

## **Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations**

**Hearing on Federal Building Security  
October 7, 1999, 2:00 p.m. 2167 RHOB**

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### **PURPOSE**

The purpose of this hearing is to assess the status of the General Services Administration's (GSA) federal building security program, and to review the progress of GSA in adopting the security recommendations of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and GSA Inspector General (IG). In a closed session to follow, the Subcommittee will receive testimony from GSA, the GSA IG, and GAO regarding the present state of security at specific federal buildings. The executive session is necessary to prevent any security deficiencies from becoming public.

## BACKGROUND

In response to the bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on April 19, 1995, the federal government introduced many initiatives to ensure the safety of the federal workforce and to preserve the federal building inventory. One of these initiatives included a Presidential Task Force to review the vulnerability of federal buildings.

The Presidential Task Force included representatives from the Marshals Service, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of State, the United States Secret Service, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Upon the conclusion of the nationwide federal building inventory security status review, the Task Force issued a report titled "Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities" (the DOJ Report) on June 28, 1995. The report recommended enhanced government-wide security standards for federal facilities, and provided the basis for GSA to implement a nationwide security enhancement effort.

The DOJ Report recommended that each federal facility enhance its security with a minimum set of standards based on specific security needs and requirements. These minimum security standards are then applied to the different security levels into which federal buildings fall. For security purposes, federal buildings are currently categorized as one of five levels, with Level I requiring the lowest level of security and Level V requiring the highest level. Level V facilities are buildings critical to national security, such as the Pentagon or CIA Headquarters, while a Level I facility has fewer than 10 federal employees and may have less than 2,500 square feet of office space. Most large federal office buildings and courthouses fall under Level IV. These security levels are based on such factors as number of federal employees, square footage, volume of public contact, and agency mission.

In order to assess the security of each facility, the DOJ Report recommended that each building establish a building security committee (BSC) and that these

committees review the need for security upgrades. As of 1998, more than 6500 BSC's were established, composed of tenant agency representatives, building employees, and union representatives. In mixed-use buildings, these committees also include private tenants. The members of the BSC are responsible for reviewing and assessing existing security measures, and making recommendations to meet minimum standards as outlined in the DOJ Report. The completed reviews are then submitted to GSA for assessment.

In fiscal year 1994, before the April 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, GSA obligated about \$96 million for building security for capital and operating expenses. From fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 1999, GSA obligated an estimated \$1.1 billion for building security. (See table below.)

#### General Services Administration

##### -Building Security-

Budget and Obligations for Fiscal Years 1994 – 2000  
(in millions)

##### Year Budget Actual

2000	\$289	---
1999	\$251	\$291 (projected)
1998	\$223	\$255
1997	\$338	\$258
1996	\$227	\$201
1995	\$116	\$109
1994	\$ 87	\$ 96

Immediately following the Oklahoma City bombing, GSA placed Federal Protective Service (FPS) Officers on 12 hour shifts, and hired an additional 800 contract security guards, which brought the nationwide total to over 3,000. During this period, GSA employed 376 uniformed FPS officers.

As of September 11, 1999, the number of FPS officers had increased to 646, with a target of 724 officers. For fiscal year 1998, the number of contract security guards reached 5,000.

GSA reports that it has been unable to recover sufficient rent to cover security expenses from tenant agencies and is in the process charging fees closer to the actual cost of providing the security.

## GAO and GSA IG STUDIES

In 1997, the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic Development requested that GAO evaluate the GSA building security upgrade program. Specifically, GAO was asked to determine (1) the criteria GSA used to assess security risks and prioritize security upgrades for its buildings; (2) the implementation and operational status of GSA's security upgrade program and the costs incurred by GSA, identifying both the funding source and the type of security upgrade (such as X-ray machines and security upgrades); and (3) whether any problems hindered GSA's implementation of the security upgrade program.

According to GAO's analysis, GSA made progress in implementing upgrades in federal buildings throughout the country, particularly in high risk buildings. The GAO found that approximately 7,000 upgrades were completed, and approximately \$353 million was obligated from the Federal Buildings Fund for the upgrade program between October 1, 1995 and March 31, 1998.

However, GAO found that GSA made mistakes in its rush to meet the timetable recommended in the DOJ Report. For example, GSA was hindered in its efforts to implement the security upgrade program due its reduced staff from downsizing, data reliability problems, and uncertain funding levels. Overall, as of 1998, GAO could not specify the exact status or cost of the building security program, and because GSA has not established program outcome measures, GSA and GAO could not estimate the extent to which completed upgrades resulted in greater security or reduced vulnerability for federal office buildings. As a result of these weaknesses according to GAO, GSA was not in a good position to manage its program to mitigate security threats.

During the spring of 1997, the GSA Inspector General (IG) reviewed expenditures made by the Public Building Service in connection with security enhancements for

federal buildings. The reports from this review indicated problems with equipment installation and implementation. In fact, some equipment, including X-ray machines, closed circuit television monitors, and magnetometers were found to be in storage, still in their original packaging two years after purchase.

At the request of this Subcommittee in early 1999, the GSA IG reassessed GSA's Public Building Service's (PBS) implementation of the security upgrade program. The GSA IG's study reviewed 207 major federal facilities, including installations located in each of GSA's 11 regions. While the GSA IG found a "marked improvement in the program's operational readiness," it also found that problems continue to exist.

Specifically, the GSA IG observed that although some installations of security countermeasure equipment were found to be incomplete, the number of instances was significantly lower than in June 1998. However, the GSA IG found that once the equipment was installed, it was not necessarily fully operational. In addition, the GSA IG expressed concern about the quality of data contained in the national federal building GSA security countermeasures database. According to the GSA IG, the information is "replete with inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated information, rendering the system useless for ongoing management of security operations or for decision making purposes." In eight instances, PBS used funds designated for security countermeasure efforts for other purposes. The total cost of these misappropriated expenditures exceeded \$900,000.

In its review, the GSA IG also found that a good percentage of the unused inventory identified in the GSA IG audit had been put in service, or had been designated for an identified or future use. The GSA IG identified over 200 cameras, monitors and VCRs in storage, which they have encouraged PBS to find a use for.

Based on GSA's continued difficulty in implementing the DOJ Report recommendations, the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management requested that GAO further investigate GSA's compliance with the GSA IG recommendations and the GAO June 1998 recommendations. Specifically, GAO was asked to evaluate the status of GSA's progress in (1) efforts to correct data in its building security upgrade tracking and accounting systems and to ensure all countermeasures are installed and operational; (2) efforts to ensure that all buildings have completed security evaluations; (3) the status of GSA/OMB

negotiations for funding security operations in GSA buildings; (4) developing building security outcome-oriented goals and measures; (5) a planned study of its security risk assessment methodology; (6) efforts to identify and correct instances of the inappropriate use of building security funds; and (7) the process GSA uses to determine agencies' costs or share of costs of building security upgrades, and whether selected agencies believe this cost is justified.

Another area of concern regarding the security of federal facilities is public access to federal building plans, including the possibility of internet access to these plans. After a thorough review of GSA's building plans release policy, the GSA IG made several recommendations, which would result in the reduction of access to the plans, thereby reducing potential security risks. Both the GSA IG and GAO will present testimony regarding the findings of their reviews to the Subcommittee.

#### STATE OF SECURITY OF SPECIFIC FEDERAL FACILITIES

GAO and the GSA IG are in the process of reviewing the state of security at several federal facilities. Due to the sensitive nature of this security information, GAO, GSA IG, and GSA will provide specific testimony relating to the current level of security at these federal facilities during a closed portion of the hearing.

#### WITNESSES

##### Open Hearing

##### Panel I

Mr. Bernard Ungar  
Director, Government Business Operations Issues  
General Accounting Office  
Accompanied by:  
Mr. Sherrill Johnson  
Deputy Director, Government Business Operations Issues

General Accounting Office

Mr. Eugene Waszily

Deputy Inspector General, Audits  
General Services Administration

Mr. Robert Peck

Commissioner  
General Services Administration

Accompanied by:

Mr. Clarence Edwards

Assistant Commissioner for the Federal Protective Service

**Executive Session**

Mr. Bernard Ungar

Director, Government Business Operations Issues  
General Accounting Office

Accompanied by:

Mr. Sherrill Johnson

Deputy Director, Government Business Operations Issues  
General Accounting Office

Mr. Eugene L. Waszily

Deputy Inspector General, Audits  
General Services Administration

Mr. Robert Peck

Commissioner, Public Buildings Service  
General Services Administration

Mr. Robert H. Hast

Acting Assistant Comptroller General  
Office of Special Investigation  
General Accounting

**STATEMENT OF EUGENE L. WASZILY**  
**ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING**  
**U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**  
**BEFORE**  
**THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS,**  
**AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**  
**COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE**  
**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
**THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1999**

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to provide to you an update on our continuing assessment of the General Services Administration's (GSA) efforts to enhance the level of physical security within Federal buildings. With me is Mr. Joseph Mastropietro, our New York Audit Office Regional Inspector General for Auditing, who has served as overall project director for audit work concerning security issues.

At the June 4, 1998, hearing on building security, we

reported that the Public Buildings Service (PBS) had made substantial progress in installing security countermeasures in Federal Buildings nationwide, and that the overall level of protection had been increased. However, we also stressed that serious operational, financial and administrative shortcomings plagued the program and weakened its effectiveness. The PBS Commissioner reported to you on the actions he had taken and additional actions planned to address the deficiencies we had found. Our office pledged to the Subcommittee that we would continue to work with PBS and monitor implementation of its corrective actions. In addition to fulfilling that promise, our office during the ensuing 15 months has undertaken additional audits to assess other aspects of PBS's physical security program. I now would like to present to the Subcommittee the results of our more recent work, and discuss our current and future initiatives.

## **Security Countermeasures Program**

### **Implementation Improves**

In late fall of 1998, we launched an extensive follow-up audit of PBS's installation of major security countermeasures, such as x-rays, magnetometers, and surveillance equipment, to assess how well physical building security enhancement projects were progressing.

To conduct our review, we selected 207 major federal facilities, including installations in each of GSA's 11 regions. We examined financial and operational records

and physically inspected the security countermeasures in place at each location.

Our work disclosed that PBS had made improvement in ensuring that security countermeasures were installed as planned. For the 207 buildings visited, we identified eight (8) countermeasures that were reported as completed but were not in place. In comparison, our earlier study, covering 159 buildings, identified 32 missing countermeasures. We were especially pleased with the progress made in the National Capital Region, where we identified only one deficiency at the 25 surveyed buildings. In contrast, our earlier work found 24 instances of missing or uninstalled countermeasures based on a review of 52 buildings.

PBS has also taken steps to make use of most of the \$2 million security equipment inventory that our original audit found sitting in a Washington, DC warehouse. Most of the more expensive equipment items, such as x-rays and magnetometers, have either been put in service or had a designated use planned. The inventory still included over 200 cameras, monitors and VCRs in storage. We have encouraged the Federal Protective Service to survey all of its other regions to determine whether they have any use for this equipment.

While the assessment of physical security equipment installations showed substantial program improvement, far less progress has been made in ensuring that PBS has accurate and reliable information concerning security countermeasure installations throughout the nation. Our review noted database discrepancies for information related to 104 of the 207 buildings in the study. In total, we identified 178 data exceptions related to these facilities. These inaccuracies render the national database unreliable for program management and decision making purposes. They also demonstrate the

need for more effective coordination between policy makers and regional officials with implementation and operational responsibilities.

In our original report, we noted that several regional offices had used security funds to acquire unapproved items and services. Our follow-up work identified 8 additional instances where funds specifically reserved for security countermeasure efforts had been expended for other purposes. The total security funds expended for unapproved expense items exceeded \$900,000.

Our follow-up study also raised a new concern: security countermeasures that had been installed but were not operational, and had not been operational for several months prior to our visits. At the 207 buildings inspected, we found 19 major security devices not in use, largely due to equipment breakdowns or because of discontinued use by tenant agencies. This suggests to us that physical security personnel have not always been effectively coordinating work with PBS buildings operational personnel to ensure that security systems are consistently maintained in full operational mode. It also suggests that better coordination and communication between PBS and the tenant Building Security Committees is needed.

### **NEW INITIATIVES**

Over the past year, we have completed, or have ongoing, other work related to security at Federal facilities.

#### **Improved Security Through Better Design and Construction Techniques**

One way to enhance public safety is to design new facilities to give more consideration to security

concerns and employ construction techniques that enable new or renovated buildings to better withstand assault with explosives.

In October 1995, following the Murrah Federal Building bombing, President Clinton issued an Executive Order that created the Interagency Security Committee. Chaired by GSA's Administrator, the Committee was formed to establish policies for developing and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities, ensuring compliance with such standards, and overseeing the implementation of appropriate security measures. GSA focused on developing enhanced security standards for planning, designing, and constructing new buildings, and for major renovation projects. GSA adopted a draft of the standards in January 1997. The Interagency Security Committee approved the enhanced standards, with minor modifications, in November 1998.

We conducted an audit to assess GSA's application of the new standards within its own construction program. Our evaluation of the security standards for new and renovation buildings concluded that GSA is applying the enhanced standards where possible; however, the standards are too new to have been applied to every phase of all current building projects. Since new construction projects take a number of years from the time a need for a building is identified to the actual construction, most current projects were planned prior to the development of the standards. GSA has been applying the standards as practicable. In addition, most construction projects currently underway are either for border stations, which are unique buildings exempt from the new standards, or projects to build courthouses. While courthouse construction would be subject to the standards, GSA and the Administrative Office of the Courts have agreed, in a memorandum of understanding, that new courthouses will follow a

unique set of rigorous, prearranged protection standards, and will not be subject to the individual threat assessments prescribed by GSA's standards.

While the study found that GSA is applying the new construction standards whenever possible, we did note that GSA had not used assessment standards when considering commercial properties for new leases of space. We also pointed out to management that some regional personnel are unclear regarding which PBS work units should have lead responsibility for ensuring that security considerations are factored into each phase of project development. PBS management agreed with our points and is working internally and with the Interagency Security Committee to establish supplemental policies.

### **Safeguarding Blueprints**

We also performed a review of public access to Federal building design plans. GSA, as the Government's primary landlord and property manager, is involved with the construction and major repair and alterations of many Federal facilities. Integral to such construction work is the development of design plans that detail the physical layout of the structure and interior space of the building. While blueprints are necessary for use in performing repair and alteration work, they contain information that would be very useful to terrorists intent on attacking a building.

We initiated this review upon learning that a set of Federal building blueprints had been provided to a

nonprofit organization considering a municipal revitalization project next to the Federal building. GSA officials had released the plans without any restrictive language regarding release to third parties and without stressing the need to safeguard the plans. With further research, we learned that Federal building design plans are, in many cases, available to the general public through several sources. More disconcerting was the fact that some of these sources were considering including Federal blueprints and designs in web sites on the Internet. Clearly, this would present a heightened exposure to physical security risks. Our audit surfaced a number of questions which needed to be addressed:

- Should GSA provide Federal building design plans to outside parties without specific provisions for physically safeguarding the plans?
- Should recipients of the plans be required to acknowledge any non-disclosure requirements?
- To what extent are plans available to the public, and what are the security risks arising from it?

A number of factors and differing opinions by various agency groups exist with regard to the need to allow access to design plans, in order to accomplish necessary work without materially increasing security risks.

We concluded that GSA needs to reevaluate current policy to determine when public access to plans represents a security threat, and decide if policy changes should be made in light of the Agency's responsibility to safeguard property and lives in today's environment of more heightened security concerns. PBS management is in full agreement with the

issues and concerns that we raised. The Commissioner established an intra-organizational task group to develop policy that will allow needed drawings and plans to be given to contractors and governmental officials, but will reduce the opportunities for plans to fall into the wrong hands. An instructional letter establishing this policy has been prepared and will soon be issued.

### **Contract Security Guard Program**

In the past few years, the estimated numbers of contract security guards has doubled to an estimated 5000 to 6000, costing \$120 million. Guards are employed to perform access control and security patrols. As more electronic security systems have been added to Federal facilities, guard personnel are increasingly assigned to operate these devices.

In recent months, we have initiated a nationwide review to assess the effectiveness of the security guard program. We are still in the survey phase of our work, but we have already encountered individual circumstances, which are unacceptable. Specifically, we have noted guard personnel placed in service without being subjected to criminal background checks. We have also found guard personnel posted without proper training, and guard service firms providing inadequate levels of service for extended periods of time. While it will take several additional months of work before we can form an overall assessment of the contract security program, it is clear from our initial work that improvements are needed.

### **Summary**

In summary, over the past year we have reviewed various aspects of the PBS physical security program finding

that many of its elements have achieved substantial improvement since our earlier assessments. From our work, we conclude that the senior managers of PBS are committed to a sound physical security program for federal facilities. They have developed ample policy guidance, and when our work has pointed out implementation shortcomings, they have reacted rapidly to correct the deficiencies. That said, what remains of concern to us is the lack of an effective oversight system to ensure that PBS policy and plans are implemented as intended. We appreciate PBS's efforts to empower its employees and assign decision-making responsibilities to the individuals who are closest to the task at hand. However, we believe that a monitoring loop of some kind is essential to ensure critical requirements are fulfilled.

Madam Chairman, this concludes my formal statement. I would be pleased to address any questions you and the Members of the Subcommittee have.

### **Background Information**

The terrorist act of April 19, 1995, which destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds of others, caused President Clinton to direct the Department of Justice to assess the vulnerability of Federal buildings nationwide to acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. Under the leadership of the United States Marshals Service, security experts from across government were assembled to classify federal properties into one of five security levels and define minimum-security standards for each classification. Then, federal facilities were physically surveyed to identify existing security conditions and prescribe what additional measures would be needed. Overall, the study found that the typical federal facility lacked

some of the features required meeting the new minimum standards.

Except for extremely high-level security sites, where agencies established their own unique security system, GSA was given the responsibility for upgrading security countermeasures for over 5,000 federal facilities. Within GSA, the Public Building Service (PBS), through its Office of Federal Protective Service (FPS), was given the responsibility for implementing the security countermeasures upgrade program. Program policy was developed at FPS headquarters in Washington, DC, while the responsibility for actual implementation of the security systems and providing additional security personnel was assigned to the 11 FPS regional offices. Congress authorized GSA to spend \$240 million to acquire and install x-ray screening devices, closed circuit television systems, lighting systems, protective barriers and other devices, as well as to significantly increase the number of security guards at many federal facilities.

In the spring of 1997, the Office of Inspector General first began hearing of possible implementation and financial problems affecting the security upgrade program and immediately initiated our review. Later, we became aware that the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic Development had asked the General Accounting Office to review GSA security efforts. We arranged to coordinate the work of our respective offices.

At the June 4, 1998, hearing held by the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic Development, concerning PBS's progress in upgrading the physical security system at federal facilities, we reported that, while overall security had been enhanced, serious operational and administrative shortcomings hampered

full implementation of the security upgrade program. We noted that FPS Central Office did not establish adequate guidance in critical areas, such as equipment procurement and installation, cost control and countermeasure criteria. Even though FPS designed and implemented a centralized physical security database, to a large extent, the regions provided unreliable data to Central Office. Given the significance of the program, the Subcommittee had requested that FPS intensify its efforts to correct the deficiencies and, after allowing a reasonable time period for corrective action, that our office reassess program implementation progress.

STATEMENT OF  
ROBERT PECK  
COMMISSIONER  
PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND  
INFRASTRUCTURE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS,  
AND  
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
October 7, 1999

Robert Peck

Commissioner

Public Buildings Service

General Services Administration

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Good morning, Madame Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the General Services Administration here to update our progress in improving security in Federally-controlled workspace. I am Robert Peck, Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service of GSA. Accompanying me today is Clarence Edwards, Assistant Commissioner for the FPS.

As I have stated before, we have no more important task than assuring the safety of the one million Federal employees who work in and the millions of Americans who visit the Federally-owned buildings and leased facilities we provide. Since the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, we have doubled our spending on security to a total of \$1.2 billion and have nearly doubled the size of both our uniformed and contract guard force.

I was pleased to read the General Accounting Office's (GAO) report on the additional progress that we have made in the past year. I have some comments on their report. Following me, Mr. Edwards will update you on the continuing

enhancements we are making to the Federal Protective Service (FPS).

I hope you will permit me to reflect briefly on the complexity of our topic here today: security in public buildings. Last March, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan gave the keynote address at the Public Buildings Service's biennial Design Awards Ceremony. The ceremony was held, appropriately, in the beautiful Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. Today's closed session will provide an opportunity for a more in-depth discussion of security in that building, which has rapidly come to epitomize a public building that works on a number of different levels: a secure workplace, a commercial crossroads, and a stimulus to urban vitality.

Senator Moynihan observed that the Reagan Building represents President Kennedy's vision of architecturally distinguished Federal buildings and a Pennsylvania Avenue transformed into a "lively, friendly, and inviting as well as dignified and impressive" public space. He went on to note that since President Kennedy articulated that goal, security has changed the face of official Washington with Pennsylvania Avenue itself closed in part and the White House, Capitol, and many Federal office buildings ringed by Jersey barriers. He called on us to have a national dialogue about security and terrorism and urged that our response "...be openness and fearlessness in the face of those who hide in the darkness."

As I say to our FPS personnel and others, we are the Public Buildings Service and must not become the Fortress Buildings Service. It is easier to guard top-secret facilities: you can place them off the beaten path, erect tall, forbidding fences and keep out most everyone except employees. We, on the other hand, locate Federal offices in the midst of our communities and must not only admit but also welcome the vast numbers of Americans who have legitimate business with or need help from the government representatives in our buildings. We have a tough job to do and we are doing it well.

### Response to GAO Report

The GAO report correctly concludes that we have improved on a number of fronts since it last evaluated our efforts. The report notes the efforts we have made to ensure that our buildings have been assessed for security needs. Ninety-eight percent of our high-risk buildings and 96 percent of our lower-risk buildings have been evaluated for our security needs. In addition, as GAO noted, we have

developed a new, risk assessment methodology; we are pilot-testing it now and expect to roll it out in January 2000. This is a complicated subject and I will be glad to comment on it further in closed session.

Another accomplishment cited by GAO is the agreement reached between GSA and OMB on funding the costs for the upgraded security program. Beginning in fiscal year 2000, all Federal agencies will pay a basic security charge of \$0.16 a square foot, compared with the previous \$0.06 per square foot. In some locations where additional security measures increase costs, there will be an additional charge above the new standard charge.

We have had each of our regions certify to the accuracy of its report to us on completion of the more than 8,000 security countermeasures nationwide that local Building Security Committees requested we make. We have upgraded the countermeasure tracking system. While we agree with GAO that there are still some discrepancies between what appears in the database and installed countermeasures, their data and ours indicate that nearly all countermeasures originally contemplated are up and functioning, and it remains a high priority for us to eliminate the discrepancies.

GAO reports that we still have not settled on performance measures for the FPS and that is true. On the one hand, I believe that with respect to terrorism the ultimate performance measure is a digital one. It is zero—no harm to anyone—or one—which means a calamity. Since Oklahoma City, we have had no major terrorist incidents in our buildings, no injury, or loss of life because of terrorism. Deterrence is the key in counter-terrorism and it depends principally on the intelligence-gathering capabilities (which are high) of other national, state and local agencies. We have enhanced our own intelligence analysis capability as part of the FPS improvement effort that Mr. Edwards will describe. The defensive physical barriers, technological, and human resources at our buildings are the last line of defense in the fight against terrorism.

On the other hand, we do collect data on security performance and it, too, tells an encouraging story. We believe our anti-terrorism measures are having an impact on other crimes against people and property in our buildings. In 1998, crimes against persons have decreased by X percent compared to 1995 and property crimes have declined by X percent. We are tracking the number of weapons violations detected in our buildings, a statistic we did not track before. We are also tracking reports of

bomb threats and actual devices.

Part of the challenge facing our security program is not only to do the job but also to convince the various users of Federal buildings that the buildings are safe places to work, visit, and conduct business. The cornerstone of our efforts to measure this perception is the customer satisfaction surveys we conduct annually. Customer satisfaction for "security of individuals within a building" increased from a mean of 3.19 in 1994/1995 to 3.52 in 1997/1998 or ten percent. Generally, Federal employees feel safer.

Anyone familiar with PBS these days can tell you that I have insisted that we focus intensely on performance measures. I believe in the business dictum that you get what you measure. You also have to be careful what you measure. Police forces have learned that measuring arrests generates a lot of arrests but not necessarily a reduction in crime. I can assure you that we are looking hard internally and seeking outside advice to find the right performance measure or two that will encourage all our security personnel to concentrate on the right things.

### The New FPS

Mr. Edwards will be discussing the specific improvement initiatives currently underway in the FPS. I simply want to describe how the initiatives came about and how they fit together.

The New Federal Protective Service came out of a 3-day "charette"--an architectural term for an intensive group planning process--held in April 1998. Participants in the workshop included GSA managers, police officers, physical security specialists, criminal investigators, the unions, as well as representatives of the Departments of Justice and Interior, Social Security Administration, and the American Society for Industrial Security. What emerged from the session was a series of specific recommendations. Mr. Edwards has taken these and, with an experienced team, combined them with some changes in strategy and tactics.

One key, new policy change is to shift FPS from its "patrol and response" posture to a community-policing model increasingly being adopted by police forces, campus security forces, and the like. Under "patrol and response," FPS units were poised to respond rapidly once alerted of an incident. With increased training under

the new model, FPS officers will aggressively patrol in and around buildings, looking for security gaps, gathering information, training building tenants in deterrence, and monitoring the performance of equipment and contract guards.

We are changing staffing functions in FPS in response to recommendations from the policy charette, shifting the emphasis from law enforcement to workplace security. Specifically, we are establishing two new positions within FPS, a career-laddered, uniformed position that combines law enforcement with security skills and an associated manager's position. The charette working group also identified the lack of standardized policies and procedures as a barrier to operational effectiveness; this is being remedied through a recently completed revision of the security and law enforcement handbook.

We also recognized some weaknesses in the screening and selection process as well as training. FPS recently instituted new medical and psychological standards and tests all FPS applicants to make sure these criteria are met. At the end of the basic training course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, we have added a two-week course for our recruits that trains them in the specific mission of the FPS. Training for physical security specialists is also being increased, and we are working to have FPS physical security specialists certified by an outside organization that commands great respect in the facility security field. In addition, the first class of FPS supervisors has graduated from a supervisory course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Contract security guards comprise the largest portion of the PBS security budget. We determined that we needed to change procedures in selecting and monitoring contractors and assigned two of our contract specialists to work on this problem. They have developed a set of model contract specifications for the program and have detailed procedures to allow us to contract for these services based on "best value" rather than low bid. Mr. Edwards will discuss this change in more detail, including efforts in the area of background checks for our contract guards and other upgrades.

In our efforts to improve our security response, we have been greatly aided by the work of the GSA Inspector General's office, whether it is in uncovering inconsistencies in our countermeasure implementation or in monitoring and enforcing our security contracts. Our IG's audits have been helpful and constructive. Similarly, we believe the GAO reports on our security program have

been fair, thorough, and constructive.

I would like to take a moment to introduce Clarence Edwards to you. Mr. Edwards has assumed the key leadership role in moving FPS to where it needs to be to meet the security challenges that face us. I was delighted when Clarence Edwards accepted my offer to join the PBS management team about two years ago; he is the right person for the job. Starting his career as a patrol officer with the U.S. Park Police in 1963 and leaving as a major, he has assumed increasingly challenging management positions in law enforcement. He was Chief of Police for Montgomery County, Maryland from 1991-1994, where a hallmark of his leadership was increasing the total number and diversity of the force as well as installing modern policing techniques, such as community outreach programs. As you will see, he is smart, dedicated and unrelenting.

Either now or following his testimony, I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify on how we at GSA are responding to our duty of providing security while preserving openness in the buildings that represent our democracy to the citizens in more than 1,600 communities across this nation.