DISASTER CAPACITY IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION: EXPERIENCES, CAPABILITIES, AND WEAKNESSES

(111–22)

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION APRIL 3, 2009

Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
CONTENTS

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii

TESTIMONY

DeAtley, Craig, Director, Institute for Public Health Emergency Response ...... 50
Delinski, Jeff, Deputy Chief Special Operations Bureau, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority .......................................................... 28
Gallegos, Gabrielle, Director of Law Enforcement Policy, Department of Homeland Security ................................................................. 6
Herron, Vernon, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public Safety/Director of Homeland Security, Office of the County Executive, Prince George's County ......................................................... 28
Mathes, Linda, President and CEO, Am. Red Cross of the National Capital Area .............................................................................................. 50
Nichols, Daniel R., Assistant Chief, United States Capitol Police Department . 6
Nickles, Peter, Attorney General, District of Columbia; Daniel R. Nichols, Assistant Chief, United States Capitol Police Department .......................... 6
Sarubbi, Jonathan, Region III Administrator, FEMA ...................................... 50
Schwartz, Major General Errol R., Commanding General, District of Columbia National Guard ................................................................. 28
Wall, Kenneth, Acting Director, Office of National Capital Region, FEMA ....... 50

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Diaz-Balart, Hon. Mario, of Florida ................................................................. 71
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia .............................. 74

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

DeAtley, Craig .................................................................................................. 78
Delinski, Jeff ..................................................................................................... 127
Herron, Vernon ................................................................................................ 135
Mathes, Linda ................................................................................................. 143
Nichols, Daniel R. ............................................................................................ 162
Nickles, Peter .................................................................................................. 165
Sarubbi, Jonathan ............................................................................................ 170
Schwartz, Major General Errol R. ................................................................. 192

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

“District of Columbia Healthcare Facilities Emergency Care Partnership Program”, chart .............................................................. 124
“Washington Hospital Center at a Glance”, fact sheet .................................. 125
“HHS Awards $25 Million in Healthcare Partnership Emergency Care”, News Release ................................................................. 126
Responses to questions from the Subcommittee ......................................... 117
Herron, Vernon, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public Safety/Director of Homeland Security, Office of the County Executive, Prince George's County, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .................. 141
Mathes, Linda, President and CEO, American Red Cross of the National Capital Area; List of schools ......................................................... 151
Responses to questions from the Subcommittee ......................................... 156
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

TO: Members of the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management

FROM: Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management Staff

SUBJECT: Hearing on “Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region: Experiences, Capabilities, and Weaknesses”

PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

On Friday, April 3, 2009, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building, the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management will hold a hearing on disaster preparedness and response capacity in the National Capital Region. The hearing will focus on how Federal executive and legislative branch agencies, the District of Columbia, multi-state agencies, volunteer organizations and the private sector are preparing for disasters and how they will respond. The hearing will also focus on plans to safeguard the citizens of the National Capital Region in the event of a disaster.

BACKGROUND

The unique nature of the National Capital Region brings distinct jurisdictional and logistical challenges in preparing for and responding to disasters and emergencies. In most, if not all states, there is one person, the governor, who is ultimately in charge of coordinating disaster response activities. However, that is not the case in the District of Columbia. While the District has been granted limited home rule, Congress retains its constitutionally based plenary authority over the affairs of the District.¹ Given this unique constitutional relationship, there are areas in the District where the Mayor’s powers are limited (e.g., Federal property in the District).

¹ P.L. 95-198, 87 Stat. 775
Even within the Federal Government there are a myriad of jurisdictional issues. In the case of various executive branch agencies, these agencies ultimately all report to the President and jurisdictional or other concerns can be addressed by White House staff. However, significant areas of the city are under the jurisdiction of Congress most notably the Capitol Grounds. As a result, coordination between these agencies is critical.

Inauguration

The recent inauguration of the President was one of the largest events ever held in the Nation’s Capital with an estimated two million people in attendance and highlighted the coordination necessary. ² While the event was large, and involved a large number of agencies, the event was also planned well in advance. However, even with this planning, there were a number of problems with the inauguration that led to further review. For example, it appears that many key decision makers did not know that there were citizens who were “stuck” in the Third Street Tunnel.³

D.C. National Guard

Unlike the Governors of the 50 States, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, the Mayor of the District of Columbia is not the Commander in Chief of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, rather the President is the Commander in Chief.⁴ Therefore, unlike the Governors, the Mayor cannot directly call out the National Guard to respond to a disaster. The President has delegated his authority to the Secretary of Defense who has delegated his authority to the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Air Force for the District of Columbia National Guard and Air National Guard respectively.⁵

FEMA Offices

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) was created by statute in 2002.⁶ FEMA’s NCRC oversees and coordinates relationships with State, local, and regional authorities in the National Capital Region as well as appropriate with the private sector. This office does much of the day-to-day emergency management planning that, in other metropolitan areas, are handled by the appropriate FEMA regional office. However, the FEMA NCRC office is not an operational office. When an incident occurs or is likely to occur, it is the FEMA regional office, in this case the FEMA Region III office in Philadelphia which has responsibility to work with the affected States (including the District of Columbia).

³ 2007 Inaugural Review Executive Summary of Findings: Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration, March 20, 2009 p. 7
⁴ See Army Regulation 130-5, paragraph 1-6(g)(2) December 30, 2001.
⁵ See Executive Order No. 11485, 1 October 1969 (34 FR 13:11) and Army Regulation 130-5, paragraph 1-6(g)(2) December 30, 2001.
Prior Legislative and Oversight Activity

The Committee and Subcommittee have held numerous hearings addressing issues related to disaster preparedness and response in the National Capital Region:

- “FEMA’s Response to the 2008 Hurricane Season and the National Housing Strategy” (September 2008)
- “Role of the Federal Government in Small Business Disaster Recovery” (September 2008)
- “National Flood Plain Remapping: The Practical Impact” (April 2008)
- “Readiness in the Post-Katrina and Post 9/11 World” (September 2007)
- “Assuring the National Guard is as Ready at Home as It is Abroad” (May 2007)
- “FEMA’s Preparedness and Response to ALL Hazards” (April 2007)
- “FEMA’s Emergency Food Supply System” (April 2007)
x

WITNESSES

Mr. Jonathon Sarubbi
Region III Administrator
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Mr. Kenneth Wall
Acting Director
Office of National Capital Region
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Mr. Phillip Morse
Chief
United States Capitol Police Department

Mr. Michael Taborn
Chief
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Police

Mr. Craig DeAtley
Director
Institute for Public Health Emergency Response
ER ONE at Washington Hospital Center

Major General Errol R. Schwartz
Commanding General
District of Columbia National Guard

Ms. Linda C. Mathes
President and Chief Executive Officer
American Red Cross of the National Capital Area

TBD
TBD
U.S. Foodservices, Inc.

Mr. Darrell Darnell
Director
DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency

Mr. Vernon Herron
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public Safety/Director of Homeland Security
Office of the County Executive, Prince George’s County
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Ms. NORTON. The hearing will come to order. And I will ask the first panel if you will be seated.

While the Senate hasn't finished its work, the House finished its work, finished the budget, and I think most people are home by now.

This hearing is so important, however, that we wanted to proceed in any case. The Ranking Member, Mr. Diaz-Balart, has a statement for the record. I am pleased to receive it at this time.

I welcome today's witnesses at this hearing concerning an important mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, under the jurisdiction of our Subcommittee.

But for this hearing, I would be attending the funeral of Mrs. Loree Murray, a gentle soul who became a beacon of resistance of gun violence when crack and the crack wars gripped the District in the 1990's. An indication of Mrs. Murray's success as a citizen anticrime activist is that, before I arrived at the viewing and wake last night, I am told that D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier was in attendance. Mrs. Murray was also such a statehood and voting rights advocate that her family placed her “Free D.C.” cap in her casket.

Considering that an important part of what concerns us at today's hearing is a new firearms risk posed by a dangerous gun amendment proposed for the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act. I told Mrs. Murray's family and friends last night that I wanted to dedicate today's hearing to Loree Murray.

Today we are pleased to welcome Federal and District law enforcement officials, emergency managers, and first responders to testify concerning steps to prevent, prepare for, and respond as necessary to incidents of all types. FEMA is the lead agency...
charged with preparing for and responding to disasters and emergencies, whether natural or manmade.

When Congress established the Department of Homeland Security shortly after 9/11, the statute that created it also established a Special Office of National Capital Region Coordination, now placed in FEMA. Our region faces the same risks as other major areas of our country from natural disasters, such as the 2001 floods in the Bloomingdale section of the District of Columbia, or manmade disasters, such as the tragic plane crash into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.

The Nation's Capital occupies a special place in the Nation's security network with the District ranking in the top four at risk for terrorist threats, along with New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. However, the challenges of responding to threats in the seat of the Federal Government are unique, and as a result, Congress established the NCCR, the only regional office inside the DHS charged specifically with coordinating security for one region alone.

The unique nature of the National Capital Region brings distinct challenges for the region and its officials. For example, the Metropolitan Police Department must work with no less than 32 Federal police agencies, and MPD, the largest police force in the region, is an indispensable part of the Federal security network for the Nation's Capital and the National Capital Region of our Nation.

The recent inauguration, the largest event ever held in the Nation's Capital, with an estimated 2 million people in attendance, including foreign dignitaries, entertainment stars, and virtually every important Federal and State official in the United States, is perhaps the quintessential example of what makes the work of elected officials and police and security officials in our Nation's Capital uniquely difficult.

Although hearings have been held concerning some problems at the 2009 inaugurations, such as citizens who were held in the Third Street tunnel, it is noteworthy that there was not a single arrest at the National Mall, notwithstanding the unprecedented crowds and the disappointments of some concerning admission. The Third Street tunnel problems are among those that will be studied by the Government Accountability Office with a report and recommendation to come.

However, Mayor Adrian Fenty, D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier, Metro, the Capitol Police, and the DHS agencies involved, including the lead agency, the Secret Service, deserve credit for the planning and operations that resulted in what most agree was an unusually successful event. Although the problems that arose require study, we are also interested in how the Federal and District agencies in cooperation with the region pulled off an event the size of which was unlike anything we had seen before, as many as five times the number of people on the Mall as anyone had ever seen, and how they were able to keep it up for 4 days of the engagement, that is also something that will help us to understand what a unique event can bring since nobody knew how many people would come, and the authorities had to be prepared for however many came, almost all of them without tickets.

Since 9/11, this region has had notable success working together to shore up unique risks to homeland security here. Literally bil-
lions of dollars have been spent, not only to repair the Pentagon, where 184 people were lost, but to fortify Metro against the unique vulnerabilities of the National Capital Region with its porous borders, 14 million people, 200,000 Federal employees, and national and foreign dignitaries that pose security risks as they move often in motorcades throughout the National Capital Region.

No risk is more apparent to homeland security in particular than the widespread availability of firearms. While the city was in the act of writing new legislation this summer, the National Rifle Association forced a number of Democratic Members of the House during the primaries just before the 2008 election to demand an up-and-down vote on a bill to eliminate all gun laws in the District of Columbia and to strip the District of all public safety gun enforcement jurisdiction.

This bill is essentially the same as the Ensign Amendment now attached to the District of Columbia House Voting rights legislation passed by the Senate in February. Despite hearings and testimony from Federal and D.C. police chiefs that the gun bill posed a, quote, “grave threat” to elected and appointed Federal officials and visitors in addition to D.C. Residents, the bill passed the House on the belief that it could be stopped in the Senate, and we were able to do so.

However, despite the hearings, almost no one had ever looked at the gun bill itself. They were focused on not doing harm to Members from more conservative districts who were facing election. Now, with the Ensign Amendment attached to the Voting Rights bill in the Senate, the time has come to look the Ensign Amendment straight in the eyes.

Understand this, we are going to get the D.C. Voting Rights passed this year. Therefore, if the Ensign Amendment is on the bill in the House, it will become law right along with the D.C. House Voting Rights Act.

The Congress has largely regarded the gun bill as just another piece of local legislation. However, Federal police must operate largely under the District’s gun laws and have testified that these gun laws have been critical to homeland security.

Today we intend to face head on what it would mean for the Nation’s Capital to have no local gun laws. We must ask whether the gun laws, as the Washington Post recently noted, “protecting the lives of D.C. Residents as well as those of tourists and foreign dignitaries, national leaders, and the President, and his family,” end quote, should be eliminated.

Before us today is whether appointed and elected Federal officials, employees, visitors and Federal presence would be more or less secure under the Ensign Amendment, which would allow, and let’s here hear it and face it, would allow military-style weapons, including 50-caliber armor-piercing guns, to be legally possessed without limit on the numbers in the Nation’s Capital.

The Nation’s Capital becomes the only jurisdiction permitting, indeed inviting, people to cross State lines to purchase guns and bring them back from two nearby States, facilitating gun running by criminals, felons, or terrorists between the States and the Nation’s Capital. A gun show loophole would be open eliminating the assault weapons ban, among other things, without any background
checks of any kind, permitting the purchase of weapons of every kind from private individuals at gun shows on a cash-and-carry basis. No gun registration is permitted, and therefore, there would be no way for police to trace guns used in crimes.

The District is deprived of all gun safety jurisdiction to revise its laws for the safety of residents and visitors and government officials even if serious threats arise. Any person could bring guns concealed or openly to any workplace in the city. Employees therefore could bring guns to a Wizards game if they worked the at the Verizon Center, to the National Baseball Park at Nationals Park, to a national convention at the Convention Center, to Pepco headquarters, to law offices, to other small and large workplaces throughout the city, to churches and other places of worship, to bars, restaurants and nightclubs, to hotels, to power plants, and to all District government offices. In short, would elected and appointed Federal officials and foreign dignitaries, visitors and District residents be safer and more secure with or without the Ensign Amendment?

Asked another way, what is to be gained from the Ensign Amendment? The time to ask these questions is now, not after there is blowback and recriminations following serious gun carnage affecting residents, Federal officials, and employees. Our job is to prevent, not only to protect.

Today’s hearing, of course, will focus on not only this most recent and serious threat to homeland security since 9/11, but on all the steps that have been taken by the agencies involved, including the District of Columbia National Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, the U.S. Capitol Police, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation Authority Police, the D.C. Attorney General, Prince George’s County Office of the County Executive, the Washington Hospital Center, and the American Red Cross.

Yet, the hearing is likely to be remembered most by whether we in Congress, with a clear threat in plain sight on the Voting Rights bill, did what was required to protect the Nation’s Capital and the National Capital Region and all who live and work here. We are deeply grateful to today’s witnesses.

May I ask my good friend and colleague, Ms. Edwards, if she has any opening statement.

Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

And just a brief statement. First, I want to say to all of the witnesses who will appear today that you have a unique responsibility in this region. And this region, as you know, is different from just about any other in the country, both in terms of our vulnerability and access, our meaning to this country and around the world. So all the agencies in this very close region sharing borders, crossing borders, require the kind of coordination and communication that is different than almost anyplace else.

So I thank you in advance for your testimony today and for helping me as a new legislator to understand your responsibilities, the challenges that you face, and what we might do here in the United States Congress to try to mitigate some of those barriers and those challenges.

I will say, as a representative of Prince George’s and Montgomery County in Maryland’s Fourth Congressional District, I can
only recall my experiences as a parent and a worker on 9/11 and the challenges of trying to get to a son over here on Capitol Hill while I was over on Dupont Circle, while Dad was over in Virginia, and trying to communicate, and the lack of communication, the difficulty of moving in and getting out of the city. And I thought just then that while, overall obviously, we handled that disaster and tragedy quite well, we still have a lot to do and especially if there were a more compelling disaster in this region, just the mere movement of people and vehicles and emergency services.

As someone who represents Prince George's and Montgomery Counties, I have been more recently focused on things like our communication systems for law enforcement, whether we have the kinds of communication systems that allow us to communicate across agencies and law enforcement operations. I am concerned about that.

I am concerned about our emergency room and hospital capacity to handle a tremendous disaster. We are home, as you know, to Adventist Hospital, to Prince George's County Hospital, to numerous other medical facilities, and yet in that, we also know that these facilities face tremendous financial and other challenges. And we have to, I think, in this region pay particular focus to those facilities and make sure that they have the emergency services and capacity to handle any impending disaster. I am not sure, frankly, that we are quite there yet. So I look forward to your testimony today and learning from each of you as you appear, and obviously, thank the Chairwoman for the foresight in pulling this discussion together.

And let me just say on the Chairwoman's closing remarks, particularly regarding D.C.'s autonomy and ability to make its own decisions both about emergency services and other decisions for the city, I am full square behind and with her because we know in this jurisdiction that it is important to have people who are capable of making decisions independently for their jurisdictions but working together.

And we want a full partner, a full voting partner, in the District of Columbia. And Maryland doesn't want the responsibility of registering guns from D.C. Residents and moving firearms across borders. That poses a tremendous burden on our State. It poses an absolute burden on our local law enforcement in Prince George's and Montgomery Counties. And so I look forward to continuing to work with the Chairwoman to address these issues as they impact our ability to respond to disasters and emergencies.

Thank you very much, and I yield.


Mr. Perriello, do you have a comment you would like to make, opening comments? Thank you,

I am very grateful to today's opening panel. I am grateful particularly to District of Columbia Attorney General Peter Nickles, who volunteered to come when Police Chief Cathy Lanier encountered a family emergency. I am very pleased and grateful to you, Attorney General Nickles, for coming.

I am pleased also to hear from the Assistant Chief of the United States Capitol Police Department, who is here for Chief Morse, who had to be away today.
We work very closely with you, Assistant Chief Nichols, on homeland security here in the Capitol and in the District.

And I am particularly grateful to the administration for providing us with a witness from the Department of Homeland Security, Gabrielle Gallegos, who is Director of Law Enforcement Policy at the Department of Homeland Security.

Ms. NORTON. Let us begin with Attorney General Nickles.

TESTIMONY OF PETER NICKLES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DANIEL R. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT CHIEF, UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND GABRIELLE GALLEGOS, DIRECTOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. NICKLES. Good morning, Chairwoman and Members of the Committee.

I appeared with the Chief almost a year ago when we presented testimony with respect to the gun legislation that was being considered by the House. And I am a poor substitute for Chief Lanier, but I am very happy to be here to talk about the impact on homeland security and this Nation's Capital of what has been called the Ensign Amendment.

I want to first talk about a very important proposition, and that is that the District of Columbia is in compliance with the Second Amendment ruling of the Supreme Court in the Heller case. Now, it is a fact that some of the same individuals and lawyers who contest the original District legislation have sued again, but I am confident and I would think the Congress would be confident that the courts will ultimately resolve any issues that relate to a very long and deliberate process engaged in by the mayor and the City Council to satisfy the requirements of the Supreme Court.

We fully respect the decision of the Supreme Court, and we have signed into law and promulgated regulations that, in my view as a lawyer who has practiced some 45 years, fully satisfy the directives of the Supreme Court.

What is important to emphasize is that the laws that the mayor and the Council have enacted affirm the District residents' right to register hand guns and possess them for self-defense in the home. I take note of the statement of Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Heller. And he underscored the District's authority to regulate firearms under the Second Amendment, and he stated, and I think it bears repetition in this discussion, "although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."

Consistent with that opinion, the District, like many States, and the District is not alone here, has determined that assault weapons and certain unsafe firearms are not eligible to be registered and possessed.

I want to correct some of the misinformation that I have heard about the District's gun laws. Shot guns, rifles, and hand guns, in-
cluding many semi-automatic models, can all be registered in the District. Indeed, rifles and shot guns, including many semi-automatic versions, were never prohibited at all, and residents have been able to register many semi-automatic handguns since September 16, 2008. And since the Heller decision alone, more than 400 handguns and 160 long guns have been registered. There is currently one licensed firearms dealer in the District, and we think more will follow because the market will take care of that.

To state it clearly, it is no more difficult to open a dealership here than opening a restaurant. And the District is certainly not alone in requiring a firearm dealer’s license. Indeed, 17 States do exactly what the District has enacted.

Now, the Ensign Amendment. In my view, the Ensign Amendment goes far beyond compliance with Heller. Most importantly, this amendment would repeal the District’s ban on assault weapons. The city’s ban is similar to the Federal ban which was in place until 2004, and that ban was not unconstitutional. And Federal law had a sunset provision after 10 years, at which time it was allowed to expire, and what is most important is that the authority then reverted to the States.

And then, in all, 10 States have banned or regulated assault weapons with 5 States having provisions that are similar, if not identical, to that of D.C. Even the ATF has described assault weapons, and I quote, as “large-capacity semi-automatic firearms designed for rapid-fire combat use. Most are patterned after machine guns used by military forces.” Certainly the District’s ban of this type of weapon is a reasonable exercise of its regulatory authority and certainly consistent with what Justice Scalia wrote in the Heller case.

Now, critics of the District’s ban will argue that criminals can get assault weapons anyway, and we all know that the use of assault weapons by criminals is a growing problem in cities across the country. We saw that most recently in the tragic incident in Oakland, California, in which two law enforcement officers were killed by a parolee with an assault rifle.

Fortunately, at this time, assault weapons do not have a strong presence in D.C. Last year, of more than 2,500 illegal firearms recovered by police, only 1 percent were assault weapons. Certainly a determined criminal could get an assault weapon, and if our assault weapons ban were merely repealed, anyone eligible to purchase a firearm under Federal law would be able to.

But the Ensign Amendment goes well beyond that by taking the unprecedented step of allowing District residents to purchase firearms in Maryland and Virginia, which would have a significant effect on the ability of this entire region to regulate firearms, including assault weapons. Nowhere in the Nation, nowhere in the Nation, are residents allowed to purchase a firearm in another State without going through a federally licensed dealer in their own State, nowhere in the Nation.

As the Governor of Maryland warned, his State would not be able properly to regulate firearms purchased by District residents. Maryland does not have the necessary expertise to interpret District laws, much less the many possible dispositions under the city’s criminal justice system. The result would be that even people
who are prohibited under Federal law from purchasing a firearm may be able to take advantage of those gaps and buy a weapon, including an assault weapon, in Maryland or Virginia.

Last September, our distinguished Chief of Police, Kathy Lanier, testified before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform about the special concerns in protecting this unique city, the District of Columbia. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated something that we have known for some time: Government facilities, dignitaries, and public servants are prime targets for terrorists, both foreign and domestic. Protecting government officials and infrastructure is a challenge for every city in the United States, but in Washington, the likelihood of attack is higher, and the challenges to protect the city are greater. As a result, it would seem to me that the District is the last place where U.S. residents across the country would want to allow assault weapons.

The District’s high concentration of iconic structures, such as the national monuments, the White House, and, of course, the Capitol, make it a highly attractive target. The high-profile human targets, from the Nation’s top elected leaders to the more than 400 foreign dignitaries that make official visits to D.C. Each year, are obviously an attractive target. Moreover, we should not be solely concerned about well-coordinated terrorist attacks. We need also to consider the unsophisticated lone wolf terrorist angry at the U.S. Government for whatever reason.

The second key vulnerability, and Madam Chairwoman, I will come to an end very shortly if you will give me a few more seconds, is, due to the sheer volume of secure motorcades traveling in this city every day, given the daily movements around the city of the President, the Vice President, and their families, and the fact that almost 3,000 foreign dignitaries spend time in our city each year, the routes for those movements cannot be shut down as they are in other cities.

As you know from your own districts, when the President and Vice President travel outside of Washington, roads are cleared of all traffic, parked cars and such. And spectators are often kept behind barricades. We don’t do this in this city because shutting down the routes for every motorcade would make it virtually impossible to navigate much of the city on a continuous basis, and we do not want the Nation’s Capital to take on the character of an armed fortress.

This freedom, however, comes with the cost of high vulnerability both for the officials and dignitaries and the general population. As Chief Lanier noted last September, in attempted and successful assassinations around the world, the first step in attacking a motorcade is frequently to take out the security detail with semi-automatic and automatic firearms. This forces the motorcade to stop, at which point the terrorists can use explosives to attack the armored vehicles carrying the targeted individuals.

We all have an immediate concern for any life threatened or lost in a terrorist event. But, as my colleague Chief Lanier noted, here in the Nation’s Capital, we must recognize that any terrorist incident, no matter how small, would garner worldwide attention and could have significant international implications. The broader re-
percussions of an incident in the city should be of grave concern to everyone in this room.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Attorney General Nickles.

Mr. Nichols, Chief Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. Good afternoon, ma’am.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the public safety and the consequence of management capabilities of the United States Capitol Police. I would like to make some brief opening remarks and, with your permission, submit my written testimony for the record.

The U.S. Capitol Police accomplishes its mission through a variety of functions to provide comprehensive around-the-clock protection for the United States Congress, the legislative process, the Capitol complex, and the millions of visitors from across the globe that come to see democracy at work. In an effort to maximize our ability to prepare for and respond to incidents affecting public safety, the U.S. Capitol police specifically focuses on key internal capabilities which, when necessary, can be augmented by specialized resources from our partners in the National Capital Region. Our current internal capabilities show the rewards of several years of investment in training, robust command-and-control systems, and physical security improvements.

Providing security, protection, and law enforcement services to the United States Congress in the Capitol Complex in a post–9/11 threat environment is a challenging task. To do this, we rely on the provisions of Title II of U.S. Code 1961, which states, “Capitol police shall police the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds under the direction of the Capitol Police Board.” We also rely on Title XL of the U.S. Code 5104, which states, “except as authorized by regulations prescribed by the Capitol Police Board, persons may not carry on or have readily accessible to any individual on the Capitol Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm, dangerous weapon, explosives, or an incendiary device.” We have recently made a number of high-profile gun, explosives, and dangerous weapons arrests through interdiction and security screening.

As the host law enforcement agency for many events of national significance, we understand that working with our many partners in the National Capital Region and sharing our resources is imperative. In recent years, we have worked hard to improve our interoperability with local agencies, such as the D.C. Fire Department and the Metropolitan Police Department as well as our Federal partners in the National Capital Region, including the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, FEMA, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Defense.

The planning for such events involves an all-hazards approach, an appropriate risk analysis, an event-specific threat assessment, and a comprehensive crisis management plan to ensure we are prepared to implement appropriate protective measures with little or no notice. As an example, the U.S. Capitol Police successfully implemented a mass notification and evacuation of more than 8,000 people at two consecutive July 4th concerts in 2006 and 2007. We had to air security threat evacuations at the Capitol Complex, one
during President Reagan's state funeral, demonstrating our ability to move large amounts of people into safety while maintaining the security and integrity of all legislative facilities. These evacuations were based on imminent threat of severe weather creating unsafe conditions for our visitors with regard to the two concerts, and a direct air security threat to the Capitol Complex during other events.

I would like to also acknowledge the relationship we enjoy between the United States Capitol Police and the Capitol Police Board. The support, guidance and oversight provided by this entity allow the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the U.S. Capitol Police planning to maintain a direct path and ensures consistent messages are provided across Capitol Hill. Consistent communications with this body ensures that we will be able to elicit additional resources if they are required. This process has been utilized effectively in the past, allowing the U.S. Capitol to supplement its resources and/or extend our abilities of the resources we have on hand every day.

Thank you, Madam Chair. This concludes my opening remarks, and I will be happy to answer any questions that you have.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Nichols.

Ms. Gallegos.

Ms. GALLEGOS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.

I am Gabrielle Gallegos, and I am the Director of Law Enforcement and Information Policy at the Department of Homeland Security.

I appreciate being asked to appear before you, and on behalf of the department, I very much want to recognize the hard work that Congresswoman Norton has done over the years on a range of important homeland security issues that impact the safety and security of Washington, D.C., and the Capital Region.

As we all know, Washington, D.C., is the site of numerous embassies, international organizations, and Federal offices. The high-profile events that occur in Washington and the many dignitaries and officials that visit, live, and work here can pose unique challenges.

That D.C. Is our Nation's Capital naturally affects the security picture. DHS's mission is to address the broad range of potential threats that can impact that security. Threats that include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, along with natural disasters of all types: threats that may impact human health or our critical infrastructure; threats that may come from other countries or originate right here at home.

In developing and executing security policy in the National Capital Region, DHS is very aware that multiple factors affect the overall level of security. DHS recognizes that the security of the Capital may be affected by local conditions and policies. Also, given the prominence of Washington as the seat of government and the proximity to Washington of Maryland and Virginia and the other mid-Atlantic States, local circumstances in this city inevitably have an impact on the work of the Federal Government in promoting regional security. These and other matters remain important as we work on a coordinated plan to advance crucial goals in this area.
The Department of Homeland Security works closely with local law enforcement and with all our State and local partners to bolster Federal, State, and local capacity to respond to the many security issues we face. One of the primary missions of the department is to support and coordinate with State and local partners, and I want to recognize the crucial relationships the department is fortunate to have with all of the local and regional police departments in the Capital region, the emergency managers and first responders, the State and local homeland security officers, and the National Guard.

And I feel particularly honored to be here with my fellow witnesses today. They clearly represent the best of modern policing and the important partnerships that we have in this area. These working relationships and the mutual support they provide are the cornerstone of our ability as a Nation to achieve important security functions. We will continue to foster these relationships as we work to address both existing threats and emerging challenges.

Thank you and I would be pleased to answer any questions.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you again, Ms. Gallegos.

Let me begin with Attorney General Nickles.

Attorney General Nickles, you are one of the District’s most distinguished attorneys working before the District was fortunate to attract you. And you are now the highest law enforcement officer in the District until we get you the full authority to be the District Attorney. So I am asking you some questions in light of your legal background and your role in the District.

Now, after the Heller decision, the city changed its gun laws. The Heller decision speaks and uses the word throughout, “handguns.” Does the new law in the District of Columbia disallow semi-automatic handguns?

Mr. NICKLES. The new law authorizes a certain type of semi-automatics to be registered in the District, and I think it needs to be reasserted that rifles and shotguns, including some semi-automatic versions, were never prohibited at all. So we have it—and I think a careful balance and the Council and the Mayor have tried to achieve, consistent with the Heller case, have been very receptive to the views of the gun proponents. This is a balance, protection of the safety of our citizens with the Second Amendment Rights of those same citizens. I think we have struck the right balance, Madam Chairwoman, and I think we have developed a scheme of legislation and regulation that is fully constitutional.

Ms. NORTON. Now, the Heller decision indicated that a person must be able to have firearms, including handguns, in the home and that these handguns must be kept operable. Is that the case with District laws today?

Mr. NICKLES. I think, effectively, yes, that we have protected the Second Amendment Right of a citizen to have a gun in the home for purposes of self-defense.

Ms. NORTON. Now, the Heller decision did not allow guns outside the home, is that correct? It spoke only of guns in the home?

Mr. NICKLES. Only in special cases where there were permits for security-type individuals, your statement is correct. The handgun or the registered gun, in our case, would be in the home.
Ms. Norton. Let me ask Mr. Nichols, the Ensign Amendment uses the words that a person may have a home in his place of business. Well, the place of business for most people is where they work. Could I ask you what you think—first, let me ask you about the Capitol. How strict are the gun laws in the Capitol of the United States?

Mr. Nichols. The gun laws within our jurisdiction, the U.S. Capitol Complex, are very strict. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we rely on Title XL of the U.S. Code to prohibit all handguns, weapons, and incendiary devices within our jurisdiction.

Ms. Norton. So no handguns, no guns of any kind can come into this Capitol, and everybody in this Capitol is fully protected from guns in this Capitol, even though it is a place of business?

Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma’am. They are protected by us through the——

Ms. Norton. Is this the case with the Federal courts as well?

Mr. Nichols. I am sorry?

Ms. Norton. Is this the case with Federal courts as well, that you can’t take a handgun into Federal courts of this city?

Mr. Nichols. That is correct. I believe that there are also restrictions, even though it is not our jurisdiction, there are restrictions that deal with Federal properties elsewhere in the city, also.

Ms. Norton. Mr. Nickles, under this bill, could you take a gun into the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia?

Mr. Nickles. I would hate to think that is the case. At the September 2008 hearing, we pointed out the problems in the legislation being considered about carrying firearms in public or concealed, and that was eliminated, but the dangerous language in the Ensign Amendment is that while it would allow the District to prohibit the carrying of firearms, concealed or openly, but except at the person’s dwelling place, place of business, or on other land possessed by the person, as your opening statement pointed out, that language “place of business” or “on other land possessed by the person” is, in my view, very dangerous. I am not personally familiar with the rules of the Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals. I know there is significant screening there. I would doubt that you could take guns into that venue, but——

Ms. Norton. You think the courts could, in the District of Columbia, although—first of all, are these rules pursuant to the laws of the District of Columbia, any laws that the courts would have in the District of Columbia, pursuant to the laws of the District of Columbia, or would they, because they are Article I courts be protected under Federal legislation?

Mr. Nickles. I think because they are Article I courts, they could adopt rules that would protect entrance into the courts, but all these other places of “business” that you discussed in your opening are potentially open, and that causes me great concern.

Ms. Norton. Including the D.C. Council, the offices of the District Government and the like, all of those would be places of business where employees could have guns?

Mr. Nickles. Potentially. This language is very unclear, but it is a loophole through which you could drive a truck.
Ms. NORTON. You patrol off-campus, Mr. Nichols. And when I was in my second term and the District was experiencing great gun carnage, like every large city in the United States, Congress decided it wasn't enough simply to allow the Capitol Police, if invaded, to do what it could but extended your jurisdiction. Would you describe your extended jurisdiction and how the changes in the D.C. Law would affect your ability to protect the Capitol in light of your extended jurisdiction, and what jurisdiction you think you need now and what jurisdiction you think you should have in any case?

Mr. NICHOLS. The jurisdiction of the United States Capitol Police is rather unique. We have a primary jurisdiction that encompasses the United States Capitol, all the congressional buildings, about 19 congressional buildings, and all the adjoining streets and parks. It is about 40 city blocks that are in the core of the city. We have an extended jurisdiction that extends out several blocks in any direction from the United States Capitol where officers enjoy the same law enforcement authority as that of the Metropolitan Police Department, and we do have an active presence within that area to enforce the laws of the District.

Also, elsewhere throughout the city, we have authority when we are on official business to enforce the laws when it comes to crimes of violence that are committed in our presence. So we can protect the citizenry when we are in any given area of the city at any given time. Layered on that is a Federal protective authority that is provided to the United States Capitol Police to protect Members of Congress anywhere within the United States, its territories and possessions.

The way that we currently operate is that police in our primary jurisdiction, we apply both D.C. Code or Federal Code to ensure that we keep the complex safe. That is, if we identify people who are unlawfully in possession of firearms, incendiary devices, explosives, then, obviously, we can identify them readily and make that arrest.

Elsewhere in the District of Columbia, just as we have all the time that I have been a police officer for 25 years, when you run into somebody on the street with a firearm, you can assume that they are either a law enforcement officer or a criminal because there really is no gray area in between right now with how the gun laws on the street are applied. That is how our officers are trained. [Submitted subsequent to the hearing: There are limited exceptions for select registered lawful firearms that are being transported.] Anyone in possession of a firearm that——

Ms. NORTON. If someone were to say, but, officer, I am on my way, and I am just taking it there, would that be presumed to be legal under the Ensign Amendment?

Mr. NICHOLS. As you know, ma'am, since we are a legislative branch agency, we don't comment on pending legislation. I would have to study the implications of that. But speaking in general, because of the environment in which we work, anytime we come in contact with an individual who has a firearm, it is our position we have to treat them as if they are a threat until we can prove that they are not because we have to understand the context in which they are possessing that firearm and what their potential intent is.
So anything that changes the current conditions that we are in is going to complicate our enforcement efforts.

Ms. Norton. I am going to ask Ms. Gallegos a question, and then I will go on to the other Members and come back with remaining questions.

Ms. Gallegos, you have testified that you work closely in the Department of Homeland Security with local jurisdictions. Would that include the District of Columbia Police Department, and if so, would changes such as the abolition of, elimination of gun laws in the District of Columbia hurt or enhance homeland security in the District of Columbia, in your view?

Ms. Gallegos. We do work closely with the Metropolitan Police Department at the Department of Homeland Security, of course through the Secret Service and through the Federal Protective Service, and other law enforcement agencies.

There are a number of threats, of course, that the Capitol faces, as you know. And we do the type of risk analysis and threat assessment that Chief Nichols was talking about. And we rely very closely on our State and local partners to provide the on-the-ground information about the threats in their jurisdictions and about the issues that are going to be most important to them, and about the types of support that they are going to need from the Department of Homeland Security.

Ms. Norton. So if guns could be brought in, military-style weapons, for example, from other jurisdictions here, you would rely on who in order to help preserve Homeland Security in the District of Columbia?

Ms. Gallegos. We would be relying on a coordinated approach. Just this morning, when I was coming here, listening on the radio hearing about a new partnership between the District of Columbia and Maryland and Virginia, those are the types of partnerships that the Department of Homeland Security wants to foster and applauds.

Ms. Norton. Are you prepared for a situation where you would be called upon to help the jurisdictions detect military style weapons that could be used in the District of Columbia in light of home rule security risks? How would you handle that?

Ms. Gallegos. We work with a variety of scenarios. We are constantly planning and preparing to adapt to changing circumstances.

Ms. Norton. How would you adapt to individuals being able to go without background checks and buy .50 caliber military-style, armor-piercing weapons at gun shows in another jurisdiction? How would you prepare for that?

Ms. Gallegos. We are going to approach that with the same kind of threat assessment, planning, coordination, working with State and local partners to address exactly that kind of emerging threat which can come from that kind of quarter, or from any number of quarters.

When we do threat assessment and we work with State and local partners, we are not just looking at particular types of weapons or particular types of incidences, we are planning across the spectrum of scenarios for the range that could include the type of weapons you are describing, or incendiary devices, or shoulder mounted.
Ms. Norton. Well, this is a particular threat that no one has had to prepare for, Mrs. Gallegos. Of the threats we have had to prepare for, legal permission from the Federal Government to buy guns in another jurisdiction that could be military-style weapons that could be used against Federal officials, is, so far as I know, not a contingency you have had to prepare for. Do you have a risk assessment involving that yet?

Ms. Gallegos. Well, I want to be careful when I answer that, a specific risk assessment, because my day-to-day responsibilities don't involve working with specific risk assessments. You notice that my title is Law Enforcement and Information Sharing Policy, and my focus is on the types of day-to-day coordination partnerships and strategic planning that I have been talking about. But I would be happy to, of course, go back to the Department and see if we can provide some additional information to you on the types——

Ms. Norton. Well, I appreciate that. And I realize you are a policy expert, Ms. Gallegos. I am a Member of the Homeland Security, and I have been kept very busy with the Department on threat assessments. And I must say, the threat assessments that we are most concerned about in this jurisdiction today, cyber threats, carry-on nuclear devices, and the rest, lead me to think that neither the Department nor anybody else is prepared for a new threat from, of all places, military weapons coming into the Nation's capital. We hope you won't have to include this threat assessment in your arsenal of assessments, which I am aware that the Department has taken on and taken on so well.

I am going to ask Ms. Edwards if she has questions at this time.

Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I do have a couple of questions.

First, in terms of the line of questioning that you have been directing regarding the challenges to D.C.'s gun laws and autonomy, I would like to have entered into the record a response from Governor Martin O'Malley of Maryland to an inquiry by our Maryland delegation regarding the impact on Maryland of a change in—the impact of this Ensign amendment and the effect on Maryland.

As I had described earlier, of course, one of the challenges is that we face a tremendous fiscal and budget crisis just like a lot of States and jurisdictions. We hardly have the resources to apply to registering guns for D.C. residents; it is just not what we are in the business of doing. We are challenged by registering firearms in our own State and our local jurisdictions. And it would be a huge burden on Maryland to take on this responsibility.

That aside, for those who believe in not imposing unfunded mandates on States, this clearly would be an unfunded mandate on the State of Maryland, proposing a tremendous burden on our State troopers and our budget.

For those people who are concerned about silly little things like State sovereignty, well, I understand that there are those who share the view that they can impose, at will, anything on the District of Columbia because they don't view it as a sovereign. Maryland is a State, Maryland is a sovereign. And we can't have the United States Congress imposing on us the requirement to register guns from another jurisdiction.
And so I would like to have entered into the record a letter from the Governor of the State of Maryland, Martin O’Malley, expressing our State’s serious concerns, and I will quote from the letter. “We have serious concerns with the language of Senate amendment 575 and request that you reject this proposal if introduced for consideration in House bill H.R. 157 and defeat it during a likely conference of the two measures.” And it does go on to state all of the implications for Maryland that would really impose on our State sovereignty and on our budget. I would like to have that entered into the record.

Ms. Norton. So ordered. And Ms. Edwards, might I say that I have spoken with your governor, Governor O’Malley and with Governor Tim Kaine. And I am pleased to report here that both Governors are strongly opposed to the entire Ensign amendment and that, as I understand it, they are writing a joint letter—in addition to the very well-documented letter that the Governor of Maryland, on his own, has already written. I would like to have that letter in the record as well, and any information we have from these two sovereign States who have been drafted into this matter without any consultation with anyone in the State or with any Member of the Virginia or Maryland delegation. I would like to have any information in that regard put in the record so that that infringement, as the Member says, we are accustomed to in the District, does not begin to infect the two sovereign States that are our neighbors and that work so closely with us. So ordered.

Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

And I just have a couple of questions; one to Assistant Chief Nichols, a couple of concerns. One, we have a number of your police officers who are constituents of mine in the Fourth Congressional District in Maryland and have been greatly concerned about the Blackmen-Malloy case, the discrimination case, those 300 black law enforcement officers of the Capitol Police. And I wonder just in terms of your ability to coordinate with other jurisdictions, how that impacts the morale of the law enforcement officers under your jurisdiction and where we see this going so that it can be resolved?

Mr. Nichols. That is currently before the U.S. Capitol Police Board. I know that our attorneys are talking to the representatives of the Black Police Officers Association to try to find some path forward on that. I think it is the District Court was making a ruling about who was actually included in the set of that lawsuit.

But I appreciate your question because it drives to the heart of professionalism of the United States Capitol Police. Regardless of some of the internal issues that we deal with on a day-to-day basis with personnel policies and procedures and even some of the concerns that the unions or the Black Police Officers Association may have, our officers separate out those issues from their professional responsibilities. And I think it was evidenced during the inauguration the extraordinary lengths that U.S. Capitol Police officers go to ensure that the Capitol complex and all those who work and visit here are safe. We are able to build upon that level of dedication and integrity to coordinate with our partner agencies throughout the region also, And we share a very good reputation, as do the other agencies that we work with.
We all have a mutual responsibility here. And I can’t remember if it was your opening statement or Madam Chair’s, but there is no one agency that is an island in this city. We all have to jointly work together to ensure the safety and security of not only people who live and work here, but the millions of visitors who come through here every year. And the laws that affect us and allow us to do our jobs are important in our efforts in that regard.

So we monitor these types of developments very closely. We look at the impact, and then we move forward in a unified fashion to ensure that we can meet the constitutional requirements that are provided, and also the public safety entities and responsibilities we carry every day.

Ms. Edwards. Well, I thank you for that. And of course I greatly appreciate, even as a new Member, the professionalism of the Capitol Police. But you should know at least that this Member remains really concerned about that outstanding litigation, precisely because so many of those officers do live in the Fourth Congressional District.

I would like to say to you as well, you know, and just again continue to salute the Capitol Police, and especially the memory of John Michael Gibson and Private First Class Jacob Joseph Chestnut, who was a resident of Prince George’s County in Maryland. It speaks to the high quality and caliber of service of the Capitol Police. And I would just want to just ensure that, as we go forward, that we not only have the highest quality and caliber and performance, but that we recruit in the most diverse way possible and reward those officers for their service.

And then finally, and I know I am going over my time, Madam Chairwoman, just one question for Ms. Gallegos. And the only reason that I know to say Gallegos is because I grew up in New Mexico. But I have one question for you regarding Homeland Security and your coordination efforts because in this region—and this region poses a different kind of homeland security concern. We have so many different law enforcement agencies that have responsibility in the region. And so I want to know kind of more directly your relationship with the Prince George’s County police, Montgomery County police, in terms of our local law enforcement and the District of Columbia, and how often those agencies are pulled together for the purposes of coordination, and the role that Homeland Security, particularly, plays in that coordination.

Ms. Gallegos. Representative Edwards, I would be happy to provide some additional information for you on that. I don’t have that level of detail with me today, but I would be happy to provide a response after the hearing.

Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much. And I yield.


Mr. Perriello.

Mr. Perriello. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Let me start just by echoing Congresswoman Edwards’ comments. As a new Member, I have just been incredibly impressed by the Capitol Police, the professionalism, the handling, particularly under some very, very difficult circumstances like the inauguration. So I just want to say, from me and my staff, my family that
has come to visit, we have been incredibly impressed by the job that you do.

And let me also preface this by saying that I think you have made a compelling case that there are many aspects of the District that are unique in terms of security threats. I think what we are probably interested in doing here is making sure that you have the ability and the leeway you need to protect us, to protect the city, to protect these national treasures. At the same time, for better or for worse, the unique aspects of the District also mean you have significant presidential values for constitutional rights for other parts of the country.

I certainly come from a part of the Commonwealth of Virginia that has very different issues when it comes to gun rights and people's use of guns. And I just, for now, want to ask two clarifying questions, and then I may want to pick things up offline.

First for you, Assistant Chief, you were saying that when you stop someone who possesses a weapon, there is a presumption that that person is a threat. Can you say a little bit more about that, and about whether that matters whether that is an authorized weapon or not, and what you mean by that?

Mr. Nichols. Well, the way that the gun laws work right now within our complex is the only person who can lawfully possess a weapon on the street is a law enforcement officer. So anyone other than a law enforcement officer who we find to be in position of a weapon, we automatically determine them to be a threat. Now, it is a sliding scale. There are people who come to the city who have a registered firearm and a license to carry a firearm in their home districts, they come to the city thinking that is legal here. It, in fact, is not.

So once we do the fielding interview, we will determine if they are not a threat, they are just somebody who is misinformed, but nevertheless in violation of the law. On the other end of the spectrum, you have people who do come here with the very intent of carrying a weapon in order to cause harm or violate the law. And as Congresswoman Edwards talked about, we have suffered the outcome of that when we had the lone wolf come up here trying to force their way into the United States Capitol building in 1998. Two of our police officers were killed.

Just recently, within the past few months, we have had many gun cases where people that cause us concern about what their intent really was showed up within our jurisdiction with long guns, shotguns, homemade hand grenades, things of that nature.

Because of our experience, and the fact that we know this is a target not only for terrorists, but for people who want to come here to seek retribution against the United States Government, our officers are trained to be very wary of people they run across in the field, whether it is within our primary jurisdiction or extended jurisdiction, who are possessing firearms because we have to run that investigation rather quickly to determine, one, if they are a threat, and two, if it is part of a larger threat that is going to be a multi-prong attack on the Capitol complex. So it is a difficult position for our officers. For our own protection, and the protection of people like you and your family that you talked about, we have to be very
wary and very on guard of people we come into contact with up here.

The way the laws are right now, either if you are in possession of a gun, you are a law enforcement officer, or you are violating the law. And it is pretty clear for us to move forward in that respect.

If there are efforts to introduce gray areas, then of course it is going to be more and more difficult for officers to determine rather quickly the means by which somebody is in possession of a gun. And it is going to take a lot of retraining and a lot more coordinated effort to ensure that we don't make an assumption on one end of the spectrum that is wrong, or assume that there isn't a threat when there is one, if there is, when there isn't. It just complicates the matter for us.

Mr. Perriello. Maybe that is a segue to the Attorney General. If you could give some sense—you have talked about some about of the District laws that you believe are permissible under the Heller decision. Can you give some sense of what you think would not be permissible, other than what has already been explicitly ruled out in your mind based on Heller?

Mr. Nickles. I am not quite sure what the Congressman has in mind. We have looked at every element of the gun laws that we have enacted. We have some lawsuits that have been filed that challenge various elements of our gun laws, for example, the requirement of training, certain of the preregistration requirements.

But I think, by and large, the lawsuits that have been filed accept the fact that the District has a basis in the Heller decision reasonably to regulate handguns and who gets the handguns and who gets the semi-automatics that are permissible.

The concern I have, Congressman, is with section 210 of the Ensign amendment. That is the one that creates the exception to Federal anti-trafficking laws only for the Nation's capital, which seems to me to be a sort of a contradiction in terms. You have got the most unique jurisdiction in the world in terms of the monuments and the government officials and the dignitaries and the IMF conferences and the World Bank conferences and the conferences of the G–7 and the G–20.

So everybody agrees this is the most unique place in the world. And then we are talking about making this most unique place in the world the only place in the Nation where residents are allowed to purchase a firearm in another State without going through some kind of licensed dealer.

To me, section 210, which also opens up the issue that Madam Chairman talked about, the gun show problem, and also as Congresswoman Edwards talked about foisted upon Virginia and Maryland the issue of registration, or what to do about the District residents. It doesn't make sense. And if the Congress thought it didn't make sense, the Congress has plenary power over the District. So our laws come in front of the Congress.

It was interesting to me that the date by which Congress could have acted to change the laws we enacted was April 1—April Fools Day. And we had no comment by Congress that any of the laws that we had enacted over a long, arduous period of negotiation with the community, with the advocates on both sides of the issue, we put together what I considered to be a very comprehensive statute
and regulatory picture which I believe will sustain any attack, and Congress lets it go into effect for this unique jurisdiction.

So that is, perhaps, the long answer to a simple question, but it poses to me the ultimate irony in the Ensign legislation and in section 210; why would you take the most unique place in the world and make it a unique place from the standpoint of regulation of firearms? I don’t understand it.

Mr. Perriello. I appreciate the passage you read from Justice Scalia’s decision on that. I am just trying to understand in your mind what it is that you believe we could do in terms of limiting firearms in D.C. that would be unconstitutional, that would be out of bounds for the District, that would be inconsistent with the other holdings of Heller.

Mr. Nickles. Well, I think if we were to take steps that effectively impede, prevent, stand in the way unnecessarily of the right of a citizen to have and provide self-defense in his home, that would be very worrisome to me. And so when we had advocates on the one side of gun regulation proposed that we really not respond at all to Heller, I was very adamant, as was the Council and the Mayor, in saying, now, look, we accept what the Supreme Court has done. We are not going to fly in the face of what the Supreme Court has said about the second amendment right. But at the same time, Justice Scalia said, we don’t intend in any way to take away the right of your jurisdiction, as every State in this country, the right of a jurisdiction reasonably to regulate the use of firearms. That is what we have done.

Mr. Perriello. Again, I appreciate all that you all have done to try to protect the Capitol and to protect us and for being part of this hearing. And I yield back.

Ms. Norton. Well, I have a number of questions raised in part by the questions of my colleagues, very good questions of my colleagues.

Let me ask Ms. Gallegos—see, I am not from the West—

Ms. Gallegos. Please call me Gabrielle, or Gabby.

Ms. Norton. You can tell I am a third generation Washingtonian.

Ms. Gallegos, I am going to ask a question because she speaks the language of Homeland Security.

In hearing after hearing in the Committee on Homeland Security we have been told that the approach we should be looking to protect our Nation, including of course the Nation’s capital, is a layered security approach, where one would wish at every level, level after level, until you were sure, as opposed to some great approach that would, in fact, accomplish what we are after.

In your view, is a layered approach to Homeland Security most effective in preventing a terrorist attack? And if so, how would the elimination of all local gun laws affect a layered approach if that layer was eliminated?

Ms. Gallegos. Well, that is a complicated question. Again, I am afraid that my expertise doesn’t extend to all of the potential types of security planning and policy that goes into answering that. And if you would permit, I would like to get back to you with a more detailed response at a later time.
Ms. Norton. I would request within 10 days a response from the Department on whether or not in the layered approach—which they have virtually invented since 9/11—that approach would be facilitated, hurt, helped, enhanced by the elimination of an entire layer, local gun laws, there would be left whatever is the Federal law that affects everybody. But even the most permissive jurisdictions have their own set of gun laws, here you would have none. And I understand your role and I very much appreciate your testimony, but we are trying to document. And you must understand that the leadership of the House and the Senate are trying earnestly to discover at this point whether there is any effect on homeland security, that for the first time the leaders in both Houses are looking very seriously at this gun law. And they are aware that the gun law is going to become law because we are going to pass the D.C. House Voting Rights Act. We are not letting anything stand in the way of that. And they have strongly supported it; it is already through the Senate. The House was the first to get it through last time on a clean rule and a clean bill.

There is no question in my mind that these leaders are going to get this done. And there is also no question in my mind that if you have this attached to both bills, it is law. And that is why I said in my testimony, don’t want the recriminations; want to know up front whether or not there is any effect of having no layer of local law here.

Now, Mr. Nickles, this law would deprive the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia of all authority over gun laws in the District of Columbia. In the public safety hierarchy, where does having some say over guns rank in the public safety hierarchy of every large city? How important is it? What is the biggest threat to public safety in every city?

Mr. Nickles. I think the Chief has spoken eloquently to the fact that guns are at the heart of public safety, and the need to regulate guns. The Chief has said many times, guns, drugs and gangs. We have been working, and we had a meeting yesterday with the Governor of Maryland to talk about how to improve coordination with respect to matters of violence because there are cross-border issues. But if the principal problems facing any municipality, particularly the urban areas, is guns, gangs and drugs, you take away the ability of the major police force in the city to deal effectively with guns as the elective leaders of the city have determined.

And I am no expert on the layered approach, but I am a first-hand viewer of what the Chief and her terrific police department do in this community. I sat with the Chief of Police in September last year when she sought to explain the problems in the House bill at that time.

Ms. Norton. Which is the same bill as this bill.

Mr. Nickles. Except for minor differences, it’s the same bill we are talking about. And it causes the Chief and myself, particularly section 210, significant heartburn.

Ms. Norton. Could I ask Chief Nichols, Chief Morse raised an issue that had not been raised before last time, and I will ask your view on it. It had to do with officer safety. He spoke of the changes that I enumerated in my testimony and the effect of the safety on officers of the force here. Would you speak to that, please?
Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma'am. It is pretty much in line with what I responded to earlier. As we police the city now on the streets, whenever you come in contact with an individual who is in possession of a firearm, whether it is through an arrest situation or through just merely seeing them on the street in a patrol operation, you can safely assume with very limited exceptions that, they are either a law enforcement officer or a criminal who is unlawfully in possession of that firearm. And that allows the officer, the officer who has made the contact with the individual, to approach in a very cautious manner and protect themselves in that regard because there really is no gray area right now.

The officer can perceive anybody that they see on the street carrying a firearm, whether it’s a handgun or a long gun, as a threat not only to public safety, but to themselves, and they take the appropriate precautions to handle that situation. It is the way that we have been policing in this city for as long as I have been a cop. When you generally have people on the street who are lawfully in possession of weapons, it starts to gray the area a little bit more because the officer will then know that it is not as clear cut. And it is a concern that is going to take a lot of retraining for our officers to ensure that they are approaching the right way and that they understand that there may be another added layer when they come in contact with somebody.

Ms. NORTON. So would you have to retrain every officer?

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma’am. The way that we have been trained now is that it is illegal to possess a firearm on the street. And no matter how we come in contact with that weapon, whether it is search incident to arrest, search of a vehicle, or merely somebody that we see in possession of a handgun, if other aspects of lawful possession are introduced with regard to street operations, then, yes, that is going to take a lot of retraining.

Ms. NORTON. So you would have to come to the Congress and ask for funds to retrain every officer of the Capitol Police force.

I do want to clarify, with respect to Mr. Nickles, when I was talking about depriving the local jurisdiction, leaving no layer whatsoever there for Federal police because there is no gun laws here, would you describe how gun laws and every other law becomes effective?

Let me give you a law professor’s hypothetical. Suppose the District of Columbia passed a gun law that the Congress disagreed with. Let us forget the question of constitutionality for the moment because, as I understand it, Attorney General Nickles, there have been 80 court suits brought since Heller and not a single gun law has been overturned. So let’s just assume that the District passes a gun safety law with which the Congress disagrees. Is the Congress, under present law, powerless to do anything to correct its disagreement with the District of Columbia, or must it now do, as this gun amendment does, deprive it of all jurisdiction, no matter what the circumstances over gun safety laws?

Mr. NICKLES. Oh, absolutely not. The Congress has plenary power over the District. And the District cannot enact any law until that law lays over in the Congress for 30 legislative days when you have a civil law, or 60 legislative days for criminal laws, which sometimes, as the Chairwoman knows, could mean months.
So that the time frame and the ability of Congress to say ultimately whether it agrees or disagrees with the gun laws is an ultimate weapon by the Congress. If there is some part of our gun laws that Congress does not like—putting aside the constitutional issue—Congress has plenary power, because no laws can become effective until those laws lay over here.

I might add, Madam Chairwoman, we are in the process of submitting and having had hearings on it, an omnibus crime bill. With the U.S. Attorney and the Police Department and the Attorney General's office, we have spent literally months developing an omnibus crime bill that deals with guns, with gangs, with drugs, with stalking, with victim protection, and many other features. And so to have in the middle of that very comprehensive effort in the District to deal with crime, and then in the middle of our effort to work with the Governor of Maryland and all of his key people who were with us yesterday in the Wilson Building, to have the Ensign amendment come in sort of in the middle of this when the Congress does have the power, ultimately, with respect to our gun laws or any other laws, to say no, we don't like that. I am not really clear why the Ensign amendment is being pressed at this time.

Ms. Norton. So, in other words, at best, it is redundant because Congress can do whatever it wants to do with the District. It could wipe out all the laws of the District of Columbia right now, could it not?

Mr. Nickles. I am afraid to say yes. It makes me feel pretty powerless, but the fact is the Congress has plenary power over the District. And it is really upon that basis that, at least in my view, that Congress has the power to grant voting rights to the District because it does have this plenary power, and in the past, in many situations, the Congress has treated the District as a State.

Ms. Norton. Could I ask Ms. Edwards, who has another question, and then I will come back.

Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

I just have one question that was raised in the message that we received from our Governor, and it has to do with the data systems integration and communications.

Assistant Chief Nichols, do you have the capacity now, let's say, if Maryland had to register a gun of a resident from the District of Columbia and that person somehow ended up here on Capitol grounds, to be able to communicate with Maryland? And does Maryland then have the ability to go into the data systems in the District to know whether somebody has a mental health prohibition or a previous conviction that would prohibit the purchase or possession of a firearm? Do you have that capacity now? Is it fully integrated?

Mr. Nichols. We do have a number of data systems that we interact with local law enforcement and also Federal law enforcement on. Whether those specific issues that you raise can be obtained through those systems, I would have to go back and then give the answer for the record.

Ms. Edwards. I would be curious to know that.

And then Mr. Nickles—and you don't have to answer this now, and it may require checking and getting back to us—my understanding is that if somebody in the District of Columbia has a men-
tal health prohibition or they had already registered the firearm, as would be required under Ensign, in Maryland and then got a conviction, Maryland wouldn’t necessarily know that it had to revoke that license because the systems are not transparent in that kind of way. And so it would be really complicated for Maryland or Virginia to do the kind of follow up that it has to do with guns that are registered by its own residents in the State because we have a State system that allows us, if a subsequent conviction comes along or a mental health prohibition comes along, we would know and then be able to revoke that firearm. We would not necessarily have that capacity registering folks in the District of Columbia, nor would we have the capacity, I don’t believe, to communicate that from one law enforcement agency to another law enforcement agency. And so it seems to me that, in terms of homeland security, this problem really poses a great danger in terms of the District even knowing whether someone who had a prohibition didn’t also still have a gun.

Mr. NICKLES. Let me get back to you on that. I do know that one of the nice features of the gun laws that we have enacted, it has a very clear standard as to who can register a gun. And it is also very important to us that if we find guns later, we are able to trace those guns back.

As to the question of the data systems, I have got people behind me that probably know the answer, but why don’t we confer and get back to you on that?

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Perhaps Chief Nichols or Attorney General Nickles can answer this question.

I think it is the Attorney General who has mentioned the Federal anti-trafficking laws. I believe those were passed in the 1930’s. Why is it that Federal law requires that you purchase a gun in your own State and only in your own State and not go out of State in order to purchase a gun when we usually allow free commerce across States?

Mr. NICKLES. Well, I don’t want to speculate, but it seems to me commonsensical that if each individual State is doing the registration of firearms, it can, A, ensure that people that shouldn’t have firearms don’t get them. And then, if those individuals go into Virginia or Maryland, for example, in order for that individual to retrieve the gun, he has to go to a federally licensed place in the District so that, once again, the District and the Federal authorities can keep track of those guns.

We are not dealing chewing gum here. I mean, there seems to me to be some basic public interest in knowing where firearms are and whether the individual who is receiving a firearm is mentally competent has been convicted of a felony, and a variety of different pre-registration requirements. This is not unique to the District. All other States in this country have similar regimes of regulation.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Now, you are aware, perhaps, Ms. Gallegos, that this Subcommittee is also in the process of building a large new compound out in Ward 8 for the Department where its headquarters and several of its agencies will be located. Are you aware that under this amendment a person who is voluntarily committed to St. Elizabeth’s mental hospital—and most people today
are voluntarily committed—would be able to immediately, upon release from a mental hospital, for whatever period of time, without any waiting period, be able to buy and keep a gun? And St. Elizabeth's Hospital is right next to the planned Department of Homeland Security. Does that give you any pause?

Ms. GALLEGOS. I was aware that that provision is in this amendment. And as we build our facilities at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, or St. Elizabeth's facility, we are, of course, going to be concerned about the security of that facility as we are about a number of the—I think the Federal Protective Service, through the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, protects somewhere in the neighborhood of 9,000 Federal buildings. And of course at all of those buildings we do prohibit guns from coming in. And we do that through screening, metal detection, of course visual inspection. And we are concerned about creating that level of security in all of the Federal buildings that we are protecting.

Ms. NORTON. This is a particularly high-security agency, is it not?

Ms. GALLEGOS. Yes. But of course we take the protection of all the Federal workers in all of our Federal buildings very seriously.

Ms. NORTON. Well, we are very glad to have your concern. I was asking a question about the Department itself and its near location to the mental hospital.

Ms. GALLEGOS. I presume that we will continue our security procedures when we are in that facility.

Ms. NORTON. So you don't have any concern that people could get out of St. Elizabeth's and buy a gun immediately.

Ms. GALLEGOS. I am certainly concerned about protecting Federal buildings, which is our charge, and about protecting our facilities.

Ms. NORTON. Let me ask you, Chief. Is it of any concern that assault weapons could be legally stored in houses or office buildings surrounding the Capitol complex under the amendment? Is it of any concern to the Capitol Police?

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, again, as you know, we don't comment specifically on pending legislation. But speaking in general, you were talking earlier about layers of security. The layers of security that we use with the Capitol complex is concentric rings, where we try to identify threats the furthest distance away from the Capitol complex so we can intercept and mitigate that threat.

The availability of stand-off weapons starts to skew that ability to identify a threat further away because the longer-range weapons extend out their actual threat parameters. So any time that there is a long gun that is in our proximity, yes, it is a concern, just as you get closer in, a handgun becomes more of a threat because it is a closer threat-type weapon.

As you know, the Capitol complex is completely open and inviting. And there are times where we don’t know that we have a threat coming toward us with regard to an armed individual until they are actually at our doors. So despite our best efforts, any time that there is a stand-off weapon nearby, it is a legitimate concern to the United States Capitol Police.

Ms. NORTON. Attorney General Nickles, on page 2 of your testimony you say the District is certainly not alone in requiring a fire-
arm dealer’s license, and that 17 States do it as well. We note that the gun amendment repeals the requirement that licensed dealers keep records of ammunition received into the inventory and ammunition sold or transferred. Were you referring to that?

Mr. NICKLES. I believe we were. The other provision that I would just raise with you, Madam Chairwoman, that really causes me also concern is this language where, under the Ensign amendment the District would be barred from enacting any law that would—let me give you the words, because these are far-reaching—’’ prohibit, constructively prohibit, or unduly burden the firearm possession by anyone not otherwise prohibited by Federal law.’’ And then it goes on to bar the District from enacting any laws or regulations that might discourage private ownership or use of firearms in a person’s dwelling or place of business, including regulations that would prevent the mentally ill, drug abusers, or domestic violence perpetrators from obtaining and possessing firearms. So this bill is a many splendored thing.

Ms. NORRIS. Yes, I just wanted to get your view of that on the record, Attorney General Nickles.

I want to ask Chief Nichols a question about something that is in Attorney General Nickles’ testimony. He talks about the assault weapon ban. And of course it is now up to the States, and that has been his testimony. The ATF has described the assault weapons that we are talking about as large capacity, semi-automatic firearms designed for rapid fire, combat use. Most are patterned after machine guns used by military forces. Those are guns which could be possessed and stockpiled in the District of Columbia.

Would you describe any concern you have that such stockpiles of guns used, as the ATF says, by military forces usually, what effect would that have on protecting the jurisdiction under your control?

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, the concern is as it has always been, that those types of weapons, or any weapons falls into the wrong hands and then is used to further a criminal act or an assault or an attack. So it is the availability of those types of weapons, by whatever means they are obtained by people who want to come up to the Capitol complex within our jurisdiction and do harm, that is a significant concern. And as I said earlier, we have had instances within the past 18 months where we have had people come up here with assault-type weapons and we have been able to intercept them and arrest them.

Ms. NORRIS. One final question. And this really flows from the testimony of Chief Lanier in—I guess it was September. And I would like the view of all three of you on this testimony from the Chief.

’’If the gun bill, the very one before us now, were passed, it would be far more difficult for the Metropolitan Police Department and Federal law enforcement agencies in the District of Columbia to ensure the safety and security of the Nation’s capital.’’

Do any or all of you share those concerns?

Mr. NICKLES. I would never disagree with the Chief of Police, who I think is the city’s foremost expert on what affects the public safety and security of this city. She has been in the police department for some 20 years, I think. She is a woman that has seen every facet of public safety matters in the city. She is a leader, and
she is doing a great job. And so when she says that, she means it. I support it.

Ms. NORTON. Attorney General Nickles, as I understand it, Chief Lanier established the city's own Department of Homeland Security, was its first officer, and is the primary contact with the Federal law enforcement and security network for the Nation's capital; is that correct?

Mr. NICKLES. That is correct. It is one of her many distinctions.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Attorney General Nickles.

Chief Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. I have known Chief Lanier for a number of years and I have watched her as Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department. And I would agree with the comment she made. I think that any professional law enforcement officer would concur with her views on that matter.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Chief Nichols.

Ms. Gallegos.

Ms. GALLEGOS. At DHS, we respect Chief Lanier enormously, of course. And as I mentioned earlier before, we regard the views of the State and local partners that we work with as extremely important. And they have enormous input into how we formulate our policy and how we go forward.

Ms. NORTON. Well, I want to thank all three of you, Attorney General Nickles, Chief Nichols, and Ms. Gallegos, for really very, very important testimony for this Subcommittee. It is important to hear from those who are on the front line in every respect. And I don't think we could have had a panel that was more informative or more indispensable to our understanding of how we should go forward.

Thank you again, all three of you.

Chief Nichols is going to stay for the next panel. And could I ask the second panel to come up, in addition to the chief; Mr. Jeff Delinski, Deputy Chief Special Operations Bureau, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Major General Errol Schwartz, Commanding General, D.C. National Guard. And because my good friend and colleague has another important engagement and must leave before the next panel, I am going to ask Mr. Vernon Herron, who is the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer of Public Safety and Director of Homeland Security for Prince George's County, if he would come forward in this panel. And instead of my asking the first questions, I am going to ask that Representative Edwards ask the first questions of this panel.

Perhaps we should proceed with Mr. Herron in case Ms. Edwards has to leave early.
Mr. HERRON. Good morning, Chairwoman Norton. Thank you for allowing me to be here today. I am Vernon Herron, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public Safety, and Director of Homeland Security for Prince George's County, Maryland.

I appear before you today on behalf of one of the largest counties in the National Capital Region. But before I begin, I also would like to take this time to thank Congresswoman Donna Edwards for her leadership in the critical issue of National Capital Region public safety, and for recommending that I appear before you today.

If time permits, I would like to offer testimony on the Ensign legislation.

First, I want to take a moment to recall that Prince George's County has testified on this issue before. In July of 2006, Prince George's County Sheriff Michael Jackson testified before the House Energy and Commerce Committee on H.R. 5785, the Warning, Alert and Response Network Act. In that testimony, Sheriff Jackson explained that warning the public of an impending disaster is a good first step, but not nearly enough to address the total reality of public safety in response to a large-scale disaster. We are pleased this hearing goes further than debating how we warn the public and discusses how we can lead and coordinate masses of people to safety.

Prince George's County, Maryland, is located in the heart of the Baltimore-Washington corridor. The county borders Washington, D.C., and is just 37 miles south of the City of Baltimore. The county's population exceeds 820,000, with a daily work population of well over 1 million people.

Covering an area of close to 500 square miles, the county is home to many businesses, as well as State and Federal agencies. Some of these Federal agencies include NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, Andrews Air Force Base, U.S. Department of Agriculture's Beltsville facility, a Federal Records Center, a large Internal Revenue Service office complex, and the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration Center for Weather and Climate Prediction. Additionally, a large portion of the region's Metro system and Interstate 95 pass through Prince George's County.

Fortunately, for most communities in America, the threat of terrorism remains just that, a threat. However, the United States has experienced several acts of terrorism and widespread natural disasters which caused devastation and catastrophe. And 9/11 was an example of this devastation and catastrophe for New York, the National Capital Region, and the entire United States. Therefore, Prince George's County is in a prime position to offer perspectives
on how to address the need, impact, and practicality for orchestrating large-scale public safety response.

Coordinated planning across the National Capital Region will greatly assist the utilization of limited resources available to support evacuation and sheltering of residents, citizens, and visitors to the National Capital Region. Actual emergencies are inherently unstable and consist of rapidly changing events whose outcome may be difficult, if not impossible, to predict.

Resource sharing will be necessary in order to ensure the region can efficiently manage a major evacuation or sheltering event. Prince George's County works closely with the Maryland Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to ensure all resources needed are being utilized in the most efficient and effective manner.

Locally, we have executed MOUs with the Board of Education to provide emergency access to the use of 260 public schools located throughout the county. Although there is adequate number of public schools to shelter thousands of citizens, we do not have enough resources to open every school, or multiple schools, simultaneously and also handle our daily responsibilities.

In the event that multiple shelters would be needed to house large numbers of citizens for an extended period, we have preselected two mega shelters, Ritchie Coliseum in the northern portion of the county and Show Place Arena in the southern portion of the county. Both are capable of sheltering several hundred people.

Prince George's County has also pre-stocked mobile caches consisting of cots, blankets, pillows and personal hygiene kits ready for transport to any shelter. For larger shelter needs, we have pre-positioned FEMA tractor trailers loaded with emergency shelter supplies ready to activate.

Having immediate access to emergency supplies enables Prince George's County to mitigate, respond to, and recover from disastrous events. Disasters require coordination between Public Safety departments, our Health and Human Services departments, as well as the other emergency support function agencies. Having these departments train and exercise together ensures that social service support and agency collaboration is available to assist during this trying time.

In the event a full evacuation of a county is necessary, the county's transportation department has access to traffic cameras located at major traffic intersections. Using these cameras can alter the time of the traffic light to reduce gridlock and facilitate smooth traffic flow.

The experiences from past incidents reveal that vehicle evacuation requires a unified effort, and this will be required for the National Capital Region. Region coordination is paramount in any effective response and recovery plan. To facilitate and effect a recovery plan, the National Capital Region has developed a regional video conference system. This video conference system uses its own data network lines which provide a direct link to every emergency operation center throughout the National Capital Region. The ability for senior officials from each jurisdiction to directly reach out and communicate with their neighbor in the National Capital Re-
gion will not only enhance the recovery process, but expedite the use of resource sharing and mutual aid.

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, also known as COG, has played a major role in fostering regional communications. Through COG, senior officials and public safety chiefs and directors of each emergency support function meet regularly to discuss issues and concerns that greatly impact jurisdictions’ ability to coordinate, communicate, and collaborate during emergencies and disasters.

Prince George’s County communicates directly with MEMA during any major event. MEMA is advised of the event and placed on alert that mutual aid may be required.

Prince George’s County also depends on several Federal funding mechanisms to support the county’s operations. Those mechanisms include the Urban Area Security Initiative, COPS Law Enforcement Technology Program, the Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants, the Byrne Discretionary Grants, and the American Recovery Reinvestment Act funds. These funding streams are critical to our continued ability to deliver public safety services and response capabilities.

Some of the grants require a match dollar amount for the jurisdictions. For example, the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant program lies dormant due to the fact that jurisdictions cannot provide the 20 to 25 percent grant match. This grant requirement cripples the ability of the jurisdiction to obtain the available funding, especially during this difficult economic time.

Also, the fiscal year 2010 House Budget resolution decreases the public safety function authority by $5 billion, while increasing the outlay by only $1 billion. This discrepancy gives us pause, as we are not able to provide as much public safety response to the National Capital Region, with cuts to important programs such as the ones I listed above.

In examining the state of operations today, we would make the following recommendations:

First and furthermore, we must keep UASI whole and urge a fiscal year 2010 budget to not be set below $900 million;

Strive for greater coordination and communication between local governments and FEMA, including conducting of unified NCR drills and exercises;

Establish clear and efficient report instructions between local governments, FEMA, and the Executive Office of the President;

Establish mechanisms for emergency expenditure reimbursement. If local governments are going to assist Federal emergency response activities, there needs to be a clear path which those local governments can seek reimbursement for those costs.

Hurricane Isabel, 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the massive crowds of this past inauguration, have all taught us valuable lessons regarding large-scale public safety response. However, if we are to move forward with the entire National Capital Region en-sync, then more coordination will need to be established and critical Federal support cannot be stripped away.

Are all of our local governments fully interoperable within themselves? And are all jurisdictions of the NCR? Is there a coordinated
National Capital Region plan for FEMA? And are all local government entities completely versed with this plan?

These are the questions we should ask moving forward. Prince George’s County would continue to partner with the NCR to make our country safe.

Each day we want to be able to inform our citizens that we are better prepared today than we were yesterday. I want to thank the Subcommittee for calling this hearing today and the Chairwoman for allowing us to speak on this important matter.

I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Herron.

Let’s move to, Major General Schwartz, D.C. National Guard.

General SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Members of this Committee for the opportunity to testify in front of you today.

I have submitted my testimony for the record, but please allow me to make some highlighting remarks concerning the District of Columbia National Guard and their contribution to the National Capital Region.

I have been a capital guardian now for 32 years, and we continue to provide excellent support to the city. The District of Columbia National Guard consists of the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, and we are housed within the District of Columbia, at Andrews Air Force Base and Fort Belvoir, Virginia. These installations outside of the District of Columbia provide us the support that we would need to perform missions in the District such as our air assets, our schoolhouses and other important venues.

The District of Columbia National Guard has a Federal and a District mission. It does not limit us to the way we perform our duties from the limited actions during a nonemergency all the way to martial law, where we can support the District.

I would like to emphasize the primary role of the District of Columbia National Guard, and let you know that it is in support of local authorities; we will only respond based upon the requests of local authorities.

The District of Columbia National Guard is like no other National Guard in the Nation. The 53 States and Territories have a Governor that they report to as their commander in chief. The District of Columbia’s commander in chief is the President of the United States. He has delegated that responsibility through the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Army who has oversight for all local missions.

The Secretary of the Air Force also has oversight over our air assets. We provide excellent air support to Congress by housing three C–40 aircraft out of Andrews Air Force Base to move the congressional delegations around, two C–38 jets and other support equipment.

The District of Columbia National Guard also performs its Federal mission, that is, supporting the warfight, Army or air, no matter what part of the world it is.

My responsibility is to make sure that the District of Columbia National Guard can rapidly respond to any homeland initiative. The Office of the Mayor will contact the Guard, I will do the necessary coordinations with senior officials about my level to make
sure that the District of Columbia gets all it needs in a very short period of time. We support 16 ESFs from the response plan, and that is transportation, communication, mass care, search and rescue, all-in hazards response, agriculture, natural resources, public safety and security. The District has added a 16th ESF for donation and volunteer management which—we are supporting them with our field kitchens and other resources that they may need from the Guard.

We are working very closely with the District of Columbia Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency and other agencies within the FEMA Region 3 area. We are housing the FEMA Region trailer and the American Red Cross trailer in the parking lots of our armory because we envision the armory with its 58,000-square-foot capacity can house—can be a shelter in case of an emergency here in the District, like we did for Hurricane Katrina where we housed several individuals who came in from Louisiana.

We have the ability to build capacity through our partnerships in the region. The Maryland National Guard, Virginia National Guard, Pennsylvania, Delaware and West Virginia offer support to the District when needed. An example of that support, which stretches beyond those States, is our support to the Presidential Inauguration in January, where 30 States and one Territory provided over 7,000 troops to the District. Our objective is to remain in the background, but to make sure that the events are safe and secure.

In our capacities from Fort Belvoir, we have just received new UH–72 helicopters for medevac reasons. We are picking up an additional three helicopters in a week or so, and we will be using those in case of local emergencies. I yield back my time, Madam Chair, and I will be happy to answer any of your questions at the end.

Ms. Norton. Thank you, General Schwartz.

Mr. Delinski.

Mr. Delinski. Good morning. And thank you, Chairwoman Norton, for inviting me to testify on behalf of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

My name is Jeff Delinski. I am a Deputy Chief of the Metro Transit Police. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, otherwise known as WMATA, or Metro, is a far-reaching system, serving 3.5 million people living in an area of roughly 1,500 square miles. We provide, on average, 1.2 million rides on weekdays, making WMATA an important contributor to the health and vitality of the regional economy.

WMATA has a history of providing emergency response training and outreach to our regional public safety partners. WMATA opened the Carmen E. Turner Training Facility in 2002, a first-of-its-kind facility in the United States dedicated to transit. The facility includes a 260-foot tunnel, two Metro railcars, a simulated electrified third rail for mock fire and rescue exercises, and a passenger rail emergency evacuation stimulator. Since its opening, nearly 15,000 people have been trained at this facility, which has earned a national reputation.

In 2004, the Metro Transit Police launched a training initiative entitled Managing Metro Emergencies. During a 2-year period this
course provided over 5,000 regional law enforcement, fire and rescue, Department of Transportation and WMATA operations personnel enhanced training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovering from a major service disruption in our system.

WMATA has recently intensified its focus on emergency management activities by creating an Office of Emergency Management. In December of 2008, Mr. Peter LaPorte was hired to oversee this new office and has a direct report to Metro’s Chief of Police. With the recommitment of six internal staff and the hiring of five personnel, Mr. LaPorte has created a team that has over 200 years of transit-based incident response and emergency management experience.

The Office of Emergency Management will oversee a new training initiative involving the delivery of incident command system training to an estimated 8,000 Metro employees. Funded through the Department of Homeland Security’s Transit Security Grant Program and the regional Urban Area Security Initiative funds, this program will raise awareness of security-related issues and instruct operational employees to implement the proper response procedures and command system structure during the initial and developing phases of a Metro-specific incident or emergency.

Above all, partnerships with first responders and regional stakeholders are the foundation of effective emergency management. WMATA would not be able to manage emergencies without capitalizing on the strengths of our partnering agencies. Continuance of frequent training and exercises as well as ongoing involvement with the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments are the primary ways for building and improving our relationships with external agencies.

WMATA is critically tied to the success of the numerous special events that take place in this region. The most recent of these large-scale special events was the 2009 Presidential Inauguration, which resulted in the largest crowd served in WMATA’s history, providing over 1.5 million individual trips on both bus and rail. The success on Inauguration Day is proof not only of WMATA’s ability to work within the region, but the region’s propensity to work together.

When an unplanned incident does occur in the National Capital Region, it is our responsibility to ensure customer safety, minimize the delay and get people moving again. WMATA’s actions on September 11, 2001, provides a good example of our ability to move large numbers of people during a regional emergency.

However, it must be said that while WMATA is willing and prepared to operate in less than ideal circumstances, we do have limits in our capacity to move passengers. Even in the best conditions, the region always faces traffic management challenges. To address this, WMATA in conjunction with its regional partners has been active in the development of the Metropolitan Area Transportation Operations Coordination program, otherwise known as MATOC. MATOC is an area-wide situational awareness effort that enhances coordination between the region’s transportation providers.

Thanks to funds appropriated by the Federal Government that make emergency management a priority, WMATA and the region have done a great job dealing with and responding to emergencies and planning for events. Continued investment in emergency man-
agement initiatives such as proper equipment, training efforts, planned processes, response measures, recovery protocols and overall prevention techniques is imperative for enhancing the National Capital Region’s mobility, safety and quality of life.

The men and women of WMATA will continue to strengthen our capabilities and relationships with our local, regional and Federal partners to ensure a safer, more secure and better prepared region. Thank you.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Delinski.

Mr. Nichols, do you have additional statement at this time?

Mr. NICHOLS. The only thing I would like to add, ma’am—obviously, I have already submitted a statement for the record, but one thing I would like to highlight is, you will hear today in the previous panel and this panel the need to coordinate and share resources within the Washington metropolitan area. There is no one agency that is well suited to work in a unilateral manner to handle the types of emergencies that occur in Washington or could potentially occur in Washington. And we have seen that, even something with the evacuation of the Mall to coordination for the Inauguration and the events on 9/11.

One of the priorities of Chief Morse, myself and Gloria Jarmon, our CAO, has is to make sure that the United States Capitol Police are able to obtain a new radio system that allows us to be a full partner with interoperability. The requirement of the agencies to have plans is fine, but the lifeblood of the agencies in this region to coordinate is our ability to communicate with each other. And when you have a key partner who has limited interoperable capabilities to talk to the people who are sitting at this table—seated at this table, certainly it causes a concern.

We are working very closely with U.S. Capitol Police Board and the Committees of jurisdiction to make sure that we have the authority and the appropriations to obtain this system, and to make sure that we can fully integrate with the Washington metropolitan area law enforcement public safety agencies should there be a major situation develop that requires an evacuation of the area or an event that causes us to bring resources into our jurisdiction so we can communicate and coordinate those rescue and law enforcement activities.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Nichols.

Let me understand your testimony. Your radio system is not now fully integrated with even the D.C.—the Metropolitan Police Department, which is the largest police department in the region; is that so?

Mr. NICHOLS. We have limited interoperability with the Metropolitan Police Department, but we don’t have full interoperability. When we bring some of our other partners, who are seated at the table here, online, we have limited interoperability.

The other problem that we have with our current system radio system is, it is not encrypted, so that when we are handling an emergency situation, everybody’s little brother with a scanner can listen to what we are doing and that, therefore, compromises our operations.

Ms. NORTON. I am going to go now to my good friend, Representative Edwards, for the first series of questions. I just wanted to
make sure I understood what you were saying. This testimony is that, even as we speak, the Capitol Police are not fully interoperable within the region or even with the D.C. Police Department located right here.

Ms. Edwards.

Ms. Edwards. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And also thank you for enabling Mr. Herron to come to this panel as I have to depart.

It is exactly this point of operability of systems that I wanted to focus on. So I appreciate, Assistant Chief Nichols, your raising that. And I want to direct this question also to Mr. Herron, because my understanding is that the Prince George’s County Police Department also has a radio communications operability concern and deficit. The Montgomery County Police Department also has an interoperability problem, in addition to the Capitol Police and the District of Columbia police.

And I am not sure, Mr. Delinski, perhaps you can tell me whether WMATA suffers the same deficit. Because this is a huge concern.

Here we are in a region, and our major law enforcement agencies have limited capacity in an emergency situation to communicate with each other and to do it in a secure fashion. This is perhaps—I mean, this is a tremendous deficit for one of the most significant regions in the country. And I think that as we look to—and this is an authorizing Committee and not an appropriating Committee. But I would say to my colleagues that as we go forward, this is a huge deficit that needs to be cleared up. And it can’t go any longer.

We are, perhaps, just lucky that we haven’t had the kind of emergency event that would require us to draw on our communications capacity and then suffer for that deficit.

And so I appreciate, Mr. Herron, first, your comments about Prince George’s County’s interoperability deficit.

Mr. Herron. Yes, ma’am.

If an emergency occurred today, Prince George’s County’s first responders would not be able to seamlessly communicate with partners in the National Capital Region.

As you know, during the 9/11 attacks, our first responders responded to the Pentagon and had to be handing out radios so we could communicate with those first responders.

We recently purchased a new radio system to replace our existing 40-year-old radio system. We are hopeful to be online with that system within the next 15 months. It is the latest and the greatest encryption, and we will be able to communicate effectively with our partners in the National Capital Region.

Ms. Edwards. Mr. Delinski.

Mr. Delinski. I share your concerns with interoperability as well. It is certainly a problem that has been challenging the Metro Transit Police Department.

As you know, we operate in all three major jurisdictions here and communicate with all local police departments. We have some limited capacity to do so, Metropolitan Police, for one, on a limited basis and U.S. Park Police come to mind.

However, this issue has also been brought up through the Council of Governments here in Washington, D.C., and using Urban
Area Security Initiative funds, we have purchased two thousand radios that obviously do communicate with each other; and they are in storage caches strategically placed throughout the region. So if there is a major event, we do have that option of pulling out those two thousand radios and distributing them to the first responders on the scene of a major incident.

So we have that option while we wait for technology to be able to bring our radio systems together.

Ms. Edwards. Major General Schwartz, can you describe your communications capacity with the law enforcement agencies and other first responders in the region?

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question.

First of all, let me talk about the framework in which we communicate. The Joint Operation Center in the District of Columbia is tied to the D.C. Emergency Management Agency through several communications mechanisms, radio CB being one of those, and radios if we have to be deployed to the streets. It further is tied to other EOCs or JOCs within the region, within the FEMA Region 3. So we have a 24/7 capability to communicate to our Joint Operation Centers within this region.

If we are deployed to the streets to assist the Metropolitan Police Department or the Park Police or whoever requires our service, we are then issued land mobile radios, or handhelds, to communicate back to our JOC and then out to different regions so that they can report back what is going on.

So because we are not on the streets 24/7, the pressures that the law enforcement agencies may feel are not realized by the Guard.

Ms. Edwards. Thank you.

And then finally, Mr. Herron, what would be the cost for a fully interoperable communications system for Prince George’s County in this really critical metropolitan region?

Mr. Herron. The cost is $65 million, and as I indicated, we did sign a contract with a vendor. We are moving forward with the placement of the towers and the testing and so forth.

And I must say that there have been—the Byrne Grant accounts and UAC’s funding has helped us facilitate the purchase of this equipment. And hopefully within the next 15 months, barring any other issues, we will be able to go live with this radio system.

Ms. Edwards. Thank you.

And then lastly, before I have to depart, my other question was also about medical emergency services. I have been really concerned that at a time when we need to step up and think about our regional medical emergency services and how we would handle a disaster, we are seeing—for example, at Andrews Air Force Base, Major General Schwartz, where some of your units are supported—Malcolm Grow Medical Center will be declining actually in its service, in its medical services at that facility.

Prince George’s Hospital Center is under great strain, even though it has the region’s trauma unit there. And I worry about the capacity of then Washington—and we will hear from Washington Hospital Center and the American Red Cross later on about our capacity to deliver the kind of medical emergency services that we need, especially outside of the District of Columbia, presuming an event that might require movement of great masses of people
out into the suburbs and particularly the southern suburbs of Prince George's County that are more adjacent to the Capitol Complex.

And so I wonder, Mr. Herron, if you—because I am looking right now at how we actually might support a much more regional approach on medical service delivery for the purposes of homeland security.

Mr. Herron. Yes, ma'am.

In the National Capital Region we have been working together for the past couple years to deal with the capacity in the hospitals, our surge capacity, so to speak. We rely heavily on MOUs to support one another, and our hospitals have these MOUs in place as well.

We have purchased several mobile medical buses to transport large numbers of victims to hospitals. We are not at the place where we really need to be—to address a large catastrophe, so to speak. We are moving in the right direction, but there is plenty of work to be done.

Ms. Edwards. Thank you.

Madam Chairwoman, I yield. And I look forward to both reading and looking at the testimony of the remainder of this panel and the subsequent one. And I appreciate your enabling me to ask this line of questions.

And thank you all for your presence here today. Thank you.

Mr. Herron. Thank you.

Ms. Norton. Thank you, Congresswoman Edwards. We are very glad you live in the region so that even when Congress is dismissed, you are willing to travel from Prince George's to be able to offer the very, very important and helpful comments and questions you have offered this afternoon.

Let me follow up on the Congresswoman's questions on interoperability because it may involve a real-life circumstance. That involves the enforcement—what we understand to be a multi-law-enforcement approach to events like the Inauguration.

Now, there has been a report issued thus far, and I have indicated that we are not prepared until the GAO report is issued to go very deeply, because we haven't had an independent report on what happened. But we do know from constituents around the country that there were people who could not get out of the Third Street Tunnel. And some have identified this as perhaps the most important, if not the only, homeland security issue that arose during what was an extraordinarily successful event in other ways. And yet there were perhaps hundreds of people who were told to make their way by walking through the Third Street Tunnel; they did and could not get out.

I am wondering if this was a question of interoperability, whether any of you participated in communication with one another so that these people who, we are told, were not even told why they were being held.

Did the Metropolitan Police sergeant, did the Capitol Police know about this? Did Metro? Did you, General Schwartz? Did you, Mr. Herron? How did this occur? And was there any communication among the agencies who appear to have coordinated so well in other regards to the Inauguration?
Mr. Nichols. I can probably be in the best position to answer that right now.

There was a joint report that was done by the agencies that were involved in the planning of the Inauguration that addressed this and some of the other issues we found, which turned out to be rather significant challenges with regard to the security plan and the balance and security plan with the level of access that we wanted to provide people to the various venues in the city.

Essentially, everything was compounded by the fact that there was an unprecedented, almost 2 million people in the city. Since that had never been experienced before, we didn't really have a historical perspective on how that would strain infrastructure, how that would test the communications capabilities of the law enforcement public safety agencies, and just generally the security plans that we put in place that day.

I will be happy to send the report over to you if you haven't had a chance to see it.

Ms. Norton. Actually, I am trying to find out from all four of you whether you had any communication during the time that people were in the Third Street Tunnel. I am trying to find out whether interoperability or the communication system was partly at fault here.

Did any of you know that there were people—I will go down. You knew, Mr. Nichols?

Mr. Nichols. We knew that there were people in the southbound tube of the Third Street Tunnel because that was a designated pedestrian route. The command level positions at the various multiagency command centers did not know that there were people in the northbound tube. The northbound tube was never intended for pedestrian use.

Ms. Norton. How did they get in there?

Mr. Nichols. Officers on the ground level, in order to overcome crowding challenges that were taking place in the northwest sector of the city, directed people down there to relieve pressure.

Ms. Norton. See, this is interesting because this is the kind of unplanned circumstance where the officer on the ground has to make a decision. And actually, if you think about it, it would seem to be a good kind of on-the-ground decision, but you would expect it to be made—the notion that you are getting a lot of crowding. Look, here is this tunnel that is closed. It won't have vehicular traffic. Let's send them through this tunnel. It makes perfect sense as long as everybody knows it.

Was the failure of communication related at all to interoperability?

Mr. Nichols. I think—yes, I believe that that was one of the factors. We had a multiagency command center going on, but in the multiagency command center, what we are really doing is listening to about 15 or 20 or maybe even more independent radio transmissions from the independent agencies.

Ms. Norton. Including, for example, anybody can get on that now because you are doing—you are tuning into other systems rather than having your own system.
Mr. Nichols. That is correct. So there was no one radio system you could monitor to get a global view of what was going on in the city that day.

Conversely, should there have been a major situation develop, the same would have been true. We would have had to listen to all these multitude of different agencies' transmissions in order to coordinate our activities and tie operations together.

Ms. Norton. Including, for example, Mr. Nichols, if somebody, you know, these incidents that we had here; and the one which is most indelibly in our minds, of course, is the incident that occurred here in the Capitol.

Here you had the tunnel open. You had millions of people here, almost none of them with real tickets. Now, if among them there had been someone with a military-style weapon who decided to open fire, what would have been the consequence there? When would you have known about it? How would that have been handled?

Mr. Nichols. Well, we had contingency plans in place to handle any number of situations that could occur, including an active shooter. We actually had table-top exercises on how these various agencies would respond, depending on whose jurisdiction the event was taking place in at any given time.

But again, the potential for something like that to occur occurs every day. It is compounded exponentially when you have large crowds at a national secure event like that where you have instant media attention of what is going on.

Ms. Norton. And, of course, it would be compounded if, in fact, there was free access to military-style weapons which would make it much, much easier to mow down people in such a crowd if you happen to be either a crazy person or a person intent upon doing harm.

Mr. Nichols. And that is an important point because, obviously, our focus is on an enduring constitutional government and the protection of the leadership of the United States, because everybody was outside of the West Front of the Capitol. You had the entire top level of the government in one place at one time. That is certainly a significant security concern.

But you can't discount the fact that there doesn't necessarily have to be an attack upon that area in order to completely disrupt and overtake the inaugural activities of that day. And we were very cognizant of that. We always are.

The agencies that were involved in the Inauguration have a constitutional requirement to make sure that the President is sworn in at noon on the 20th, like the Constitution says; and anything that has the potential of disrupting that, whether it is an active shooter on the Mall or something occurring here on the Capitol grounds, we have to guard against that.

And as the threats proliferate through access to weapons or whatever, the difficulty of making sure that we hit that constitutional requirement for the Inauguration is even more difficult.

Ms. Norton. So would you be as alert today in looking for the lone gunman, single shooter as looking for somebody carrying a nuclear device, assuming that was possible, into this area?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma’am. We run a spectrum of threats and we look at threats based upon the probability and the consequence. And we weigh our resource allocation toward that scale.

Ms. Norton. Let’s talk probability and consequence.

Isn’t there a greater probability for a single shooter to come in spraying a crowd or a motorcade than there is for someone to bring in a nuclear device today?

Mr. Nichols. Yes. And I think if you look at some of the terrorist attacks that have taken place just recently—Mumbai is probably the best example of what a small group of people who are heavily armed can do to disrupt an entire city. We are not immune from that.

We have seen—and you have talked about it, I have talked about it also—what occurred on July 24, 1998, where we had one individual with one handgun, and the disruption that he caused and two police officers dead and a citizen wounded.

So, yes, it is a significant concern. It is a significant test of the planning and response capabilities of the law enforcement agencies in the city. And it is something we have to be cognizant of every single day.

Ms. Norton. Thank you, Chief.

Now, I would like to go down the line and ask any of you if you knew—of all the things that happened, most of the things you would expect to happen. I think what people didn’t expect was that the officers would have to make an almost instant decision about the crowding and sending people through a tunnel. As it turns out, some of those had tickets. In fact, many, many of those had tickets and did not get out.

I am trying to learn whether or not, with the present system of operability, if any of you were informed of the fact that there were people in the Third Street Tunnel.

Mr. Delinski?

Mr. Delinski. I will say that communications up to and including the Inauguration itself were very robust. The planning was tremendous; the event was tremendous. We had officers and officials assigned to many different command posts throughout the region that were able to feed back information to our EOC at Metro, so we would get real-time information and so forth. We had an extensive antenna out in the field, getting as much information as we could.

However, to my knowledge, we were not notified of the Third Street Tunnel condition. There was no request made to help alleviate that. Of course, we had our hands full with Metro-related issues, transporting 1.5 million people.

Ms. Norton. You would have had your hands full, Mr. Delinski, if there had been a shoot-out in there, but I bet you would have dispatched Transit Police to help in the event that there was such an event.

Mr. Delinski. Absolutely.

Ms. Norton. I am just trying to hear—I am not casting blame. If anything, we are trying to help, because we are shocked, amazed, and awed that there would not be interoperability among all those related and that you would have to do what looks like a jerry-built system if you want interoperability.
Major General Schwartz, you had a major role to play. In fact, you were the commander of all the forces, not only the D.C. National Guard, but all forces at the Inauguration.

Were you informed through radio or other kinds of contact that people were stuck in the Third Street Tunnel?

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, the joint task force D.C. was not missioned to provide support to the tunnel. We had 7,000——

Ms. NORTON. Yes, sir, I am just trying to know if you knew about it.

General SCHWARTZ. No, ma’am, we did not know about it.

Now, does that point towards a physical communication problem or just failure to communicate? And that is what we have to look at. The officer who was probably sending folks down into the tunnel probably had no situational awareness of what was happening in the tunnel. Therefore, was it the failure to communicate or a communications problem physically?

Ms. NORTON. Well, we will find out, but the—in this age of high technology, it doesn’t seem to us, if there were a state-of-the-art system available to officers, that there would have been lack of notice of all officers. And, again, although there were people who got sick in the tunnel, handled very well, you hardly heard anything about it.

And although people continued to be joyful about the Inauguration, our job and your job is to think of worst-case scenarios. And the worst-case scenario that I know, from speaking to a number of you about planning, was not that there would be a lot of folks there—you had already shown you could handle lots of people—but that something unforeseen would happen. As it turns out, this was the unforeseen event. And it happened in part because officers were trying to relieve crowding, not because of some outside force. And yet some outside force could have taken advantage of the failure to communicate.

Mr. Herron, you are a public safety officer, as well. Do you know whether Prince George’s officials or you were informed that people, I am sure some from your own county, were stuck in the Third Street Tunnel?

Mr. HERRON. Madam, I was in the emergency operations center during the entire event, and we were not informed.

Ms. NORTON. And this is the emergency operations center of where?

Mr. HERRON. Prince George’s County.

Ms. NORTON. And you were not informed.

Mr. HERRON. No, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. I think that the testimony here of very competent officers is all that needs to be said about this appropriation period and interoperability.

Chief Nichols, isn’t it true that some funds have been allocated to begin, at least, on interoperability among the region and the District of Columbia police?

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, ma’am. I believe that there was a lot of money that was given to the Department of Homeland Security to distribute across the Nation, with regard to grant money for local and State law enforcement agencies.
The U.S. Capitol Police, because of the fact that we are a legislative branch agency, can't receive grant money. So we were appropriated a supplemental appropriation to begin planning for our new radio system. And we have requested additional funds in the current bill.

Ms. NORTON. So how far along are you, sir?

Mr. NICHOLS. We are pretty far along in the planning stages right now. We are being monitored very closely by the Committees of jurisdiction to make sure that we are in the realm of——

Ms. NORTON. Does that mean not only the D.C. Police Department, but Metro? Does that also mean the region, that you would be interoperable with the entire region?

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, we would be interoperable with the entire region. We project right now, if we getting the funding that we are requesting and the authority to move forward, it would still be about 3 years before we get our system completely online and up and running. That is why the chief has made this such a priority, because nobody can predict in the span of 3 years what we are really going to be facing, not only within the Capitol complex but within the region. So this is something that has a very high priority so we can get it online and get down the road with fulfilling our mission.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, General Schwartz?

General SCHWARTZ. Madam, may I just add that if the system is going to be delivered in 3 years, we have to look at upgrades to the existing system to make sure that they can all interoperate or upgrade it together.

Ms. NORTON. And it looks like between now and a fully interoperable system we are into jerry-built systems, at some considerable risk, I take it, to homeland security.

Mr. NICHOLS. You are right. Right now we are making due with what we have. I believe that, obviously, from the testimony today, we are not the only agency that is in this position. But the agencies in the region have to continue to bridge the gaps that we experience with regard to our communications capabilities.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Herron, could I ask you a question? Once there was the evacuation of New Orleans, everybody talked about, how can we evacuate? Some of us have emphasized “stay in place,” that there are few events where there would be a need to evacuate whole populations. For example, we have floods in this area, but seldom have we had a hundred-year event, as they are called.

However, it could be that there would be the need to evacuate people from the District of Columbia. It is a pretty big jurisdiction. You have spoken of a place—a shelter. I want to make sure I have—the places that are mentioned, which have been mentioned.

Mr. HERRON. Ritchie Coliseum and Showplace Arena.

Ms. NORTON. Ritchie Coliseum, Showplace Arena. How many people could be sheltered in these two facilities?

Mr. HERRON. I think, combined, we can probably shelter up to probably 3,000 people.

Ms. NORTON. If more than 3,000 poured out, think about where Prince George’s is located.

Mr. HERRON. Then we are in trouble. To be quite honest with you, we are in trouble. You know, we have asked our citizens to
be prepared to make a plan to shelter in place to prepare for the future.

In Louisiana, we had more than 2,000 residents migrate to Prince George's County to stay with relatives, which impacted our capacity. They self-evacuated and stayed with relatives in Prince George's County, and it was a strain on our resources.

Ms. NORTON. Do you advise shelter in place unless told to evacuate?

Mr. HERRON. I think every citizen should have a plan to shelter in place, have alternative housing with friends and relatives that they can migrate to in case of an emergency.

Of course there will be that segment of society who will not have the resources to do that. And that is when the government must be prepared to respond to the needs of those citizens.

Ms. NORTON. Most of the time, when there has been an event of some kind, you don't know what it is. Chief Nichols has testified that it is likely to be a spraying event of some shooter, as we had here in the capital, as it is to be some exotic event. So, therefore, the first thing is we don't know anything. That is why the questioning that Ms. Edwards and I have done on operability, in the first place.

And before we tell people to stay in place, we would like to know what the event is, so that we can know what we are talking about. It puts us in a terrible position, you in a terrible position, to tell people to stay in place or to go without being able to speak to one another, with everybody trying to get on these little jerry-built systems that you have concocted. And, by the way, in case of a terrorist event, others being able to listen in to what it is you are saying.

I would like to know, in the event of an emergency, whether known or unknown, where you would expect a unified command, who is in charge of making decisions?

General SCHWARTZ. Ma'am, I would think the local incident commander is in charge. That is the first person on the scene.

Ms. NORTON. Now, that would mean whoever in the jurisdiction, like Mr. Herron?

General SCHWARTZ. I think the first responders, which is normally police or fire, would be on the scene, and then the supporting packages will come in to assist that incident commander.

Mr. DELINSKI. He is exactly right, if I could follow up on that. When there is an incident such as an active shooter, the first law enforcement official on the scene would set up an incident command. Any responding units, whether it be from that particular agency or other agencies, would report to incident command and ask for directions, get information and so forth, and feed that information back to their departments as well.

If it is a rescue situation, such as a fire it would be in the hands of the fire department. At that point, law enforcement would respond to incident command and then work with them to mitigate the situation.

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask you this question, Mr. Delinski? I noted in your testimony, if I can find it, 2008, Metropolitan Transit Police Department investigated 224 suspicious packages and people, nine
unknown substances, 20 bomb threats in your facilities. “Investigated,” that doesn’t mean you found anything.

Mr. DELINSKI. Correct.

Ms. NORTON. And I do appreciate that. Did any of these investigations involve guns?

Mr. DELINSKI. There were a few incidents that were reported of suspicious people that were seen carrying weapons.

Ms. NORTON. When you see—now, of course, your system transports people throughout the region and especially to the District of Columbia, which is the hub of the region. If you see a person with a weapon in one of your facilities, how do you respond today?

Mr. DELINSKI. If the weapon is concealed, obviously you approach that person and get as much information, maintaining a safe distance, watching the person’s hands and so forth, doing the——

Ms. NORTON. How would you know if it were concealed, sir?

Mr. DELINSKI. Because of a bulge maybe in the side, maybe someone else had seen it previously. It may have been moderately displayed underneath his jacket, where it was sticking out, the butt of the gun, or something along those lines.

Obviously, if the weapon is out, we make the immediate police challenges to, raise your hands, stop what you are doing. And we have the person, if the weapon is in their hand, direct them to drop the weapon on the ground, move it away from them, and then spread them out in the prone position on the ground, where we can go and secure them and then investigate the circumstances that led us to that point.

Ms. NORTON. I believe, if I am not—I believe that Virginia does allow concealed weapons.

Mr. DELINSKI. Correct.

Ms. NORTON. How do you handle the fact that one part of the—

I am not sure Maryland does, however.

Mr. DELINSKI. No, it is illegal.

Ms. NORTON. Maryland does not.

Mr. HERRON. You have to have a permit issued by the Maryland State Police in order to carry a concealed weapon.

Ms. NORTON. So you can have one with a permit?

Mr. HERRON. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. It may require a permit, for that matter, in Virginia. But the point is you can conceal, carry, carry in many places in Virginia for sure.

Mr. DELINSKI. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. How does the Metro handle three jurisdictions, all with vast amounts of the Federal presence, who have their own quite different gun laws?

Mr. DELINSKI. It is complicated, to say the least. I mean, that is one of the reasons our recruits are selected through a vigorous background process. We go through three training academies. We are certified in all three States, as we refer to, the District of Columbia——

Ms. NORTON. So you have to know the laws, essentially, in all three States?

Mr. DELINSKI. We have to learn the laws in all three States, correct.
Ms. Norton. So you would, if we passed a whole new gun law in the District of Columbia, so new that it said, “You don’t have any more gun laws in the District of Columbia,” would you have to retrain every officer?

Mr. Delinski. All 450 sworn members we would have to retrain, yes.

Ms. Norton. Are you funded to retrain all sworn officers of the Metropolitan Transit Authority?

Mr. Delinski. There is currently no funding available for that now.

Ms. Norton. How would you handle bus travel? Do bus drivers assume any responsibility—they are not law enforcement officers—for people carrying weapons? How would they be expected to respond, when coming from two jurisdictions which do have their own local gun laws to a jurisdiction which has no gun laws whatsoever, the Nation’s capital?

Mr. Delinski. We ask our employees, particularly those on the buses and in the rail system, to be vigilant in observing suspicious behavior. And we ask that if they do see this type of activity, a concealed weapon or otherwise, that they report it to us immediately. We do not ask them to intervene or take any type of police action and to be very limited in their contact with any type of suspicious person.

Ms. Norton. Would such personnel, and in particular I am thinking about personnel who may see people who board the vehicle, such as a bus driver, would such personnel have to be retrained, as well, if there were no gun laws in the District of Columbia and they traveled on vehicles between the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions?

Mr. Delinski. Currently, there is no training in the law for other employees outside the police department.

Ms. Norton. So how do they know whether to call if there is a concealed weapon, for example?

Mr. Delinski. We ask them through public service announcements and also public awareness campaigns, internally and externally, to follow those procedures and not take any type of direct action and contact us and let us do that.

Ms. Norton. Mr. Herron, did you have something to add to that?

Mr. Herron. Yes, ma’am, if I may take this opportunity to speak briefly about the amendment.

Ms. Norton. Please.

Mr. Herron. As you know, I am the public safety director in Prince George’s County. As part of my responsibilities, I direct the police department and the fire department, the Department of Corrections.

Prior to my appointment as public safety director, I was a Maryland State trooper for 27 years, and I proudly served in several jurisdictions throughout the State of Maryland, including Prince George’s County. During my tenure, 13 of my colleagues were killed in the line of duty. Two of these colleagues were personal friends of mine, and they were killed at the hands of men who possessed illegal firearms. I personally was involved in a shooting where a man who attempted to take my life possessed a gun unlawfully.
If this legislation passes, Prince George's County currently would be in a situation where our crime would increase tremendously. Just recently, we announced a drop in crime that had reached an all-time low. It hadn't been this low in 20 years, and this is because of the work of our men and women of the police department and our citizens. During this fight to decrease crime, two of our police officers were killed in the line of duty, Sergeant Richard Findley and Sergeant Goggins. Sergeant Goggins was killed at the hands of a criminal who should not have been in possession of a handgun.

In the State of Maryland, we have gun straw purchases, where people can buy guns legally and then give those guns to somebody who should not possess them. With the enactment of this amendment in the District of Columbia, it will triple the straw purchases in the region. And I can tell you from experience from a local level that that would cause an increased amount of gun violence in Prince George's County and throughout the national capital region.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Herron, the testimony is important, especially your testimony concerning increase and, as you have been able to report, the recent decrease in gun violence in Prince George's County. The District had as many as 430, 440 homicides in the early 1990's, and it is down to something a little over 200 now. We cannot imagine how rapid or how savage would be the increase in gun violence if there were no gun laws in the District of Columbia at all. When everyone thinks of tight gun laws, all one has to imagine is a jurisdiction where there is none at all and you are left to your own devices.

Now, let me ask you, Mr. Herron, as a public safety officer, how would the absence of gun laws here in the District of Columbia complicate any evacuation activities? You have your own gun laws; we would have none. You could stockpile assault weapons. You could have any—you could have gone to Maryland, you could have gone to Virginia. Maybe when you are leaving you want to take your guns with you.

How would the presence of no gun laws, and therefore the accumulation of guns here, complicate evacuation and other activities associated with a natural or man-made disaster?

Mr. HERRON. I think the absence of gun laws, Madam Chair, would impair our efforts in the national capital region to keep our citizens safe. It is important that we have these layers of security, and the interdiction of illegal guns is one of those layers. If we are not able to control or we are in partnership with a jurisdiction that has no gun laws at all, it would definitely impede or impact not only evacuations but the safety of our citizens in the national capital region.

You asked a question about the training of police officers, additional resources. You know, currently, the Maryland State Police is responsible for registering handguns and the purchase of handguns. If, in fact, this burden would be put on the State of Maryland, I don't think the State of Maryland has the resources to be able to have to register handguns from another jurisdiction.

Ms. NORTON. Would guns be allowed in any of the shelters where you would receive people from other jurisdictions or from your own jurisdiction?
Mr. Herron. No guns would be allowed in any shelters unless you were a law enforcement officer.

Ms. Norton. Of course, particularly with interoperability, it might be hard for people to know that.

Mr. Herron. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. Norton. If any kind of event were to occur now.

General Schwartz. Similarly with the D.C. Armory, now that we have metal detectors on each of our entrances, we will be able to detect if any weapons would be coming into the building.

Ms. Norton. I wonder if—no, that maybe under Federal law.

Let me ask all four of you about layers. Again, this comes from testimony that we have received in hearings of the Homeland Security Committee, where the mythology of layers after layer after layer, local level, certain things happen there, certain things happen at the State, and the cumulative effects, if I may summarize it, is that you are able to provide security in a region as high-risk as this.

I would like to speak about layering and what would happen if one layer, namely gun laws in the District of Columbia, the Nation’s capital, were to disappear? Let’s start with Mr. Herron and go on down.

Mr. Herron. Madam Chair, I was present when you asked this question previously. I think that without a doubt that, if that layer was removed, it would impact homeland security in this region.

It is important to have layers. It is important to have collaboration and cooperation. It is important to know what happens in others’ jurisdictions about the sale and the purchase of guns and things of this nature.

I am very concerned, our county executive is very concerned about this pending amendment and how it is going to impact our citizens in Prince George’s County.

Ms. Norton. Major General Schwartz, you, of course, are perhaps most aware of the military-style weapons. I know that you have served in Iraq. I would like you to describe the notion of layering, which I understand goes on also on the ground when you are in a theater of war.

General Schwartz. Ma’am, first, to clear the record and get it straight, I was not in Iraq, but my troops were in Iraq.

But on the topic of layering, I think the first thing we have to do is the education of all citizens in this area so that they know the laws, so that they can assist the local authorities with this problem. If all citizens are fully aware of what the laws are, what the issues are—

Ms. Norton. But, you see, I am not at the citizen level. I am now asking for officers. I am trying to find out—I understand the citizen layer has to be aware. I am assuming that the citizen layer, by the way, is not aware. I am not going to assume what millions of people know. I am trying to find out about the layering provided by various authorities available to us.

General Schwartz. Yes, ma’am. And I think that, in the law enforcement arena, all layers are extremely important, and we cannot eliminate any of those layers. There would be a significant gap, and there the security and safety of the entire population will be at risk.
Ms. Norton. General Schwartz, if there had been no assault weapon ban in the District of Columbia at the time of the Inauguration, would that have complicated or affected the National Guard security that you were called upon to provide?

General Schwartz. Yes, ma’am, it would have affected the briefings that our men and women received before going out on their mission, especially in the Mall where there were no screening required for the large number of folks——

Ms. Norton. Well, please, let’s make that point clear. There was screening if you happened to be close in and to have a ticket. But if there were 2 million people on the Mall, surely a million and a half were completely unscreened individuals.

Go ahead, sir.

General Schwartz. Yes, ma’am. As a matter of fact, they all were unscreened. They would only be screened if they were going into the parade corridor or close to the Capitol.

So it was a concern. And we were very vigilant in making sure—and, as you hear earlier, we had mechanisms in place to conquer what may happen. And we were very fortunate that day that nothing happened.

Ms. Norton. Mr. Delinski, going on down the line.

Mr. Delinski. One of the things that we pride ourselves on at WMATA is our very low crime rate. The chances of someone being a victim of a Part 1 crime in the system, meaning one of the more serious crimes—rape, robbery, homicides, and so forth—are very low. Chances of being a victim of one of those Part 1 crimes is less than three per every million riders that we have on a regular daily basis.

So if suddenly there is this influx of weapons that maybe this bill may bring about, you would certainly expect that we would see an increase of guns in the Metrorail system, which you can go down the road through this process and say may equate to a higher level of crime.

Mr. Delinski. Also, we have a very open system at Metro. We do not have security points in place like airports——

Ms. Norton. No screening whatsoever to get onto——

Mr. Delinski. We have approval for random bag checks at station entrances. However, it is under conditions of higher alert levels or significant threat against a system. So they are not out there every single day.

We don’t have this airport-type screening of everyone who is coming into our system. So I think, with this amendment being passed, or if it would be passed, you would certainly expect that our vulnerability would increase as a result.

Ms. Norton. I must compliment the Metro for apparently receiving endless numbers of new riders. You have become the most popular ticket in town. And you have kept a low crime rate.

Of course, more people, more risk. And you are finding all kinds of people, including Federal officials who decide they are going to pass up that ride and just get on a Metro and get here. So that has increased, as well, we know for a fact.

Finally, Chief Nichols?

Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma’am, within our jurisdiction, we use a concept that allows us to identify threats the furthest point that we
can. Our goal is to detect, deter, respond to a threat, defeat that threat, and then mitigate the results of what that threat brought to our jurisdiction.

Those principles have to interplay well with each other. And, as you know, we are in the middle of this city, so we are not an island. Things that occur just on the other side of the street from us, even though it may be legal in that jurisdiction, especially with regard to weapons, doesn’t diminish the concern that we have within our jurisdiction about a potential incoming threat.

So it is a very significant issue; it has to interplay with each other. And we do take the layers of security and the concentric rings of security very seriously.

Ms. NORTON. The testimony of all four of you has been quite indispensable to this hearing. We are trying to get a sense of the threats to the region. We are trying to understand evacuation. We are trying to understand what happened, of course, at the inauguration.

And even given the criticism, I want to take this opportunity to commend each and every one of you for a stellar performance. We didn’t expect perfection; we didn’t get it. Perhaps we didn’t expect the Third Street Tunnel, but we should have expected there would be something like that.

I don’t know how Metro was able to absorb all of these people. It isn’t as if you had any idea how many you were supposed to absorb.

I do want to say for the record that, when it became clear that Metro had done all it could, I asked Mr. Catoe to come see me to do even more, so that the subways would be kept open beyond what he had already agreed to do without additional resources.

I want you to know this is one Member—I think I have my whole region with me—going to try to get those additional resources for what was a Herculean job Metro did. There just would have been no inauguration, let’s face it, without Metro. We would have been sitting here by ourselves, telling the President, “It is 12 o’clock now. Metro has broken down, so nobody has come.” That is just how indispensable Metro has been.

And the reason people felt so safe, despite the crowds, was precisely because of the job each and every one of you did during that time. I regard it as an unplanned event. Sure, there was planning, and, sure, most of the planning worked. But I think it is most valuable because of what you could not possibly have planned for.

So I want to take this opportunity, even given my questioning, to thank all of you for the work you did then and especially for your testimony concerning a brand-new threat that none of you could have contemplated and that may be upon us. I thank you very much.

And I am going to now call the next panel. I am going to ask the—because we have run past where some of you I know expected, I am going to ask all of you who have not testified—Mr. Sarubbi, Mr. Wall, Mr. DeAtley, Ms. Mathes—to come forward at this time. I apologize for the time it has taken.

The purpose of this hearing was to get on the record what Members of Congress do not know. No one has read the bill. People were about to vote blindly against the security that we have spent
billions of dollars to protect. At least no one will be able to say that they did not know, if they approve the Ensign amendment.

And we are very pleased to hear from Jonathan Sarubbi, the regional administrator of FEMA, where the Office of National Capital Region is located; from Kenneth Wall, the acting director of that office, which is also in FEMA; from Craig DeAtley, director of the Institute for Public Health Emergency Response, ER One, and Washington Hospital Center; and, finally, from Linda Mathes, who is the president and CEO of the American Red Cross.

Could I ask you to testify in that order?

Mr. Sarubbi?

TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN SARUBBI, REGION III ADMINISTRATOR, FEMA; KENNETH WALL, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, FEMA; CRAIG DEATLEY, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE; LINDA MATHES, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AMERICAN RED CROSS OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA

Mr. Sarubbi. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman. I am Jonathan Sarubbi, the regional administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region III, based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss today's hearing topic, "Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region: Experiences, Capabilities, and Weaknesses," and to answer your questions.

I am joined today by my colleague, Kenneth Wall, acting director of FEMA's Office of National Capital Region Coordination.

In my position as regional administrator for Region III, I oversee FEMA's all-hazard preparedness and emergency management efforts in Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Region III works with our partners in the regional, State, and local levels to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate against man-made and natural disasters.

The regional office is composed of experts in four distinct areas that provide support in our mission, and they are preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. As a part of our mission, Region III plays a vital role in the event that a Federal disaster declaration is issued for our region, including assisting in the development of preliminary damage reports and providing support for public assistance grants and individual assistance grants.

Let me address a number of specific points of interest to the Committee.

We partner closely with our colleagues in the Office of National Capital Region Coordination. This partnership includes areas of risk assessment to support decision-making, participating in drills and exercises, and the coordination in response to incidents in the national capital region. Should a natural disaster occur in the national capital region, FEMA Region III coordinates disaster response and recovery under the guidance of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

In accordance with the national response framework, disasters are managed locally. Within the national response framework, FEMA Region III provides direct support to Virginia, Maryland,
and the District, including assistance with evacuations, sheltering, and other unmet needs. Each State and the District maintains sovereign authority and receives support in disaster funding from FEMA Region III independently. The Stafford Act directs that the District be treated as any of our 50 States. The Stafford Act also equates the position of mayor with that of a State Governor, and he or she would act accordingly for the purpose of asking for Federal disaster assistance.

During an incident within the District, local first responders establish command of the incident and manage the response. FEMA Region III monitors the incident, assesses District needs, and provides assistance upon request to the mayor and approval of the President.

On the issue of mass care, the District’s Department of Human Services has the lead for Emergency Support Function Six. This entity would be responsible for shelter or feeding operations within the District. The American Red Cross of the National Capital Area supports the District’s Department of Human Services by providing sheltering management teams while Serve D.C. Augments with further volunteer support upon request. In addition, the District Department of Health utilizes the Medical Reserve Corps and works in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services to support any medical needs.

With regard to the Capitol grounds, we are not aware of any formal agreement between the legislative and executive branches to address disasters on the Capitol grounds. In the event of a localized incident, such as a fire or severe storm, the local jurisdiction response would normally address the response. The Capitol Police would be the first to respond to an incident on the Capitol grounds and, as the incident commander, coordinate with other response agencies as necessary. This is in line with the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework.

For a larger event, such as a major hurricane, where there is a Stafford Act declaration, any Capitol grounds issues could be coordinated through the Unified Coordination Group within the Joint Field Office. The Joint Field Office coordinates the delivery of Federal assistance and funds to the District of Columbia.

In conclusion, our disaster capacity in the national capital region is robust. Through working with the Office of National Capital Region, State, Federal, and local entities, Region III is prepared to provide the support necessary in the event of a disaster in the national capital region. The experiences we have had with disasters in this region, a refinement of our capabilities, and lessons learned have Region III properly prepared to respond to a disaster in our region and specifically in the capital area.

I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much.

We will go on to Mr. Wall now, the Office of National Capital Region Coordination.

Mr. WALL. Good afternoon, Madam Chair. I am Ken Wall, acting director of the Office of National Capital Region Coordination, which is now part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. And I appreciate your invitation to join my colleagues Jon Sarubbi,
Craig DeAtley, and Linda Mathes in appearing before the Subcommittee today.

As you mentioned in your opening statement, due to the unique nature of the national capital region, Congress established the Office of National Capital Region to coordinate Federal, State, local, and regional authorities for the purpose of enhancing preparedness in the national capital region.

We do this by working closely with our regional partners, an example of which is our engagement with the National Capital Region Senior Policy Group, which is comprised of the homeland security advisors and chief emergency managers of Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, who represent their chief executives and jurisdictions. I am a member of the Senior Policy Group, representing the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The Senior Policy Group plays a key role in sustaining a coordinated regional approach to homeland security and strengthening integrated decision-making and planning. This is just one example of the engagement of the Office of National Capital Region Coordination. We also work closely with other National Capital Region stakeholders and partners, to include the local chief administrative officials, public health officials, first responders, emergency managers, leaders from the private sector and nonprofit communities, and many other Federal, State, local, and regional officials.

Working with our National Capital Region partners, the office provides support and build in capacity to respond to an incident in a coordinated fashion. For example, the Office of National Capital Region Coordination and other Senior Policy Group members developed the “First-Hour Checklist” for the National Capital Region to guide coordinated leadership decisions and actions during the initial response to an incident in the National Capital Region.

Significant strides have also been made with regards to interoperability, as well as risk analysis to support decision-making by NCR leaders. Additionally, the Office of National Capital Region Coordination plans, leads, or participates with regional partners in exercise and drills and events that occur frequently in the National Capital Region. These efforts bolster regional information-sharing and integrated planning.

During response to a natural disaster, the office is able to support Region III and the Federal coordinating officer. For example, we provide enhanced situational awareness, assist in the coordination with national capital region partners, and deploy agency representatives to National Capital Region Operation Centers, where needed, to augment FEMA and Region III’s capability.

The Office of National Capital Region Coordination’s activities allow us to contribute to FEMA’s broader efforts to improve and maintain relationships with State and local partners, toward the end of working well together in the event of another natural disaster.

I look forward to addressing any questions you may have.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. DeAtley?

Mr. DeATLEY. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I previously submitted my written testimony but appreciate, in particular, the opportunity to share some
concise remarks and have brought one additional document that I would request, if possible, to be added to the record.

I would like to begin my comments today by noting that, in the context of remarks that have been made prior to mine, I think it is important to keep in mind that when laws are broken and weapons are used to inflict harm, oftentimes the victims of that crime end up in a trauma center such as the Washington Hospital Center. I think it is also important to keep in mind, too, that hospitals and, as we saw last weekend, even nursing homes can become the actual site of that violence.

When talking about disaster capacity, given the current climate for change in our health care system, I think it is also important to keep in mind that no meaningful change can occur in our system at present that does not include expanding the support given to emergency preparedness both for our hospitals in the national capital region and across this Nation, as well as for all other members of the health care system.

Since 2002, I have been one of two people responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness at the Washington Hospital Center, more recently at the National Rehabilitation Hospital, as well as for MedStar Health, the parent company for both of these facilities. Prior to that time, I spent 29 years at George Washington University, where I had similar responsibilities.

The Washington Hospital Center recognizes that, as the largest hospital in the national capital region, home of the busiest trauma center, emergency department, and only adult burn unit, we have special responsibility in the area of emergency preparedness.

Since 1999, with the inception of the project ER One, a unique federally funded project to develop an all-hazards, all-risks-ready health care facility, the Washington Hospital Center has undertaken a number of important initiatives to improve our state of readiness. These include, but are not limited to, introducing an innovative facility design to maximize capacity, capability, and protection, as well as building a state-of-the-art ready room to take care of victims from mass casualty incidents from natural as well as man-made causes.

The Washington Hospital Center took the lead in writing and obtaining, on behalf of a broad-based District of Columbia health care coalition, one of five nationally awarded $5 million Department of Health and Human Services coalition partnership grants. The purpose of this grant is to improve the emergency preparedness of the entire District of Columbia health care system. The Washington Hospital Center is privileged to be administering that Federal grant.

I think it is important to note that the health care facilities occupy a unique position in the emergency response framework. If you look at the big six—police, fire, EMS, hospitals, public health, and emergency management—hospitals are the only ones that are privately funded. The work we need to do to become and stay prepared and ready to respond to a major disaster must be funded from clinical care or else be supported by government grants and other forms of assistance.

In December 2007, in response to a recognized problem of a siloed and fragmented health care system in the District of Colum-
比亚和作为结果，$5000万HHS拨款，哥伦比亚特区紧急医疗系统联盟被成立，以创建一个更综合和合作的方案准备和响应，一个结合了健康领域的所有方面的健康系统。该哥伦比亚特区紧急医疗系统联盟，现在包括了哥伦比亚特区所有政府机构与卫生设施，与所有的私营健康系统在一个我们的首都。

在18个月中，联盟的紧急事务委员会和相关工作小组，已经完成了一个史无前例的脆弱性分析，为健康系统，写下了一个紧急事务计划，及有关的沟通说明和公共信息官员的角色。并很快就会有关健康设施疏散的模板，也能。我们已经扩大了医院的互助援助广播系统，并增加了其他的参与者。

我们正在解决家庭重聚问题，也就是说，在大规模的灾难中，如何确定亲朋好友和他们的亲人被送往了哪家医院？很快，城市中七个最繁忙的急诊部门，就能够在灾难期间，实时共享病人登记数据与哥伦比亚特区卫生部。这是一个了不起的成就，这在我们国家，很少有其他的城市能够做到。

联盟还聘用了一个顾问，来对八个医院进行安全风险评估，并完成了华盛顿医院中心校园的设计研讨会，这是一个被标识为24个关键基础设施之一。

我们也意识到，大规模的灾难，不尊重政治的或地理的边界。我们需要并且一直在加强与我们同事，来自马里兰和弗吉尼亚的合作。

尽管有显著的改进和进展，我提到的，还有很多医院，个人和联盟自身，共同面临的需要和问题。例如：华盛顿医院中心，仍然在寻求$120万，来建设我们的ER One设施，提供扩大的和足够的容量和能力，来提供紧急医疗，到哥伦比亚特区的人，以及为应急医疗设计，优化每天的运作和高后果事件。联盟的资助将在2009年9月结束，没有联邦资金的后续计划。我们需要持续的资金，来完成剩下的工作。

最后，需要在州和联邦资金的规章中作出改变。目前，医院是不允许根据《Stafford法案》，和其他选择的联邦，州和地方的灾难规章，来接收灾难资金。例如，全国首都地区，医院在2009年1月的就职典礼期间，发生了数以百万计的费用和损失收入，与补充性工资和取消的急诊程序相关。我们需要持续的资金，来支付我们的额外工作。

和最后，需要在州和联邦资金的规章中作出改变。目前，医院是不允许根据《Stafford法案》，和其他选择的联邦，州，和地方的灾难规章，来接收灾难资金。在就职典礼期间，例如，医院在地区，全国首都地区，发生了数以百万计的费用和损失收入，与补充性工资和取消的急诊程序相关。我们需要持续的资金，来支付我们的额外工作。
dures, but were told by FEMA that we are not eligible for relief funding, despite there being a presidential declaration. The fear that some of us has is the disaster within the disaster. uncompensated expenses related to our response will bankrupt a hospital such as my own because we are operating on a 1 to 2 percent operating margin.

Since 9/11 and especially over the past 18 months, the health care system in our Nation’s capital has made significant improvement in emergency preparedness. And the Washington Hospital Center feels privileged and pleased to have played a role in facilitating some of these improvements. But much more needs to be done.

I would be glad to answer any subsequent questions that you have.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. DeAtley.

Now Ms. Mathes?

Ms. MATHES. Chairwoman Norton, thank you for inviting me to participate on this important panel with these great colleagues. I am Linda Mathes. I am CEO of your American Red Cross in the national capital region. I am absolutely honored to represent the American Red Cross in the District of Columbia and, in Virginia, Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax County, Prince William and Loudoun Counties, and, in Maryland, Prince George’s County and Montgomery County, Maryland, and all the cities within these counties.

With your permission, I would like to submit the entire written testimony and simply highlight right now a few key comments, major themes in the testimony.

First, a little bit about the background of the role and the experience and the capacity of the American Red Cross in this region. For more than 125 years, our Nation has relied on the American Red Cross in times of disaster to help provide shelter, food, clothing, emotional and other support. We also supply nearly half the Nation’s blood, and we teach literally hundreds of thousands of people in life-saving and emergency preparedness skills. In addition, we support the men and women of the military and their families.

In this community, we have been engaging the community in carrying out this mission and delivering these services for over 104 years. Our mission is to provide relief to the victims of disasters and help people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. We carry this mission out absolutely every day, responding typically every day to some two to four disasters, typically fires in this community, like the three we responded to this Saturday. We assisted some 33 people, spent about $8,000 providing for food and clothing and health and medical supplies and mental and emotional support that is needed.

While responding to these everyday local disasters, we also respond to the larger periodic disasters that have been mentioned today—hurricanes, floods, tornadoes—and those odd ones like the sniper attack, the anthrax attack, the terrorist attack. While responding to these, we are always preparing for the next major, large disaster that could occur. In addition, our local Red Cross has a unique opportunity to work with community officials in preparing for and responding to national special security events, like the
presidential inauguration or memorial openings or presidential funerals.

Our typical role and the one that is built into local and county plans and even the National Response Framework is largely mass care, human care, providing the feeding and the sheltering and the bulk distribution of critical supplies.

To carry out all these services, we rely on a network of thousands of volunteers. We have thousands of volunteers in this area and about a thousand who are dedicated to helping us with disaster work. We manage large numbers of spontaneous volunteers, as well. The example of the thousands of people who were displaced by Katrina coming into our community. There were some 7,000 evacuees who came into our community. We mobilized some 2,000 volunteers to help us here, and we deployed some 2,000 to help along the Gulf Coast.

We rely on partnerships and collaboration with dozens of public and private and nonprofit partners to recruit volunteers and carry out these services. Partnerships with faith-based organizations, with organizations like 100 Black Men, the Nonprofit Roundtable, Salvation Army, Catholic Charities. We work with the Board of Trade and the Council of Governments.

We also rely on having ready access to equipment and supplies to enable us to shelter and feed thousands of people, particularly critical during those first 72 hours up to a week. Our model for disaster services is collaborative, diverse, inclusive. This is truly all about neighbors helping neighbors.

We have increased our capacity significantly over the past several years. We have focused on increasing preparedness of Red Cross chapters throughout the area, increasing the preparedness of families and businesses throughout the region. And we have done you this through a variety of education and training programs. We train, in the course of a given year, typically over 100,000 people in important life-saving and emergency preparedness skills.

We focus on extending our outreach, again, through dozens of public and private and nonprofit partnerships. We play the leadership role with the Nonprofit Roundtable and at the seat with the Council of Governments on the Emergency Preparedness Council with the Regional Human Services Working Group. We co-chair the Nonprofit Emergency Preparedness Task Force. We reach out to networks of networks to engage our partners and colleagues.

Within the region, we have developed region-wide plans to mobilize Red Cross resources throughout the region wherever they are needed. We have been fortunate to receive UASI funding—UASI has been mentioned several times today—to be able to increase our critical supply of cots and blankets and comfort kits, the kinds of essential supplies we need to shelter and feed thousands of people at any time. We have also been fortunate in acquiring charitable dollars and private sponsorships that has enabled us to open up a Regional Disaster Coordination Center to facilitate coordination and communication throughout the region.

Three remaining key points: First, we have a plan in place, and we have experience implementing it. We test it, we drill it, we learn from our experiences and update our plans. Secondly, we
have made great progress. And this is largely due to the kind of collaboration and partnerships each of us has spoken about today.

Thirdly, as much progress has we have had, there is much progress yet to be had. Some key areas for further strengthening are: first, volunteers. Well, we have thousands of volunteers, and they are the backbone of the American Red Cross. We need more. We need people to step up to the plate and get training before the next disaster occurs.

Secondly, and this has been mentioned today too, the importance of more families taking seriously the development of personal and family emergency preparedness plans, taking those few basic, core actions to prepare themselves and their families for emergencies. We urge more attention and more leadership to encouraging families to do this.

Thirdly, supplies. We have the ability, we have ready access to the kind of supplies that would enable us to shelter some 15,000 people tonight. We have the ability to feed more than twice that many. We need more supplies. We need more supplies that would enable us to take care of people with special needs and disabilities. We have some; we need more.

And, lastly, we need the kind of warehouse and storage space to store these supplies, and, again, on both sides of the river.

In conclusion, Madam Chairwoman, I am confident that we are more prepared now as a local community, a region, and a nation, more prepared than we ever have been. We have made great progress. You can count on your American Red Cross to do everything we can to work with you to help the families in this community and the businesses and the community in general be as prepared as we can possibly be for excellent response.

Thank you.

Ms. Norton. Well, thank you, Ms. Mathes. I should thank you for your continuing really indispensable activities here in the District of Columbia all the time, always available.

Mr. Sarubbi and Mr. Wall, you heard the testimony, I presume, concerning interoperability. Were you aware of this interoperability? And to what extent is this region-wide interoperability?

Mr. Wall. I would like to address that.

We were aware that there are legacy systems that exist still in the National Capital Region——

Ms. Norton. Well, Mr. Wall, let me ask you, before you go any further, how much money have you received, you the region—as a region, our money comes straight to you first off—how much money have you received from the Federal Government since 9/11?

Mr. Wall. The National Capital Region, through the Urban Area Security Initiative grant, has received about $335 million since, I believe, the first round in 2003.

Ms. Norton. Now, of that, how much money has gone to systems for interoperability?

Mr. Wall. Specifically for voice interoperability radio systems, I believe Chief Delinski mentioned the radio cache. We have 1,250 radios positioned around the region for catastrophic events to provide some of that interoperability. About $5.5 million has gone for the purchase of those radios to maintain——
Ms. Norton. So who is interoperable on what you are describing there as various devices?

Mr. Wall. The caches that I am describing were purchased by the region to assist with the jurisdictions that aren’t in a full operational state right now, including Federal responders, such as Capitol Police, as the chief mentioned, and other local jurisdictions.

In addition to that, I believe about $6 million from the regional Urban Area money was also provided in support of Prince George’s County, to help them with their interoperability challenge as well.

Ms. Norton. Mr. Wall, is there any plan to have a—first of all, I appreciate what you have done to fill in the blanks there. But in light of the fact that even the Capitol Police can’t talk with the D.C. Police, have any funds been set aside? Are we in the process of making the national capital region interoperable one with another?

Mr. Wall. Yes, ma’am, I believe we are. I think we are taking aggressive steps to do that.

And one thing that I would like to raise, just so we have in context the state of interoperability, the Department of Homeland Security a couple years ago went to urban areas around the country and did an interoperability test. And the national capital region was one of a handful of jurisdictions that received the highest marks for tactical-level voice interoperability.

So, in terms of where we are with the rest of the Nation, through the systems that we have in place, both legacy systems, both in systems that connect legacy systems to other systems, you know, we do have that tactical voice interoperability.

Ms. Norton. Mr. Wall, I think you have done exactly the right thing, given what, I take it, is a much larger expense for complete interoperability. I must start, though, from the hit on the Pentagon. From the description, I believe it was the chief or Mr. Herron, of how they had to just hand out whatever they had then.

And I must ask then, therefore, is there a plan and has any money been set aside to make the National Capital Region, where the bulk of the Federal presence is located, fully interoperable, quite apart from what you have? It seems to me done quite well to fill in the gaps pending what I still haven’t heard. Is there a plan to make the region fully interoperable?

Mr. Wall. I will say, yes, there is a plan, but understanding that, when we are talking interoperability in the National Capital Region, we have resources that are available to our State and local responders. And that process has worked very well. We have put a lot of resources into that——

Ms. Norton. So the money that went to State and locals they have tried to use for that purpose. What would it take for all of them to be a part of an interoperable system so that you wouldn’t need little radios and the rest that you have already done to, in fact, make it possible to talk among yourselves?

Mr. Wall. I am sorry, I am not sure I——

Ms. Norton. What would it take, either in terms of logistics or funds, to go beyond what you have done since 9/11?

Mr. Wall. It would take some resources for some Federal responders so they can come up to the same level of capability that our State——
Ms. Norton. Are you satisfied that if there were an event, with what you have been able to do—and I commend you for what you have been able to do—that there would be secure systems, that you could talk one to the other, today?

Mr. Wall. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. Norton. Who owns those radios or other devices you are speaking about?

Mr. Wall. The devices that I am speaking about and the radio caches are owned by the region, if you will. They were bought with regional funds. They are managed by Fairfax County, Montgomery County, and the District of Columbia. So they maintain the radios, they program the radios, they deploy the radios.

Ms. Norton. If your testimony is that you are satisfied that the devices of various kinds that you now have on the ground are secure and interoperable, why do we need interoperability at all? Or do we? Perhaps you are testifying we don’t need interoperability.

Mr. Wall. No, ma’am, I am not testifying that we don’t need interoperability. And to the point made on the earlier panel, I think there are steps that we still can achieve to increase our interoperability.

What I am saying is we have a baseline of capability today that was developed by the region, by the public safety folks in the region, the decision process up through their chief executives, that size what we have now and the capability and the plan so that we have, today, interoperable communications.

Ms. Norton. All right. Are you satisfied with what Chief Nichols and the chief of police of the District of Columbia have on the ground in terms of the way they do interoperability?

Mr. Wall. I can’t speak specifically to the state of the Capitol Police, so I would have to get back to you.

Ms. Norton. I ask you about that because it is a real-life example. We have very few real-life examples, and that was a tremendous success. But here is an in-time example of no interoperability when we had more people in the District of Columbia than at any time in the history of the Nation’s capital.

So when you say we have these devices on the ground, you would have expected, of all the time they would have been working, during the inauguration. So I am left to understand how that could have occurred, that even Capitol Police at one end of the tunnel didn’t know that other police had, in fact, funneled people through the tunnel, and others were completely in the dark, including the commander of all of the forces, the military forces, who were here.
So I am not yet understanding interoperability with these devices that you have on the ground.

Could it happen again? I guess since you say, “Hey, we have got these devices,” what is to keep that from happening tomorrow if, in fact, we have people in the Third Street Tunnel?

Mr. WALL. I would say, my understanding of exactly what happened is very limited, that there is—I think the takeaway from——

Ms. NORTON. The only reason I press you, Mr. Wall, is that you have testified that what you now have is secure—and you haven’t even said you have requested full interoperability—is secure and does, in fact, give you the ability to operate as you are supposed to operate.

It is only in light of that question that I am putting these questions before you. Because I have this real-life example that I have to account for. And I have the fact that this could happen again, and I don’t have any way to know what I, as a Member of Congress, should be doing, what I should be asking for, and the like.

Mr. WALL. I am not——

Ms. NORTON. Maybe Mr. Sarubbi, your superior, has some ideas. I need to know, could this happen tomorrow? Are you satisfied with what is on the ground? This is the national capital region. We have a real-life example from 9/11 of 2 million people here, thousands stuck in the tunnel.

And Mr. Wall has put together the best he can with the money he has had. And I want to know why that didn’t work during the inauguration and thousands of people were stuck in a tunnel.

Mr. SARUBBI. Well, our role in FEMA is to prepare first responders to respond to a disaster, and also to assist them in responding to a disaster by providing direct Federal assistance, as well as funding. So I think the questions that you are asking are perhaps a little bit outside my purview, in terms of——

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Wall reports to you, sir. This is an office in FEMA. We set up a special office. First it was located just in the office; then they moved it on to FEMA.

Now, Mr. Wall is only a coordinator. He has coordinated, it sounds to me, as best he can. And yet he is unable to tell me whether or not, if you had people stuck in the Third Street Tunnel, the system he has put in place would work interoperably so that people at one end of the tunnel would know what people at the other end of the tunnel were doing.

Therefore, I don’t know what to ask Congress to do, what to tell my colleagues. I am left here with no answer. Somebody has to tell me what to do so there is not another Third Street Tunnel event.

Mr. WALL. Madam Chair, if I might just—I, perhaps, gave a bad description of what my role is and led to some sort of misunderstanding.

The interoperable communications that I was talking about funded through the Urban Area is State and local capability based on State and local decisions and plans. We, as a coordinator, support that process and make sure that the Federal, State, and local people are part of that process and have awareness into it.

But I don’t have—it is not the role of the office to put in place an operable communication for an event such as the inauguration.
Ms. Norton. No, I understand the difference between an operations office and a coordinator. But you are the coordinator. You are the only ones who know—who are supposed to know what is at one end of the tunnel and what is at the other so you can tell the others what it is they have to do.

Mr. Wall. Well, I think that assumes that we have a tactical-level operational role, which our office does not.

Ms. Norton. So do we have a void there? Nobody knew what was happening in the tunnel, and nobody is able to tell me who should have known or what we should do about it.

Could I ask you to do this, Mr. Wall?

Mr. Wall. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. Norton. I have no complaint about what you have done, given the resources available to you. I have had to sit here and listen to the chief of the Capitol Police say he can't even talk to the chief of the largest police office in his very jurisdiction, that is to say the District of Columbia. Then, upon further examination of witnesses, they say they can't talk either.

And yet you have testified that you have these devices that enable people to talk; they are fairly secure. But you have not been able to tell me that there have been conversations that tell you that these devices enable you to be interoperable in the Third Street Tunnel again, should an event occur there. I have to assume an event will occur there. It is not my job to assume that this is the last event in the Third Street Tunnel or some other tunnel. We have nothing but tunnels in the District of Columbia.

It is my obligation to ask you to meet with the members of the region to discuss interoperability and, within 30 days, indicate to us whether or not you believe, in the event of an event in the tunnel or, for that matter, in WMATA, which is also in essence a tunnel, whether you could communicate, one to the other, and what it is, regardless as a request for funds, but what it is you would need in order that police even in the same district, the District of Columbia, can talk to one another and certainly across the district.

We are not going to be sitting up here having another event and people didn't even tell us what to do, or another Third Street event and we weren't even warned that you were not interoperable. That is why we feel so strongly. I lost three schoolchildren, among other residents, among these 184 people.

And we need more information on interoperability so that, in my role as a Member of the Homeland Security Committee, in my role as Chair of this Committee, which has the major jurisdiction over FEMA, I can know what it is to tell my colleagues is needed.

Now, Mr. DeAtley, you testified that, under the Stafford Act, the hospitals weren't even—some of them weren't even eligible to be reimbursed. Now, first of all, I am told—if we ask you this question to precede it. What hospitals in the District of Columbia are for-profit, and what hospitals remain nonprofit? Are you aware of that?

Mr. DeAtley. Generally speaking, yes, ma'am. The three for-profit facilities that I am personally familiar with are George Washington University and the specialty hospitals of Hadley and Capitol Hill. And, actually, I think there is a fourth; that would be United Regional.

The remaining facilities——
Ms. Norton. You said United Regional. That is Greater Southeast?

Mr. DeAtley. Old Greater Southeast, yes, ma’am.

Ms. Norton. How about Metropolitan Hospital Center?

Mr. DeAtley. The Washington Hospital Center is a not-for-profit. NRH is a not-for-profit. Those other facilities in the system, if you will, which number now, I believe, about eight others, are all not-for-profit, is my understanding.

Ms. Norton. Mr. DeAtley, I have been informed by staff that one of the reasons—and this is an absurdity. This is why people need to tell us and why I am pressing Mr. Wall and Mr. Sarubbi to get us the appropriate information. I am told that the Stafford Act provides funding for nonprofits. Isn’t that ridiculous? I mean for nonprofits only.

For at least 50 years, you have had hospitals turning from nonprofit to for-profit. Here we have some of the biggest hospitals in the District of Columbia now for-profit. And I am sitting up here with a major jurisdiction over the Stafford Act not even knowing that I should have requested a change in the Stafford Act to request a change in medical funding and medical operations today where they are often owned, even if they are connected with a university, by a for-profit entity.

And I do want to thank you for that testimony, because it is another one of the absurdities of how easy it is for the bureaucrats to simply answer, when you ask for funding, “Sorry, we only fund for-profit,” without coming and telling us about that. Any Member of Congress will today have for-profit hospitals that yesterday were nonprofit.

So forgive me for not knowing that. And that is a change I expect to request in the Stafford Act upon finding more information about it.

Ms. Mathes, as I am aware of the extent which you are dependent upon volunteers, I need to know how many of your thousands of volunteers live in the District of Columbia.

Ms. Mathes. We will be happy to follow up with you to give you some precise numbers. The figures I quoted to you, several thousand volunteers who work with us in this region, that figure can be broken down according to how many are in the District and how many are in other parts of the region. If you would permit me, I would like to follow up and give you that level of detail.

Ms. Norton. I am aware that there is great generosity in sharing volunteers across regional lines. But I would, in the event of an event, getting to the District, if you were a volunteer who resided in the region, might be difficult. And your own people might be asking you to give aid first and foremost there.

So we really do need to know the breakdown of these volunteers. I would like it for the District of Columbia, Montgomery County, and Prince George’s County and the other regions in the national capital region, if you will.

Have you had any mock exercise here, either for evacuation or any other event, Ms. Mathes?

Ms. Mathes. We have participated in numerous exercises with our colleagues at the table and colleagues around the region, exercises and drills in the District and elsewhere.
Ms. Norton. Any involving evacuation?

Ms. Mathes. I would like to—typically, the exercises and drills involve a particular type of incident. I would like to get back to you on a precise answer regarding if any of them have regarded evacuation.

Ms. Norton. One of the things I am most interested in, Ms. Mathes, is whether, in the event of an evacuation, absent some kind of event with gases so noxious that they were being released all over the District of Columbia, one could imagine a situation where instead of evacuating to Prince George’s County, which has limited capacity as you heard in prior testimony, one might evacuate to other sheltering places in the District of Columbia, such as the Armory, such as large places such as the Verizon Center and the rest.

Are those places considered places for evacuation? In other words, for sheltering within the District of Columbia, what would those places be, please?

Ms. Mathes. We have identified quite a few shelter locations in the District of Columbia and elsewhere. They are typically schools, some churches, some other organizations. We have identified some 56,000 spaces, again throughout the region, but I can follow up with you to provide a specific number of those within the District of Columbia.

We have surveyed them to make sure that they meet some basic criteria for being able to accommodate the immediate and emergency needs of people.

Ms. Norton. We would very much appreciate those numbers.

Mr. Sarubbi and Mr. Wall, have there been any discussions within the region of differences in gun laws and capacity in the event of a gun event in this city or region?

Mr. Sarubbi. Again, Madam Chairman, our role within FEMA is to provide support to our State and local partners—

Ms. Norton. All right, then let me ask Mr. Wall, since he is the coordinator.

Have you assumed, Mr. Wall, that all have different gun laws, and yet if there were a spraying, such as of a motorcade where dignitaries traveled daily, or an event involving guns, have you assumed that there are different gun laws in how you would handle such an event? Have there at least been discussions on a coordinating level of that kind?

Mr. Wall. I have not been involved in any conversation of—

Ms. Norton. How would those discussions have occurred, sir, if they occurred at all? If not within an office whose job it is to do coordination, where and with what form would they have occurred?

Mr. Wall. As I said, I am not aware of discussions that have occurred—


Mr. Wall. There are forums, as mentioned before, at the Metropolitan Washington Council of Government, where chiefs of police and our law enforcement folks from the region get together and talk about law enforcement issues. I would imagine that such a discussion would happen in one of those forums.

Ms. Norton. As a coordinator, I would ask that, if such discussions occur, you be informed of them so that you can know that
such a—I mean, it is hard to understand what the role of a coordinator is if not to at least understand what is being discussed among the various parties he coordinates.

Mr. WALL. Yes, ma’am. And we do have representatives in each of those meetings. And what I am saying is, to my knowledge, the specific discussion that you mentioned has not occurred.

Ms. NORTON. In light of the fact that the testimony here has been that a gun attack would be more likely than any other attack in the District of Columbia today given risk analysis, could I ask that you assure this Subcommittee that such discussions do, in fact, occur?

Mr. WALL. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. I appreciate it.

Mr. DeAtley, ER One has been a major concern to me. It would be the only system capable of receiving people who were contaminated and of decontaminating them in large numbers.

You have apparently received some funds, some $5 million from HHS to improve emergency preparedness. Were any of these related to the so-called ER One, which would, of course, be a demonstration project but would also be such a facility here in the District of Columbia to handle contamination of people in the region?

Mr. DeATLEY. No, ma’am. The coalition’s focus primarily has been across the spectrum over the health care facilities.

$100,000 of the $5 million is being spent on developing what we refer to as the ceiling membrane concept. That would be studying the airflow using a revised filter or ceiling tile being strategically in rooms that would isolate and contain contagions, if you will.

But that is a concept development. The rest of the money is going to a broader coalition set of deliverables than decontamination.

Ms. NORTON. So most of the money to decontaminate people, for example—you are the closest hospital or one of the closest hospitals straight up the way from the Congress, from the Supreme Court. Most of the money to do decontamination, if there was contamination, for example, some kind of contamination got set loose in the Capitol or in the Supreme Court or in the White House, you do not have the funds presently to decontaminate individuals, officials, residents, and the like?

Mr. DeATLEY. All of the hospitals in the District of Columbia and the national capital region, including the Hospital Center, have spent their own moneys to a point in building their current capacity. That initial outlay of funding and its sustainment cost has been supplemented periodically by other sources of funding, including a grant which is currently in place to focus just on mass decontamination where hospitals and hazardous material team personnel are working together to do a gap analysis—that has been completed—to purchase equipment to fill the gap and, once that equipment arrives, to initiate training to use that equipment so there can be a greater sharing.

That all having been said, additional funding support would be keenly appreciated by hospitals, especially to sustain, if not to expand, our current capability.
Ms. Norton. Well, as important as it is, indeed it is vitally important, that local hospitals be able to do decontamination, what is the point of ER One as a major facility for decontamination?

Mr. DeAtley. Well, the Washington Hospital Center, as I said previously, is the largest hospital in the national capital region. So, being the largest facility, having the busiest ER and the only adult burn unit, we fully expect that in incidences throughout the national capital region we will get a large percentage of that population coming to our facility.

Ms. Norton. Would your plan be to direct, to the extent possible, if ER One were to become fully operative, that such patients be brought to that facility as opposed to other facilities?

Mr. DeAtley. Well, we are not trying to advocate for taking patients away, so much as we are trying to be, as a facility, prepared for the unusually large number of patients that we would expect to see because of who we are and where we are located.

ER One is all about taking a concept of what the ideal facility is to be designed like to now request funding to build that facility, to have that enhanced capability, while at the same time serving as a national model, a study place, if you will, for further developing scientific approaches to some of these ongoing problems.

Ms. Norton. With the Secretary, the first Secretary of HHS under President George W. Bush, I came to the Washington Hospital Center, sat with your personnel, and had a very impressive briefing of what ER One would look like and how it would operate. As I understood it, the Washington Hospital Center was prepared to invest considerable funds on its own into that center. Could you discuss that, please?

Mr. DeAtley. Yes, ma'am. I am not the one that is ultimately in charge of that design, but, from my perspective of being one of five directors of the institutes that constitute ER One, I know that the Washington Hospital Center had, particularly early on, spent significant sums of its own operating capital to fund an improvement in the emergency department itself and then, using funding that came from the city and from the Federal Government, to build what we now have as the ready room.

And what we have built from that is additional funding to do the first and the second phase of the ER One project, which was to take a subject matter group of experts to define what should we be doing, how better could we be doing it. That was phase one. Then working with architects to design the facility capable of operationalizing those concepts. And that leads us up to this current phase three, where, with that additional funding to match what the Washington Hospital Center and MedStar Health is willing to commit, to build——

Ms. Norton. If the funding were available, would you be prepared to start—with the design work having been done, as I hear your testimony, would you be prepared to start in building such a decontamination facility in the District of Columbia?

Mr. DeAtley. We would be anxious and quite willing to proceed as quickly as possible.

Ms. Norton. Mr. DeAtley, would you, within 10 days, get to this Committee a record of the funds from Washington Hospital Center, non-Federal sources, District of Columbia, Washington Hospital
Center and other non-Federal sources that have already been committed to or would become committed if the Federal funds were available?

Mr. DeAtley. Yes, ma’am, we would be glad to.

Ms. Norton. Ms. Mathes, we understand that the Red Cross is indispensable. We have seen you operate so often, giving food and shelter. Do you give cash to victims of disasters, of natural disasters or, for that matter, other disasters?

Ms. Mathes. We do provide assistance to family members to assist in their purchasing the kind of food and clothing and health and medical supplies they need.

Ms. Norton. What is the extent of your Federal funding in the District of Columbia? How much of your funds come from Federal sources, what percentage from private sources?

Ms. Mathes. Virtually all of our funding comes from private sources. We are totally dependent upon people giving of their time and their money to make Red Cross services possible.

We have applied a couple of times in the past few years for the Urban Area Security Initiatives funding and have been fortunate to receive some funding for equipment and supplies. But, otherwise, it is the people of this community who are making our services possible.

Ms. Norton. And is that in the event of a natural or man-made disaster as well?

Ms. Mathes. Yes.

Ms. Norton. It is important to put that on the record, because people see the Red Cross on the job so often when there is a natural disaster such as the one we just had in North Dakota, Minnesota, Kentucky. And they just figure you are one of us. And it is important that the record know that is one of you; that is to say, that is the people of the United States of America. And we are grateful for those contributions.

You have testified, Ms. Mathes, that there are approximately 55 volunteers to each paid staff member in the national capital region. I don’t know how to evaluate that compared to other regions. Is it high or low compared with other metropolitan regions?

Ms. Mathes. Thank you. We like it to be higher. Again, back to the important role a volunteer can play——

Ms. Norton. How does it compare with New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and the like, for example?

Ms. Mathes. Madam Chairwoman, I am not certain of their percentages, their ratios. We find it very important to track that ratio; not all of our colleagues do. I would be happy to follow up and report back to you on it.

Ms. Norton. It would be very important for us to be able to say to our region how we compare with the other regions. You heard me name four other cities, which really means regions—San Francisco, Chicago, and what am I leaving out? New York. How could I? All of whom are in the top four. It would be important for us to know what the ratio of volunteers here is compared to there.

Mr. DeAtley, there is a District of Columbia Health Care Coalition. Who are they? And who is responsible for calling that coalition into action?
Mr. DeATLEY. The coalition was created as a result of that HHS grant that I spoke about earlier. It is a combination of all of the city government agencies that have health care responsibilities, coupled with all of the other private-sector health care organizations. We have never seen such a coalition in my 36 years of working here in the city before December of 2007.

Insofar as the action is concerned, it is present itself on a daily basis. By that I mean there is a duty officer, for example, that is standing watch, representing the coalition, working with——

Ms. Norton. Is that a duty officer in every particular hospital?

Mr. DeATLEY. No, ma'am. That is one duty officer. There is 13 of us that volunteer to take this weekly tour of duty, if you will.

Ms. Norton. Rotating?

Mr. DeATLEY. Rotating responsibility. There is a primary and a backup.

There is an additional source of volunteers to—if an event were to happen in the city, we could activate depending upon the situation what we call our Health Care Coalition Response Team to work with that duty officer to support the District of Columbia, principally HSEMA and DOH, to deal with health care system delivery-related problems.

But the core of the effort, quite candidly, is the Emergency Management Committee that is meeting every 2 weeks that volunteer committee members from all of the member organizations to do the development work, the policies, the procedures. We are right now beginning to plan a citywide exercise to be held in June, all in an effort to improve our preparedness.

Ms. Norton. Indeed, you presaged a question. I want to know if ER One has ever had a test-run of capabilities, or are you waiting for the funding?

Mr. DeATLEY. No, ma'am. The ER One, the Washington Hospital Center stands ready to respond to an emergency right now. We have a decontamination capability. We train our personnel. We have the equipment to at least start that effort. So it is not about having no capability; we are talking about improving that capability.

Ms. Norton. If, indeed, there was some kind of contamination, how many people in the District of Columbia or region could you handle today?

Mr. DeATLEY. One, I would like to reiterate that it would not be a single facility that would be successful. It needs to be a combination of facilities.

But, in our particular case, particularly during what I will call prime-time business hours, up until 8 o'clock at night, we could process with our current staffing and equipment for at least a 3-hour period of time roughly 100 critical patients an hour and 200 noncritical participants. That is the most that we could do.

Lesser staffing, off-hours, then that would begin to drop off.

Ms. Norton. Now, does ER One assume that, in the event of an event involving contamination, that some hospitals at least, for example, you are located in northwest Washington, might be able, given how you share apparently and have your duty officer and the rest, might be able to direct, despite some capability on their own, that participants be taken to the larger capability at ER One? For
example, Howard University Hospital, which is close by; for that matter, Walter Reed, which is close by; some of the other hospitals perhaps.

Does the existence of a very special hospital, with larger capacity than others, assume that there would be some capacity to take referrals from others in the event of a capacity rather than do what you do now, which is everybody is on his own?

Mr. DEATLEY. We are working hard with D.C. Fire-EMS and their hazardous material team officials for a situation like you described, to try and ensure that facilities are not brought patients in excess of their current capability.

Would we at the Hospital Center expect for an incident in the city to receive more patients than the other hospitals? That is entirely plausible, and we are trying to prepare for that possibility, most definitely.

What I would like to reiterate, the strength of the system is not having one that can do it all. It is the sum of the parts that we need to continue to struggle to improve upon.

Ms. NORTON. That is a very important point. But I ask this question because, to the extent that the Federal Government is supposed to be paying for a central facility, which is a facility for demonstrating to the entire Nation and a facility for the District of Columbia and the region, the Congress is likely to expect some specialization if Federal money is going into such an activity. But fully understanding precisely what you said, we would also expect everybody to be able to handle patients as they receive them.

Mr. DEATLEY. If I may follow up on that comment, while we are talking about decontamination as one aspect, I would also point out that the ER One project, the concept design is about treating patients of a variety of different problem sets, whether it would be trauma from an explosion, biologic in nature, as well as contamination from a chemical or radiologic incident.

Ms. NORTON. That is an important point, as well. On the other hand, it is a contamination point that I think would most interest the Federal Government. Because there you would have to have not only the people who do what you do every day—look, we have a lot of gun trauma. If we had an explosion, somebody who works in a trauma emergency room would know how to handle that.

But I am not certain that the same capability throughout the region would exist if some unknown substance—first of all, it would be unknown. Secondly, it would be dispersed around the region and then have everybody trying to figure out what it is, what personnel would be best suited to handle that kind of contamination. That is the kind of expertise that I believe we are looking for in ER One.

Mr. DEATLEY. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. One final question. The, perhaps, most pathetic, most tragic part of Katrina had to do with people who could not take care of themselves, and these were patients, trauma patients who were in hospitals.

I would like to ask if the Red Cross has any coordinator for persons with disability. I am not dealing with hospitals now; that, I have to assume, the hospitals understood. But the region has very generous programs for dealing with people with disabilities. How
would the Red Cross handle large numbers of people with various kinds of disabilities?

We have everything from Gallaudet, where people are hard of hearing or cannot hear at all, sometimes cannot speak; to people who are in group homes; to children who go to special schools to get special education. This is a region that has many special facilities for disabled people.

How would the Red Cross handle an event with so many widely dispersed people with disabilities across the region?

Ms. Mathes. Excellent question. Madam Chairwoman, we work closely with partners who specialize in working with people of special needs and disabilities. We engage them in planning efforts and in the execution of them. So we would count on our close working partnerships with our colleagues in the government, as well as our nonprofit colleagues, who work closely with people with special needs and disabilities.

We work, for example, with the National Organization on Disability to anticipate the needs of people with special needs and disabilities in coming into shelters. We have acquired quite a bit of equipment specifically to accommodate people with special needs; also children, special equipment for children, for sheltering.

We have worked with partner organizations to mount preparedness efforts, preparedness education efforts, to assist with what we have talked about earlier today in terms of helping families develop emergency preparedness plans.

Ms. Norton. Well, staff tells me, Mr. Sarubbi, that, after Katrina, headquarters now has a disability coordinator by statute. That is one of the things we learned from Katrina. Is there a disability coordinator in this region and, to your knowledge, in other regions?

Mr. Sarubbi. There is a disability coordinator at the national level. Each of the FEMA regions do not have a disability coordinator. But we work closely, similar as to what my Red Cross colleague indicated, with our partners in helping to assess the evacuation and sheltering of people with special needs, particularly special medical needs.

For example, we have been working on a project here, the last 2 1/2 years, called the gap analysis, where the scenario would be a Category 3 hurricane. How would we deal with the evacuation of people with special medical needs? We have been looking at ways of enhancing that capability, also working closely with our partners at HHS.

It is not an issue that has been resolved as of yet. There is still much work to be done in that area. But it is certainly one of our focuses, particularly here in Region III, in the national capital region, as well as for a hurricane scenario in the Hampton Roads area, which is an area that is extremely vulnerable to a direct hit by a hurricane and, because of the geography of the area, would be particularly difficult in evacuating citizens, particularly citizens or people with special medical needs.

Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Sarubbi.

May I ask that, of all of the—one of the things that we had testimony here today was about the use of July 4th as a real-time exer-
cise. And something we would like to see in this region is more real-time exercises.

But I have to ask you that, of all—you know, for the average person, which might be a quick learner, we have seen very good results when people are told what to do, who have all of their capabilities. Without real-time exercises, perhaps they could get through.

I would ask, in this region, that you consider real-time exercises for people with disabilities. They are all over the region. They are often away from their home base. Without real-time exercises, I have no confidence that a disabled person of whatever disability would necessarily be prepared, as any able-bodied person might, to simply do what the person is instructed to do, where sign language may be necessary, where the person could be handicapped in other ways.

So I would ask FEMA, through your disability coordinator established by statute after Hurricane Katrina, to consider real-time exercises throughout the United States, of course, but particularly in this region, where we are more vulnerable than most other regions.

Mr. SARUBBI. I will certainly do that, Madam Chairman. And, as I indicated earlier, that is an area of emphasis for us, to continue to work with people with special medical needs. And, certainly, having real-time exercises, I think, is an important step in that direction. Thank you.

Ms. NORTON. I know that all of you have waited a very long time for us to testify and then to undergo my cross-examination, as it were. But all I am trying to do is to get on the record what we need to know in order to respond to your needs.

I have found the testimony of each and every one of you invaluable. And may I thank you, first of all, for your great patience in waiting so long, but most of all for your very valuable testimony. Thank you very much.

And this hearing is finally at an end.

[Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
I thank Chairwoman Norton for holding this hearing today on the Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region.

In most jurisdictions, the protocol for responding to a disaster is well defined. States and local governments prepare and respond accordingly and when their resources are overwhelmed, they request appropriate Federal assistance.

The Governor of a state also has the ability to call up the National Guard, if necessary, to support its State and local operations.

It is not as straightforward in the Nation’s Capital. As the seat of the Federal government, the Constitution gives Congress exclusive legislative control over the District of Columbia.

While Congress has granted authority to a Mayor and city council, responding to a major disaster in D.C. will still require many moving pieces working seamlessly together.

The large presence of Federal property in D.C. and questions of jurisdiction that cross local and Federal lines makes it less clear who is responsible for what and when.

For example, there are numerous Federal law enforcement agencies that operate in D.C. and which
have jurisdiction over certain aspects of the city, including the Capitol Police, the Park Police, the Federal Protective Service, the Secret Service, and even the U.S. Mint Police and GPO Police.

- Each of these Federal entities has its own jurisdiction and responsibilities and will react accordingly should there be a major disaster.

- It is unclear how much these entities are coordinating and communicating with local officials and law enforcement so that we do not see confusion if a disaster strikes.

- And, unlike a state, the Mayor is unable to call up the D.C. National Guard if needed.

- Even developing an effective evacuation plan can prove challenging in D.C. D.C. must ensure that its plans take into account what Federal entities and neighboring states will do if a disaster occurs.

- For example, will the Capitol Police or the Secret Service shutdown roads around the Capitol or White House respectively? And, has D.C. officials taken this into account in their evacuation planning.

- In addition to the complexity created by the role of the federal government in D.C., there is also still a lack of clarity with regards to who is in charge at the Federal level.

- When FEMA was transferred into the Department of Homeland Security, it was stripped of many of its functions and authorities.
The failed response to Hurricane Katrina was an unfortunate, yet predictable consequence of FEMA’s diminished capabilities.

Following Katrina, this committee and the Select Katrina Committee conducted a full investigation and review of the government’s preparations for and response to Katrina.

And, in 2006, as a result of those investigations, we drafted and passed into law the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act to improve the government’s response to all types of disasters.

While some of its provisions have been implemented, many others have yet to be and key policy documents like HSPD-8, HSPD-5, and the National Response Framework have yet to be revised to reflect the changes mandated by that legislation.

Inconsistent policies and slow decision-making are just some of the symptoms of the problems with the bureaucracy FEMA is buried in at DHS.

And, these issues are magnified when applied to D.C. in which Federal and local coordination is even more critical in responding to a disaster.

I thank the witnesses that are here today and look forward to hearing from them on these and other issues.

Thank you.
APRIL 3, 2009

Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region: Experiences, Capabilities and Weaknesses

STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON
CHAIR, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE

I welcome today’s witnesses to this hearing concerning an important mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the jurisdiction of our subcommittee. But for this morning’s hearing, I would be attending the funeral of Loree Murray, a gentle soul who became a beacon of resistance to gun violence when crack and the crack wars gripped the District in the 1990’s. An indication of Mrs. Murray’s success as a citizen anti-crime activist is that before I arrived at the viewing and wake last night, I am told, D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier was in attendance. Mrs. Murray was also such a statehood and voting rights advocate that her family placed her Free D.C. cap in her casket. Considering that an important part of what concerns us at today’s hearing is a new firearms’ risk posed by a dangerous gun amendment proposed for the District of Columbia, House Voting Rights Act, I told Mrs. Murray’s family and friends last night that I wanted to dedicate today’s hearing to Loree Murray.

Today, we are pleased to welcome federal and District law enforcement officials’ emergency managers and first responders to testify concerning steps to prevent, prepare for and respond, as necessary, to incidents of all types. FEMA is the lead Federal agency charged with preparing for and responding to disasters and emergencies of all types. When Congress established the DHS shortly after 9/11, the statute that created it also established a special Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC), now placed in FEMA. Our region faces many of the same risks as any other major area of our country, from natural disasters, such as the 2001 floods in the Bloomingdale section of the District of Columbia, to man-made disasters, such as the tragic plane crash into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. The nation’s capital occupies a special place in the nation’s security network, with the District ranking in the top four at risk for terrorist
threats along with New York, Chicago and San Francisco. However, the challenges of responding to threats in the seat of the federal government are unique and, as a result, Congress established the NCCR, the only regional office inside DHS charged specifically with coordinating security for one region alone.

The unique nature of the National Capital Region brings distinct challenges for the region and its officials. For example, the Metropolitan Police Department must work with no less than 32 Federal police agencies, and MPD, the largest police force in the region, is an indispensable part of the federal security for the nation’s capital and for the National Capital Region.

The recent inauguration, the largest event ever held in the nation’s capital, with an estimated two million people in attendance, including foreign dignitaries, entertainment stars and virtually every important federal and state official in the United States, is perhaps the quintessential example of what makes the work of elected officials, police and security officials in our Nation’s Capital uniquely difficult. Although hearings have been held concerning some problems at the 2009 inauguration, such as citizens who were held in the Third Street Tunnel, it is noteworthy that there was not a single arrest at the National Mall, notwithstanding the unprecedented crowds and the disappointments of some concerning admission. The Third Street Tunnel problems are among those that will be studied by the Government Accountability Office, with a report and recommendation to come. However, Mayor Adrian Fenty, D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier, Metro, Capitol Police and the DHS agencies involved including, the lead agency, the U.S. Secret Service deserve credit for the planning and operations that resulted in what most agree was an unusually successful event. Although the problems that arose require study, we are also interested in how the federal and District agencies in cooperation with the region pulled off an event the size of which was unlike anything they had seen before and how they were able to keep it up for the four days of the engagement.

Since 9/11 this region has had notable success working together to shore up unique risks to homeland security here. Billions of dollars have been spent not only to repair the Pentagon, where 184 people were lost, but to fortify Metro against the unique vulnerabilities of the national capital region, with its porous borders, 14 million people, 50,000 federal employees and national and foreign dignitaries that pose security risks as they move, often in motorcades, throughout the national capital region.

No risk is more apparent to homeland security in particular than the widespread availability of firearms.

While the City was in the act of writing new legislation this summer, the National Rifle Association forced a number of Democratic members of the House during the primaries just before the 2008 election to demand an up or down vote on a bill to eliminate all gun laws in the District of Columbia and to strip the District of Columbia of all its public safety gun enforcement. This bill is essentially the same as the Ensign
amendment now attached to the District of Columbia House Voting Rights legislation, passed by the Senate in February. Despite hearings and testimony from federal and D.C. police chiefs that the gun posed a "grave threat" to elected and appointed federal officials and visitors, in addition to D.C. residents, the bill passed the House on the belief that it could be stopped in the Senate and we were able to do so. However, despite the hearings, almost no one here had ever looked at the gun bill itself. They were focused on not doing harm to members from more conservative districts.

Now, with the Ensign amendment attached to the voting rights bill in the Senate, the time has come to look the Ensign bill straight in the eyes. The Congress has largely regarded the bill as another piece of local legislation. However, federal police must operate largely under the District’s gun laws and have testified that these gun laws have been critical to homeland security. Today we intend to face head on what it could mean for the nation’s capital to have no local gun laws. We must ask whether the gun laws, as the Washington Post recently noted, “protecting the lives of D.C. residents as well as those of tourists and foreign dignitaries, national leaders, and the president and his family” should be eliminated. Before us today is whether appointed and elected federal officials, employees, visitors and the federal presence would be more or less secure under the Ensign amendment which would allow military style weapons, including 50 caliber armor piercing guns, to be legally possessed without limit on the numbers in the nation’s capital; the nation’s capital becomes the only jurisdiction permitting, indeed inviting, people to be able to cross state lines to purchase guns and bring them back from the two nearby states, facilitating gun running by criminals, felons or terrorists between the states in the national capital region; a “gun show loophole” is created without any background checks of any kind, permitting the purchase of weapons from private individuals at gun shows; no gun registration is permitted and there would therefore be no way for police to trace guns used in crimes; the District is deprived of all gun safety jurisdiction to revise its laws for the safety of residents and visitors, even if serious threats arise; and any employee could bring a gun, concealed or openly, to any workplace in the city. Employees could bring guns to a Wizards game at the Verizon Center, to a National's baseball game at Nationals Park, to a national conference at the Convention Center, to Pepco headquarters, to law offices, and to other small and large work places throughout the city, to churches and other places of worship, to bars, restaurants and nightclubs, to hotels, to power plants and to all District government offices.

In short, would elected and appointed federal officials and foreign dignitaries, visitors, and District residents be safer and more secure with or without the Ensign Amendment? Asked another way, what is to be gained by the Ensign amendment?

The time to ask these questions is now, not after there is blowback and recriminations following serious gun carnage effecting residents or federal officials and employees. Our job is to prevent, not only to protect.
Today's hearing of course will focus not only on this most recent and most serious threat to homeland security since 9/11 but on all the steps that have been taken by the District of Columbia National Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, the US. Capitol Police, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Police, the DC Attorney General, Prince George's Office of the County Executive, the Washington Hospital Center, and the American Red Cross. Yet, the hearing is likely to be remembered most by whether we in Congress, with a clear threat in plain sight now, on the voting rights bill, did what was required to protect the nation's capital and the national capital region. We are deeply grateful to today's witnesses for their testimony.

Congressional Testimony of Craig DeAtley PA-C

Director, Institute for Public Health Emergency Readiness
ER One Institute
Washington Hospital Center
110 Irving Street NW
Washington DC 20010
Ph 202 257-4714 Email craig.deatley@medstar.net

Madam Chairwoman:

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region — Experiences, Capabilities and Weaknesses. I am an Emergency Department Physician Assistant and the Director of the Institute for Public Health Emergency Readiness of the ER One Institute at the Washington Hospital Center.

Since 2002, I have been one of two people responsible for coordinating Emergency Preparedness at the Washington Hospital Center (WHC) and more recently, at National Rehabilitation Hospital as well as at MedStar Health, the parent company for both facilities. Prior to coming to WHC, I spent 29 years at George Washington University working in the area of emergency and disaster medicine.

The Washington Hospital Center recognizes that as the largest hospital in the National Capital Region (NCR), home of the busiest trauma center, Emergency Department and only adult burn unit, we have a special responsibility in the area of emergency preparedness. Since 1999 with the inception of Project ER One, a unique federally funded project to develop an “all hazards, all risks ready” healthcare facility, the Washington Hospital Center has:

- introduced innovative facility design to maximize capacity, capability, and protection;
- implemented a revised incident command system to comply with the National Incident Management System (NIMS);
- built a state of the art “Ready Room” to take care of victims from mass casualty incidents from natural and manmade causes;
- developed an on line training and education systems, SITEEMS, used by hospitals and other agencies in the District of Columbia.
The Washington Hospital Center took the lead in writing and obtaining, on behalf of a broad-based District of Columbia healthcare coalition, one of five nationally awarded five ($5) million dollar Department of Health and Human Services Coalition Partnership grants. The purpose of the grant is to improve the emergency preparedness of the entire District of Columbia healthcare system. Washington Hospital Center is privileged to be administering that federal grant.

I think it is important to point out that health care facilities occupy a unique position in the emergency response framework. If you look at the “big six” – police, fire, EMS, hospitals, public health, and emergency management—hospitals are the only one that are privately funded. The work we need to do to become and stay prepared and ready to respond to a major disaster must be funded from clinical care or else be supported by government grants and funds.

In December 2007, in response to a recognized problem of a siloed and fragmented healthcare emergency response system, and as a result of the $5 million HHS grant, the District of Columbia Health Care Coalition was founded to create a more comprehensive and collaborative approach to preparedness and response, one that unites all aspects of the healthcare system.

The District of Columbia Emergency Health Care Coalition includes all of the DC government agencies with healthcare responsibilities such as Fire/EMS, Public Health, Mental Health and Medical Examiner working with private sector organizations that include all 12 hospitals, the DC Hospital Association, the DC Medical Society, Poison Control Center, DC Primary Care Association and DC Health Care Association and the Community Connections Mental Health Clinic.

In the short span of eighteen (18) months the Coalition’s Emergency Management Committee and associated work groups have conducted a first ever Hazard Vulnerability Analysis for the healthcare system, written a much needed emergency operations plan and accompanying attachments on communication and public information officer role in an emergency and soon an evacuation-attachment will be completed.

We have updated our Hospital Mutual Aid Radio System (HMARS) and expanded the partners who are part of the system. We are solving the family reunification issue — which is how does a family member or friend find out which hospital their loved one has been taken to in a mass casualty incident. Soon seven (7) of the busiest hospital Emergency Departments in the city will be sharing patient registration data with the Department of Health during a declared emergency. This is a remarkable accomplishment that is equalled in only a few other cities in the nation.

The Coalition has also had a consultant conduct a security risk assessment for eight (8) hospitals and completed a design Charrette for improving campus security for the Washington Hospital Center /Children’s National Medical Center/ Veterans Administration Hospital / National Rehabilitation Hospital campus, together, considered to be one of 24 critical infrastructures in the District of Columbia.

And we recognize that a mass casualty incident does not respect political or geographic boundaries — we need to and have been coordinating our efforts with our colleagues from Maryland and Virginia including creating an information sharing procedure between hospital coordination centers.
Despite the significant improvements and progress I have mentioned, there are still numerous issues and needs that individual hospitals such as the Washington Hospital Center and the Coalition are confronting.

The Washington Hospital Center is still seeking one hundred twenty million dollars ($120 million) in funding to actually build ER One, to provide expanded and adequate capacity and capability to deliver emergency care to the people of the District of Columbia, and also to be a national demonstration facility for emergency care center design optimized for both daily operations and high consequence events.

The HHS Coalition Partnership Grant will be completed by September 2009 and there is no follow on federal funding yet identified. We need funding to continue the substantive work that has been done to date as we build a tangible connected system of emergency care.

Finally, changes must be made in state and federal funding regulations. Currently hospitals are not allowed to receive disaster funding under the Stafford Act and other federal, state and local disaster regulations. During the Inauguration, for example, hospitals throughout the NCR incurred millions of dollars in expenses associated with supplemental staffing, cancelled elective admissions and procedures but were told by FEMA they were not eligible for relief funding despite the Presidential declaration. The fear some of us have is the disaster within the disaster- that uncompensated expenses associated with the required response will bankrupt a hospital such as my own because we are already operating on a one to two percent operating margin.

Since 9-11 and especially over the past 18 months, the healthcare system in our Nation’s Capital has made significant improvement in emergency preparedness and the Washington Hospital Center feels privileged and is pleased to have helped facilitate these improvements... but much more needs to be done including providing them with information technology and creating an information sharing procedure.
A Blueprint for Emergency Preparedness by Nonprofits

The Greater Washington Task Force on Nonprofit Emergency Preparedness

September, 2003
# Greater Washington Task Force on Nonprofit Emergency Preparedness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Washington Board of Trade,</td>
<td>George Vradenburg, Task Force Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Foundation of the Nat’l Capital Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Red Cross National Chapter</td>
<td>Keith Berkery, Charles Blake, Linda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Foundation of the Nat’l Capital Region</td>
<td>Mathes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene &amp; Agnes E. Meyer Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fannie Mae Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater DC Bars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Washington Board of Trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill and Knowton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKinsey &amp; Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonprofit Roundtable of Greater Washington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Virginia Family Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army, National Capital and Virginia Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivors’ Fund</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Way of the National Capital Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Business Journal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Regional Association of Grantmakers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terri Lee Freeman, Gary Jonas, Kathy Whelpley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Rogers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen Howard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siobahn Canty, Stephen McMahon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Cunningham, Bob Peck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Belkin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Blair, Les Silverman, Jim Simon, Gretchen Zucker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave Robertson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuck Bean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Shaw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Lew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terry O’Hara Lavole</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Egger, Arlene Krohmal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Orfinger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ted Lutz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kae Dakin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Blueprint for Emergency Preparedness by Nonprofits

INTRODUCTION

Many things worked very well on the nonprofit front in the wake of September 11. Donors gave generously. A host of nonprofits quickly came together to collect funds, manage volunteers, and provide services to all types of victims. Nonprofits continue to provide crucial services, and they report high levels of victim and donor satisfaction on many important measures.

But not everything worked. Donors were confused about giving options, how funds were used, and funds sponsorship. Many unnecessary in-kind donations were collected and transported. Victims often had to go to multiple service providers to get the appropriate services, and they usually did not have enough information about what was available. Perhaps most important, some providers did not immediately recognize certain categories of victims (e.g., dislocated workers and temporarily closed businesses), who did not receive adequate assistance in a timely fashion.

LESSONS LEARNED

Greater Washington’s nonprofits believe that they have a responsibility to build on the lessons from 9/11 and other disasters. Nonprofit sector emergency preparedness is crucial to a comprehensive community emergency plan. The nonprofit, public, and private sectors are the three crucial players in effective and efficient emergency response.

Against this backdrop, The Community Foundation for the National Capital Region formed a Task Force, composed of people from greater Washington nonprofit and philanthropic organizations, an intergovernmental coordinating body, the business community, media outlets, and a communications firm, to develop a "blueprint" for improved emergency preparedness. Task Force members with expertise in relevant fields (e.g., fundraising, volunteer coordination) provided material for initial drafts of the blueprint; the entire group reviewed and refined these drafts. A team from McKinsey & Company provided overall coordination.

The Task Force agreed that the blueprint should set forth general principles, basic processes, and key decisions for attracting resources (funds, volunteers, in-kind donations) and distributing them through disaster response and recovery services. Task Force members also articulated five specific criteria for the blueprint’s design. Against the overall goal of victim relief and recovery, they agreed that the blueprint’s proposals should:

• build on and reinforce collaboration among nonprofits,
• ensure coordination with other sectors and geographies,
• create transparency and ensure accountability throughout the nonprofit sector,
• be flexible enough to respond to changing needs and to innovations in service delivery and resource intermediation, and
• be generic enough to apply to a variety of communities.

COMMUNITY PLANNING

Thanks to the hard work, creative thinking, and open minds of all the people involved in this project, the Task Force is putting forth a blueprint for nonprofit emergency preparedness that represents a tangible and comprehensive starting point for detailed community planning. Communities must be ready to direct their own emergency response activities. While national organizations can provide emergency assistance to local communities, local community planning and decision-making are critical. Local organizations are knowledgeable about
and responsive to local needs, and they typically carry much if not most of the burden of recovery.

As the diagram below shows, the blueprint is organized around refinements to two core processes. The first process is intermediation of resources (funds, volunteers, and in-kind goods and services) by marshaling them from donors and providing them to victims and service providers. The second is service provision for both response and recovery. The blueprint also describes three enabling mechanisms: a collaboration network, a communication plan, and a key measures report.

In some communities, local government agencies may provide some of the services described below, or they may serve as volunteer intermediaries. The recommendations in this blueprint apply to local government agencies acting these capacities as well as to nonprofits.

Given its 9/11 origins, the blueprint focuses on man-made emergency situations that cause many injuries and/or deaths and affect a large geographic area, but it should prove useful in any emergency requiring the involvement of multiple nonprofit organizations.
Resource Intermediation

The core process of resource intermediation involves collecting, managing, and distributing the three types of resources needed to support emergency and recovery services: funds, volunteers, and in-kind resources. The process has two goals: to provide services to victims (which may require support for nonprofits serving victims) and to provide a giving opportunity for all types of donors.

As the diagram shows, the resource intermediation process has four steps: prepare, assess needs, solicit resources, and manage/distribute resources. The blueprint calls for targeted enhancements to this process for each of the three types of resources.

Funds

The objective of funding intermediation is to quickly and efficiently raise the money needed to support disaster response and recovery services to victims while building and maintaining trust with donors. Since most service providers are not self-funding, they need resources for providing immediate and long-term support to victims, including the development of capabilities to provide such support. Donor trust is essential to raising substantial funds for the full scope of emergency needs.

Lessons learned in responding to 9/11 and from other disasters point to the need for three enhancements to the basic fundraising process.

1. Establish simple giving points for donors. Simple giving points for donors are streamlined, coordinated giving mechanisms that offer a clear explanation of the general purpose of different funds. These giving points can educate donors on the purpose and use of funds, helping to build donor trust, and on the needs of different groups of victims. Simple giving points improve efficiency by limiting fundraising expense, resulting in more funds for victims and/or service providers. Although several main donor funds evolved out of the 9/11 experience, it took several days for giving points to be established, and confusion about the purpose, use, and sponsorship of different funds hurt relationships with donors.

These kinds of problems can be addressed through preparation activities that get funders to collaborate on fundraising standards and processes that enable them to maintain independence or to create joint funds. More specifically, funders should discuss fundraising plans (multiple funds, joint funds, single fund) and prepare the logistics for simple giving points (e.g., hotlines, websites, POD boxes, walk-in centers) so that those donor channels can be activated immediately after a disaster. Donations for disasters are often collected through workplaces or places of worship. Funders should engage with businesses and religious institutions in advance about ways to improve transparency and to simplify giving points for donors.

2. Increase transparency to gain trust. Transparency is the communication of fund intent, fund use, and fund impact to donors, the funding community, victims, and service providers. Transparency helps maintain donor trust and ensure that all service provider needs are being met.

Transparency can be achieved through planned regular meetings within the funding community and between funders and service providers and through media and direct communication to donors and victims. Agreeing to standards, including policies about types of assistance, victims served, use of funds for services vs. cash benefits, time frame for assistance, and administrative expenses, is a critical activity. In particular, it is important that service providers be transparent about the administrative costs needed to receive and distribute funds effectively.
3. Work directly with service providers to define needs on an ongoing basis. Funders and service providers need to work together to identify resource needs and determine how those needs change or might change over time. In greater Washington, funding intermediaries met on a weekly basis after 9/11 to discuss recovery needs and work with service providers to help meet those needs. This practice, unusual for a funding intermediation process, greatly improved the distribution of funds.

Efforts like this must be inclusive, recognizing the variety of victims, and diverse, to accommodate change in both needs and organizations. Funders should communicate with the business and government sectors to ensure adequate and non-duplicative coverage of victims’ needs, especially when there are needs that exceed nonprofit resources (e.g., assistance to large numbers of unemployed or to small businesses). Funders should also communicate with service providers and other organizations familiar with different socioeconomic, cultural, linguistic, and regional populations affected by the disaster.

VOLUNTEERS

The objectives of volunteer recruitment and assignment are to maximize the number of trained, affiliated volunteers before a disaster and to actively manage unaffiliated volunteers. Increased affiliation ensures that service providers train and manage volunteers. Active management of unaffiliated volunteers by volunteer intermediaries helps volunteers provide needed disaster services, keep safe, and enable emergency responders to perform their jobs. Volunteer intermediaries can also support nonprofits in using unaffiliated volunteers effectively. Not incidentally, volunteering provides opportunities for individuals to express sympathy for and provide tangible support to members of their community victimized by disaster.

The Task Force’s work has led it to recommend three enhancements to the basic volunteer intermediary process.

1. Educate potential volunteers and nonprofits on the benefits and processes of affiliation. Affiliated volunteers were crucial to emergency response and recovery during 9/11. They provided valuable, skilled assistance without distracting from the overall effort.

Community education about affiliation should increase the number of affiliated volunteers. Potential volunteers and nonprofits need to understand how affiliation increases and improves volunteer training, assignment accuracy, and ongoing volunteer management. In addition to providing the volunteers needed to respond quickly after a disaster, promoting affiliation also helps nonprofits in their efforts to assess needs and search for skilled volunteers.

Promoting affiliation is most important during the preparation phase of resource intermediation, when volunteers go through the affiliation process and receive the necessary training. Volunteer intermediaries should work with response service agencies to develop a plan for affiliating volunteers. This plan should include the preparation of educational messages to the public, an explicit volunteer referral role for volunteer intermediaries, and training for nonprofits in using affiliated volunteers.

2. Create a management system for unaffiliated volunteers. A management system for unaffiliated volunteers is crucial to assessing, assigning, and managing solicited and unsolicited volunteers after a disaster. Military security at the Pentagon prevented a large number of people from showing up to volunteer, and lines of potential blood donors stretched for blocks in New York. Active management of unaffiliated volunteers ensures that volun-
neers are matched to service provider needs, while keeping volunteers out of danger and out of the way of emergency responders.

Creating a volunteer management system is a preparation phase task, involving both technological support and logistical mechanisms for handling large numbers of volunteers. Volunteer intermediaries will need to develop profiles of needs for unaffiliated volunteers during a disaster, coordinate training for nonprofits in the effective use of unaffiliated volunteers, coordinate training for unaffiliated volunteers, and develop plans for keeping volunteers safe and out of the way of other responders (including public messages asking volunteers to stay away from disaster sites and safe staging areas for volunteers who show up anyway).

3. Conduct proactive, ongoing need assessment with service providers. In most cases, volunteer intermediaries will need to reach out to service providers to determine the need for volunteers. They should also be prepared to determine needs independently in case that proves necessary.

A process for continually updating resource needs, led by volunteer intermediaries, will help service providers quickly and effectively meet emergency needs. Experience from other disasters shows that service providers are generally too occupied with service provision to regularly assess their volunteer needs and communicate with volunteer intermediaries.

Needs assessment occurs immediately after the disaster and becomes increasingly important as the recovery continues and victim needs change. It requires attention to four key activities: establishing a hot-line that nonprofits can use to report volunteer needs; establishing a proactive communication system, including escalating contacts (e.g., informal contacts, e-mail and phone survey, deployment of outreach teams to conduct site visits); coordinating with other resource and victim needs assessments; and monitoring emerging and changing needs.

IN-KIND

The objective of in-kind resource intermediation is to provide goods, services, and products to victims and service providers while minimizing waste. In-kind resource intermediation must be carefully prepared and managed to limit the donation of unneeded resources and to deliver needed donations efficiently. Without appropriate management, in-kind donations can be costly and hamper disaster response.

The Task Force believes that two enhancements to the basic process will lead to more effective and efficient in-kind resource intermediation.

1. Plan for and solicit donations in advance. Service providers routinely say that in-kind donations are the most difficult resource to manage and employ effectively. From Hurricane Hugo to 9/11, there are many stories of needs going unmet and donated resources being wasted. In-kind intermediaries can prevent these kinds of problems by identifying potential goods, services, and product needs for a variety of potential emergencies and then proactively soliciting donations against those needs from public and private sector sources. Services can include direct assistance to victims (e.g., mortgage forbearance, tuition assistance) as well as participation in response actions (e.g., logistics in handling donated goods). The stockpiling that results from these efforts may be virtual, i.e., in the form of memorandums of understanding and/or contracts.

Planning and solicitation activities are conducted in the preparation phase to ensure that the needed supplies are identified and available. Those activities include developing profiles of needs for in-kind
goods and services in disasters; if necessary, soliciting agreements from businesses to donate in-kind goods and services; coordinating stockpiling of key in-kind resources with state/local governments, FEMA, and service providers, and working with retail stores on programs to enable victims to use vouchers to obtain goods.

2. **Educate the public.** Like volunteer intermediaries, in-kind intermediaries must educate the public about needed and unneeded resources. Education will help prevent the waste of both donations and processing resources. There are numerous examples of 9/11 media attention, much like those about rescue dogs, that led to excessive, unsolicited donations, such as cases of dog food and dog booties.

Education about in-kind resources, which should be done in the preparation phase and in the solicitation phase, involves preparing public messages about donated goods, including identifying needed goods and discouraging the donation of unnecessary goods, and communicating with the public (continued throughout the recovery phase if necessary).
Service Provision

The core process of service provision involves developing response and recovery services and delivering them to all victims of a disaster. The process’s specific goal is to meet immediate basic and longer term recovery needs for all victims. Service providers must be able to “scale up” their capabilities to address the needs caused by a substantial disaster.

As the diagram on page 2 shows, the basic service provision process has four steps: prepare, assess needs, develop service plans, and deliver services. The blueprint calls for targeted enhancements to the basic process for both response and recovery services.

RESPONSE

The objective of response services is to provide immediate help to all people affected by a disaster. These services typically cover basics such as food, water, and shelter and, by definition, are limited to the period immediately following a disaster. Despite this focus, response service providers will often provide immediate assistance with longer-term services and lay the groundwork for the provision of recovery services.

The Task Force's review of lessons from 9/11 and other disasters points to the need for one enhancement to the basic response service provision process: having emergency providers adopt a standard victim intake procedure, including sharing of victim data with appropriate confidentiality protections.

A standard victim intake procedure specifies information requirements and a common confidentiality agreement with victims and among service providers. Standard procedures make it easy to compile databases of needed victim information, quickly identify needs, and quickly link victims to services. After 9/11, New York service agencies had difficulty coordinating recovery services because each emergency response agency had created a unique database and was governed by different confidentiality policies. This meant that some victims were contacted multiple times about the same services, while others were not contacted quickly. The New York United Services Group addressed these problems by improving service coordination through training, meetings and electronic communications among service providers, and development of a shared database. The American Red Cross and other groups are taking this experience, as well as experiences from other disasters, to develop a nationally deployable shared database for disasters.

Service providers should develop and gain agreement to standard intake procedures during the preparation phase. Specific activities involve gaining agreement on common confidentiality forms, building a joint database for victim information, and training service providers on database use.

RECOVERY

The objective of recovery services is to provide longer term rehabilitative services such as mental health and employment assistance to all people affected by the disaster. Longer term can often mean several years.

The Task Force's work has led to two enhancements to the basic recovery service provision process:

1. Gain agreement on standards of operation. In an emergency, service providers need to be able to scale up their capabilities quickly through improved
cooperation. Such cooperation should include adopting minimum criteria for record keeping, confidentiality, personnel qualifications, training, and financial controls. These standards will help improve average service quality, and they will enable service providers to share responsibility among organizations. Ultimately, they will help service providers earn greater public trust since established standards can be made transparent to donors. While there are many examples of service providers working together in the 9/11 response, pre-agreed operational service specifications helped make this cooperation smoother and easier to implement.

Standards of operation should be set during the preparation phase, with key potential service providers working together to agree to operational standards in critical areas, including record-keeping, data-sharing (including protection of confidentiality), financial systems, personnel systems, and approach to supporting recovery workers, and to train service providers to maintain those standards.

In responding to the 9/11 Pentagon attack, nonprofit service providers in greater Washington learned the importance of case managers in helping victims find appropriate services, leverage available resources, and think through and implement recovery plans for themselves and their families. A survey of 9/11 Pentagon victims who had case managers revealed that many considered their case managers as important as the financial assistance they received. Communities should consider how to scale up their capabilities to provide case management to the most-affected disaster victims.

2. Preplan for capacity needs. Preplanning ensures that recovery service providers are able to meet victims' service needs for an extended time period and that they can identify and obtain additional resources where necessary. While the case manager approach was used effectively after 9/11, a different type or scale of disaster may require different approaches. Even the case manager approach had to be quickly scaled up to handle 9/11 capacity requirements.

This enhancement is made in the preparation phase, so that nonprofits have time to plan for and build additional capacity. Specific activities are to identify appropriate recovery service models for various types and sizes of disasters, size the required resources for each model, identify capacity gaps, and create plans to fund and build the required capacity for each model. Preplanning should include capacity to address specific cultural and linguistic needs of affected populations, who may be better served by emerging and grassroots nonprofits.
Enabling Mechanisms

To one degree or another the proposed enhancements to resource intermediation and service provision call for collaboration and communication within, across, and beyond those two core processes. This cooperation is especially important before an event occurs, when nonprofits are building a strong disaster response network. Meaningful improvements in disaster response and recovery will only occur if nonprofits work together and involve representatives from the public and private sectors.

The blueprint's three enabling mechanisms, a collaboration network, a communication plan, and a key measures report, are a direct response to this overarching need. The key measures report also serves as an important management tool.

1. Collaboration network. Leading nonprofit organizations or a nonprofit association need to organize a collaboration task force whose role will be to link overall disaster preparation efforts by nonprofits. The task force will be responsible for facilitating and ensuring the completion of key activities; leading efforts that involve the majority of the area's resource intermediaries and service providers (e.g., creating single entry points for victims seeking services); providing forums for discussion, information sharing, and collaboration; and deciding on the decision-making structure and process for implementing the emergency plan. The task force can also connect the nonprofit sector with the business and government sectors, link local nonprofit activities to those of national nonprofits, and share insights and best practices with nonprofits in other cities.

The blueprint Task Force's own work has demonstrated the value of collaboration within and beyond the community. While some of the formal and informal networks essential to rapidly resolving potential issues and to cooperative preparation planning already existed, the blueprint process itself led to new networks, strengthened existing relationships, and facilitated proactive planning of network objectives and interactions – all of which were invaluable in the Task Force's work.

The proposed collaboration task force should be composed of representatives from area resource intermediaries and service providers and from other networks and sectors, e.g., local business groups, local government. Obviously the nonprofit organizations or nonprofit association organizing this task force will need to strike a balance between broad inclusion (including the perspectives of populations with diverse cultural and linguistic needs) and manageable size in selecting its members.

The collaboration task force should review the ways in which victims' views are adequately taken into account in the disaster response. The key measures report is one way to obtain feedback from victims. In addition, in some disasters it has been found useful to include victim representatives in deliberations about disaster response through relatively informal means (e.g., by including victims in advisory groups) and more formal mechanisms (e.g., by including victims on organizational boards of directors).

2. Communication plan. The greater Washington nonprofits had no 9/11-related media communications plan, which resulted in the public receiving mixed messages about volunteer needs, donations, fund use, and the provision of recovery services. To avoid this unnecessary and unproductive confusion in the future, the collaboration network should develop a plan for communication with the public during response and recovery. People need to know how they can help and what nonprofits and
philanthropies are doing to address victims' needs. (This communication plan is for communicating with the public at large, not with victims about services; that communication is covered in the service provision process.)

Significant steps can be taken before a crisis to enhance communication with the public if and when a crisis occurs. This planning includes preparing key messages; drafting written background materials; identifying and training potential spokespeople; setting up a "talk" web site; planning logistics for press briefings; identifying media representatives to contact before, during, and after a disaster; and meeting with some or all of those media representatives to discuss the nonprofits' plans and address media questions and concerns.

Key messages before a disaster include informing the public about nonprofit preparation activities and about opportunities to make donations or to volunteer with nonprofits. During and after a disaster, key messages include efforts by the nonprofit community to assist victims and information on the effectiveness of those efforts (using the key messages noted earlier and discussed next). To convey these messages across diverse socioeconomic and linguistic populations, consideration should be given to a diversity of channels of communication.

3. Key measures report. Resource intermediaries and service providers need to publish periodic public reports on their emergency response and recovery activities. These reports should be built around key measures such as indicators of outcomes for victims, resources donated, use of resources, effectiveness in meeting victims' needs and donors' expectations, and unmet needs.

This performance transparency increases public trust in the nonprofit sector by letting people know how their money was used and demonstrating accountability across the sector. It also helps nonprofits and other interested parties evaluate disaster responses and determine how to improve future responses.

Major activities in developing and using the key measures report include gathering agreement on the exact measures to be tracked; getting feedback in each area from victims and donors, which can be done in a variety of ways, e.g., informal contacts, comment/complaint logs, press accounts, formal surveys; analyzing that feedback to identify common themes; and writing for the future and making periodic performance reports to relevant parties and to the public at large.

* * *

The Task Force hopes that this blueprint will prove useful to nonprofits in many communities to prepare for potential disasters. In the greater Washington region, Task Force members have begun to implement these recommendations in partnership with other nonprofits, the business sector, and local and federal government agencies. Support for this project was provided by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, AOL, Time Warner Foundation and McKinsey & Company.
## APPENDIXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposed enhancements to funding intermediation</td>
<td>A – 1 to A – 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed enhancements to volunteer intermediation</td>
<td>B – 1 to B – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed enhancements to in-kind intermediation</td>
<td>C – 1 to C – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed enhancement to response service provision</td>
<td>D – 1 to D – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed enhancements to recovery service provision</td>
<td>E – 1 to E – 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO FUNDING INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prepare</th>
<th>Assess needs</th>
<th>Solicit resources</th>
<th>Manage/distribute resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Prepare simple giving point(s)</td>
<td>- Convene discussions among funding intermediaries (and with service providers) for assessing victim needs</td>
<td>- Activate simple giving point(s)</td>
<td>- Convene discussions among funding intermediaries to ensure effective, efficient, and transparent distribution of funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Create informal network of funding intermediaries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Agree on common standards for transparency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# DETAIL ON PREPARING – FUNDING INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Prepare simple giving point(s)</td>
<td>• Association of funding organizations/ community-wide funding organization</td>
<td>• Issues addressed should include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other funding organizations</td>
<td>- <strong>Which funds</strong> should be involved, including whether they are joint and whether general or specific to the disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Key messages</strong> about fund uses and purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Channels</strong> for solicitation (e.g., through Internet, media, workplaces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create informal network of funding intermediaries</td>
<td>• Association of funding organizations/ community-wide funding organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other funding organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agree on standards for transparency</td>
<td>• Association of funding organizations/ community-wide funding organization</td>
<td>• Standards should help each organization set out and explain policies on issues of concern to potential donors, including policies on types of assistance, victims served, use of funds for services vs. cash benefits, time frame for assistance, and administrative expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other funding organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## DETAIL ON ASSESSING NEEDS – FUNDING INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Convene discussions among funding intermediaries (and with service providers) for assessing victim needs | **Lead** • Association of funding organizations/ community-wide funding organization • Other funding organizations | • These discussions should seek comprehensive participation by  
  – Including organizations familiar with different socioeconomic, ethnic, linguistic, and regional populations affected by a major disaster  
  – Coordinating with other sectors to ensure needs are widely understood, especially when needs are beyond the resources of funding organizations (e.g., assistance to large numbers of unemployed or to small businesses)  
• The discussions should be on-going to monitor and re-assess needs that may emerge or change over time |
## DETAIL ON SOLICITING RESOURCES – FUNDING INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Activate simple giving point(s)</td>
<td>• Association of funding organizations/</td>
<td>• Publicizing the giving point(s) should be a key message included in the overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community-wide funding organization</td>
<td>communication plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other funding organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- The table above outlines the responsibilities for various activities in the context of soliciting resources for funding intermediation.
- The "Lead" column lists the primary responsible parties, while the "Others" column includes additional contributors.
- The "Key considerations" column provides additional guidance or notes on how to approach these activities.
# Detail on Managing/Distributing Resources - Funding Intermediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Key Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Convene discussions among funding intermediaries to ensure effective, efficient, and transparent distribution of funds</td>
<td>• Association of funding organizations/community-wide funding organization</td>
<td>• These discussions can improve <strong>effectiveness</strong> in achieving complete, non-duplicative coverage of victims’ needs by enabling each funding organization to know what others are doing to address those needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other funding organizations</td>
<td>• These discussions can improve <strong>efficiency</strong> by sharing best practices for grant-making processes and systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• These discussions can improve <strong>transparency</strong> by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Reassessing standards for transparency as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Developing clear understandings on issues related to fund distribution (e.g., achieving equity of assistance among victims)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Identifying and explaining differences in fund policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Designing key messages and providing background information to be included in the overall communication plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO VOLUNTEER INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prepare</th>
<th>Assess needs</th>
<th>Solicit resources</th>
<th>Manage/ distribute resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Develop plan to affiliate pre-event volunteers with service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop profiles of needs for unaffiliated volunteers during a disaster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate training for nonprofits in effective use of unaffiliated volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate training for unaffiliated volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate development of a volunteer intake and matching system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop plan to keep volunteers safe and out of way of other responders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assess nonprofit needs for volunteers after a disaster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implement plans to keep unaffiliated volunteers safe and out of way of other responders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Activate/scale up volunteer intake and matching system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate training of more volunteers as necessary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continue to train nonprofits on how to use unaffiliated volunteers effectively</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B
### Detail on Preparing – Volunteer Intermediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Key Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Develop plan to affiliate pre-event volunteers with service providers</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermediaries, VOADs, response service agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Plan may include public messages, referrals of volunteers to nonprofits, and request for staff details from other nonprofits and businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop profiles of needs for unaffiliated volunteers during a disaster</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermediaries, VOADs, response service agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate training for nonprofits in effective use of unaffiliated volunteers</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermediaries, VOADs, response service agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate training for unaffiliated volunteers</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermediaries, VOADs, response service agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate development of a volunteer intake and matching system</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermediaries, VOADs, response service agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop plan to keep volunteers safe and out of way of other responders</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermediaries, VOADs, response service agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Volunteer intermediaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DETAIL ON ASSESSING NEEDS – VOLUNTEER INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Key Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Assess nonprofit needs for volunteers after a disaster</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• <strong>A hot-line</strong> should be available for nonprofits to report volunteer needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Volunteer intermediaries, VOADs, response service agencies</td>
<td>• Needs assessment must also include <strong>proactive efforts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>because many nonprofits may be too busy to ask for help or even possibly to respond to e-mail or phone calls; proactive system could include escalating contacts, such as:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Informal contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- E-mail and phone survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Deployment of outreach teams to conduct site visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Volunteer needs assessment should be done in <strong>coordination</strong> with other resource and victim needs assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>On-going monitoring</strong> should be established to track emerging and changing nonprofit needs for volunteers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Detail on Soliciting and Managing/Distributing Resources – Volunteer Intermediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Implement plans to keep unaffiliated volunteers safe and out of way of other responders</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermedaries, VOAAs, response service agencies</td>
<td>- Intake system should accommodate walk-ins, e-mails, and phone inquiries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Activate/scale up volunteer intake and matching system</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermedaries, VOAAs, response service agencies</td>
<td>- Intake/matching system should include regular communications with volunteers, who appreciate their efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate training of more volunteers as necessary</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermedaries, VOAAs, response service agencies</td>
<td>- Opportunities to express sympathy and grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continue to train nonprofits on how to use unaffiliated volunteers effectively</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer intermediary and association of service providers</td>
<td>• Volunteer intermedaries, VOAAs, response service agencies</td>
<td>- Being kept informed of overall situation, volunteer needs and roles, and impact of their efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO IN-KIND INTERMEDIATION

- Prepare
  - Develop profiles of needs for in-kind goods and services in disasters
  - Coordinate nonprofits with capacity to handle logistics of in-kind goods
  - Solicit agreements from businesses to donate in-kind goods and services if necessary
  - Coordinate development of a donated-goods intake, logistics, and matching system
  - Coordinate stockpiling of key goods
  - Prepare public messages about donated goods

- Assess needs
  - Assess nonprofit needs for in-kind goods and services after a disaster

- Solicit resources
  - Activate system for donated-goods intake, logistics, and matching goods to needs
  - Coordinate matching of in-kind services to needs
  - Implement communication plan about donated goods

- Manage/distribute resources

Appendix C
# DETAIL ON PREPARING – IN-KIND INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Develop profiles of needs for in-kind goods and services in disasters</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td>• A key service may include wholesale approach to payment problems due to lost personal and business income caused by disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate nonprofits with capacity to handle logistics of in-kind goods</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Solicit agreements from businesses to donate in-kind goods and services if necessary</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td>• In-kind services may include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Logistics for donated goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Information/communication systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Debt forgiveness/ moratoriums for disaster victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate development of a donated-goods intake, logistics, and matching system</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate stockpiling of key goods</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prepare public messages about donated goods</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Responses and recovery service agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• FEMA, state/ local government, service providers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other resource intermediaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Messages should identify needed goods and discourage donation of unnecessary goods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DETAIL ON ASSESSING NEEDS – IN-KIND INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Assess nonprofit needs for in-kind goods and services after a disaster</em></td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td>• As for volunteer needs assessment, in-kind needs assessment should include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other resource intermediaries</td>
<td>- A <strong>hot-line</strong> for nonprofits to report in-kind needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Proactive efforts</strong> to reach out to nonprofits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Coordination</strong> with other ongoing efforts to assess needs of victims and non-profits seeking to assist them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- <strong>Ongoing monitoring</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DETAIL ON SOLICITING AND MANAGING/DISTRIBUTING RESOURCES – IN-KIND INTERMEDIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Activate system for donated-goods intake, logistics, and matching goods to needs</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td>• Business associations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate matching of in-kind services to needs</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td>• Response and recovery service agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implement communication plan about donated goods</td>
<td>• Lead volunteer/funding/ in-kind intermediary</td>
<td>• Other resource intermediaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROPOSED ENHANCEMENT TO RESPONSE SERVICE PROVISION

**Prepare**
- Build and maintain informal network among nonprofits
- Establish or participate in communication network to alert service providers of disaster
- Develop profiles of disaster response needs
- Develop plans to improve transition of victims from response to recovery services
- Assist nonprofits and philanthropies in developing business continuity plans
- Develop a plan for simple entry point(s) for victims seeking services and assistance
- Develop a plan for collecting and sharing information on victims and services

**Assess needs**
- Supplement assessment of response needs with organizations leading the response (e.g., emergency management agencies and VOADs) as necessary

**Develop service plans**
- Support response organizations and supplement their service provision as necessary
- Coordinate transition of victims from response to recovery services
- Implement communication plan to explain services to victims

**Deliver services**
## Detail on Preparing — Response Service Provision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Key Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Build and maintain informal network among nonprofits</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>Nonprofit service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Networking should extend across diverse communities and across jurisdictional lines in a region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish or participate in communications network to alert service providers of disaster</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>Nonprofit service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop profiles of disaster response needs</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>Nonprofit service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop plans to improve transition of victims from response to recovery services</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>Nonprofit service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assist nonprofits and philanthropies in developing business continuity plans</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>Nonprofit service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop a plan for simple entry point(s) for victims seeking services and assistance</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>Nonprofit service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Key issues include providing complete information; managing referrals, technologies, and confidentiality; and accommodating multiple languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop a plan for collecting and sharing information on victims and services</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>Nonprofit service providers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Key issues include common data elements, database architecture, technology platform, training users, and confidentiality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## DETAIL ON ASSESSING NEEDS – RESPONSE SERVICE PROVISION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Supplement assessment of response needs with organizations leading the response (e.g., emergency management agencies and VOADs) as necessary</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>• Lead response agencies have experience in and systems for assessing victim needs; however, an extreme disaster may exceed past experience and stretch existing systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DETAIL ON DEVELOPING RESPONSE SERVICE PLANS AND DELIVERING RESPONSE SERVICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Support response organizations and supplement their immediate response service provision as necessary*</td>
<td>* Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider *</td>
<td>* Nonprofit service providers *</td>
<td>* Key messages include*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Coordinate transition of victims from response to recovery services *</td>
<td>* Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider *</td>
<td>* Nonprofit service providers *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Implement communication plan to explain services to victims *</td>
<td>* Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider *</td>
<td>* Nonprofit service providers *</td>
<td>– How immediate victim needs will be met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Anticipated transition to recovery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO RECOVERY SERVICE PROVISION

- Prepare
  - Develop profiles of anticipated disaster recovery needs
  - Identify potential capacity shortfalls for disaster recovery and develop plan for addressing them
  - Agree on standards of operation and train service providers in achieving those standards
  - Create advisory/governance structure to lead recovery process

- Assess needs
  - Participate in discussions with funding intermediaries for assessing victim needs

- Develop service plans
  - Convene discussions among service providers to coordinate recovery
  - Implement communication plan to explain services to victims

- Deliver services
### DETAIL ON PREPARING – RECOVERY SERVICE PROVISION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Develop profiles of anticipated disaster recovery needs</td>
<td>• Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider</td>
<td>• Service providers, government emergency management agencies</td>
<td>• Staff is likely to be a key constraint on capacity; as a result, plans for filling capacity gaps may focus on ways to borrow staff, solicit in-kind services, and arrange staffing details</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Identify potential capacity shortfalls for disaster recovery and develop plan for addressing them | • Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider            | • Service providers, government emergency management agencies          | • Key areas for operational standards include  
  - Record-keeping  
  - Data confidentiality  
  - Financial systems  
  - Personnel systems  
  - Supporting recovery workers |
| • Agree on standards of operation and train service providers in achieving standards | • Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider            | • Service providers                                                    |                                                                                                                                                   |
| • Create advisory/governance structure to lead recovery process           | • Association of nonprofit service providers/ major service provider            | • Service providers                                                    |                                                                                                                                                   |
# DETAIL ON ASSESSING NEEDS – RECOVERY SERVICE PROVISION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Key considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Participate in discussions with funding intermediaries for assessing victim needs</td>
<td>- Advisory/governance group</td>
<td>- Service providers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Key considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Convene discussions among service providers to coordinate recovery</td>
<td>• Advisory/governance group</td>
<td>• Service providers</td>
<td>• Key coordination issues include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Reassessing standards of operation and modifying them as necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Identifying unmet resource needs and coordinating with resource intermediaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implement communication plan to explain services to victims</td>
<td>• Advisory/governance group</td>
<td>• Service providers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. What improvements in emergency preparedness have been noted in the Nation’s Capital?

I believe there are three notable areas of improvement (among others) that the healthcare system in the District of Columbia has achieved, post 9-11 and especially since the receipt in December 2007 of the Department of Health and Human Services Coalition Partnership Grant. These areas are:

**Collaboration**

All of the members of the DC healthcare community have joined together under the auspices of the DC Emergency Healthcare Coalition — that has never happened before. The five (5) million dollar Department of Health and Human Services Coalition Partnership Grant that WHC is administering has largely led to the creation of the Coalition. The Coalition is composed of hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes working with the Poison Center, mental health, public health and FIRE and EMS. The Coalition’s Emergency Management committee is meeting twice monthly to discuss planning and response issues and to craft through various work groups needed policies and procedures. In addition, joint training materials have been created and a city wide exercise is being planned for June 26th.

**Planning**

The Coalition has created a number of important planning documents. The Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) outlines the basic tenants of the healthcare system’s response to planned or unplanned events. Among the attachments to the plan are a Communication Annex, PIO Annex and soon there will be an Evacuation Support Annex. Each of these Annexes specifically addresses some aspect of emergency response and how the system response will be coordinated and supported. Parts of the EOP have been used to provide guidance for the city’s response to the current H1N1 flu outbreak.

Coalition planning efforts have included reaching out to colleagues in Northern Virginia and Maryland. For example a new NCR Hospital Incident Information Sharing Procedure has been
written and is rehearsed on an every other month basis. The procedure was also used quite effectively during the Inauguration.

**Technology Availability and Utilization**

Using money provided from the HHS Coalition Partnership Grant, the Hospital Mutual Aid Radio System (HMARS) has been updated to comply with newly forthcoming FCC bandwidth standards. The number of users has also been expanded to ensure more complete alert and notification capability. To insure effective communication with our partners in Northern Virginia and Maryland new HMARS radios were placed in their hospital Coordination Centers.

The DC Department of Health has issued new 800 mgHz radios to each hospital for more direct communication in an emergency. The system also serves as a redundant capability to the HMARS radio should it fail.

The Healthcare Information Sharing System (HIS), a web based system for sharing various forms of information among all of the Coalition partners has been expanded and redundant servers purchased to insure dependability. The HIS has been the principle way information has been provided on a daily basis during the H1N1 healthcare system response. The Hospital Coordination Centers in Maryland and Virginia have been given access to HIS so they are able to learn what information is being disseminated to our healthcare system. In turn, DC has been added to their web based information sharing capability.

2. What area does the Metropolitan area need to improve upon?

**Increased inclusion of hospitals into senior decision making process**

Hospitals are an integral part of the District of Columbia and National Capital Region response system and yet we are not included as full members of the Council of Governments. While police, fire/EMS and public health have direct access to influencing policy decisions and funding priorities hospitals are not equal partners who can directly speak for themselves, especially when grant funding decisions are made. They must often times rely on public health to make their case. While public health officials are supportive and understand hospital requests they are often not sufficiently versed in the day to day operational issues of a hospital to advocate as well as a hospital spokesperson can. The recent traffic control decisions surrounding road closures during the Inauguration is an example of policy being set without consultation with hospitals. The consequences were a great inconvenience, hardship and resulted in increased operational costs for the hospitals.

**Receipt of intelligence information from law enforcement**

Timely, accurate, and complete information is vital to an emergency response. While the DC Department of Health has greatly improved their commitment and capability to share information with the healthcare community, local and federal law enforcement remains somewhat reticent to do so. Whether for operational or security reasons, law enforcement’s reluctance to share what they know, especially during an emergency, can potentially have
adverse impact on the healthcare system, particularly the hospitals when criminal activity or terrorism is involved.

**Funding support for hospital and healthcare system preparedness**
The infusion of funding associated from the HHS Coalition Partnership Grant has provided the opportunity for a diverse, yet vital series of advancements in healthcare system preparedness that has been achieved over the past eighteen (18) months. The funding has been used not only to buy much needed equipment and consultant assistance, but also to reimburse the Coalition members for time and effort spent on attending meetings, crafting procedures as well as participating in training and exercising. Non-profit organizations such as the DC Primary Care Association and DC Health Care Association and all District of Columbia hospitals operate within an exceptionally thin profit margin. Their operating budgets have traditionally limited the amount of money set aside for emergency preparedness in favor of daily patient care and other needed operating priorities. The infusion of grant funding has been a major contributing factor to the success of the coalition and the noteworthy progress that has been made. The HHS Coalition Partnership Grant expires September 09. Several of the initiatives implemented with this funding will have on-going operating costs and work in several other planning and response areas still needs to be initiated. The current economy will significantly handicap the Coalition members from investing significant monies into continuing the work that has been started. The absence of any additional federal dollars will also increase the likelihood that continued progress will be much slower coming and in some cases might not be seen at all.

3. Has the ER One ever had a test run of their capabilities?

Portions of the ER One concept have been tested successfully. However, because funding for the construction of ER One has not been forthcoming from the federal government, the full ER One has not been built and so the complete ER One concept in its entirety has never been able to have a comprehensive test run of its underlying design concepts. This was to be exactly one of the goals of building ER One; to serve as a laboratory and test bed for new concepts, new approaches, and new technologies in the delivery of emergency care in a mass casualty incident.

In the interim while we await the full federal funding of ER One, Washington Hospital Center has moved ahead and tested certain concepts in training and through its Bridge to ER One (explained below).

The Washington Hospital conducts six (6) - eight (8) exercises annually. These exercises include mini drills that focus on specific functional areas (i.e. Emergency Department, Hospital Command), response procedures (i.e. patient registration, alert/notification), tabletop exercises for Executive staff and full scale exercises where all areas of the hospital are involved. These exercises exceed the Joint Commission expectation that one internal and one external drill is conducted per annum. At least once if not twice annually the hospital drills with other DC community responders including other hospitals, police, Fire/EMS, Public Health and Homeland Security and Emergency Management.

In addition to general emergency preparedness training and exercises the hospital provides quarterly training for the Emergency Department personnel and members of the volunteer Team Decon members who would be responsible for putting on personnel protective equipment (PPE)
in order to decontaminate (wash off) victims contaminated with chemical agents or radioactive substances. Team Decon personnel come from throughout the hospital and include clinical and non-clinical personnel. The training provided includes classroom instruction on response procedures and specialty topics as well as practical work such as dressing in PPE, setting up and conducting decontamination on ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients of all ages.

Additionally, key components of ER One have been tested in an emergency department expansion space called the “Bridge to ER One.” The Bridge to ER One was a 10 room expansion of the Emergency Department at Washington Hospital Center. It was completed in April 2007, and resulted in the addition of a net of 18 patient care bays to the Washington Hospital Center ED, the busiest emergency department serving adults in the District of Columbia.

Because the Bridge to ER One space is testing only the patient care bay aspect of ER One, it has not permitted us to evaluate other key design features of the full ER One design, specifically the extensive front end forward evaluation rooms (which can be transformed into full treatment rooms during a surge incident), the public (i.e. “waiting”) space convertibility into clinical care space, and the whole portal concept where advanced screening diagnostics can occur before the patient has even set foot in the main building space.

4. What was the result of the test run?

On the training side, the frequency and variety of drills conducted by the Washington Hospital Center give those responsible for leading preparedness needed insight into areas that require procedure revision (i.e. revise alerting procedure) and/or specific focused training (i.e. use of radiation detector, conducting triage/patient sorting).

Regardless of the type of training and exercise given, they traditionally have been well received and appreciated by those personnel who participated. Improved procedure and equipment familiarization and more efficient information sharing and teamwork are the most frequently seen benefits. Depending on the type of exercise conducted, a formal After Action Report (AAR) is written that outlines response strengths and weaknesses as well as a corrective action plan complete with the corrective actions to be taken, responsible party(s), and timeframe to completion; an AAR is also written after every real world emergency.

On the functional side, the Bridge to ER One tests proved to be highly effective in real-world situations. The design of the Bridge to ER One tested two key design features of ER One: 1) scalability by elasticity and expansibility (a capacity concept) and 2) every room a negative pressure isolation room. Both concepts have been tested and have passed muster.

Elasticity and expansibility are two strategies for managing surges in patient numbers. Elasticity means putting more people in the same space. Expansibility means recruiting contiguous space to provide clinical care. ER One rooms are sized in such a way that they are extremely comfortable and commodious for one patient and his or her family but they can easily accommodate two or even three patients during times of patient surge. The ER One design for caring for several patients in a patient care room has been a success. Washington Hospital
Center Emergency Department volume has increased > 10% since the Bridge to ER One has opened (now approaching 250 patients per day) and the ED waiting times, left without being seen percentages, and patient throughput times have begun to decrease.

The second concept that has been tested in the Bridge to ER One is having every patient care room be a negative pressure isolation room. (In a standard 30 bed emergency department, there are typically only one or two negative pressure isolation rooms). Every room in the new Bridge space is a negative pressure isolation room. In addition, the ventilation system in the Bridge provides 15 air exchanges an hour with 100% nonrecirculated air (i.e. 100% fresh air from the outside; the main emergency department space has 8-10 air exchanges an hour with only 30-50% of the air coming from the outside, i.e. 50-70% recirculation). During the swine flu epidemic, ED protocol placed every patient who was suspected of having influenza directly into one of the new negative pressure isolation rooms in the Bridge space. This system of patient placement worked extremely well and permitted the rest of the Emergency Department to continue to function to care for all the non-infectious emergencies while potentially contagious patients were cohorted in the negative pressure rooms of the Bridge space.

5. What weaknesses in the system were acknowledged?

Problem areas that have been discovered in the recent past include alert messaging not being universally received, the need for improved efficiency in patient registration, and tracking patient location. These problems and any others that are discovered are critically analyzed and practical solutions sought by who are responsible for the completing the task and not just those responsible for emergency preparedness.

6. Please explain the facility design of the ER One and its ability to maximize capacity and capability

ER One was designed around three core concepts: capacity, capability, and protection. ER One capacity goals were to be able to go from 1X (normal state) to 4-5X number (surge state) of patients without having catastrophic degradation in the delivery of medical care services. Its specialized capabilities were designed to be able to handle highly contagious or contaminated patients. And in terms of protection, ER One was designed to be able to keep operating in the face of a terrorist attack, collateral damage from an attack nearby, or from the outage of a major utility. The design goals of ER One are to be able to handle 2000 patients per day, 200 patients per hour for two hours, and 400 simultaneous patients, decontaminate 500 patients per hour, and house >100 highly contagious patients.

ER One has been designed to serve both as a clinical care facility to manage the daily emergency needs of the National Capital Region and as a demonstration facility for the medical management of a high consequence event for the whole nation. This is an important concept because the ER One design team recognized early on that in order for ER One to be successful, it had to be part of the daily fabric of hospital life for two reasons: 1) without the constant test and refinement of the ER One systems and processes of patient care, there would be no assurance that those systems and processes of care would work during a mass casualty incident; and 2) it would be
hard to justify spending large amounts of money on a project that would be utilized only on very infrequent occasions.

7. Can you provide the Subcommittee with records of funds given to the Washington Hospital Center?

**FY09 Funding:**
- $10 million in competitive grant from DC from Tobacco Settlement funds for Bridge to ER One

**FY08 Funding:**
- $312,000 for ER One facilities and equipment at WHC – LHHS Appropriations Bill
- $5 million from HHS competitive grant for regional surge solutions

**FY06 Funding:**
- $3.5 million for Bridge to ER One - THUD Appropriations Bill ($2.5 million in HUD section, Community Development Fund, $1 million in DC section, Office of the Chief Financial Officer)

**FY05 Funding:**
- $1.29 million for ER One Schematic Design - Labor/HHS/Education Appropriations Bill, HRSA Account
- $2 million from DC Government for ER One Schematic Design

**FY04 Funding:**
- $3.75 million for Emergency Enhancements - DC Appropriations Bill, Federal Payment for Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness in DC

**FY03 Funding:**
- $5 million for Emergency Enhancements - DC Appropriations Bill, Federal Payment for Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness in DC
- $3 million from DC Department of Health for other emergency upgrades

**FY02 Funding:**
- $2.5 million in a discretionary grant from HHS for ER One effort
FY00 Funding:

- $2.2 million grant through the HHS Office of Emergency Preparedness for the design study portion of ER One

8. Please walk us through the Hazard Vulnerability Analysis

The Joint Commission, which accredits healthcare facilities in the United States, has outlined a requirement that hospitals annually conduct an objective evaluation of the internal and external threats to the facility. The Washington Hospital Center (WHC) meets this requirement by using a tool published by Kaiser Permanente to conduct a comprehensive analysis to identify the likely threats. The last survey done at WHC in late 2008 identified the top internal threats to include: fire, flooding, and workplace violence. The top external threats include bad weather, mass casualty incidents, and terrorism. Once identified, the Emergency Preparedness Committee and personnel from ER One then create response plans for each of the top emergencies in both categories. These risks are also used as the themes for the various types of exercises that are annually conducted.

As part of the HHS Coalition Partnership Grant given to the WHC on behalf of the DC Emergency Healthcare Coalition, a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis for the entire healthcare system was conducted in 2008 for the first time. Once again the Kaiser Permanente tool was used to complete the analysis. The results were shared with all of the Coalition partners and used to help determine what response plans are needed from a system support perspective. The Coalition has begun to write response plans related to healthcare facility evacuation, public information sharing, and information sharing.
District of Columbia Healthcare Facilities Emergency Care Partnership Program

Washington Hospital Center

Craig DeAsey, PA-C Project Director

Realization Management Office (RMO)

Program Evaluator

Emergency Management Work Group – Elected Chair

DCIA Hospitals
- Children’s National Medical Center
- George Washington University Hospital
- Georgetown University Medical Center
- Howard University Hospital
- National Rehabilitation Hospital
- Providence Hospital
- Shirley Memorial Hospital
- VA Medical Center

DCIA Hospitals Cen.
- Washington Hospital Center
- Walter Reed Army Medical Center
- Greater Southeast Community Hospital
- Riverside Hospital
- Psychiatric Institute of Washington
- Specialty Hospital – Hattie
- Specialty Hospital – Capitol Hill

Primary Care Clinics
- DC Primary Care Association
- Unity Clinics
- Community Connections Mental Health Clinic
- Visiting Nurse Association

Private/Government
- Office of the City Administrator for the District of Columbia
- DC Department of Health
- DC Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency
- DC Fire and EMS
- DC Chamber of Commerce
- Office of Chief Medical Examiner
WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER
AT A GLANCE

Washington Hospital Center is the most suitable location for a demonstration facility in the Nation's Capital, as evidenced by the following compelling statistics:

- WHC is the largest and most comprehensive hospital in DC. It is three times the size of any other hospital (907 beds) in DC
- WHC manages 400,000 patient visits per year
- 75,000 emergency room visits per year (current ER was built in 1958 to hold only 30,000 patients)
- WHC is one of the 25 largest hospitals in the country
- WHC has the region's only burn center
- WHC is home to the region's highly acclaimed MedSTAR medevac helicopters and shock trauma service
- WHC is listed in the U.S. News & World Report List of "Best Hospitals" in the country
- WHC has historically handled Washington's toughest cases: all of the 9-11 MOST serious casualties from the Pentagon; 400 patients after the anthrax attack on the Hill and the Brentwood Post Office; the police officers shot on Capitol Hill in 1998; Officer Delehanty after he was shot with President Reagan; Air Florida crash into the 14th Street Bridge in the early 80s; 300 casualties during the 1968 riots
- Many of the design principles of ER One can be duplicated affordably at other hospitals around the country as a normal course of upgrading their aging facilities
News Release

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, September 27, 2007

HHS Awards $25 Million in Health Care Partnership Emergency Care

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) today awarded $5 million health care partnership emergency care grants to five health care partnerships. The recipients were selected via a competitive process aimed at improving hospital surge capacity, emergency care system capability, and community and hospital preparedness for public health emergencies.

"The program found five emergency health care partnership projects that can serve as best practices examples for the nation's public health community," said HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, RADM W. Craig Vanderwagen, M.D., USPHS.

The projects selected to receive grants are focused on:

- Helping integrate public and private emergency care system capabilities with public health and other first responder systems through periodic preparedness and response capabilities evaluation via drills and exercises; and integrating public and private sector public health and medical donations and volunteers;
- Improving the efficiency, effectiveness and expandability of emergency care systems and overall preparedness and response capabilities in hospitals, other health care facilities (including mental health and long-term care facilities), and trauma care and emergency medical service systems, with respect to public health emergencies; or
- Developing plans for strengthening public health emergency medical management, and the provision of emergency care and treatment capabilities.

The five lead grant award recipients for each partnership project are:

- Children's Hospital Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif.
- The Regents of the University of California, Davis, Calif.
- Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indianapolis, Ind.
- Rhode Island Hospital, Providence, R.I.

###

Washington Hospital Center Application | RFA # DOH_JICAP_10.10.08 | Upgrading Emergency Care Capability | 261
Testimony of Jeff P. Delinski
Deputy Chief, Special Operations Bureau
Metro Transit Police Department
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Before The
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings and Emergency Planning

Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region:
Experiences, Capabilities and Weaknesses

April 3, 2009
Good morning and thank you, Chairwoman Norton, for inviting me to testify on behalf of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). I am Jeff Delinksy, Deputy Chief of the Special Operations Bureau for the Metro Transit Police Department, and I welcome the opportunity to address the Committee’s theme of Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region, and specifically the critical role that WMATA plays in the region's preparedness and response to emergencies.

**Background**

As you well know, WMATA was created in 1967 from an interstate compact to plan, develop, build, finance, and operate a balanced regional transportation system in the National Capital area and has been operating both bus and rail transit since 1976. The transit system has grown to encompass 106 miles of track running through 86 rail stations, 332 current bus routes servicing over 14,000 bus stops, and is supported by dozens of transit facilities. This makes WMATA the second largest subway system and seventh largest bus system in the nation. In short, WMATA is a far-reaching system servicing 3.5 million people living in an area roughly the size of Rhode Island. We operate in the District of Columbia, the State of Maryland, and the Commonwealth of Virginia, in five counties and three cities.

We provide on average over 1.2 million rides on weekdays transporting tourists, local residents, and commuters, making WMATA an important contributor to the health and vitality of the regional economy. The Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) is responsible for a variety of law enforcement and public safety functions in transit facilities throughout the Washington, DC metropolitan area. Existing as the first and only tri-jurisdictional police agency in the country, the MTPD has 423 sworn officers, 106 security special police, and 24 civilian personnel. Day in and day out, MTPD is focused on supporting WMATA’s goal to provide the “Best Ride in the Nation.”

The geographic location and role of the District of Columbia as the nation’s capital present a number of vulnerabilities and hazards for the region. It is unfortunate, but inevitable, that unexpected incidents can and do happen in a community of this size. Since the inception of WMATA, safety has remained our primary focus coupled with quick response and resolution of emergencies. Whether a small Metro-specific incident or a regional emergency, our first priority is keeping our passengers, employees, and the
public safe. As has become routine, WMATA will respond to incidents and emergencies in partnership with our local first responders to protect lives, preserve property, and restore service.

**WMATA Emergency Management History**

In 1995, the sarin chemical attacks in the Tokyo Subway served as a wakeup call for transit police departments around the world. More recent attacks on mass transit systems, as seen in Israel, Madrid, London, and Mumbai, further demonstrate the need for effective transit emergency management. Although our rail and bus systems have not experienced these types of attacks, WMATA remains alert and aware of the threat of terrorism. In 2008, the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) investigated 224 suspicious packages and people, 9 unknown substances, and received 20 bomb threats to our facilities. We are vigilant; yet a terrorist attack could occur. Moreover, the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the devastation of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and even the recent floods in North Dakota emphasize the support and resources mass transit systems can contribute during natural disasters and non-terrorist related emergencies. Not only are transit systems critical for moving people away from potential terrorist threats and natural hazards, they may also provide temporary sheltering, traffic routing and control, as well as movement of emergency supplies, personnel, and equipment.

WMATA has a history of providing emergency response training and outreach to our regional public safety partners. WMATA opened the Emergency Response Training Facility in 2002, a first of its kind facility in the United States dedicated to transit. It is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week to provide the knowledge and skills necessary for first responders, including military, law enforcement, fire, emergency medical service personnel, and WMATA employees to respond to a transit emergency. The facility includes a 260-foot tunnel, two Metrorail cars, and a simulated electrified third rail for mock fire and rescue exercises. The tunnel is used for terrorism, disaster, and tactical response drills. The facility also houses the nation’s first passenger rail emergency evacuation simulator. The emergency evacuation simulator can roll a passenger commuter rail car 180 degrees (upside down) in 10 degree increments, simulating railcar positions after derailments or other rail incidents. WMATA has used the “rollover rig” to train fire, police, and other first responders on the complications
associated with rescuing people from a rail car that has rolled over on its side or even upside down. Since its opening, more than 15,000 people have been trained at this facility, which has earned a national reputation.

In 2004, Metro Transit Police launched a training initiative entitled “Managing Metro Emergencies.” The training was devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings in addition to a recent series of service disruptions that forced thousands of customers to evacuate the Metrorail system. During a two year period, the “Managing Metro Emergencies” course provided over 5000 regional law enforcement, fire and rescue, department of transportation, and WMATA personnel enhanced training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting, and recovering from a major service disruption in our system. The course put particular emphasis on enhancing the management of pedestrian and vehicle traffic when forced to temporarily evacuate rail stations due to service disruptions. The course was so well-received by the region that Metro also offered an additional, more operational oriented course requested by the region’s fire departments.

Emergency management staff has provided training and outreach to a variety of stakeholders, developed emergency response partnerships with local response agencies, and participated in a variety of programs designed to improve prevention and response to emergency incidents and planned events. Additionally, the emergency management staff is responsible for outfitting and maintaining Metro stations with equipment and tools that can save lives in the event of rail incidents or emergencies, including:

- Emergency Track Evacuation Carts and cabinets
- Automated External Defibrillators
- Emergency Medical Services cabinets
- Station fire maps

**WMATA Emergency Management Present and Future**

Emergency management is based on identifying gaps in training and response and developing strategies for meeting those needs. It is my pleasure to announce that WMATA has recently intensified its focus on emergency management activities by creating an Office of Emergency Management within the Metro Transit Police Department. In December of 2008, Mr. Peter LaPorte was hired to report directly to the Chief of Police as the Director of the Office of Emergency Management. Mr. LaPorte has over
20 years of experience in state- and local-level public safety, including serving as the Executive Director of the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency from 1999 to 2003. He has coordinated nine Presidential-declared disasters including floods, blizzards, Hurricane Isabel, and the Washington District’s response to the 9-11 events.

Since his first day he has been working to enhance both external and internal relationships and to build an emergency management staff. With the recommitment of six internal staff and the hiring of five personnel, Mr. LaPorte has created a team that has over 200 years of transit-based incident response and emergency management experience. With backgrounds encompassing fire services, law enforcement, HazMat response, emergency medical services, fire protection systems, emergency management, incident command, structural engineering, construction, radio communications, transit operations, and transportation planning, the emergency management staff has a range of skills that contribute to a well-rounded, knowledgeable team.

While the Office of Emergency Management will continue to conduct training and improve our response to incidents, it will also oversee a new training initiative involving the delivery of Incident Command System (ICS) Training to an estimated 8,000 WMATA employees. The training will be delivered at awareness, operational, and command levels. Funded through the Department of Homeland Security’s Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) and regional Urban Area Security Initiative funds, this program will raise awareness of security-related issues and instruct operational employees to implement the proper response procedures and command system structure during the initial and developing phases of a Metro-specific incident or emergency. This will allow WMATA to better manage resources and integrate with other local emergency response agencies. This same training is available for external public safety response agencies to prepare for incidents in the Metro system.

The emergency management staff has also committed to focusing attention on improving efforts for planning and recovery functions including:

- continually updating WMATA’s Emergency Operations Plan
- procuring emergency equipment and technology to improve response time
• establishing methods for seeking reimbursement funds due to special events or emergencies
• documenting after action reports for significant events and emergencies

Above all, partnerships with first responders and regional stakeholders are the foundation of effective emergency management. WMATA would not be able to manage emergencies without capitalizing on the strengths of our partner agencies. Continuance of frequent training and exercises, as well as ongoing involvement with the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) are the primary ways for building and improving our relationships with external agencies and departments. One of the many committees that WMATA sits on within the Council of Governments includes the Emergency Manager’s Committee which is composed of Emergency Management professionals from the COG member jurisdictions, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Federal partners.

WMATA’s Role in Special Event Planning

WMATA not only responds to emergency incidents, but is critically tied to the success of the numerous special events that take place in this region, such as the National Cherry Blossom Festival, Capitol Fourth of July celebrations, and designated National Security Special Events. The most recent of these large-scale National Security Special Events was the 2009 Presidential Inauguration which resulted in the largest crowd served in WMATA’s history. With a great deal of planning, preparation, and coordination in concert with numerous other regional players, including the United States Secret Service serving as the lead agency, WMATA’s goal was to provide service for all those choosing transit as their means of getting to and from the National Mall and other destinations on Inauguration Day. All of WMATA’s internal activities would have proved pointless had we not coordinated with the region-wide Inauguration planning effort.

The success on Inauguration Day is proof of not only WMATA’s ability to work within the region, but the region’s propensity to work together. And although it is sometimes overlooked, it is during pre-planning for events such as the Presidential Inauguration that relationships and networks grow and strengthen. It is because of the ability for the region to work together, and in some cases thanks to volunteers that came from all parts of the
nation, that WMATA is able to boast that we provided safe transportation for over 1.5 million individual trips on both bus and rail on Inauguration Day.

**WMATA Priorities and Capabilities during an Emergency**

WMATA is a key player in responding to large-scale incidents or emergencies. When an unplanned incident does occur in the National Capital Region it is our responsibility to ensure customer safety, minimize the delay, and get people moving again. Our first priority is to our regular customers. Whether that means getting people home or simply moving them away from danger, if WMATA is able to function safely and in manner that puts no one at risk, we will be providing the best transit service available.

WMATA’s actions on September 11, 2001 provide a good example of our ability to move large numbers of people during a regional emergency. On that day, WMATA’s General Manager and Chief of Police determined that there were no credible threats against the Metro system and decided to keep the system open to assist in moving people out of harm’s way and back home. Luckily, train operations were still working peak shifts and morning rush hour was extended to transport people back home. As a result, WMATA transported over 1 million people on bus and rail that day. If WMATA had shut down the system, these people would have been stranded in a city that was under attack. It takes equipment, personnel, and planning to keep buses on the road and trains in motion; any missing link can disrupt transit operations. Activating an aggressive transit emergency response takes all of the aforementioned components and, just as critical, substantial coordination with the region.

It must be said that while WMATA is willing and prepared to operate in less than ideal circumstances, we do have limits in our capacity to move passengers. Even in the best conditions, the region always faces traffic management challenges. WMATA in conjunction with its regional partners has been active in the development of the Metropolitan Area Transportation Operations Coordination (MATOC) program. MATOC is an area-wide situational awareness effort that enhances coordination between the region’s transportation providers. It is currently being developed with funding provided by Congress and is set to go operational in July of this year. Through this and many other efforts, WMATA will continue to strengthen its partnerships and always try to be responsive to requests from our regional
partners for assistance during an emergency, taking into consideration these challenges and our priority commitment to our everyday customers.

WMATA and the National Capital Region are dedicated to improving our emergency management capabilities. Much of this progress is due to funds appropriated by the federal government to make emergency management a priority for the region. It would prove beneficial if the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) specifically could provide more flexibility in the use of Transit Security Grant Program funds so that we can more adequately address our primary needs linked to emergency management and response. Thanks to your efforts and others in Congress, the overall funding level for the Transit Security Grant Program has increased significantly over the past two years – that’s the good news. Unfortunately, the TSA does not deem as a priority spending funds on emergency management activities such as purchasing equipment to assist first responders, enhancing emergency communications, and procuring other tools critical for mitigating the impact of an emergency.

**Conclusion**

While WMATA and the region have done a great deal in readying for and responding to emergencies and planning for events, continuing to invest in emergency management initiatives such as proper equipment, training efforts, planning processes, response measures, recovery protocols, and overall prevention techniques is imperative for enhancing the National Capital Region’s mobility, safety, and quality of life. The men and women of WMATA will continue to strengthen our capabilities and relationships with local, regional, and federal partners to ensure a safer, more secure, and better prepared region.
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
Jack B. Johnson, County Executive
Vernon R. Herron, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for
Public Safety/Director of Homeland Security

Testimony
Of
Mr. Vernon R. Herron

On behalf of
Prince George's County, Maryland

Before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
and Emergency Management
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
April 3, 2009
Washington, D.C.

I. INTRODUCTION
Good morning, Chairwoman Norton, Mr. Diaz-Balart, and Members of the
Subcommittee, my name is Vernon Herron. I am the Deputy Chief Administrative
Officer for Public Safety and Director of Homeland Security for Prince George's County,
Maryland. I appear before you today on behalf of one of the largest Counties in the
National Capitol Region. Currently, I also serve on the following committees, Statewide

Before I begin, I also want to take this time to thank Congresswoman Donna Edwards for her leadership in the critical issue of National Capitol Region public safety and for recommending that I appear before you today.

II. THE REALITIES FACING THE NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION

First, I want to take a moment to recall that Prince George’s County has testified on this issue before. In July of 2006, Prince George’s County Sheriff Michael Jackson testified before the House Energy & Commerce Committee on HR 5783, the Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act. In that testimony, Sheriff Jackson explained that warning the public of an impending disaster is a good first step, but not nearly enough to address the total reality of public safety in response to a large-scale disaster. We are pleased this hearing goes further than debating how we warn the public and discusses how we can lead and coordinate masses of people to safety.

Prince George’s County, Maryland is located in the heart of the Baltimore/Washington corridor. The county borders Washington, DC and is just 37 miles south of the City of Baltimore. The County’s population exceeds 820,000 with a daily work population of well over one million. Covering an area of close to 500 square miles, the County is home to many businesses, as well as state and federal agencies. Some of the Federal agencies include NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Andrew’s Air Force Base, several Smithsonian support centers, the Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Beltsville facility, a Federal Records Center, a large Internal Revenue Service office complex, and the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Center for Weather and Climate Prediction. Additionally, a large portion of the region’s Metro system and Interstate 95 pass through Prince George’s County.

Fortunately for most communities in America, the threat of terrorism remains just that; a threat. However, the United States has experienced several heinous acts of terrorism and wide-spread natural disasters which caused devastation and catastrophe. And 9/11 was an example of this devastation and catastrophe for New York, the National
Capitol Region and the entire United States. Therefore, Prince George’s County is in a prime position to offer perspectives on how to address the need, impact, and practicality of orchestrating large-scale public safety response.

III. RESOURCES, OPERATIONS, COORDINATION AND FUNDING IN-PLACE TODAY
Coordinated planning across the National Capital Region (NCR) will greatly assist the utilization of limited resources available to support evacuation and sheltering of residents, citizens and visitors to the NCR. Actual emergencies are inherently unstable and consist of rapidly changing events whose outcome may be difficult, if not impossible to predict. Resource sharing will be necessary in order to ensure the region can efficiently manage a major evacuation or sheltering event.

Prince George’s County works closely with MEMA and FEMA to ensure all resources needed are being utilized in the most efficient and effective manner. Locally, we have executed MOUs with the Board of Education to provide for emergency access and use of our 216 Public Schools located throughout the County. Although there is adequate number of public schools to shelter thousands of citizens, we do not have enough resources to open every school or multiple schools simultaneously, and handle our daily responsibilities.

The actual location and size of the shelter/school is determined by the number of people being displaced. Elementary and Middle schools are primarily used for small capacity and/or short term sheltering. High schools are used for long term and large capacity sheltering. For small events, the closest school outside the hot zone will be selected for sheltering. In the event that multiple shelters will be needed to house large number of citizens for an extended period, we have pre-selected two mega shelters, Ritchie Coliseum in the northern portion of the County and Show Place Arena in the southern portion both are capable of sheltering several hundred people.

The Ritchie Coliseum is located on both Metro rail and Metro Bus routes. Access to Showplace Arena will require bus transportation for residents without transportation. Both facilities provide for abundant parking allowing for residents to self evacuate if necessary.
Prince George's County also has pre-stocked mobile caches consisting of cots, blankets, pillows and personal hygiene kits ready for transport to any shelter location when needed. For larger shelter needs we have pre-positioned FEMA tractor trailers loaded with emergency shelter supplies ready to activate. Having immediate access to emergency supplies enables Prince George's County to mitigate, respond to, and recover from disastrous events. Disasters require coordination between our Public Safety departments, our Health and Human Services departments, as well as the other Emergency Support function (ESF) Agencies. Having these departments train and exercise together ensures that social service support and agency collaboration is available to assist during this trying time. The American Red Cross is also a major provider in assisting with all shelter operations, providing volunteers, and providing additional sheltering supplies.

In the event a full evacuation of the County is necessary, the County's transportation department has access to traffic cameras located at major traffic intersections. Using these cameras can alter the timing of traffic lights to reduce gridlock and facilitate smooth traffic flow. The experiences from past incidents reveal; vehicle evacuation requires a unified effort, and this will be required for the National Capital Region.

Regional Coordination is paramount to any effective response and recovery plan. To facilitate an effective recovery plan, the NCR has developed a regional video conferencing system. This video conference system uses its own data network lines which provide a direct link to every Emergency Operation Center (EOC) throughout the NCR. This direct link will work even when normal lines of communications have been rendered inoperable. We have determined that communication is the key to any successful recovery plan. The ability for senior officials from each jurisdiction to directly reach out and communicate with their neighbor in the NCR will not only enhance the recovery process but expedite the use of resource sharing and mutual aid. The need for video conferencing became evident during 911 when President Bush, while stationed on Airforce One was unable to video conference with his senior staff. The President was not able to address the public via the television. This flaw was one of the first concerns corrected in preparations for future events.
The MWCOG has played a major role in fostering regional communications. Through MWCOG, Senior Officials and Public Safety Chiefs and Directors of each ESF meet regularly to discuss issues and concerns that greatly impact jurisdictions' ability to coordinate, communicate and collaborate during emergencies and disasters.

Prince George’s County communicates directly with MEMA. During any major event, MEMA is advised of the event and placed on alert that mutual aid may be required, if the event becomes overwhelming. Routine updates are provided in WebEOC to allow MEMA as well as the entire NCR to monitor the event as it unfolds. Once again, regional information sharing and communication is paramount to a successful emergency mitigation.

Prince George’s County depends on several Federal funding mechanisms to support the County’s operations. Those mechanisms include: 1) The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant; 2) COPS Law Enforcement Technology Program; 3) Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants; 4) Byrne Discretionary Grants; 5) American Recovery Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds. These funding streams are critical to our continued ability to deliver public safety services and response capabilities. The FY2010 House Budget Resolution decreases the public safety function authority by $5 billion while increasing the outlay by only $1 billion. This discrepancy gives us pause as we are not able to provide as much public safety response to the NCR with cuts to important programs such as the ones I listed above.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In examining the state-of-operations today, we would make the following recommendations:

• First and foremost, we must keep UASI whole and urge a FY2010 budget set not below $900 million ($837.5 million was the FY2009 enacted amount); Strive for greater coordination and communication between local governments and FEMA including the conducting of unified NCR drills and exercises;

• Establish clear and efficient reporting structures between local governments, FEMA, and the Executive Office of the President. In a disaster, authority and
authorizations need to move quickly thus requiring that FEMA have a direct line
to the President and local governments have a direct line to top FEMA officials;

- Establish mechanisms for emergency expenditure reimbursements. If local
governments are going to assist in Federal emergency response activities, there
needs to be a clear path by which those local governments can seek
reimbursement for those costs;

- Provide the Council of Government’s Senior Policy Group, of which I am a
member, direct access to FEMA support representatives during a disaster. Time
is of the essence and response time is critical.

V. CHALLENGES AHEAD

9/11, Hurricane Isabel, Hurricane Katrina, and the massive crowds of this past
inauguration have all taught us valuable lessons regarding large-scale public safety
response. However, if we are to move forward with the entire NCR en-sync, then more
coordination will need to be established and critical Federal support can not be stripped
away. Does the NCR have a unified alert system? Are all local governments fully
interoperable within themselves and all other jurisdictions of the NCR? Does the NCR
regularly conduct response drills? Is there a coordinated NCR plan for FEMA, and are
all local government entities completely versed with this plan? These are the questions
we should be asking moving forward. Prince George’s County is prepared to be a leader
in answering those questions.

I want to thank the Subcommittee for calling this hearing today and the
Chairwoman for allowing us to speak regarding this important matter. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
May 11, 2009

Michael Obrock
Staffer
Committee for Transportation and Infrastructure

RE: Congressional Subcommittee Hearing Questions

Dear Mr. Wellenkamp:

Attached are my responses to Mr. Mike Obrock’s follow-up questions to your April 3, 2009 subcommittee hearing testimony.

- Heron – I was pleased to read about the regional video conferencing system. Are all the regions tied into this system, Montgomery County; DC; Northern Virginia?
- How many emergency operations centers are there throughout the region?

There are 19 jurisdictions which are members of the Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments (COG) that are tied into the video conferencing system. Each of these video conferencing systems is located in that jurisdiction’s emergency operations center. A list of the member jurisdictions is provided below.

- District of Columbia
- City of Bowie
- City of College Park
- Frederick County
- City of Gaithersburg
- City of Greenbelt
- Montgomery County
- Prince George’s County
- City of Rockville
- City of Takoma Park
- City of Alexandria
- Arlington County
- City of Fairfax
- Fairfax County
- City of Falls Church
- Loudoun County
- City of Manassas

14741 Governor Oden Bowie Drive, Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20772
(301) 952-4131 • TDD (301) 985-3894
City of Manassas Park
Prince William County

○ Herron – what recommendations can you make regarding clearer and more efficient reporting structures between governments?

The jurisdictions located within the National Capital Region have taken a significant step toward providing a clearer and more efficient reporting structure by creating a uniform resource list for equipment and supplies. Previously, a single term could have had a different definition to each jurisdiction around the region. The creation of the resource typing list provides for a clearer picture as to the resources available throughout the region. Another significant improvement has been monthly COG meetings among the regional decision makers. These meetings have provided for a common venue to share, discuss and remedy issues and concerns that may have occurred in one jurisdiction but not another.

○ Herron – as you are aware the Chair and I have introduced a bill to make FEMA an independent agency. We believe an independent FEMA could better achieve the quickness of response you mention on page 6 of your testimony. Do you have an opinion on an independent FEMA?

I concur with your assessment of making FEMA an independent agency. Emergency response assistance needs to be prompt in order to mitigate the possible effects of a disaster. If FEMA were reinstated as an independent agency, the amount of time needed to prepare for and respond to an event could be significantly reduced. Katrina’s lesson learned is a clear example of the need to have an independent FEMA agency.

Should you require additional information, please contact me on 301-952-4431.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Vernon R. Herron
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public Safety/Director of Homeland Security
TESTIMONY OF LINDA C. MATHES
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
AMERICAN RED CROSS OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA

Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
United States House of Representatives

Introduction

Chairwoman Norton and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to appear today on behalf of the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area. My name is Linda Mathes, and I am the Chief Executive Officer of the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area.

For more than 125 years, our nation has relied on the American Red Cross in times of disaster. The Red Cross provides shelter, food, clothing, emotional and other support to those impacted by disasters in communities across the country and around the world. We supply nearly half of the nation's blood. We teach lifesaving skills to hundreds of thousands of people each year, and we support and provide invaluable resources to the members of the military and their families. Whether it is a hurricane or a heart attack, a call for blood or a call for help, the Red Cross is there. The American Red Cross of the National Capital Area, with a ratio of approximately 55 volunteers to each paid staff member, provides relief to victims of disaster and empowers people in our community to prevent, prepare for, and respond to disasters and other life threatening emergencies. The American Red Cross of the National Capital Area is responsible for providing services to the following jurisdictions:

- District of Columbia
- Fairfax County, VA (including the cities of Falls Church and Fairfax)
- The City of Alexandria, VA
- Arlington County, VA
- Prince William County, VA (including the cities of Manassas and Manassas Park)
- Loudoun County, VA
- Montgomery County, MD (including the cities of Gaithersburg, Rockville, and Takoma Park)
- Prince George’s County, MD (including the cities of Bowie, College Park, Laurel, and Greenbelt)

The issue we are discussing today, “The Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region: Experiences, Capabilities and Weakness” is of utmost importance to me and my Red Cross colleagues. Due, in large part, to support and funding from the United States Congress, local government, the coordination and collaboration with various nonprofit organizations, support from the business community, and the generous financial and in-kind contributions of the American people, we as a region and a nation have continued to strengthen our ability to respond to disasters.
Brief Overview Of Mass Care And The American Red Cross

In 2008, the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area responded to over 550 disasters of all types including single and multi-family fires, flooding, power outages, and even a hurricane.

In one example, the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area responded to a massive, five-alarm fire that destroyed an entire apartment building in the Mount Pleasant neighborhood of Northwest DC, displacing more than 200 individuals from their homes. During the tragic incident, the local Red Cross provided care and support to the affected families, and continues today to provide follow up services as residents cope with the devastation they experienced. The Chapter spent over $150,000 for food, shelter and medical care.

We rely on a network of nearly 900 trained disaster workers from the local community – the greatest number of them volunteers – who have a deep commitment to helping their neighbors in time of trouble. In addition, the Red Cross has the capacity to manage large numbers of spontaneous volunteers during major incidents. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when more than 7,000 evacuees found refuge in the metropolitan Washington area, the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area trained and deployed more than 2,000 local volunteers who saw the need and wanted to help. Those volunteers include those who join the relief effort on their own accord, but also through relationships that have been built up between the Red Cross and local churches, synagogues, and mosques, through other community organizations such as Greater DC Cares, 100 Black Men, and the Nonprofit Roundtable and through established relationships the Red Cross has maintained for many years with groups like the Salvation Army, Southern Baptist Convention Disaster Services, and Catholic Charities.

Our model for disaster services is collaborative, diverse, and inclusive; it takes the entire community to deliver an effective response to a large-scale event.

For purposes of my testimony I would like to highlight some important points relative to the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area:

- The Disaster Response Plan of the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area addresses the challenges and opportunities that are unique to the National Capital Region.
- The American Red Cross of the National Capital Area collaborates with nonprofits and government partners, including outreach in emergency preparedness and disaster response to the special needs community, community organizations, faith-based institutions, businesses, and schools.

While we continue to improve upon our state of readiness in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, we recognize that challenges still exist, and we know that, with added resources, we can expand our reach and improve our ability to best serve the residents, workers, and guests who live in our community.

The American Red Cross Of The National Capital Area Disaster Response Plan

The Emergency Services Program of the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area is designed to provide innovative and effective disaster planning and preparedness that will increase the capability of people and communities to respond and recover from a disaster. This disaster plan:

- Identifies the possible disaster risks within the National Capital Region and their anticipated effects
- Provides the framework for responsive, consistent, and timely relief assistance to those affected by disaster
- Describes the American Red Cross in the National Capital region’s capability to respond
- Provides procedures for managing the Red Cross’ resource
- Promotes a spirit of cooperation and mutual support between the Red Cross, the community, and local emergency management officials
In accordance with the mission of the American Red Cross, during a disaster relief operation the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area will:

- Provide a safe and supportive environment to meet the needs of residents forced from their homes by the threat or occurrence of a disaster event
- Provide food and other basic recovery items at fixed sites or mobile units throughout the disaster area to support clean up and restoration efforts
- Staff the local government emergency operations centers and contact and/or coordinate with local government and partner relief agencies
- Assess the impact of the disaster
- Conduct public affairs and disaster fundraising activities
- Provide clients with excellent customer service from their first encounter with a Red Cross worker until all of their emergency needs have been met.
- Provide information, communication, and reunification to family members separated or out-of-touch due to the disaster event

Hazard Risk Assessment

The Response Plan also identifies the hazards that threaten the chapter’s jurisdiction, determines the risk these hazards pose, and assesses the impact of the hazard upon the community. In cooperation with local offices of emergency management, the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area has analyzed the hazard potential for its jurisdictions in order to adequately prepare for disaster response.

Severe Weather (High Probability) - Analysis shows that severe weather, including thunderstorms, snow, and ice storms, blizzards, high wind storms, and tornadoes, is the most significant hazard affecting the National Capital Region. Severe thunderstorms occur frequently in the area and can generate very destructive winds and heavy rains. Historically, thunderstorms occur on an average of 30 days per year. Although they may occur in any month, about 75 percent occur during the months of May through August. In the summer months, severe thunderstorms result in electrical power outages, downed trees, local flooding, flash floods, and property damage. In the winter months, the area is vulnerable to major snowstorms, such as the ice storm of January 2000 and the blizzard of February 2003.

Fires (High Probability) - Fires constitute the next most serious hazard in the jurisdiction. While the probability of a large-scale conflagration engulfing many city blocks is very low, the Chapters in the region do consistently respond to a high number of smaller fires, particularly single family homes, apartments, and other multi-family dwellings. Other potential related risks are industrial and technological hazards, which might include radiological and hazardous materials incidents. The Red Cross has the resources to handle most fire incidents. In 2008, we responded to more than 500 such local disasters, most of which received little or no publicity. The most pressing problem that has arisen in the past is obtaining sufficient hotel rooms in the District of Columbia at the height of tourist season or when a large meeting or convention is taking place in the city.

Transportation Accidents (High Probability) - Transportation accidents represent the third most important hazard. Three large airports (Ronald Reagan National, Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall, and Dulles International) serve the Washington, DC metropolitan area, as do numerous highways, rail, bus, and subway systems and the navigable waterway of the Potomac River. This extensive transportation network brings people and products, including hazardous materials, into and through the National Capital Region at an ever increasing pace. Many people who live in the surrounding areas enter the District of Columbia in the morning to work and return home in the evening. Tourism, the District’s largest industry, also brings 17 million people per year into the city. This heavy volume of traffic makes a transportation accident involving mass casualties a very real possibility. The Red Cross has sufficient resources to support local officials in response to a
transportation accident. These incidents often only require a short term response involving the normal range of Red Cross services.

Special Events (Medium Probability) - The National Capital Region, in particular Washington, DC, has a long history of large gatherings of people for various purposes, including peaceful demonstrations, protest marches, and planned and unplanned acts of civil disobedience, as well as periodic celebrations such as the Independence Day fireworks and the recent Presidential Inaugural. All such gatherings present some level of risk. The American Red Cross in the National Capital Region routinely staffs the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency’s Emergency Operations Center during such events and has contingency plans in place should an incident occur. The American Red Cross in the National Capital Region has the resources to staff that EOC and other emergency operations centers throughout the region with a trained Red Cross government liaison to better interface and collaborate with our government partners.

Terrorism (High Probability) - The National Capital Area faces growing and increasingly serious threats related to various types of terrorism. As the Nation’s Capital, the District of Columbia is the primary seat of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government as well as much of the command structure for the nation’s defense. This geographic area contains many potential targets that would result in a special impact, both locally and nationally. Potential targets include monuments, landmarks, military installations, government and public buildings, and softer targets such as hotels and large buildings where people work and live.

American Red Cross Services

The Disaster Response Plan of the American Red Cross in the National Capital Region provides direction for the provision of specific services following a disaster including:

Sheltering - Well-identified shelters are often the first sign of relief efforts to people in affected communities. These facilities address basic human needs for food and shelter, and their prompt establishment is essential. Sheltering people affected by disaster may include congregate sheltering in facilities such as schools, churches, or other large facilities, or the use of commercial facilities, such as motels and hotels, as shelters for individuals or families. Shelters may be opened in anticipation of a disaster, during an evacuation, or after a disaster occurs. The Red Cross usually initiates sheltering activities in coordination with government and/or emergency management or with other community organizations.

Through effective partnerships, the Red Cross also engages community agencies and their resources to ensure that shelters meet the needs of individual communities, their residents, and the various partner agencies that may provide sheltering assistance in an emergency. In certain instances, the Red Cross may be asked to provide shelter for rescue workers and similar groups when housing is unavailable through the organization the workers represent. Congregate housing may also be required for Red Cross disaster staff when other housing in the disaster-affected area is limited or at the onset of an event. With the support of Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant funding in recent years the American Red Cross in the National Capital Region has expanded its capacity to shelter affected individuals to 15,000, including supplies for over 600 people with disabilities. These supplies were available during the aftermath of the flooding caused by Hurricane Hanna just last year in northern Virginia. These supplies are stored in a warehouse and forward deployed in 56 trailers throughout the region. The Red Cross has surveyed shelter spaces for 56,000 individuals, or 112,000 individuals in an evacuation situation.

Feeding - The Red Cross will provide regular meals in its shelters as well as emergency feeding through mobile distribution and additional fixed sites for affected families and individuals and workers throughout the affected area. Food service may also be provided for emergency workers or other groups providing disaster relief at the discretion of the administering unit. Mobile feeding is critical to meeting the immediate needs of affected communities and establishing the presence of Red Cross relief efforts. It is provided from vehicles to affected families and individuals and relief workers.
returning to and cleaning up disaster-damaged homes. Mobile feeding may also be provided in instances of severe disruption to power and other utilities. With UASI support and increased partnerships throughout the community, we have increased our immediately accessible feeding capacity to 35,000 meals per day and have recently partnered with the Pennsylvania Avenue Baptist Church in the District of Columbia to host a Disaster Kitchen Training course during the recent regional leadership training conference to increase local capacity to cook and serve safe, nutritious meals during an emergency situation.

**Bulk Distribution** - In some disasters, essential items that clients need to assist their recovery might not be immediately available in the local area. In such cases, the Red Cross will initiate distribution of items such as comfort kits, clean up kits, water, ice, shovels, insect repellent, or other items that may be needed. The Red Cross determines appropriate distribution items to meet client's needs based on the circumstances of the event in coordination with community partners and government. When bulk distribution is appropriate, prompt action to procure and mobilize the needed resources is essential because the window for providing such assistance to clients is often very short.

**Disaster Health Services** - The relief operation ensures appropriate health care workers are available at shelters, emergency aid stations, feeding sites, and other service delivery sites as needed. The initial focus is on the direct needs of disaster victims and emergency workers, including Red Cross paid and volunteer staff, although most staff health needs will be handled by Staff Health Services.

**Disaster Mental Health Services** - Mental health services are provided at service delivery sites and other appropriate settings to people affected by the disaster. The Red Cross supports and assists community mental health providers in meeting the needs of disaster victims. Because mental health services may be provided only by licensed or certified mental health professionals, the relief operation must prioritize this service to locations of greatest need until additional resources are available.

**Individual Client Services** - At the onset of a disaster relief operation, the Red Cross immediately starts planning for the delivery of individual assistance. Although some types of assistance depend on an accurate assessment of the damage, individual assistance must be initiated as soon as possible. Individual assistance is accomplished by identifying the pressing needs of the client, be they clothing, medicine, eyeglasses, etc, and providing the capacity for the client to replace those items. Assistance is based solely on need and is completely free to the client.

**Safe And Well Information** - Chapter paid and volunteer staff responds to calls from concerned family members and provide information about available resources that can help families communicate with one another during times of emergency. In addition, Red Cross staff process requests that focus on those family members who have serious health problems and are in an area affected by a disaster. Within the disaster affected area and through the use of tools like our Safe and Well website, the Red Cross helps individuals and family members to communicate with family and friends outside of the affected area.

**Outreach to the Special Needs Community**

In developing mass care and sheltering capacity throughout the community, the American Red Cross in the National Capital Region works with the National Organization on Disabilities (NOD) to ensure that services and shelters are accessible to people with disabilities. Some of the results of our collaboration include:

- Reviewing all our shelter surveys for ADA compliance
- Identifying in general, and on specific location levels, how we can best set up our shelters to be more accommodating to people with special needs
- Working with NOD and other subject matter experts (including experts from FEMA, Maryland Department of Disabilities, Assistive Technology Industry Association, and the Spinal Cord Injury
Association) to identify specific items that need to be available in shelters to make them more accessible to people with disabilities.

Additionally, the American Red Cross in the National Capital Region worked with the District's Office of Disability Rights to help coordinate the ADA requirements for the inaugural events with all agencies of the DC Government and Federal partners, and we ensured that all shelters opened for the Inauguration were ADA compliant.

With our other chapter partners, we are working to coordinate and expand our language bank to be sure that we have the capacity to effectively communicate with those with limited skills in English. Currently, we have the capacity to translate in more than 15 languages, but for a metropolitan area where five times that number of languages are spoken, there is still much to do.

Nonprofit Community, Government And Other Partner Collaboration

The nonprofit community in this region is better prepared than we were in 2001. In September 2003, the Greater Washington Task Force on Nonprofit Emergency Preparedness developed "A Blueprint for Emergency Preparedness by Nonprofits." As identified in the report, the nonprofit sector is crucial to a comprehensive emergency preparedness and operations. Furthermore, the nonprofit, public, and private sectors are part of a three-legged stool of effective emergency response and mass care planning. To this end, I would like to highlight and comment on some of the Blueprint's specific goals:

- To build on and reinforce collaboration among nonprofits
- To ensure coordination with other sectors and geographies
- To create transparency and ensure accountability throughout the sector
- To be flexible enough to respond to changing needs and to innovations in service delivery and resource intermediation
- To be generic enough to apply to a variety of communities

The American Red Cross of the National Capital Area staffs the local Emergency Operation Center(s) (EOC) with Red Cross Government Liaisons who collaborate with their government and nonprofit agency counterparts for the appropriate resources needed for the operation. This staffing provides a direct link between the government agency most directly responsible for the event and the Red Cross and the resources that we can bring to bear to support that government agency.

The Red Cross takes a lead role in actively working with the local VOADs (Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster), which are coalitions of independent voluntary agencies that meet regularly to ensure a coordinated community response that addresses the needs of victims and minimizes overlap of services in the event of a disaster. There is no formal system for requests for assistance; rather the VOAD leadership is contacted with the request by phone.

The Red Cross is also involved with the local FEMA Emergency Food & Shelter Program Boards in the jurisdictions. This program supplements the work of local social service organizations within the local areas, both private and governmental, to help people in need of emergency assistance.

The American Red Cross of the National Capital Area also serves as the coordinating agency for the National Capital Area Case Management Cooperative (CMC) for nonprofit agencies providing long-term case management for disaster victims. I am charged with calling for the activation of the CMC to assist with the long term case management of the disaster victims and can also activate the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN) during a disaster relief operation.

I am pleased that the American Red Cross of the National Region is playing a significant leadership role in the community to foster a partnership around emergency preparedness and response. Specifically, I serve as the Chair of the Regional ESF-6 Committees for Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services. In addition, the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area serves as a member of several Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments committees including the regional preparedness...
working group and the human services group. Dr. Joseph Scuito, Senior Director, Emergency and International Services, and I work closely with all of the Emergency Managers in the region to coordinate on key issues, such as preparation for any contingency that may have occurred during the 56th Presidential Inaugural. Other partnerships include the following:

- Chapter staff sat on the US Secret Service and DC presidential inaugural committees.
- Chapter staff continue to sit on USSS Health and Medical Subcommittee for National Special Security Events in the National Capital Region.
- We have initiated and expanded our collaboration with DC government on the development of shelter planning. We are currently planning a joint tabletop exercise with DC to further refine shelter plans.
- We provide support to the DC National Guard during major special events including setting up canteens and warming shelters during the inauguration.
- We worked with Save the Children to provide support kits for children in shelters during the inauguration. This partnership is ongoing to provide children’s shelter kits throughout the region should shelters become necessary.
- We are currently working on Memoranda of Understanding with FEMA Region III to access equipment and supplies from FEMA stockpiles during an incident.

Many other organizations and agencies provide disaster relief and support and the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area establishes strong partnerships with these agencies to coordinate disaster activities for the maximum benefit of the affected people and communities.

To ensure effective disaster readiness and response, the Red Cross has established relationships with partner community agencies. While our national headquarters seeks out and negotiates partnerships with national-level agencies and organizations, our local chapters make those partnerships come alive by establishing and nurturing local relationships.

Opportunities And Challenges Impacting The American Red Cross Of The National Capital Area

The Red Cross has made substantial progress addressing the many issues of complex disasters. Through our relationship with our national office and a network of chapters throughout the country, resources can be diverted to the Washington area in the event of a major calamity. Nevertheless, the level of resources locally is limited and a number of challenges still exist.

- As an organization dependent upon contributions from the public, the availability of funding limits the progress we can make. We have been fortunate and very grateful for the support of the Congress in funding preparedness through UASI. We have received grant money that has allowed us to acquire nearly 70 vehicles devoted to disaster response. Trailers, outfitted with shelter supplies are strategically placed in some 56 areas around the region. Trucks are available to transport more supplies. Some stockpiles of meals, cot, and blankets, water and clean up kits, and other disaster supplies are available locally, but they will accommodate only a small percentage of the potential need in the event of a major disaster. The funding and that of some corporate partners has allowed us to stand up a state of the art Regional Disaster Coordination Center at our facility in Fairfax. It has provided for Mobile Command Centers, one for each side of the river.

- Volunteers are the backbone of the system of support the American Red Cross can provide. The ability to recruit and train more volunteers and to turn them loose on a community that must prepare itself is critical to long term success in surviving a major calamity. We continue to need to recruit and train more volunteers, first to prepare them to provide service in the event of a disaster, but also to saturate the community with the training and support to allow people to prepare themselves and their families. A region-wide communication campaign can provide the backdrop to encourage people to join the fight for ultimate preparedness.
Supplies are a key to immediate response. Although we currently have the supplies available, they are warehoused in a facility with a lease that will expire shortly. It is critical that the warehousing capacity handle up to 30,000 square feet of supplies and we are interested in building pre-fab warehouses that are immune to leases and unpredictable agreements with corporate or government partners.

Ready Rating Program

In February 2008, the St. Louis Area Chapter of the American Red Cross launched the Red Cross Ready Rating Program, designed to engage and guide local businesses, schools, and organizations to prepare for disasters and other emergencies. This membership program is currently being pilot tested in the St. Louis area, and I am hopeful the District of Columbia can launch a similar program in the near future.

By signing a membership agreement, participants commit to take steps to become better prepared within a year. They then utilize an online questionnaire tool that helps them assess their disaster vulnerabilities and discover where they “rate” in the process of developing and implementing an emergency response plan. Once they understand their level of preparedness and what still needs to be done to be fully aligned with the program, the website offers information and examples to help achieve their goals.

This program encourages community preparedness in multiple ways. Participating members receive a Ready Rating Member Seal to display on their websites or otherwise show that they are committed to being more prepared. Part of their evaluation “rating” looks at the group’s actions and effectiveness when it comes to encouraging and strengthening disaster preparedness within their own community. In effect, this helps groups look beyond their immediate preparedness needs to identify ways they can help their communities get better prepared, such as holding a blood drive. Additionally, membership is renewed annually and based on continual improvements in preparedness from one year to the next. Since the project’s launch in St. Louis in February, 37 groups have signed on to this program including 11 businesses, 18 schools and 8 community organizations.

Conclusion

To summarize, Madam Chairwoman, I am confident that we as a region and as a nation are better prepared for disasters than at any time in our history, but we have more work to do. The goal of the American Red Cross is to ensure that every family, every business, every school, every faith-based and community organization is prepared for disasters and life-threatening emergencies. With your support and that of the United States Congress we can and must reach that goal. Thank you.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL NAME</th>
<th>STREET ADDRESS</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>PHONE</th>
<th>E911</th>
<th>POOL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alum Bank Elementary School</td>
<td>1150 Libertarian St</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-355-6120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria High School</td>
<td>8200 Cameron Rd</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-657-3120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop O'Donovan Prep School</td>
<td>6000 Connecticut Ave</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke High School</td>
<td>3210 Hill St</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-548-2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central High School</td>
<td>6010 Connecticut Ave</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Park High School</td>
<td>3600 College Park Rd</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornerstone Elementary School</td>
<td>2501 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.C. Corporate Center</td>
<td>2500 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edsall Elementary School</td>
<td>4000 Edsall Rd</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falls Church Elementary</td>
<td>3930 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort McNair Elementary School</td>
<td>2029 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort McNair High School</td>
<td>2029 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanover High School</td>
<td>3600 Connecticut Ave</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Branch Elementary</td>
<td>2501 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Branch High School</td>
<td>2501 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland Lutheran School</td>
<td>2501 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Vernon School &amp; Recreation Center</td>
<td>2501 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Henry High School</td>
<td>2501 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah V. Taylor Elementary</td>
<td>3001 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC Williams High School</td>
<td>3220 New Hampshire</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>703-828-6900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- All phone numbers are in the format 703-xxxx-xxxx.
- The pool column indicates whether the school has a pool (1) or not (0).
- The ADA column indicates whether the school is ADA compliant (1) or not (0).

**Schools and Addresses:**
- Alum Bank Elementary School, 1150 Libertarian St, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Alexandria High School, 3210 Hill St, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Bishop O'Donovan Prep School, 6000 Connecticut Ave, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Burke High School, 8200 Cameron Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Central High School, 6010 Connecticut Ave, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- College Park High School, 3600 College Park Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Cornerstone Elementary School, 2501 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- D.C. Corporate Center, 2500 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Edsall Elementary School, 4000 Edsall Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Falls Church Elementary, 3930 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Fort McNair Elementary School, 2029 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Fort McNair High School, 2029 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Hanover High School, 3600 Connecticut Ave, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Long Branch Elementary School, 2501 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Long Branch High School, 2501 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Maryland Lutheran School, 2501 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Mt. Vernon School & Recreation Center, 2501 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Patrick Henry High School, 2501 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- Sarah V. Taylor Elementary School, 3001 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042
- TC Williams High School, 3220 New Hampshire Rd, Alexandria, VA 22314-3042

**Additional Notes:**
- All schools are located in Alexandria, VA.
- Phone numbers are provided for contact purposes.
- The pool column indicates whether the school has a pool (1) or not (0).
- The ADA column indicates whether the school is ADA compliant (1) or not (0).
1. Did the relocation and case services provided for Katrina victims serve as a dress rehearsal for a major disaster in the metropolitan region?

In many ways, the evacuation of several thousand people from the Gulf Coast to the Washington metropolitan area following Hurricane Katrina did allow the American Red Cross and our partners to rehearse and assess the response to a major disaster in the National Capital Region (NCR). Engaging in long-term sheltering and extensive casework, plus managing volunteers and donations following Hurricane Katrina allowed us to refine our plans and procedures in the event of a major incident in the region.

However, the Katrina evacuation did not cover the full range of requirements of catastrophic incidents. During the Katrina response, we were able to take advantage of many infrastructure resources of the NCR such as industrial kitchens and transportation assets, which will most likely be severely disrupted or non-existent in a catastrophic emergency. In order to be able to meet these resource needs in the event of damage to local infrastructure, the National Capital Region needs to increase our capacity and our partnerships including building the capacity of all of the public and private organizations responsible for an effective response.

2. How did the American Red Cross create its Hazard Risk Assessment?

The hazard risk assessment is based on the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) produced by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments in 2007 and on hazard analysis and assessments obtained from the Offices of Emergency Management in the jurisdictions throughout the National Capital Region.

3. How would you characterize the level of coordination between the Red Cross chapters of the National Capital Area? Does the Red Cross participate in mock exercises?

The American Red Cross has recently structured its field operations to assign regional oversight to key chapters throughout the country. The American Red Cross of the National Capital Area serves as a regional headquarters and is responsible for the programs and direction of four chapters within the region – the Alexandria Chapter, the Arlington County Chapter, the Loudoun County Chapter, and the Prince William Chapter. In a disaster situation, we operate as a single organization in concert with our national organization and its national resources.

Following the terrorist attack on the Pentagon in 2001, the five chapters in the National Capital Region recognized the need to develop a coordinated capability to deal with major emergencies. In 2002, the Washington Metropolitan Area Consortium (WMAC) was formed and served as the basis for the current Red Cross structure.
Under WMAC, all Red Cross Chapters have agreed to assign their resources and personnel to a single Red Cross entity responsible service delivery.

Likewise, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) has formed similar partnerships among its members recognizing that while each government is responsible for the safety of its own citizens, response will cross jurisdictional boundaries. Although a great deal has been accomplished through cooperation among the MWCOG members, much remains to be done.

The Red Cross regularly participates in exercises, both internal and with our government, non-profit, and business partners. In the coming months, the Red Cross of National Capital Area will be holding an internal hurricane exercise as well as participating in a shelter tabletop exercise with several Washington DC government agencies.

4. Who does Red Cross training of volunteers? Do you do it in-house or under contract?

The American Red Cross conducts its training in-house and the majority of our classes are taught by volunteer instructors. Instructor candidates are our most experienced volunteers who complete a comprehensive series of disaster training courses. Once an instructor completes this training, he or she teaches in tandem with an experienced instructor to ensure the quality of the product and build experience and confidence in presenting the material.

In Fiscal Year 2008, the Red Cross of the National Capital Area trained 764 volunteers in functional disaster courses. We also provide training to partners in mass care and shelter operations to increase capacity in the event of a disaster in the National Capital Region.

5. Please explain the “Ready Rating” Program.

The Red Cross Ready Rating Program is an initiative developed by the St. Louis Chapter of the Red Cross. The program engages businesses, schools, community organizations, and other groups. Organizations that voluntarily join the Red Cross Ready Rating Program commit themselves to taking key steps to become better prepared. Participating groups must first complete an online assessment that identifies gaps in developing emergency response plans and encouraging preparedness within the community. Once the vulnerabilities are known, they are then provided information and resources to help become better prepared. The Ready Rating program forms a collaborative partnership between the Red Cross and the participating organizations to work together to strengthen preparedness in the community.

6. In terms of disaster planning and management, what are the challenges that make the National Capital Area unique?

The number of political jurisdictions and the respective authorities of those jurisdictions make the coordination of planning and implementation a challenge. Within the metropolitan area, we work with two states, the District of Columbia, the federal government and its various departments and bureaus as well as some 15 counties, cities, towns and municipalities. Each has its various ways of doing business.

The large transient and tourist population of the National Capital Region also increases its challenges. At any given time, there is a significant population present in the region that does not have a permanent residence and, therefore, limited resources in the community. In a large-scale disaster, these people would still require assistance, necessitating an increase in our response capacity.
7. In your testimony you mention lack of hotel rooms as being a particular problem here in the National Capital Region. How do you handle the shortage of hotel rooms?

The limited number of hotel rooms occasionally requires the Red Cross to utilize congregate sheltering in situations when hotels/motels would be preferred. Also, the limited number of hotel rooms requires us to house clients further away from their homes and jobs than is preferable. To assist in this situation, we have reached out to community centers and faith-based organizations to increase the number of smaller shelters available to handle single or small multi-family incidents.

8. How does the Red Cross make decisions regarding shelters? When does the Red Cross use hotel rooms in lieu of a school, or other large facility?

For incidents in which fewer than seven to ten hotel rooms are required to shelter clients, it is often more cost effective to utilize hotels/motels than congregate shelters. The use of hotel and motel rooms in these smaller incidents is also less disruptive to the client’s normal routine and that of the community.

9. What is the Red Cross’ sheltering capacity in the National Capital Region? Is that the optimum amount?

The Red Cross currently has the supplies and equipment to shelter 15,000 people and has surveyed potential shelter spaces to house 56,000 within the Washington metropolitan area in a non-evacuation situation. Based on guidelines that the Red Cross uses in planning for catastrophic situations, we assume that we will need the capacity to shelter and care for up to 500,000 people (nearly 10% of the population). Through our partnerships in the multi-state area surrounding the District, we have identified 718,000 additional shelter spaces. Ultimately, shelter capacity is constrained by building availability, volunteer availability and the availability of needed supplies.

10. How does the mobile feeding program work? Does the Red Cross own its own mobile vans?

When necessary, the Red Cross uses emergency response vehicles (ERVs) to serve kitchen-prepared meals along feeding routes throughout the affected community. In the National Capital Region, we have a variety of vehicles that can be used for feeding, including 4 national ERVs, 2 mobile canteens, and several food service trailers. This variety provides the American Red Cross in the National Capital Region with a flexible operating platform to meet the needs of the incident and the community.

In addition, the Red Cross partners with other major nonprofits, such as DC Central Kitchen, the Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention to supplement Red Cross feeding assets.

11. What type of individual assistance does the Red Cross provide? Who is eligible for individual assistance?

Locally, the Red Cross provides individual assistance to meet basic food, clothing, and shelter needs immediately following a disaster. All persons displaced due to a disaster are eligible for assistance based on their need. The amount of individual assistance depends on a standardized assistance plan as well as the size of the family affected and the amount of damage caused by the disaster.

A key component to individual assistance is one-on-one casework. This casework helps tailor assistance to individual needs, and also helps clients identify all resources in the community (in addition to the Red Cross) that may be able to help in their recovery.
12. Has the Red Cross ever participated in exercises including evacuations? If so, what is the number of evacuees?

To date, the Red Cross of the National Capital Area has not participated in any exercises that include evacuations. However, on May 19, 2009, we were scheduled to participate in a DC Shelter tabletop drill that will include a small scale evacuation.

The work done by various government entities and supported by the Red Cross for the annual July 4 celebrations, and the recent Presidential Inaugural were clearly considered to be related to a potential evacuation. Planning for those events consistently takes evacuation into account.

13. Please explain the number of volunteers in National Capital Region.

On June 30, 2008, which is the conclusion of our past fiscal year, the numbers of volunteers serving the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Registered</th>
<th>Registered for Credit</th>
<th>Unregistered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. District of Columbia</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Fairfax County</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Arlington County</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Alexandria</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Prince William County</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Loudoun County</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Montgomery County</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Prince George's County</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Multiple jurisdictions</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 5,049 115 3,756

'Registered' volunteers perform their volunteer work on an ongoing basis throughout the year. Volunteers who are 'Registered for Credit' include those who work with the Red Cross in order to fulfill some type of credit responsibility. This type of volunteer includes young people who need to participate in volunteer work as a school requirement or those performing court required service fall. 'Unregistered' volunteers are episodic in nature; their work relates to a specific incident.

Episodic volunteers are important to the implementation of a relief effort. Historically, in major disaster operations, individuals from within the community who have never before worked with the Red Cross present themselves to the organization wanting to help their neighbors. An important component of the Red Cross disaster program includes immediate training of such individuals to become part of the relief effort. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when several thousand evacuees left New Orleans and arrived in the Washington metropolitan area, more than 8,000 episodic volunteers supported the relief efforts here.

14. Is there a Red Cross plan for evacuation of the National Capital Area and have there been drills to prepare for such an event?

The Red Cross does not create plans for a mass evacuation. The safe evacuation of an area is a public safety matter as well as a mass care issue. As such, the responsibility for determining if an evacuation is warranted and for implementing that evacuation rests with local government. The role of the American Red Cross is to understand and contribute to the planning for such eventuality and to be prepared to support the pursuant mass care needs.

The Red Cross works closely with government agencies in the respective jurisdictions we serve both independently and through the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) to help ensure that any plans for an evacuation are comprehensive and meet the mass care and human service
needs of the community. While few drills in the past have addressed this type of event, the recent presidential inauguration provided an opportunity for an exercise in planning the emergency evacuation of downtown DC. An upcoming exercise sponsored by the District government will address a small scale evacuation within the District, and the Red Cross will play a key role in that drill. Evacuation planning remains a priority for the American Red Cross; we pursue this priority through annual exercises to test our response capability for various disaster situations.

15. Please provide a list of specific sites within the District of Columbia that are designated as shelters during a disaster.

The American Red Cross in the National Capital Region has surveyed and approved potentially available shelter space for approximately 56,000 persons. This space is generally the property of the respective local governments including schools, community centers, and other public buildings (although the Red Cross is now trying to establish partnerships with the faith-based community to make their facilities available in the event of an emergency). In an emergency, public buildings are declared shelters on an as-needed basis by local government. Once this declaration occurs, the American Red Cross staffs and operates the shelter. Of the total potential shelter space mentioned above, an estimated 17,500 spaces are in the District of Columbia.

A list of shelter sites that have been identified and surveyed by the American Red Cross is included with this report. Please note, the shelters contained within this list may or may not be opened during a specific disaster.

Additionally, the Red Cross locally has sheltering equipment (cots, blankets, etc.) to handle approximately 15,000 people. Because we are a national organization with centralized resources, the local Red Cross can access additional shelter supplies held in national storage facilities within hours of an incident. During Fiscal Year 2009, we have established a target to increase local sheltering equipment capacity to 25,000 including supplies and equipment for 5,000 people with special needs and 300 infants and children.

16. How does the National Capital Area’s volunteer-to-paid staff ratio compare to other major cities, such as San Francisco, Chicago and New York?

According to the American Red Cross’ Field Operations Consolidated Information System, through which all Chapters account for program and service statistics annually, on June 30, 2006, the following data was reported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Volunteers</th>
<th>Total Paid Staff</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Capital Area*</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>47.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater New York</td>
<td>5,037</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>15.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Chicago</td>
<td>3,775</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>25.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Area</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>30.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The National Capital Area Chapter administers a contract with NIH requiring the hiring of 28 employees that do not utilize volunteers and are not part of the normal menu of Red Cross programs and services. The ratio of volunteer to paid staff without these staff members is 67.17.

17. Please describe some of the measures the Red Cross and other organizations have in place for people with disabilities and/or special needs during an evacuation?

During an evacuation, one of the main roles of the American Red Cross is to provide shelter to people who are forced to leave their homes. The Red Cross has a variety of measures in place to ensure that people with a range of needs can be accommodated in Red Cross shelters. For example, the Red Cross reviews accessibility issues when it selects potential shelter sites and works closely with the owners of the facilities used as shelters to make temporary modifications to the building as necessary. We make reasonable modifications to our policies and practices if necessary to make our services available to
people with disabilities, and we provide auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities.

In addition, during the past several years, the American Red Cross has been working with the National Organization on Disabilities (NOD) and other governmental and non-governmental organizations (including the DC Office of Disability Rights) to ensure that our communities have the appropriate plans in place to address the sheltering needs of people with disabilities. Some of the results of our collaboration include:

- Identifying in general, and on specific location levels, how we can best set up our shelters to accommodate people with disabilities.
- Working with NOD and other subject matter experts (including FEMA, Maryland Department of Disabilities, Assistive Technology Industry Association, and the Spinal Cord Injury Association) to identify specific items that can be used to accommodate people with disabilities in our shelters.

Under the 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative mass care bundle, the Red Cross has purchased equipment that can be used in shelters to address the needs of people with disabilities such as ramps, shower and toilet assisting devices, feeding assist devices and special needs accessible cots.
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the public safety and consequence management capabilities of the United States Capitol Police. (Optional) I would like to make some brief opening remarks and with your permission, submit my written testimony for the record.

The U.S. Capitol Police accomplishes its mission through a variety of functions to provide comprehensive, around the clock protection for the Congress, the legislative process, the Capitol Complex, and the millions of visitors from across the globe that come to see democracy at work. In an effort to maximize our ability to prepare for and respond to incidents affecting public safety, the U.S. Capitol Police specifically focuses on key internal capabilities which, when necessary, can be augmented by specialized resources from our partners in the National Capital Region.

Our current internal capabilities show the rewards of several years of investment in training, robust command and control systems, and physical security improvements. Providing security, protection and law enforcement services to the United States Congress within the Capitol Complex in a post 9/11 threat environment is a challenging task. To do this, we rely on the provisions of Title 2 USC 1961, which states “Capitol Police shall police the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds under the direction of the Capitol Police Board”, and 40 USC 5104, which states, “except as authorized by regulations prescribed by the Capitol Police Board, persons may not carry on or have readily accessible to any individual on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm, a dangerous
weapon, explosives, or an incendiary device."
We have recently made a number of
high profile gun, explosive, and dangerous weapons arrests through interdiction and
security screening.

As the host law enforcement agency for many events of national significance,
we understand that working with our many partners in the National Capital Region
and sharing our resources is imperative. In recent years, we have worked hard to
improve our interoperability with local agencies such as D.C. Fire Department and
Metropolitan Police Department as well as our federal partners in the National
Capital Region including FBI, US Secret Service, FEMA, HHS, and the Department
of Defense.

The planning for such events involves an all-hazards approach, an
appropriate risk analysis, an event specific threat assessment, and a comprehensive
crisis management plan to ensure we are prepared to implement appropriate
protective measures with little or no notice. As an example, the U.S. Capitol Police
successfully implemented a mass notification and evacuation of more than 8,000
people at two consecutive July 4th concerts in 2006 and 2007, and two Aircon
evacuations, one during the former President Reagan’s State funeral, demonstrating
our ability to move large amounts of people to safety, while maintaining the security
and integrity of all Legislative facilities. These evacuations were based on the
imminent threat of severe weather creating unsafe conditions for our visitors or a
perceived air threat to the Capitol complex.

I would also like to acknowledge the relationship we enjoy between the
United States Capitol Police and the Capitol Police Board. The support, guidance,
and oversight provided by this entity, allow the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the U.S. Capitol Police planning to maintain a direct path and ensures consistent messages are provided across Capitol Hill. Consistent communication with this body ensures that we will be able to elicit additional resources if they are required. This process has been utilized effectively in the past, allowing U.S. Capitol Police to supplement its resources and/or extend the abilities of the resources we have on hand every day.

That concludes my opening remarks, I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Testimony of
Peter Nickles
Attorney General

Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region:
Experiences, Capabilities, and Weaknesses

United States House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairwoman

April 3, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Chairwoman Norton, members of the Committee, staff, and guests: my name is Peter Nickles, and I am the Attorney General of the District of Columbia. Thank you for the opportunity to present this statement on the impact on homeland security in the nation's capital of the amendment to the D.C. House Voting Rights Act (S. 160) proposed by Senator John Ensign (R-NV) (the "Ensign Amendment").

I would like to first take a moment to update you about the additional legislative action taken by the District of Columbia since the US Supreme Court issued its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. As previously stated to the Committee, the District government — both the Executive and the Legislative branches — fully respects the Supreme Court's decision. Most recently, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted and the Mayor signed into law permanent legislation continuing the District's compliance with the Heller decision. Together these laws affirm District residents' right to register handguns and possess them for self defense within the home.

All of the District's legislation has been carefully crafted to comply with the Court's decision in Heller. Justice Scalia underscored the District's authority to regulate firearms under the Second Amendment when he stated:

> Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

*District of Columbia v. Heller,* 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (U.S. 2008). Consistent with Justice Scalia's opinion, the District, like many states, has determined that assault weapons and certain unsafe firearms, are not eligible to be registered and possessed.

Some of the misinformation about the District gun laws needs to be corrected. Shotguns, rifles, and handguns — including many semi-automatic models — can all be registered in the District. Indeed, rifles and shotguns (including many semi-automatic versions) were never prohibited at all, and residents have been able to register many semi-automatic handguns since September 16, 2008. Since the Heller decision alone, more than 400 handguns and 160 long guns have been registered. Although there is currently only one licensed firearms dealer in the District, the free market will likely address that. Besides getting a firearms dealer license from
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) and from the District, it is no more difficult to open a dealership than a restaurant. And the District is certainly not alone in requiring a firearms dealer’s license—17 states do so as well.

However, the Ensign Amendment goes far beyond mere compliance with _Heller_. Most importantly, the Ensign Amendment would repeal the District’s ban on assault weapons. The city’s ban is similar to the federal ban in place until 2004. This ban was not unconstitutional; the federal law had a sunset provision after 10 years, at which time it was allowed to expire, and authority reverted to the states. In all, 10 states ban or regulate assault weapons, with five states having provisions similar to that of DC. Even the ATF has described assault weapons as “large capacity, semi-automatic firearms designed for rapid fire, combat use…Most are patterned after machine guns used by military forces.” Certainly the District’s ban of these weapons is a reasonable exercise of its regulatory authority.

Critics of the District’s ban will argue that criminals can get assault weapons anyway. The use of assault weapons by criminals is a growing problem in cities across the country, as we saw most recently in the tragic incident in Oakland in which two law enforcement officers were killed by a parolee with an assault rifle. Fortunately, however, assault weapons do not currently have a strong presence in DC. Last year, of the more than 2,500 illegal firearms recovered by police, only 1 percent were assault weapons. Certainly a determined criminal could get an assault weapon. And if our assault weapons ban were merely repealed, anyone eligible to purchase a firearm under federal law would be able to.

But the Ensign Amendment goes beyond that by taking the unprecedented step of allowing District residents to purchase firearms in Maryland and Virginia, which would have a significant impact on the ability of the entire region to regulate firearms—including assault weapons. Nowhere in the nation are residents allowed to purchase a firearm in another state without going through a federally licensed dealer in their own state. As Martin O’Malley, Governor of Maryland, has warned Congress, his state would not be able to properly regulate firearms purchased by District residents. Maryland does not have the necessary expertise to interpret District laws, much less the many possible dispositions under the city’s criminal justice system. The result would be that even people who are prohibited under federal law from

---

1 ATF, _Assault Weapons Profile_, supra note 7, at 19
purchasing a firearm may be able to take advantage of those gaps and buy a weapon—again, including an assault weapon—in Maryland or Virginia.

Last September, Cathy Lanier, Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, testified before the Committee on Oversight & Government Reform about the special concerns in protecting the District of Columbia. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, demonstrated something that we have known for some time: government facilities, dignitaries, and public servants are prime targets for terrorists, both foreign and domestic. Protecting government officials and infrastructure is a challenge for every city in the United States. But in Washington, DC, the likelihood of attack is higher, and the challenges to protecting the city are greater. As a result, the District is the last place where US residents across the country would want to allow assault weapons.

The District’s high concentration of iconic structures—such as the national monuments, the White House, and, of course, the Capitol—make it a highly attractive target. The high-profile human targets—from the Nation’s top elected leaders to the more than 400 foreign dignitaries that make official visits to DC each year—are also an obvious and attractive target. Moreover, it is not just well-coordinated terrorist attacks we need to secure the city against. We must also consider the unsophisticated “lone wolf” terrorist, angry at the US Government for whatever reason.

The second key vulnerability is due to the sheer volume of secure motorcades traveling in Washington on any given day. Given the daily movements around the city of the President, Vice President, and their families, and the fact that almost 3,000 foreign dignitaries spend time in our city each year—the routes for their movements cannot be shut down, as they are in other cities. As you know from your own districts, when the President and Vice President travel outside of Washington, roads are cleared of all traffic, parked cars, and such, and spectators are often kept behind barricades. We don’t do this in DC because shutting down the routes for every motorcade would make it virtually impossible to navigate much of the city on a continuous basis, and we don’t want the Nation’s capital to take on the character of an armed fortress. This freedom, however, comes with the cost of higher vulnerability—both for the officials and dignitaries, and the general population. In attempted and successful assassinations around the world, the first step in attacking a motorcade is frequently to take out the security detail with
semi-automatic and automatic firearms. This forces the motorcade to stop, at which point the terrorist can use explosives to attack the armored vehicles carrying the targeted individual.

We all have an immediate concern for any life threatened or lost in a terrorist event. But as my colleague, Chief Lanier, noted, here in the Nation’s Capital, we must also recognize that any terrorist incident, no matter how small, would garner world-wide attention and could have significant international implications. The broader repercussions of an incident in the city should also be of grave concern to everyone in this room.
Jonathan Sarubbi  
Regional Administrator  
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region III  
Department of Homeland Security  

AND  

Kenneth Wall  
Acting Director  
Office of National Capital Region Coordination  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Department of Homeland Security  

Before the  
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee  
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management  

U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C.  

April 3, 2009
INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman Norton, Ranking Member Díaz-Balart, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee


Thank you for inviting us to appear before you today to discuss emergency management in the National Capital Region (NCR). Let me begin with a brief overview of Region III and my role as the Regional Administrator. Mr. Wall will follow with a brief overview of NCRC and its work in the National Capital Region (NCR).

I. OVERVIEW

Region III

As the Regional Administrator, I oversee FEMA’s all-hazards preparedness and emergency management efforts in Delaware, the District of Columbia (the District), Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. These efforts include development, implementation and execution of FEMA’s programs and initiatives, and work with State, District, local, and private sector partners to build a strong, capable, and responsive Region.

Helping me to carry out my duties are nearly 114 dedicated full-time employees along with more than 450 intermittent Disaster Assistance Employees, commonly known as disaster reservists. The regional office is structured into five major components or divisions which include Disaster Assistance, Disaster Operations, Mitigation, National Preparedness and Management. A Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) from U.S. Army-North, is co-located with us in Philadelphia. The DCE is a full-time, seven-person element that interacts daily with Region III personnel and leadership to provide expertise and support to our planning, response, and recovery efforts.

Let me also briefly share with you the scope of disaster assistance provided by FEMA to the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia since 2000. FEMA has responded to and assisted with the recovery from 18 major disaster declarations and 6 emergency declarations. In so doing, we have provided assistance to 132,011 residents, disbursing nearly $510 million in Federal assistance.

The District alone had four major disaster declarations and three emergency declarations, totaling $15.5 million in federal disaster assistance. Under the Individual Assistance Program, which provides disaster-related housing and other needs assistance to individuals and families, $4.9 million has been awarded, while $10.6 million was awarded through the Public Assistance
Program. Public Assistance provides supplemental aid to States, communities and certain private nonprofit organizations for the repair or replacement of disaster-damaged public facilities, and for emergency protective measures.

Office of National Capital Region Coordination
The NCR is the fourth largest metropolitan area in the United States, encompassing 12 local jurisdictions across Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The NCR is home to more than five million residents and 20 million tourists annually, and -- uniquely -- is the seat of the national government with more than 270 Federal departments and agencies representing all three branches of government.

In section 882 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress created NCRC to “oversee and coordinate Federal programs for and relationships with State, local, and regional authorities” within the NCR. Congress further directed NCRC to coordinate with Federal, State, and local officials and the private sector to enhance domestic preparedness and also to provide information and technical support to its State and local partners. Transferred to FEMA in 2007 with other preparedness elements, NCRC reports directly to the FEMA Administrator.

NCRC builds strong partnerships to enhance regional preparedness, working in collaboration with many partners in the NCR. NCRC interacts daily with Federal, State, local, regional, and private sector/nonprofit homeland security partners. For example, the Director of NCRC represents DHS and FEMA on the NCR Senior Policy Group (SPG), comprised of the homeland security advisors and chief emergency managers of Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia (representing their political leadership). The SPG plays a key role in sustaining a coordinated regional approach to homeland security and strengthening integrated decision making and planning.

The SPG is just one example. NCRC actively engages with chief administrative officers (CAOs), public health officials, first responders, emergency managers, leaders from the private sector and non-profit communities, and many other Federal, State and local partners in support of all hazards preparedness.

Working with our NCR partners, NCRC provides support in building capacity to respond to an incident. For example, NCRC and other SPG members developed the NCR “First Hour Checklist” to guide coordinated actions during the initial response to an incident in the NCR. This resulted from the NCR’s experience in Hurricane Isabel in 2003, during which NCRC facilitated communications between Federal, State and local entities and the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, the SPG and CAOs to support information sharing and coordinated decision-making, for example on workplace, transportation and school closures.

Regional-level capability development also includes significant efforts in the areas of interoperability and risk analysis to support decision-making on the part of NCR leaders. With NCR partners, NCRC also plans, leads or participates in exercises, drills and events (e.g., NSSEs, state funerals, demonstrations) that occur with frequency in the NCR, bolstering information sharing and integrated planning.
These established working relationships allow NCRC to contribute to broader FEMA efforts to maintain and enhance its relationships with State and local partners. During a response to a natural disaster within the NCR, NCRC is able to augment Region III and support the Federal Coordinating Officer by providing enhanced situational awareness and consequence analysis capabilities; coordination with NCR partners; and, agency representatives at operations/communications centers to facilitate information sharing. In the event of a natural disaster in the NCR, NCRC stands ready to support FEMA’s core mission and the initiatives of Region III and our Federal, State and local NCR partners.

II. INCIDENT RESPONSE

How would FEMA respond to a natural disaster? To explain, I will address the National Response Framework (NRF), local disaster response, the disaster declaration process and the concept of unified coordination.

Local Disaster Response

In January 2008, FEMA released the NRF, the successor to the National Response Plan. The NRF establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response and incorporates many NRP elements and lessons learned.

The NRF is not FEMA’s plan—it is the framework that guides the Nation’s combined response resources, from the individual all the way to the Federal government, including non-governmental organizations and the private sector. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), is a key component to the NRF. NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes, such as the Incident Command System, that enables effective incident management across all levels of response—from the local fire chief to the Department of Homeland Security’s National Operations Center.

In accordance with NIMS, disasters are managed locally. When an incident occurs, local governments will always be the first to respond. If the magnitude of the incident is beyond the capability of the local jurisdiction, State assistance may be requested. If the State or District cannot meet those needs, they can request assistance through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). EMAC allows States and the District to ask for whatever assistance they need for any emergency, from earthquakes and hurricanes to acts of terrorism. This mutual aid agreement allows States to join forces and help one another whenever disaster threatens.

Disaster Declaration Process

Should a State, or the District, suffer from any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, severe storm, or earthquake), or regardless of cause any fire, flood, or explosion, the State, or the District, may be eligible for Federal disaster assistance. If State resources have been overwhelmed by the event, Federal assistance may be requested. At the request of the District’s mayor or State’s governor, a joint FEMA and State/District Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) takes place to determine the impact and magnitude of damage and the resulting unmet needs for individuals, businesses, the public sector, and the community as a whole. In addition to representatives from FEMA and the State/District, the PDA teams may also, as appropriate,
include local government and other Federal or State/District agency representatives. FDA findings are used by the District’s mayor or State’s governor as the basis for the request for a presidential declaration and also are used by FEMA in developing the Regional Administrator review, analysis, and recommendations. The governor or DC mayor may request a disaster declaration based on a determination by the governor or mayor that the response is beyond the combined capabilities of the State, or District, and impacted local governments.

The request is submitted through the FEMA Region III Regional Administrator to the President. If the incident is of significant severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster or an emergency declaration, the President may declare that an emergency or major disaster exists. The declaration process can be conducted expeditiously in a catastrophic situation. When a disaster is declared, the President identifies the scope of the assistance programs and the initial jurisdictions eligible for Federal assistance. A major disaster declaration may provide Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMG) assistance.

Also, immediately following a catastrophic incident of unusual severity and magnitude the State, or District, may request an expedited declaration. An expedited declaration can allow for the provision of necessary emergency protective measures, limited to Direct Federal Assistance (DFA), without the need to conduct a PDA. DFA is otherwise eligible and necessary emergency work performed by a Federal agency when the State/District/local government lacks the capability to itself perform, or contract, for the necessary work. Generally, other assistance, including Individual Assistance, reimbursement for Public Assistance and HMG assistance may only be provided once PDAs are complete, unless the level of damage to public and/or private infrastructure is empirically overwhelming, in which case limited Individual Assistance, reimbursement for Public Assistance (emergency work only), and HMG assistance, may be provided as appropriate.

FEMA also has procedures in place that allow for the provision of Federal assistance when a major disaster declaration is not warranted. When the State or the District is immediately threatened by a natural or man-made incident that could result in significant impact, an emergency declaration may be requested in advance of the incident. This declaration would supplement State/District and local efforts to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. Available assistance is typically limited to emergency protective measures, such as life saving and life sustaining actions, including DFA. DFA may include Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, general public and medical evacuation support, or commodities; some elements of DFA are supplied by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

Unified Coordination

FEMA is responsible for coordinating the overall Federal support to a disaster response, which invariably involves multiple departments and agencies employing a broad range of assets and individual statutory authorities that can rapidly and efficiently address critical assistance and support needs.

Among its first steps in a disaster, FEMA Region III would activate the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) and deploy a regional Advance Emergency Response Team (ERT)
and/or Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) to the State or District Emergency Operations Center and/or a designated field location to establish an Interim Operating Facility.

During an incident in the NCR, the ERT will obtain early-stage situational awareness with continued coordination and support from the NCRC. The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) could also make plans to standup at FEMA headquarters depending on the projected scope and potential impact. (A full NRCC with all ESFs may be activated or only a partial NRCC with a limited number of functions included.)

At the RRCC in Philadelphia, FEMA coordinates the delivery of Federal assets through 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Each ESF has a lead Federal agency and several support agencies. The major focus following a disaster is to begin actions to fulfill life-saving and life-sustaining needs based on the priorities and requests of the District or the State.

In my role as the Regional Administrator, I serve as the Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) for daily regional business; however, I delegate this DRM authority to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to exercise my authority for a particular emergency or major disaster while leading an ERT or directing the Federal response and recovery activities in the affected jurisdictions. In the NCR, there are pre-designated experienced FCOs assigned to the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia for hurricane season.

The Joint Field Office (JFO) is one of the principal NRF organizational elements designed to implement the comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. It is the primary Federally-managed facility for the co-location of representatives of multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional entities that share responsibility for Federal response and recovery activities surrounding an incident. The JFO is initially supported by the RRCC. Once the JFO has assumed the responsibility for direction and control of the Federal support mission, the RRCC will demobilize.

The JFO is led by the Unified Coordination Group, which includes specified senior leaders representing State and Federal interests. Within the Unified Coordination Group, the FCO is the primary Federal official responsible for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing Federal response activities. To oversee District and State response and recovery efforts, the mayor appoints a District Coordinating Officer and the governor appoints a State Coordinating Officer in their respective JFOs—both are part of a specific Unified Coordination Group.

Overall, it is most important to understand that FEMA and other Federal agencies work in partnership with local, District and State officials and respect the lead role they have in the initial assessment and response to an emergency.

Regional Response to Disasters
A few examples of how Region III responds to disasters include our responses to Hurricane Isabel on September 18, 2003 and, more recently, Tropical Storm Hannah in August 2008.

Hurricane Isabel struck the mid-Atlantic region, resulting in six simultaneous disasters for five Region III States and the District of Columbia. Due to the magnitude of Isabel, Region III
staffed, rostered and coordinated six different response teams and set up joint field offices. Turnkey operations (in which other FEMA regions provided operational support) were employed, and Region III staffs were embedded in all the regional operations that were assigned to handle Isabel: FEMA Region VII for Maryland; Regions IX and VI for the District of Columbia; Region IX for West Virginia; and Region X for Delaware.

During the response, the District immediately called on the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, receiving emergency management staff from New Mexico, Mississippi and South Carolina to assist in its emergency center operations and in the areas of public information and public assistance. Isabel was the Region’s biggest operation in its total impact on the States and the District.

We were particularly active monitoring and responding to Tropical Storm Hanna. In order to prepare for the potential effects of the approaching storm, we forward deployed an FCO and FEMA liaison to the emergency operations centers of the District and Maryland. An FCO and ERT were deployed to Virginia. We were able to plan along side the States and the District, maintain situational awareness and anticipate initial response needs. If supplies and resources were warranted to supplement State and local efforts, we were in place to respond.

Region III utilizes a team referred to as the ERT-A Light. The team consists of a pre-designated FCO and key staff positions that are familiar with the State or District emergency staff, the emergency operating locations, and their emergency response capabilities. This established relationship allows faster response coordination, situational awareness, and ability to provide requested assistance.

III. REGION III-WIDE PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES

Because disasters can strike at any time, the better prepared the Federal and State governments can be ahead of time, the more efficient and seamless the response and recovery. We are now leaning forward by working even more closely with our State and local partners to anticipate their needs and to work with them to fill them quickly. A key to understanding and being ready is to know the capabilities and shortcomings.

Gap Analysis
One major initiative that is at the core of FEMA’s preparations for hurricane season is our Gap Analysis Program (GAP), which has enhanced understanding of the mutual capabilities we have with our States and the District. During the past two years, working in collaboration with our State and local partners, we have enhanced our response for the initial 72 hours of a disaster and early stages of recovery at the local, State, District and Federal levels. The analysis has focused on seven critical areas: emergency communications; transportation and evacuation; commodities; search and rescue; fuel and emergency power; debris clearing; and mass care and emergency assistance and interim sheltering. Currently, our Search and Rescue subject matter experts are working with the District to coordinate Region III Search and Rescue efforts, and the efforts of our debris subject matter experts who are reviewing debris management plans within the NCR. These are just a few examples of the many activities taking place on a daily basis.
In a related effort, the Region’s Individual Assistance Branch has been working with the District, Maryland, and Virginia and the American Red Cross to strengthen each entity’s sheltering preparedness measures and to allow FEMA a better understanding of potential requests in an event where a Category 3 hurricane impacts their respective jurisdictions.

**Exercises and Other Activities**

During the 2008 Hurricane Season, Region III held a highly successful Pre-Declaration Tabletop Exercises with State senior leaders in Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, the District and Pennsylvania to exercise a new Disaster Assistance Policy, which enables States to receive an emergency presidential declaration in anticipation of a hurricane or other imminent disaster. These exercises were attended by State emergency management directors, homeland security advisors, governor’s chiefs of staff, senior operations and planning personnel, and senior military advisors.

Operation Hotwire, a functional exercise held on October 23, 2008, examined operations and life safety and sustaining capabilities during a prolonged regional loss of power. Bringing together government officials and private sector electrical power providers, the exercise examined a number of concerns during a natural disaster, including the ability of Emergency Operation Centers to maintain communications, the regional resource allocation process during a major power outage, and the public health/mass care ability to respond. The collaborative exercise after-action review process identified numerous areas for improvement in position-specific training, information technologies and standard operating procedures. Implementation of these remedial actions will help streamline our disaster response and recovery processes.

We are also supporting regional catastrophic planning efforts through grant funding such as the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP). All five of our states and the District have partnered in this $11 million grant to support six projects: regional public compliance/behavioral analysis, public preparedness, transportation, mass care, resource management, and modeling and simulation. The behavioral analysis in particular is the cornerstone of this grant application. Its early and ongoing outcomes will be used as planning assumptions for the other projects regarding motivational factors behind public reaction as well as adherence to recommendations and mandates. Performing up to date, regional-and-scenario-focused behavioral studies will allow stakeholders to be better able to develop plans directed towards Public Preparedness, Transportation, and Mass Care as they relate to the planning priority of Mass Evacuation and Sheltering.

In the area of community preparedness, I lead a Regional Advisory Council (RAC) consisting of 22 state and local emergency managers throughout the mid-Atlantic region who meet regularly to discuss issues pertaining to emergency management, and we maintain strong relationships with other stakeholders including our Citizen Corps. There are representatives from 210 councils throughout the NCR.

**CONCLUSION**
In conclusion, should a natural disaster affect the National Capital Region, FEMA has established a clear and comprehensive plan of action to mobilize a coordinated and well organized response and recovery.

Thank you for your time, and we look forward to answering your questions.
Question: How does FEMA Region III work with the District Government before during and after disasters?

Response: 
Before the Disaster
While the hallmark work of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is responding to and recovering from all disasters, preparedness is fundamental in the Agency’s role and plans before a disaster strikes.

Through the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act Legislation of 2006, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was assigned responsibilities to develop a National Preparedness System. The purpose was to achieve the National Preparedness Goal to strengthen the Nation’s ability to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters.

Preparedness programs, cover planning, equipment and organizational activities required to sustain training, exercises, and response and recovery program capabilities. The noteworthy programs are: Emergency Management Program Grant (EMPG), Regional Catastrophic Planning Grant Program (RCPGP) and Gap Analysis.

Region III is the principal conduit for delivery of the National Preparedness System programs and activities to the District of Columbia. A primary source of grant funding for staffing and capability building is the Emergency Management Program Grant. The District’s Emergency Management Program Grant for FY09 will build and sustain the following capabilities:

- Develop and implement emergency response procedures that enhance the conduct of activities related to emergency response.
- Run the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the city’s main operational control and communications facility during an emergency, disaster or special event, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
- Ensure the District of Columbia has comprehensive training programs that meet the District’s emergency response and preparedness requirements;
- Develop comprehensive emergency preparedness and management plans to meet the District’s requirements.
- Enhance interoperable communication tools.
- Develop a comprehensive mitigation program.

The National Capital Region, which includes the District is designated as Tier 1 for the Urban Area Security Initiative program. With this designation, the District was awarded $11.5 million dollars in FY08 as part of the Regional Catastrophic Planning Grant Program (RCPPG). RCPPG is intended to enhance regional catastrophic preparedness and continuity of operations efforts. In Region III, the District of Columbia is participating in RCPPG to provide a catastrophic plan for evacuating the NCR jurisdictions. This effort will examine how people behave when told to evacuate, public messaging, mapping evacuation routes, defining shelter standards, tracking resources, and providing the District with evacuation modeling capabilities.

Lastly, Region III implemented the Gap Analysis initiative with its state partners to identify current resource gaps for hurricane preparedness at local, state and federal levels. This initiative is at the core of FEMA’s preparations for hurricane season and has enhanced understanding of the mutual capabilities we have with our states and the District. During the past two years, working in collaboration with our state and local partners, we have enhanced our response for the initial 72 hours of a disaster and early stages of recovery at the local, state, District and federal levels. The analysis has focused on seven critical areas: emergency communications; transportation and evacuation; commodities; search and rescue; fuel and emergency power; debris clearing; and mass care and emergency assistance and interim sheltering.

In a related effort, the Region’s Individual Assistance Branch has been working with the District, Maryland, and Virginia and the American Red Cross to strengthen each entity’s sheltering preparedness measures and to allow FEMA a better understanding of potential requests in an event where a Category 3 hurricane impacts their respective jurisdictions.

**During a Disaster**

Should the District suffer from any catastrophe (including a severe storm, flood, fire, or explosion), the District may be eligible for federal disaster assistance. If District resources have been overwhelmed by the event, federal assistance may be requested. At the request of the District’s mayor, a joint FEMA/District Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) team takes place to determine the impact and magnitude of damage and the resulting unmet needs for individuals, businesses, the public sector, and the community as a whole.

In addition to representatives from FEMA and the District, the PDA teams may also, as appropriate, include other Federal agency representatives. PDA findings are used by the District’s mayor as the basis for the request for a presidential declaration and also are
used by FEMA in developing the Regional Administrator’s review, analysis, and recommendations. The DC mayor may request a disaster declaration based on a determination that the response is beyond the combined capabilities of the District.

The request is submitted through the FEMA Region III Regional Administrator to the President.

Post-Disaster
In accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF), disasters are managed locally. Immediately after a major incident, local emergency personnel would respond and assess the situation. For an incident in the District, responders under the Mayor’s authority, would establish command of the incident and manage the incident.

Among its first steps in a disaster, FEMA Region III would activate the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) and deploy a regional Advance Emergency Response Team (ERT) and/or Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) to the District Emergency Operations Center and/or a designated field location to establish an Interim Operating Facility. During an incident in the NCR, the ERT will obtain early-stage situational awareness with continued coordination and support from the NCRC.

At the RRCC in Philadelphia, FEMA coordinates the delivery of Federal assets through 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Each ESF has a lead Federal agency and several support agencies. The major focus following a disaster is to begin actions to fulfill life-saving and life-sustaining needs based on the priorities and requests of the District or the State.

The Joint Field Office (JFO) is one of the principal NRF organizational elements designed to implement the comprehensive approach to domestic emergency management. It is the primary Federally-managed facility for the co-location of representatives of multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional entities that share responsibility for Federal response and recovery activities surrounding an incident. The JFO is initially supported by FEMA Region III’s RRCC in Philadelphia. Once the JFO has assumed the responsibility for direction and control of the Federal support mission, the RRCC will demobilize.

The JFO is led by the Unified Coordination Group, which includes specified senior leaders representing District, State and Federal interests. Within the Unified Coordination Group, the FCO is the primary Federal official responsible for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing Federal response activities. To oversee District and State response and recovery efforts, the mayor appoints a District Coordinating Officer and the
Disaster also offers an opportunity to look ahead and take preventive measures. The Mitigation Division strives to create safer communities by reducing the risks to loss of life and property.

Every year, FEMA provides the District with grant money through the Community Assistance Program which is part of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), to build staff capability and to increase staff resources to promote sound flood plain management decisions throughout the District’s flood prone areas. As a participating community in the NFIP, flood insurance is available to all District residents and FEMA staff is available to provide technical support. By enforcing the flood plain management regulations, providing data to improve the flood plain maps and encouraging the purchase of flood insurance policies, future flood losses in the District are reduced and the recovery and repairs for home and business owners are expedited with money provided through the flood insurance claims process.

The District is eligible to apply for additional FEMA hazard mitigation grants both before and after disaster strikes. FEMA staff provides both grant money and technical support to the District for both mitigation planning and projects in an effort to reduce the District’s vulnerability to floods, fire and the entire range of natural and man made hazards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question#</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>D.C. Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing</td>
<td>Disaster Preparedness in the National Capital Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>TRANSPORTATION (HOUSE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question: Please explain Operation Hotwire, and the lessons you learned from that exercise as it relates to the National Capital Region?

Response: Operation Hotwire, a functional exercise held on October 23, 2008, examined operations as well as life safety and sustaining capabilities during a prolonged regional loss of power. Bringing together government officials and private sector electrical power providers, the exercise examined a number of concerns during a natural disaster, including the ability of Emergency Operation Centers to maintain communications, the regional resource allocation process during a major power outage, and the public health/mass care ability to respond.

The District of Columbia was an active participant in this exercise. As captured in the after-action report, the following key lessons learned were:

- **Communications**
  Situational awareness of scenario was maintained using radios that could be powered through on-site generation capability during a power outage.

- **Emergency Generation Capabilities**
  The District of Columbia identified gaps in existing and available emergency generator inventories, access to fuel, support personnel to install and maintain generators, and transportation for the generators.

- **Information Dissemination / Public Messaging**
  A widespread power outage will impact how critical information reaches the public because television, cable, and internet service would be limited or unavailable.

The District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency is reviewing and validating the lessons-learned and developing a corrective action plan to remediate identified deficiencies.
Question: What lessons did you learn in your 2008 Hurricane Season Pre-Declaration Table Top? Were there any specific lessons you learned that relate to the National Capital Region?

Response: The Pre-Disaster Declaration Tabletop Exercises with senior leaders in Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, the District and Pennsylvania focused on a new Disaster Assistance Policy, which enables States to receive an emergency presidential declaration in anticipation of a hurricane or other imminent disaster.

With respect to the lessons learned from this exercise as it relates to the National Capital Region, the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency and FEMA officials had the opportunity to walk through a Category 3 hurricane scenario and discuss:

- Triggers necessary for a pre-disaster declaration
- Cost share implications for the District for a pre-disaster declaration
- Resources available from the Federal government to assist the District during an immediate life saving/sustaining response
- Resources anticipated to be needed by the District during such a scenario, based on internal planning and findings from the FEMA Gap Analysis Program.

Overall major lessons learned:

- The District is working with FEMA Region III in “pre-scripting” a pre-disaster declaration request and pre-identifying resource needs in order to expedite the request and approval process.
- The District identified the need for federal assistance in evacuating pets and special needs populations. Through the Gap Analysis program, Region III and the District are defining the specific needs to be addressed.
- Region III and the District continue to work on interim/temporary housing plans for tourists and university populations. Additionally, for District residents, more specific evacuation and housing plans dealing with the repopulation of the District post-event need to be developed.
- Federal agencies should plan to take protective measures to maintain operations during a hurricane without relying on the District for support. For example, the District is not in a position to provide emergency generators to federal facilities.
Federal entities should handle their own facility and personnel protection through Continuity of Operations Planning.
**Question:** Under FEMA’s new Disaster Assistance Policy, what types of assistances can States and the District receive prior to a hurricane or other imminent events?

**Response:** When the State or the District is immediately threatened by a natural or man-made incident that could result in significant impact, an emergency declaration may be requested in advance of the incident. This declaration would supplement State/District and local efforts to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. Available assistance is typically limited to emergency protective measures, such as life saving and life sustaining actions, including Direct Federal Assistance (DFA). DFA may include Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, general public and medical evacuation support, or commodities; some elements of DFA are supplied by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Question#: 5
Topic: debris
Hearing: Disaster Preparedness in the National Capital Region
Primary: The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton
Committee: TRANSPORTATION (HOUSE)

**Question:** If debris were strewn across Capitol Hill, how would resources be prioritized to clear the residential areas versus the area surrounding the congressional office buildings? Would resource conflicts arise over restoring utilities and access to federal, District, and private buildings?

**Response:** FEMA is not charged with the task of debris removal on federal property. The removal would be the responsibility of the federal agency affected. The issue of debris removal on residential streets would be the responsibility of the District of Columbia. The District has been developing a comprehensive debris removal plan that prioritizes the removal of debris.

However, should the District find itself unable to cope with the situation due to the magnitude of the incident and if it finds the response is beyond its capabilities, it may ask for an emergency or major disaster declaration that would provide for Public Assistance (PA). If granted, under this reimbursement program, supplemental assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures would be made available to the District.

In addition, through the Region's Gap Initiative, the Region and the District have worked collaboratively to enhance the District's ability to deal with this issue. As a result, the District has identified critical access roads and is capable of clearing them within the first 72 hours. The District and the National Capital Region (NCR) jurisdictions continue to work on developing debris management operation plans. These plans contain facility-specific temporary debris management plans for four major sites in the NCR jurisdictions, including material about the Army Corps of Engineers Debris Operations Plan. FEMA will continue to assist the District and the NCR jurisdictions with their debris planning efforts.
Question#: 6

Topic: NCR vs. Region III

Hearing: Disaster Preparedness in the National Capital Region

Primary: The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton

Committee: TRANSPORTATION (HOUSE)

**Question:** Explain the breakdown of responsibilities between your offices and how you work together before during and after disasters.

**Response:** FEMA Region III and the Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) work jointly before and during disasters to ensure the best possible response and recovery.

The NCRC, which reports directly to the FEMA Administrator, engages in day-to-day interaction and coordination with Federal, State, local and regional authorities in the National Capital Region (NCR) to further all hazards planning and preparedness activities. During a disaster, NCRC would augment Region III resources and support the Federal Coordinating Officer by providing enhanced situational awareness and coordination capabilities and provide agency representatives at operations/communications centers to facilitate information sharing.

Among its first steps in a disaster, FEMA Region III would activate the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) and deploy a regional Advance Emergency Response Team (ERT) and/or Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) to the State or District Emergency Operations Center and/or a designated field location to establish an Interim Operating Facility.

During a disaster in the NCR, the ERT and/or IMAT will obtain early-stage situational awareness with continued coordination and support from the NCRC. At the RRCC in Philadelphia, FEMA coordinates the delivery of Federal assets through 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Each ESF has a lead Federal agency and several support agencies. The major focus following a disaster is to begin actions to fulfill life-saving and life-sustaining needs based on the priorities and requests of the District or the State.
**Question:** What is the extent of your interactions with U.S. Capitol Police or other congressional entities before during and after incidents on Capitol Hill?

**Response:** Local emergency personnel are the first to respond to an incident, so the Capitol Police would be the first responders to an incident on the Capitol grounds and would begin assessing the situation. FEMA Region III would be monitoring the incident, obtaining situational awareness reports through the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency in case federal assistance is requested. Federal assistance could range from the distribution of commodities, debris removal, assistance with transportation and evacuations, search and rescue assets, fuel and emergency power, sheltering, assistance to special needs populations and pets, and communications.

The Office of National Capital Region Coordination regularly interacts with U.S. Capitol Police, the Senate Sergeant at Arms, and the House of Representative Office of Emergency Management in coordinating planning, preparedness, and response activities. For instance, personnel from the aforementioned entities are members of the Joint Federal Committee (JFC) and the JFC Emergency Managers Subcommittee, each of which meets regularly to discuss preparedness efforts in the NCR. During an incident, NCRC would assist in conducting information sharing and coordination among and between NCR partners and the U.S. Capitol Police and the other congressional entities.

Overall, it is most important to understand that FEMA and other Federal agencies work in support of and in partnership with District officials and respect the lead role they have in the initial assessment and response to an emergency.
Question: At the hearing, Ms. Norton asked Mr. Wall to meet with States in the NCR within 30 days to determine what it would take to be able to communicate in an interoperable manner. Has that meeting taken place and what were the determinations?

Response: Establishing, continuing and further developing tactical interoperable communications has been a priority within the National Capital Region (NCR) for many years and as such the NCR’s local first responders can all talk to each other and have interoperable voice radio communications. NCR leaders and officials meet on a regular basis to continually build on the successful tactical interoperable communications capabilities that currently exist. For example, the NCR Executive Interoperability Regional Programmatic Working Group, in which NCRC participates, met on April 1, 2009 and will meet again on June 3, 2009. Additionally, NCRC also participates in the Metro Area Chief Information Officers, who last met on April 16, 2009 and will next meet on May 21, 2009, and the Police Chiefs Subcommittee on Communications.

The Region has developed a compatible radio system which enables firefighters and police officers to communicate with their counterparts across jurisdictions and most of the NCR jurisdictions use similar radio systems. For example, the District of Columbia, City of Alexandria, and Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, Montgomery and Prince William Counties use common 800-megahertz radio systems. Additionally, the NCR’s tactical interoperability is a result of regional mutual aid agreements that allow first responders to operate on each other’s radio channels.

The NCR also has a back-up system of 1,250 interoperable 800-megahertz radios that are pre-positioned across the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia. This cache provides additional radios for use during disasters or planned events that involve multiple agencies or jurisdictions, such as the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. The cache also assists police and firefighters responding to any type of emergency (natural or man-made) occurring in the Metro system, to include the subway tunnels.

In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security’s Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecard gave the NCR a rating of “advanced” in all categories, making it one of only four urban areas to achieve top-rankings for its tactical interoperability. The Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecard assessed the maturity of tactical interoperable communications capabilities in 75 urban/metropolitan areas throughout the Nation and reviewed the ability of mutual-aid first-responders to share voice communications as an
incident develops. In the NCR, the event on which this Scorecard was based included participation of land, air and water assets from federal, state and local agencies.

| Question#: | 8 |
| Topic:     | interoperable communications within NCR |
| Hearing:   | Disaster Preparedness in the National Capital Region |
| Primary:   | The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton |
| Committee: | TRANSPORTATION (HOUSE) |
STATEMENT OF

MAJOR GENERAL ERROL R. SCHWARTZ
COMMANDING GENERAL
JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL GUARD

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

April 3, 2009
Introduction

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and members of the subcommittee, for the
capabilities that the District of Columbia National Guard can put into action in the
evend of a disaster.

The District of Columbia National Guard comprises both Army and Air National
Guard components. Federal law charges the National Guard with dual state and federal
missions. Those functions range from limited actions during non-emergency situations to
full-scale law enforcement of martial law when local law enforcement officials can no
longer maintain civil control. I would like to emphasize that our primary role is to
support civilian authorities.

In the 53 states and territories, the governor is the commander in chief of the
National Guard. Since we do not have a governor in the District, the President of the
United States serves as our commander-in-chief. The authority to call-up the D.C.
National Guard is delegated by the President and Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of
the Army.

The District of Columbia can and does request support from the D.C. National
Guard through the Commanding General. This in turn starts the process I just mentioned.
Federal agencies send a request directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the
Commanding General.

Like all other National Guard units, the D.C. National Guard continues to support
the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force in defending the nation’s national security objectives.
While deploying our forces to Iraq and Afghanistan during the past several years, we have simultaneously supported local civil authorities in the District.

One of our primary missions in support of the District is to rapidly respond to requests for support from the Office of the Mayor by providing military, emergency and community support as outlined in the District’s Emergency Response Plan. We have developed an all-hazards plan to respond to requests from federal and District authorities. In accordance with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Response Framework dated January 2008, there are 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) that are nationally recognized. The District has added one of their own for a total of 16 ESFs. The District has requested that our units and personnel support eight of the 16 ESFs.

When requested by the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (DCHSEMA), we will support:

- **ESF 1 – Transportation**: Provide intersection control support and transportation, infrastructure security, facilitate the transport of disaster-relief supplies, and assist in the evacuation or relocation of people during emergencies;
- **ESF 2 – Communications**: Operate on designated radio frequencies that interface with the D.C. Emergency Operations Center, and provide a liaison to the operations center at the request of DCHSEMA;
- **ESF 6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services**: Provide shelter, assist with security on roadways and in the designated shelters, facilitate transportation of disaster relief supplies and equipment, provide mobile kitchens and shower facilities and assist in the evacuation or relocation of victims;
- **ESF 9 – Search and Rescue**: Provides search-and-rescue capability and temporary emergency shelters, support traffic control, emergency transportation, evacuation of civilian population, communications assistance, area security, protection from theft and looting, medical services, aircraft for medical evacuation and monitoring, surface radiation monitoring, radiation hazard plotting, wind and weather data, and control of reentry;
- **ESF 10 – Oil and Hazardous Material Response**: Provide equipment and mobilize units to provide the following:
  * Traffic control;
  * Emergency transportation;
  * Evacuation of civilian population;
  * Search and rescue;
• Communications assistance;
• Area security;
• Protection from theft and looting;
• Medical services;
• Aircraft for monitoring;
• Surface radiation monitoring;
• Radiation hazard plotting;
• Wind and weather data; and
• Control of reentry.)

• **ESF 11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources:** Coordinate and provide mobile kitchen, feeding facilities and personnel, and assistance with delivery of bulk food and cooking supplies; and weather forecasting capabilities;

• **ESF 13 – Public Safety and Security:** Provide manpower to civilian law enforcement to assist in management of the designated 142 critical intersections in the city, and with requested law enforcement requirements;

• **ESF 16 – Donations and Volunteer Management:** Support safe collection, transportation and distribution of donated goods and services.

In the case of an emergency, the Armory has been designated as the city’s continuity of operations site. We are also prepared to support the city by partnering with the Joint Force Headquarters, National Capital Region, in coordinating with the Defense Department, and will coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and its agencies such as FEMA, and other civilian agencies including the American Red Cross.

At the request of DCHSEMA, there are currently prepositioned FEMA and American Red Cross trailers in the parking lot of the Armory that contain disaster relief supplies.

In times of emergency, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with each of the states in FEMA Region III ensures mutual aid, support and cooperation with Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia and Pennsylvania. We focus on providing logistical support required to bring units from these states into the local area, including operational control, credentialing, food, shelter, equipment and transportation of National Guard support personnel.
The 56th Presidential Inauguration provides an excellent illustration of the support the National Guard brings to the table. During the inaugural period in January 2009, 7,000 National Guard personnel from more than 30 states were deployed inside the boundaries of the nation’s capital, and another 3,000 were stationed just outside our borders. I was in command of this Joint Task Force, and I never felt more proud of the Guard than I did during this entire event—before, during and after. With nearly two million people in and around the National Mall on Jan. 20, there was not one arrest related to the largest inauguration in our nation’s history. We accomplished this arduous task by coordinating our support with DCHSEMA and the myriad of law enforcement and civilian agencies involved in the event. We provided traffic and crowd control, logistical support, medical support, communications, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive detection capability, shelter, food, equipment and transportation.

Our D.C. National Guard Aviation units located at Davidson Army Airfield near Fort Belvoir, Virginia, are also key assets available to support civil authorities in a disaster. We recently received new UH-72 MEDEVAC helicopters for our 121st Medical Co. (Air Ambulance), which will eventually replace our aging UH-1 “Huey” fleet. These assets provide important medical-evacuation airlift capability.

Our Air Guard units on Andrews Air Force Base, the home of our 113th Wing, also provide critical defense and airlift capability. One of our more critical, ongoing duties is the Air Sovereignty Alert mission, protecting the skies over the nation’s capital. Since Sept. 11, 2001, our F-16 Fighter pilots and crews at Andrews have been on 24/7 alert, ready to respond at a moment’s notice to any threat or violation of the airspace over
the city. Last year alone, the 113th Wing responded to 146 such incidents which required our pilots to scramble to their aircraft and launch from the runway. We have adequate facilities for this mission. Several buildings including three aircraft hangars could be utilized in an emergency as well as the active-duty and Reserve facilities on the base.

We continue to train our full-time staff to quickly respond in the event of an emergency within the District of Columbia, primarily with our National Guard Response Force. We have trained more than 100 soldiers and airmen from our full-time staff to respond to emergencies within four hours of notification and maintain control until released or until follow-on forces arrive. The response force can support civil authorities with critical infrastructure protection and crowd control.

Another critical asset in the event of an emergency is our 33rd Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (CST). The CST is trained to respond quickly in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and-or explosive attack. Their job is to assess the situation and advise the civilian incident commander or military leadership of potential courses of action to minimize loss of life and property. The CST is also trained to respond to natural or manmade disasters. Their extensive training includes exercising with DCHSEMA, the D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, Secret Service, FBI and other emergency responders.

While we have extensive capabilities to support civil authorities during a disaster, I’d like to talk about how we can improve and be better prepared for a large-scale disaster. In 2005, in response to a request from the mayor, the D.C. National Guard Armory housed more than 350 people who found themselves without a home following Hurricane Katrina. We were able to use the Armory as a shelter because the event
happened during a temperate time of the year. However, if something should happen in
the month of July, the Armory would not be fit for use because of the lack of air
conditioning. This and other improvements to the Armory are needed. The structure of
the building, located about two miles from where we are currently seated, is essentially
sound. But various building systems have not been modernized and many systems of the
building components in all of its sections have reached the end of their expected service
life and require replacement. I am entering into the record our Capital Plan Policy
Statement which details the Armory’s extensive renovation requirements.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the D.C. National Guard remains committed now more than ever to
providing emergency support to the District of Columbia and to improve our community. We
would appreciate any support from this subcommittee to improve our ability to respond to an
emergency and save lives. Thank you for asking me to come here today and for the chance to
communicate our capabilities and requirements. Madam Chair, I would be happy to answer any
questions that you or the subcommittee members might have.