Germany into a single republic, Berlin became the flash point of the Cold War.”

The presence of the American bases in Germany in May of 1949, when with the support of the Western Allies, a new West German government was created, was already a fait accompli and under these conditions:

West German government lacked the necessary independence to negotiate with the Allied commanders, and was in effect told to lease the ground and installations ‘required for defense purposes’ without any financial compensation. Furthermore, the German government paid all costs associated with re-building, maintaining, and establishing bases for the Allied Forces during this time as part of reparation transfers.

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337 Richard Pells, 47.
338 Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas Klemmer, 10.
3. The Relationship between the American Soldiers and the Civilian Population; the Central Role Played by the German Women and Youths

The relationship of the American troops with the German civilian population had important implications in the way West Germany was perceived by U.S. officials. After the war, the German population had a high percentage of women and children, who played an important role in reversing the perception about the German population from blame to compassion.

In the beginning “[t]o convert the Germans in the American zone from beggars to partners, the United States had to help re-establish the economic and cultural infrastructure.”

The well known writer, Petra Goedde in her book *Gis and German Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949*, depicted the beginning of the relationship between the American soldiers and German civilians in the most tumultuous post WW II environment. The author describes the significant role played by the German women and children in this relation, as being the representative part of the German society, since a large number of German soldiers were killed or taken as prisoners. As Petra Goedde, concluded:

Cultural feminization became a powerful catalyst in America’s postwar rapprochement with Germany. The preponderance of women and children and the pervasiveness of hunger in early post-war Germany fostered in American GIs a shift from one traditionally male gender role – conqueror - to another – protector and provider. In doing so, Americans redirected their attention from those segments of German society responsible for the Nazi war crimes to those whom Americans universally recognized as victims of the war.

In postwar Germany Americans viewed the society as being under Allied occupation, and, as such, the policy was adjusted accordingly: “The relations between the German populations and the American soldiers were very much influenced by the

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339 Pawel Piotr Zduniak, 12.
fraternization ban imposed on September 12 [1944] by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.”

In such an environment the American feelings “…displayed a wide spectrum of attitudes towards Germans, ranging from open hostility to a vague notion of cultural affinity. Yet it was the friendly relations between soldiers and German civilians that most troubled occupation officials. Those relations exposed the tensions between soldiers as private individuals and as agents of occupation policy.”

The occupation treatment was soon replaced with a softer behavior, since the most German did not fit into the American anti-Nazi propaganda:

The non-fraternization directive failed in part because by the fall of 1944 soldiers did not encounter many Germans characterized by the government’s official wartime image of a monolithic people unified by their support for the war. Instead they found a defeated population devastated by the destruction of the war and rather desperate in its desire to make peace with the Allies. While Army pamphlets warned soldiers about ‘the German’ – mostly in the masculine singular – soldiers saw a plurality of Germans, men and women, young and old, Nazis and non-Nazis, locals and refugees, perpetrators and victims. The line that once had so clearly separated ‘us’ from ‘them’ became increasingly blurred.

Soon after the fall of 1944, the discrepancies between the American and German societal values began to disappear, and Germans were regarded as people who suffered during and after the war, as victims of the Nazi regime. Very soon the U.S. policy had to be readjusted. “The eventual breakdown of the ban signaled the demise of the idea of German collective guilt as a basis for the U.S. occupation policy toward Germany.”

The summer of 1945 marked the definitive abandonment of the ban, and as mentioned, the German society, represented especially by its feminine component, played a crucial role in this change:

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342 Petra Goedde, 42.
343 Ibid., 44.
344 Ibid., 45.
Beyond being overly optimistic, Eisenhower’s reference to denazification indicated a major shift in American attitudes toward Germany. Rather than assuming Germany’s collective guilt, the military government began to distinguish between ‘guilty’ and ‘innocent’ Germans. Eisenhower’s explanation suggested that fraternization with non-Nazi was permissible, at least to a certain degree. More importantly, the move reflected the dominant perception of American military officials concerning fraternization, namely that German women did not belong to the pool of Nazi sympathizers. On the basis of this assumption, military officials calculated, fraternization no longer posed a threat to the mission of the occupation.345

This turning point in the American policy made possible the view of the Germans as being part of the western community, Germany was no longer considered an outsider. The fraternization opened the possibilities that American soldiers could interact with the civilian society at an interpersonal level. To a certain extent this interaction was biased on the poor condition of the society. The economy was broken, food was scarce and other basic products, such as soap, were barely found. Under these circumstances an underground economy flourished, which “…depended to a large extent on American GIs’ interest in exchanging food and cigarettes for luxury items.”346 The circle was simple: Germans provided souvenirs and Nazi prohibited items in exchange for cigarettes, and then the cigarettes were exchanged for food with farmers. Regarding the relationship of the American soldiers with the German women “[m]ost GIs who sought the company of women at least initially did so for sexual rather than social reasons.”347 Due to the harsh living conditions “[s]ome women resorted to prostitution to save themselves and their families from starvation. For others it became an additional source of income.”348 For some, the situation was so desperate that, “[s]ome mothers even sent their teenage daughters – in one case the girl was allegedly twelve – into DP camps, or areas occupied by American soldiers, in order to obtain food and cigarettes in exchange for sex.”349 “Still others fell in love with GIs and regarded the material benefits of the relationships as

345 Petra Goedde, 76.
346 Ibid., 91.
347 Ibid., 86.
348 Ibid., 91.
349 Ibid.
secondary. What ever the original motivation, food had become a central aspect of
American-German interactions. This material based relation triggered some awkward
results, and “[t]he threat of venereal disease became the most compelling tool for the
military government to discourage fraternization.”

Soon after the society began to normalize, American soldiers started to marry
German women. This civil act played a significant role in the realm of American-German
relations. “In the context of the occupation the act of marriage assumed public and
political significance far beyond the concerns of bride and groom.”

Within five years of Germany occupation, the number of Americans in committed
relationships with Germans grew exponentially, and soon the German spouses entering
the U.S. were the second largest category of immigrants after Anglo-Americans ones.
According to statistics, “… by June 1950, 14,175 German wives, six husbands, and 750
children of ‘citizen members of the United Sates Armed Forces’ had entered the United
States.”

Regarding the German children, contact with the American culture was a great
opportunity for developing a new culture and getting rid of the Nazi heritage. “For young
Germans, the wholesale or even partial adoption of an international youth culture offered
an escape from the burdens of the Nazi past. Age would thus become a more important
factor than nationality in defining their cultural and social identity.”

As an overall conclusion Petra Goedde sustains that “[t]he informal relationships
between GIs and German civilians illuminate the social and cultural dimension of
American postwar involvement in Germany.”

350 Petra Goedde, 91.
351 Ibid., 93.
352 Ibid., 100.
353 Ibid., 101.
354 Ibid., 161.
355 Ibid., 126.
4. The Cold War and the Berlin Airlift

The events occurring during the late 1940s shaped the relations between Americans and Germans and "[w]hat had begun in the fall of 1944 as a punitive occupation of an enemy country had by 1948 turned into a protective occupation of a dependent people."356

The accumulation of tensions between the western countries and the Soviet block in the framework of normalizing West Germany evolved during the following period into what was known as the “Berlin airlift.”

The story of the Berlin airlift has usually been told within the framework of the deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The showdown over the city was the first serious conflict of the cold war. … West Berlin was the prize the Soviet Union wanted to extract from the West in exchange for the creation of a separate West German state, a prize the United States was unwilling to relinquish. Germany served as the locus for the unfolding of the great power rivalry.357

This new course of action greatly strengthened American-German political relations the necessity of reforming German status in Europe and in the world: “… the Berlin airlift emerges as a very different story, one that moves the relationship between Americans and Germans to center stage.”358 Firstly it changed the perceptions regarding Germany as “[t]he symbolic identification of Berlin with the free world became an essential tool in galvanizing international support against the Soviet blockade.”359 And secondly the American military fraternization with the Germans entered the final stage as they took part in the fighting against the Soviets. The help provided by the American pilots to the civilian population from Berlin contrasted with the Soviets’ actions, and “…perhaps the most powerful expression of the American paternalist benevolence came through the so-called ‘Candy Bomber.’”360 Delivering candies was an honest gesture,

356 Petra Goedde, 167.
357 Ibid., 168.
358 Ibid., 169.
359 Ibid., 187.
360 Ibid., 180.
which was a contrast to the fear of the Russian blockade. These actions included also the eastern sector of Berlin gaining psychological values in responding to the Soviets’ action. “As Berlin’s fate became identified with that of its candy-craving children, the contrast between Americans and the Soviets appeared even stronger.”

The American opposition gained even more value when the American pilots’ sacrifices proved their commitment in safeguarding those who just five years ago were the enemy:

The heroic actions of the American pilots, involving even plane crashes, unfolded new dimensions. “Just as during World War II, Americans interpreted the casualties as a human sacrifice for preservation of freedom and democracy. Only this time the fallen soldiers had given their lives not only to protect their own families at home but those of their former enemies as well.”

The beginning of the 50s marked a new era in the American-German relationship, and the rising opposition to Soviet actions paved the way for West Germany to become a sovereign state and gain the status of an ally under the NATO umbrella. The necessity of having German contribution to the common defence efforts speeded up the process and smoothed European opposition to German militarism. The projection of the American strategic interests towards Asia, starting with the Korean War, also had influence toward reconsidering the German position and role on the European continent.

D. LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY AND ALLIANCE FORWARD DEFENSE, ONSET OF BURDEN SHARING ISSUES, CLASHES BETWEEN DIFFERENT PLANS

1. The Armament of the FRG and Integration into NATO

The common history of the allies within NATO was also viewed “…as a bargaining process among states with many interests in common but some conflicting

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361 Petra Goedde, 182.
362 Ibid., 183.
ones as well”\textsuperscript{363} which “…is often described as a search for mutually advantageous or win-win solutions.”\textsuperscript{364} In the post war era when the reconstruction of Europe had a special meaning, spending on the defence budget meant fewer resources available for the welfare of the state.

Burden sharing was important from the beginning of NATO because it allowed the member states to do more together than they could do individually. The Korean War in the mid 1950s was viewed as the first try of the Americans for involving the Europeans in this part of the world and for benefiting from the burden-sharing policy in achieving their political objectives.

Regarding the basing of the American troops in Germany, there were mutations in the mid 50s, as West Germany became a sovereign state and was co-opted in the common defensive efforts of NATO. The process had started already back in September of 1950, when “… Acheson confronted the NATO partners with the U.S. intention of permitting and pursuing the partial reconstruction of Germany’s military ability to use it in the defense of the West.”\textsuperscript{365} The equation was simple and viewed through the burden-sharing lens, from a strategic point of view, “…to develop a strong defense in Western Europe, members of the alliance would have no choice but to begin the rearmament of Western Germany or dedicate large amounts of assets to defend it.”\textsuperscript{366} This new approach of the defense of Europe was seen in the new economic prosperity of the continent, and “…both America and Britain agreed that West Germany would eventually be needed to shoulder more, if not all, of the burden for its defense.”\textsuperscript{367} “Economically, the cost of occupation was becoming high and thoughts of a prolonged presence were out of the question. With


\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{366} Ryan J. Fayrweather, 15.

\textsuperscript{367} Hubert Zimmermann, 13.
the outbreak of the Korean War, it became even more imperative economically for the U.S. and UK to convince others that a re-armed West Germany was vital to NATO’s defensive structure.\textsuperscript{368}

The transformation of Germany’s status also changed the basic arrangements regarding the stationing of the U.S. troops.

West Germany completed its evolution to a Western ally in 1955 by establishing itself as a sovereign democratic nation and by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Membership in NATO canceled out the previous basing agreement between West Germany and the Allied Forces; instead, the bases had to meet the terms of NATO statutes governing troop deployments in a Member State. Since that moment, the United States began paying all expenses to maintain, improve, or establish bases in West Germany; as compensation, West Germany agreed to lease the land to U.S. Forces for free.\textsuperscript{369}

The new status as an independent state allowed West Germany to reconsider its position towards the American presence, and “…on that date, the new all-German national government became fully independent, allowing Germany the power to review regulations governing stationing of foreign troops on its soil.”\textsuperscript{370}

2. Germany’s Interdependence with NATO’s Crises

The first nuclear crisis erupted in 1956 on the fertile terrain of divergence between national and multi-national strategic views and different approaches inside the Alliance. The failed creation of the European Defence Community (EDC) in May 1952, the year of Greece and Turkey’s admittance had been declared as a closely related organization “…within the framework of, and reinforcing NATO.”\textsuperscript{371} The EDC was viewed as the preamble of the future crisis inside the alliance, and also “…as a means of slowly disengaging Europe from Atlantic, Anglo-Saxon control.”\textsuperscript{372}


\textsuperscript{369} Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas Klemmer, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{370} Pawel Piotr Zduńak, 9.

\textsuperscript{371} Ian Q. R. Thomas, 38.

\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., 44.
From 1958 to 1962, NATO crossed the most dangerous military crisis in its history, known as the Berlin crisis, which also played an important role in determining the roles, missions and NATO’s doctrine. Three main strategic concepts have been promoted as a military response to the change of the military situation and political conceptions: “…the shield, flexible response, and the multilateral force (MLF).”

In Europe the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet Union in November 1956 created a new dangerous situation, which exercised more pressure on the allies. The change in the Soviet Union’s attitude and tactics required that NATO “…make its purposes better understood in non-NATO countries” through its rhetoric in actions such as the “battle for the minds of men.” The rising necessity of consultation in this period had not been implemented, and in the Cuban Missile Crisis the European allies had not yet been consulted by the U.S. even though there was danger of a nuclear war.

In this period and afterwards, a new notion was promoted through rhetoric and ally interdependence, both economic and military, which played an important role in redefining NATO’s conception by depicting “…international communism as a cohesive threat to the free world.” The interdependence played an important role in the foreign policy of the member states in the following period, being soon completed by “…the concept of the indivisibility of the peace,” which clearly indicated the unity and a readiness for the action of the Alliance. The interdependence concept was part of the United States’ rhetoric “…in its attempt to cultivate European support for its evolving policy toward Southeast Asia.”

373 Thomas Risse-Kappen, 71.
374 Ian Q. R. Thomas, 57.
375 Ibid.
376 Ibid., 62.
377 Ibid., 63.
378 Ibid.
3. The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War from 1964 onwards marked a change of the American involvement from Europe towards Asia. It caused a significant change of understanding and different approaches of Europe’s defence on both sides of the Atlantic. The war itself triggered a change in the balance of the American troops and those from Europe, in the sense that on the “Old Continent” the allies were called upon for more substantial commitments.

Also tearing at the internal workings of the alliance was the Vietnam conflict and U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia. Perceptions of U.S. commitment to Western Europe grew as the continuing war in Vietnam had a dramatic effect on U.S. force levels in the Federal Republic of Germany. By 1968, two thirds of one division and a cavalry regiment, 28,000 troops, had redeployed back to the United States to support its Vietnam commitment.379

For West Germany, the withdrawal of the American troops accentuated the economic decline and “[i]n 1966, for example, the Federal German economy fell into recession, and Chancellor Erhard was forced to seek relief from Washington in the form of asking to have the volume of their obligated weapons purchases lowered.”380

The acute situation in Europe, due especially to the new aggressive stance the Soviet Union had adopted in late the 70s, provided for new grounds in transforming the bilateral U.S.-Germany relations. The U.S. could not afford anymore to backup Germany, being themselves caught between financial problems caused by the Vietnam War and the new challenges launched by the Soviets.

Conversely, and at a bad time for Germany, the U.S. Congress was trying hard to find ways to limit money being spent oversees in the form of basing and troop deployments. Economic stagnation and the war in Vietnam were taking a toll on alliance members, but with Soviet actions

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379 Simon Duke, 63.
such as the Prague spring offensive, in August 1968, the last thing that the United States and NATO could afford to do was appear irresolute with regard to members around the world.\(^\text{381}\)

As part of the burden sharing, Germany had to financially contribute to the expenses for the war in a *qui pro quo* of benefiting from the presence of the American troops on its territory: “It can be argued that the host country (which means principally Germany) has received windfall expenditures from the ‘involuntary tourism’ of United States' troops, and so should be prepared to pay local maintenance costs as long as the United States remains in a deficit position.”\(^\text{382}\)

The Vietnam War period was a time in Germany, as in most European countries, the pacifist and anti-war movements started to grow and raise their concerns regarding the American presence. The situation became more critical in the war aftermath with a growing antiwar position toward the American public and the perception of the American troops coming back from Vietnam. Complementary is the description of the American bases from Germany by Daniel J. Nelson in his book *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany*. He illustrated the skepticism of the Europeans regarding the American commitment in Europe especially in the Vietnam War era, when he describes the picture of U.S. bases as “becoming stations in the route of Vietnam and populated by loutish, hash-smoking, malcontent soldiers.”\(^\text{383}\)


1. Atlanticism-plus, Issues of Burden Sharing, Burden Shifting in Europe

The rise of deterrence (‘deterrence theory was in part the creation of governments in London and Washington intent on cutting defence spending by substituting threats of

\(^{381}\) Ryan J. Fayrweather, 40.


nuclear retaliation for costly mass armies\textsuperscript{384}) and détente from the middle of the 60s until the 80s played an important role in reshaping and reformulating the aims and objectives of NATO, being a powerful engine for renewing the organization. More than that, deterrence and détente played a significant role in the post-1989 evolution.

The following decade after the 80s brought an acute revival of the superpower condominium conception and marked the renewal of “…confrontation, principally between the two superpowers.”\textsuperscript{385} Slogans such as ‘peace through strength’ or ‘arming to disarm’ started to dominate NATO’s rhetoric and its policy started to return “…to ideology and the rhetoric of the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{386} The confrontation was moved to March 1983, and deterrence gained new meaning when “Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), popularly known as Star War promised to provide a space-based defence against Soviet missiles.”\textsuperscript{387}

In the mid 80s the quarrel about the commitment of the Europeans and their participation to the common efforts of defense was acute and growing along with resistance against the American influence on European policy. America was arguing the fact that Europe spent less and profited greatly by the American security umbrella in developing their economies by diverting resources, which otherwise would be spent for defence. The European nations felt the presence of the American troops more as a burden and as a threat to the country, population, and environmental safety.

An accurate German point of view to this dilemma was provided by Gerhard Henze, Minister-Counsellor, at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the U.S. The diplomat delivered his speech at Town Hall of California, in Los Angeles, on May 6, 1986.

Driving from Washington to Los Angeles and knowing that I would have to speak to you about Western defence I diverted some of my attention from the beautiful landscapes and life in the cities to looking for

\textsuperscript{384} Wallace J. Thies, 4.
\textsuperscript{385} Ian Q. R. Thomas, 111.
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid., 109.
\textsuperscript{387} Ibid., 124.
American soldiers and military installations. I did not see very much. If I had gone in Germany from Cologne to Munich, a 370 miles trip, the picture would have been different. On many bridges I would have seen yellow signs with black tanks and ciphers on it indicating the maximum weight for tanks crossing the bridge. I would have heard the thundering noise of low flying military aircrafts and I would have passed a lot of military vehicles. This is not surprising in a country with the size of Utah or Oregon which has almost 900,000 German and foreign soldiers stationed on its territory. Compared with the size of the United States you would have to have 33 Mio soldiers to reach a similar density.

Where do all these soldiers come from? More than 55 percent are Germans. About 26 percent come from United States. The other soldiers are British, French, Canadians, Dutch and Belgians.

I mentioned these figures because you sometimes hear the argument in the United States that European Allies do not assume their adequate share of the common defense burden. This certainly is not true for Germany. In Central Europe – the main defense area of the Atlantic Alliance – the German armed forces provide 30 percent of the combat aircrafts, 50 percent of the ground forces and ground-based air defense and 60 percent of the main battle tanks. We have the highest frequency of military exercises. Allied forces fly 580,000 sorties per year over our territory. Every working day there are 500 low level flights.388

Mr. Henze also addressed the issue of SDI, and the fact that from a German perspective Federal Germany was doing more than any other European ally and the U.S. themselves:

While it still seems difficult to find sites for the deployment of the new MX strategic missile in the United States the German Government started in 1983 the deployment of medium range nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic which had been agreed upon in NATO according to the schedule. Other European countries like Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands followed. To deploy new missiles was by no means an easy decision in a country like the Federal Republic of Germany where the population is ten times as dense as in the United States and where only a few of the deployed missiles would be far away from major settlements. There are more military forces and more nuclear weapons per square mile deployed in my country than in any other Western country.

There also is agreement among NATO countries that the defense infrastructure should be improved. Air bases need better protection. Communications systems have to be modernized. Logistical support must be strengthened. In 1985, NATO started its biggest 5 year infrastructure program which will require 10 billion dollars. Twenty-eight percent of the expenditure will be paid by the U.S. The Federal Republic, the much smaller country, will come up with 27 percent of the total cost.  

2. The Fall of the Berlin Wall and Germany’s Reunification

After 1989 the Soviets lost the initiative and the unification of Germany would take place in just a matter of months. After more than 40 years the Germans’ dreams were about to become true:

The Soviet Union is in the unfortunate position of having lost all its cards. It has no effective way of preventing German unity. Several months ago an American visitor asked the Soviet minister of defense, "Aren't you going to use your three-hundred-and-something-thousand troops in East Germany to prevent unification?" The answer he got, much to his amazement, was "Oh, they are going to reunify around our troops." So the Soviets realize that they cannot stop it.

The events of 1989 brought not only the German unification but also a complete change in the European political and security landscape: “And then came the sudden and totally unexpected end of the division of Europe. The issue of German unity, which everybody had dreaded and had hoped could be postponed ad infinitum, suddenly was there. It wasn't even an issue to be discussed; it was a fait accompli, for all practical purposes.” The sudden changes in Europe re-opened the aspiration for an integrated Europe capable of counterbalancing the U.S. hegemonic tendencies. “And that's pretty much the French case. Their instinctive reaction has been, ‘Since this united Germany is going to be there, we must get a hold on it.’ And the hold takes the form of a real acceleration of Western European integration-what is known, in the jargon of the

390 Elliot R. Goodman.
391 Ibid.
European Community, as 'deepening.'

392 Even the French stratagem aimed at coping with the German rising influence instead of struggling against it, still, “[w]ith a united Germany, a number of French are afraid that even within a federal Europe, Germany will be the most important member.”

393 And this is particularly true when the point is taken that “[s]ince World War II, Germany has become the leading proponent for European integration and since the end of the Cold War has acted almost exclusively through international or multilateral organizations in world affairs (NATO, OSCE, UN, etc.).”

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Even more, when describing the balance of power in Europe, Ash is of the opinion that Germany is a central player: “For though Tony Blair might like to describe Britain’s role as pivotal, Europe’s real pivot is Germany.”

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F. GULF WAR IN 1990-1991, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BUNDESWEHR, 2003 IRAQ CRISIS, REDUCTION IN FORCE, LOCAL LABOR ISSUES

1. 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis

In the following period, the Soviet Union’s leader Mikhail Gorbachev proved himself as a “…genuine and determined reformer who sought not confrontation but cooperation.”

396 This opened a new era, which changed the rhetoric of NATO from a politics of ideology to a politics of pragmatism (“…especially in the area of military affairs”)

397, and ultimately led to the relaxation of the East-West confrontation and made the end of the Cold War possible. This laid down the foundation for discussions on strategic nuclear forces’ downsizing, a verification process, and the limitations of nuclear testing. The notion of security for all from “the Atlantic to the Urals” became a great possibility by the openness of Moscow and good faith shown through unilateral troop

392 Elliot R. Goodman.
393 Stanley Hoffmann.
395 Timothy Garton Ash, 63.
396 Ian Q. R. Thomas, 131.
reductions. The allies’ answer came after the Brussels summit in May 1989 where they endorsed the Conventional Parity Initiative, which laid down NATO’s view and policy on reduction. The real challenge for NATO “…was that the Soviets were seeking not to widen their sphere of political, military, and ideological competition but to narrow it.”\textsuperscript{398} It led to a vacuum of power, which further opened a new era in Europe’s affirmation of its own political agenda towards the security of the continent, which also placed Germany at centre of stage. Few other important events played as important a role in developing the American-German relations.

On August 2, 1990, the beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis,

… put German leaders in a very difficult position. They obviously considered the invasion itself a blatant violation of international law and felt an obligation to support not only the corresponding United Nations Security Council resolutions on the matter, but to show support for the United States as well. However, German leaders were also very conscious of Soviet and East German sensitivities concerning on-going negotiations and were keen not to make any moves which could upset this situation or the first all-German national elections scheduled for October 1990.\textsuperscript{399}

An intermediate solution was found as an alternative to sending troops in the Gulf area: “It was agreed that the Federal Republic would provide economic aid to those states most affected by the invasion, logistical and financial support for the military coalition aligned against Iraq but they would not send German troops to the region.”\textsuperscript{400}

2. “Out of Area” and the FRG, the German Basic Law and the Bundeswehr

In the following period of time Germany embarked in a process of reconsidering its security policy. Defining the role and missions of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) within the new political and security context was part of the process.

\textsuperscript{398} Ian Q. R. Thomas, 146.
\textsuperscript{400} Kevin L. Hill, 25.
The question of the constitutionality of Bundeswehr deployments in the NATO-WEU naval embargo in the Adriatic in Somalia in 1992, and in the AWACS monitoring in the Balkans, was coming to a resolution in 1994 when:

The Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994 freed Germany from constitutionally mandated military abstention, but it raised a political dilemma at the same time. Although German troops are cleared to join international peace missions, the legal ruling does not necessarily translate into wider political and popular support in Germany for sending soldiers abroad.\(^\text{401}\)

In May 1995, the Bosniac conflict required another assessment of the German involvement in the new formula of UN-NATO Rapid Reaction Force.

… the June 30, 1995 decision was historic and, as stated by Chancellor Kohl, “a major turning point in foreign and defense policy.” While fortunately the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) plan was never fully implemented, Germany did provide increasing amounts of support to operations in the Balkans, including German ECR-Tornadoes participating in their first air strikes on Bosnian Serb military positions as part of a NATO operation on September 1, 1995. Although these flights were reconnaissance missions and did not drop ordinance, it was considered the country’s first combat mission since World War II.\(^\text{402}\)

As Kevin L. Hill concluded in his thesis, “[t]he events of 1991-1995 had enabled the government to gradually consolidate support for an 'entirely new security policy construct,' one which permitted out-of-area operations and led to the Bundeswehr’s sizable participation (4,000 soldiers) in NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) later that year, and in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996.”\(^\text{403}\)

3. The Split over the War in Iraq, 2001-2005

Another important fact that played an important role in the U.S.-Germany relationship involves the deteriorating of transatlantic relations and the fact that “…the


\(^\text{402}\) Kevin L. Hill, 36.

\(^\text{403}\) Ibid.
Bush administration in August 2002 aggressively and openly elevated the issue of Iraq onto its national security agenda." 404 Most of the countries were not in favour of pre-emptive military actions envisaged by Americans in settling the Iraq issue, declaring that a UN Security Council’s approval was necessary before force could be used. Moreover after the UN Security Council Resolution 1441, the European opposition led by France and Germany was directed against the Bush administration’s push for acting against Iraq’s disobedience to comply with the provisions of resolution.

Another fact that worsened the relations was the U.S. Department of Defense’s official declaration on the split of Europe into two groups, the "old" party represented by Western countries which were against the U.S. policy, and the "new" party represented by Eastern Europe, “…including such states as Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and the Baltic countries, [which] were forward-looking and progressive in meeting new security challenges.” 405 The predominant actors in the European policy-split complicated the situation on the Old continent: “Crucially, the four countries at the heart of any history of the modern West – Britain, France, America and Germany – were divided two against two.” 406 This was a real confrontation at the world scale as these four countries were “…the states with the first and seventh largest economies in the world (America and Britain) lined up against the fifth and sixth (Germany and France).” 407

NATO’s transformation clearly continued with the allies’ split “…and open debate over the organization’s role with the Iraq crisis in 2003” 408 culminated with efforts to promote consensus regarding the decision to provide security guarantees to Turkey, under Article 4. The Alliance continuously evolved and included new historical explanations. The dispute among the allies over the issue of protecting Turkey against

404 Ryan C. Hendrickson, 127.
405 Ibid., 128.
406 Timothy Garton Ash, 9.
407 Ibid.
408 Ryan C. Hendrickson, 2.
Iraq threats and the defence of the European bases against terrorists, resulted in the lack of consensus between the American and continental Europeans views immediately before the outbreak of the Gulf War in March 2003.

The anti-Americanism has represented, on many occasions, the binder of different political parties, or even more the escape route or reserve option, in building political confidence and unity. In Germany, for instance, the general political attitude towards the U.S. dramatically changed after 9/11 and even more anti-Americanism was used as an electoral weapon: “The September 2002 German election, where for the first time in the postwar period a leading candidate concluded that major electoral gains could be had by running against the United States, should be taken as a warning that American unilateralist could indeed come at a price.”

The NATO 2003 crisis affected also the U.S.-Germany bilateral relations and in “… the new political environment in Europe, the United States faced serious impediments and difficulties from the German government in realizing the fundamental aims of American foreign policy.” It was more and more observable that “…the burden of supporting more than a million soldiers on German soil became unbearable-not only for the United States, but also for the reunified German state.”

4. Re-Basing and Reduction

It became clearer that the “American forces in Germany are not positioned to meet the coming challenges of the 21st century. With the increasing need for operability outside Europe, bases in the heart of unified Germany no longer serve the strategic purpose they did during the Cold War.” The “…present American basing structure in Germany is expensive and too large. Instead of spending precious resources on military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) still maintains

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410 Pawel Piotr Zduniak, 1.
411 Ibid., 9.
412 Ibid., 1.
a complex base structure in Germany with thousands of U.S. soldiers and their families.\textsuperscript{413} The necessity of downsizing the American presence in Germany was not a follow up of the German position regarding the war in Iraq, as William Safire observed:

The proposed radical change is not finalized and is not punishment for Chancellor Schroder's antiwar pandering or his subsequent isolationism (although the recent weakening of German resolve, as one diplomat told me, "certainly makes the timing opportune"). German officials are right to worry that U.S. forces now headed from Germany to the Persian Gulf may not, after the war and occupation, return to their old bases.\textsuperscript{414}

Future disagreements may easily hamper the projection of the American troops from their bases from Europe and especially from Germany:

The U.S. basing of units also obviates the reliance on European states for support of a diplomatically contentious operation. For instance, ground units stationed in Germany could be immobilized if the German government demonstrated its opposition to a military operation by denying or delaying the use of airspace, rail, airbases, and seaports, despite treaty obligations. Additionally, other European neighbors to Germany, such as Austria, Switzerland, and France, could complicate deployments by denying the use of airspace either as an invocation of neutrality or as a sign of displeasure regarding U.S. policy. As the EU gains prominence and given that it is often at loggerheads with the United States over virtually every issue, the problem of cooperation in Europe likely will grow. Even though obstructionist governments could derail the “lily pad” option as well, the United States would retain the flexibility to bypass Europe.\textsuperscript{415}

But “[d]espite its criticisms of the Iraq war, Germany imposed no restrictions on the use of American bases during that conflict. It continues to deploy thousands of German soldiers to protect those bases, freeing American troops for other uses. Berlin also contributes $1 billion a year to the bases' support.”\textsuperscript{416}

\textsuperscript{413} Pawel Piotr Zduniak, 1.
\textsuperscript{414} William Safire.
\textsuperscript{415} Raymond A. Millen.
Among other reasons that may trigger such withdrawals may be the fact that the German regulations imposed additional pressure on the American troops especially regarding the protection of the environment. “For the United States, the preservation of the current base structure in Germany for operational, strategic, economical and political reasons is becoming more and more difficult. Training has become more difficult in Germany due to rigorous environmental regulations. American bases in the heart of Europe, together with thousands of U.S. soldiers, family members, buildings, installations and other facilities, are too extensive and relatively inefficient.”\textsuperscript{417} “With the end of the Cold War, exercises in the German countryside are practically nonexistent. German environmental concerns, payments for maneuver damage, maneuver restrictions, and the dangers to civilians are too great to make them worthwhile.”\textsuperscript{418} Starting with early 1990s “[o]ver the past decade or so, the Pentagon has felt increasingly constrained by training restrictions placed on the U.S. forces by their European host.”\textsuperscript{419} “For example, training has become more difficult in Germany due to stringent environmental regulations. Germany has severely limited America’s ability to fly helicopters at night, conduct live-fire exercises, and conduct training maneuvers in heavy, tracked vehicles.”\textsuperscript{420} “Although these restrictions are understandable because of Germany’s dense population and politically powerful environmental movement, they have forced the Pentagon to look elsewhere to train.”\textsuperscript{421}

Gregory R. Copley asserted in one of his articles that “[m]ost of the 65,000 Army troops in USEUCOM have been based in Germany. It is anticipated that as many as 40,000 could be based, in the future, in the Balkans, providing a significant economic injection into

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{417} Pawel Piotr Zduniak, 3.
\textsuperscript{418} Raymond A. Millen.
\textsuperscript{421} Vernon Loeb.
\end{footnotesize}
the local economies, quite apart from infrastructural development (and the additional impact of Air Force and Naval basing). There would be a commensurate loss to the German economy.”

Robert D. Critchlow, citing the former Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, argued that:

… relocating personnel and facilities in some cases could reduce frictions with host governments and enhance cooperation with allies. He also indicated that nations that imposed restrictions or conditions on the use of U.S. forces from their territory would be viewed as less satisfactory locations. He did not specifically cite the countries he saw as sources of friction with respect to the presence of U.S. forces or the conduct of U.S. operations. However, it was widely assumed he was referring to friction with Germany over the invasion of Iraq and German restrictions on U.S. training exercises.

In any case, the schism between the German Europeanized point of view and the American approach of its policy towards world security has led to the fact that “[t]oday, the prevailing American feeling about Germany is one of disillusionment and disappointment.” From an American perspective the effect of relocation of its troops will generate long term effects: “Lack of presence could find the United States reducing its voice in European or Asian affairs, and finding it harder to motivate international coalitions or support when needed.” Moreover, “[f]or the last 60 years, American taxpayers footed most of the bill to protect Europe, most recently deploying forces to stop the Balkan wars. Somehow Europeans appear to believe Americans will continue doing this indefinitely, regardless of European behavior and attitudes. They are badly mistaken.” The disengagement of the U.S. from Europe will inevitably have, as a consequence, the fact that “…Europe will distance itself from the United States as well.

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423 Robert D. Critchlow, 8-9.


425 Robert D. Critchlow, 19.

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) proponents will pounce on any opportunity to marginalize U.S. leadership in Europe, and a withdrawal would serve as a pretext to advance the EU agenda.427

5. Financial Aspect: Externally and Internally Orientated

The dispute between the U.S. and Germany has grown over the financial issues as well. The failure of the European partners to meet the necessary requirements for European security and support for the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, has laid the ground for an exacerbated quarrelling. The lack of participation was viewed by the American side, as a lack of political will.

Germany insists that it is not a lack of political will that prevents it from doing more in Afghanistan, where it has 2,000 troops. It says that with missions also in Kosovo and Bosnia, its forces are stretched thin. But if the world's third biggest economy is already exhausted by deploying 7,500 non-fighting troops abroad out of a total force of 270,000, what other than a lack of political will can account for this sorry state of its military affairs?

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, last year the U.S. spent $417.4 billion on defense or $1,419 per capita. France's total spending was $35 billion or $583 per capita, while Germany spent $27.2 billion or $329 per capita and is planning to freeze defense spending at current levels over the next few years.428

In accordance with the Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense 2003 published by the U.S. DOD, in 2001 the size of Germany’s Host Nation Support was $862 million much smaller than the Japanese contribution ($4.62 billion) even the amount of U.S. stationing forces is 71,434 in Germany. The German 21 percent of the U.S. stationing costs was the lowest when compared with Japan’s contribution (79 percent in 2001) or South Korea’s (39 percent). As shown in Figure 14429 the share of the costs in Germany is the smallest one from a list of the first top 10 U.S. allies.

427 Raymond A. Millen, 5.


In Germany, the withdrawal under the new 2005 BRAC process may bring some problems related to financial and social issues.

According to the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), the short-term consequences of U.S. withdrawal may be predicted and measured in three ways. First, more than 32,446 Germans have lost their jobs in U.S. bases since 1991 [1995 data]. Second, the United States has returned more than 92,000 acres of property. To put it into perspective, this amount of land is almost the same size as the German federal state of Bremen, and is twice as large as the U.S. District of Columbia. Third, the loss of more than $3 billion in annual spending by the U.S. military in the German economy will adversely affect local retailers and contractors.430

The 3 billion dollar sum included “…salaries of laid-off German civilians, and the loss of American military residents’ consumption in the German economy. However, most of the laid-off workers either found new jobs or were compensated though a special joint American-German benefits package.”431

However there are differences between the rural and city situation:

The completely different situation is in rural, underdeveloped areas without industry and other prospects than working in the large American military base. The German Counties hosting the Air Bases in Hahn and Bitburg demonstrated the link between the U.S. withdrawal and an almost instantly rising unemployment rate.432

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430 Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas Klemmer, 6.
431 Ibid., 29-30.
432 Ibid., 30.
Usually the closure of American bases in the rural areas affects those who heavily rely on American revenues, such as landlords for housing or civil employees. As an example in Bitburg the country had been closely linked with the Bitburg Air Base.

When the Air Force closed the base in 1994, it removed the district’s chief employer. Thousands of Americans left the area; a withdrawal felt painfully by their former German landlords. The lack of alternative job opportunities caused a temporarily, and sometimes lasting, dislocation of laid-off workers and contractors, who previously worked at the base. 433

In William Boston’s 2003 article, “Auf Wiedersehen, it’s Been Good to Know You,” treated the financial consequences of a possible American withdrawal for a couple of the most important locations:

However, the impact of troop withdrawals would hit some German communities hard. The Ramstein and Spangdahlem air bases, the largest U.S. military communities outside the U.S. are home to 40,000 American soldiers and relatives. Around 6,000 Germans are employed there. An economical study by the University of Trier concluded that the bases contributed 1.4 billion euro to the local economy in 2001, supporting some 27,000 full time jobs in a region with few other economic possibilities. 434

And referring to the same withdrawal subject, Zduniak concluded:

Additionally, the withdrawing of American Forces would mark the end of the certain era for the German society. U.S. bases, since the end of the World War II, were present on German soil and guaranteed the peace and stability for recovering the post-war state. During the Cold War, with the American military and support, Germany was the important political actor on the international arena. Nowadays, many Germans are afraid that with U.S. redeployment in the future, German importance in the world will weaken. 435

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433 Keith B. Cunningham, and Andreas Klemmer, 35.
435 Pawel Piotr Zduniak, 54.
G. SUMMARY

The presence of U.S. troops in Germany for more than half a century has left an enduring mark on the local society. It is visible in the world of sports and entertainment, business, culture, and politics.

The immediate period after the occupation was very important through the fact that the Americans left their imprint in building up a completely new society. The transplant of American beliefs on fertile Europe’s post war conscience gave birth to a new civilization.

In the late 1940s the establishment of the Iron Curtain was the new policy within Europe. The initial mission of the American troops in Germany had been re-configured in a new protective dimension, especially because the confrontation between East and West. The necessity of unity and cooperation of all European countries against the Soviet Union, paved the way for Germany in becoming a partner.

It is very important to mention the importance played by the composition of an after-war German society in the normalization between the conquerors and conquered. After the war the German population had a high percentage of women and children, which played an important role in reversing the perception from blame to compassion.

The summer of 1945 marked the definitive abandonment of the ban on fraternization and the end of the first stage in the way of normalizing the German society. Regarding the German children, contact with the American culture had been a great opportunity for developing an international culture and ridding itself of the Nazi heritage.

What started as a punitive occupation of an enemy country had, by 1948, turned into a protective occupation of a dependent people and was forged further through the Berlin Airlift events.

Further on, the Truman Doctrine, the introduction of the Marshall Plan, and impending merger of the Western zones of Germany into a single republic paved the way for the establishment of West Germany as a country and as a Western partner. In the beginning, the West German government lacked the necessary independence to negotiate
with the Allied commanders, and the lease of ground and installations necessary for defense purposes were without any financial compensation.

Regarding the basing of the American troops in Germany, there were mutations in the mid 50s, as West Germany became a sovereign state and was co-opted in the common defensive efforts of NATO.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, it became even more imperative economically for the U.S. and UK to convince others that a re-armed West Germany was vital to NATO’s defensive structure. Since that moment, the United States began paying all expenses to maintain, improve, or establish bases in West Germany; as compensation, West Germany agreed to lease the land to U.S. Forces for free.

The interdependence concept was part of the United States’ rhetoric in its attempt to cultivate European support for its evolving policy toward Southeast Asia, especially in the outbreak of Vietnam War. The Vietnam War period was the time when Germany and other European countries saw pacifist and anti-war movements begin to grow and there was a rising concern regarding the American presence.

In the mid 80s the quarrel about the commitment of the Europeans and their participation in the common efforts of defense was acute and growing, along with resistance against the American influence on the European policy. The European nations felt the presence of the American troops more as a burden and as a threat to the country, population, and environmental safety.

The events of 1989 brought not only German unification but also a complete change in the European political and security landscape. The sudden changes in Europe re-opened the aspiration for an integrated Europe capable of counterbalancing the U.S. hegemonic tendencies. Germany has become the leading proponent for European integration, and since the end of the Cold War has acted almost exclusively through international or multilateral organizations in world affairs, distancing itself more and more from the American influence.
The Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994 freed Germany from constitutionally mandated military abstention, and allowed Bundeswehr to assume missions outside of Germany.

In 2003 the NATO countries split over the war in Iraq, and the opposition led by France and Germany was directed against the Bush administration’s push for acting against Iraq’s disobedience to comply with the provisions of UN resolutions. Starting with this occasion in Germany, anti-Americanism has become the binder of different political parties. Europe distanced itself from the United States as well. ESDP proponents pounced on any opportunity to marginalize U.S. leadership in Europe, and any American withdrawal of troops from Europe would serve as a pretext to advance the EU agenda. The failure of the European partners to meet the necessary requirements for European security and support for the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, has opened the door for exacerbated quarrelling. The lack of participation was viewed, by the American side, as a lack of political will.

The actual American bases in Germany, of which a preponderance are in the western part of Germany, are a legacy of the first initial setting-up back in 1944. American troops stationed in Germany were over 10,000,000 personnel strong for 50 years (1950-2000).

After the end of the Cold War, U.S. officials started to observe that the present American base structure in Germany is no longer efficient. This military configuration was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy--the Soviet Union--during the Cold War era. The entire widespread infrastructure, the number of bases, landing strips and runways, and training areas for supporting such a large amount of conventional forces were not required anymore.

The new configuration of the American presence in the world started right after the end of the Cold War. After 2000, the presence of the American troops entered a new era regarding its relocation. The process of redeploying the present U.S. military structure from Germany was closely connected with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.
Among other reasons that may trigger such withdrawals may be the fact that the increasing German regulations impose additional pressure on the American troops, especially regarding the protection of the environment.

Overall it may be iterated that usually the closure of American bases in the rural areas affects those who heavily rely on the American revenues, such as landlords for housing or civil employees. As an alternative to the accompanying problems for base closures, compensation though the special joint American-German benefits package may be a solution.

The American presence in Germany has for along the last 60 years contributed the largest impact on the country’s past, present, and future political, economical, and social actions.
V. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The signing of the 2005 Access Agreement concerning the use of military facilities in Romania by the USA armed forces was a political decision of undeniable importance, which gave fresh impetus to the development of bilateral relations.436

Minister of National Defence, H.E. Mr. Teodor Melescanu

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis has endeavored to identify possible ways for making the Romanian-U.S. bilateral relationship a successful one in view of the inherent pitfalls of such defense agreements. In trying to provide useful tools to those officials responsible for the issues of policy associated with the guest forces in the host nation, this thesis offers conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations based not only on the character of Romanian society but also on the experience of other countries with similar experiences. The following conclusions are filtered, in turn, through the collective experience of representative U.S. allies and their experience of host forces in the past half century.

With the aim for minimizing the political and operational negatives, and hence to avoid the bi-lateral problems that have affected host countries elsewhere in Europe, as well as the wider world, this thesis seeks to emphasize the positive aspects and valuable lessons learned from the Japanese and German experience.

From the beginning, this thesis assumed that the presence of the American troops on Romanian territory could have both positive and negative civil-military consequences. And as such it will plainly affect the entire spectrum of the Romanian society, politically, economically, and socially.

By identifying the Romanian concerns and expectations, this thesis has tried to offer an answer by using past experience and possible remedies which can be found in similar cases of force and statecraft.

The author hopes that this study shall be of aid to the Romanian MOD as the designated authority for implementation of the AA in succeeding in performing its tasks from the perspective that the views of the Romanian society on the U.S. military may be projected onto its Romanian counterpart, and the military, in ensemble, may be made responsible for any dysfunction, misunderstanding or mismanagement.

Finally, this study seeks answers as to how one can reinforce the potentially positive aspects of such stationing while minimizing the potentially negative aspects.

B. POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

1. Conclusions

The relocation of the American troops in Romania is part of the new “lily pad” basing conception, which breaks with customs of the Cold War as concerns the U.S. force posture and makes "…’new NATO’ far more strategically responsive to the Middle East and Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Maghreb (North African states)."437 This concept is to ensure, as well, a better common training with the new host nation’s military while better serving the Americans’ “…own strategic interests."438 This concept would reduce costs for the U.S., and “[i]nstead of building its own bases as it has in the past, the Army would use other countries’ existing facilities."439 Another important issue for the U.S. is for it to avoid the environmental restrictions imposed by some countries in Europe.


The physical location of the American troops in Romania takes place in the context of recognizing the Black Sea region’s importance in the zonal, continental and world’s security.

Romania, as the vanguard of both NATO and EU in the new century, has to deal in the Black Sea region with a variety of asymmetric challenges and threats, beginning with the Russian hegemonic tendencies and its political, military and economic countermeasures, and ending with the proliferation of terrorist activities, drugs, arms and human trafficking.

Some countries may see the positioning of the new bases as a counter measure to the Russian Federation’s growing control and hegemonic aspirations over such hot spots as Transdnistria, Chechnya, and Abkhasia. The Russian interest in this part of the world is aimed at the control of natural resources, especially that of energy resources. In this context the Russian reaction is one of opposing the closeness of NATO troops to its borders and sphere of influence. Under these circumstances, the Russian reaction was to suspend its participation in CFE and vehemently condemn the new bases in Romania and the new plans of anti-missile capacities in Poland and the Czech Republic as a flagrant trespass of the convention. Another problem that needs consideration is the possibility that nuclear proliferation may increase in the Black Sea area, and a possible rocket missile threat may be directed towards Romanian territories.

The Russian policy towards Europe is not only political or military, but also economic. Since Europe is dependent on the Russian exports of energy, natural gas, and oil, Moscow has found political leverage in an “on-off faucet” strategy, or preferential contracting, which has already affected and may continue to affect Romania in the future.

Romania may face challenges not only from the East but also from West. The rise of the opposition to U.S. policy and strategy among the Western European countries and the formalization of the schism in NATO, opposed to the openness of Romania in hosting the American troops, may alter the relations between Romania and those EU countries opposing the U.S.’s hegemonic tendencies (Germany, France, and others). Romania may be challenged by some of the EU’s members in its political, economical, and other fields related to its integration in the EU.
The consideration of using Romania for basing troops first came in the spring of 2003 when Turkey decided against its involvement in Iraq. The MK Airport was a viable alternative solution for the refueling and supplying of the American troops, to the Turkish facilities.

The American presence in Romania currently lacks a Navy component due to the provisions of the Montreux Convention of 1936. Even though an American naval presence in the Black Sea would increase the security, Russia and Turkey are opposed to any change of the status of the Black Sea due to political and economic reasons. This is because it may affect their interests and influence. In this case, Romania is seen as “…assuming the role of the Trojan Horse at the Black Sea coast.”

Besides external concerns, internally, some of the public fears that the bases in Romania will be used for launching attacks against Iran, which will contribute to the degradation of security.

The presence of the American troops in Romania has strong political support and the overall opinion is that “…together with the American and European partners this region will be transformed in a security, and democratic zone, and will represent a future alternative source of energy for Europe.”

Romanian officials have emphasized on different occasions the fact that Romania “…retains the ownership of all the terrains, military bases, and other facilities that are going to be used.” This argumentation is made for making the point crystal clear that “…there will be no American bases on the Romanian territory.”

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440 The views presented in the original article "Wars for Hegemony at the Black Sea" of the Turkish author Barcin Yinanc in Turkish Daily News has been cited in the Romanian newspaper Romania Libera, July 05, 2007.

441 Alexandra Babiciu, “Taubman, Onorat că Gâzduiește Serbarea de 4 Iulie într-o Românie Membră a UE, Lucru Promovat de SUA” [Taubman Honored to Celebrate 4th of July in the EU’s New Member Romania, Whose Membership was Supported by US], MEDIAFAX, July 04, 2007.


443 Ibid.
As part of the benefits it is envisaged that the security provided by the presence of the American troops will make Romania a stable country and, implicitly, more attractive to foreign investments.

As part of the general security situation in Romania, there are opinions that terrorist organizations may target the American troops, which may certainly affect part of the civilian population. Those organizations may take advantage of chemical and biological weapons’ development, using these kinds of weapons as a primary means in their attacks against the U.S.’s partner states. The necessity of improving the defense against cyber and informational attacks must also be considered.

Regarding the formal framework, the signing of the AA and the creation of the Joint Committee completed the conclusion of the additional implementation arrangements, creating the legal responsibilities and basic rights of the parties. Additionally, the creation of the inter-ministerial committee ensured the civil control and oversight and the necessary political tools through the access of the decisional factors. The network at the national level involves all three related levels: political, political-military and military, for assuring the necessary expertise and for creating the related responsibilities.

Until now the military institutions have manifested an openness in informing the public. The transparency adopted by the Romanian MOD ensures that the civilians will have direct access to the process and offers the necessary information in assessing the achievements in implementing this bilateral agreement.

Regarding mass media, it may be observed that some Romanian newspapers are biased in presenting the reality and most of the time they hunts for the “sensational.” The information offered to the public is many times ambiguous, incomplete, and manipulated by implying rumors and speculation rather than the reality-- which disorients the public.

2. Lessons Learned

The changes in the international situation may trigger a redefinition of any security arrangements. The need for a rethinking of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and
the German attitude after the end of the Cold War, are living proof of such circumstances. Differences in the political and economic interests may have also a big influence toward reshaping any bilateral relation. The Japanese and the German cases sustain the idea that a political and diplomatic subordination and an increased dependence on others in providing security end in a crisis because of the effects that such policies can have on the political image of the host countries. Part of the recovery process, the use of the armed forces in different missions under the auspices of the UN, EU, OSCE and other international organizations may create higher visibility and an improved perception by the international community.

The changes in the future security situation (i.e. some major set back to the U.S. geo-strategy or gross escalation of conflict) may well trigger a necessary re-evaluation of a foreign military presence on the territory of another state, imposed firstly by the economic and financial reasons and secondly by the international opinion.

Deterrence of any possible aggression as part of a security alliance may fade with the passage of time, as the perception of the threat diminishes as well as the political culture grows and matures as has been seen elsewhere in the case of Europe and Asia. For continuing such an alliance a reevaluation of the aims and missions is needed. An increase of such a relation through the extension of a multilateral cooperation may represent a partial solution. As in the case of Japan, the possibility to include China “…in a strong multilateral security structure”\textsuperscript{444} may be crucial in dealing with the zonal security challenges.

The military actions conducted by the American troops around the world may trigger anti-war protest movements and raise the level of the anti-American sentiments. As this thesis has presented, the public opinion in both Japan and Germany became negative and opposed American policy and hegemonic tendencies during the time of the Vietnam War, Iraq wars, Afghanistan and others.

The analysis of the legal framework of the American military’s presence in Japan, and the new developments intending the revision of those documents (including SOFA) may represent valuable grounds for further interpretation of future trends, which may occur someday in similar alliances.

In both country-case studies, there was a re-discussion of the formal agreements in the first five to ten years. Particularly for Japan the “Special Measures Agreements” were discussed every five years.

In any country the press’ attitude may have a crucial role in influencing public opinion and political circles, and thus creating an opinion which most of the people will accept. The main observation is that in both Germany and Japan the more attention the press pays to an issue directly linked to the American military bases or security, the more that specific issue grows. Moreover for Japan the overall conclusion provided was that Japanese public opinion is event-driven.

As in Okinawa, public opinion may develop a hypersensitivity to events that happen around the military bases, which may cause a rising opposition to the presence of American troops. The tendency of the local media to report effectively from the “viewpoint of local residents, particularly under adverse conditions,” as a result, constantly reporting only negative issues and not covering issues that would place U.S. forces “in a favorable light” may create biased opinions. The example of Okinawa is self-explanatory. The example of Germany more or less tracks with this generalization, as well, especially with the rise of the environmental movement in the 1980s to say nothing of the pacifist segment in part of German political culture.

Miscommunication and wrong signals sent by officials may crucially influence public opinion. The case of Lt. Gen. Earl Hailston in Japan who called Okinawans “a bunch of wimps” in one of his e-mails which was published in the local press could be a valuable lesson learned.

Using not only English, but also the local language in sending messages targeting the locals may represent a valuable way for improving the communication and mutual understanding.
3. **Recommendations**

1. The opening of the MK military base should be presented in an efficient interconnection system with the other bases from Turkey, Bulgaria, and even the Middle East, and for no reason should it be seen as a supplement or a replacement of the bases from Turkey. It is the obligation of the Romanian military policy to promote this idea taking into account the new context of Turkey’s zonal and continental relationship with U.S.

2. It should be made very clear by the military informational sources about the status of the common use of the military site by both American and Romanian armed forces. The fact that Romania retains the ownership of all the terrains, military bases, and other facilities that are going to be used should be made very clear to the civilian mass media and population.

3. There should be better promotion of the political, military strategic and zonal security importance of the bases. Local authorities should be supported and backed up by the central authorities in their endeavor to represent the link between the official position and local perception of the American presence. The public should be informed and be convinced of the fact that the American presence in Romania is beneficial for both countries.

4. The necessity for transparency and correctly informing the civilian population on the scope and number of the American troops in Romania is very important and should be the attribute of the military press. A better understanding by the ordinary people through a sustained media campaign of the bases’ functions and attributes will help in perceiving the reality and reduce any possible tensions.

5. The cooperation and interoperability through common training of the Romanian military and the U.S. troops represent another positive aspect of the partnership. The Romanian military should take full advantage of this opportunity. A rotation of the Romanian troops involved in the common
training activities would be a good idea. Increasing the zonal cooperation with the military of riverane countries of Black Sea (not only Bulgaria) and their involvement in the American-Romanian common training activities may help in relaxation of the actual situation.

6. Regarding the internal and local security, the central and local authorities should pay increased attention to this aspect and take the appropriate measures for improving the security. The idea that “…this kind of thing did not happen until now in Romania” could be a weak excuse for not acting.

7. Re-discussion of the additional implementation arrangements of the AA, on a five-year basis, may be necessary for adjusting the legal framework to the new future conditions, which may avoid discrepancies between the understanding of the obligations and rights of the parties and the real conditions.

8. The Romanian and American officials have to be aware that there will always be a part of the civil society that opposes the American military presence on national territory. In response to that, the openness of the military institutions in informing the public should continue; a complete ignorance of the opposing part is not a solution and its actions may gain more value and force along the time. In this context all levels of the Romanian society should be aware of the fact that the presence of the American troops on Romanian territory will have both positive and negative civil-military consequences; only some of them may have subjective cause, while the majority of the other events normally happen in relation with any kind of military activities.

9. The U.S. counterpart may consider making the base newspapers bilingual in order to keep Romanian base employees and their families informed.

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445 ROMPRES, “Ministrul Apărării Anunță că Soldații Americani vor Sosi în Bazele din Constanța la Sfârșitul Lunii August” [The Minister of Defence Announces that the American Soldiers will Arrive at the Bases in Constanta at the End of August], June 20, 2007.
Another useful tool may be making the U.S. military website (if any in Romania) bilingual. Having a Romanian-speaking announcer on the base may also improve the communication.

10. Regularly informing the local community about the activities performed by the military, standards, and safety rules may constitute a good way for preventing problems. Briefing the local authorities on a regular basis by the base commander on this matter will help in constructing a continued dialog and reciprocal trust.

C. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

1. Conclusions

Regarding the American military presence in Romania, the civil society has expectations and concerns. Some of them originate from human nature while others are influenced by facts and local conditions and culture. The differences between the Romanians and Americans in understanding and approaching diverse issues may have the roots in the differences and dissimilar ways of perception and considering the reality, in differences between national and cultural backgrounds, in differences between life experiences. The local customs and traditions may also add some issues to the general perception. The differences in the purchase power between the American soldiers and locals may also affect their relation and interaction, making some of their actions biased.

Part of the social expectations, the opening of the MK site, “…brings jobs for 550 Romanians, with another 50 jobs possible as supplementation as soon as the operations start.”\(^{446}\) Considering the American presence at almost 3000 people, the employment ratio is 1/6.

For a community of approximately 10,000 people, as Mihai Kogalniceanu is, such an employer as the military base could be the most important one in the area.

\(^{446}\) Sânziana Ionescu, “Peste o Mie de Militari ai US Army vor Veni să se Antreneze la Constanța” [Over 1000 US Army Troops are Coming to Constanta to Train], MEDIAFAX, August 09, 2007.
The sums to be invested by the American counterpart at MK in the near future (approx. 35 million dollars on top of the 30 million dollars already spent) may not represent too much at the macro level, but it will make a difference at the micro level, and could play a major role in developing the local area and increasing the level of local business.

Some Romanians are concerned with what the central and local press label as an inevitable “drunkenness, rapes, fighting, scandals” from the American military.

For neighborhoods around the bases, the formation of a black market (drugs, arms, human trafficking) and local security degradation are seen as the main problems. A “colorful fauna” around the American military bases comprising drug dealers, arm and human trafficking brokers may appear, gravitating towards the “prosperity” mirage of the Americans. This situation may negatively influence the local society and may generate the extension of drug use among the civilians. At the end of the road, local security may be affected by the struggle between different gangs for controlling the local market.

Concerns were also expressed regarding the SOFA provisions. In this context, there is the opinion that the American soldiers may be prosecuted only over the ocean, by American martial courts, which, of course cannot punish them in favor of some ‘collateral victims’ from Eastern Europe.

Regarding the environmental concerns, all possible hazardous implications were included in the pages of the Romanian newspapers: pollution, vibrations, phonic pollution, and all possible ranges of accidents from possible plane crashes or aviation and artillery live fire. A part of the public opinion expressed worries about “… real catastrophes for locals,” which these kinds of incidents may generate.

Regarding the relative positive approach to the permissive environmental legislation in Eastern Europe, it may trigger disputes in the future when countries from this part of the world will align their policies to European standards.

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447 Maria Petrean, “Americanii vor Investi 34 de Milioane de Dolari la Kogalniceanu”, [The Americans Will Invest 34 Million Dollars at Kogalniceanu], Gardianul, August 01, 2007.
The general picture of the social realities shows that while at the central level, mainly politically represented, the attitude may be positive, the local level of society may encounter different conditions, which if not well evaluated may generate opposition. The discrepancy between the political and social is more evident where the central authorities do not back up the local ones in dealing with a foreign military presence. It is also true that the level of nuisance is directly proportional to the number and size of the bases. Another issue that should be mentioned is the discrepancy between the expectations of civil society and the reality. The bigger the difference is, the bigger the level of disappointment grows.

2. Lessons Learned

The previous experiences of Japan and Germany show that, over the years, the local community’s perception regarding the presence of the American troops suffered mutations in the way of considering more the problems and less the benefits of such presence. In Okinawa’s case, the locals saw “… incidents and accidents involving U.S. military personnel and other problems, real or invented, [as] a ‘burden.’”

The beginning of the American presence in Germany points to the fact that a material based relation between the American soldiers and locals, especially when there is a discrepancy in purchasing power, may generate social problems such as development of an underground market, prostitution and spreading of venereal diseases. If, as in the German case, the American soldiers seek the company of women “… for sexual rather than social reasons,” some of them may develop these relations and may marry local women.

The American military presence in other foreign countries generates high employment ratios related to the number of deployed American soldiers. The analysis of the employment ratio in Japan reveals a 1/2 ratio (“58,000 military personnel …

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449 Petra Goedde, Gis and German Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949, Yale University Press, 2003, 86.
supported by approximately 5,500 DoD civilian employees and more than 25,000 Japanese workers\textsuperscript{450} while in Germany this is slightly higher at around 3/4 (40,000 American soldiers and relatives, supported by around 6,000 Germans employees and contributing 1.4 billion Euro supporting some 27,000 full time jobs).

Usually the local population is not aware of the provisions (stipulations) of the documents regulating the presence of the foreign troops in their country. Especially in the cases of refusal of the American authorities regarding the transfer of custody of a suspect involved in a crime on the national territory of the host country, there is the perception that such action is against the national laws and rights of prosecuting the felons. Even though similar crimes, such as murder or rape, are committed by locals they do not receive similar attention from the local society as in the case when American soldiers are involved. After 1995, both the U.S. and Japan agreed on revision of the SOFA.

The revision of the SOFA was possible, as in the Japanese case, on the basis of a so called “sympathetic consideration” “… to allow Japanese prosecution of any military member accused of a crime against a Japanese national.”\textsuperscript{451} Under these provisions "heinous crimes such as murder, robbery and sexual assault"\textsuperscript{452} were considered.

The reality shows that the number of crimes committed by foreign soldiers may be larger than the known number, because some cases such as sexual assault or rape may go unreported because “… of fear for retaliation and shame.”\textsuperscript{453}

Reformation of SOFA was also called for allowing the local authorities to be involved in the examination of accidents.


Bureaucratic responses offered by the American officials, who use a complicated formal language, may inflict upon the local population the sentiment that their complaints and requests are not taken seriously.

Any military activity may cause incidents which are related to this special activity: crashes and near collisions of jets and helicopters; danger from munitions during live-fire exercises; lumbering trucks that aggravate the traffic congestion; threats to endangered species; noise pollution caused by the thundering noise of low flying military aircrafts, etc.

The fact that Germany and other European partners have less permissive environmental legislation, which involves a morass of bureaucracy requirements, stands as part of the motivation for re-basing the American troops; actually, it influences the fact that less time and effort is spent on training than getting to the training areas and back.

A short period of tour of duty of the American troops in the foreign countries triggers lack of continuity at both soldiers’ level and at the command level. During a short period, the command personnel are unable to foster mature, professional relationships with local officials. A six-month period is too short for the servicemen to get in contact with the local community and be aware of the local customs. In this case they fail to be “good neighbors.”

When deploying troops, the U.S. authorities should pay special attention to the cultural training and building up of the cultural awareness. Being aware of the local norms, habits, rules, and customs may have the advantage of avoiding a lot of misunderstandings, mistakes or even conflicts between the American military personnel and locals.

3. Recommendations

1. The American military presence plays a major role in developing the local areas and providing jobs and increasing the level of local business. The American counterpart should be aware that any misunderstanding or syncope in this area might generate a degradation of the civil-military
relations, in a sense that the American presence could be seen as a burden and not as an advantage. The lessons learned from Japan and Germany shows that the employing ratio in Romania is lower than in the case of these two countries, which may signify that in the near future the number of the local employees may (should) be increased.

2. As in Japan’s case, the integration of the Romanian troops, and physical stationing of units together with the American troops may generate positive perceptions from the public. The assignment of a Romanian Deputy Camp Commander and the participation of the Romanian military to the base protection may also increase the popularity of the American troops.

3. Positive contributions to the local economic development should be considered. For a better perception of the American presence in Romania, the point of bases’ contribution to the local economic development must be made clear. A better promotion of the size of the contribution and what it means at the local level would certainly improve the public’s perception.

4. The U.S. authorities should be aware of the benefits that a promotion of a “good neighbor” policy may generate for improving the communication with the local community. Under its auspices some local actions may be considered:
   - Establishing an international school, [and granting access to the locals];
   - Providing native English speakers to aide the Romanian teachers in teaching English;
   - English teaching program in schools and the prospects for expansion, volunteerism at orphanages, and beach clean-ups may be considered.

5. U.S. may consider the changing of the U.S. personnel policy and cultural awareness. Assignments which are 36-month tours for those accompanied by family members and 24-month tours for those who are not accompanied by family members, to get to know the community they live
in and become a more responsible member of that community, may improve the relations with the local community.

6. The MK base commander may consider limiting the places where the American servicemen may go. It has two advantages; first it would be easier for the military police to keep under control a limited number of locations, and secondly would avoid troubles for military personnel from entering the “wrong neighborhood.”

7. The military police from the MK base should consider a close cooperation with the local police and authorities in identifying the threats and the dangerous persons in the area of responsibility. The military garrison from Constanta should establish MP patrolling and filters in the area of MK base and inside the Black Sea coast spas.

8. The SOFA’s provisions should be better promoted through the communications channels to the civil society. The Romanian authorities may consider renegotiation of this document (as in the Japanese case) and in that case should pursue this issue in relation to the U.S. authorities.

D. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ISSUES

1. Conclusions

The relocation of the American troop plans after the mid 90s took into consideration the reduction of the military expenses by redeploying a certain number of troops in less expensive areas and improving the stationing and rotation planning. The selection of the new locations occurs by identifying those sites that require minimum investments for setting up or modernization. The infrastructure and depositing facilities have to be adequate for the purpose of basing American troops. After all, the Americans are after “…very efficiently and economically built” bases. Even more, there are critics

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who doubt the actual possibilities of relocating the troops from Germany as Lt. Col. Amy Ehmann, who said that "'There's no place to put these people' in Romania, Bulgaria or Djibouti, and she predicts 80% will end up staying in Germany."455

The actual presence of the American troops in Romania at the MK base had taken into consideration the appropriateness of this base to the Fetesti airport and Constanta seaport and rail hub. Those locations permit a quick inflow and outflow of troops in emergency cases, plus this area is the nearest located to the Black Sea allowing for interconnection with the other bases in Turkey, Bulgaria, and even the Middle East. It should be added that Dobrogea (the south-eastern part of Romania) is the closest location to the troubled areas of Transdnistria, Middle East, Caucasus, and Balkans.

In the last ten years, Romania has experienced a series of American investments, and a series of American companies have opened their business in Romania, especially in the food area. The opening of the MK base may generate economic benefits at the local level: “… local contracts for goods and services, the local employment for functioning of the base, and for necessary construction of the local and zonal infrastructure’s elements. At the same time, the American presence will help on promoting tourism capabilities of the zone, with a substantial impact for the near future."456

The reverse of this situation is that the locals “hunting for overnight profits” may cause the escalation of the prices, which may harm the local population. The rising of prices in the real estate business represents another aspect of the social implications. This issue is possible when one takes into consideration the increased purchasing power of the Americans. This situation might be good for doing business, but certainly will eliminate competitiveness on the local market since none can compete with the Americans. Until now, nobody was interested in acquiring properties in Mihail Kogalniceanu; however, the American competitiveness may generate negative feelings and anxiousness vis-à-vis the idea that the Americans dictate the prices and terms in the local real estate business.

456 Razvan Belciuganu.
The absence of any local economic programs may worsen the situation especially in the reduced activity’s period, when the level of employment or services contracted by the bases are decreasing.

2. Lessons Learned

As part of “burden sharing,” the host nation, not even obliged by the formal provisions of an agreement, may pay part of the costs related to the basing of the American troops on its national territory. The related payments may be considered as a reimbursement for the security provided by the presence of the American troops (Japanese case) or from benefiting of windfall expenditures from the "involuntary tourism" of United States' troops (German case). HNS may involve expenditures related to local maintenance costs (gas, electricity, etc), salaries of the locals employed by the military bases, or other similar costs. Starting in 1978 the HNS for the U.S. forces in Japan has been negotiated on a step-by-step basis every five years and concluded by adoption of special agreements through so-called Special Measures Agreements.

The HNS costs may differ from country to country. In the Japanese case it covered approximately 79 percent (as of 2001) of total cost for basing the American troops, representing a total of $4.62 billion. In the German case it was $862 million, which represented 21 percent of the total cost.

HNS may start as an expression of sympathy for the U.S. efforts in providing security, and may be a semi-legal artifice (as “Omoiyari” in Japan).

When military bases are established in a rural area, it may cause a dependence of the local population on the revenues coming from the bases, which otherwise wouldn’t have become part of the local economy. In the rural areas, where the principal economic activities are based on agriculture, fishing, food processing, and the manufacture of textiles and pottery, the increasing need for services and entrepreneurial contracts may cause, in the beginning of such a relation, a development of economic activity. For the local population, the jobs on the bases are well-paid, with handsome benefits and may be
fiercely competed for. Usually, the closure of American bases in rural areas affect those who heavily rely on the American revenues, such as landlords for housing, or civil employees.

The tourism related to the military presence and for recreational purposes may also constitute benefits for the local community. After 9-11, there are more and more concerns about a reduction of their profits from tourism because this activity was “…vulnerable due to the fear of terrorism directed at the U.S. military bases.”

Okinawa represents a case where the local economy had developed in relation with the needs for the American bases. The manufacturing industry has been neglected, “…while its service sector, largely dependent upon sales of imported goods, and its construction industry, which depends upon public works projects, are disproportionately overblown.”

When, in such a case, a military base is closed it can cause difficulties for the local economy, which, in absence of alternative economic programs, will collapse.

Wrong economic policies adopted by the central authorities may cause more harm in a similar situation. Again the Okinawa case provides valuable lessons learned by the fact that that the development program for Okinawa adopted by Tokyo, had as a consequence Okinawa’s dependence upon capital investment from the central government, and made Okinawa's economy heavily reliant on public works subsidies.

Additionally, economic facilities may attract local investors and a resurrection of the local economy. The establishment of the Okinawa Special Free Trade Zone, which is the only free trade zone in Japan, was created “…to encourage business enterprises to establish facilities in Okinawa and promote trade” and may serve as an example.

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457 Thom Shanker.
The German experience provides proof that in the urban areas the work power released by closing down a military base is easier absorbed by the local economy and in this case causes less harm to the local society.

3. **Recommendations**

1. The responsible Romanian authorities have to adopt the necessary measures for maintaining the continuous interest of the American counterpart in using the offered facilities. An advantageous offer with a long perspective, instead of a short one with immediate benefits, is preferable. The Romanian MOD’s central structures together with the local authorities should assist the American side in obtaining fair deals on the local market, thereby eliminating speculative offers.

2. The local authorities should be involved in ensuring a loyal competition and promotion of the serious contractors and firms for entering economic activities with the bases, eliminating “overnight profits hunters,” measures which may serve to generate mutual trust and cooperation.

3. Development of local economic programs which ensure economic facilities or tax exemptions may encourage and attract local investments, an expansion of the local economy and deter development of any dependency upon the needs of the military base.

4. The local authorities may sponsor re-qualification programs for the jobs needed by the base, and for learning English language, which may ensure a higher employment rate from the local population.

5. Advertising employment opportunities and services needed at the local level may improve the economic and financial benefits by attracting more locally-available resources. Using the same standards the local firms should be given priority by the base.

Even though the primary target of this thesis has been the Romanian civil political authorities and policy makers, as well as the Romanian MOD, the conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations provided may also be useful for the U.S. Department of
Defense in adjusting its ongoing presence in central and eastern Europe. Such an effort cannot be suffused with a false romanticism that assumes away the normal frictions associated with the stationing of foreign troops on national soil. The ease with which the experience of Japan and Germany has or has not been sufficiently factored into the so-called "lily pad concept" in the first years of the present decade requires a more balanced assessment and reflection. This thesis may also be useful for other countries, which face similar issues in hosting foreign troops on their territory. The author of this thesis suggests this in view of the unknown future of U.S. force posture in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. While the differences of politics and society, as well as contemporary strategies diverge, nonetheless this analysis has suggestive implications for those concerned with force posture in the Middle East as well.

This thesis has tried to provide a part of the necessary background for making the bilateral relationship under the AA a successful one, and may constitute a small piece in the solidifying of the U.S.-Romania relationship in both civil and military affairs.
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