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PARTNERSHIPS IN SECURING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Wednesday, March 12, 2008

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Clarke, and Lungren.

Ms. JACKSON LEE [presiding.] The subcommittee will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on partnerships in securing critical infrastructure. Importantly, this testimony will include insight into the planning that goes into securing critical infrastructure for a global event like the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics.

Let me acknowledge the presence of my friend and colleague from New York, Congresswoman Clarke, and indicate that the Ranking Member has been detained. However, he will be arriving shortly. At that time, we will allow him to give his opening statement.

Importantly, this is a vital hearing, and I welcome the witnesses. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of you for joining us again this afternoon. We are here to learn about the preparations that are going into securing critical infrastructure in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. Some might ask why this should be a topic to be addressed by this subcommittee. The importance to us is that the Vancouver games will be a mere 30 kilometers from the U.S. border, and planning, preparation and response measures must be in place on our side of the border.

We are certainly reminded of the attempt by an alleged terrorist that walked across the border at the turn of this century. So this is an important challenge that we have before us.

Between February 12, 2010 and February 28, 2010, it is estimated that 1.8 million tickets will be sold for the events and that 250,000 visitors will attend. Three billion people are expected to watch or to view this world event on television. Because the games are being held so close to the United States, there will be a heavy reliance on U.S. infrastructure. Washington State will provide key transportation access and overflow accommodations for the event.
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport will be used frequently as an alternate airport to direct flights into Canada. The games will also mean more travel on Washington State highways, passenger rail lines, airlines and ferries. Certainly, we welcome this opportunity, but it would be foolish if we did not focus on how do we secure the homeland. That is the responsibility of this committee, and I thank Chairman Thompson for his leadership. I thank my colleague, Ranking Member Lungren, for working with us for this important hearing.

U.S. resources will be stressed during the games and the need for these resources will be exacerbated in the event of some sort of attack. For this reason, essential planning is necessary to ensure that proper prevention and response procedures are in place on the U.S. side of the border. The purpose of this hearing is to begin a discussion about the efforts underway to secure the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.

This hearing is intended to be fact-finding hearing, where we learn from people deeply involved in planning for Olympic events about what needs to be done and what role DHS should have in securing critical infrastructure. This hearing will allow members to acquire knowledge from experts about the steps to be taken and the questions to be asked.

In short, this hearing will not complete the subcommittee’s activities on this important topic. It lays the groundwork for activity ahead that will attempt to move DHS in the right direction of better coordinating planning and response activities prior to this global event. As we all know, the Olympic Games have been the site of terrorist activity dating back over 3 decades, most notably the Munich massacre, which occurred in 1972 at the Summer Olympics in Germany—an absolutely atrocious and violent event that woke the world up in a tragic way. Eleven Israeli athletes and one German police officer lost their lives.

So we know that this is not impossible. This is not a question of the possibility of the possible. This is a question of being prepared for what has already happened and what could happen in the future. During the Atlanta Games in 1996, at a late-night concert in the town square of the Olympics, Eric Robert Rudolph placed a green military knapsack containing nails and three pipe bombs at the crowded event.

Two people were killed and 111 were injured from the pipe bomb explosion. As Rudolph later said, he acted for political reasons. This means that this is an open and viable possibility. We do not encourage terrorist acts, but we certainly need to be prepared.

This past weekend, Chinese police allegedly thwarted a planned attack on the Beijing Olympics scheduled for this summer by a group based in Western China. State-run Xinhua News Agency quoted government officials as saying——

Although it has not been independently corroborated that these individuals were in fact terrorists, this event reinforces that individuals may attempt to make political statements through violence at the Olympics in Vancouver. In its role to prevent, protect and coordinate responses to disasters such as acts of terrorism, DHS has designated a DHS Federal coordinator whose tasks is coordi-
nating the security plans of the DHS components in preparation for the games.

However, some have suggested that this coordinator has not played a prominent role in any planning effort. An over-arching complaint among stakeholders in the State of Washington is the lack of involvement of DHS personnel in assisting with the planning efforts that may be necessary to employ if an event at Vancouver cascades and negatively affects U.S. infrastructure.

There are several potential problems that have been identified as causes for concern as we move forward to 2010: lack of planning efforts ahead of any potential terrorist activity; lack of procedures in place if Canada shuts down its border; lack of status review regarding mutual aid agreements between the United States and Canada—and might I add, if the borders shut down, what is the viability of ingress and egress even for escape or some need to provide security to our homeland?; lack of knowledge about the consequences of a port being shut down; and lack of understanding of how the interoperability of radios is functioning between stakeholders. That is an important challenge that we have to be concerned about.

The Governor of the State of Washington created the 2010 Winter Olympic Task Force and it includes a Security Subcommittee Task Force. Most of the planning efforts carried out within the United States are done by this entity. DHS published a report required by Congress entitled Report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games on June 22, 2007. I would like to introduce that report into the record.

This report required DHS to report on expected increases in border flow, necessary enhancements to border security, estimated border crossing wait times, and any need for increased border personnel. The report recognizes that significant progress is necessary for the United States to know how the United States prepares for a large-scale special event occurring in the immediate vicinity of its international borders.

Key issues discussed in the first section of the report include Washington State’s role providing critical transportation access to the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. Key issues discussed in the second section of the report include technical interoperability challenges such as the significant impact that multi-jurisdictional agencies have on frequency and band width used and the need for coordination and interoperability both technical and operational, and the need to involve Canadian and U.S. frequency licensing agencies early in the planning process.

So this hearing is about planning and preparedness. In a letter from members of the Washington State delegation to Secretary Chertoff dated December 21, 2007, members inquired about steps taken to implement recommendations in the report, as well as what sources of funding exist to ensure that implementation is successful. In a response dated February 4, 2008 and surprisingly signed by the assistant secretary for legislative affairs, the concerns of members were not addressed.

The concerns were: the creation of an integrated Federal support plan; the creation of a multi-year training and exercise plan and schedule; a plan by CBP to meet anticipated impact of increased
border flow at domestic airports, seaports, rail stations and bus terminals, including the expected displacement effect; a plan by CBP to ensure border wait times at ports of entry do not exceed the current average peak wait times, including opening of additional lanes and augmentation of temporary duty officers; an operational and funding plan to establish a brick-and-mortar multi-agency coordination center close to the border; an integrated interoperability plan to support the 2010 Olympic mission using the SAFECOM interoperability continuum to develop a robust interoperability solution.

Until these vital issues are addressed by DHS, we cannot rest assured that the 2010 games will be secure. In fact, we cannot rest assured that we have a plan that ensures that this homeland of the United States is secure, working in cooperation with the Canadian government. As this subcommittee continues to investigate the efforts in Washington State, we will eagerly be looking for DHS, including Secretary Chertoff, to show us that it has the security situation well in hand.

At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the DHS report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, and we will do that again when the Ranking Member is present. We will add that as an admitted document, but we will repeat that.*

I would also ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the two letters, the first by members of the Washington State delegation to Secretary Chertoff, inquiring about implementation of the previously mentioned report; and the second is the response to the Washington delegation by DHS. Again, I am offering to enter this into the record by unanimous consent, and we will submit that again when Mr. Lungren is present.

[The information referred to follows:]

*The information has been retained in committee files.
Congress of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20515

December 21, 2007

The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

Earlier this year, the Department of Homeland Security, in accordance with Public Law 109-295, released the Report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games. We are writing to follow up on the Report and to ask what steps have been taken by the federal government to ensure the recommendations made by the Report are being implemented.

As you know, the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games in Vancouver and Whistler, British Columbia, Canada, are remarkable opportunities for both Canada and the Pacific Northwest. According to the report it is estimated that 1.8 million tickets will be sold for the event, and 250,000 visitors will attend. Additionally, the report anticipates that there will be 35,000 volunteers, nearly 7,000 athletes representing 80 countries, and 10,000 members of the media in attendance. Three billion people are expected to view this world event on television.

With opportunities come challenges. As the Report indicates “the operational challenges facing regional, local, tribal, state, and federal authorities...are particularly complex due to the close proximity of the Olympic venues in Whistler, BC and Vancouver, BC to the U.S.” We agree. A number of things will need to be accomplished, as indicated by the Report, before the Games begin in February, 2010.

Due to the high profile of the Games, as well as the existence of the U.S. – Canada border, the federal government must play a lead role in the planning and preparation for the Games. The following is a list of recommendations included in the Report to Congress. We are interested in knowing what, if any, steps have been taken by the federal government to implement these recommendations and what sources of funding exist to ensure implementation is successful.

- The creation of an Integrated Federal Support Plan (page 9);
- The creation of a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan and Schedule (page 12);
December 21, 2007

• A plan by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to meet the anticipated impact of increased border flow at domestic airports, seaports, rail stations, and bus terminals including the expected displacement effect (19);

• A plan by CBP to ensure border wait times at ports of entry do not exceed “the current average peak wait times” including the opening of additional lanes and augmentation of temporary duty officers (page 20);

• An operational and funding plan to establish a “brick and mortar Multiagency Coordination Center close to the border” (page 25);

• An “integrated interoperability plan to support the 2010 Olympic mission using SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum to develop a robust interoperability solution” (page 46);

We also believe that an agreement to ensure expeditious cross-border transit for emergency personnel will be necessary.

We offer our strong support for these recommendations. The 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games are critically important for Canada and for the Pacific Northwest, and we should do what we can to ensure the Games a success. The recommendations made by the Department of Homeland Security in its report to Congress are important in this regard.

Thank you. We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Patty Murray
United States Senate

Maria Cantwell
United States Senate

Norm Dicks
Member of Congress

Adam Smith
Member of Congress

Rick Larsen
Member of Congress

Allen Smith

The Honorable Rick Larsen  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Larsen:

On behalf of Secretary Chertoff, thank you for your letter requesting a follow up to the Report to Congress regarding the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games in Vancouver and Whistler, British Columbia, Canada. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to avoiding undue border delays while swiftly addressing any security risks before, during, and after the Olympic Games.

DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is engaged with the Olympic Task Force Security Sub-Committee to establish an integrated planning process of Federal, State, and local stakeholders in coordination with Canadian representatives. CBP is also aggressively exploring port-specific solutions to accommodate the anticipated increase in traveler volume. Specifically, they are looking at flexible infrastructure solutions to overcome existing physical facility limitations. The mutual goal is to provide for adequate modifications to infrastructure that will allow for increased processing of travelers and maintaining border security.

To complement existing staff, DHS anticipates deploying several hundred officers from nationwide locations from CBP’s Offices of Field Operations, Border Patrol, and CBP Air and Marine. This cadre of officers will include specialized units such as first responders and hazardous material experts, along with dedicated enforcement assets such as air and marine support and surveillance. This will enhance the emergency response capabilities in conjunction with cross-border emergency groups and support immediate deployments in response to emergency situations.

As a key stakeholder, DHS continues to work closely with the Operations and Planning Workgroups within the Olympic Task Force Security Sub-Committee to help develop Standard Operating Procedures for a 2010 Coordination Center (previously known as the Multijurisdiction Coordination Center). This Center will be located at the CBP Air and Marine facility in Bellingham, Washington. CBP will participate in a tabletop exercise planned for March 2008 in the Bellingham area.

The designated DHS Federal Coordinator will continue to assess and evaluate plans from component agencies and will be instrumental in ensuring interoperability among the stakeholders. The Office of Operations Coordination will develop and publish an Integrated Federal Support Plan just prior to the event and continue to seek a funding strategy for the 2010 Coordination Center. The Office of Emergency Communications continues to lead the effort for an integrated interoperability plan using a SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum. SAFECOM will work with existing Federal communications initiatives and key emergency response stakeholders to address the need to develop better technologies and processes for the multi-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary coordination of existing systems and future networks.

www.dhs.gov
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Once again, I would like to thank everyone for their participation today. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. As I indicated, Ranking Member Lungren will be in, but at this time this committee will stand in recess for the vote, and we will return in a moment. I thank the witnesses for their indulgence. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The subcommittee will now come to order.

It will be my pleasure to now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for an opening statement for 5 minutes.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.

I am glad we were able to finally get here. It takes me a little bit longer these days. I share your interest and concern over the challenges the Nation faces securing our critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, it will be a never-ending struggle due to our country's many critical infrastructure assets scattered from coast to coast. As we know the 2010 Winter Olympics will be held in Vancouver, Canada, which creates terrorist opportunities similar to those which have been exploited in the past. A world stage, enormous crowds, multiple venues and close proximity to the U.S. border presents an attractive target to the twisted terrorist mind.

This is a very serious issue which should be examined in a bipartisan manner. I am sorry the hearing was only noticed less than a week ago, and that I did not have warning about it. Hopefully, we can have future hearings with Republican input. The Vancouver Olympics certainly deserves more attention than we are able to provide this afternoon.

I would hope that we could have the Department of Homeland Security, which has the Federal responsibility of protecting our critical infrastructure; the Coast Guard, which would play a key role securing U.S. ferries, waterways and ports for citizens traveling to and from Vancouver; and I wish we would have reached
out to the 2010 Olympic Committee core group, which is currently planning for the Vancouver games.

As I understand it, in fact yesterday, a tabletop exercise was conducted at Camp Murray, Washington for the 2010 Olympic Security Committee Core Group and liaison agencies from Federal, State and local security partners. This first tabletop exercise is attempting to identify gaps in the initial standard operating procedures, future training goals, communications and coordination center needs.

As I understand it, DHS Federal Coordinator Mark Beatty also participated. I hope that the chairwoman would agree we need to examine the issue in a more comprehensive fashion. The Vancouver Olympic threat deserves no less than our best congressional bipartisan oversight efforts. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses we have here today.

Thank you.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We wanted to resubmit documents that we ask unanimous consent to submit into the record. That would be the report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic Winter Games by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. I ask unanimous consent. With no objection, it will be submitted into the record.* Then two letters,** one dated December 21, 2007 to Michael Chertoff by the Washington State delegation, and one dated February 4, 2008, the response of the Department of Homeland Security to the Washington delegation from the Homeland Security Department. We ask unanimous consent. Without objection, they will be submitted.

Let me indicate to Mr. Lungren that we look forward to building on your comments. I think they are important comments on expanding this research. Of course, we noticed the hearing in the appropriate time, and we will look forward to the minority staff in future hearings. Mr. Lungren is correct that there is a top-off going which I applaud, frankly, because that will give us an opportunity in our future hearings to ensure that we have representatives engaged in that top-off, and again being able to ask them the hard questions about coordination.

So we are grateful to the witnesses that are here today. That will simply lay the groundwork for our future hearings, because with the Olympics in 2010, we certainly have our work cut out for us, and certainly a period of time in which we must move forward on these issues.

With that in mind, let me remind any other Members of the subcommittee that under the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record.

I now welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness, Mr. Doug Arnot, is senior vice president, games operations, Chicago 2016. Mr. Arnot served as security lead for the Salt Lake Olympic Games, overseeing all games operations. He is presently developing the security plan for Chicago’s bid for the 2016 games.

Our second witness, Mr. Jeff Slotnick, is a security industry consultant with more than 26 years of experience in providing professional development and training to security, law enforcement, mili-

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*The information has been retained in committee files.

**Previously submitted and included in the hearing record.

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Arnot. Gentlemen, I would offer to say that your testimony is in fact timely, as we indicated in the backdrop of operational planning and top-off activities going on in the region. So we thank you for your presence here today.

Mr. Arnot.

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS B. ARNOT, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GAMES OPERATIONS, CHICAGO 2016

Mr. ARNOT, Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and the honorable Member from California. I appreciate the opportunity to address this subcommittee. I genuinely appreciate the study that each of you has apparently given to this matter. It is clear that you have a significant understanding of the challenges that face the securing of an Olympic games, the infrastructure around it, and the areas around it.

Very briefly, the Department of Homeland Security report began to capture the magnitude and complexity of the games. Not to go too deep into all of the statistics, but about 7,000 athletes and officials, 80 countries, 1.8 million tickets, and there will be about 500,000 general spectators. The media will be about 10,000. The media sub-center and the main international broadcast center for the games will be about the size of CNN and 30 Rock combined.

There are about 25,000 volunteers that will work at the games. The athletes’ village, just for your little statistic of the day, will probably serve somewhere in the neighborhood of about 250,000 meals, all for the various varieties of diets for the athletes during the games.

The games, in short, whether summer or winter, are really the largest peacetime events in the world. The size and complexity are matched only by the worldwide attention and scrutiny. As each of you has noted, the games are an attractive target and need to be protected as such.

The target is actually growing larger. With each consecutive games, you not only now have the games venues, but what is built around the games—the live sites, the entertainment centers, the sponsor hospitality. So the number of ticketed spectators ends up being about 25 percent of the people who will actually participate in games activities.

The security period itself for the games extends well beyond the period of the 16 days of the games. The security period is generally around 60 days, and I would urge us all to recognize that the security period includes not only the Olympic Winter Games, but the Paralympic Winter Games.

No post-community can handle the security of the games alone. It needs to be supplemented significantly, and the public safety forces in the region will need the help obviously in Canada of significant Federal support, as has been the case in the United States.
A clear understanding of the event itself is crucial to being able to protect the event. It needs to be provided by knowledgeable and experienced games experts and is essential to the security planning and understanding of what resources each agency can bring to the games. Yet I would urge also that we need to understand there needs to be a balance struck between the spirit and excitement of the games, and the protective needs of the games, between the image, that is, and the security needs. Only with a comprehensive understanding of the games and exhaustive preparation is this possible.

I might point out quickly a couple of things which can assist in preparation for the games. We can reduce the burden in Washington and in Oregon with appropriate interaction from more distant ports of entry and the communication back and forth between those ports of entry and the organizing committee, as well as the forces in the United States. We should also understand that travel profiles can be established and border demand anticipated. That will help a great deal. That information can again be developed with the VANOC group.

Public information programs detailing what Olympic travelers can expect and how they can facilitate their own cross-border travel must be balanced with the threat assessments and properly adjusted security policies and procedures. There are also other concepts—express lanes, off-hours logistics and freight operations—that will help in the efficacy of the operation.

Finally, I would like to note that throughout the world, Olympic athletes and officials and the media that follow them, and the many national team officials that support them, enjoy a status at international borders in other countries that is the near-equivalent of international diplomats. As the United States of America has responded to terrorist threats, our reputation as a host for travel for international sport has deteriorated.

Re-engaging operations like the 24-hour rapid response effort of the United States State Department and INS that was developed for the Salt Lake Olympics will help us to monitor the travel of the athletes and key officials, and ensure them an appropriate travel and ease of transit from the United States ports of entry all the way to the Vancouver Games.

Thank you very much. I stand ready for whatever questions you might have.

[The statement of Mr. Arnot follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS B. ARNOT

MARCH 12, 2008

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games fairly represents some of the baseline statistics that begin to outline the challenge of securing the events for 2010. As one of the world’s “super events” the Olympic Winter Games are an extraordinary organization and execution challenge.

The number of athletes, officials, media, broadcasters, spectators listed in the DHS report are part of the picture. The Games will be spread over a distance of 120 kilometers stretching from Vancouver and Richmond to Whistler Mountain. There will be four venue clusters and two Athlete Villages. Some of these areas, particularly the more remote, are served by limited public safety resources. So, the capability of calling on existing “reserves” or off-duty personnel is not an option, and the force must be supplemented. As at all Winter Games the rugged terrain around
the mountain venues calls for special attention and the winter weather can be particularly harsh on personnel, equipment and infrastructure.

The Olympic Games attract the attention of the world as no other event. Any incident at an Olympics is felt around the world. The Games have been attacked twice, and should be protected as an attractive target. That target grows larger with each consecutive Games as they evolve beyond the sports venues into many major public celebrations, attracting an event population that is several multiples of the number of ticketed spectators and event support personnel.

The security period of the Games, with some waves of increasing and decreasing activity is about 60 days. The number of places that must be secured is well beyond the obvious competition and key non-competition venues. Live sites, medal ceremonies, concerts, sponsor events, and much more, expand the event and the job of securing the event.

Of course, all of the Games-related activity is added to the normal activity of the host city/region and, as noted, the resources needed to secure the host city/region grows well beyond the local resources regularly available for public safety. Thus, I am sure that Canada is planning significant Federal support such as that which was provided and absolutely necessary for the 2002 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games.

Arguably the most critical aspect of securing the Games is adopting a command and control structure that will serve the Games in planning and preparation as well as in execution of the plan. In Games prior to Salt Lake, planning by public safety agencies for Games Security tended to exclude a major player, the event itself. Yet, a clear understanding of the event, provided by knowledgeable and experienced Games experts, is essential to Security planning and an understanding of what resources each agency and organization can provide to the plan.

Early planning for Salt Lake City was similarly isolated from the event. Inexperienced local planners worked in an information vacuum. But, over time, an extraordinary new model was developed. It was a complex private, public partnership of local, State and Federal agencies, the United States Military and the Organizing Committee that structured a plan that was strong enough that it required little modification after 9/11. It was the seemingly endless integration work sessions, with key agencies and the Organizing Committee at the table, that developed the appreciation and understanding of roles, responsibilities, resources and procedures for the routine, as well as the exceptional, that made the security operation at the 2002 Olympic Winter Games a success. A similar approach is suggested for planning the U.S. operations for 2010.

One apparent challenge for 2010 is to secure the Northwest border States without unduly disrupting the experience of Olympic visitors or the lives and commerce of the region. To achieve this, the security force must develop a comprehensive understanding of the event itself with which, even at a distance, it will be interacting daily. As fundamental as it may seem, an understanding and trust must be developed in order for each agency and organization to develop an appreciation for the task and challenge of the others so that a balanced, team plan can be developed.

The DHS report logically focuses on the Washington, Idaho and Montana borders. But, the burdens at those points can be reduced with appropriate interaction with more distant ports of entry in other parts of the United States of America. An Olympic Travel plan such as that developed for Salt Lake should be considered. Working with the Organizing Committee, information about athletes, media, broadcasters, and officials was developed and shared with multiple ports of entry into the United States of America. The same was done for sports and broadcast equipment that is critical to the Games. There was also the appointment of intermediate airports for private aircraft inspection, again reducing the burden on the “Olympic Zone”. This might be considered for air traffic in traveling north as well as south.

Working with the Vancouver Olympic Organizing Committee, a detailed understanding of event schedules and crowds should be developed. Travel (USA Re-entry) profiles need to be studied and border-demand anticipated. Public information programs detailing what Olympic Travelers can expect and how they can facilitate their own cross-border travel must be balanced with threat assessments and properly adjusted search policies and procedures. The operation will need well-trained personnel supported by information and communication. It is suggested that concepts such as express lanes, and off-hours logistics and freight operations may reduce the peak hour burdens and add to search efficacy. The Winter Games present unique challenges posed by terrain, and weather. This should be accounted for in all planning, especially for a State-side response to an exceptional incident in Canada that could prompt an unanticipated early, mass departure from the event.

Throughout the world, Olympic athletes and officials, the media that follow them and the many national and team officials that support them enjoy a status at inter-
national borders that is the near equivalent of international diplomats. As the
United States of America has responded to terrorist threats, our reputation as a
host or travel hub for international sport has deteriorated. By re-engaging operations
like the 24-hour Rapid Response effort of the U.S. State Department and INS (de-
developed for the Salt Lake Olympics) we can monitor the travel of athletes and key
officials and ensure them an appropriate welcome and ease of transit from a U.S.
port of entry all the way to the Vancouver Games.

These practices helped the United States of America to avoid what could have
been very damaging international press reports of athletes or officials in holding
cells waiting resolution of entry status. To the contrary, the hard work on entry pro-
cedures set the tone for a Salt Lake Games that many hailed as the best Winter
Olympics ever. With information, communication and cooperation we can facilitate
travel to the 2010 Olympic Winter Games without jeopardizing our national secu-

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the witness for his testimony.
The next witness, thank you very much. You are recognized for
5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY A. SLOTNICK, PRESIDENT,
SETRACon, INC.

Mr. SLOTNICK. Madam Chairwoman, and the gentleman from
California, I stand here today to inform you of my impression of se-
curity, critical infrastructure, preparedness and response capabili-
ties in preparation for the 2009 World Fire and Police Games, 2010
Olympics and 2010 Paralympics. Based on my experience, I can se-
riously tell you we are not prepared.

The safety and security of the United States is at risk if we do
donot take direct action. There are tasks identified by DHS in their
congressional report, some of which have not been completed, and
11 additional tasks that must be accomplished to ensure a safe and
successful event.

The DHS report to Congress on the games identifies gaps which
must be addressed prior to the Olympics. It is my impression that
precious little has been accomplished in the way of Federal prepa-
ration and support, although tremendous strides have been made
on a State level with minimal funding. The World Fire and Police
Games commence in 14 short months. The DHS Special Events
Working Group promised a comprehensive risk, threat and vulner-
ability assessment. This essential planning document has not yet
been prepared.

The Pacific Northwest has a higher threat of disaster. We are
susceptible to a variety of potential catastrophic incidents, includ-
ing earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, flooding, terrorism, epidemics
and fires. These are exacerbated by the geographic constraints of
the population centers, bordered by the Pacific Ocean on the west
and the Cascade Mountain range on the east.

In its current status, the 2010 Olympics has been federally des-
ignated as a special event. In past year, the Academy Awards,
Superbowls, and 2002 Winter Games were given the higher des-
ignation of national special security events. Many of these were
only 2 to 4 hours in duration. The 2010 Olympics will be conducted
over 14 days and seen by 3 billion viewers, seconded only by the
Summer Olympics.

The Pacific Northwest has significant private sector assets—Boe-
ing, Microsoft, Starbucks and Washington Mutual are national or
global in nature and possess significant intelligence assets. In
many cases, individuals in these organizations have higher security clearances than law enforcement officials. It would be unfortunate not to capitalize on these assets through the framework established by the Northwest Warning and Response Network.

These companies and others have significant physical assets that will be impacted by Olympic traffic. They must move supplies, materials and personnel in support of business operations. The impacts will be significant in the case of a manmade or natural disaster.

A robust information intelligence-sharing process can prevent an attack by discovery in the early planning stages. This is best accomplished through a process which includes vetted public and private professionals in all critical infrastructure sectors. Additionally, our intelligence-sharing abilities with our Canadian partners needs to be enhanced and tested.

Recent flooding in Lewis County closed down all lanes of Interstate 5 for 4 days. This closure had an estimated economic impact of $5.8 million per day. From this, we can only extrapolate what the financial impact might be of a major event. The best way to limit significant expense is to rapidly respond, mitigate and recover from an emergency. Costs become exponential each day an emergency continues. To prevent this, we must enhance the State’s capabilities developed through General Lowenberg’s excellent efforts.

The DHS report does not address border issues for emergency operations. It is imperative that medical, fire and police resources have prearranged agreements for expedited border crossings in both directions. In regards to nurses, doctors, and medical personnel, there are union issues which must be considered. Although identified in the congressional report, it is not apparent what progress has been made at the Federal level to enhance the interface between the United States and Canadian Customs authorities.

I have noted 11 areas for improvement. We should upgrade the 2010 Olympics and associated games to a national security event; provide Federal support for funding, training and exercise of NWWARN; permit participation in intelligence and information process of professionals; fund exercises to support greater interoperability of intelligence assets between Washington Fusion Center and Canadian authorities; provide funding for training of private security officers and police officers in surveillance detection; fund exercising of the Pacific Northwest Emergency Mutual Aid agreements; complete the SEWG threat and vulnerability assessment; fund tabletop exercises which include participation from all sectors from both sides of the border; plan for border crossings during emergency situations; develop prearranged border-crossing agreements for medical and fire personnel; and develop protocols for expediting mass transit through the border.

The return on investment for this funding and support is the development of best practices which will directly impact the safety and security of the Pacific Northwest and 2010 Olympics. The lessons learned will have national relevance as other States and event planners can benefit from our experiences and best practices.

Dealing with future catastrophes is not easy. It requires time and commitment. Commitment in the Federal Government means establishing priorities for action through funding. Only when this
is seen, will collaborative plans have a reasonable chance of successful implementation. PNWER is a unique organization, statutorily viable in several northwest States and the Canadian provinces. It has a proven track record through its Center for Regional Disaster Resilience to expedite these processes and significantly impact preparedness through its ability to develop collaborative solutions between the public and private sectors.

Pending your questions, this concludes my testimony. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Slotnick follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY A. SLOTNICK

MARCH 12, 2008

Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee, first and foremost I want to thank you for this opportunity you have provided me as a citizen of the United States of America to impact the safety and security of our great Nation and specifically the Pacific Northwest.

You have seen the biography I provided so I will not take time with my professional bona fides. I do have a brief story to recount: In 1985 while I was still serving in active military service I was returning from a 5-year overseas tour in Europe where I experienced terrorism first-hand through the activities of the Bader Mein Hoff Gang, the Italian Red Brigade, the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, and the day I will never forget as I watched in June 1985 the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in which a 23-year-old U.S. Navy diver, Robert Dean Stethem, of Waldorf, MD, was shot and dumped on the tarmac of Beirut International Airport. These events fundamentally changed my outlook on the world and put me on a course that has led to me speaking with you today.

You may ask why do I invoke these memories—well in 1985 as I returned to the United States through Kennedy International Airport I looked around and said to myself, We are not ready, doesn’t anybody watch the news? I retired from military service late in 1992 and watched in horror as the World Trade Center was destroyed in 2001.

I stand here today to inform you of my impression of security, critical infrastructure preparedness, and the response capabilities of the Pacific Northwest in preparation for the 2009 World Fire and Police Games, 2010 Olympics, and 2010 Paralympics and based on my experience I can seriously tell you that we are not prepared.

The safety and security of the 2010 Olympics and the United States is at risk if we do not take direct action. There are tasks that were identified by DHS in their congressional report, some of which have not been completed, and eleven additional tasks I will identify that must be accomplished to insure a safe and successful event.

I have lived in the Pacific Northwest for almost 22 years and during that time I have served on numerous Homeland Security-related committees, personally conducted Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability Assessments for two counties, Transit Facilities, water and sewer utilities, private corporate facilities, and educational facilities. Additionally, I have participated as a planner and evaluator for several Blue Cascades Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Exercises held by the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). Additionally, I have been involved in writing initiatives and breaking down barriers in support of public/private partnerships in information sharing and intelligence. Most recently I was an active participant in the recent floods in Lewis County which closed down Interstate 5 for a period of several days.

I am an industry professional who has a ground-up view and I wish to share that with you today. I am going to provide information on several critical areas, they are:

- Public/Private Interoperability Issues;
- Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Regional Disaster Resilience;
- Expedited Border Crossing Issues.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic and Para-Olympic Winter Games identifies many gaps and shortfalls which must be addressed prior to the 2010 Olympics. As I have experienced in local meetings and read in various Federal documents precious little has been accomplished in the way of Federal preparation and support although tremendous strides have been made on a State level with minimal funding.
The 2009 World Fire and Police Games will be held also in Vancouver, and provide an opportunity for us to plan and test our preparedness for the Olympics. The World Fire and Police Games which commence in 14 short months and will bring athletes, spectators, and support staff from all over the world to the Pacific Northwest. As we speak winter Olympic teams are already arriving in the Northwest for practice and preparation.

To this end the DHS Special Events Work Group (SEWG) promised to provide a comprehensive risk, threat and vulnerability assessment. This is a critical document as security planning and decisions are based in risk and risk is calculated from threat. This essential planning document has not yet been prepared.

Different from other Olympic Events the Pacific Northwest has a considerably higher threat of disaster. We are susceptible to a variety of potential catastrophic incidents (indeed, these are more than potential—most have occurred in the recent past); Including earthquakes; volcanic eruptions with lahar flow possibility; flooding; hurricane-force windstorms; domestic and foreign terrorism; epidemics; tsunamis; fires; hazardous materials disaster; landslides; and tornados. These events—and the problems associated with any response to them—are exacerbated by the geologic and geographic constraints of the main population centers (Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, Vancouver) which are bordered by the Pacific Ocean on the west and the Cascade Mountain Range on the east. These geographic features create what has become known as the I–5 corridor.

In its current status the 2010 Olympics has been federally designated a “Special Event”. In past years the Academy Awards, Super Bowls 2002 to 2008, and 2002 Winter Olympics were given the higher designation of “National Special Security Events”. Many of these events were only 2 to 4 hours in duration. The 2010 Olympics will last for 14 days and be seen by over 3 billion viewers second only by the Summer Olympics:

Given the above information I ask that you consider upgrading the designation of this event to “National Special Security Event”.

PUBLIC/PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING

The Pacific Northwest has significant private sector assets. Companies like Boeing, Microsoft, Starbucks, and Washington Mutual are national or global in nature and possess significant intelligence assets for support of their operations. In many cases individuals in these organizations have higher security clearances than many law enforcement officials.

It would be unfortunate not to capitalize on these assets in support of the 2010 Olympics through the framework established by the Northwest Warning and Response Network NWWARN.

The best way to prevent an attack is by discovering it in the early planning stages. This can best be accomplished through a robust Information and Intelligence Sharing process for vetted professionals in all critical infrastructure sectors, both public and private.

Sharing intelligence and warning information with Canada will be key in preventing any attack during the 2010 Olympics. In consideration of our cross-border Canadian partners this ability needs to be enhanced and tested.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PREPAREDNESS AND REGIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE

I was recently involved in flooding of Lewis County Washington which closed all four lanes of Interstate 5 for 4 days, 3 to 7 December 2007 it is estimated this 4-day closure had a regional economic impact of $5.8 million per day.

In the grand scheme of things this was a relatively minor event. From this, we can only imagine what impact a major event would have on the Pacific Northwest Economy.

The best way to prevent significant expense is the ability to rapidly respond, mitigate, and recover from an emergency event. Costs rapidly become exponential each day that an emergency event continues.

To prevent this we must enhance the States’ capacities developed through General Lowenberg’s excellent efforts and conduct federally-supported and -funded cross-border, multi-jurisdictional, disaster resilience preparedness exercises that consider critical infrastructure interdependencies which could negatively impact the Games, and the border.

EXPEDITED BORDER CROSSING

At present there are considerable issues pertaining to cross-border movement of people and goods related to the various games. The DHS report prepared for the
2010 Olympics identified numerous significant issues with border crossing, the report only considers the anticipated increases in traffic due to the games. The report does not address Emergency Operations in case of a manmade or natural disaster.

It is imperative that Medical, Fire, and Police resources have pre-arranged agreements for expedited border crossings in both directions should their support be required during the response phase of a critical incident. In regard to nurses, doctors, and medical personnel there are union issues which must be considered and resolved.

I have several concerns for non-emergency operations during the Olympics including developing protocols for the movement of people and goods at the border. To the best of my knowledge not enough effort is being made at the Federal level to develop this interface between the Customs and Border Patrol, and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA).

Ideally, it is important to develop protocols for mass transit carriers such as buses and high-speed ferries.

To further cut down on Border delays it would be reasonable to consider a Park-and-Ride type of arrangement with shuttle busses where the benefit is pre-clearance of passengers to expedite border crossing during the games.

Reduced passenger car traffic is very important to the Vancouver Olympic Committee (VANOC) as no private cars will be allowed on the road to Whistler, not to mention emergency response and potential congestion issues. Identified gaps need to be federally addressed, especially on our side of the border, with Critical Infrastructure owners and operators, Mass Transit carriers, and border officials.

**ELEVEN AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT**

**General**
- Upgrade the 2010 Olympics and associated games to a National Special Security Event.

**Information Sharing**
- Provide Federal Support for funding, training, and exercises for NWWARN.
- Permit participation of vetted professionals through NWWARN in all critical infrastructure sectors both public and private.
- Include participation by our Canadian partners in information and intelligence sharing.
- Fund exercises to support greater interoperability of intelligence assets between the Washington Fusion Center WAJAC and Canadian Authorities.
- Provide training for private security officers and street level police officers in Surveillance Detection and Indicators of Deception.

**Critical Infrastructure**
- Fund exercising the mutual aid agreements with (PNEMA) which have not been tested.
- Complete the SEWG Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability Assessment.
- Fund the development of Table Top Exercises which include participation from impacted sectors specifically owners and operators of critical infrastructure, emergency managers, PNEMA, fire, and police from both sides of the border.

**Expedited Border Crossing**
- Consider and plan for Border Crossings during emergency situations.
- Develop pre-arranged border crossing agreements (both ways) for Medical, Fire, and Police personnel.
- Develop protocols for expediting Mass Transit through the border by expedited manifests of passenger information.

The return on investment for this funding and support is the development of best practices which will directly impact the safety and security of the Pacific Northwest and 2010 Olympics. The lessons learned will have national capacity as other States and event planners can benefit from our experiences and best practices.

**CLOSING**

Given the current world situation and based on my experience I feel the 2010 Olympics has strong potential to be a global target and at a minimum has a higher-than-normal possibility for natural disaster.

In this light I remind you of the 1972 Olympics where the terrorist target was not only twelve Israelis, but the millions of innocent viewers worldwide who had terrorism brought right into their living rooms as they watched a terrorist event unfold on national television.
The way forward: Dealing with future catastrophes is not easy. It requires time and commitment. Commitment in Federal Government means establishing priorities for action through funding. Only when this is seen will collaborative plans have a reasonable chance of successful implementation.

The Pacific Northwest Economic Region, of which I am a part, is a unique organization that is statutorily viable in several Northwest States and the Canadian Provinces.

PNWER has a proven track record through its Center for Regional Disaster Resilience to expedite these processes and significantly impact preparedness through its ability to develop collaborative solutions between the Public and Private Sectors.

Through the dedicated efforts of General Lowenberg and his staff, the Pacific Northwest economic region, and an involved community the framework for successful completion of these actions exists in the Pacific Northwest.

This concludes my testimony.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank both of the witnesses for their insightful testimony. I will begin the questioning by yielding myself 5 minutes.

May I ask both Mr. Arnot and Mr. Slotnick, based upon your expertise in security, and specifically security for the Olympics, I want you both to consider these thoughts. In past Olympics, what has the role of security been in advance of and during the games’ preparation? As part of those Olympics, what has been the role of the Federal Government? That is, how has it been involved in the process? What should be the role of the Department of Homeland Security and the rest of the Federal Government be doing in preparation for the Vancouver Olympics? Is DHS and the rest of the Federal Government providing the necessary support?

I will start with Mr. Arnot. Mr. Slotnick, I do want you to answer the question in the context of your remarks which say we are not prepared.

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

Mr. Arnot.

Mr. ARNOT. Well, Madam Chairwoman, I think the key role of the Federal Government is important to address. I think overall, what we are looking at and what was very successful finally in Salt Lake City was clearly outlining roles and responsibilities for the specific Federal agencies.

The key lead agency should be the local agency. In the case of Utah, it was the Utah State Police. In Chicago, should we be fortunate enough to host the games, it would be the Chicago Police Department. They need to take the lead in the unified command structure, but the Federal agencies can all play a very specific role. Secret Service played a very important role in terms of developing the infrastructure protection plan, particularly as it related to the venues themselves. The Federal Bureau of Investigation played key roles in terms of intelligence, hostage rescue, and response to terrorist activities.

I could go on with each one of the elements of the command, each one of the agencies that was involved. You know well what the responsibilities are, but clearly what was successful for us in Salt Lake City was to understand the expertise of each one of the agencies and apply it appropriately to the command structure.

In the early stages, in advance of the games, the key role of the Federal Government actually was to assist in the development of the training for all of the agencies that were involved and to su-
port financially the training of the local agencies. No local agency, as I said in my testimony, is prepared to handle the games alone. They need to be supplemented by the Federal agencies, and they need obviously of course to be able to handle the normal public safety responsibilities of their jurisdiction during the games time. To handle both that and the games is simply too much for them.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The Department of Homeland Security did not exist.

Mr. ARNOT. That is correct.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, was there a coordinating lead agency from the U.S. Government.

Mr. ARNOT. From the U.S. Government, the lead agency was the United States Secret Service.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. They coordinated with the lead law enforcement on the ground?

Mr. ARNOT. They did. They coordinated directly with the Utah Public Safety Command, but the Public Safety Command, importantly, included all of the Federal agencies, as well as all of the State and local agencies. It compelled everybody, quite frankly, to sit down in the same room and work through together what the details of planning would be, what the communication protocols would be, and all of the myriad of details for each one of the venues, all of the surrounding area, and everything, quite frankly, that dealt with it, from the air above to the ground beneath us. It obviously involved the U.S. military significantly, too.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What do you think now with the Department of Homeland Security in place, with all of its resources, and I imagine tentacles in a lot of emergency preparedness and the whole question of providing equipment so there is interoperability, what role would you see for the Department of Homeland Security?

Mr. ARNOT. I would see the Department of Homeland Security taking a role of coordination of the Federal agencies, and understanding again what the expertise of each one of those agencies is, and being able to oversee each of those agencies in handing their roles and their areas of expertise.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I guess not speaking directly as to what is going on in Vancouver and Washington State, did you have enough resources during your time, your tenure for the Olympics, from the Federal Government? Was there sufficient support?

Mr. ARNOT. We did in Salt Lake City. It was late, perhaps, in coming, but when it did come, it was adequate.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you for your polite demeanor in that it was adequate. We thank you for giving us that assessment. Thank you, Mr. Arnot.

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, Madam Chairwoman.

As far as what should DHS be doing, I think I can summarize it by saying providing expertise, funding and being a good community partner. I think those are things that are very important.

As I stated, we are talking about the 2010 Olympics, but in reality what we are speaking about is the 2009 World Fire and Police Games that give us an excellent opportunity to prepare and exercise in preparation for the games. In many cases, as far as partici-
pants, there is a larger attendance from the 2009 World Fire and Police Games than there are for the Olympics.

So it would be appropriate to have that funding and have that funding up front so that what we are able to do is involve the community, get everybody working together so that we have this adequate response. The other thing that I see is that since the 2010 Olympics is not on U.S. soil, it has been given a lesser designation. As Mr. Arnot said, the Utah Olympics was designated a lead agency of the U.S. Secret Service. The U.S. Secret Service only takes the lead if it is designated as a United States special event.

That is why I would encourage that we change that designation to a special event, because we do have significant impact within the continental United States as an alternate hub, an arrival points, teams coming into practice in the Pacific Northwest before the games, and the impact of the Americans that will be attending the Olympics. Our understanding is that 40 percent of the attendees at the 2010 games will be Americans, and most of those are expected to come through the port of Seatac into Vancouver.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I will have some follow-up questions, but my time has expired.

I am now pleased to yield to the distinguished gentleman for 5 minutes for questioning, Mr. Lungren, the Ranking Member.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Arnot, you talked about the organizational model developed for the Salt Lake City Olympics involving the private-public partnerships, local, State, Federal, U.S. military, Olympic Organizing Committee. Are you knowledgeable about whether or not that is the model that is being used by the Washington State Olympics Security Committee?

Mr. ARNOT. I don't have specific knowledge of that, sir.

Mr. LUNGREN. Do you, Mr. Slotnick?

Mr. SLOTNICK. I do know that in Washington State, we are using an ICS-based model. That is the model for all responses within Washington State, simply because of our hazard profile, being on the cusp of a 9.0 earthquake, we adhere to ICS very carefully. I can't imagine that we would use anything but unified command for that.

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Slotnick, you talked about some union issues involving doctors, nurses and other medical personnel that might somehow interfere with them rendering assistance. Can you tell me what you mean by that?

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes. There are some union agreements within Canada that prevent our people from actually going across the border and responding.

Mr. LUNGREN. I see. So it is the cross-border, not any——

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, it is not a U.S. union issue, but it is an issue that needs to be addressed and resolved.

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. You mention in your testimony about your background and how we were all shocked at what happened at the Olympics in Munich——

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, sir.

Mr. LUNGREN [continuing]. And that sort of thing. Obviously, we have a heightened concern for terrorism today, coming in our own borders.
Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, sir.

Mr. LUNGREN. That has heightened the interest of not only this committee, but the entire Congress and the government itself.

What I am trying to find out is the gravamen of your complaint about what is occurring now. Is it that it is not happening fast enough? You are afraid it is not going to happen? Or is it because there has not been a designation of the 2010 Olympics as a national special security event that is at the core of your concern?

Mr. SLOTNICK. I think it is a bit of all of the above, sir. My personal perception is that things are not moving fast enough. We are 14 months away from the 2009 World Fire and Police Games. We have adequate time with the proper Federal support to be able to respond adequately and properly for the 2010 Olympics. But it just doesn't seem to have the impetus behind it that it should.

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me ask this about, when we talk about risk, we talk about threat, we talk about vulnerability, we talk about consequence. Threat is primarily, in my judgment, a function of us gathering, analyzing and disseminating intelligence, and understanding what the bad guys are looking at.

Are you satisfied at this point in time with the level of intelligence sharing from the Federal Government to State and local authorities with respect to either or both of the 2010 Olympics or the earlier games, the Police and Fire that you have been referring to?

Mr. SLOTNICK. At this point, to the best of my knowledge, sir, the Security Working Group has not produced their risk, threat and vulnerability assessment that would give that threat and identify that threat specifically for the Olympics. The other thing, as I identified, it is very important that we incorporate private sector in this. Private sector has significant assets and is going to be directly impacted by any event that occurs as a result of the Olympics, whether it is something that is caused by a criminal act, or whether it is something that happens as a result of natural disaster.

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me ask you this, it has been my impression that the Northwest, particularly the State of Washington, from a standpoint of coordination of local, regional and State law enforcement and other first responders, are on what I would call the forefront of coordination and collaboration. Is that your feeling, that throughout that region there is a real effort at a regional approach? And that whether we are talking about the 2009 games or the 2010, that it is one of the better areas of our country in that regard?

Mr. SLOTNICK. Definitely, sir. The Northwest Warning and Alert, NWWARN, is leaning way forward in the trenches in that regard for coordinating information coming from private sector and elevating it to the Washington Joint Analytical Center, WAJAC. WAJAC is a tremendous program and does have coordination at the upper levels with the Federal intelligence group and the JTTF, Joint Terrorism Task Force.

But it could be better. Again, funding is an issue. General Lowenberg has done some significant things with State funding. It would be exceptional if we could advance that model and get that model up to speed for the 2010 Olympics.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Lungren.
Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Lungren.

Gentlemen, thank you for your patience and perseverance.

Let me just start by asking Mr. Arnot, in your experience with Chicago and your previous experience with New York, to what extent is security and having a plan in place taken into account when the Olympic Committee decides upon a location? Is this a significant factor?

Mr. ARNOT. The easy answer is yes, it is a significant factor. When the International Olympic Committee makes the decision, the security and general public safety of the entire Olympic environment is definitely a major consideration on their part.

Ms. CLARKE. I wasn’t here, unfortunately, for the beginning of both of your testimonies, but I wanted to ask either of you, since you both have had the experience with security at large-scale events going back many years, generally speaking has security greatly evolved significantly since the 2001 Olympics and other such events held in North America? If so, in what ways?

Mr. ARNOT. If I could start. The 2002 games established a new threshold for us. I think that the bar was raised significantly by 9/11, obviously. I think that the model that has been established, the work that was done on the 2000 games was significant. It would be my own personal opinion that we have not seen significant advancement since 2002.

Ms. CLARKE. Mr. Slotnick, did you want to chime in? Is there anything that you would vary with Mr. Arnot on?

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, ma’am, I would concur with that. I think since 2001, we have seen considerable growth in security in general, and security concerns against criminal acts and terrorism. It has been exponential. Of course, since that time, the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan, the National Intelligence Plan have all evolved since that time and impact how we conduct ourselves and how we plan for emergencies and prepare for terrorist acts.

Ms. CLARKE. Then, this question is for either of you as well: In preparing for any Olympics, who takes ultimate responsibility for security? Is there one organization that has the final say and ensures that all security organizations work together in a sensible way? Is it the Olympic Committee, the government of the host country, the local government? What would you say is the command structure around security for events of this magnitude?

Mr. ARNOT. I think we would probably both agree that it needs to be a unified command structure. At the top of that unified command should be the host city, assuming that the host city in itself has significant resources. A city like New York for the 2012 bid, a city like Chicago for the 2016 bid, would take the lead. The other agencies, including the Federal agencies, would come in in a designated support role.

In Utah, it was a bit different because the city of Salt Lake itself did not have a very substantial police department. So the Utah State Patrol was the lead agency. In each case, it was the lead government officer. In the case of Salt Lake, it was the Governor. In the case of New York’s bid, it was the mayor. In the case of Chi-
icago, it would be the mayor who in fact is the person in charge of that public safety command.

Mr. Slotnick. Ma’am, I think of considerable note is that this is not an event that is a specific U.S. event. We have the cross-border issue, so all the more need for unified command and the ability to exercise those commands prior to any event. With the actual Olympics being conducted on Canadian soil, but significant impact to the United States and U.S. businesses and the I-5 corridor, it is just absolutely huge in what we should be preparing to do.

Ms. Clarke. So are you saying that in terms of unified command, is it your assertion that the Federal Government probably through CPB would also have to be a partner in this? Then just in closing, because I know my time is running out, I know that the Chairwoman raised the issue of interoperability in terms of communication. Have there been any advances to your knowledge which would facilitate the emergency preparedness for the environment that you are working with right now?

Mr. Slotnick. We have been working on interoperable communications within the State. The ability to communicate with the Federal Government has improved, but again we are dealing with a cross-border issue. So it is not only our ability to communicate within ourselves, but it is our ability to communicate with Canadian law enforcement and Canadian Federal Government even for normal operations, let alone during an emergency.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady for her thoughtful questions. I would like to pursue those questions, so I yield myself an additional 5 minutes for an abbreviated second round.

Again, let me suggest that this is both instructive and I think it opens the door for future hearings for those who are presently in the top-off and presently engaged. But let me raise this question. As you well know, I gave a list of concerns when I gave my opening remarks, having to do with the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. I would like to again raise them with you for your thought and analysis by both witnesses, and Mr. Arnot first.

I am concerned about expedited border closings during the games, and what would happen if we would have to close the borders; intelligence fusion across borders and within governments, the way of communicating intelligence quickly; radio interoperability, which my colleague mentioned just a moment ago; and the need for a multi-agency coordination center; and what roles should DHS play in support of these efforts.

Now, I would appreciate as I have looked over the landscape of large events, Mr. Arnot, the Olympics are not the only large events that we confront every day here in the United States. I know that the NASCAR is continuously happy, the throngs of individuals that they put in a stadium almost on a weekly basis. Likewise, so is the Superbowl thrilled with their numbers, whether it is the NBA All Stars or playoffs—these are large-number venues.

So please incorporate in your answer your thoughts about a breakdown or a break-out or a segregated—“segregated” is not right—but an actual designated assistant secretary or component of DHS to deal with large events, so that there is a point person
that is collaborative, that is coalescing, that is working, even thinking, if you will, way ahead of the time when we have to address these sometimes very thorny questions.

Mr. Arnot, I mentioned the expedited border crossings, intelligence fusion, radio interoperability. I think you heard all my points.

Mr. Arnot, Madam Chairwoman, thank you.

I think the notion of expedited border crossings—the notion that we have the appropriate personnel at the border crossings now to be handled an expedited border crossing I would assume from Canada into the United States, especially in the event that there would be some kind of a significant incident surrounding the games and what that would do to the general psyche of the people who were at the games, obviously being able to have the appropriate number of people at the border closings I think is, as the distinguished representative from Washington noted earlier, the idea that that is supported by appropriate medical personnel and other support personnel is something absolutely to take a look at.

Intelligence fusion—intelligence is absolutely the first key to the security of the games or any large event. The sharing of intelligence back and forth between the United States and Canada is something that absolutely needs to be looked at with regard to the event. The development of fusion centers for this particular event, if it has not already happened, it something that I would suggest should be researched.

Radio interoperability—your operation is only as good as your information. Your information is only as good as your communication. Your communication is based on your communications equipment. You can’t operate if you don’t have interoperability of your communications equipment.

I was very impressed, Madam Chairwoman, with your understanding of the spectrum demands on an event like this, especially when they are crossing borders and we are dealing with different Federal agencies, and the control of those spectrums.

The multi-agency coordination center—regardless of the fact that this event is in Canada, if the United States is going to be able to address the threats that might be posed by this event to the United States, it would be suggested that a multi-agency task force be assembled and that they are in one place able to communicate and work with each other on a regular basis.

Your question about the threat assessment to other events I think is also quite wise. On any given Saturday in the fall, we have dozens of stadiums across the United States with 50,000, 60,000, 70,000, 100,000 people. Each of the State and local agencies have done a good job between 2002 and today in terms of stepping up what they can do individually to protect those areas. The job is enormous. The risk is significant. The threat, because of the numbers of people alone, is something that bears some consideration.

I think that the notion of having someone or an office within the Department of Homeland Security that is able to review those events on a regular basis, preview the events on a regular basis and be able to address Federal support that might be deemed necessary, I think would be prudent.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me, before I go to Mr. Slotnick, Mr. Arnot first of all thank you for bringing your vast range of knowledge and disparate knowledge, different venues that you have either consulted on or actually been operationally involved in and in charge. In the games in Atlanta and Salt Lake, did you have direct contact with security so that as you are managing whether or not an athlete has gotten on the bus and has gotten to the venue for his or her particular skill, did you feel that you had either the walkie-talkies, whether e-mail was sufficient at that time, but the direct contact with the principals dealing with security?

Mr. ARNOT. Madam Chairwoman, in Atlanta, the answer is no, we did not. Atlanta was a challenge from a number of different perspectives. The advancement of the planning from Atlanta to Salt Lake was very significant. I will tell you that I felt that during the Salt Lake Games, I could get to the information in a relatively short period of time. In the case of an emergency, that short period of time may not have been short enough. The communications equipment and the varieties of communications equipment that we were working with at that time would have allowed us—the protocols were there, the cooperation was there, the will was there, but the way was not necessarily there.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me let Mr. Slotnick finish, and I will then yield very quickly to Ms. Clarke for a question that she has as well. Did you remember my questions?

Mr. SLOTNICK. Yes, ma’am, I did.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Arnot, very much. That was a very important response. Thank you.

Mr. SLOTNICK. As to expedited border crossings, I think this is very important to include private sector. The Pacific Northwest economic region through their Blue Cascades exercises has done quite a bit to conduct gap analysis and identify alternatives for emergencies and for natural disaster.

I think the same model would be applied to looking at issues with border crossing in a collaborative effort, how we might expedite certain crossings. For example, having mass transit set up so that there wasn’t a lot of individual vehicular traffic, but with the carrot being for people to get pre-cleared if they take mass transit, allowing them to cross the border rather expeditiously in both directions, would eliminate a lot of tie-up at the border; would reduce the amount of personnel needed; and have folks with ability to travel very rapidly.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you suggesting opening up or expanding mass transit that crosses the border? And are you suggesting that that would be a manner of evacuation?

Mr. SLOTNICK. It could be both. It could be both, ma’am. But yes, I am suggesting that we consider pre-clearing folks, similar to some other programs like the CLEAR Program that we use here in the United States for folks that are traveling between TSA venues from airport to airport. They get pre-cleared in a biometric fashion, so that they are able to transit the TSA rapidly—to have something set up like this at the 2010 Olympics to allow citizens from both sides to be able to cross rapidly during normal operations, as well as have expedited crossing in case of an emergency.
As to intelligence fusion, it is absolutely key. It is a critical component. Again, I would like to reemphasize the need for private sector involvement in that. We see a lot of information that comes across that is geared toward Federal consumption, toward law enforcement consumption.

But not only does private sector need to be aware of what is going on, but private sector has a tremendous awareness of what is going on, because they have to deal with it to protect their enterprises on a daily basis. When you are protecting a Boeing enterprise or you are protecting a Microsoft enterprise, you are aware of a lot of the same things that Federal Government is and law enforcement. The opportunity to share that in both directions to me is key and critical.

As to an office within DHS, I think instead of having to reinvent things at each event, the ability to have an office that would be in charge and have standardized protocols, lessons learned, the ability to learn from each event and improve those standard operating procedures and personalize them for each event would be greatly enhanced by having a central repository for those type of events.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much.

I will now yield to the gentlelady from New York for her question.

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Madam Chair.

My question is really a follow-up to the expedited border crossing. I just wanted to note that the Olympics tend to be international by nature, so that the processing, the Customs processing of individuals who may not be either citizens of Canada or the United States, has that been taken into consideration? For U.S. citizens, the CLEAR Program is great, but if you are not a citizen of the United States, it doesn't really facilitate the transporting of ease through TSA.

Have you looked at the fact that we will have people from around the world attending this event, and the intricacies of having to deal with moving them about should something occur at the venue?

Mr. SLOTNICK. Ma'am, I would say that it has been considered. Probably not many solutions have been developed. Funding is certainly lacking in that area, but the ability to have funding for collaborative exercises that allow those things to rise to the top where a gap analysis can be done and solutions developed, needs to happen. That has not happened yet.

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much.

Let me add my appreciation on behalf of the committee and offer to say to you that we selected a day that couldn't have been more busy, if that is completely correct English, with members in a variety of hearings. You might hear a lot of buzzing of emails. These are other staff members asking us why we are not in the committee meeting that is going on across the campus, which is why Congresswoman Clarke and Congressman Lungren is now on the floor dealing with a matter, and a number of our Members are doing so.

Having said that, we believe this is a very important first step and hearing. We are grateful to each of you for providing now the series of questions, and I think a roadmap going forward, one, not
only for Vancouver, but really the question that we really have been studying over a period of time, large venues. We have had some staff assessments on a number of large venues. I don’t think that we have reached the final conclusions that you have now contributed to in terms of what we need to be addressing.

Mr. Arnot, your very frank and blunt statement, without I know any attempt to denigrate, but your frank comment on Atlanta is taken for what it is, as a help to us to realize that the incidences that we have had, whether or not one would say it would be totally preventable because terrorists are by their nature based upon surprise. But we do know that we have now the wake-up call, and now with more sensitivity after 9/11, to really be prepared.

We have been very fortunate in all of the large events that we have engaged in as Americans, from whether it is a faith meeting with how many hundreds of thousands come to a faith event for good purposes, versus boxing opportunities and NASCAR and just plain old Rose Bowl activities where all the parents and everyone is gathered for a celebratory time.

We need to be more conscious, and I do think we are going to look very closely at the idea of this designation in DHS because we need to be consulting with experts like yourself. We need to build a very tight team within the agency that has immediate response and activity and operational activity on all of these events, which frankly I believe certainly have probably been attended to by a number of law enforcement agencies.

I can’t imagine that some of our important law enforcement agencies are not engaged in some of these large venues. But again, how are they engaged? Are they on the day-of and that is the extent of their work? Then I think that is not enough. This hearing contributed to moving us forward along those lines.

So let me again on behalf of the full committee, Mr. Thompson the Chairman, Mr. King the Ranking Member, and myself as the subcommittee Chair that has a great interest in this concept called critical infrastructure, thank you very much for your testimony and your patience today. We appreciate it.

Any additional statements to be offered by our members can be submitted into the record. Let me do my follow-up so that we will make sure that everything is in order. The Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. You will be assisted by the committee staff in case you want to know where those submissions can be made.

This subcommittee looks forward to subsequent hearings and briefings on the security issues surrounding the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. As I previously indicated, now that you have brought us quite a bit of information and challenge, we will be looking at other large-venue events, and we will do so in the coming weeks and months. This continues to be an ongoing issue and a very important issue.

Hearing no further business, the subcommittee now stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]