The Secretary of the Army's
Task Force on Extremist
Activities

Defending American Values

March 21, 1996
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For over 220 years the United States Army has been the defender of the Nation and the values embodied in our Constitution. That sacred bond of trust between the Army and the American people was brought into question on December 7, 1995, when soldiers allegedly committed two racially motivated murders in Fayetteville, North Carolina. The Army is a reflection of American society and has a 21% annual turnover of personnel. The Army cannot escape the growing impact of extremist and racist organizations in our society at large; but clearly, the Army must identify and address indications of extremist and racist attitudes among soldiers and appropriately deal with extremist behavior when it occurs. The Secretary of the Army formed this Task Force to determine the scope and impact of extremist activities within our ranks and to make recommendations.

The Task Force visited 28 major Army installations in the United States, Germany and Korea during January and February 1996. Task Force support teams interviewed soldiers, both individually and in groups stratified by race, ethnicity and rank; and checked a variety of military and local law enforcement records for evidence of extremist activity. During 7,638 interviews, less than one percent (0.52%) reported that a soldier or Army civilian was an active participant in an extremist group. Additionally, less than one percent (0.98%) reported coming into other types of contact with extremist groups on or near Army installations.

The Army Research Institute analyzed confidential written surveys of 17,080 soldiers administered at the 28 installations where interviews were conducted. In the survey 3.5% of the soldier participants reported they have been approached to join an extremist organization since joining the Army. Another 7.1% reported they knew another soldier whom they believed to be a member of an extremist organization. The Task Force concludes that interview findings are more accurate than survey findings due to the greater ability of personal interviews to corroborate reports and eliminate duplicative reporting. We also consulted with nationally recognized human rights organizations to ensure a full understanding of the challenges of extremism and racism in the Army.

The Task Force concludes that there is minimal evidence of extremist activity in the Army. However, other areas of concern were identified. While leaders and soldiers perceive that extremist activity is minimal in the Active Army, all soldiers agree that the Army is no place for extremists. Extremist groups are visible and active in communities outside some Army installations; however, local law enforcement authorities state that extremist groups do not seem to be specifically targeting soldiers for recruitment. The Army regulation on participation in extremist organizations is misunderstood and confusing to soldiers and junior leaders. Existing Army training programs and
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assessment tools do not adequately address extremism. Gang-related activities appear to be more pervasive than extremist activities on and near Army installations and are becoming a significant security concern for many soldiers. Existing open installations combined with less regulated barracks policies have degraded the commander’s knowledge about potential illegal activities after duty hours.

While assessing the extent of extremism in the Army, the Task Force found many contributing factors. Overt racism is suppressed by Army policy, however there is an undercurrent of subtle racism which reflects a similar undercurrent in contemporary American society. The impact of this undercurrent is aggravated by the high Operational Pace of units, a “zero defect” mentality, and inexperience among first-line supervisors. The Army’s Equal Opportunity Program is not effectively educating soldiers in units and in Army schools on extremism or providing a tool for commanders to assess and improve the human relations environment in their units.

The Task Force makes twelve major recommendations:

- Clarify and expand the Army’s regulation on extremist activity.
- Conduct separate assessments of extremist activity in the Reserve Components and Army civilian workforce.
- Develop a reporting process for timely and accurate information sharing on extremism among appropriate staff agencies.
- Ensure that all law enforcement and other relevant information on extremist activities is disseminated to battalion and lower levels.
- Develop a process to evaluate soldiers’ behavior, adaptability and human relations sensitivity during recruitment and Initial Entry Training.
- Review soldier Initial Entry Training to ensure necessary discipline, motivation, team building, and inculcation of Army values.
- Review leadership and human relations training in all pre-commissioning and professional development training.
- Review the Army Equal Opportunity Program, including staffing, training and the complaint process, to ensure responsiveness to the contemporary needs of soldier and leaders.
- Clarify Army policies and chain of command responsibilities for soldier quarters.
- Ensure that membership in fraternal, social or private organizations does not impact on the conduct of official Army duties.
- Request Department of Defense review DoD Directive 1325.6 and issue guidance on extremist organizations and activities.
- Develop a Department of the Army Pamphlet on extremist activity for use by leaders at all levels.
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Report of the Secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities

DEFENDING AMERICAN VALUES

This report provides the observations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities: Defending American Values (hereafter referred to as the Task Force). The Secretary announced the Task Force on December 12, 1995, in response to tragic events which ran counter to the special bond between the American people and the soldiers sworn to protect them. The specific catalyst for the Task Force was the homicides of Mr. Michael James and Ms. Jackie Burden on December 7, 1995, in Fayetteville, North Carolina. To date, three soldiers have been charged in direct connection with that crime. Rather than focus exclusively on the Fayetteville homicides, the Task Force was charged to determine the extent of involvement by soldiers in organizations which promote extremist activity, and to assess the overall human relations environment throughout the Army. Task Force members were:

Major General Larry R. Jordan       Deputy The Inspector General

Ms. Karen S. Heath                  Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
                                      (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Mr. John P. McLaurin III            Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
                                      (Military Personnel Management and Equal
                                      Opportunity Policy)

Brigadier General Daniel Doherty    Commanding General,
                                      U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

Sergeant Major Gene C. McKinney     Sergeant Major of the Army

Task Force Member biographies are at Annex A.
Acknowledgments

The Task Force was assisted in its efforts by over 50 officers, noncommissioned officers, and Army civilian employees (Department of the Army Civilians and Non-Appropriated Fund employees) who provided full-time support in coordinating and conducting field visits, developing data collection instruments, collecting and analyzing that data, and providing detailed policy research. The Task Force wishes to publicly acknowledge the hard work of this full-time support staff along with the many thousands of Army team members at installations worldwide who facilitated our visits and participated in data collection. The Task Force also acknowledges the contributions of the outside agencies, both Federal and private, who provided valuable time and expertise to this effort. The value of their individual and collective efforts will be evident in the America’s Army of the future.

Larry R. Jordan
Major General, United States Army
Task Force Chair

Karen S. Heath
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Task Force Member

John P. McLaurin III
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
Task Force Member

Daniel Doherty
Brigadier General, United States Army
Task Force Member

Gene C. McKinney
Sergeant Major of the Army
Task Force Member
Part I

IMPACT OF EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

"I ... do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . ."

With these words soldiers, whether they be commissioned officers or the newest recruits, enter the service of their country and the United States Army. In taking this oath, soldiers swear allegiance not only to the Constitution, but also to the values our citizens hold most dear. The Armed Forces of the United States are, in a very real way, the ultimate guarantors of the American way of life. In particular, the United States Army and its soldiers have proved this out with sacrifices of sweat, blood, and lives on battlefields at Lexington, Gettysburg, Bataan, Normandy, Pusan, the La Drang Valley, and Medina Ridge, along with other places too numerous and obscure to mention here. As such, the bedrock American values of the worth and dignity of every person, the respect for diversity, tolerance of differences, and civil rights of all must not just be protected by the Army, but also practiced by it. For over 220 years, the American people have had a special relationship with their Army. Soldiers have always been our sons and daughters but, since 1972, they have been sons and daughters who felt a special calling and volunteered for the task of defending America.

Regrettably, the homicides of Mr. James and Ms. Burden in Fayetteville, NC, allegedly by soldiers who harbored extremist views and racial motivations have called into question the reputation of the Army and the relationship it enjoys with the American people. That there might be soldiers whose political views and personal biases are so extreme as to lead them to murder innocent citizens has raised the disturbing possibility that there may be others in the Army with similar attitudes who could display such illegal and reprehensible behaviors. The mission of this Task Force was to assess the influence of extremist groups in the Army and to review the human relations environment, in particular the effect of extremist groups on that environment.

The areas of interest which are reported herein include: the extent of extremist activity in the Army; the way in which the human relations environment in the Army impacts extremism; the manner in which the leadership deals with extremism; and recommendations to more effectively deal with the extremism. This report concentrates on a central theme. The Secretary wanted to report to the American people on a very focused issue which arose from the Fayetteville homicides: the extent of extremism in their Army.
Historically, the Army leadership has dealt effectively with blatant acts of extremism. The Army is a value-based organization. Annually the Army replaces approximately 21% of its force from American society. All possess differing attitudes, behavior, and mores. The Army soldierization (socialization) process seeks to instill the professional soldier’s core qualities of commitment, competence, candor, courage, and compassion. The leadership recognizes its responsibility to develop and mold soldiers, and thus seeks to change inappropriate behavior in the short term and to change attitudes in the long run. The goal is to develop good Americans, as well as good soldiers who internalize and practice the Army ethos of duty. Contained within the concept of duty are the values of integrity and selfless service which are outlined in the Army Field Manual 100-1, The Army. Officer and noncommissioned officer leaders model soldierly values as part of their effort to ensure ethical excellence in units and soldiers. Those soldiers who cannot internalize the Army values do not remain in the service.

Commanders and leaders have the administrative and disciplinary tools to deal effectively with manifestations of extremist behaviors. Interactive systems are in place to address extremist activity in the Army (i.e., Uniform Code of Military Justice, administrative sanctions, required Equal Opportunity and Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army training, mandated unit command climate assessments, required performance evaluations, and counseling).

In addition to the leaders in the chain of command, the Army has trained, dedicated, and full-time chaplains, equal opportunity advisors and inspectors general with an assigned mission to monitor the human relations environment. These systems are designed to be proactive, not merely reactive. Previously, however, they have not focused on extremism.
ASSESSMENT OF SOLDIER PARTICIPATION IN EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

It is the conclusion of this Task Force based on available information that the extent of soldier participation in extremist activities or organizations is minimal. The Task Force found no widespread or organized extremist activity in the Army. It did identify instances of individuals or small, informal groups of individuals who held extremist views. Allegations or suspicions of widespread, concerted recruitment of soldiers for extremist causes, and participation by soldiers in organized extremist activities, were not substantiated in the three methods the Task Force used to assess the extent of extremist activity in the Army (soldier interviews, surveys, and reviews of data provided by both military and law enforcement agencies).

The first way the Task Force assessed the extent of extremist activity was through soldier interviews conducted at 28 installations in 12 states as well as seven sites in Germany and five sites in Korea.

In discussing extremist activity and organizations we used the definition found in Army Regulation 600-20, Command Policy, paragraph 4-12, "Extremist Organizations," that:

Military personnel, duty bound to uphold the Constitution, must reject participation in organizations which --

1. Espouse supremacist causes,

2. Attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin, or

3. Advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.

- Of the 7,638 soldiers interviewed there were 40 first-hand reports that another soldier, Army civilian employee, or Army family member was an active participant in what the interviewee considered to be an extremist organization under the definition of extremism.

- Of the 7,638 soldiers interviewed there were 36 first-hand reports that another soldier, Army civilian employee, or Army family member was a passive participant in what the interviewee considered to be an extremist organization under the definition of extremism.

- Another 72 interviewees told us that they had some other type of contact with extremist organizations or activities during the preceding 12 months. Reports
of such contact included: firsthand accounts of verbal threats from extremists, attempts at recruitment, encounters with extremist group media, and also hearsay reports of extremist group meetings or other activities.

- There were 36 reports from interviewees who told us that they observed soldiers, Army civilian employees or Army family members who displayed extremist characteristics of dress or lifestyle, most frequently of the type associated with skinheads.

- Finally, there were 55 reports from interviewees of casual encounters with extremist symbology on or near Army installations. The most frequently encountered symbols were swastikas and the letters “KKK.”

- Intermingled with the extremist activity indicators outlined above, we had reports from 70 soldiers who felt that they or their families were being threatened by illegal and violent gang activity in or around Army installations. Much gang activity was territorially and racially defined.

The accuracy of these findings is dependent upon the willingness of the respondents to truthfully provide information. Some soldiers may have withheld information about their own or other soldiers’ participation in or association with extremist organizations out of fear of punishment or reprisal. However, the methodology employed, the large sample size, and the broad geographic distribution of the sampling lend credibility to the data.

Second, the Task Force supplemented these group and individual interviews with the Army Research Institute analysis of a confidential written survey administered to 17,080 soldiers. Both the interviewed and surveyed soldiers were given the official definition of extremist organizations found in Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, that “extremist organizations espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin; or advocate the use of force or violence and otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.” A wide variance of opinion exists among soldiers on what constitutes an extremist organization or cause. Some soldiers tended to apply their own ideas as to which organizations were extremist. The written survey was not as precise in determining the exact extent of possible extremist activity as face-to-face interviews. Interviewers found that, while some organizations were unanimously viewed as extremist, there were considerable differences of opinion on many others, including some social and fraternal organizations whose members may be primarily from one ethnic or racial group, and whose ideas may be controversial. Live interviewers were better able to distinguish more generally accepted instances of extremism and to determine when one identified instance of extremism was referred to by multiple soldiers in different interview groups (i.e., double counted). Daily interviewer wrap-up sessions clearly showed that activities of a few individuals were repeatedly cited in different
interview groups. In contrast, the survey instrument did not provide for this level of refinement.

Army Research Institute analysts stated that weighted survey results could not be used to accurately estimate the level of extremist activity, but weighted survey results do point out the number of soldiers who are aware of extremist activity and who, in some cases, have been approached.

- 3.5% of the soldiers surveyed reported having been approached to join an extremist organization since joining the Army. 4.6% of the soldiers surveyed reported having been approached to join an extremist organization prior to joining the Army.

- 3.1% of the soldiers surveyed reported having been approached to participate in an extremist activity since joining the Army. 4.5% of the soldiers surveyed reported having been approached to participate in an extremist activity prior to joining the Army.

- 7.1% of soldiers surveyed reported that they knew another soldier whom they believed to be a member of an extremist organization. 11.6% of soldiers surveyed reported that they knew another soldier whom they believed to be an extremist, but not a member of an extremist organization

The third way the Task Force assessed the extent of extremist activity was through the review of data provided by Army law enforcement and other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. The common theme from local civilian law enforcement officials was that soldiers were rarely part of an extremist threat, nor were they specifically targeted for recruitment, due to the level of routine control and aggressive response to incidents by the military chain of command. The assessment teams found that appropriate collection and sharing of criminal intelligence by military and civilian law enforcement agencies occurred routinely at each installation visited. All available criminal intelligence on extremist activity was also effectively communicated to brigade- or installation-level commanders by Army law enforcement. However, communication of criminal intelligence on extremist activity, absent criminality, to and from commanders at battalion level and below was extremely rare. The type of criminal intelligence normally collected and shared by Army law enforcement involved the activities of individuals or groups which posed a demonstrated or potential threat to the security and safety of Army installations and personnel. Few soldiers were identified by law enforcement officials as being involved in extremist activity. When soldier participation in extremist activity rose to the level of criminal conduct, communication of such conduct between military and civilian law enforcement agencies and unit commanders was effective.
The Task Force also consulted outside private organizations who continuously monitor human relations trends in the United States. They provided the Task Force with valuable information about extremism in the Nation as a whole, as well as their perspective on extremism in the military. Generally, they confirmed the Task Force conclusion that there is no widespread or organized extremist activity in the active military, and shared the Task Force concern that even isolated incidents of extremist activity in the Army are unacceptable.

Accordingly, the Task Force concludes that, based on information provided the Task Force, extremist activity in the Army exists to a relatively small degree. Nevertheless, any degree of extremist activity is incompatible with American values and cannot be tolerated.

What Type of Extremist Activity Occurs

Recruitment

Overall, little active recruiting of soldiers by extremist organizations is evident. A possible exception could be Special Operations Forces, which some senior commanders believe are targeted by the militia movement. The Task Force was unable to irrefutably confirm or deny this belief during the course of this assessment. Some Active Component soldiers of various ranks were concerned that the Reserve Components and Department of the Army civilian employees are much more closely tied to the non-transient civilian population and may be more susceptible to or targeted for recruitment by extremist groups. Off-post extremist activity in surrounding communities varied by location, and ranged from negligible to considerable.

The soldierization process begun in initial entry training, with its focus on teamwork, should, along with encouraging unit cohesion, help reduce the new soldiers’ vulnerability to extremist arguments. This continued soldierization is important since The Army Research Institute survey found that 17.4% of those surveyed report coming into contact with extremist or racist material. Personal interview sessions corroborate the existence of this material. Soldiers at every installation had isolated stories of seeing pamphlets, recruiting posters or billboards, graffiti, or unsolicited facsimile or electronic mail messages. Extremist material is increasingly present on the Internet. No pattern could be drawn from these disparate events. Some of the types of material with which soldiers reported coming into contact are: symbols and slogans, personal tattoos or distinctive clothes, posters and pictures, audio tapes, magazines and books, and fliers and leaflets.

Hate Groups, Militias, and Gangs

Soldiers reported contact with three basic types of extremist organizations: Hate groups, militias, and gangs. Nationally recognized hate groups seem to be active in the communities surrounding most major installations. In addition, many installations have
lesser known hate groups which seem to be limited geographically to the immediate locale. Soldiers at most installations report contact with these organizations at local bars, shopping areas, bowling alleys, or restaurants. Again, the nature of some reported contact with soldiers seems to be a function of the soldier being in a certain place at a certain time and not one of the extremist organization specifically targeting the soldier. There are off-post establishments known to soldiers which cater to hate groups.

Most reported contact with militias tended to involve knowledge of the existence of such groups, knowledge of rallies and other public activities, sightings of suspected militia members at local events, or chance encounters in rural or forest areas. The existence of official state militias, legitimate historical militia organizations, historical re-enactment groups, and paint-ball game organizations caused some confusion between these legitimate activities and organizations and that of the paramilitary extremist groups. The Task Force found only two soldiers confirmed to have affiliations with such extremist groups.

Of all groups, gangs are of the most concern to soldiers. Gangs posed a particular problem for the Task Force because they tend not to be considered as extremist organizations in the terms defined in AR 600-20, paragraph 4-12. Most of them do not fit the working definition of an extremist group in that they do not seek to deny others their civil rights by force or threat of force. Gangs are frequently organized along racial or ethnic lines and are prone to violent behavior. Of all the extremist organizations, gangs are the most likely to operate on an installation (e.g., housing areas, clubs, schools, etc.). Most soldiers believe that open-post policies, coupled with either poor screening of patrons for eligibility at on-post morale, welfare, and recreation outlets and clubs, or unruly conduct by guests of authorized patrons, contribute to gang presence. Further, the lack of on-post housing forces many junior soldiers to live in low-cost housing off post in areas which are occupied by gangs.

Skinheads

The skinhead issue was one of the most complex to deal with, particularly since it is a part of a subculture that exists on post, off post, and in youth gangs. The music, the dress code, the hair style, and the values of skinheads of both the racist and so called non-racist skinhead movements are virtually indistinguishable. Soldiers affecting the skinhead or punk rock appearance exist in the Army at every installation which was visited. Many soldiers and leaders believe much of this activity centers around an appreciation and taste for the punk culture and not necessarily a desire to violently deny others their civil rights.
Interview Responses

Soldier Response to Extremism

Soldiers universally stated that they believe extremism has no place in the Army. The freedoms of speech and association guaranteed by the Constitution are not lost on soldiers, but the majority strongly believe that certain rights are held in abeyance when entering the Army. These restrictions are required to preserve good order and discipline in an institution which must achieve rapid and thorough obedience to orders by both individuals and teams to succeed in defending the Nation in modern armed conflict. The regulatory differentiation between active participation in an extremist group and passive support for such a group is regarded by most soldiers as confusing. To most soldiers, any belief in, association with, or membership in an extremist organization should be grounds for separation from the Army, whereas senior leaders in the field recommend a graduated but firm and rapid response of individual counseling, adverse personnel action, legal action, or separation from the military, depending on the nature of the soldier’s extremist involvement. In the final analysis, soldiers do not approve of hard core extremism or hate groups and do not want the Army to either.

Simultaneously, soldiers tend to tolerate a wide array of behaviors which, on the surface, would appear to many to be controversial. Such things as dress codes, room decor, and language are situational. There is no leap to judgment as to whether a soldier is an extremist or racist based on outward affectations alone. For instance, some soldiers noted that current fashion trends are strongly influenced by the music and video industries. Many of today’s youth wear articles of clothing and accessories which are “in fashion,” especially those that are reputed to have some secret or sinister meaning. This may show that the wearer is fashion conscious, not necessarily a member of some extremist group. Most soldiers felt that through close contact they could tell whether a soldier was an extremist or just “making a fashion statement.”

Commander/Leader Response to Extremism

Over the course of interviews with 103 brigade- and 150 battalion-level commanders, as well as 272 command sergeants major, responses were amazingly consistent. The vast majority viewed any participation in or with extremist organizations or any type of extremist behavior as totally incompatible with military service. The majority were consistent in articulating the steps they have taken or would take in dealing with any extremist activity brought to their attention, and in the shortcomings of the Army’s current regulation on extremist activity—Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12. Senior commanders, especially those who have had soldiers involved in extremist activities, said that the Army Regulation gives them sufficient guidelines on what constitutes an extremist organization and what administrative steps can be taken to change a soldier’s behavior prior to employing the military justice system. Junior leaders, who most often implement policy, were less sanguine. Many junior leaders requested a list of extremist organizations and a specific checklist of actions to be taken.
upon confirmation of extremist activity. All cited the need for a thorough investigation coupled with close liaison with their legal advisor as the initial steps in dealing with soldiers possibly involved in extremist activities. Depending on the severity of the offense, actions from counseling/reprimand through adverse efficiency reports and elimination from the Army would follow. There was no stated reluctance to discharge or prosecute a soldier who would not modify his or her extremist behavior. Senior commanders said the Army Regulation has two shortcomings: lack of a punitive clause (i.e., violation of the regulation itself is not an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice), and insufficient clarification between active and passive participation.

Commanders interviewed who have had to take action against soldiers for any form of extremist activity generally stated that they were satisfied with wording and focus of the Army Regulation. However, little evidence was found that paragraph 4-12 facilitated dealing with extremists. Most of these soldiers were eliminated for varying forms of non-extremist misconduct. These commanders stated that a punitive clause in the Army Regulation would have greatly simplified the administrative and/or judicial process. Additionally, these commanders were an exception to many leaders and soldiers, who were not familiar with all aspects of the Army Regulation and who echoed confusion concerning extremist organizations vice extremist activity. However, most leaders understood the regulation’s intent, and were committed to taking swift action against any soldier whose participation in or association with extremism might have a deleterious effect on unit cohesion or good order and discipline of their unit.

In contrast to the approach of more senior leaders at brigade and battalion, many junior officers and noncommissioned officers at company through squad level are confused as to what groups are by definition extremist and what nonviolent actions cross the line of extremism. Much confusion exists concerning active versus passive participation. Some leaders are afraid to take preemptive action for fear of cutting some of the privileges that the majority of the Army is trying to afford its junior soldiers via the Single Soldier Initiative and Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers. These contemporary programs strive to give young single soldiers living in the barracks similar latitude in life-style (i.e., room arrangement, choice of where to eat, etc.) in their off-duty hours as has traditionally been extended to married service members. These programs are often seen as unnecessarily restricting the authority of leaders to monitor what happens in the barracks after duty hours or the behavior of their soldiers off post.

Command action is also hampered because, although information sharing between military and local civilian law enforcement officials is excellent, vertical dissemination of that information to the lower echelons of command (battalion-level and lower leaders— who must deal directly with the soldiers) is uneven. Also there is inadequate horizontal sharing of information on posts between Equal Opportunity Offices, Military Police, Judge Advocate, Chaplains, Mental Health professionals, and other staff agencies which should “be aware” of various types of extremist activity. At present, the Army lacks a common service-wide methodology for integrating and tracking information on hate crimes and extremist activity. Consequently, small unit leaders often do not get the
information they need to make preventive corrections and to educate their soldiers on the specific potential of any extremist threat in the area.
ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN RELATIONS ENVIRONMENT IN THE ARMY

The Task Force believes that any analysis of extremism must be conducted with an appreciation for the current human relations environment in the Army. There is a unique dynamic between extremism in an organization and the human relations of that organization. A poor climate can foster stereotyping and hate, and a unit with poor human relations can become a breeding ground for extremism. Likewise, a strong human relations environment can deter extremism as it fosters open communications, promotes tolerance of diversity, and encourages dialogue. The Task Force provides the following thumbnail sketch of the state of human relations in the Active Army as a necessary backdrop when evaluating extremism in the Active force today and the threat it could pose in the future.

As previously stated, the Army replaces approximately 21% of its soldiers each year. These soldiers come from all segments of our society and bring with them their differing attitudes, behaviors, tolerances, and intolerances. Currently, there are no screening methods available to identify recruits who possess or are prone to develop extremist attitudes. In Initial Entry Training as well as officer pre-commissioning programs, the Army soldierization process seeks to instill Army values in its soldiers and future leaders. However, soldier and leader feedback suggested the need for even greater inculcation of core Army values.

Areas of Concern

The Task Force identified several areas of concern in the human relations environment which may impact on the propensity of soldiers to participate in extremist activities.

- Most majority and many minority soldiers believe overt racism and discrimination are suppressed by the Army’s unequivocal Equal Opportunity policy and by firm enforcement of that policy.

- The human relations environment is best where the chain of command is clear in its policy, proactive, and both quick and unambiguous in its response to incidents or complaints.

- Many soldiers believe teamwork, racial integration, and equitable treatment occur in the workplace, yet most minority and many majority soldiers believe that subtle racism exists. Most report that off-duty socialization often polarizes along racial, ethnic, cultural, or other lines. This behavior, however, is often viewed as natural and acceptable.
Senior Army leaders believe the Army’s human relations environment is shaped by institutional mores and operational requirements and reflects Army values. In some instances, leadership at battalion or higher level may have differing perceptions of the human relations environment from those of junior soldiers due to hierarchical insulation, generational differences, or preconceptions. Junior soldiers reported an undercurrent which reflects their perception of race relations in the country at large. This undercurrent focuses on racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, stereotyping, separatism, self-polarization, misperception and individual racial animosity. This undercurrent must be addressed to limit our vulnerability to extremism.

Many soldiers perceive that members of fraternal, social, and private organizations display favoritism while on duty, especially when membership in these organizations is predominately from one race or ethnic group. This inhibits the fostering of a strong human relations environment.

The Army relies on its Equal Opportunity Program and requisite training to address these issues. The quality of Equal Opportunity Advisors and Representatives was found to range from excellent to fair, resulting in uneven unit Equal Opportunity training throughout the Army. There is a perception that some graduates of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute lack the interpersonal skills to be effective. The assessment also revealed several installations where Equal Opportunity staffing was inadequate. This was usually the result of an imbalance between the Army Regulation 600-26 requirements and personnel authorizations.

Recently, equal opportunity training has focused predominately on sexual harassment and sexism. Currently, most soldiers and leaders believe that sexism is more prevalent than racism at the unit level. Based on their experiences in the 1970s, senior leaders in the field believed the Army’s racial problems were solved. However, the Army must educate soldiers and leaders on racist and other extremist activities and organizations to insulate them from recruitment and participation, as well as instructing them on sexual harassment. Soldiers must have the expertise to recognize and report racist, supremacist and other extremist activities to their chain of command.

This is particularly important because the Army Equal Opportunity Complaint System has not succeeded in achieving credibility with some soldiers and leaders. Junior soldiers continue to fear reprisal for filing equal opportunity complaints. Many majority soldiers and small unit leaders perceive that some minority soldiers and females are abusing the equal opportunity system. System credibility is further degraded because minorities and females are over-represented in Equal Opportunity staff positions. If soldiers lack faith in the willingness of the chain of command to adequately address their complaints, a climate of suspicion and distrust can be created.
**Shifting Demographics**

The Army is experiencing a dramatic decrease in minority presence in combat arms units. While the absence of minorities was quite noticeable in all combat units, it is even more pronounced within Special Operations Forces. This representation might lead to adverse human relations consequences in the future by fostering supremacist attitudes among white combat arms soldiers.

**Operational Pace**

The high Operational Pace for units is contributing to a stressful human relations environment. Operational Pace can be defined by the amount of time units and soldiers are out of their garrisons or away from home, living and working for extended periods in a field environment to accomplish contingency or readiness missions. Recurring contingency missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere around the world are significantly stressing the Army. High Operational Pace limits the time and resources available to commanders to effectively deal with human relations problems or extremism. When key leader involvement in Equal Opportunity training is lacking, soldiers interpret this to mean that the training is not important. High Operational Pace often leaves insufficient time for non-go-to-war training. In this stressful environment, there is little time for feedback to soldiers or for command information sessions in which to address soldiers’ concerns. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that some junior and mid-level noncommissioned officers lack sufficient experience and leadership training to solve human relations problems. Consequently, the troubled soldier, with an extremist viewpoint, could go uncorrected and undetected until his attitudes manifest themselves as violent or otherwise illegal behaviors.

**Social Issues**

Alcohol was viewed by many as a major contributor to lowering inhibitions to racist or extremist behavior. Some Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Club activities perpetuate polarization by race and group affiliation. The abuse of alcohol and polarization, where it occurs, can contribute to the deterioration of the human relations environment.

**Zero-Defect Environment**

Today’s Army is still experiencing the effects of downsizing, base realignments, and increased contingency operations, which contribute to a perception of instability and career insecurity in the force. Within this context of change, many soldiers and leaders, especially junior officers and noncommissioned officers, perceive a zero-defect environment developing. Zero-defect is viewed as no tolerance for mistakes, no opportunity for recovery, and a demand for perfection. This concern with failure avoidance can lead to subordinates insulating superiors from bad news for fear of unwanted attention or criticism, soldiers discrediting the chain of command for failure to
take decisive action on equal opportunity complaints, or the chain of command labeling soldiers who file complaints as malcontents and whiners.

Dignity and Respect

The threat to the Army by extremists may be minimal at this time, but it does not mean that this situation may not change, especially as extremism in American society ebbs and flows. If commanders remain focused only on the next mission and are not sensitive enough to extremism’s potential impact on their soldiers, and if no one brings problems to the attention of leaders for fear of admitting imperfection, then the risk to the Army posed by extremism can grow. Given this, the Army must redouble its efforts to instill its values in the force.

Throughout the assessment, senior leaders, especially brigade and battalion commanders, reported three major approaches to ensuring their soldiers were treated with dignity and respect. They were:

- Modeling through their own behavior and actions those values and traits they wished to instill in their subordinates, i.e., fair treatment of all soldiers, honesty in all actions, total commitment to the Army, support of superiors, etc.

- Implementing all Army human relations policies, programs, and regulations.

- Monitoring their organization’s climate via commander/leader presence, sensing sessions and surveys, and swift action on all reports of violations of regulations and policies.

Most leaders felt they personally made a genuine effort to treat soldiers fairly, according them dignity and respect. A striking aspect of their interview responses was that, while each discrete group felt they accorded others dignity and respect, they, as a group, did not feel they were accorded proper respect or treated fairly. Some junior soldiers attributed this failure to maintain a positive command climate to shortcomings of new and inexperienced sergeants. Some senior noncommissioned officers, particularly First Sergeants, attributed command climate shortcomings to mid-grade noncommissioned officers, specifically staff sergeants.
Part II

REVIEW OF POLICIES

The Task Force analyzed Executive Orders, Department of Defense Directives, and Army and other Services regulations relating to the basic policy regarding extremist activities and organizations; other related policy issues in areas of training, data collection and reporting, climate assessments, and accessions; and feedback from the Task Force field teams.

POLICY

Department of Defense Directive, 1325.6, *Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces*, provides the basic guidance on prohibited activities:

*Military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; or, advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts, to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading such organizations is incompatible with Military Service, and is therefore prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action, against military personnel who actively participate in such groups.*

Following the Oklahoma City bombing, the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff provided additional emphasis and guidance in a message entitled *Extremist Activity* on 3 May 1995. One day later, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff referenced Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 in their memorandum *Dissident and Protest Activity*, when they wrote, “Accordingly, we ask that you direct commanders and supervisors to disseminate this memorandum throughout their organizations and to ensure that their personnel are briefed on the guidance in this memorandum, Department of Defense Directive 1325.6, and the Service implementing directions.” Few soldiers or leaders below brigade-level recalled such briefings.

The first time the terms *knowing membership* and *active participation* were used to determine policies toward individuals involved in extremist organizations was in Executive Order 11785, published in 1974. Two Department of Defense Directives, 5200.2, *Department of Defense Personnel Security Program*, and 1325.6, *Guidelines for*
Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces, use the same terminology. Two Army Regulations, 604-10, Military Personnel Security Program, and 380-67, Department of the Army Personnel Security Program, both use this concept when developing criteria for application of security standards.

Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, paragraph 4-12, “Extremist Organizations,” implements Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 by stating that “activities of extremist organizations are inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Active participation by soldiers is prohibited.” This regulation goes further by stating “Passive activities, such as mere membership, receiving literature in the mail, or presence at an event, although strongly discouraged as incompatible with military service, are not prohibited by Army policy.”

The guidance contained in Army Regulation 600-20 is limited to participation in organizations. It does not address the inappropriate behaviors of an individual soldier who neither seeks nor maintains membership in, or affiliation with an extremist organization. However, leaders in units which have dealt with extremist behavior state that the focus should be on individual behavior rather than organizational affiliation as a more effective approach.

Further complicating the policy’s focus on organizations versus activities, is the confusion over which groups should be categorized as extremists. While many commanders seek an official list of extremist organizations, Executive Order 11785 abolishes the use and development of such lists.

The regulatory guidance is also troubling to some leaders in the field, because of the terms "active" and "passive." These terms can be and are misunderstood, raising apparent contradictions. As an example, in the regulation, membership alone is not prohibited and may be termed “passive participation.” However, further guidance states, soldiers “must reject participation” in such organizations.

The provision of paragraph 4-12 which prohibits active participation in extremist organizations refers to Army Regulation 600-20, Chapter 6, “Equal Opportunity.” This implies that the term “extremist” applies only to those groups whose hate is based upon race, ethnicity, religion, and/or national origin. This interpretation would not encompass all extremist ideologies such as those militias or “patriots” advocating the overthrow of the United States government. It is noted that the Army’s description of “disloyal or subversive military personnel” used in 1948 addresses all of these ideologies while encompassing both group and individual behaviors:

Activities and associations which may be considered as establishing reasonable grounds for the discharge of disloyal or subversive military personnel and for the rejection of persons for military service will include, but are not limited to, one or more of the following:
Advocacy of revolution, or by force or violence to alter the existing constitutional form of government of the United States; advocacy of revolution, or by force or violence to bring about the economic, political, or social change

Membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons--

Which practices, seeks to practice or advocates--

Denial by force, violence, or intimidation, to any person, group of persons, or class of persons within the United States or Territory subject to its jurisdiction of any right or rights which the Federal Constitution guarantees or protects against encroachment by either or both Federal and State Governments

Individual behaviors are easily addressed without concern about whether an organization meets the regulatory definition of extremist or deliberations over organizational affiliation or membership. Commanders already have the authority to deal effectively with extremism when the practices are overt. Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-4, "Soldier Conduct," provides that ensuring proper conduct of soldiers is a function of command. Commanders rely on all leaders in the Army to "Take action against military personnel in any case where the soldier's conduct violates good order and discipline." Paragraph 4-12 lists options available to the commander for dealing with a soldier's participation in an extremist group. Although Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12, is not punitive, the commander's inherent authority to impose administrative sanctions and the specific offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice provide sufficient authority to enforce Army policy.

Existing administrative procedures, non-judicial punishment, and disciplinary actions available to the commander and other leaders are found in Department of Defense Directive 1325.6, Army Regulation 635-200, Enlisted Separations, Army Regulation 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, Army Regulation 601-280 Army Reenlistment Program, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Commanders have a wide variety of actions available to address soldier misconduct arising from participation in extremist activities, ranging from counseling and on-the-spot correction for a very minor infraction, to bar to reenlistment, administrative discharge, and court-martial for a more severe manifestation of extremist behavior. In addition, the personnel security procedures contained in Army Regulation 380-67, Personnel Security Clearances, authorize commanders to deny access to classified information and suspend the security clearance of a soldier manifesting extremist behaviors.

The draft of Change 2 to the Joint Ethics Regulation, (Department of Defense Regulation 5500.7) provides more specific guidance on employee use of Government communications systems and those paid for by the Federal Government (i.e., telephones, facsimile machines, electronic mail, and access to the Internet). It will require that employees use such systems for official use and authorized purposes only, and it defines
and sets criteria for such uses, which might include some “personal use” in appropriate circumstances.

A detailed summary of contemporary directives and regulations relating to extremist organizations or activity is at Annex B.
TRAINING

There is no specific Army requirement to conduct training on extremist activities per se. Army Regulation 350-1, *Individual Military Education*, does require commanders to conduct awareness and refresher training on subjects that support unit cohesion, discipline, and morale. Army Regulation 600-20, Chapter 6, requires commanders to educate soldiers on the Army's policy of fair and equitable treatment for all personnel. Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12, directs commanders, as a minimum, to educate and counsel soldiers identified as members of extremist groups and/or when they engage in extremist group activities. Army Regulation 350-41 requires commanders to conduct awareness and refresher training as needed for moral and ethical development.

Regarding security training, Department of Defense Directive 5240.6, *Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program*, and Army Regulation 381-12, *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army* require counterintelligence awareness; periodic education on both international and domestic terrorist threats; and reporting of such threats pursuant to program guidelines. Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army applies to all national security crimes to include subversion, sedition, spying, treason, espionage, sabotage, and terrorism. Based on Executive Order 12333, *Intelligence Activities*, which focuses on international threats, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army training has traditionally focused on international, rather than domestic threats.

Equal Opportunity Training Support Packages used in Army leader development courses, beginning with training received in pre-commissioning and initial entry courses, and training materials available to the field (Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, *Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide*, and Training Circular 26-6, *Commander's Equal Opportunity Handbook*), do not specifically address extremist activity. They do, however, discuss racism, discrimination (to include religious intolerance), and aspects of behavior contrary to morale, teamwork, good order, and discipline.

There is a lack of congruency among the training tools available to Army schools and units in the field. Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, Training Circular 26-6 and Training and Doctrine Command’s Training Support Packages currently used in officer and noncommissioned officer professional development courses differ in the information provided to leaders and soldiers. The training objectives used in the Training Support Packages are repetitive rather than sequential and progressive in nature.

The extent and quality of human relations training received by officer candidates varies greatly depending upon their commissioning source. Extremism is not specifically addressed. The United States Military Academy employs a comprehensive program entitled *Bedrock II: Consideration of Others*. This program provides 62 hours of human relations training over the course of the four years a cadet spends at USMA. Reserve Officers Training Corps' human relations training is not standardized. Cadet Command
directs local Reserve Officer Training Corps commanders to evaluate and devise their own programs based upon training needs. There are no standard human relations training support packages used throughout Cadet Command. Soldiers in the Officer Candidate Course receive a two hour block of instruction in the area of human relations.

Formal training is not provided to Army law enforcement personnel in hate or bias motivated crimes while attending the United States Army Military Police School at Fort McClellan. In January 1996, U.S. Army Military Police School instructors received a one-hour block of awareness training concerning extremist activity. Personnel in attendance were directed to integrate this training into all law enforcement courses.
DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING

The Department of Justice and Department of Defense each publish guidance for reporting and data collection of extremist activity. Army reporting requirements are contained in Army Regulation 190-40, Serious Incident Report, Army Regulation 190-45, Law Enforcement Reporting, Army Regulation 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, Army Regulation 380-13, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations, and Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy.

Regulatory guidance concerning data collection and reporting of extremist activities is not specific. It must be inferred from fragmented references to criminal conduct normally associated with such incidents. There is no specific requirement for data collection and reporting of extremist activity in Department of Defense and Army Equal Opportunity channels. Quarterly and yearly complaint reports (Department of the Army Form 7980) do not specify a category on extremism, though complaints of extremism may be categorized as complaints of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination. Required Annual Statistical and Narrative Reports contain no requirement for annotation of extremist activity. There is no requirement in Department of Defense or Army regulations for incorporation of law enforcement data of civil rights violations or hate and bias-motivated crimes into the required annual Military Equal Opportunity Assessment.

The 1990 Hate Crimes Statistics Act mandated collection of hate crime statistics by federal agencies. Automated data collection and reporting of hate crimes under the National Incident-Based Reporting System is scheduled for implementation by the Department of Defense in January 1997. All racially motivated crimes, to include hate crimes, are currently reported in accordance with Army Regulation 190-40, which mandates submission of a Serious Incident Report to Headquarters, Department of the Army for selected serious incidents or criminal offenses. The Serious Incident Report contains a data entry for “racially or ethnically motivated criminal acts.” However, field experience indicates that racial or ethnic motivation is not always immediately discernible. Often, such determinations are made later in the investigation. No reporting requirements currently exist for crimes resulting from religious intolerance or sexual orientation; however, a forthcoming revision to Army Regulation 190-40 will require a Serious Incident Report on all forms of bias/hate crimes.

Military law enforcement personnel are authorized by Army Regulation 380-13 to collect, process, store, and report data on extremist groups and activities that threaten military supplies, classified information, personnel, or installations. This regulation specifically authorizes data collection in response to efforts to subvert loyalty, discipline, or morale of military and civilian personnel by “...actively encouraging violation of laws, disobedience of lawful orders and regulation, or disruption of military activities.” To facilitate the collection of this data, Army law enforcement agencies are authorized to
coordinate with local law enforcement agencies for the purpose of determining actual or potential threats to the military. The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command is specifically responsible for the collection and distribution of criminal intelligence with other military and civilian law enforcement agencies.

Dissemination of information on extremist activity within the local command is implied but not required. While Equal Opportunity Advisors, Chaplains, and Inspectors General are all tasked with maintaining “the pulse” of the command climate in their units, distribution of information concerning extremist activity to these personnel/agencies is not mandated.
CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS

Commanders can proactively seek to discern the presence of unit members who sympathize with or engage in extremist activity through the conduct of periodic unit climate assessments. Command climate assessments typically include interviews of key personnel in and around the unit; sensing sessions with a sampling of unit personnel; a review by the commander and staff of unit records in the areas of awards, promotions, retention, discipline, job assignments, and school opportunities; and a human relations survey of unit personnel. When done properly, the assessment should enable a commander should be able to identify human relations concerns, to include issues of extremism. More often than not, commanders rely heavily on the results and analysis of the survey tool in their assessment of command climate since the information is received anonymously, reducing the respondent's fear of reprisal. Department of Defense Directive 1350.2 directs “Secretaries of military departments shall require commanders to . . . assess equal opportunity climate (preferably as part of assumption of command) and schedule follow-up periodically thereafter."

Army regulatory guidance does not yet reflect the new Department of Defense Directive. However, Interim Change 4 to Army Regulation 600-20, dated September 17, 1993, states, “It is strongly encouraged that commanders conduct a unit climate assessment and unit training needs assessment within 90 days of assuming command (180 days for Reserve Component) and annually thereafter.” The forthcoming revision to Army Regulation 600-20 will mandate conduct of such assessments.

Training documents available to the field are also not in accord with the Department of Defense requirement. Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide, incorrectly requires conduct of command climate assessments within 60 days of assumption of command vice 90 days as specified by Army Regulation 600-20. Training Circular 26-6, Commanders’ Equal Opportunity Handbook, reflects the previously published standard in that, “It is strongly recommended that commanders conduct unit climate assessments within 90 days of assuming command (180 days for Reserve Components) and annually thereafter.”

Climate assessments at Department of the Army level have historically not addressed extremist group or gang activity. The Army’s current service-wide survey of command climate, the Sample Survey of Military Personnel, does not address extremism. Several unit climate survey tools are available Department of Defense- and Army-wide. These include the Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-69, Unit Climate Profile, and the Training Diagnostic Assessment System. However none of these surveys specifically address the issue of extremism. Climate surveys developed for specific Major Commands (i.e., US Army Europe Personnel Opinion Survey) and units (Rangers, Fort Hood Leadership Survey) address various aspects of the human relations environment in units, but none directly address extremist activity. The Army Violence Prevention Program includes an
optional *Unit Risk Inventory Survey.* Although the Army Violence Prevention Program identifies the Army's concern with extremist activity within units, the Unit Risk Inventory does not query its respondents on this issue.

Climate survey tools available Army-wide are dated and do not adequately address other current human relations issues. Far from being "user friendly," surveys such as the *Unit Climate Profile* require hours of work in development of raw data and further work in analysis. Unit Equal Opportunity Advisors are not trained in the use of the Unit Climate Profile or the Training Diagnostic Assessment System and scant information is provided to untrained personnel on analysis procedures.

Due to the workload involved, such surveys, though available to commanders, are rarely utilized. Current computer survey technology could easily accomplish initial data analysis for the commander, breaking down responses by racial, ethnic, religious, and gender categories, as well as by subordinate unit and pay grade.

Commanders of installations and units above brigade level do not have access to viable climate surveys. Climate surveys, such as the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey, Unit Climate Profile, and Training Diagnostic Assessment System, were originally developed for use in company- and battalion-size units. As such, these surveys do not provide an aggregate picture of command climate in higher echelon units, staffs, and installations. Thus, the existing surveys are inadequate in identifying extremist as well as other human relations concerns at higher echelons of commands.

Though commanders are required by Department of Defense Directive to conduct climate assessments, the survey tools available to them for use are inadequate. None include questions on extremist activity. Training in analysis of such survey tools is either scant or nonexistent.
ACCESSIONS

There is no screening process to preclude individuals involved in prior extremist activity from enlisting. Police records checks are done for enlistees only if the applicant states that he or she committed an offense or if the recruiter has reason to suspect the applicant is concealing a criminal record. Many localities seal juvenile records and if the law enforcement authority queried refuses in writing to provide information or asks a fee, then the police records check is not required. A police records check is performed on all officer accessions subject to the same limitations regarding sealed records, written refusals, and fee demands.

When processing for national security clearances, applicants are required to fill out Standard Form 86, Security Questionnaire, which asks only if the applicant “has ever been an officer or a member or made contributions to organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow of the United States Government and which engages in illegal activities to that end, knowing that the organization engages in such activities with the specific intent to further such activities.”

Doctors may medically reject service applicants for “Tattoos that will significantly limit effective performance of military service.” Knowledge of tattoo patterns is important for medical personnel involved in the accession process due to the proclivity for members of some extremist groups to get specific tattoos as part of their initiation or other organizational rituals.
The following specific recommendations result from the review of policies, training, data, collection, climate assessments and accessions:

**Policy:**

- Re-title the Army Equal Opportunity Program as the Army Human Relations Program.

- Revise Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12, to clarify the Army’s policy on extremist activity. As part of this revision:
  
  -- Recommend that the term “extremism” be defined in Army Regulation 600-20, to include all forms of extremist ideologies or behavior.

  -- Consider making the revised provision punitive.

  -- Reaffirm the commander’s inherent authority and responsibility to take action in order to maintain good order and discipline.

  -- Address individual conduct that constitutes “extremist activity” but is not connected with membership in or association with an identified extremist organization.

  -- Drop the “term passive” altogether in favor of more precisely defined language.

- Expand Army Regulation 381-12, *Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army*, to include threats posed by extremists.

**Training:**

- Develop a state of the art, interactive, discussion-based set of training support packages for use at each level of professional military education. Make such training sequential and progressive in nature, attuned to the levels of experience and responsibility of the target audience.

- Revise training support packages for leadership training provided at Primary, Basic, and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Courses; Warrant Officer and Officer Basic Courses; First Sergeant Course; Advanced Warrant Officer Courses; Advanced Officer Courses; Sergeant Majors Academy; and Command and General Staff Course, Pre-Command Course, and Senior Service Colleges. Teach
leaders how extremist behavior and activities impact on good order and discipline of organizations and the leaders’ recourse to such activities.

- Conduct training on Army policy in relation to extremist groups as an enabling learning objective in required Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army training. Assemble training packages to support commanders and supervisors in the field. Conduct periodic training and maintain accountability through the existing Command Inspection Program.

- Provide commanders with a Criminal Investigation Command installation/local security assessment that describes the current local extremist threat. As part of the required Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army training, these assessments would be prepared at least annually (updated as required) and form the basis for identifying vulnerabilities that require correction.

- Revise Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, Training Circular 26-6 and Equal Opportunity Training Support Packages to elaborate on extremism and to conform with revisions to Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12.

- Consider applying requirements similar to the United States Military Academy’s Consideration of Others program to all pre-commissioning programs.

- Develop a new Department of the Army pamphlet on extremist activity for use by Army leaders that will: provide information on Army policy and regulatory guidance; provide elaboration on defining extremist groups and activity; identify training resources and reporting requirements; and discuss administrative and punitive sanctions available to commanders.

**Climate Assessment:**

- Use technology to produce automated climate surveys that include questions on extremism and can generate a report of findings for installations, higher echelon headquarters, and brigade-, battalion-, and company-size units.

- Add a segment on “Extremist/Gang Activity” to the Sample Survey of Military Personnel for ongoing survey assessment of these issues at Department of the Army level.

- Include questions on extremist activity in the Army Violence Prevention Program’s Unit Risk Inventory. Incorporate the Unit Risk Inventory into the development of current unit climate assessments as an optional segment.

- Implement all provisions of Department of Defense Directive 1350.2.

**Accessions:**
- Request revision to Department of Defense policy to allow recruiters to question military applicants for previous extremist affiliation/activity.

- Perform local record check where applicant has lived.

- Seek Congressional relief from Services’ payment of administrative fees for criminal records checks.

- Inform all applicants for military service of the Army’s policy on extremist behavior. Incorporate this policy into statements of understanding signed by applicants for military service.
Part III

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
FAYETTEVILLE HOMICIDES

About midnight on the evening of December 6-7, 1995, Private First Class James Burmeister, Private First Class Malcom Wright, and Specialist Four Randy Meadows, soldiers assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, allegedly murdered Mr. Michael James and Ms. Jackie Burden in the 400 block of Campbell Street, Fayetteville, North Carolina. Investigation determined that these soldiers associated with a small local “skinhead” group.

Police obtained arrest warrants for Burmeister and Wright and arrested them without incident at Burmeister’s residence around 8:10 AM, December 7, 1995. Local authorities subsequently charged all three soldiers with murder and incarcerated them in the Cumberland County Jail. They are expected to be tried later this summer.

Investigation to date has revealed no apparent connection between Burmeister, Wright, and Meadows prior to their assignments to Fort Bragg. They came from different parts of the country, were serving their first enlistment and had no known criminal histories.

Since these crimes were allegedly committed by soldiers subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command at Fort Bragg assisted in the Fayetteville Police Department investigation. During the conduct of the investigation of the murder of Mr. James and Ms. Burden, it was discovered that there was an earlier skinhead shooting involving Fort Bragg soldiers.

On April 1, 1995, a soldier, a member of a local skinhead group called SHARP (Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice), was treated for a gunshot wound in the chest. The victim reported that he was wounded by an unknown assailant during a drive-by shooting at an off-post residence where members of SHARP were known to gather. Investigation revealed that this shooting incident actually occurred during a physical altercation between racist skinheads and SHARP. The participants were predominantly soldiers assigned to Fort Bragg. A separate criminal investigation was initiated and conducted by military and local authorities and prosecution is pending.

The degree of command response to the soldiers identified as being involved with skinhead activities included formal counseling, administrative discharges, bars to re-enlistment, and formal non-judicial and judicial actions. The degree of response depended on the extent to which these soldiers were found to be involved in prohibited or disruptive activities or behavior. Burmeister, Wright, and Meadows are awaiting trial for
murder and conspiracy. Court-martial charges have been preferred against three soldiers for their involvement in the April 1995 shooting incident. Sixteen (16) soldiers have been counseled and barred from reenlistment for their involvement with skinhead activity, two of whom were punished under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for related misconduct. Three soldiers received written reprimands in addition to the counseling and bar to reenlistment. The remaining soldiers were counseled about their skinhead affiliations with no further action required at this time.

LESSONS LEARNED

When the murder of Ms. Burden and Mr. James occurred, leaders of XVIII Airborne Corps and U.S. Army Special Operations Command, both headquartered at Fort Bragg, took multiple steps to define the scope of extremism at Fort Bragg and to determine its effects on their organizations. First, the Commanding Generals requested all information from the CID investigation of the homicides to determine how many soldiers were involved in extremist organizations/activities; to discern with the help of local law enforcement, what extremist organizations were active in the Fort Bragg area; and to ascertain which of these organizations had penetrated the post, i.e., had soldier involvement, were recruiting, etc. Next, both Commanding Generals directed a series of steps to inform both their soldiers and the Fort Bragg military community of the Army’s regulations and rules concerning extremist organizations/activities. These included the following:

- Policy letters that outlined command positions concerning extremism.
- A formal chain-teaching program throughout both units that outlined Army and Fort Bragg policies and regulations.
- Surveys and sensing sessions conducted by the Fort Bragg Inspector General and Equal Opportunity personnel to determine the human relations climate on the post and to seek any new or additional information about the circumstances surrounding either the Burden/James homicides or extremist organizations/activities in general.
- Use of the post newspaper and TV channel to inform the Fort Bragg community of Army policy concerning extremist organizations/activities and to solicit any information from the general post population about the incident.

These actions were supplemented by commanders’ conferences focused on this issue and frequent updates at regular command and staff meetings at all levels.

In addition to these actions, the XVIII Airborne Corps conducted an after action review of the homicides to determine if such crimes could have been forecast,
if the chain of command missed any indicators, if soldiers who profess and/or participate in extremist organizations/activities exhibit common traits, and if anything could have been done better. Examples of potential indicators include history of poor performance (Army Physical Fitness Test failures, multiple counseling statements, etc.), tattoos or extremist paraphernalia, or prior association with any formal or informal group. After a thorough analysis, the after action review revealed the following:

Specialist Burmeister had been involved in several incidents prior to the homicides that, had they been reviewed through a racist/extremist filter, would have revealed some indicators of his involvement in extremist activities.

- A total of 26 soldiers at Fort Bragg have been identified as having some association with extremist activities.

- There were no clear indicators suggesting a common profile among Fort Bragg soldiers charged with the homicides or those subsequently identified as extremists. These soldiers exhibited the following common characteristics which, taken by themselves, do not necessarily indicate extremist beliefs or predict violent behavior:
  
  -- Very short ‘high and tight’ haircuts.

  -- Similar dress: blue jeans, boots, suspenders.

  -- Interest in the punk rock culture to include frequenting local clubs which catered to this environment.

- The Task Force assessment revealed that prior to the Burden/James homicides, there were few strong indications that extremist organizations/activities were an issue at Fort Bragg. Subsequently, extremism received only passing attention in unit equal opportunity training.

- After the homicides, the senior leaders of both the XVIII Airborne Corps and US Army Special Operations Command took action to investigate the scope and depth of any potential soldier involvement in extremist organizations/activities.
Part IV

TASK FORCE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

- Most commanders, leaders, and soldiers perceive that extremist activity is minimal in the Active Army.

- The vast majority of soldiers perceive extremist activity as incompatible with military service.

- Although there were relatively few extremists identified in the Army, leaders recognize that even a few extremists can have a pronounced dysfunctional impact on the Army’s bond with the American people, institutional values, and unit cohesion.

- Extremist groups are visible and active in communities outside some Army installations. Local law enforcement authorities state that extremist groups do not seem to be specifically targeting soldiers for recruitment. The results of Task Force interviews and surveys tend to substantiate this conclusion.

- The current policy on participation in extremist organizations is confusing and complicates the commander’s interpretation of extremist activity.

- Gang-related activities appear to be more pervasive than extremist activities as defined in Army Regulation 600-20. Gang-related activity both off post and on post (i.e., billets, military housing areas, schools, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation facilities), sometimes involves family members and young soldiers. Gangs are a significant security concern for many soldiers.

- Many soldiers and leaders were unfamiliar with the guidance contained in Army Regulation 600-20. Most soldiers believe no participation in extremist organizations, active or passive, should be tolerated. The vast majority of soldiers believe that membership should be prohibited.

- The sharing of criminal intelligence, to include extremist activity, by military and civilian law enforcement authorities occurs routinely.

- Existing open installations combined with less regulated barracks policies degrade the commander’s knowledge about potential extremist activities after duty hours.
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- The overall human relations environment in the Army generally reflects the degree of tolerance and intolerance in American society and impacts the degree of vulnerability of soldiers to extremism.

- The Army’s annual recruitment of approximately 21% of its personnel strength ensures that it remains reflective of the nation’s values. This turnover also continually exposes the Army to new soldiers who may hold extremist views and affiliations.

- Most majority and many minority soldiers believe overt racism and discrimination are suppressed by the Army’s unequivocal Equal Opportunity policy and its firm enforcement. The human relations environment is best where the chain of command is clear in its policy, proactive, and both quick and unambiguous in its response to incidents or complaints.

- Many soldiers believe teamwork, racial and ethnic integration, and equitable treatment occur in the workplace, yet most minority and many majority soldiers believe that subtle racism exists. On an interpersonal level, junior soldiers report an undercurrent which focuses on racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, stereotyping, separatism, self-polarization, misperception, and individual racial animosity. Most report that off-duty socialization often polarizes along ethnic, cultural, or other lines, which is often viewed as natural and acceptable.

- Leaders and soldiers alike cited high Operational Pace, unpredictability, reorganization impacts, and financial hardship of junior soldiers as contributing to a stressful human relations environment.

- Many soldiers and leaders, especially junior noncommissioned officers and officers, perceive a “Zero Defect” environment. Many believe this concern with failure avoidance leads to shielding superiors from bad news and to not attacking the root cause of problems for fear of unwanted attention or criticism.

- In some instances, leadership at battalion or higher levels may have differing perceptions of the human relations environment from those of junior soldiers, due to “hierarchical insulation,” generational differences, or preconceptions.

- Some new sergeants and staff sergeants are viewed as lacking the necessary experience and leadership training to effectively resolve human relations problems.
• The Army does not have a formal process to evaluate soldier extremist behaviors, adaptability, and sensitivity to human relations issues during the recruiting process or Initial Entry Training.

• Sexual harassment and sexism have received greater emphasis and attention from commanders than other human relations issues in the last two to three years. Based on their experience in the 1970s and 1980s, senior leaders in the field appeared to believe the Army’s racial problems were being adequately addressed. Racism and extremism were perceived as lesser problems and were less likely to have been targeted for training or leadership focus.

• Equal Opportunity and other human relations training within many units appears to be conducted erratically or with varying degrees of effectiveness. Until recently, little has been included on the subject of extremism.

• Many junior soldiers expressed little confidence in the responsiveness of the Equal Opportunity complaint system. They also consider the unit-level Equal Opportunity Representatives ineffective. By contrast, the Equal Opportunity complaint system is often viewed by junior leaders and some other soldiers as being abused by minorities and females.

• Most leaders believe that the absence of an Army standard and confusing billets policies degrade commanders’ ability to be aware of and influence after-duty activities. Single Soldier Initiatives (SSI) and Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS) are widely misunderstood, confused with each other, and often misinterpreted as limiting the chain of command’s authority/ability to manage the billets (establish policy, inspect, enforce standards).

• Most soldiers believe that open-post policies, coupled with either lax screening of patrons for eligibility at Morale, Welfare, and Recreation outlets and clubs, or unruly conduct by “guests” of authorized patrons, can contribute to disruptive activities and undesirable incidents.

• Alcohol abuse reduces individual inhibitions against unacceptable and illegal behavior, and when coupled with varying degrees of racial, ethnic, and cultural polarization, can degrade the general human relations environment in units.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Revise Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, paragraph 4-12, to eliminate the confusion created by the distinctions between active and passive participation in organizations and activities; to specify more clearly when commanders will counsel and/or take adverse action against soldiers who are displaying extremist behavior, and to make the regulation punitive.

- Conduct separate in-depth reviews of the extent of extremist activity and the human relations environment in the Reserve Components and in the Army civilian workforce.

- Develop a reporting process for the timely and accurate sharing of information on extremism among appropriate staff agencies, e.g., Equal Opportunity, Military Police, and Judge Advocates.

- Ensure that all information on extremist activities is disseminated to leaders at battalion and lower levels.

- Develop a process to evaluate soldiers’ behaviors, adaptability, and sensitivity to human relations issues during recruitment and initial entry training, and screen for extremist views and participation during recruitment and initial entry training.

- Review Initial Entry Training to determine whether it is properly structured, resourced, and conducted to instill necessary individual discipline and motivation, team building, and inculcation of Army values. Review sustainment training of Army Values after Initial Entry Training.

- Review officer pre-commissioning programs to determine the adequacy of leadership and human relations training with an eye toward adopting a comprehensive program like the United States Military Academy’s *Consideration of Others*’ program.

- Ensure that officer and noncommissioned officer professional development courses include sufficient instruction on leadership, human relations and extremism.

- Review the Army Equal Opportunity Program, including the complaint process, training, reporting, and oversight to ensure responsiveness to the contemporary needs of soldiers.

- Improve Equal Opportunity training in Army schools and in units, conduct as required by regulation, and incorporate relevant portions on extremism.
• Fully staff Equal Opportunity Staff Officer, Advisor, and Representative positions with appropriately trained personnel who represent the racial and gender composition of the Army.

• Establish an Army policy and clarify guidance on Single Soldier Initiatives and the Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers programs. Clarify policies on acceptable standards of conduct in and appearance of soldier quarters and on the chain of command’s role in enforcement.

• Clearly state policy and then ensure that membership in fraternal, social, or private organizations will in no way impact upon the conduct of official or on-duty activities.

• Implement the detailed recommendations concerning Policy, Training, Data Reporting, and Accessions contained in Part II.
This assessment is the result of an intensive two-month effort in which the Task Force members synthesized and distilled the results of 1,681 individual leader interviews and 5,957 interviews of soldiers and civilians in group settings at 28 installations both overseas and in the continental United States. This “real world” experience was buttressed by an in-depth look at current Army and Department of Defense policies and regulations pertaining to extremism and the Army’s existing human relations environment. Finally, the Army Research Institute administered a confidential survey to 17,080 soldiers to help supplement the Task Force’s interview conclusions.

This report reflects the overall opinion of the interviewed and surveyed soldiers and civilians and the conclusions of the Task Force as to the extent of extremist activity in the Army. The complex and evolving nature of the extremist problem in America, and the rigorous time constraints, shaped the assessment strategy and population sample. The resulting report provides an assessment of the Army today.
THE TASK FORCE CHARTER AND SECRETARIAL GUIDANCE

The Secretary of the Army appointed Major General Larry R. Jordan to the Task Force Chair on December 12, 1995. The Task Force was comprised of an interdisciplinary team of senior personnel chosen by the Secretary from the human relations, law enforcement, and other appropriate disciplines. The Secretary gave the Task Force seven missions.

- Assess the extent of soldier participation in racist and other extremist organizations.
- Assess the current human relations environment among active duty soldiers in the Army, in particular the influence of extremist groups on that environment.
- Assess how the chain of command views and exercises its authority to handle participation in extremist organizations.
- Assess how well the chain of command emphasizes the need to treat others with dignity and respect.
- Assess the adequacy of information sharing on racist and other extremist organizations between military and civilian law enforcement officials.
- Identify the strengths and weaknesses of Army policy governing participation in racist and other extremist organizations, to include implementation, training, and oversight. Provide recommendations to correct task force-identified weaknesses.
- Review the circumstances underlying the killing of Mr. James and Ms. Burden in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

The charter also described the scope of the assessment which the Secretary expected. The Task Force was charged to look at large concentrations of soldiers in the United States and overseas, including Korea and Europe. It became clear that the large mission and short time allotted precluded looking at any group other than active duty forces.

The Secretary addressed the initial Task Force meeting on January 3, 1996, and personally amplified the intent, purpose, and scope of the Task Force and its mission. He reiterated that the central thrust of the Task Force effort was to review the influence of extremist groups on the Army. Although the human relations environment in general would be reviewed, the impact of extremist groups on that environment was to be the focus of the assessment. Finally, the Secretary enumerated the following principles which he expected to govern the Task Force recommendations. They must:
- Support the way the Army operates as a team

- Emphasize the effective use of the chain of command

- Reinforce the responsibility of commanders and noncommissioned officers for the welfare of their soldiers and for what their soldiers are doing

- Support the Army’s leadership style of establishing responsibility at the lowest appropriate level. In this regard, suggesting centralized Department of the Army programs was to be viewed with skepticism.

A copy of the Task Force Charter is at Annex C and a verbatim transcript of the Secretary’s remarks is at Annex D.
TASK FORCE METHODOLOGY

The data to support the assessment was obtained through a mixture of confidential written surveys, group sensing sessions, personal interviews of selected leaders and key staff personnel, and reviews of local Criminal Investigation Command, Inspectors General, Equal Opportunity, and Staff Judge Advocate records. Personal Task Force member oversight of these activities occurred at almost all locations.

Team Composition

The Task Force assembled five teams to assist in the data-gathering effort. Four teams were charged with traveling to various installations, and one team was charged with the review of departmental policy, recording of task force deliberations, and report preparation. Each of the four assessment teams had a senior team chief (colonel or lieutenant colonel) and a senior noncommissioned officer (master sergeant) detailed to it from the Inspector General Agency, three trained Inspectors General interviewers (chief warrant officer, major, or lieutenant colonel), and senior representatives from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, The Judge Advocate General’s Office, the Criminal Investigation Command, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, and a Command Sergeant Major who represented the Sergeant Major of the Army. These teams were also designed to reflect racial and gender diversity. The resources of The Inspector General were used extensively during this assessment because of their experience in conducting Army-wide inspections and interviewing soldiers. It is important to remember, however, that this was not an Inspector General inspection but rather an assessment for the Secretary of the Army by a special Task Force supported by a variety of resources. The policy team was similarly composed, formally led by a colonel but with three lieutenant colonels heading different functional areas: policy review, coordination of Task Force operations, and Task Force deliberations and report preparation.

Team Training

Intensive training was provided for the teams prior to conducting the first field visit.

- The Criminal Investigation Command, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms provided information on trends, behavior, symbols, and modus operandi associated with extremist and racist groups.

- The United States Military Academy Leader Development Branch and Behavioral Science and Leadership Department provided material on human behavior and programs to address human relations.
The Offices of the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel provided information on various Army policies, in particular on Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*.

- The United States Army Recruiting Command provided information on the criteria against which potential enlistees are screened.

- The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command provided information on the Initial Entry Training soldierization process and the inculcation of values.

- The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, provided information on various equal opportunity issues and human relations topics.

- The Inspector General Agency provided instruction on interview techniques and group dynamics.

  In addition, the Task Force spent considerable time in sessions designed to standardize the wording of the questions which would be asked, and the order in which they would be asked, as well as standardizing other administrative and reporting requirements to ensure that the same type of information was being gathered at the various installations.

*Site Selection*

The Task Force felt strongly that it was necessary to visit a large number of posts worldwide both to meet the Secretary’s expressed guidance and to do a thorough check on the pulse of the Army and the nature of any extremist threat. Accordingly, an ambitious schedule was put together which ensured that the operational as well as training environments were looked at, that the bases visited in the continental United States were geographically dispersed, and that a wide variety of units were seen (combat, combat support, combat service support, and special operations forces).

In all, 103 brigade or equivalent level commands were visited at 28 installations in 12 states as well as seven sites in Germany and five sites in Korea. The following installations were visited in the United States: Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, and Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Benning, Georgia; Forts Hood and Bliss, Texas; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort McClellan, Alabama; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Forts Richardson and Wainwright, Alaska; and the Military Entrance Processing Station, Baltimore, Maryland. In general, the teams were at the smaller installations for a week and at the larger installations for two weeks.
Leader Interviews

Individual interviews were conducted with various leaders at each installation visited. Required interviews included the Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, and Chief of Staff at installations or the Commanding General, Assistant Division Commanders, and Chief of Staff at divisional headquarters. In addition, a large number of brigade commanders (colonel-level), battalion commanders (lieutenant colonel-level), and command sergeants major were interviewed at each location. The teams also interviewed selected key staff members who would have knowledge as to the state of extremist activity and human relations in the area such as: Equal Opportunity Officers and Advisors, Provost Marshals, Criminal Investigation Command agents, Command Judge Advocates, Chaplains, Inspectors General, military mental health professionals (social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists), senior civilians, local civil police, and Federal Bureau of Investigation officers. In all, 63 command group personnel, 253 brigade- and battalion-level commanders, 272 command sergeants major, and 1,093 staff officers and other key personnel were interviewed.

A summary of the demographics of the interview population, by grade or duty position and race, is at Annex E.

Soldier and Civilian Interviews

Most soldiers and civilians were interviewed in group sessions. Groups were established in a variety of ways at each installation in accordance with the desires of the Task Force. Rank was one factor. These stratified groups were: Company Commanders (captains), lieutenants, First Sergeants, master sergeants/sergeants first class, staff sergeants, sergeants, specialists through privates, chief warrant officers and warrant officers, General Schedule 12 through 8 Department of the Army civilian employees, General Schedule 7 through 1 Department of the Army civilian employees, and Wage Grade Department of the Army Civilians. Some groups were racially diverse. Other groups stratified by race (Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Other). Males and females were mixed in those groups which represented commands with women assigned to them.

In all, 531 group interview sessions were held in which 5,256 soldiers and 701 Department of the Army Civilians were interviewed.

The selection of these group interviewees was of concern to the Task Force. In order to insure a random sampling, installations were given a series of the final two digits from Social Security numbers against which they ran a data query. Any soldier whose Social Security number ended in the assigned two digits was required to participate in the group interview sessions. Such randomly identified soldiers comprised 50% of the groups interviewed. The remaining 50% of the groups were selected from assigned units to provide an approximate picture of diversity in the command.
Candor was encouraged by the granting of conditional anonymity during the interviews. Soldiers were informed that anything they said during the interview would not be shared with their commanders and supervisors with the exception that admissions of personal criminal wrong-doing would have to be referred to proper authorities. Individual soldier opinions and comments would be treated as privileged communications. This policy was reinforced by the interview teams. No unauthorized personnel from the command were allowed in the interview rooms as observers. The only personnel privy to soldier interview sessions were the Task Force members, the interviewers, and the soldiers being interviewed. In some interview sessions with Army civilian employees, union personnel were permitted to be present in accordance with the union contract. Candor was further encouraged by stratifying group interviews by rank, and for a portion of some categories, by race and ethnicity.

Coordination with Law Enforcement Officials

The teams interviewed military, local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to ensure that the exchange of communications between military and civil authorities on the subjects of extremist activity and hate crimes was satisfactory and two way.

Army Research Institute Survey

The Army Research Institute designed a 94-question confidential survey which was administered to 17,080 soldiers at the same installations where the interviews were conducted. This survey was administered in conjunction with the traveling teams’ interviews but was independent of the traveling teams’ efforts. The survey was used to help supplement team observations. A demographic summary of the Army Research Institute survey is at Annex F.

Outside Agencies Consulted

During the course of this assessment, the Task Force met with representatives and received briefings from the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Within the Department of Defense, the Task Force also coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Department of the Air Force, and the Department of the Navy. The Task Force also solicited the input of private organizations which had directly offered or expressed their concern in the wake of the Fayetteville homicides. These included the Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’rith, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Conference on Christians and Jews, the National Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Wiesenthal Center. The Task Force acknowledges the concern, expertise, and effort of those government and private organizations which provided input.
ANNEXES

ANNEX A---Task Force Member Biographies
ANNEX B---Summary of Contemporary Policy on Extremism
ANNEX C---Task Force Charter
ANNEX D---Secretary’s Remarks to the Task Force
ANNEX E---Interview Demographics
ANNEX F---Survey Demographics
ANNEX A

TASK FORCE MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

Major General Larry R. Jordan
Chairman of the Task Force on Extremist Activities. MG Jordan is currently serving as Deputy The Inspector General of the Army. He has served more than twenty seven years as an Armor Officer, and as Commanding General of the United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Kentucky, one of the Army’s largest training installations. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Brigadier General Daniel Doherty
Member of the Task Force on Extremist Activities. BG Doherty has served more than twenty seven years as a Military Police Officer, and is currently the Commanding General of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command.

Mr. John P. McLaurin, III
Member of the Task Force on Extremist Activities. Mr. McLaurin is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Military Personnel Management and Equal Opportunity Policy. He is a retired Colonel of the United States Army and a lawyer. His key active duty assignments before concluding his career in the Judge Advocate Generals Corps included Staff Judge Advocate of the 2nd Infantry Division in the Republic of Korea, and of the Health Services Command in San Antonio, Texas.

Ms. Karen Scott Heath
Member of the Task Force on Extremist Activities. Ms. Heath is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and has oversight of personnel readiness, quality of life and health care policies and issues for the Navy and Marine Corps. She has more than thirteen years experience as senior professional staff member on the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

Sergeant Major of the Army Gene C. McKinney
Member of the Task Force on Extremist Activities. SMA McKinney serves as the senior advisor on enlisted matters to the Secretary of the Army and to the Chief of Staff of the Army. He has previously served as the Command Sergeant Major of United States Army Europe. During his more than twenty eight years of service, he has held every enlisted leadership position from scout leader to command sergeant major.
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| Jun-74| Executive Order 11785 Amending Executive order No. 10450   | Section 2. Neither the Attorney General, nor the Subversive Activities Control Board, nor any other agency shall designate organizations pursuant to section 12 of Executive Order 10450, nor circulate nor publish a list of organizations previously so designated. The list of organizations previously designated is hereby abolished and shall not be used for any purpose.  
Section 3. Subparagraph (5), paragraph (a) of section 8 of Executive Order 10450 is revised to read as follows: "Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any state of subdivision thereof by unlawful means." | DoD Directive 5200.2 DoD Personnel Security Program |
G. Military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; or, advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts, to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, and organizing or leading such organizations is incompatible with Military Service, is therefore prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action against military personnel who actively participate in such groups. | Chapter 4-12 AR 600-20                        |
### ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

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<td>Jan-87</td>
<td>DoD Directive 5200.2 DoD Personnel Security Program</td>
<td>Chapter II Policies Section 2 Criterion for Application of Security Standards 2-200 Criteria for Application of Security Standards . . . The criteria for determining eligibility for a clearance under the security standard shall include, but not be limited to the following: d. Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.</td>
<td>AR 380-67 DA Personnel Security Program AR 604-10 Military Personnel Security Program</td>
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<td>Jan-80</td>
<td>DoD Directive 5200.27 Acquisition of Information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense</td>
<td>D. Authorized Activities DoD components, are authorized to gather information essential to the accomplishment of the following defense actions. 1a. Subversion of loyalty, discipline, or morale of DoD military or civilian personnel by actively encouraging violations of law, disobedience of lawful orders or regulations, or disruption of military activities.</td>
<td>AR 190-45 Law Enforcement Reporting AR 380-13 Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-affiliated persons and Organizations</td>
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<td>Feb-86</td>
<td>DoD Directive 5240.6 Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program</td>
<td>A. Purpose 3. Establishes requirements for the periodic briefing of DoD personnel on hostile intelligence and terrorist threats. 4. Prescribes judicial and administrative sanctions for DoD personnel who fail to comply with the requirements of this Directive. F. Procedures 1(2) Information concerning any . . . terrorist organization, sabotage, or subversive activity that is reasonably believed to pose or have a potential to pose a direct threat to DoD or AR 381-12 Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army 18 USC 2387 Criminal Subversion . . . generally includes inciting military or civilian personnel of the DoD to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt military activities, with the willful intent thereby to interfere with, or impair the loyalty, morale, or discipline, of the military forces of the United States. Terrorism- The unlawful use or threatened use of force or</td>
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<td>Aug-93</td>
<td>DoD Directive 5500.7 Joint Ethics Regulation</td>
<td>3-301 Membership and Management DoD employees may become members and may participate in the management of non-Federal entities as individuals in a personal capacity provided they act exclusively outside the scope of their official position. 3-301 Primary Ethical Values Respect To treat people with dignity, to honor privacy and to allow self-determination are critical in a government of diverse people. Lack of respect leads to a breakdown of loyalty and honesty within a government and brings chaos to the international community.</td>
<td>violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. (from Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program.) Terrorist Organization- Ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more people engaged in conduct or patterns of conduct which involves use of force or violence. Purpose of group using violence must intimidate/coerce a government, civilian population of segment in furtherance of political or social objective. (FBI Definition)</td>
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<td>Jun-94</td>
<td>FM 100-1 The Army</td>
<td>The Army Ethos... The Army ethos, the guiding beliefs, standards and ideals that characterize and motivate the Army, is succinctly described in one word—Duty. Duty is behavior required by moral obligation, demanded by custom, or enjoined by feelings of rightness 5-6). It requires the impartial administration of standards without regard to friendship, personality, rank, or other bias.(7) Compassion is basic respect for the dignity of each individual; treating all with dignity and respect. It is the personification of the “Golden Rule,” treat others as you want them to treat you.(9) The American Soldier American soldiers come from a wide range of cultural backgrounds. Upon entering the military service, they are called upon to adapt their individual values to those of the military profession.(10)</td>
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## ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

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| Aug-95| AR 40-501 Standards of Medical Fitness | **2-32 Personality, behavior, or academic skills disorders**  
The causes for rejection are as follows:  
a. Personality or behavior disorders, as evidenced by frequent encounters with law enforcement agencies, antisocial attitudes or behavior which, while not sufficient cause for administrative rejection, are tangible evidence of impaired characterological capacity to adapt to military service.  
**2-35 Skill and cellular tissues**  
z. Tattoos that will significantly limit effective performance of military service. |                                                                 |
### Annex B—Summary of Contemporary Policy on Extremism

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<td>Nov-93</td>
<td>AR 190-40 Serious Incident Reports</td>
<td>a. The establishment of off-limits areas is a function of Command. It may be used by commanders to help maintain good discipline, health, morals, safety, and welfare of service members.</td>
<td>Under revision</td>
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#### 1-4 Responsibilities
- b. Commanders of MACOMs will:
  1. Implement a reporting system... and ensure that the MACOM headquarters submits the SIR to HQDA (overseas only)
- c. CONUS installation commanders will report SIR to HQDA...
- d. All Active Army, Army National Guard, or United States Army Reserve unit, agency, or activity commanders, to include commanders of Army elements of unified commands or combined commands, will:
  1. Expeditiously notify the CONUS installation commander having geographic reporting responsibility or the overseas MACOM commander, as appropriate, of serious incidents.

#### 2-3 Incidents not reportable by SIR
- h. Incidents involving subversion and espionage directed against the US Army and deliberate security violations.
- Appendix B Category 1 Reportable Serious Incidents
d. Terrorist activities, sabotage, and incidents, initiated or sponsored by known terrorists, dissident groups, or criminal elements that occur on an installation, or involve military personnel or property off an installation.
- Appendix C Category 2 Reportable Serious Incidents
  - c. Racially or ethnically motivated criminal acts.
  - p. Group breaches of discipline involving 10 or more persons who collectively act to defy authority.

#### C-1
- Any other incident that the commander determines to be of concern to HQDA based on the nature, gravity, potential for adverse publicity, or potential consequences of the incident.

proponent to broaden to include all bias crime, categories "religious, sexual orientation, national origin"
- proponent to change to '3' or more (same as FBI)

No follow up if "Race/Ethnic" not immediately discerned
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<td>Sep-86</td>
<td>AR 190-45 Law Enforcement Reporting</td>
<td>2-4 Acquisition and storage of information on non-DoD affiliated persons and organizations</td>
<td>See DoD Directive 5200.27 Acquisition of Information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense</td>
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<td>a. Information on persons and organizations not affiliated with DoD may be acquired, reported, processed, and stored per AR 380-13. Situations listed in AR 380-13 justifying acquisition of this information include, but are not limited to-</td>
<td>Proponent changing report to match /collect NIBRS requirements: includes 'Bias/motivation' data</td>
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<td>(3) Subversion of loyalty, discipline, or morale of DA military or civilian personnel by actively encouraging violation of laws, disobedience of lawful orders and regulations, or disruption of military activities.</td>
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<td>4-2 Military Police Report (DA Form 3975)</td>
<td>Dissemination</td>
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<td>b. Cautionary rule. An incident will not be reported as a founded offense unless adequately substantiated by police investigation. A person will not be reported as the subject of an offense without probable cause supported by corroborating evidence.</td>
<td>Local Commanders and Supervisors</td>
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<td>(DA Form 4833) Table 4-2 Offense Code List</td>
<td>Crime Records Center (Army)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5E Civil Rights DA Form 2819 Crime Data Report</td>
<td>No requirements to report to HQDA</td>
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<td>Not required to disseminate to subordinate equal opportunity advisors, Inspector General, or Chaplain</td>
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<td>No other code for defining hate crimes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>No mechanism for recording hate crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-93</td>
<td>AR 190-51 Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and NonSensitive)</td>
<td>This regulation sets forth physical security policies, procedures and standards for safeguarding Army property. It gives commanders the flexibility to enhance physical security by adapting invested resources to meet local needs based on risk analysis results.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-85</td>
<td>AR 195-2 Criminal Investigation Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Describes the investigative authority of the US Army and provides guidelines for determining if an Army interest exists in a given criminal offense (para 3-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-85</td>
<td>AR 340-21 Military Personnel Security Program</td>
<td>1-5 Policy</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Collect only the personal information about an individual that is legally authorized and necessary to support Army operations. Disclose this information only as authorized by the Privacy Act and this regulation.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3-2 Blanket routine use disclosure
   c. Disclosure of requested information. If the information is relevant and necessary to the requesting agency’s decision, a record may be disclosed to a Federal agency in response to its request in connection with:
      (1) Hiring or retention of an employee
      (2) Issuance of a security clearance
      (3) Reporting of an investigation of an employee

4-5 First amendment rights
No record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the first amendment will be kept unless expressly authorized by Federal statute, by the subject individual, or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. Exercise of these rights includes, but is not limited to, religious and political beliefs, freedom of speech and the press, and the right of assembly and to petition.

4-6 CMT (Common military training) categories
a. Program (P) Program training applies to the majority of soldiers and is conducted in a structured manner as follows.
   (1) ... training base (resident training) is conducted in accordance with an approved POI.
   (2) ... training in units is conducted on a continuing or cyclical basis...

c. Refresher (R) Refresher training is used when periodic or recurring emphasis is required. Refresher training frequency is left to the commander’s discretion.

e. Awareness (A) Awareness training can be accomplished by briefings or orientations ... How and when this training is conducted is discretionary and depends on the commander’s evaluation of need.

Table B-1 Common military training in units
Applicable Subjects
SAEDA 350-41  ACSEL P P
Counterterrorism 525-13  DCSPER A,T A,T
EO/Sex Harass 600-20  DCSPER R R
ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Directive or Regulation</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command Info 360-81</td>
<td>OCPA A A</td>
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<td>Legend</td>
<td>P- Program = Periodic requirements for all units</td>
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<td>A- Awareness = Does not assume training in schools, but</td>
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<td></td>
<td>does require command emphasis</td>
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<td>R- Refresher = Assumes training to standard in schools, but</td>
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<td>requires occasional review to sustain training level for all</td>
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<td>soldiers</td>
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<td>T- Time Sensitive = Training required within a reasonable</td>
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<td>period before an event or exercise</td>
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<td>Table B-2 Common Training in Army Schools</td>
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<td>Applicable Subjects B A P Bn An S F Ob Oa C Cg</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EO/Sex Harass P P P P P A A A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SAEDA P P P P P</td>
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<td>Standard Conduct P R R P R</td>
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<td>Military Justice P P P A A A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legend</td>
<td>B-Basic, A- AIT, P- PLDC, Bn- BNCOC, An-ANCOC, S- SMC, F- Functional,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ob-OBWOCS, Oa-OAUSWOT, Oa-OAUSWOT, C- CASC, Cg-CGSOC/MWOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug-93</td>
<td>AR 350-41 Unit Training</td>
<td>B-3 CMT (Common military training) categories</td>
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<td>(1) Program (P) Program training applies to the majority of</td>
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<td>soldiers and is conducted in a structured manner as follows.</td>
<td>soldiers and is conducted in a structured manner as follows.</td>
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<td>(a) ... training base (resident training) is conducted in</td>
<td>(a) ... training base (resident training) is conducted in</td>
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<td>accordance with an approved POL.</td>
<td>accordance with an approved POL.</td>
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<td>(b) ... training in units is conducted on a continuing or</td>
<td>(b) ... training in units is conducted on a continuing or</td>
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<td>cyclical basis. . .</td>
<td>cyclical basis. . .</td>
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<td>(9). Refresher (R) Refresher training is used when periodic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>or recurring emphasis is required. Refresher training frequency is</td>
<td>or recurring emphasis is required. Refresher training frequency is</td>
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<td>left to the commander's discretion.</td>
<td>left to the commander's discretion.</td>
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<td>(11). Awareness (A) Awareness training can be accomplished by</td>
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<td>briefings or orientations... How and when this training is conducted</td>
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<td>is discretionary and depends on the commander's evaluation of need.</td>
<td>is discretionary and depends on the commander's evaluation of need.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Table B-1 Common military training in units</td>
<td>Table B-1 Common military training in units</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Applicable Subjects</td>
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## ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAEDA 350-41</td>
<td>ACSP</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism 525-13</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>A,T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO/Sex Harass 600-20</td>
<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Info 360-81</td>
<td>OCPA</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **P**: Program = Periodic requirements for all units
- **A**: Awareness = Does not assume training in schools, but does not require command emphasis
- **R**: Refresher = Assumes training in standard in schools, but requires occasional review to sustain training level for all soldiers
- **T**: Time Sensitive = Training required within a reasonable period before an event or exercise

### Table B-2: Common Training in Army Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable Subjects</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Bn</th>
<th>An</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Ob</th>
<th>Oa</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Cg</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EO/Sex Harass</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAEDA</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard Conduct</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Justice</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **B**: Basic, **A**: AIT, **P**: PLDC, **Bn**: BNOC, **An**: ANCOC, **S**: SMC, **F**: Functional, **Ob**: Ob-OBC/WOCS, **Oa**: OAC/SPOT, **C**: CAS, **Cg**: CGSOC/MWOC

### Chapter 1: Introduction

1-6 Installation OCS Structured Interview

- The objective of the Structured Interview is to identify the degree to which the . . . . The applicant’s past behavior is a variety of situations is evaluated to predict future performance.

### Chapter 2: Eligibility Requirements

2.2 Who May Not Apply

- Individuals may not apply if-
  - Their selection would clearly not be in the interests of National Security

**Predeparture Interview**

- a . . . . This in-depth interview is to verify that the selectee is
### Annex B—Summary of Contemporary Policy on Extremism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Directive or Regulation</th>
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</table>
| Sep-74| AR 380-13 Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-affiliated persons and Organizations | 6. Operations related to protection of Army personnel, functions and property  
   a. Information on persons and organizations not affiliated with the DoD may be acquired, reported, processed, and stored under the authority of this paragraph only if there is a reasonable basis to believe that one or more of the following situations exists:  
   (3) Subversion of loyalty, discipline or morale of Department of the Army military or civilian personnel by actively encouraging violation of laws, disobedience of lawful orders and regulations, or disruption of military activities.  
   c. The criteria to be used in submitting a request to conduct a special investigation operation involving persons or organizations not affiliated with DoD are as follows:  
   (1) The target group must represent a significant and demonstrable threat to the security effectiveness of Army functions and property. | See DoD Directive 5200.27 Acquisition of Information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense |
| Sep-88| AR 380-67 DA Personnel Security Program                                                  | Section II Criteria for application of security standards  
   2-200 d. Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United | See DoD Directive 5200.2 DoD Personnel Security Program |
### ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

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<td>States, or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2-401 Subversive affiliations</td>
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<td>a. In the context of DoD investigative policy, subversion refers only to such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. Specifically, this is limited to information concerning the activities of individuals or groups that involve or will involve the violation of Federal law, for the purpose of:</td>
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<td>(3) Depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States.</td>
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<td>b. Military Department/FBI jurisdiction.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Allegations of activities covered by criteria a through f para 2-200 of this regulation are in the exclusive investigative domain of either the counterintelligence agencies of the Military Departments or the FBI. . . .</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Appendix 1 Adjudication Policy</td>
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<td>1-2 Loyalty</td>
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<td>a. Basis . . . Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b. Disqualifying factors</td>
<td>(2) Membership in an organization that has been characterized by the DOJ as on which meets the criteria as one which meets the criteria in the above cited “Basis.” (3) Knowing participation in acts that involve force or violence or threats of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or to</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar-93</td>
<td>AR 381-12 Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army</td>
<td><strong>SAEDA—Chapter 3 Reporting Requirements</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>2-2 Content of Training</strong>&lt;br&gt;... At a minimum, SAEDA training will include instructions on the following:&lt;br&gt;1. The international and domestic terrorist threat, the vulnerability of DA personnel and their family members to terrorist acts, and the defensive measures that may be employed to thwart such acts.&lt;br&gt;j. The intelligence threat posed by nontraditional adversaries.&lt;br&gt;<strong>3-1 SAEDA Incidents</strong>&lt;br&gt;... Personnel subject to the UCMJ who fail to comply with the requirement of this paragraph are subject to punishment under UCMJ, as well as to adverse administrative or other adverse action authorized by applicable provisions of the USC or federal regulations. . . The following incidents and</td>
<td><strong>SAEDA is a bi-annual training requirement per change 1-</strong>&lt;br&gt;Has accountability under Army Command Inspection Program&lt;br&gt;Definition of subversive/terrorist comparable to extremist Content of SAEDA training has traditionally focused on foreign threat  &lt;br&gt;Neither field nor HQDA has made correlation Training package needs revision to include Extremist Activity</td>
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## ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

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| Jun-92  | AR 525-13 The Army Combating Terrorist Program | 1-4 US Government and army policies for CBT/T b(1)(d) Ensure all personnel are informed of the terrorist threat and of all security precautions designed to reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attack.  
2-10 CG TRADOC will a. Develop and implement appropriate training programs from AT, to include-   
(1) An orientation for cadets and officer candidates undergoing precommissioning training and for soldiers undergoing initial entry training which familiarizes them with individual protective measures . . .   
(2) Comprehensive training in leadership courses designed to train officers and NCOs to exercise their responsibilities for protecting personnel, family members, facilities and equipment from terrorist attack, . . .  
2-11 CG, USACIDC will- a. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate to affected commands criminal information pertaining to terrorist activities, within the provisions of applicable statutes and regulations.  
f. Report terrorist incidents, suspected terrorist activity and criminal information concerning the terrorist threat to appropriate local commanders.  
2-12 CG INSCOM will d Include terrorist threat information in briefings on | AR 525-13 Definition of terrorism  
The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. |
### ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

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<td>subversion and espionage directed against the Army (SAEDA) per AR 381-12.</td>
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<td>e. Serve as the Army's intelligence liaison representative to Federal, State, and local agencies ... to exchange terrorism information.</td>
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<td>2-16. MACOM Commanders will</td>
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<td>d. Ensure that SAEDA training (AR 381-12) includes information on the nature of the terrorist threat, vulnerabilities of military personnel ...</td>
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<td>e. Develop AT education and training programs, threat briefings and public affairs command information programs to inform ... Such materials should be disseminated ... during periods when the THREATCON level exceeds NORMAL in CONUS locations.</td>
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<td>2-18 Installation Commanders will</td>
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<td>e. Prepare an installation/local security threat assessment that describes the current terrorist threat. Assessments should be prepared at least annually (and updated as required) and form the basis for identifying vulnerabilities that require correction.</td>
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<td>3-9 Training and Exercises</td>
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<td>a. Individual awareness training will be conducted for all new accessions during their initial entry training. This training will focus on the worldwide terrorist threat to Army personnel ...</td>
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<td>b. Leaders courses ... will include instruction in CBT/T responsibilities and techniques applicable to force protection. ...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul-95</td>
<td>AR 600-8-24 Officer Transfers and Discharges</td>
<td>Chapter 4 Eliminations</td>
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<td>4-1 Overview</td>
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<td>c. An officer who has his or her security clearance withdrawn or withheld due to unfavorable information regarding loyalty, subversion, or security may be processed for involuntary separation according to AR 604-10.</td>
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<td>4-2 Reasons for Elimination</td>
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<td>While not all inclusive, when one of the following or similar</td>
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| Dec 86 wcl Oct 94 | AR 600-37 Suspension of Favorable Actions for Military Personnel in National Security Cases or Other Investigations or Proceedings | conditions exist, elimination action may be or will be initiated as indicated below:  
   a. Substandard performance of duty  
   b. Misconduct, moral or professional dereliction, or in the interest of national security.  
   (5) Acts of personal misconduct (including but not limited to acts committed while in a drunken or intoxicated state).  
   (8) Conduct unbecoming an officer.  
   (10) Acts or behavior not clearly consistent with the interests of national security. (See AR 604-10)  
   c. Derogatory Information                                                                 |                                                                                                                                     |
|            | AR 600-50 Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel                      | Chapter 4 Unfavorable Information in Intelligence and Security Files  
   4-1 Security Information  
   Derogatory information concerning loyalty and subversion (AR 604-10 ch 2) will be processed as set forth in that regulation.  
   4-3 Commanders will ensure that security clearances are not suspended in lieu of punishment under the UCMJ or other disciplinary measures. Denial or revocation of a security clearance will not be used as a punishment or disciplinary measure. |                                                                                                                                     |
| Mar-88     | AR 600-20 Army Command Policies and Procedures                                             | Chapter 2 2-1 Chain of Command  
   b. Commanders are responsible for everything their command does or fails to do. . .  
   d. Soldiers have a responsibility to ensure their unit commander is made aware of problems which affect the discipline, moral, and effectiveness of the unit.  
   Chapter 4-4 Soldier Conduct  
   a. Ensuring the proper conduct of soldiers is a function of command. Commanders rely upon all leaders in the Army, whether they are on or off duty or in a leave status, to—  
   (2) Take action against military personnel in any case where                                                                 |                                                                                                                                     |
ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

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|      | Chapter 4-12 Extremist Organizations (Added) | The activities of extremist organizations are inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Active participation by soldiers is prohibited. (see para 6-3) a. Military personnel, duty bound to uphold the Constitution, must reject participation in organizations which—
1) Espouse supremacist causes.
2) Attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin.
3) Advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. | See Change 2. to DoD Directive 1325.6 Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces
Recommendations
Title and Address “Activity” not “Organizations”
Add para on Command Authority
Definition is confusing
Definition of Extremists
Use Definition from Security Regulations
Do not tie to REDCAT/Gender alone
Will address militias and others
Make Regulation punitive |
|      | Chapter 4-12 Extremist Organizations (Added) | b. Passive activities, such as mere membership, receiving literature in the mail, or presence at an event, although strongly discouraged as incompatible with military service, are not prohibited by Army policy. Positive actions to limit soldier participation are listed in d below. | |
|      | Chapter 4-12 Extremist Organizations (Added) | c. The prohibited activities concerning extremist groups include the following:
1) Participating in a public demonstration or rally.
2) Knowingly attending a meeting or activity while on duty, when in uniform, when in a foreign country, or in violation of off limits sanctions or commander’s order.
3) Conducting fund-raising activities.
4) Recruiting or training members (including encouraging other soldiers to join).
5) Organizing or leading such a group
6) Distributing literature on or off a military installation.
7) Participating in any activity that is in violation of regulations, constitutes a breach of law and order, or is likely to result in violence. | |
|      | Chapter 4-12 Extremist Organizations (Added) | d. Commanders should take positive actions when soldiers in their units are identified as members of extremist groups and/or when they engage in extremist group activities. Some of these actions include—
1) Educating soldiers as to the Army’s policy of fair and | |

B-16
equitable treatment for all. Commanders will point out that soldiers holding views to the contrary are not in harmony with Army goals, beliefs, and values, and should seriously reconsider their position.

2) Counseling and advising soldiers of the incompatibility of such organizations with military service, and that their membership—
   a) Article 92-Failure to obey a lawful order or violation of a lawful regulation or general order (for example, participation in nonapproved on-post meetings or demonstrations, distribution of literature without approval or discrimination.)
   b) Article 116-Three or more people whose actions cause "Public Terror"
   c) Article 117-Provoking words or gestures
   d) Article 134-Conduct which is disorderly or service discrediting.
   8)Imposing off-limits restrictions on off post facilities that pose a threat to the discipline, health, morale, safety, or welfare of military personnel in accordance with AR 1909-24.
   9) Ordering soldiers not to participate in specific events sponsored by extremist groups when there is a reasonable likelihood of such participation resulting in activities which are illegal or are prejudicial to good order, discipline, or morale.
   e. Actions taken by commanders must be appropriate to the specific facts surrounding any incident. Not every incident warrants separation or UCMJ action.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar-95</td>
<td>AR 601-210 Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program</td>
<td>2-10 Moral and administrative criteria a. Applicant Interview. Recruiter will interview applicant on any records of arrest, charges, juvenile court adjudication's, traffic violations, probation periods, dismissed or pending charges or convictions, including those which have been expunged or sealed. (1) If applicant claims none, processing may continue</td>
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<td>without a police records check. (3) If applicant admits an offense, or recruiter has reasons to suspect applicant may be concealing a record, start police records check. . .</td>
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<td>b. Police Clearance e. Delay of police reply. If reply from police authorities is not received within 21 days, a copy of the DD Form 369 request will be forwarded to the battalion whose area includes the city in question. Battalion commander will exert every effort to obtain police clearance and return results to requesting recruiting station. If efforts to obtain information fail, process allegation as self-admitted offense.</td>
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<td>I. Police records check not required. If law enforcement agency states, in writing, that it will not provide information or that a fee is required and copy of that statement is maintained in recruiting battalion, police records check will not be required. DD Form 369 will contain reference to that written statement. The form will be forwarded with enlistment packet.</td>
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<td>2-16 Entrance National Agency Check/National Agency Check ENTRNAC/NAC a. DD Form 398-2 will be initiated on all ENTRNAC/NAC requests (superseded)</td>
<td>superseded by SF 86 Sep 95</td>
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<td>4-24 Nonwaiver medical, moral, and administrative disqualification's The following are disqualification's that cannot be waived: h. History of antisocial behavior. m. Persons whose enlistment are not clearly consistent with the interests of national security under AR 604-10.</td>
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<td>Chapter 6 MEPS Processing Phase Section 11 Guidance Counselor Processing Phase 6-5c. . .specifically, question applicant on existence of juvenile and youthful offender records. Explains thoroughly to each applicant the Army policy that adjudication as a youthful offender or juvenile delinquent by a State, or disposition by Federal juvenile authorities, will not prevent</td>
<td>List of 26 different areas the guidance counselor must cover from Army policy on Drugs to discouraging enlistees from wearing contact lenses to basic training</td>
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<tr>
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<td>enlistment if applicant is otherwise eligible.</td>
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<td>AR 601-270 MEPS</td>
<td>Chapter 3 Operational Guidance 3-6 Applicant clothing standards Applicants being processed at the MEPs will be dressed in a manner decided by the IRC. Chapter 6 Operating Procedures 6-5 MEPS preenlistment interview MEPS will interview applicants (before the Oath of Enlistment is administered) for the purpose of assisting recruiting activities . . . Any additional information obtained from applicants which may have a bearing on their qualification for military service will be furnished to the appropriate MEPS examining officer . . . for resolution. Specific interview requirements and procedures will be established by the Commander, USMEPCOM, in coordination with recruiting Service commanders. Chapter 9 Processing of Selective Service Registrants (This chapter will be implemented upon direction of HQDA) 9-15 Initial Screening . . . Registrants are unacceptable when their record of convictions or adverse juvenile adjudication's reflects frequent difficulties with law enforcement agencies, criminal tendencies, a history of antisocial behavior, alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual misconduct, or questionable moral character.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep-95</td>
<td>AR 601-280 Army</td>
<td>1-8 Authority to act on retention actions f. In those cases where a soldier is fully qualified for retention but his commander believes it is not in the best interest of the Army for the soldier to continue to serve (but a Bar to Reenlistment is not warranted), the commander may forward the soldier's request for reenlistment or</td>
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B-19
### ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Directive or Regulation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr-75</td>
<td>AR 604-10 Military Personnel Security Program</td>
<td>extension through command channels to the first Colonel or higher in the soldier’s chain of command. . . If denial of the requested action is supported, the commander will provide his or her comments, attached as an endorsement . . . through the servicing senior Career Counselor to the Commander PERSCOM . . . The Commander PERSCOM may, on a case-by-case basis, deny reenlistment and/or extension to any soldier who does not have a statutory entitlement to reenlist. . . Any commander who is a commissioned officer in the soldier’s chain of command may stop the process for denial and approve the soldier’s request. 8-2 Standards for Reenlistment a. Only soldiers of high moral character, personal competence, and demonstrated adaptability to the requirements of the professional soldier’s moral code will be reenlisted in the Active Army. 8-4 Criteria d. Soldiers against whom a Bar to Reenlistment may be initiated: (13) Cannot adapt to military life; uncooperative; involved in frequent difficulties with fellow soldiers (15) Causes trouble in the civilian community (17) Personal behavior brings discredit upon his unit or the Army 8-5 Procedures a(2) A Bar to Reenlistment should not be based on generalities, approximate dates, vague places or time. It should be based on specific incidents substantiated by official remarks made at the time of each occurrence. the soldier should be counseled on each occurrence and told that all instances are made matter of official record when acts considered unworthy of the US Army are performed.</td>
<td>This revision eliminates reference to the Attorney General’s list. . . The factors listed in table 2-1 interpret rather than limit the criteria and are not all-inclusive. See DoD Directive 5200.2 DoD Personnel Security Program Regulation is not obsolete, but is not used, no proponent.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Directive or Regulation</td>
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| Sep-95| AR 611-101 Commissioned Officer Classification System | 4. Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws . . . .
   e. Whether the individual was or should have been aware of the subversive aims of the organization.
   f. Extent of the individual’s activities in the organization. (e.g., was he an official; did he participate actively and publicly in meetings, social events, demonstrations, or parades, etc.; did he recruit other members, did he subscribe to literature of the organization, etc.)
   g. Whether the individual supported the organization financially, or participated in drives, benefits, etc., for strengthening the organization.
   h. Reasons advanced by the individual for membership, affiliation or association, e.g., to obtain low-cost insurance, improving conditions of minority groups, or belief in other alleged objectives of a patriotic or similar acceptable nature, social activities, etc. | Nothing applicable |
| Sep-95| AR 611-201 Enlisted Classification System |                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Nothing applicable |
|       | AR 635-200 Enlisted Administrative Separations | Chapter 1- General Information
"Separation policies . . . promote the readiness of the Army by providing an orderly means to ensure the Army is served by individuals capable of meeting required standards of duty performance and discipline."
Chapter 13-Separation for Unsatisfactory Performance 13-2 Criteria
a. Commanders will separate a soldier for unsatisfactory | found |
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>performance when it is clearly established that—</td>
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<td>(3) The seriousness of the circumstances is such that the soldier's retention would have an adverse impact on military discipline, good order, and morale, and</td>
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<td>(4) It is likely that the soldier will be a disruptive influence in present or future duty assignments, and</td>
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<td>(5) It is likely that the circumstances forming the basis for initiation of separation proceedings will continue or recur, and</td>
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<td>(6) The ability of the soldier to perform duties effectively in the future, including potential for advancement or leadership, is unlikely, and</td>
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<td>(7) The soldier meets medical retention standards.</td>
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<td>Chapter 14 Section III Acts or Patterns of Misconduct</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. A pattern of misconduct</td>
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<td>(2) Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.</td>
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<td>Discreditable conduct, and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline includes conduct violative of the accepted standards of personal conduct found in the UCMJ, Army Regulations, the civil law, and time honored customs and traditions of the Army.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep-92</td>
<td>AR 670-1 Wear and Appearance of Uniforms</td>
<td>1-7 Personal appearance policies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>a. General The Army is a uniformed service where discipline is judged, in part, by the manner in which the individual wears the uniform as prescribed.</td>
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<td>b. Exceptions to appearance standards based on religious practices.</td>
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<td>(1a) Religious apparel, articles, and jewelry that are not visible or apparent. &quot;Religious apparel&quot; is defined as articles of clothing worn as part of the observance of the religious faith practiced by the soldier.</td>
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<td>(1b) Visible or apparent religious articles, symbols, and jewelry under the same circumstances as authorized for nonreligious reasons.</td>
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<td>(4) When a soldier is wearing an Army uniform outside of worship services or other rites and rituals, neat and</td>
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## ANNEX B—SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY POLICY ON EXTREMISM

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<tr>
<td>Mar-90</td>
<td>DD Form 398-2 superseded by SF 86</td>
<td>conservative items of religious apparel are those that-&lt;br&gt; (a) Are discreet in style and design, and subdued in brightness or color.&lt;br&gt; (b) Do not replace or interfere with the proper wearing of any prescribed article of the uniform.&lt;br&gt; 1-8 Hair and fingernail standards and grooming policies d. Hygiene and body grooming... Tattooing in areas of the body, (i.e., face, legs) that would cause the tattoo to be exposed while in class A uniform, detract from a soldierly appearance.&lt;br&gt;1-10 When wearing the Army uniform is required or prohibited h. The wear of Army uniforms is prohibited.&lt;br&gt; (1) In connection with the furtherance of any political or commercial interests or when engaged in off duty civilian employment.&lt;br&gt; (2) When participating in public speeches, interviews, picket lines, marches, rallies, or public demonstrations, except as authorized by competent authority.&lt;br&gt; (3) When attending any meeting or event which is a function of or is sponsored by, and extremist organization.&lt;br&gt; (4) When wearing the uniform would bring discredit upon the Army.&lt;br&gt; 1-14 Wearing of Jewelry a. The wearing of a wrist watch, a wrist ID bracelet, including a conservative style MIA/POW ID bracelet (only one item per wrist) and not more than two rings is authorized.&lt;br&gt; b. No jewelry, watch chains, or similar items, to include pens and pencils, will appear exposed on uniforms.&lt;br&gt; d. Fad devices, vogue medallions, personal talismans, or amulets are not authorized for wear in uniform or on duty.</td>
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21. Organizations b. Are you now or have you ever been affiliated with any organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which:
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep-95</td>
<td>SF 86</td>
<td>(2) Advocates or approves the commission of acts of force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to deny persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30. Your Association Record</td>
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<td>a. Have you ever been an officer or a member or made a contribution to an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the United States Government and which engages in illegal activities to that end, knowing that the organization engages in such activities with the specific intent to further such activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL LARRY R. JORDAN  
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL  

SUBJECT: Task Force Charter  

I have selected you to lead a task force to assess the human relations environment in general and the influence of extremist groups in particular among soldiers throughout the Army. The task force will ascertain and describe this environment, determine how it can be made better for all of our soldiers, and make recommendations as to how we can better deal with racist and other extremist forces that intrude upon the Army community. This memorandum will serve as the task force's charter.  

The task force will be interdisciplinary, composed of senior personnel selected by me from the human relations, law enforcement, and other disciplines that will bring various perspectives to this undertaking.  

The task force will examine the human relations environment among soldiers across the Army, and will specifically review the circumstances underlying the recent incident in Fayetteville, North Carolina. The task force will look at large concentrations of soldiers in the United States and overseas, including Korea and Europe. Its review will include an assessment of the extent to which soldiers participate in racist and other extremist organizations; how the chain of command views and exercises its authority to handle any such participation and how well it emphasizes the need to treat others with dignity and respect; the adequacy of the sharing of appropriate information on such participation between military and civilian law enforcement officials; and the strengths and weaknesses of departmental policies pertaining to such participation, their implementation throughout the Army, and related training and oversight. The task force will recommend changes addressing any weaknesses identified.  

The Director of the Army Staff will provide all required administrative support; and, of course, the worldwide resources of the Office of The Inspector General will be available to you, as well. Prior to beginning the review, you should coordinate with appropriate officials at the Department of Justice.
Because of the importance of this issue to the Army, please keep me regularly informed of your progress. The task force's report should be provided to me by March 1, 1996.

Togo D. West, Jr.
I. Introduction

Good morning. I am here to give you some guidance as you set out upon this critical review. You need to know from the very beginning of this undertaking that your mission has been set out not only by me, but also by the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Perry is very aware of the composition of this group, your charter, and my personal involvement and he asked me to stress to you his interest in this Task Force. This early – and continuing – involvement by the Secretary of Defense is a great indicator of the importance of your mission.

Your work will have potentially far-reaching impact throughout not only the Army, but the entire Department of Defense. In looking at the influence of extremist groups among our soldiers, you will be looking at issues that affect the very fabric of our value system and your findings and recommendations have the potential to benefit all of the Services.

I have named this group "The Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities," and I have given it a subtitle as well: "Defending American Values." The title reflects my intent of the direction, purpose, and scope of this task force and its mission.

This morning I want to personally express that intent to you; first and foremost, you must understand the mission, if you are to succeed. But I would also say that I want my intent to be clear to the Army, the Defense Department and to the public. As for getting the word out to those audiences, I intend to remove as much of the burden as possible from you, so that you can concentrate on your mission. I have brought Sergeant First Class Rebecca Marcum in from the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute to assist with public affairs, which will be handled directly from my office. However, as the teams visit locations throughout the Army, they will, simply through the conduct of their business, represent my intent to many of our commanders and soldiers. They will, in effect, be spokespersons themselves to a significant portion of the Army.
II. Secretary's intent

A. Direction: task force responsibility to the Secretary of the Army

I have named this "The Secretary of the Army's Task Force," because I want it to be clear that this task force is responsible to me. The influence of extremist groups is a matter of potential concern to all Army units and organizations and it is an influence that could have a significant impact on our ability to successfully operate. For those reasons, this issue deserves -- and has -- my personal attention.

As the leader of the task force, Major General Larry Jordan will direct the teams and their work. However, each of you on the task force--each member as well as the leader himself--is responsible for what the task force achieves. All of you are individually and collectively responsible to me and no other for your review and recommendations.

B. Scope: central focus of task force

I have called this the "Task Force on Extremist Activities," because I want to stay focused on the central thrust: reviewing the influence of extremist groups on the Army. As I have stated in your charter, you will "assess the human relations environment in general," but you must keep in mind that it is the effect of extremist groups in particular on that environment which I have asked you to review. The Secretary of Defense agrees with this approach, and I have limited your time accordingly.

Your review will touch on many aspects of human relations--intolerance of all types, issues of race, gender, religion, rank, active versus reserve component distinctions, perhaps military versus civilian employee versus family member issues. You may in fact include among your recommendations further study in any of these or other areas. But resist the impulse to become fully engaged now in one of those related studies or in a comprehensive study of human relations. You do not have time, and it is not in the charter I have given you.

C. Purpose: the larger implications of the review

Having cautioned you on the limited scope of your task, I will reiterate that the subject of this review has far-reaching implications for our Army and the entire Department of Defense.

I have given the task force the description of "Defending American Values," because that is what the Army does, and that is what the task force must help me ensure that we continue to do. Indeed, the Army has defended American values for more than 220 years. Even before the birth of this nation, our Army defended the very values upon which the nation was to be founded.
Soldiers have a special bond with the American people whom they are charged to protect. That bond is reflected in our soldiers’ commitment through their oath of service and their duty to the Constitution. It is this bond and this oath—and a tradition of service that dates back more than 220 years—that make active participation in extremist organizations simply inconsistent with service as a soldier.

The impetus for this review was the tragic killing of Mr. Michael James and Ms. Jackie Burden in Fayetteville, the alleged involvement of three soldiers in those killings, and the reported involvement of those soldiers in extremist groups. I have asked you to include in your review the circumstances underlying this incident, but more than that, to look at the Army as well—for any one incident is an incident too many if it is at war with our basic principles.

I am looking to you for recommendations that will help me ensure that the Army continues to defend American values—particularly those of respect for human dignity and fairness for all—and to preserve them among our ranks.

III. Further guidance

You have my intent of the direction, scope, and purpose of your review. In addition, I would offer several points in the way of guidance for you to keep in mind as you conduct the review and particularly when you write your recommendations.

First, keep in mind that your recommendations should support the way the Army operates as a team. They should emphasize effective use of the chain of command. Commanders and noncommissioned officers are responsible for their soldiers’ welfare and their discipline; they are responsible for how and what their soldiers are doing. Our preferred leadership style in the Army is to “power down,” or establish responsibility at the lowest appropriate levels. While it may be tempting to come up with recommendations for centralized programs run at Department of the Army level, beware of suggesting ideas that would run counter to our leadership principles in the Army.

Second, your recommendations must also be clearly focused and feasible. They should be aimed specifically at any problem areas you find, and they should be executable.

Finally, keep in mind that I have asked you to look at our strengths as well as weaknesses in addressing soldier participation in extremist organizations. Your recommendations may include ways of maintaining or even enhancing our strengths. In any event, do not overlook them in your effort to identify weaknesses.

IV. Conclusion
As you go through this review, there are five key points I want you to remember and use as your guide.

One -- Know that the entire Army is watching your work; even more importantly, all of the Defense Department will be waiting for your findings. And perhaps most important of all, the American people are concerned about how their Army is doing and how it is controlling extremist behavior and the people of the United States will be watching.

Two -- Your review has the potential to establish a whole new set of groundrules for how we monitor, and if necessary, regulate the associations, affiliations and conduct of our soldiers.

Three -- Only you, as members of this Task Force, will be accountable for your work. You must each be comfortable with your recommendations which you will base on the true findings, whatever they may be.

Four -- Remember that you will examine an institution with a very proud heritage which boasts some of the finest soldiers to serve. I ask you to remember this because it will give your work context; it will paint for you the background against which you should carefully consider your findings and recommendations.

Five -- Until we publish and release a report, your views, expectations and findings as members of this Task Force are only for the ears of one another and me. I have worked very hard to provide you with flexibility and confidentiality and you must guard both of those as prized possessions.

I have set for you a hefty charter, but one that I believe is realistic. In closing, I would like to recall an observation by American statesman Adlai Stevenson, who said: “It is often easier to fight for principles than to live up to them.” [speech, New York City, 1952]

There is little doubt, here in our country or anywhere in the world, of our Army’s ability to fight and win any battle in order to protect the American people and the values for which this nation stands. Your task is to determine if there is more we can or should be doing to ensure that we live up to those values within the Army itself.
## Annex E

### INTERVIEW DEMOGRAPHICS

#### TASK FORCE TEAM INTERVIEWS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Interviewed</strong></td>
<td>7,638</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>4,265</td>
<td>(56%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>(28%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>(11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>6,366</td>
<td>(83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>(17%)</td>
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**Individual Interviews** - 1,681

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Group</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigade Commanders</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalion Commanders</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>(9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Sergeants Major</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>(16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Members</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
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**Group Interviews** - 531 Groups (5,957 Interviewees)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company Commanders</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>(7%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Sergeants</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers (Captain - Warrants)</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>(15%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noncommissioned Officers</td>
<td>2,307</td>
<td>(39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Enlisted (Private - Corporal)</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Annex F

## SURVEY DEMOGRAPHICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number Surveyed</th>
<th>17,080</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Survey Respondents</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Racial/Ethnic Groupings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>9,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Answer Question</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military Rank Groupings*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Grouping</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer (All)</td>
<td>3797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr. NCO (E7-E9)</td>
<td>3060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jr. NCO (E5-E6)</td>
<td>4714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jr. Enl (E1-E4)</td>
<td>5365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Answer Question</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Gender Groupings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>14,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Answer Question</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* Standard survey techniques, which weight answers based on percentages of each category at surveyed installations, were utilized in analyzing the raw survey data.)