9–11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY

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9–11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY

TUESDAY, AUGUST 24, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08, a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. Chair is going to accept opening statements from myself and Mr. Lantos, and then we will go to the witnesses. Then we will go to the questioning. When the questioning is through, we will return to opening statements, where every Member can make what, by then, will be a closing statement, but they will have the opportunity to express themselves. Because of the time limitations on our witnesses, and my desire that everybody participate, we will reverse the normal proceeding and have opening statements at the end.

Chair will now make his opening statement, and then yield to Mr. Lantos.

I want to welcome Governor Kean and Mr. Hamilton to the friendly confines of the International Relations Committee. It is very much a pleasure and an honor to see Mr. Hamilton because he sat in this chair and presided so successfully over many a bumpy road. So it is great to see you.

Of course, Governor Kean, you have done a marvelous job.

So with that in mind, we have entered an "age of terrorism." By that I mean the terrorist attacks that we and others have increasingly faced should not be seen as isolated phenomena but as an enduring feature of this new century. We are, in fact, at war, but with new and far different enemies than we have previously encountered. Our enemies are unlikely to be vanquished in any traditional sense of achieving their final surrender. In fact, there may never be an end to the conflict, never an end to the need for vigilance, preemption, and vigorous application of all measures within our capabilities.

Wendell Phillips forewarned us that the price of freedom is eternal vigilance. It is important that we face this grim, yet fundamental, fact, for if we are indeed in a war, we must fight that war. And we must fight to win, because the consequences of losing have no limits. We must remember that our enemies seek neither our defeat nor a negotiated compromise but our annihilation, and they will exploit any opportunity, target any innocent, to achieve their aims.

We are only in the beginning stages of learning how to fight this new kind of war. Unfortunately, we are also in an election year, when all manner of foolish and knowingly false charges can be recklessly made. The many firing squads that have formed have no shortage of eager volunteers, with some preferring the generous blast of a shotgun to the more selective aim of a rifle.

But it is a statement of fact that this Administration has vigorously and successfully prosecuted the war against terrorism. That is not to say that there have not been serious mistakes, inexcusable lapses, and lost opportunities. There is even criticism coming from the directly opposite direction, with some charging that the efforts to protect the American people have been too energetic and too intrusive, although I cannot but believe that this waspish view is confined to a small minority. But criticism must not be silenced, because, with the stakes so high, our goal must be perfection.

We have been enormously aided in that task by the work of the 9–11 Commission and its report on the complex nature of the threats we face, the mix of striking successes and regrettable missteps that comprise our response to date, and a much-needed set of recommendations to help guide our future deliberations, plans, and actions. Of the two score recommendations of the report, many concern subjects over which this Committee has primary jurisdiction, and we are currently focused on developing measures that we believe will address these comprehensively.

This hearing will address the range of the Commission's recommendations, but I will take the opportunity to address a subject that is too often overlooked and undervalued—namely, public diplomacy.

In this new type of war, the front line is not always on the battlefield, with our fortunes dependent on the success or failure of the military's operations. Nor can the task be confined solely to managing our relations with foreign governments. If we are to wage this war successfully, we must engage the peoples of the world as well. For it is within the realm of their enmity that our enemies can secure shelter and sustenance.

As survey after survey has revealed, the image of the United States in the Middle East has become a stunningly negative one in country after country, having reached a level of anger, suspicion, hatred, and fear that often approaches unanimity.

The standard response is that, "Something must be done." Although we have heard this lament for many years and from many sources, in truth, very little has in fact been done. But even were a vigorous effort to be initiated tomorrow, near-term relief is unlikely, largely because too many of the proposed solutions are predicated on a mistaken diagnosis of the problem. That is, there is insufficient familiarity by the peoples of the region with the U.S. way of life, the result being a lack of understanding of our religious and cultural tolerance and of our benign values. In other words, we are unloved because we are unknown.

Yet even a moment's reflection would confirm this cannot be a true explanation. For decades, the Middle East and every other region of the globe has been inundated with American popular culture in its endless varieties, transmitted by movies and television and other media boasting a universal reach. Every aspect of Amer-

ican life has been endlessly paraded in front of the world's populations with depictions ranging from "Baywatch" to CNN, from John Wayne's westerns to Ken Burns' "The Civil War." So great is this dominance that denunciations of American cultural imperialism have long been commonplace, from France and China to Canada and Iran.

It may also surprise many that America's values are widely recognized and admired, including our democracy, our multiculturalism, our dynamism, and our many other praiseworthy qualities. Again, unfamiliarity with our essential goodness is not the source of the enmity we face.

The core problem, the one revealed in survey after survey, is not that we are insufficiently known. Rather, it is the bedrock belief that the United States has chosen to become the enemy of the region's peoples, has chosen to pursue policies that are deliberately aimed against them and their interests. This grotesque parody has been nurtured by our enemies who daily depict the United States as an evil force on a crusade to undermine or humiliate Islam and the Arabs, to seize the region's oil wealth, to do any number of evil acts.

Given the near-universal belief of the peoples of the region that our policies are deliberately aimed against them, the obvious response would be to vigorously and directly counter these ubiquitous slanders and deliberate distortions. But far too rarely do we actively attempt to do so, relying instead on the conviction that the benign nature of our motivations is self-evident. Unfortunately, the evidence is that this reassuring image is little more than an illusion.

Given that the central problem we face is the distorted perception of our policies, and not an unfamiliarity with us as a people, we must focus our efforts on that specific task. We must not fool ourselves into believing that spending more resources on easier-to-address, but ultimately peripheral, issues will provide much benefit, if any at all. We must pray for deliverance by simple and passive measures, but miracles cannot be expected from false gods.

Addressing the problem of manufactured hatred and the deliberate distortion of our policies will require a profound and lasting shift in our approach to this region, requiring a permanent and vigorous engagement in the shaping of opinion and the imprinting of images.

One element in a new approach which can be instituted immediately, however, is a sustained effort by our officials, from the President on down, speaking directly to the populations in these countries to explain our policies in the region, our aims, our motivations and what these mean for them and their countries. A televised address by the President to the peoples of the Middle East in which he outlines and explains United States goals and objectives in the region might not convert the millions, but it would authoritatively begin a long-overdue process of reengaging a population whom we have abandoned to our enemies.

We must not only counter the slanders but go to their sources. In particular, we should hold governments accountable for the anti-American content in their government-controlled and influenced media. I do not understand the reasoning for our nonchalance and

our reluctance to do so in the face of such egregious provocation, given that freedom of the press in many of these countries is often little more than a lie, and that the slant of coverage nervously follows the line drawn by government bureaucrats.

These are but two suggestions that we can readily implement, and there are many more.

We can be helpless only by choice. For decades, we have stood and watched the tide rising against us, relying on the self-evident nature of our nobility to make our case for us, slumbering in the opium den of self-congratulation and the assumed love of others. In that, we have been extraordinarily foolish, extraordinarily irresponsible.

We may denounce our slanderers and bemoan their influence, but we bear much of the responsibility for our problems because we have needlessly allowed these voices to preach and rant and lie and insinuate unhindered. By our silence, we have implicated ourselves and validated our enemies and slept as they summoned their forces to battle.

But America has always risen to meet even seemingly hopeless challenges and overcome them. The 9–11 Commission and its work of enormous assistance is preparing us to advance to the waiting battlefield and once again overcome our enemies.

I now turn to my friend Tom Lantos for any remarks he may wish to make.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I wish to identify myself with your powerful and wise remarks.

I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses. If I am not mistaken, this is your 200th consecutive appearance. While Olympics may come and go, the Kean-Hamilton show keeps moving on. Your dilemma is that of Zsa Zsa Gabor's eighth husband. You know what is expected of you, but you have got to make it interesting every time.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for responding to my request and holding this extraordinarily important hearing on the 9–11 Commission recommendations. We cannot bring back the loved ones who lost their lives in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania almost 3 years ago, but we can create a legacy for them by helping to ensure that such wanton destruction never again happens. It is a great honor to be able to welcome our distinguished witnesses, Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, who have spent the last year and a half doing just that.

It is also a particular and personal pleasure for me to welcome our long-time colleague, Lee Hamilton, back to the Committee that he chaired so admirably, and on which he served with such distinction for so many years. One of the highlights of my work in Congress has been that of sitting next to Lee for many years and listening to his advice and counsel on foreign policy. When you retired from the House, Lee, we lost a valued source of both vision and reason, but our loss has clearly been to the benefit of the United States of America, as your leadership with Governor Kean on the Commission so well demonstrates.

I would also like to note the tremendous bipartisan spirit in which the Commission deliberated and in which it formed the Commission's recommendations.

We in this Committee strive to conduct the business in a similar atmosphere of mutual respect, friendship and bipartisanship. I wish that much of the rest of the Congress and the Executive Branch would follow your example and ours more often.

Mr. Chairman, the Commission's recommendations are wide-ranging and of great relevance to our Committee, dealing with public diplomacy, from promoting U.S. values abroad to the increasing terrorist mobility. And while I agree with many of the Commission's recommendations, I would like to focus on the few areas where I find myself in disagreement with the Kean-Hamilton suggestions.

You state that the war of ideas is the far greater struggle than the military struggle against terrorism. I must disagree. Unless we prevail fully in the military aspect against these killers, we may have little time or opportunity to wage the war of ideas. The war of ideas is a long-term struggle that must, of course, proceed simultaneously with the physical war on terror, but military action is an indispensable prerequisite to success along all other lines. And I think it would be a very serious mistake for us to suggest that the war of ideas, the struggle for hearts and minds, somehow supersedes the need for physically destroying both terrorists and their infrastructure.

You also urge, gentlemen, that the United States engage with the Arab and Muslim world in a dialogue about critical issues, political/economic reform, education and economic opportunities, tolerance and the rule of law. I fully agree; however, I caution that it would be pointless to engage with the two main Arab and Muslim organizations as units, the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. To deal with them as institutions would be to rush to the lowest common denominator and accomplish nothing of value. Engagement must be with like-minded governments and officials if anything positive is to be accomplished. It is a dream that we can engage NATO with the Arab League, or NATO or the European Union with the Islamic Conference, as institutions.

Now, I would agree with your observation that vibrant private sectors in the Arab and Muslim world have an interest in curbing government power, but I must note, unfortunately, that there are no real vibrant private sectors in the Arab world today. Much of the success in the private sector is the result of cronyism, subsidies and corruption. I believe that the talk of vibrant private sectors is largely a rhetorical flourish, not based on facts. We must work to help create them, and, as you suggest, bolster and support Muslim political, educational and religious reformers.

As part of the war of ideas, I strongly agree that we need to increase greatly funding for the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Beyond this, I would like to focus on one of the Commission's most critical recommendations: That the Administration publicly identify countries that provide sanctuaries to terrorists and terrorist groups, rank them in order of priority of threat to the United States, and design specific strategies to deal with each one individually. This is an extremely important task.

Chairman Hyde and I have been pressing, in particular, to keep a United States focus on Afghanistan. We have been urging the involvement of NATO in the struggle for Afghanistan. We are

pleased that NATO is engaged. I must state for the record that NATO's commitment is woefully inadequate. It is simply unthinkable that the NATO Alliance cannot muster a much greater and more effective force in Afghanistan than it has done thus far.

We have always been calling for NATO engagement on the ground, large-scale, in Iraq. And it is long overdue that our NATO allies, all of them as an organization, participate in both the remaining military aspect and the reconstruction of Iraq.

I would like to turn for a moment to another terrorist sanctuary for which a strategy is sorely needed: Syria, a country which is also well known to possess weapons of mass destruction.

I returned from Syria and Libya just Sunday morning, two countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism. The contrast between them could not be more stark. Libya has turned away from developing weapons of mass destruction and made great strides in eliminating its previous support for terrorism. Libya is a developing success story for the very reasons the Commission recommends. We and our allies applied direct and comprehensive economic and political pressure on Colonel Gadhafi for years without exceptions and without wavering. Colonel Gadhafi finally got it, as I can testify, since I met with him last week again. He finally saw his policies of terror and possession of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs as a mistake. It only promised him future isolation, deprivation and insecurity.

Unfortunately, as the war against terrorism rages all around it, Syria still has its head in the sand, stubbornly refusing to acknowledge that there is no future as a sanctuary for terrorists.

When I was in Damascus over a year ago, I personally conveyed to President Assad that change is necessary to improve Syria's relationship with the United States. Close the terrorist offices in Damascus; withdraw Syria's military from Lebanon; withdraw the thousands of military intelligence officers from Beirut; stop anti-American propaganda in the state-controlled media; and others. Apparently Damascus thinks that the world is foolish enough to be placated by half-hearted efforts.

Mr. Assad could seal the border with Iraq against the movement of terrorists if he chose to do so, just as he has sealed the border on Golan Heights for many years. Damascus allows Iran to ship military supplies to terrorists in the south of Lebanon and is the key to the continued and growing strength of Hezbollah, a terrorist organization. You cannot claim to be fighting terrorists while at the same time supplying weapons to terrorist groups. Assad's actions speak volumes about his continuing willingness to provide a sanctuary for terrorists and the supply of terror weapons for them to use.

The attacks of 9/11 were a turning point in modern world history that offers nations a choice between civilization and barbarism. Libya took the right path toward integration and operation with the world of civilized nations. Syria has again taken the wrong road of history, and its citizens unfortunately will pay a high price for Assad's lack of vision as Syria becomes more and more isolated.

I would welcome any thoughts Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton have on this issue of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries. I also look forward to greater details regarding the Commission's re-

port on foreign policy recommendations so that we as a Committee can respond effectively and in a similar spirit of bipartisanship to these recommendations in the coming weeks.

I want to congratulate our two distinguished visitors for their extraordinary service to the American people, and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

As I said before, we will defer further Member statements until the questioning of our witnesses is completed.

We are honored to have two very important figures with us today. Their contribution is well-known. And on behalf of the House International Relations Committee, I would like to express our profound gratitude for their ongoing service to our country.

I would like to welcome Thomas H. Kean, Chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, otherwise known as the 9–11 Commission. He served as Governor of New Jersey from 1982 to 1990, and, since 1990, as President of Drew University. Governor Kean also served for 10 years in the New Jersey Assembly, rising to the positions of Majority Leader, Minority Leader and Speaker. He holds a B.A. from Princeton and an M.A. from Columbia.

Welcome, Governor Kean.

I am pleased to welcome back to the Committee Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair of the 9–11 Commission and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Prior to becoming Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center, Mr. Hamilton served for 34 years in Congress, representing Indiana's Ninth District, and during his tenure, he served as Chairman and Ranking Member of this very Committee.

Since leaving the House, Mr. Hamilton has served as a Commissioner on National Security in the 21st Century. He is currently a member of the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council. He is a graduate of DePauw University and Indiana University Law School.

Welcome, Mr. Hamilton.

We are extremely honored to have you both appear before us today.

Governor Kean, please proceed with a 5-minute summary, if possible. We won't be too strict on that. Your statement and full statements will be made a part of the record.

Governor Kean.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. KEAN, CHAIR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (9–11 COMMISSION)

Mr. KEAN. Thank you very much Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos, distinguished Members of the Committee on International Relations.

We are honored to appear before you today. We want to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for their very articulate statements and their help. We want to thank the leadership of the House of Representatives for the very prompt consideration you are giving to the recommendations of the Commission.

This is extraordinary to have Committee sessions like this in the month of August. I recognized, I think, what it meant to the Congress. I didn't recognize what it meant to members of the Commission as far as August went, but I thank you for your prompt attention.

Our findings and recommendations were strongly endorsed by all Commissioners—as you have noted, five Republicans and five Democrats—because we share a unity of purpose. And we call upon Congress and the Administration to display that same spirit of bipartisanship as we collectively seek to make our country and Americans safer and more secure.

Terrorism is the number one threat to the national security of the United States. Counterterrorism policy must be the number one priority for this President, and for that matter, for any President for the foreseeable future.

We cannot succeed against terrorism by Islamic extremist groups unless we use all of the elements of national power, and that means military power, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, homeland defense, and—yes—diplomacy and public diplomacy.

See, if we favor one tool, and we neglect the others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort. By the way, this is not just our view. This is the view of every single policymaker that we talked to. We cannot succeed against terrorism with one tool alone. Secretary Rumsfeld, for instance, told us that he can't get the job done with the military alone. For every terrorist we kill or capture, he said, more can rise up to take their place. He told us the cost/benefit ratio is simply against us.

Cofer Black told us: "You can't get the job done with the CIA alone."

We need all the tools of American power if we are going to win this war, and we want to concentrate this morning on two of them, diplomacy and public diplomacy.

Our Commission came to the judgment very quickly that the United States cannot win the war against Islamic terrorism without friends and without allies. In every area we talk about, we need strong international partnerships. We need access and overflight rights for our military forces. We rely heavily on information exchanges and liaison with friendly intelligence services. We need foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners to surveil and arrest terrorist suspects. We have to have the cooperation of foreign financial institutions to track the flow of terrorist funding. We need common and national passport and document standards for international travel. And we need common security standards for international aviation.

If these activities are to be successful, they must take place in the context of strong government-to-government relationships. See, we have to build trust if we are going to get cooperation with our international partners. We can and must take action on our own, obviously, to protect our people, but we are also convinced that we cannot make our country safe and secure over the long term without strong and sustained international cooperation.

We are already working intensively with friends and allies. What is not clear to us and the Commission is whether we are pulling all these efforts together in a considered way.

What the Commission recommends is that we work to engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamic terrorism. This can take place through multilateral institutions, which would also create a contact group of the leading coalition governments where we can coordinate and consolidate our efforts against terrorism.

Now, as the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Lantos, said, we can have no sanctuaries. We can allow no sanctuaries. We say we have to kill or capture those committed to terrorism and cannot commit them to sanctuaries anywhere.

We became convinced that we need new international institutions for engagement between the West and the Arab Muslim worlds, and that is not just the Arab League or the Islamic Conference. Right now, we have on the one side NATO and the G–8; on the other side we have Arab League and the Islamic Conference. There is no place there for the two worlds to come together, and, Congressman, you are absolutely right. We need a place where we can meet, though, with leading Muslim states to discuss critical issues about the future: Political and economic reform; educational, economic opportunity; the rule of law; mutual respect; tolerance. We need a forum where Western governments can come together and work constructively with Arab and Muslim leaders, some of whom we believe can share our vision of the future.

This dialogue should not only be between governments, but you have to somehow get a dialogue between societies as well. We want to foster that broad dialogue and help reformers in the Arab and Muslim world succeed in their efforts to reshape their own societies.

What became clear in our own investigation is that the national security institutions of the U.S. Government were designed to deter and defeat Cold War threats, threats of war between great powers. Our Government, still today, is not geared to deal with the threat from international Islamic terrorism. That threat today is not from great armies that are gathered. The threats today come from the beliefs that propelled 19 young men to take their own lives simply to inflict the greatest harm on us.

The military struggle is part of the struggle we face, but the far greater struggle we face is the war of ideas. As much as we worry about bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and we do, we are never going to win that struggle unless we worry even more about the attitudes of tens of millions of young Arabs and hundreds of millions of young Muslims.

Those people are not committed to violence, but they do sympathize with bin Laden. In the long term, that sympathy—which can turn in some degrees to support—represents a dire long-term threat for this country, because they represent the wellspring to refresh the doctrine of hate and destruction, no matter how many al-Qaeda members we capture or kill.

For these reasons, we welcome the opportunity to address the question of public diplomacy.

I would now like to pass the torch to my friend, colleague and teacher, Congressman Hamilton.

STATEMENT OF LEE H. HAMILTON, VICE CHAIR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (9–11 COMMISSION)

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Members of Congress and Governor Kean, Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Lantos and distinguished Members of the Committee.

It is very good to be here in familiar surroundings. I might say to you that I have learned in the past few days that it is easier to ask the questions than it is to answer them. But I am very pleased to be here with Governor Kean, whose extraordinary leadership has enabled the 9–11 Commission to succeed.

I also want to join Governor Kean in thanking the Chairman and Ranking Member for excellent opening statements.

I begin with public diplomacy. The small percentage of Muslims who are fully converted to Osama bin Laden's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion. It is with the large majority of Muslims that we must encourage reform, freedom, democracy and opportunity, even though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its effectiveness simply because we are its carriers. In short, the United States has to defeat an ideology, not just a group of hardcore al-Qaeda operatives.

The United States must define its message. We must define what we should stand for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world. Muslim and Christian friends can agree on the need for respect and opportunity. If we heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the Arab and Muslim world, a moderate consensus could be found.

That vision of the future should stress life over death; educational and economic opportunity. This vision includes widespread political participation and contempt for indiscriminate violence. It includes respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and tolerance for opposing points of view. We need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously.

If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us. Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, and our Government has begun some promising initiatives with both. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for larger resources. It should get them. The United States should rebuild the scholarship exchange and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States.

The United States and its friends need to stress educational opportunity in the Arab and Islamic world. We should work to cut the Middle East illiteracy rate in half by 2010, targeting women and girls, and supporting programs for adult literacy; support the basics, such as textbooks that translate more of the world's knowledge into local languages and libraries to house such materials. Education about the outside world or other cultures is weak, and

support for more vocational education is needed in trades and business skills.

The Middle East can also benefit from programs to bridge the digital divide and increase Internet access. We should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds would be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education.

Economic openness is essential. Terrorism is not caused by poverty. Indeed, many terrorists come from well-off families. Yet when people lose hope, when societies break down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are created. Backward economic policies and repressive political regimes slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition and passions have no constructive outlet.

Policies that support economic development and reform also support political freedom. International commerce requires ongoing operation and compromise, the exchange of ideas across cultures, and the peaceful resolution of differences. Economic growth expands the middle class, a constituency for further reform. Vibrant private sectors have an interest in curbing government power. Those who control their own economic destiny soon desire a voice in their own communities and societies.

Thus the Commission recommends a comprehensive U.S. strategy to counterterrorism, including economic policies that encourage development, open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and enhanced prospects for their children. Mr. Chairman, we are convinced that we cannot win the war against Islamic terrorism unless we also win the war of ideas. We need to win hearts and minds across the great swath of the globe from Morocco to Malaysia.

We need to understand public diplomacy in the proper sense of the word. Public diplomacy is not just the mechanics of how we deliver the message. What matters most by far is the message itself. People in the Arab and Muslim world need to know that America is on their side; that America stands for political participation, personal freedom, the rule of law; that America stands for educational and economic opportunity.

We cannot take on the responsibility for transforming the Arab and the Muslim world. It is up to courageous Muslims to change their own societies. But the people of the Arab and Muslim world need to know that we are on their side, and that we want better lives for them and their children and their grandchildren. America's message to the Arab and Muslim world must be a message of hope.

We are pleased to now respond to your questions.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamilton.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. KEAN, CHAIR, AND LEE H. HAMILTON, VICE CHAIR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (9–11 COMMISSION)

Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Lantos, distinguished members of the Committee on International Relations: We are honored to appear before you today. We

want to thank you and the leadership of the House of Representatives for the prompt consideration you are giving to the recommendations of the Commission. We are grateful to you, and to the leadership of the House.

The Commission's findings and recommendations were strongly endorsed by all Commissioners-five Democrats and five Republicans. We share a unity of purpose. We call upon Congress and the Administration to display the same spirit of bipartisanship as we collectively seek to make our country and all Americans safer and more secure.

WE CANNOT SUCCEED WITH ONE TOOL ALONE

Terrorism is the number one threat today to the national security of the United States. Counterterrorism policy must be the number one priority for this President, and for any President, for the foreseeable future.

We cannot succeed against terrorism by Islamist extremist groups unless we use all the elements of national power: military power, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, homeland defense, and—yes—diplomacy and public diplomacy. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort. This is not just our view: it is the view of all policymakers. We cannot succeed against terrorism with one tool alone.

- Secretary Rumsfeld told us: He can't get the job done with the military alone. For every terrorist we kill or capture, more rise up to take their place. He told us the cost-benefit ratio is against us.
- Cofer Black told us: You can't get the job done with the CIA alone.

DIPLOMACY

We need all the tools of American power to win this war, and we want to concentrate this morning on two of them, diplomacy and public diplomacy.

Our Commission came to the judgment pretty quickly that the United States cannot win this war against Islamist terrorism without friends and allies. In every area we talk about, we need strong international partnerships:

- We need access and overflight rights for our military forces;
- We rely heavily on information exchanges and liaison with friendly intelligence services;
- We need foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners to surveil and arrest terrorist suspects;
- We need the cooperation of foreign financial institutions to track the flow of terrorist funding;
- We need common international passport and document standards for international travel;
- We need common security standards for international aviation.

If these activities are to be successful, they must take place in the context of strong government-to-government relationships. We need to build trust and cooperation with international partners.

We can—and must—take actions on our own to protect our people. But we are also convinced that we cannot make our country safe and secure over the long term without strong and sustained international cooperation.

We are already working intensively with friends and allies. What is not clear to us is whether we are pulling all these efforts together.

What the Commission recommends is that we work to engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. This can take place through multilateral institutions. We should also create a contact group of the leading coalition governments, where we can coordinate and consolidate our efforts against terrorism.

ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD

The Commission also became convinced that we need new international institutions for engagement between the West and the Arab and Muslim Worlds. On one side, we have NATO and the G–8, and on the other we have the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. But we don't really have a place where the two worlds come together.

We need a place where we can meet with leading Muslim states to discuss critical issues about the future—political and economic reform, educational and economic opportunity, rule of law, mutual respect, and tolerance. We need a forum where

western governments can come together and work constructively with Arab and Muslim leaders on a shared vision of the future.

The dialogue should be between not only governments, but between societies as well. We want to foster a broad dialogue. We want to help the reformers in the Arab and Muslim world succeed in their efforts to shape their own societies.

ENGAGE THE STRUGGLE OF IDEAS

What became clear to us in our investigation is that the national security institutions of the U.S. government were designed to deter and defeat cold-war threats, great power threats. Our government—still today—is not geared to deal with the threat from transnational Islamist terrorism. The threat to us today is not from great armies. The threat to us comes from the beliefs that propel 19 young men to take their own lives in a desire to inflict grave harm upon us.

The military struggle is a part of the struggle we face, but the far greater struggle we face is the war of ideas. As much as we worry about Bin Ladin and al Qaeda—and we do—we worry far more about the attitudes of tens of millions of young Arabs and hundreds of millions of young Muslims.

Those who sympathize with Bin Ladin represent, in the long-term, a far greater threat to us. They represent the well-spring to refresh the doctrine of hate and destruction, no matter how many al-Qaeda members we capture or kill. For these reasons we welcome the opportunity the opportunity to address the question of public diplomacy.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion. It is among the large majority of Arabs and Muslims that we must encourage reform freedom, democracy and opportunity, even though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its effectiveness simply because we are its carriers.

In short the United States has to help defeat an ideology, not just a group of hardcore al Qaeda operatives.

The United States must define its message. We must define what we stand for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world. American and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity. If we heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the Arab and Muslim world, a moderate consensus can be found.

That vision of the future should stress life over death: individual educational and economic opportunity. This vision includes widespread political participation and contempt for indiscriminate violence. It includes respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and tolerance for opposing points of view.

We need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.

- Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, and the government has begun some promising initiatives with both. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.
- The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States.

AN AGENDA OF OPPORTUNITY—EDUCATION

The United States and its friends need to stress educational opportunity in the Arab and Islamic world. We should:

- Work to cut the Middle East's illiteracy rate in half by 2010, targeting women and girls and supporting programs for adult literacy;
- Support the basics, such as textbooks that translate more of the world's knowledge into local languages and libraries to house such materials. Education about the outside world, or other cultures, is weak; and
- Support more vocational education is needed, in trades and business skills. The Middle East can also benefit from programs to bridge the digital divide and increase internet access.

We should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds would be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education.

AN AGENDA FOR OPPORTUNITY—ECONOMICS

Economic openness is essential. Terrorism is not cause by poverty. Indeed, many terrorists come from well-off families. Yet when people lose hope, when societies break down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are created. Backward economic policies and repressive political regimes slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition and passions have no constructive outlet.

- Policies that support economic development and reform also support political freedom.
- International commerce requires ongoing cooperation and compromise, the exchange of ideas across cultures, and the peaceful resolution of differences.
- Economic growth expands the middle class, a constituency for further reform.
- Vibrant private sectors have an interest in curbing government power;
- Those who control their own economic destiny soon desire a voice in their own communities and societies.

Therefore, the Commission recommends a comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism, including economic policies that encourage development, open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and enhance prospects for their children's future.

CONCLUSIONS

Mr. Chairman, we are convinced that we cannot win the war against Islamist terrorism unless we also win the war of ideas. We need to win hearts and minds across the great swath of the globe, from Morocco to Malaysia.

We need to understand public diplomacy in the proper sense of the word. Public diplomacy is not just the mechanics of how we deliver the message.

What matters most, by far, is the message itself. People in the Arab and Muslim world need to know that America is on their side—that America stands for political participation, personal freedom, and the rule of law; that America stands for educational and economic opportunity.

We cannot take on the responsibility for transforming the Arab and Muslim world. It is up to courageous Muslims to change their own societies. But the people of the Arab and Muslim world need to know that we are on their side, that we want better lives for them and their children and grandchildren. America's message to the Arab and Muslim world must be a message of hope.

We would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you——

Chairman HYDE. Incidentally, we will keep strict time, 5 minutes on the questions.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me be very quick then.

First of all, thank you, Governor Kean and Chairman Hamilton, for the extraordinary work you did and for the great work of your staff, Chris Kojm, Al Felzenberg, and so many others who did great work on this Commission.

A couple of very brief questions. On page 384 you make the point that for terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.

I note U.N. Security Resolution 1373 and all the other international conventions that preceded it. Resolution 1373 created the Counterterrorism Committee. It receives reports, they hold conferences—in fact, there will be one held in Cairo later on this year. A lot of the reports are late, but there seems to be no penalty for failure to report.

I looked at the 12 conventions that the U.N. is admonishing countries to adopt, and they are very good, you know, from unlawful seizure of aircraft, nuclear materials, plastics explosives, and financing of terrorism. However, there is no convention about travel as far as I can tell. Would you recommend that a convention, an international convention, be concluded so there would be greater emphasis among the world's countries to crack down on travel?

Secondly, you mention, Governor Kean, so eloquently, I think, about the importance of having a place to meet. I chair the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and on June 15th, in part of an ongoing process meeting, we held a hearing, and Natan Sharansky and many others testified, including Max Kampelman, our former Ambassador to the OSCE. They spoke to the need of applying the OSCE model in the Middle East and including the Mediterranean countries.

Right now there are six Middle Eastern countries that are called OSCE Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. We frequently meet with their Foreign Ministers; we meet with their Members of Parliament. It provides a basis for dialogue, discussion, and hopefully working out in a diplomatic venue the outstanding issues.

Rather than reinvent the wheel, it seems to me, we have the 55 countries of the OSCE already there, including Central Asia, Central Europe, and, of course, Russia, Canada and the United States. The OSCE provides a venue, I believe, that could provide an opening to engage those Middle East countries in the agreements, the process, and the baskets that we have on security, trade, human rights. OSCE principles are all universally recognized considerations or norms. Why not apply the OSCE?

I have other questions, but time at this point doesn't permit it.

Mr. KEAN. Well, let's take the second part first. That would be a model, I think. We have got to have a forum where we can talk to each other. We don't have one right now. The Helsinki process is perhaps a good model to proceed for the Western Muslim world to build on for some sort of a long-term forum. That would be good.

Travel is the time at which terrorists are most vulnerable. I mean, that is the time we should have been able to stop people before 9/11, because when they move, they become vulnerable. They have to use forged documents, forged visas, whatever. They are liable to be picked up at one stage or another. They have to get on planes or other means of transportation and get tickets. They are very vulnerable at that time.

We have got to have a priority for some uniform passports, for something—for document standards. There has got to be an international agreement. I mean, we have recommended in this country that, at the very least, we start with drivers' licenses that have the same standards. But as we move to international travel, we have got to have an international convention in this area.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. So an international convention is something that you would recommend?

Mr. KEAN. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Smith, thank you for bringing those up. They are both very important points.

I would agree, as the Governor has indicated, that we argue in the report for a modern border immigration system. There are a lot of aspects to that, but one aspect to it is that we have to work out standards with the international community. Eventually we ought to have a means of real-time verification of passports worldwide. Now, that is a long way off and a lot of complexities to that, but that is what we ought to aim for.

As the Governor has said, the travel documents are really critical. We must know that people are who they say they are when they come into the country. And the only way you can do that is through standards that are internationally accepted. So that is a good point that you make. And the Helsinki process would indeed be an excellent model.

What impressed us over and over again—and Mr. Lantos referred to this, too—was that the current mechanisms just aren't working very well with regard to this dialogue and flow of information, and that is critically important. As you all know, you can't get anywhere in resolving these questions unless you have some kind of a forum where that dialogue can take place. And the Helsinki model—I know you have had a major role in over a period of years—I think it is a good one for us to emulate.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Several years before we had a Commission, and long before you published your report, which deserves so much praise, I proposed a few weeks ago an amendment calling for a major shift of United States aid to Egypt from overwhelming military to a more balanced approach to military and economic aid. Over recent years we have provided Egypt some $30 billion of military aid. Egypt today has a huge and highly modern, vast military apparatus. It is useful for regional stability, but the time has come to move away from $1.3 billion of annual military aid to Egypt and to shift some of that to economic aid. Because economic aid will be infinitely more useful to the development of an Egyptian society more along the lines that your Commission hopes for, and we all do. Chairman Hyde supported my amendment, but despite that, it did not prevail.

I would like to ask both of you gentlemen whether as a conceptual framework—without being frozen into the dollar figures—do you believe that the time is now ripe to achieve our goals to move some of our military aid to Egypt into economic aid?

Governor Kean.

Mr. KEAN. We do emphasize vehemently in the report the need to move aid into—not only into the economic areas, but in education.

Mr. LANTOS. Education.

Mr. KEAN. Cultural exchanges.

Mr. LANTOS. Nonmilitary areas.

Mr. KEAN. Yes. Right now we have given this tremendous aid to Egypt, and a poll taken very recently shows that only 15 percent of the people in Egypt have a favorable opinion of the United States and its policies. So clearly while we may be succeeding in the military area, we are not succeeding very well in what we call the battle for the hearts and minds of the people in Egypt or in any other part of the region. We believe the people going to the

madrassas are going because there is no other school available. So what we recommend is trying to join with others to create some public schooling so there would be an alternative for those parents from some of those schools that teach hate, as we know.

We do talk a lot about the kinds of exchanges you are talking about. We think it is past time. We have got to reach people. We have got to reach people in a better way than we have in the past, or we are not going to win this long-term struggle. As you have mentioned, economic aid is one of the very important ones. People have no hope, no hope of a job, no hope of a job in the future, just fertile ground for the kinds of ideas of hopelessness and terror that organizations such as bin Laden's propagate.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Your question really called to mind Secretary Kissinger's testimony many years ago before this Committee in which someone asked him where he got the figures for Egyptian aid, around $1 billion. And he said, "Well, it is a nice round figure," and that nice round figure has been in the budget for 30 or 40 years now, I think.

Well, the changes in the mix of aid we did not address. We did not get into the question of military assistance. I would simply affirm what the Governor has said, and that is there isn't any doubt at all that we need to focus a lot more on a better vision for the people of the Middle East, including the Egyptians, and that would certainly include more quick educational aid.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you.

So I take it both of you are in support of my amendment.

In the remaining time, I would be grateful if both of you could comment, however briefly, on the reform of the intelligence structure that was proposed in the last couple of days by some of our colleagues on the other side of the Hill.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Lantos, we have not analyzed that in great detail. I have had—and I am not sure if the Governor has had—some conversations with Senator Roberts. One of the things that strikes us in looking at it is that there are a lot of commonalities between what we have recommended and what he has recommended. He says the status quo is not acceptable. He believes reform is necessary. He supports the creation of a National Intelligence Director. He supports the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center. He wants to ensure that the military has all of the tactical intelligence that it needs, and that the civilian policymaker has strategic and national intelligence. Both proposals put a lot of emphasis on strengthening the national security workforce of the FBI, and he certainly is in agreement with the creation with regard to putting someone in charge of the intelligence community.

Now, there are some differences, and I must say I have not looked at those completely. I believe the proposal calls for a much larger adjustment—I am not sure that is the right word—but larger adjustment of the CIA than we have suggested. And he calls for more removal of some of the DoD intelligence agencies from the direction of the Pentagon than we do.

But Senator Roberts and the Republicans in the Senate Intelligence Committee that have supported that are all very sound people, and we will look at those proposals very carefully. It is a little early for me to make any judgment about it.

Mr. KEAN. I would concur to the remarks that Congressman Hamilton made. I have not talked to Senator Roberts. I have not really been briefed on this proposal at all.

The one thing we do concur on absolutely is that the present situation is unacceptable, and it has to be changed, and as long as there is not some change in the intelligence-gathering apparatus and the structure of the intelligence agencies, the American people are going to be less safe.

As I have read it in the newspapers, I think Senator Roberts' proposal is a constructive alternative. We have not, obviously, met with the Commission, so Congressman Hamilton and I are talking, really, on our own.

Mr. LANTOS. Would you agree, however, that whatever major reorganizational proposal will be forthcoming, it should be a bipartisan proposal at this time in our Nation's history?

Mr. KEAN. We believe very strongly on the Commission that this is a time when this kind of proposal has to be taken right out of politics. It is just too important for the country. And we tried to set an example on the Commission. There is no Republican or Democrat way to solve this issue. This is something that is in the interests of the safety of the American people.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, I agree. I think it is a very complicated business, reorganizing intelligence, and I think you are going to have to have broad agreement, or you simply will not be able to get it through.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

With the September 11 attacks on our Nation, we learned to our horror that no one is immune from this gross manifestation of terrorism, and as the 9–11 Commission's report so correctly points out, the United States became a Nation transformed. On that day, we were surprised and grasped the power of evil. But on this day, we are informed and, thanks to your report, ready to defeat this evil. Within that context, I would like to ask you some questions about legislation that our Committee is working on.

What recommendations do you have for specific programs within the existing initiatives, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Broader Middle East Initiative, and efforts toward a Middle East free trade area, that would help us win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world; and would you support the educational fund and the vocational programs that Mr. Hamilton mentioned in his remarks to be funded out of these existing programs?

With respect to terrorist sanctuaries and global partnerships that address this terrorism threat, would you support amending the Export Administration Act to mandate determinations and punitive measures for countries that are serving as terrorist sanctuaries? Would you support the creation of a Terrorism Interdiction Initiative out of the Department of State that would help us establish bilateral agreements and global partnerships to interdict terrorists and their weapons, to create regional terrorism centers and establish terrorism prevention teams?

Lastly, what is the appropriate role of the State Department's Counterterrorism Office? Should this office maintain an operational

role? Should it primarily be tasked with negotiating access and operations? And what about the International Atomic Energy Agency? Should it not be making sure it is not hampered in its work because of financial constraints, and should it be removed from the deferred payment program, and should our assessment to this Agency be paid at the beginning of this calendar year? Those are some of the projects we have been working on.

Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. You have raised a lot of questions. I think we can respond only in a general way. The Middle East peace initiatives, the initiatives for free trade, the educational funding are all, I think, quite consistent with the recommendations the Commission has made with regard to providing more economic opportunity and more educational opportunity in these regions.

The point we made with regard to the terrorist sanctuaries is that there must be a strategy developed in dealing with wherever these sanctuaries are. They are so terribly important in terms of the ability of the terrorists to get their act together that we must always try to deny a sanctuary to the terrorists. Now, sometimes that takes military action, but, above all, it takes a strategy of how you deny, what kind of tools do you have. Economic sanctions, of whatever kind, would certainly be one of those tools to deny those sanctuaries in countries that are providing the sanctuaries.

The reference to the State Department office and whether or not it would play an operational role—we believe that with regard to counterterrorism, planning for an operational role should be done in the National Counterterrorism Center. The National Counterterrorism Center would not only collect intelligence and pool it and analyze it, but also would plan operations.

Now, that is a planning function, not an operational function. So to the extent you are saying operation is execution, that would not be in the National Counterterrorism Center, and it would be with the State Department. So I think we are in accord on that.

We do recommend, with regard to weapons of mass destruction, a very strong program of support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the President's initiative in that area as well. We support all of that.

Now, we did not get into the questions of the operation of the IAEA and all.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlewoman's time has expired.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for allowing us to give closing statements, which will give me an opportunity to once again say that we can—and I will describe how—use our economic power to pressure North Korea and Iran into abandoning their nuclear programs.

If we end this decade having destroyed Saddam, the Taliban, and even capturing bin Laden, but we also end this decade with a nuclear capacity in Iran and an ability to smuggle nuclear weapons into the United States, I think we will end this decade less safe than we began it.

Chairman Kean, I want to thank you for your opening statement in demonstrating that, contrary to what one might glean from looking at the press, the 9–11 Commission is not a Commission report

on restructuring the Intelligence Community; it is, instead, a powerful call that we use all the elements of national power to combat terrorism, and that means a look at all the issues that confront us here on this Committee. Vice Chairman Hamilton came to the Financial Services Committee. We need to change policies governmentwide, not structure in one part of the government.

Vice Chairman Hamilton, I want to thank you for mentioning textbooks. I will be urging this Committee to do something phenomenally expensive, or moderately expensive at least, and that is that the United States perhaps ought to provide, at our cost, textbooks and teacher manuals to the elementary schools of every country that is susceptible to bin Laden's influence. I think that that would go a long way toward providing literacy for women in various countries, as well as helping education, as well as helping to mold minds. Our enemies have done it. They have gone further and actually created the schools. They call them Islamic fundamentalist madrassas.

I want to pick up on a line of questioning that began yesterday at Financial Services when we were graced by Vice Chairman Hamilton, and that is that the mandate of this Commission expired last weekend. I have an ulterior motive, and that is to get everyone on this panel here today to join with Mrs. Maloney, Mr. Shays and others in legislation to extend the mandate of this Commission and extend its funding.

Chairman Kean, I am under the impression that the Commission lasted for about 22 months, and received an annual budget of $15 million, is that correct, or a total budget?

Mr. KEAN. Total budget.

Mr. SHERMAN. So for $15 million, we got the most——

Mr. KEAN. $14 million. You have given us $1 million we didn't have.

Mr. SHERMAN. For $14 million, we have got the most influential report of the year, if not the decade, and we are now in a position—I mean, it is a great report, but you raise as many new questions as you answer. And for every recommendation that is specific, there is another recommendation that says, gee, we would like to flesh this out for you, but we don't have any time.

I want volume two. I am from L.A., and we believe if the first movie is a success, you make a sequel. It is my understanding that you are now seeking private funding at a much lower level, and I want you to explain how much lower level we are talking about in terms of funding, if you are able to raise private funding. Doesn't it take a lot of your time to go seek private funding? We in politics know when you seek private funding, as some of us do for our campaigns, that people raise questions about who and where and what.

So, I know you are not here to advocate for the legislation that everyone here ought to join in introducing, but perhaps you could tell us a little bit about some of the benefits, but more detriments, of the hat-in-hand approach to continuing your Commission's good work.

Mr. KEAN. Well, first of all, we are trying to raise some private funds. We cannot do the kind of exploration that you are talking about without the funds we are trying to raise.

Mr. SHERMAN. So if we don't act, we don't get volume two.

Mr. KEAN. That is right. What we are trying to get funds for is to simply educate the American people, to educate them on the report, educate them on the recommendations. And all 10 Commissioners have agreed to do some speaking and testifying, obviously, appear before various forums in various cities across the country, just to let the American people know of the challenges that we found, the problems we found, and the solutions that we recommend.

To do that, we are trying to establish a very small office in town, maybe three or four people at most, just to coordinate that travel, coordinate the Commissioners, keep us together as a group as we try to further educate the American people and, frankly, hope to see our recommendations adopted.

Mr. SHERMAN. So if we don't act, you have a staff of three or four. During the Commission's work, how many were on your staff?

Mr. KEAN. We had a staff of about 70.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again I want to commend Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton for the terrific job they have done. I was going to call Mr. Hamilton "Vice Chairman," but when he is in this room, we always refer to him as "Chairman."

I especially want to congratulate you on the bipartisan theme that ran through your report, and in keeping with that theme, I would like to identify myself very much with the spirit of what Congressman Lantos said this morning in his opening statement, and just respectfully express a concern that I have with your report where you refer often to trying to win the minds and hearts, setting up more exchange programs, student programs.

I think all of that is good, but I am wondering in the real world if we are giving the impression that will have more of an impact than it really will. For instance, we talk about the image of the United States, and, again, in a bipartisan state, the two times we really went to war during the 1990s was in Bosnia and Kosovo. In both of those wars we killed Christians, we bombed Christian cities, to save Muslims. There was no territory, there was no oil, there was nothing there for the United States at all. And apparently we have gotten no credit for that in the Muslim world.

Now, to me, if that wasn't an example of the benevolence of the United States and our good intentions, I don't know what is. And without opening a debate on Iraq, I know people have honest differences over that, but when the United States went in, our goal was to get out as soon as we can. We are not trying to take land, we are not trying to take their oil, and yet we still seem to be making no headway with the Muslim community.

I am wondering if the problem isn't just so entrenched that it is going to be a very long-term program we have to enact and undertake. Again, I am for it. I am just wondering, though, if we are setting up an equivalency, saying we have to win over their minds and hearts. When we did that with communism, we had one ideology and they had another. And as much as we disagreed with their ideology, at least we realized there was an intellectual basis for Marxism. Here we are talking about pure hatred. This isn't an

Islamic philosophy; this is almost a madness, and yet it has been embraced by millions of people.

I am wondering how many schools we have to open, how many textbooks do we have to provide, how many libraries do we have to open, how many exchanges do we have to have to really make an impression on people who have this type of mindset?

So I am really just raising these questions, and wondering if we are not giving almost a false impression by thinking that on the one hand we have the military and the diplomatic, on the other we have these exchanges and educational initiatives, and giving the impression that those initiatives can bring about any short-term results.

Again, I am not really disagreeing with you. I think I am echoing some of what Congressman Lantos said and expressing some concerns I have. Again, I would probably support almost all of these programs you are talking about. I am just wondering what the real impact would be, considering the mindset that we are up against.

To me, the only way we would even begin to have any impact at all would be if we turned our back on our closest ally, Israel. That may give us 6 months of good faith, and after that they would find some other reason. But it just seems they are so much against us for reasons that are almost all mindless and irrational. I think a lot of it is begrudgery and jealousy to some extent, a refusal to acknowledge their own deficiencies they have had over many decades, if not centuries.

With that, I really put that out and ask for your comments. That isn't a question so much as me thinking out loud and asking you if you care to comment, or maybe you don't think it is worthy of comment.

In any event, I want to thank you for your service to our country.

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Congressman. I will just start by saying we recognize this is a long-term job, but it is not just in the Middle East.

Since last summer, for instance, the favorable ratings of the United States have fallen from 61 to 15 percent in Indonesia, one of the largest countries in the world, and from 78 percent to 31 percent among Muslims in Nigeria.

We are not going to have a safer world unless people understand us better. You are absolutely right. We risked American lives to save Muslims because we thought it was right in Eastern Europe. They don't know about that. Nobody has told them. We do not have the kind of information agencies that we did during the Cold War that have the power to spread our ideas and our messages to that part of the world.

Mr. KING. Do you believe that those types of agencies similar to Radio Free Europe and others, if we set that up in the Middle East, could be strong enough to counter Al-Jazeera?

Mr. KEAN. Al-Jazeera has been very, very successful, and we have to recognize why it has been successful and give that part of the world some alternative, providing we can't influence Al-Jazeera itself. We are not doing that right now. Al-Jazeera is it, if you want to listen and learn about that part of the world in that part of the world.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. King, we make a very sharp distinction. On the one hand you have Osama bin Laden and his adherents. We don't think that is a large number of people. It is not millions; it is hundreds, maybe thousands. We are not going to convert them. They are not going to espouse democracy and free enterprise, and we say, as you and others have advocated, you have to replace them, you have to remove them, you have to capture them, you have to kill them.

The great mass of the Islamic people—the Muslims—may admire Osama bin Laden, may sympathize with a lot of the things he says, but they do not support his violence. And it is that great multitude of people that we are talking about here with public diplomacy and with the effort of economic and educational opportunity, and we think that is a very long-term challenge.

We don't in any way want to reduce the military effort. It is absolutely essential, no question about it. But it is targeted at a fairly small number of people, comparatively.

Look, Islam stretches from Morocco to Indonesia. There are billions of people there, and those are the people that we think American policy has to be very much focused on, at least to the extent that we are focused on the military side.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

The Chair recognizes himself. Gentleman, I think we are missing something. Let us pick Egypt. I have never read such hateful comments in the official papers as I have read coming out of Egypt: That we spread the AIDS virus deliberately, that we have genetically poisoned food, that we are guilty of every crime in the book. And that is what the population reads over there. I have the copies here. I will not burden you with them, but it is sickening. It is nauseating.

So with one hand we are wiping the mud off, and, with the other hand, we are shoving billions of dollars to the Egyptian Government and the people. Hosni Mubarak himself said and is quoted in the *Al-Ahram* paper as saying these guys that hit the World Trade Center, that they were Government people, American people. We did it to ourselves.

Why do we continue to hand money to people while they dump on us? Maybe one tool in using this vast array of resources is telling them to cut it out or they don't get the billions they have factored into their budget. But in country after country after country, the press is hateful and contemptible, and we do nothing but write the check.

I would like to hold a hearing, close the doors, and ask the State Department to tell me why I should vote for sending more money to Egypt as long as they obviously hate us so much. I would like to get an answer to that, because it goes on year after year after year. We pay the ransom, but they keep killing the hostage.

Anyway, that is a statement. I don't require any answer.

Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, gentleman. There is so much that I want to say, but I think I am going to at first just say "thank you" to both of you.

Mr. Hamilton, I had the honor of serving with you for so many years on this Committee, and your wise counsel and judgment is

something that I will always know and cherish and still seek whenever I run into you.

Governor Kean, being a New Yorker, I still remember those television commercials about New Jersey and you being perfect together. Thank you for the great work you have done.

The Chairman just mentioned the hate coming from the Egyptian media. I want to just mention a couple of other countries, notably Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. We have just designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally, but how do we avoid sending the signal to Pakistan's government that as long as they cough up the occasional al-Qaeda terrorist, we will look the other way over their proliferation support and their terrorist support, Kashmir and everything else, and how do we convince them that they don't have the United States over the war-on-terrorism barrel?

And what about Musharraf's intelligence service? He may personally be committed to fighting this war on terrorism, but I am not convinced about his intelligence service.

When you talk about Saudi Arabia, they didn't admit to having a problem. Now that they were attacked by al-Qaeda last year, they finally realized they have a problem.

Governor Kean, you mentioned the madrassas that proliferate in Saudi Arabia. When the Saudi royal family still blames Zionists for the September 11th attacks and terrorism, how effective can they be in fighting the root causes of terrorism within their own country?

I would like your comments about Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Let me just also make a comment on the fact that the genius of your Commission is that five Democrats and five Republicans unanimously came up with a report, and I think that is just terrific. I was reading about Senator Roberts' proposals, and I think some of them are very good, but I am saddened by the fact that he seems to have only consulted with Republican Members of the Senate, and I want to second the feeling that this needs to be bipartisan.

Finally, I want to comment on something Mr. King said, because he is right on the money in terms of what we did. I chair the Albanian Issues Caucus. Not only do we not get credit for what we did to save Muslims in Europe, but the Muslims in Europe are very appreciative. I know of no greater pro-United States around the world than Albanians.

We don't utilize our Muslim allies, the people in Kosovo who wanted to help us with our efforts in Iraq and others things, that want to speak out. I have often felt we don't utilize these Muslim allies we have and the good friends in the Muslim world that we have.

I am wondering if you would care to comment on all of those things in the 2 or 3 minutes that you might have.

Mr. KEAN. We single out three countries for special attention in our report and some paragraphs. One is Pakistan, one is Saudi Arabia, and the third is Afghanistan. The reason we picked those three for special attention is because it seemed to us they are unstable countries with great dangers of whether or not the present governments are going to be able to make it in the long run. And

instability in any of those countries would mean a real blow to us in the war on terror.

Now, we make recommendations in the report for each of those areas. In the case of Saudi Arabia, we say we have to stop just engaging them on oil. It is not a relationship, you know, if you give us oil, we will support your monarchy and forget about everything else. It is not going to work anymore. We have to engage the Saudi Royal family in real discussions about change in that country. They are starting to understand that, thanks, as you say, to the fact they were attacked themselves. We have got to push and shove gently sometimes, firmly at other times, to help them make the changes that are in their own best interests.

In Pakistan, we have got to help in the schools. There are not any schools; there are just those madrassas. There is no alternative. Parents don't have anyplace to send their children. We have started to invest in an educational system in Pakistan. I think we have to expand that position and help in that area.

Musharraf is an ally; there is no question about it. He has not got control of certain northern regions of his country. We have to also work with him because he is unquestionably an ally in the war on terror. At the same time, we have to help him make changes that we think will be beneficial not only to us, but to him in the long run in his own country.

In Afghanistan, we have just got to be engaged there, because that is where the terrorists would love to go back. They would love to have that as their refuge, and that cannot be allowed to happen again. We have to continue to be committed to the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. I was wondering if—Mr. Hamilton, if we could hear his wisdom on some of my questions.

Chairman HYDE. I know him to be very brief.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think Pakistan presents as tough a problem as there is in American foreign policy today. The ultimate nightmare is for an Islamic radical government to get ahold of a nuclear weapon, and that is possible in Pakistan today.

We have a lot of problems with Musharraf on terrorism, on proliferation, on lack of democracy and other matters, but you have to balance all of these things. Where we came down is that the United States needs to be on the side of pragmatic reform in these countries. You cannot expect Jeffersonian democracy in any of them in the near term, but we can push and prod them in the right direction on a lot of these important issues to us: Democracy, proliferation.

This proliferation effort in Pakistan under General Khan—he created the Wal-Mart of nuclear weapons, and we didn't even know it. It took us 4 years to find out. I mean, that is an awesome danger to the world and to the United States. So we have got a long ways to go.

What we say in the report is that we should help these countries, provided those leaders are willing to make a lot of tough choices, and we have to push and prod them in the right direction.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up on Chairman Hyde's comments about Egypt and the distorted government-controlled media that we are up against there, most recently we are seeing it in Darfur. I am told that we are being criticized, that our only interest there—even though what we are basically trying to do is stop genocide and the murder of thousands and thousands of people—that apparently our only interest is allegedly that we hate Arabs or we want to take their oil. This is the type of stuff that is in the official government-controlled Egyptian press. So it is just one of the things we are up against.

One of the other things we are up against, however, is also self-inflicted in this country, when you look at some of the rhetoric that is over the top, some in our own media. I won't dignify a particular movie by mentioning its name here in an official hearing, but some of the allegations in that, and some that are taken, unfortunately, seriously, and is used by enemies of this country in the Middle East to say, yes, see here, even in the American media they are saying how the President lied, for example, when we know that not only was our intelligence saying, for example, that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, but so were the Germans and the French and the British and many others. That was one thing they all agreed on. Ultimately they haven't been found, and we may never know the answer to all that. I hope we certainly do. But, in any event, some of the over-the-top allegations, and this is a political season, so we are going to see some in this country, unfortunately, but that is somewhat self-inflicted in our political process.

But let me shift gears. Mr. Lantos said something which I very much agree with. He says so many things I do agree with. But he said it is not just winning the hearts and minds over there, we have to win this war.

What I have been concerned about, and I hear this from my constituents back in Cincinnati, and that is the frustration sometimes about actually getting bin Laden, because we think he is in that Wild West region of Pakistan, the tribal-controlled areas up there. And some people will say Iraq was a distraction, and that is why we didn't get bin Laden and that sort of thing, which is trash, as far as I am concerned.

But the question I have is, Should we be more aggressive in working with Pakistan's Government? I was in Pakistan back in January and met with President Musharraf, and this was a couple of weeks after the second assassination attempt on his life, and he told us that he was making every effort to get them, because these are the folks trying to assassinate him. That is logical. And he complained we had not provided helicopters, for example, and that by the time they hear bin Laden is here or there, he hears of it, and they can't get up there quick enough to get him.

What more can we do relative to Pakistan or ought we to be doing? You mentioned, Governor Kean, about the madrassas, for example. We were told that they are either closing them down or making sure they are not spewing this hatred and teaching those kids over there who grow up to be the terrorists. Whether or not, you get different stories about that.

But I am particularly concerned about Pakistan and what you gentleman think we should be doing differently there or doing better.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chabot, I believe that we do have to support Musharraf in every way possible to seal that border. We hear about the Taliban now reconstituting itself in Afghanistan. It is a very difficult political problem for Musharraf. You remember there was an assassination attempt on him not very long ago, so we have to make allowance for that.

But there is not any doubt that we have to have, in your words, a very aggressive policy, and that means military policy, in searching out al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden specifically, and in order to do that, we have to have the cooperation of Musharraf. We can't do it without him. That is why we are in this difficult spot. Even though that Government is doing a lot of things we are not pleased with, we have to be very aggressive on it.

Now, I want to say a word about Osama bin Laden. Removing Osama bin Laden is greatly to be desired, but we don't think removing him changes the war on terrorism all that much. As of today, it is our analysis that Osama bin Laden is an inspirational leader for a lot of people across the Islamic world, but not an operational leader.

So we are all for removing Osama bin Laden, and we think that effort has to be a very aggressive effort to do so, but neither should we believe that once we remove him, we have solved the problem, because I don't think we really have. The problem is much, much more deep-seated than Osama bin Laden.

Mr. KEAN. I might just say Musharraf is a real ally. When people try to kill you twice, it concentrates your mind wonderfully. He is devoted to the war on terror, as are we, and he would like to get bin Laden just as much as we would.

Inside his own country, though, to say get rid of the madrassas when there is no alternative, no public school, no place for a mother and father to send their child except the local madrassa. So we have got to work with them, and we are starting to now, to help them in an alliance to build alternatives to those madrassas, real schools that will teach people real things so they can gain jobs and have some hope for the future.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Mr. Hoeffel.

Mr. HOEFFEL. I want to thank both of you for your extraordinary bipartisan leadership. You had lots of resistance. A lot of people didn't want your Commission to succeed. You succeeded because you stuck together. It is remarkable.

I hope that the Congress will match the example that you have set by working in a bipartisan fashion to implement your recommendations. None of us know how long the war on terror will last, but when its history is written, I believe you two will be among its first heroes, and I really thank you for what you have done.

I want to extend your Commission authority. I think it would be a great service for you to have the public funding that you need, and I support your recommendations for a National Director for Intelligence, for a counterterrorism center, and certainly the need to

unify and strengthen congressional oversight, and I thank you for all those recommendations.

I have two questions, broad questions, I guess. First: Should the United States take a more active role in the Middle East peace process? Would it benefit our position in the Middle East and Eurasia to be seen as more actively involved in that peace process? How significant is that?

Secondly, we have heard a lot of discussion today about economic aid. This Committee has actually talked on several occasions about a modern-day Marshall Plan. Our Chair and our Ranking Member have embraced the concept. Secretary Powell has embraced the concept in testimony. We have not implemented any details. The original Marshall Plan was about an $18 billion commitment over 4 years, which would translate to about $100 billion over 4 years in today's dollars.

How valuable would it be to pull together all these good ideas about economic aid and aid to education and all the rest into a big program that would be presented as a big program, a modern-day Marshall Plan?

Mr. KEAN. I think it would be very, very useful, as long as it was well planned out and well thought out. It is a big idea. It is a very big idea, and, as you say, the devil would be in the details as you tried to figure out what went in it, how you would implement it, and what went to the various governments to help, rather than deter, what we were trying to do. But it is a very good idea.

Of course, the peace process, the continuing conflict with the Palestinians and Israel and all of that, is constantly used against the United States. So anything we can do to move that peace process along, if we were to achieve peace in that part of the world and the preservation of the State of Israel in peace, it would take one of the great arguments that people use against the United States in that part of the world.

So my personal recommendation would be to get as involved as we can be in a useful manner to try to achieve peace in that part of the world, because it would help in the war against terror.

Mr. HAMILTON. I agree with that. There isn't any doubt that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a staple, as we say in the report, of popular commentary today across the Arab and the Muslim world, and we did not address that conflict. We thought that was really kind of outside our mandate. A more active role is your question, and I think that the answer to that is, yes, a more active role would be helpful in trying to resolve the conflict.

Secondly, on the question of economic aid, I am for that basically, but it is not just a question of the amount or number of resources. It is how you put it all together and how you use it. We put a lot of money into a lot of different places without much of a payoff on it, as we have heard several times here this morning.

My own personal view is I am a pretty strong believer in tough conditionality, and if you don't have the conditions that you set, and if you are not tough about enforcing them, then the money is largely wasted.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you, gentleman.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Dr. Ron Paul.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Commission report, and I believe Governor Kean has mentioned it, we have to use all the tools available to us, and yet I think there is one tool that seems to have been neglected that I would like to suggest. It is the tool of rethinking our foreign policy and considering possibly that our foreign policy of interventionism helped precipitate our crisis.

I think at times the report alludes to this, that our presence in the Middle East and the perception, if you will, have helped to incite the terrorists. There was a base in Saudi Arabia which they were very unhappy about, and this motivated many of them to participate, and yet we don't talk about that. If anything, the emphasis here is more of the same. You know, we need more money and more intervention, and that to me is discouraging, especially if it is correct that our participation over there has contributed to it.

I am as interested in the discussion on Egypt, because I think that is very important, and it makes a strong point. You make a point in the Commission report that they have gotten more money than any other Muslim nation, and only 15 percent of the Egyptians support us. I think it makes my point, that it doesn't work. So how can we expect better results with mere money?

I would say we should look to the Congress. If that is too much money for Egypt, in the old days the power of the purse was in the hands of the Congress. So I would say the responsibility lies with us, if Egypt is getting too much money.

In Pakistan, supporting a military dictatorship that overthrew an elected Government that now has nuclear weapons, and probably somewhere in Pakistan is Osama bin Laden, while at the same time a lot of men are dying to impose democracy in Iraq, it comes across as rather inconsistent.

But, you know, we had a few other crises that were handled differently than the one we handled this time. In 1962, we had a crisis with missiles, and it was probably the most serious thing in the 20th century. Yet Kennedy stood strong and said to the Soviets, why did you do this? They said, well, you have missiles on our border. So he quietly said, we will take our missiles back. Instead of poking more at the Soviets, he backed off, and the issue was diffused.

Ronald Reagan, at the same time when he confronted a crisis in the Middle East in Lebanon, he wrote in his biography that perhaps we didn't appreciate fully enough the depth of the hatred and the complexity of the problems that made the Middle East such a jungle. Perhaps the idea of a suicide car bomber committing mass murder to gain instant entry to paradise was so foreign to our own values and consciousness that it did not create in us the concerns for the Marines' safety that it should have. Reagan pulled the Marines out within a few months. In the weeks immediately after the bombing, he said, "I believed the last thing we should do was turn tail and leave." Yet the irrationality of the Middle East politics forced us to rethink our policy there. He moved back, and no more Americans died.

So I see this problem persisting in that we are not saying maybe we should, you know, rethink some of the things that we do. Maybe sending more money to Egypt will not make them love us; sending more money to Pakistan will not make them love us.

So my question is this: If terrorism, as many believe, occurs as a reaction to our foreign policy, how can we defeat terrorism without changing that policy? Right now I don't see any discussion in this regard.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Paul, the Commission discussed at some length this question of the relationship between terrorism and American foreign policy, and it is a very difficult matter. We tried to better understand Osama bin Laden's reasons for doing what he did, and I at least conclude, and I think the Commission does, that there are a variety of factors that came into play. Much of it is ideology, even theology. There isn't any doubt that he espouses a very radical view of Islam, and he wants to convert the world, if you would, to his view, and that is heavy in the fatwas that he pronounces. But also in those fatwas are grievances against American foreign policy. They are there, there isn't any doubt about it, and he exploits it.

I was in the Congress when we decided to send American forces to Saudi Arabia. I think that was the right decision. That was in the late 1980s, maybe the early 1990s. I don't think we had a vote on it, although we may have.

But foreign policy has consequences. Sometimes those consequences none of us can predict. Nobody got up on the Floor when we decided to send troops to Saudi Arabia and said that is going to set off Osama bin Laden, but if we are to believe what Osama bin Laden says, then that is what triggered his hostility. Did we make a mistake in doing that? I don't think so. We protected a very important resource for us, and we had a presence in the Middle East that was very important, but it has unintended consequences.

Now, the questions you raise about intervention, I think that is one of the great questions, maybe the great question of American foreign policy in the next several decades: When do you intervene and when don't you?

I think you make the case that we ought not intervene, period. I don't think I would agree with that. The Commission didn't address that question. But let's take the case of Afghanistan. We chose not to intervene in Afghanistan after the Soviets pulled out, and what happened? What happened was that Osama bin Laden found a sanctuary there, and that was the incubator of the attacks against us. If we had intervened, would it have changed? Well, nobody can say for sure, but the probabilities are that we would not have had Osama bin Laden attacking us, because he wouldn't have had the sanctuary from which to develop his enterprise.

So, sometimes intervention means all different kinds of things. Sometimes it is military, sometimes it is diplomatic, sometimes it is humanitarian, and I think those are exceedingly difficult questions.

But I do want to pick up on something you say that I think is very important, and that is the complexity of these matters. We tend to see them very simplistically. You say, oh, my, we have to intervene and clean it up. We will be in there a year or 2, and then we will get out. Well, it doesn't happen that way. If you are going to intervene, you better decide to be there for a good long while, and you better be prepared to put the resources in to do it.

This raises the question of sustainability. How long will the American people and how long will you be prepared to put billions of dollars into any intervention, just make it country X? How long will the American people be willing to support that with all of the other things that crowd into their attention and all of the other international crises that will surely arise?

So, you are right to emphasize the complexity of these problems, and I add to that the whole question of sustainability, the political will of the United States to maintain its interests.

Let's take the country of Haiti. I am getting a little off the Commission's report here. Take the country of Haiti. Episodic. We are in, and we are out; we are in, and we are out; we are in, and we are out. Can't make up our minds on Haiti.

Well, I think you raise the big question of American foreign policy. Maybe the toughest question of American foreign policy will be in the years ahead: When do you intervene? That is, incidentally, a Presidential decision. Congress doesn't play much of a role in that. The President makes the time.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. HAMILTON. Presidents make the call, and I think it is going to be a huge, huge question for American foreign policy, because every American President is going to be asked again and again and again to intervene here, there and yonder.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I started reading a book called *All the Shah's Men*, and it talks about the CIA coup in Iran, and it talks about how people went back and forth with choices, and then the choice is made, and the United States was involved in the coup.

I think we need to understand our history to understand where we want to go. That is what I found so engaging about chapter 12 in the Commission's report, because you do start saying we need to understand each other so much better than we do.

So I want to know what our benchmark should be for success. I know you are going to lay some issues out, but is it being more engaged with countries on people's ability to feed themselves, teaching them how to have some of the technology available, health care for women and children in many of these countries?

What I see us do as a Congress—and I realize it is the President that sets foreign policy—but it is the Congress that provides the sustainability, so we have to be part of the discussion, and we have to be part of the oversight. Other than that, as you so eloquently put it, we are in, we are out; we are in, we are out, because we can wash our hands and say we have no ownership in this. It is the President's sole responsibility.

What I see us doing more often than not is debt relief and military aid. Those things are important, but they don't touch the lives of the everyday person. So that is why maybe 15 percent of the people in Egypt think we do a fantastic job, because they are either involved in the Government, or they are involved in the military, but it doesn't affect the regular population. In other words, you and I have no connectivity with the people in the Islamic world.

So, what should be our benchmarks? What should be our key to success? Although the Government's foreign policy as it is laid out

in our Constitution is the Executive Branch, unless there is bipartisan support moving forward and support between the Administration and the Congress, we won't solve this problem. I think you do speak to it in chapter 12, and I would like you to refocus and redirect it, as long as I am one of the last questioners.

Thank you.

Mr. KEAN. First of all, I am glad you recognized the historical emphasis in our report. Congressman Hamilton and I made a point actually to pick a number of very good historians to be part of that from the beginning, because this was history. We were writing history and trying to learn lessons from history.

As far as benchmarks go, I think the underlying thing we are trying to establish for people is hope. People in those countries who don't have anything at all want much the same thing as your constituents want. They want some sort of an education which will enable them to have a better life. The women in those societies would like to participate more fully than they do. They would like to have a home and some food, not unusual or difficult things. Where the United States can be seen as participating and helping them in that regard and the United States taking credit for that—which we should when we do those things, and we don't always do—is very important.

Health, education, economic growth—this is what we have got to do, and we have to get countries to work closely with us to achieve those ends for their own people. We have got to be seen as somebody who wants that, and establish that hope and that glimmer of hope so that you don't have these societies where 50 percent of the people are young men living without jobs or education or hope. And out of that climate of despair comes the climate for terrorism.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the point you made about benchmarks is a good one. Secretary Rumsfeld asked, what are the metrics about the war on terrorism? It is a very good question, what are the metrics.

I think we would answer that some of the metrics are: How many women are being educated, what is the educational impact; what about the illiteracy rate, is that being improved; what about health care? In other words, very measurable things, at least in our country, maybe not as well measured elsewhere. So those metrics become enormously important. And we set out one of them, I think, in our statement earlier on literacy by 2010.

Those are important things to do. I use the analogy—I hope it is not too simplistic—about your role as a politician and American foreign policy. Every politician meets a constituent from time to time who asks you to do something that is totally beyond your ability to achieve. You can't do it. It is impossible to do.

One of the political tricks is to say to that person, or to convey to that person, I am on your side. I want to try to help you. I must have done it 150 times a year. I would be surprised if you haven't done it.

In the same way, American foreign policy has to convey to these people that we are on your side, we want you to have a better life, we want you to have educational opportunity. We have to recognize that we can't do this. As big as we are, as rich as we are, as power-

ful as we are, we cannot solve the educational program in Pakistan.

I think you folks have appropriated, or made available, $100 million to help improve the schools in Pakistan. I have been told that anyway; I don't know whether the figure is exactly right. I think that's the right move, but $100 million for the schools in Pakistan is a drop in the bucket, a mere drop in the bucket. But it is an important drop because it lets those people know that we want to improve their educational system.

And so, I think we have to encourage these governments to do not what is in our interest, because they are not going to buy that. No country is going to do something because we want them to do it. We have to persuade them that it is in their interest to do it.

And if Saudi Arabia—let's be specific—doesn't begin to change; doesn't begin to move toward reform; doesn't begin to become more accountable and transparent and open; then all of these masses of people that the Governor referred to a moment ago, who now know what the good life is because they can see our life on television, and know they don't have it, if the Saudi Government doesn't begin to understand those forces that are arising now in that area of the world, and if they don't begin to adapt to it, they are not going to be there.

So it is in their interest to change, not just our interest to change. And what we want to do is push and prod those governments in the right direction toward accountability, toward transparency; and we want to push them and prod them in the right way on education and health care systems, and say, okay, we will give you a modest amount of money to help you if you are prepared to move in the right direction.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. McHugh. Is Mr. McHugh here?

Mr. Smith of Michigan.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Gentlemen, first, everybody is thanking you. Thank you for the tremendous job. We are now so well informed. The 9–11 Commission was established by an act of Congress. And so, Governor, when you say the Commission is looking for private funding to continue in an effort to inform the public or an effort to support Congress in its decisions, I was sort of under the impression that one of the main goals was to develop the kind of facts and information that could better assist Congress in making the decisions that have to be made.

What is your goal in continuing the Commission's efforts?

Mr. KEAN. Our goal is really to keep five Republicans and five Democrats together. In my office, I have well over 100 invitations from groups who want me to speak. Lee may have even more. Every single Commissioner has them. These are organizations who are deeply concerned about this war on terrorism, who in many cases are reading the Commission report—it is now a best seller, as you know—and want to learn more about it.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Would you think the goal of most of the Commissioners is to promote the solutions that you have advocated, or a better understanding of the problem?

Mr. KEAN. It is both. It is to better understand. Some groups, I suspect, from the invitations I have seen on my desk, really want to understand 9/11 better. They have elucidated to that.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. And of course we have all seen a lot of the Commissioners—I am just a little bit concerned. I would hope that there would be an effort to support Congress in making its decisions that are challenging.

You suggest that we should take politics out of the realm so, Governor, Lee, would you think it might be advisable to not make any final decisions until after the November 3 elections? I mean, I see politics already sort of a competition of, we should do all these things and how do you protect yourself if something bad is going to happen. What are your thoughts on the immediacy of Congress' actions?

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Smith, we believe the recommendations we have made are good ones and important ones and even urgent. We understand that every one of these fields is a very complicated matter. We don't pretend to have the final solution to all of these matters and a lot of other people would have other ideas. So there does have to be a deliberative process.

We don't try to tell you when to enact these things. We do say to you, we think this is an urgent matter. We think the status quo is not acceptable; that the risk of terrorist attack is greater if you do not make changes from the status quo. We don't know whether that's a few months or a few years. But it's your job in the Congress to assess what we have done to see what's good about it and maybe what's not so good about it.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. The report tends to focus on the threat of terrorism in the United States.

Mr. HAMILTON. It does. That's our mandate.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. The ramifications of other threats concerning proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, concerning the drug production in South America and Afghanistan and that influence on both terrorism and our culture, certainly the cost—was there any consideration of a cost analysis of your recommendations?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we——

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. I am thinking about economic security in the long run also.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yeah. We did not have the advice of the budget office or others. We made a roundhouse guess as to how much all of our recommendations would cost.

They are not cheap. Most of them are in the border security area, incidentally, and safety and transportation, protecting infrastructure, transit systems and the like. Those investments are going to have to be made, we believe, and we recommend that they be made.

Now, I do want to say that we focused, you are correct, on terrorism, and we made recommendations for a counterterrorism policy. But one of the things we do in our chart—I don't know if you have had an opportunity look at that—is recommend the establishment of national intelligence centers, which would change from time to time. Terrorism would be one, but not the only one. Weapons of mass destruction would be another, and narcotics might well be a third. In other words, whoever the policy people are, the President and the National Security Council and the Congress, whatever threats they would identify as the major threats to the American

people, we would suggest that you set up a national intelligence center to look at that threat.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. My time has expired, but the one thing it would be good to get your opinions on, sometime, is: What are your suggestions on how we might reform Congress to better react and develop solutions? And I know in your history you have sort of related that.

Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman HYDE. Also, include in that mandate how to reform the State Department. That might be equally important.

The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. And I also wanted to thank both of you gentlemen for the extraordinary work of the Commission. It made us all very proud to be Americans and to be Members of Congress who voted in favor of this 9–11 Commission.

I agree with you, Mr. Hamilton, that it is easier to ask the questions than to answer them. But I have to admit to you a certain level of frustration on my part that the Congress is not going to be able to match your Commission when it comes to bipartisanship, leadership and a commitment to our Nation when it comes to these very important issues.

I have been feverishly taking notes as people were asking you questions and you were answering, and I am not sure I am going to be plowing any new ground, but there are certain frustrations that I have that I would like to share with you.

I agree that in order to win this war against the terrorists we need to do more than use our military. We have to use all the weapons in our arsenal, including our diplomatic weapons, economic weapons, educational weapons, and I dare not use the word "sensitive" approach to our foreign policy, but perhaps a more enlightened one.

But when we talk about the Muslims having their future and the future of their destiny in their own hands, I agree with you. But I am not certain how we break through—and, again, we have spoken about all of these nations but Egypt, and we have talked about the anti-Semitism and the anti-Western attitude, and we all know that they have done nothing to eliminate the flow of serious weapons in the tunnels that connect Egypt to Gaza, which is creating more instability in that area, and refusing to return their Ambassador to Israel, which hasn't helped the situation.

It may be a peace between those two nations, but it is certainly a cold one, and when I had the opportunity to meet Mr. Mubarak on a number of occasions, I can't remember meeting a more haughty or arrogant human being in my life, and this is the person that we call our friend and ally.

When it comes to Yasser Arafat, we all want to achieve peace in the Middle East, obviously, but we are dealing with one of its most corrupt rulers. He has stolen millions of dollars that have been given by the United States and the European Union countries, and

rather than providing resources and benefits and services to his own people and striving to create a Palestinian State so that both nations can live side by side in harmony, he has skimmed so much money off the top that we can't even begin to account for it. And a lot of that money was supposed to go for educational purposes.

So the Palestinian people obviously turned to Hamas for their social services and educational needs, because Arafat certainly isn't doing it.

I have seen some of the textbooks that they use for their school children. This is not my idea of an education. But the American taxpayer, spending millions and millions of dollars to provide education for these Palestinian children to no avail makes it even worse.

And perhaps the worst offenders of all, the Saudis. We had representatives of the State Department sitting right where you are talking about this wonderful friendship and its partners, these great partners with us against the war on terrorism. I thought I was living in a parallel universe when I heard that nonsense.

The madrasas—we do need to reform them. But knowing that the Saudis are giving millions and millions and millions of dollars to fund these madrasas—which are all anti-American, anti-Western—so, how do we break through?

We support nations and support individuals that do not have our best interest at heart. Quite the contrary, they are our biggest enemies in the world and we dress them up and we take them out on a date and we pretend that they are our lovers. They are not. What do we do and how do we reform our foreign policy to more adequately reflect the realities of our century?

Mr. KEAN. Wow. That went a little beyond our mandate, but I will give you some personal thoughts.

You know, when you take Egypt, for instance, Egypt is the center of the Arab world in every way. And those who, like yourselves, are trying to oversee American foreign policy, recognize two things: One, that therefore they are essential in any war on terror, and secondly, that there is no peace for Israel without the help of Egypt.

Now, you start with those two things. And then you recognize the kinds of things you just brought up. And somehow, complexity of foreign policy toward these nations is summed up, I think, very well by Egypt.

Saudis may be even more complicated as you get in the whole politics of the Royal family and the fact that the Royal family isn't one. The Royal family is all of these thousands of people at this point, many of whom have very different ideas. So you can say Saudis, yes, they are great allies, because there are some of them who are. And some of them in the Government who are and some in the Royal family who are, and there are others who are not. Although I think, again—like I said about Pakistan, I think their attention has been enormously concentrated since the terrorists have made it clear they want to destroy them as much as they want to destroy us, that makes an alliance a bit stronger. And I think they are listening to us a little bit more than they did.

But these are enormously complex subjects. And we said, basically, in the Commission that somehow we have got to get beyond

these leaders. Somehow we have got to use some of the tools that we developed in the Cold War and have since abandoned to reach people in the street in a way that we are not doing now.

We can't necessarily work through some of these people you mentioned because these people don't want our message to get through. You have got to find other ways to get it through. We developed some of these techniques in the Cold War. I think we have got to, perhaps, redevelop and use some of these agencies again, I guess would be my opinion.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me just elaborate on that.

All of these anti-Western moods that you speak about are true. The question is, what do you do about it? And the broad choices are, you either decide to engage or you decide to isolate. And I don't think isolation, from my point of view, is the way to go. With all of the frustrations—and you have mentioned several of them—on engagement, it is still the better way to go.

Many years ago I sat in this room right at the peak of the Cold War, and we would have the high representatives of the Soviet Union here, and they would give their speeches and we would give our speeches. And they were all set speeches. There was no dialogue. And I would walk out of that room and I would say to myself, "This is hopeless; we are never going to be able to bridge this gap." And I was very discouraged.

But people a lot smarter than I said, "No, that's not the way to go. You have got to keep engaging the Soviet Union, inch by inch, bit by bit." And we did. And we did it for 50 years and it worked out pretty well.

We may be in this for 50 years. Maybe more. But I am persuaded that the way to get at it is through engagement. And I know there are a lot of frustrations there and a lot of complications and a lot of difficulties, but it is the way to go. Isolation, I think, would turn the world away from any opportunity for progress.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. McCotter.

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, thank you for your hard work. I know this is a particularly difficult year to be bipartisan, but you managed to pull it off. Just a couple of quibbles because I am sure that you get that all the time.

The use of the word "sanctuary," I think, is apt, but I would like to have also seen an emphasis on states that actively participate in the sponsorship of these terrorist organizations. I think, again, terrorist sanctuary has a passive connotation to it, when I think that there are states actively involved with perpetuating terror.

Also, the "failed state" has kind of a connotation of exoneration. I don't think anyone would say that Nazi Germany was a failed State; I think they would say it was an evil State. I think that "failed state" means there is a good, honest effort to tend to the needs of one's people, and it just didn't work out. I don't think that's the case with many of these states that we are dealing with.

One of the things that I think we have to look at, and it has been touched on, is the fact that it is not a solely political matter. And I think that Mr. Hamilton touched on the fact that in many ways it is a theological matter, that one of the reasons that we are hated in the Middle East is our very culture itself. We are infidels. We are not simply non-Muslim. We are people who lead good Muslims

away from the true faith in the minds of bin Laden. We are a greater danger. That's why we are the great Satan.

It is not about what we did in Iran. It is not about what we have done in Iraq or elsewhere. It is the very fact that our existence, that our pluralism is a direct threat to their version of Islam. That's why there is no emphasis on the nation-state that will be built if bin Laden were to be successful or if the Islamic extremists were to be successful.

They are not concerned with the nation-state. The first greater threat to them is the threat to their version of their theology. And that includes our Arab allies in the Middle East.

In terms of the jurisdiction of this Committee, I would just caution, "diplomacy" is not a magic word; that nation-states have interests, and even amongst allies those interests tend to collide sometimes, just as much as they coincide—and particularly with the French, we can look back to Richelieu to see what they are up to these days. It hasn't changed.

So we can talk until we are blue in the face, but given our experience in the Cold War—again I use France because they are in and out of NATO, the DeGaulle years—sometimes you can't do anything to get someone to go along, especially if in the past they believe that this problem is the number one problem for the United States, just like the Soviet Union was, and that a lot of American money and a lot of American blood will be spent to defeat the enemy regardless of their apathy or their participation. We have seen this before.

And in keeping with the Cold War theme, it just strikes me that we have to look at radical Islam as having arisen to fill the vacuum of the secular theology of communism. It has a great appeal to the dispossessed, and I think that your recommendations for soft power are necessary.

The one thing that I would like to see, and you have talked about the Marshall Plan having complexities to it, is that we have to make sure that any soft money is properly accounted for and beneficially used. And I think it should start from a grassroots approach rather than the top-down approach that we have taken in Iraq. It has to immediately be felt at the grassroots level and have a tangible, palpable impact on these people.

As Mr. Lantos pointed out, to protect the soft money and positive impact at the grassroots level, we have to have the military option to be prepared, whether it be Americans or others, to defend those from the terrorists attacking them at the grassroots level. In many ways it would be a situation akin to what Pablo Escobar used to do in Colombia, that any gains that the Government would make, he would blow it up. He would terrorize people. He would threaten them with, "You will either be bribed or you would get a bullet." We see this in Iraq today with the people that we are trying to recruit to defend their country and build it. They are being targeted by terrorists.

In many ways, we have to make sure that any soft power is started at the grassroots level and is dispersed, so that it makes it harder for the terrorists to aim at one particular target. And also have the military option to make sure that these people are: (A) able to defend themselves, or (B) that we might have to, to protect

these gains at the ground from being taken away by the terrorists themselves.

But all in all, I would like to thank you for your work. I think it was a tremendous service to your country. And, you know, best of luck to you in whatever you are going to do now.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to enter the caucus of admiration for both of you gentlemen and the full Commission's work, particularly your focus on public diplomacy. But in that respect, I would hope to maybe offer an observation and a question or two.

When I look at the region in which we determine to possess the greatest danger for our country, it seems to me Iran stands out possibly more than any other country in terms of its potential for development of nuclear weapons and potential for the exportation of that technology and the use of that technology. And I don't think any fair analysis would conclude that a failure of public diplomacy has thwarted America's ability to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities.

Likewise, whether one supports the Administration's position in Iraq or whether one is critical of it—I am not asking; I am not offering my own view. But it is my experience that hatred for America and disdain for our principles did not start with the invasion of Iraq. Clearly, in the minds of most Islamic leaders, public personalities and the perception of the mass public, as I understand it, it is the Iraq invasion and the Iraq policy which has focused the hatred in these countries upon ourselves.

In that context, we talk about possible realization by the Saudis of their own limitations and their own vulnerabilities at this point. I would caution any real positive analysis in the context of, well, yes, they understand better their vulnerabilities. They still blame Zionist conspiracies when they get attacked from within. And I question our logic, quite frankly—not yours, but this Committee's and us collectively—when we support Prime Minister Sharon's disengagement plan from Gaza, which I do wholeheartedly, but not recognize that it is the Egyptians who are negotiating between the Palestinian rejectionist groups so that there is not total chaos when the Israelis leave.

We can't argue that America should be more engaged, which I agree with, but—as you rightfully pointed out—not understand, if we are not going to engage with the current leadership within Egypt, that exists in Egypt, we might as well not engage.

The criticism of the current leadership in Egypt, much of it is legitimate, it is fair. These are the balances that have to be weighed judiciously.

I applaud the focus on public diplomacy. But if I am correct that, at this point in time at least, the greatest focus of the anti-Americanism is a result, fairly so or not, of our actions in Iraq, whether we agree with them or disagree with them, what specifically do you believe we can do to counterbalance what they perceive as our unjust actions in Iraq?

Or do we just go along, which I think is what we are doing now, and pretend as if we can just move on from Iraq without addressing it directly within those capitals and within those mass media markets in those Islamic countries?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think that, to my mind, if I understood you correctly, the most important thing we can do is to make a success of Iraq. And, if we can come out of Iraq with a reasonably stable Government, a reasonably accountable Government, and a better life for ordinary Iraqis, that will be a tremendous plus for us in the region.

But the flip side is also true.

Mr. WEXLER. Why do you have confidence, having had the experience of successfully defending Kuwait, which we did, successfully defending Islamic populations in the Balkans, which we did with relative success, why do you have confidence that even if our policy in Iraq becomes a successful one, that we will somehow benefit more in the Islamic world than we did from successfully protecting Kuwait and successfully protecting the Islamic populations in the Balkans?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I don't put it forward as a cure for all of the problems. I just think you will be a little better off if you achieve that than if you don't achieve it. There are a lot of other things, as you point out, that would be a factor as well.

I guess, in a sense, if you fail in Iraq, the negatives increase dramatically. If you succeed, it certainly won't solve all our problems, but it will indicate that American intentions are to bring about a stable, democratic, nonthreatening Iraq.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Nobody mentions Libya.

Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Chairman, very much for holding this hearing today. I thank Governor Kean and former Chairman Hamilton. They both bring a wealth of experience and a wealth of good judgment to the 9–11 Commission.

And I wanted to start, Lee, with something you said yesterday at the Financial Services Committee about the importance of not fighting the last war. Of course, to fight the next war, we have got to understand the battlefield. As we go through the Commission report, it talks about how one top official says that the way he anticipated—the reason he knew to look, or to be concerned with the danger posed by aircraft was not because of any warning that came through the agency. It was because he read a book by Tom Clancy, and Clancy had some imagination.

As you say, it is "crucial to find a way of routinizing and even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination." I thought that was a very interesting observation. But how do you bureaucratize the exercise of imagination?

How do we build incentives to think creatively, anticipating the next mode of attack? How do you do that, especially when you think about DARPA, the Defense Department office that came up with the idea of a futures market so that they could anticipate risk, a futures market on terrorist risk. Then you see the explosion when that hit the public, and all of a sudden they pull back. And no, we won't look into that; we won't go down that road because there is criticism there.

Along these lines, the Commission report recommends, as you have said today, that the United States make a long-term commit-

ment, for example, to the future of Pakistan providing military and development aid, especially focused there on setting up these schools to replace the schools that were closed down, the public schools, when the Pakistani military moved all the aid to defense. But to do so, so long as Pakistan's leaders are willing to make difficult choices of their own, that is, to combat radicalism and move toward democracy.

Well, here is my question. What if Pakistan doesn't move in the direction that we and most Pakistanis would like? What if President Musharraf is overthrown? What if the Pakistani nuclear program falls into radical hands?

A good Chess player thinks several steps ahead. A really good Chess player thinks several steps ahead based on different possible scenarios that his potential opponent could make. And I am wondering if our intelligence analysis is continually developing a range of scenarios and a range of policy options. Or are we always in this reactive mode fated to wait until we see what potentially deadly development occurs?

As I have read over the years, and I am thinking about Gary Kasparov and his op-eds on world politics. Now that man has imagination. Clancy has imagination. I am wondering if it would be more helpful to our insights to bring in personalities like that from the outside world, because what we have seen going through the report is a total lack of imagination from the inside.

I would like to have a response on that.

Mr. KEAN. Yeah. We can comment on what was, not what is right now. I mean, what was: We did not look ahead. We did not plan. We didn't coordinate and share information. There was no contingency planning based on a number of areas. That was true.

Hopefully, at the present time, a lot of that has been corrected. As far as imagination goes, when we met privately with President Clinton, that was one of his major points. He said, you know, thinking back, I wish we had had some people who just were able to sit and think about some of these problems. You know, weren't bothered by a lot of other stuff, just look out the window and think, and try to come up with some of the contingencies, some of the possibilities, some of the probabilities, and then make plans based on some of that.

That was a very strong recommendation he made to us. Just have some people with imagination sit there and analyze and think, and that would be basically their job. And that's to the line of questions a very good one.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, your question about how do you institutionalize imagination is a very good one. My answer would be that you have to include in your group of experts, intelligence analysts and any other experts, some unconventional thinkers. But beyond that, you have to use the Red Team concept that I think creates a kind of a counter point of view. It creates competition, if you would, of analysis and ideas. And I think it is very important that that occur. There isn't any doubt that those of us that work in government get kind of narrow visions, I guess, of what the policy options may be, what the threats may be, what the tactics may be, and you do need people that will push you to see other tactics, other threats and other points of view.

Mr. ROYCE. A Team A, Team B concept?

Mr. HAMILTON. That's right.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you both.

Chairman HYDE. I found your comment interesting about the Red Team and the Blue Team, because that's counter to the notion of a single czar of intelligence. The absence of competitive analysis on that kind of arrangement, I think we really have to think about that.

But in any event, I am now going to try and—Mr. Smith has asked unanimous consent, which is given, to ask one question. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I thank you for this, Mr. Chairman.

Just let me ask our very distinguished witnesses, and again I want to thank you for the great work you did.

I was struck in reading the report by the recommendations on public diplomacy. Much of what you recommended is what Chairman Hyde and Tom Lantos had accomplished so effectively through the State Department reauthorizations and other public diplomacy initiatives. It looked like you put them side by side, and it was very similar. Just to give credit where credit is due, and I want to thank them for their leadership on this.

You make a strong recommendation that the Broadcasting Board of Governors—the report says, it has asked for money. It ought to get it; and I couldn't agree more. How would you regard the fact that the appropriations bill for Commerce, Justice, and State, which has already passed the House, provides $601 million for that organization, which is doing tremendous work through public broadcasting, 65 million of which, a dramatic increase, is for Arabic broadcasting? How do you react to that?

Frank Wolf, the Chairman of the Committee, wrote a bill. It got very, very little press and almost no one knows about it. I didn't see anything anywhere about this subsection of Mr. Wolf's bill, which puts this enormous amount of new resources into this effort. How do you react to that?

Mr. KEAN. I am delighted. And I might say, by the way, I commend obviously the Chairman and the Ranking Member. A lot of our ideas are not new; they are the best thinking of a number of people in the Congress, in various Administrations. We interviewed over 2,000 people. Many of them have long records of government service and gave us their ideas. So these are a compilation of the best we could do, based on some of the very good thinking that we were based on.

But, no, on that particular—I am delighted. I think the more we can increase in that area, the more we outreach to the world of ideas, to the Arab community in their own language, the better off we are going to be and the more we're going to see these numbers we are talking about start to change.

Chairman HYDE. In the 103rd Congress, Mr. Hamilton, you may remember—or may not, I barely do—that I introduced legislation to combine the Intelligence Committees of the Senate and the House into a joint Committee which would expedite testimony. You wouldn't have to keep repeating the testimony before two Committees, and would have the wisdom of an ongoing Conference Com-

mittee on legislation. That was torpedoed by the gentlemen from Mount Olympus, across the Rotunda, because I guess they felt associating with us on a Committee level was a step down.

But I hope, perhaps, they will reconsider, and that could be one of the reforms that would go toward expediting consideration of these important issues.

Now, I promised opening statements and if anybody is so gauche as to still have one, I will recognize you and you may make your opening statement.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to no one in gaucheness.

Chairman HYDE. That means you have an opening statement?

Mr. SHERMAN. I do indeed.

Chairman HYDE. All right. The gentleman from Gauche.

Mr. SHERMAN. That's Los Angeles.

First, we do need to continue this Commission. We need volume two. And to see you lose 70 staff members while so many questions remain unanswered is a tragedy for this country. I think it may take more than just us here in Congress. It may take the American people making their views known.

We need a structure in the Intelligence Community where they share the information, but don't always share the same viewpoint. And I think that there is a lot of discussion to get there.

I promised that I would mention the ways in which we can put economic pressure on Iran and North Korea to try to get them to stop their nuclear program. The Iranian Government's Achilles heel is that it must have some support from its people, and it has to show its people that they can participate in the international economic arena and still develop nuclear weapons. They have to bring home the bacon, or at least the halal equivalent.

We have done a terrible job in signaling the Iranian people that they must stop this nuclear weapons program if they want the benefits of the international economic community. We ourselves voluntarily import $150 million a year of luxury goods, like caviar, from Iran, saying that we don't even bother to stop that. We have sat by and let the World Bank loan that Government a half a billion dollars. And a consortium of Japanese oil companies would not have contracted to invest $2 billion in Iran if we had not signaled that we will waive the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. So we did, they will, and the Iranian people can be told by the mullahs, "Let us do the nuclear stuff, it doesn't hurt us."

The North Korean Government's Achilles heel is their dependence on aid from China. The Chinese don't support the North Korean nuclear program, but they have calculated that the best thing in their interest is to grudgingly give the aid.

The United States has got to change Chinese policy, and we have to be willing to inconvenience American importers in order to tell the Chinese, if you want that continued trade relationship with us, you have to do more than just show up at the meetings with the North Koreans.

Finally, I want to commend the Commission for something that others have criticized you for. Others have said that you should suggest a change in America's foreign policy objectives in order that al-Qaeda hate us less. Even if we abandon all our friends in the Middle East, even if we changed all our positions, we are still

going to be a target, because we exemplify on a grand scale a culture that competes successfully with Taliban ideology.

The U.S. cannot make concessions, or we simply whet bin Laden's appetite. If we gave him everything he said he wants, he would keep asking for more until Taliban policies prevailed worldwide.

There is no way for us to hide. We need to lead, not retreat, in order to defeat terrorism.

I thank the Chairman for indulging gaucheness.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank again Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton and their staff. This blueprint for action will get the deference that is due it, and that is that we will act on it. I think much, if not all—and perhaps even in addition to the recommendations, we will act on, and our men and women in this country will be safer.

I especially want to thank the 9/11 widows and their family members who were here. There were also others who were very effective in bringing the need for a 9–11 Commission to the Congress.

It was, at its beginning at least, somewhat controversial. But you two gentlemen have proven that bipartisanship can trump all the petty differences that sometimes arise between us. Where there are real differences, they need to be aired. And certainly that is the strength of the two-party system. But I think you two gentlemen have proven that when we act together, we act more effectively on behalf of America and for world peace.

I also want to make a very brief point that on a number of the issues that were raised, especially in the section dealing with international relations, we will act on those as well, and I think we will act very quickly. We had a hearing last week. Under the auspices of this Committee we heard from nine State Department assistant secretaries and deputies, including those dealing with consular affairs and with visas. It became very clear that they are taking to heart the many recommendations you made. The fact that it was so easy to get a visa out of Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the world, and that markings on the visa applications were fraudulent, is wrong.

"Where are you going?" was obviously one of the questions posed by the consular officers in the visa interview, and some of these individuals had written answers such as, "A hotel, USA." And they still got approved. There was a very permissive attitude that resulted in grave injury, and those people who mean us harm were not weeded out.

You again have made it very clear, and I think the Administration and State Assistant Secretary Harty made it very clear, that consular officers are much better informed now and are much more aggressive in trying to stop that.

Let me also point out, as well, on the textbook issue, Mr. Hamilton, you mentioned the hope of cutting the illiteracy rate in half by the year 2010. While there are a number of other places we need to look to help in that regard, last week we were asking our State Department assistant secretaries about the advisability of

using UNESCO. We are now back in it, funding it at the level of $70 million. We are back in, full scale, you know, with both feet.

Therefore, UNESCO ought to be looking at textbooks that are free of anti-Semitism and hate and are promoting tolerance, unlike UNRA and others in the Palestinian areas where those textbooks are replete with hatred.

How do you break the cycle of violence when you have young people reading in their textbooks anti-Semitic and anti-American rhetoric and vitriol?

Thankfully, I think we do have some possibility to cut the illiteracy rate, but doing so with textbooks that are tolerant.

And finally, I will mention one thing that you did cite in the text which needs more discussion. Is there a connection between issues like human trafficking, which is transnational and the billions of dollars which are gleaned by the terrorists? We don't know if there is a connection, but certainly there are mobsters in both nefarious enterprises.

In addition, narcotrafficking and drugs are certainly another source of great amounts of money. What should be done to investigate links in these areas? Should DEA, for example, be part of our intelligence sharing? We don't think it is right now. Maybe that's something you might want to comment on in the written text.

There are so many unanswered questions. You provided more information on financing just over the weekend, and I think that was very helpful.

I want to thank you again. This is a catalyst for action. You did an extraordinary job.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And I also want to again thank the two gentlemen for extraordinary work and extraordinary testimony here today. I just want to mention a few things, some of which have been mentioned before, and most of which have not.

First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I believe very strongly that Congress should not be on vacation now, that we should be here implementing the recommendations of these gentleman from the 9–11 Commission. And I want to just say that I know that Nancy Pelosi is going to sponsor legislation recommending the adopting of the recommendations of the Commission, and I intend to cosponsor that legislation; and I think it is very, very important that we do that and do that as soon as possible, before the November 2 election.

I also would like to comment on Senator Roberts' proposals. I think they are very interesting. You know, I am very critical and disgusted about the faulty intelligence. You know, we are bogged down in Iraq, I believe mainly because of faulty intelligence. And I am not so concerned that weapons of mass destruction weren't found, but I am much more concerned about the lack of intelligence about the resistance we would encounter once we won the war. I think that lack of intelligence, telling us what the realities would be on the ground in the post-war era, is just shocking; and that's why I believe that Senator Roberts' plan to break up the CIA into three parts—national clandestine service, office of national assess-

ments, and office of technical support—is an interesting proposal to look at.

And I agree with the 9–11 Commission and also with Senator Roberts about establishing the office of a National Intelligence Director who would have a lot of authority. Unfortunately, I think the White House doesn't grasp this and wants to just rearrange furniture and not have one who can really have the power of the purse and really do things to implement.

And I also believe that it is an interesting proposal, removing the Defense Intelligence Agency's human intelligence spy operations from the Pentagon and establishing them as an independent agency under the control of a National Intelligence Director.

So these are things that I think we need to look at.

I want to just also mention a couple of points that weren't made. The Commission talks very well, I believe, about the debate over sending Homeland Security funds to areas of the highest risk versus a State-by-State basis. As a resident of New York City, representing the New York metropolitan area, obviously the risks facing New York are much greater than those facing other areas of the country, except for, perhaps, Washington, DC, and some other large cities. I know that the report discusses this issue and emphasizes the fact that these funds should not be used as pork, but need to be sent where the risk is the greatest. And fortunately we had that battle on the House Floor, that we lost, but it is a battle that we need to look at again and put the funding where the greatest threat is.

And finally, I want to talk briefly about two other issues and that's the recent Coast Guard reauthorization. I inserted language to have an assessment of nuclear power plants where we might have attacks from water. There is a plant in New York, Indian Point, which we are very concerned about; and I think that we need to take very seriously threats to energy infrastructure in United States from al-Qaeda.

The other problem I think we need to deal with is the whole issue of emergency responder radio interoperability. On 9/11, New York City police and firefighters were not able to communicate with each other on their radios because they used different equipment on different frequencies; and in fact, the police helicopter, which was circling over the World Trade Center towers, was not able to radio the firefighters that the second tower was about to collapse.

I think, again, these are issues that we need to look at and continue to address.

So again I want to conclude by thanking both of you for your good work. I have read the report and I just cannot think of a better service that 10 individuals have done for this country than the work that all of you have done.

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. And I want to state that you have proven how difficult it is to keep politics out of this discussion.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I don't think, with all due respect——

Chairman HYDE. You said the White House doesn't get it.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I think, with all due respect, these aren't politics. These are issues that are very important to the American people, and I really don't think it is politics. I think that is a mischaracterization of what I said, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect.

Chairman HYDE. Well, I really think it is, with all due respect. Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Like you, I had the pleasure of serving with the distinguished gentleman from Indiana, and I want to thank Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton and I want to thank Governor Kean for their service again to our country.

Much of this Commission's report concerns how to improve our defenses against terrorism through the better use of intelligence. This is critically important. The report lays out who the enemy is, "Islamist terrorism" which, in the Commission's words, can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.

The Commission's recommendations that fall within this Committee's jurisdiction regarding the use of our diplomatic tools are critically important to the mission of defeating terrorism. The Commission notes that in the 21st century, our strategic focus must be on remote regions of the world and on failing states. In its words, we must find ways to extend our reach, straining the limits of our influence.

That is correct, and I will just remind the Committee that in 1996 I warned of the terrorist breeding ground in Afghanistan and that it could lead to a second attack on the United States. Even though this Committee was quite active on Afghanistan, it was not widely recognized that the vacuum left there after the Cold War was a terrorist incubator. The Taliban opened its doors to Osama bin Laden, as the Commission notes, who developed a terrorist organization with lethal global reach.

The Commission's straightforward observation about the importance of remote regions and failed states is unfortunately not yet well understood by the American people. I speak with some experience, having chaired the African Subcommittee for the last four Congresses.

The United States significantly trimmed its diplomatic presence and its intelligence capabilities in Africa after the Cold War. This has left the United States largely blind on that continent where terrorism is a growing concern. Congress is debating the merits of reforming our Intelligence Community, but if analysts don't have solid on-the-ground reporting coming to them, it won't matter what type of intelligence organization we have in place.

Lastly and most importantly, this past weekend the 9–11 Commission staff put out a report, "9/11 and Terrorist Travel." Its first paragraph states,

> "Even after 19 hijackers demonstrated the relative ease of obtaining a U.S. visa and gaining admission into the United States, border security still is not considered a cornerstone of national security policy. We believe that it must be made one."

This is an argument that Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton laid out yesterday before the Financial Services Committee. I could not

agree more, and frankly, I don't understand the lack of progress on this key issue.

Reforming the bureaucracy won't be easy. These are very large and complex organizations we are dealing with, with a culture that we have discussed earlier. But we are facing a very determined and very deadly foe, so the stakes could not be higher.

The Commission has laid out an excellent foundation for our work. For that, again, we as Members of this Committee are very appreciative.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I would request that you restrict your statement to 3 minutes so we can finish by 1 o'clock.

Mr. CHABOT. I will do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I want to thank especially Governor Kean and Mr. Hamilton, as well, for their leadership and what they have done for our country. It is very important.

I would hope that Congress can work in a bipartisan fashion. It would be nice to think that we could address some of the things that we are facing in this country. I am particularly frustrated with some of the diplomatic problems. I had the opportunity, along with my colleague, Mr. Faleomavaega from American Samoa, to serve for a year as the representative from Congress up at the U.N., and one would hope that some of our nominal allies like the French and the Germans and some others would be more cooperative when they are at risk as well. But I see very little of that hoped-for cooperation.

Oftentimes they work to undermine the American position on not just fighting terrorism, but so many other things. And it is something that we oftentimes in this country take too much for granted, our allies who aren't really allies, especially the French. But we could go far beyond that.

One thing that often goes unsaid: Some of the Middle Eastern nations and some others—much of their activity out there is basically devising new anti-Israeli strategies. And everything comes down to that up there far too often. Those are some of the things.

Some of the things that I heard here today that the Chairman said, I think were particularly worth repeating. He said that we may never—there may never be an end to this conflict; and that may sound discouraging, but nonetheless, it may well be true. It may only be a matter of degree to the extent that this war is either hot or not quite so hot at that time.

He also said that our enemies seek not our defeat, but our annihilation. And I think that's another absolutely accurate thing.

Mr. Lantos said something which I agreed with, again saying that we are not just fighting for the hearts and minds of some of the folks over in the Middle East, but we have to win that war as well.

And I could go on and on, but one of the things I wanted to point out that didn't get a lot of attention: Saudi Arabia. There was a vote in which it showed our Congress' dissatisfaction with Saudi cooperation, saying that no money under a particular bill that we

passed could go to the Saudis. And a lot of that shows how fed up many of us in Congress are with the lack of cooperation from the Saudis. And I will keep within the 3 minutes, and I thank the Chairman. I could talk for an hour.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. Paul, would you restrict yourself to 3 minutes?

Mr. PAUL. I will do my very best.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. That's all one can ask.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank Mr. Hamilton—although this is my opening statement, I want to thank you for your answer to my question, because I thought your answer was very well thought out and balanced and at least gave recognition to the fact that foreign policy does have unintended consequences too often, and they are unpredictable.

My contention, I think, with the general thrust of the report, is that it looks like we are placing the blame on the bureaucratic foul-up, more so than anything else, and that maybe if we rearrange things and increase the size of some of our departments and some more money, that we can compensate for the foul-up and the inability of the $40 billion we have already spent on intelligence; and we are going to solve that problem.

And hopefully that will work, but I have my reservations. Of course, my big concern is, once again, that foreign policy is very, very significant. In the report you talk about emphasis on counteracting the madrasas and their radicalization of some of the Muslims. But we also have to remember that when the Soviets were in Afghanistan, that was one of the tools of the CIA, to go in and encourage exactly that radicalization.

Once again, here's a point of on-again, off-again. And, of course, you can say, we should intervene more wisely. Then there are those others who might caution, maybe a lot less intervention might be better.

I do concede the point that there are some very radical individuals there, like Osama bin Laden, that hate our culture. But once again, he has to have a motivating force to recruit, and unfortunately, I think, because we didn't back away and recognize some of our errors in foreign policy, that we have actually contributed to the recruitment of the al-Qaeda. I don't think there is evidence that al-Qaeda is weaker and there are less members; I think there is actually more recruitment.

This policy of nonintervention should not be written off as isolationism because I happen to believe that in a very open society where people travel and educational exchanges occur, there is free trade. So this is a little bit different than pure isolationism and protectionism.

I throw those ideas out as suggestions. Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. The last questioner, with the indulgence of the Chairman, is Mr. Nick Smith of Michigan. Three minutes, Nick.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Chairman, my full statement, if it could be entered into the record and let me add some comments to that.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, every statement will be made a part of the record, and we will write some written ques-

tions, if you will entertain them at your convenience, and that will save——

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. The report doesn't relate to some of the changes that have already been made in your intelligence community.

I think some of the changes have been very effective. As an old Air Force intelligence officer and talking to some of my colleagues in the community, there is a change that has taken place that is adding to our intelligence quality and availability.

I would also like to mention that we need to be looking at the reorganization of Congress to more effectively deal with this problem, but also the reorganization, as the Chairman mentioned, of the State Department.

Our cooperation and support of the intelligence efforts of other countries is something that we need to take better advantage of than we have in the past.

And, in conclusion, I would like to mention that I think it is possible to overprotect ourselves. As we look at the imposition on our civil rights, as we look at the cost with the kind of debt that we are accumulating now in the Federal Government, with the kind of unfunded liabilities that are now estimated to be about $73 trillion, I think there needs to be a balance of cost and effort with protecting ourselves.

If we give up some of the things that have made us great in this country, as we keep on, for example, we are now looking at a very serious problem of reducing the very high-quality students coming into this country in science and math by making it more difficult for them to go through investigations. So we see countries like Canada, Europe, Australia, hiring some of our great professors and now luring those students into their countries. So we just need to be very careful, it seems to me, as we look at protecting ourselves, that we don't overprotect ourselves.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I want to thank the gentleman and thank the Members for attending and sticking it out, and especially thank the witnesses, Governor Kean and Lee Hamilton, for an excellent contribution to one of the most difficult subjects we have to deal with.

You are to be commended, and we are grateful, and thank you so much.

The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

Statement of the
Honorable Barbara Lee
Before the
House International Relations Committee
Tuesday, August 24, 2004

"9/11 Commission Recommendations for Diplomacy"

Thank you, Chairman Hyde and Congressman Lantos, for holding this important hearing regarding the 9/11 Commission's Recommendations for Diplomacy, and thank you, Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, a former distinguished Chairman of this Committee. Thank you – and thank of all the 9/11 Commission members – for all you have done in developing recommendations that we can use as an outline for reforming the U.S. intelligence community so that we will hopefully never have to live through another day such as we did on September 11, 2001. Your commission is to be commended for its thorough investigation of the security and technical aspects of the intelligence and communication failures on that day and beforehand.

I also want to thank for the families of the 9/11 victims for their courage in convincing an initially un-cooperative Administration to form the bipartisan 9/11 Commission.

We have an obligation to study seriously this report promptly, as we are here doing today, but at the same time, we need to take a deliberate view of all of the recommendations of this commission.

It is equally important to explore the extent to which 9/11 tragedy became an excuse to justify this Administration's foreign policy. The Commission's report speaks at length about the need for improved public diplomacy efforts in promoting a better image of America abroad.

We had the opportunity to develop strategic alliances with old and new friends – indeed we had an historic opportunity. Yet this Administration squandered that opportunity. Worse, they actually alienated our friends by advancing the Doctrine of Preemption, a policy that is unnecessary, wrong, and absolutely dangerous. In any context, it would make enemies of our friends, but the way that the United States has used this doctrine has inflamed anti-Americanism around the globe, so that we are less safe now than we were before 9/11.

In Iraq, the doctrine of preemption has unnecessarily cost almost 1000 American lives, untold thousands of Iraqi lives and the lives of international non-combatants.

In response to the Administration's action, I introduced H.Res. 141, the disavowal of the doctrine of preemption, and I believe that its passage would truly help repair America's broken reputation in the world.

The Commission has explored the extent to which our national security apparatus and our agencies were used – and misused – in the use of 9/11 evidence. I believe that it is imperative that we address their recommendations. At the Congressional level, we must work to make sure that we provide real resources for homeland security and for our first responders.

But one thing concerns me about one of the Commission's recommendations: the creation of a national intelligence czar. I fear that a consolidation of these agencies may lead to a compromising of our citizens' civil liberties. This is not a theoretical issue – we have seen it in the months and years after 9/11, as this Administration has repeatedly used the mantra of "national security concerns" as an excuse to compromise the civil liberties of Americans and others. We have seen this in our country, as people have been bullied and wrongfully threatened. We have seen this at Guantanomo Bay, where the Supreme Court has ruled that many prisoners have been held without probable cause. And we have seen this in the fallout of the Abu Ghraib, where even the Bush Administration acknowledged that scores of prisoners had been held inappropriately.

That is my fear about moving too quickly on the creation of an intelligence czar, unless we understand the full consequences of such a decision. I would hope that this Congress and Committee of jurisdiction debate these issues fully, before we move to enact the recommendations of this Commission.

On the whole, though, I'm pleased with the work of this Commission. And I appreciate, Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton being with us here today. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to submit my statement into the record.

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GOVERNMENT REFORM
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Statement by Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia
for International Relations Committee Hearing on
9/11 Commission Recommendations
August 24, 2004

With the September 11th attacks on our Nation, we learned, to our horror, that no one is immune from the gross manifestations of terrorism. As the Commission's report described, the United States became a "nation transformed."

On that day, we were surprised, grasped by the power of evil. Now, we are informed, ready to defeat this evil.

We understand that the challenge before us is a deeply entrenched one. We must work to make certain that nothing of this nature ever happens again. Defeating all terrorist organizations of global reach and pre-empting the proliferation of new terrorist threats and weapons, is a central component of this struggle.

The 9/11 Commission report addresses these strategic considerations with recommendations ranging from:

- the need for the U.S. Government to promote American values, define what the message is and what we stand for;
- to the need for the U.S. to "engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism;"
- to recommending that a "comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future."

While most recently outlined in the Commissions report, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia which I Chair, has been focusing on such items throughout this Congress, addressing not just state-sponsors and existing terrorist sanctuaries as Iran, Syria, and

Afghanistan, but also examining Islamic extremism and terrorist activity in Central Asia, for potential threats.

We have held numerous sessions, exerted oversight over, and developed legislative items to address other critical issues such as:

- proliferation and terrorist pursuit of unconventional weapons programs, particularly, the implications of Iran's nuclear efforts;
- as well as terrorist financing, with special emphasis on Saudi Arabia.

We have intensified our efforts in preventing the spread of Islamist terrorism through the redirection of assistance toward greater investments in educational and political/economic reform, working with the Administration to better define, strengthen, and expand the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, and the efforts toward a Middle East Free Trade Area.

Within this context, I would like to ask our distinguished guests a series of questions relating to initiatives I have been working on for inclusion in future 9/11 legislation:

- What recommendations do you have for specific programs within the existing initiatives that would help us win hearts and minds in the Muslim world? How can we further encourage and build on the development of the many nascent democratic institutions that are emerging throughout the region?

- Would you agree on the need to commend the people and governments of such countries as Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Morocco, for their efforts toward political and economic liberalization?

- Do you see this as part of a dual strategy– that is, one of cooperation and assistance to those embarking on concrete verifiable reforms, while holding accountable those, such as Saudi Arabia, who ignore the needs and universal liberties of their own people?

With respect to terrorist sanctuaries and global partnerships to address the terrorism threat:

- Would you support amending the Export Administration Act to mandate determinations and punitive measures for countries serving as terrorist sanctuaries?

- Would you support the creation of a Terrorist Interdiction Initiative out of the Department of State, to establish bilateral operational agreements and global partnerships to interdict terrorists and their weapons; create regional terrorism centers; and establish terrorism prevention teams?

- What is the appropriate role of the State Department's Counterterrorism Office? Should this office maintain an Operational role, or should it primarily be tasked with negotiating access and cooperation?

- Do you believe that the Global Patterns of Terrorism report needs to be redefined to address existing and emerging terrorist sanctuaries that are not state-sponsors, as well as to further focus and report on terrorists' pursuit of WMD capabilities?

With respect to proliferation concerns…

- would you agree that the International Atomic Energy Agency should not be hampered in its work because of financial constraints? Would you agree that it should be removed from the deferred payment program and our assessments to the IAEA should be paid at the beginning of its calendar year?

- Could you elaborate on the Commission's recommendation calling for an expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative?

Lastly, would you support calling for the U.S., in preparation for next year's NPT Review Conference, to seek support for the establishment of criteria to determine "need" and eligibility for nuclear power, in an effort to prevent such pariah states as Iran from manipulating the NPT and using dual-use technology to achieve nuclear weapons capability?

In closing, I would simply like to add that I have often seen the United States as a cause more than a nation. And now, that cause faces another foe— foes who seek our destruction and whose ideas are in direct conflict with ours.

However, with freedom as our beacon and justice as our instrument, we will defeat terrorism and those who would engage in its insanity.

I look forward to your testimony and again, thank you for serving our nation.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICK SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

I am grateful for the opportunity for this Committee to discuss the report of the 9–11 Commission with the co-chairmen.

Other committees in both the House and the Senate have discussed many aspects of the report. The lessons and impact of the report for the State Department are important for this committee. I want to mention two aspects of this report. The first concerns the scope and framing of the War on Terrorism and our national security overall. The commission has urged us to recognize the "generational challenge" that we are faced with and made some specific recommendations. However, questions remain about how to operationalize these. The second has to do with the impact of the intelligence consolidation on the State Department.

I have an additional concern that while the report is excellent, the challenge is for Congress or the President to enact effective changes. We face complex questions. The American people have entrustred us with the responsibility to do the right thing, rather than the fastest, most politically expedient thing. When some immediately embraced the conclusions of the report, I was somewhat uncertain what they were embracing other than a good investigation. These are complex issues that demand thoughtful consideration by Congress. I am uncertain that it can be completed by mid-October or even December.

The report raises the issue of a "generational challenge". The implication seems to be that we need to reconceptualize our foreign policy around fighting terrorism. It is easy to make comparisons to the intellectual and organizational work done during the Truman administration in which ideas, such as containment and deterrence, and agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the CIA, were created. The commission has made organizational recommendations such as consolidating the intelligence agencies, relocating covert operations into the Defense Department, and reorganizing Congress to improve oversight over the intelligence community and the Department of Homeland Security.

However, it is less apparent what the intellectual focus is, and this is particularly important for the State Department. During the Cold War, deterrence guided our nuclear and conventional weapons posture for 40 years, and containment led us to oppose the advance of communism at every point. The report argues that, ultimately, the War on Terror will only be won when there is political transformation in the Islamic world, but it provides only few guiding principles about how to act. The report makes specific suggestions to "engage the struggle of ideas" on page 375, "define our message" and "what we stand for" on page 376, and "engage other nations" on page 379. These are well and good, but it is not clear how to operationalize them or what their implications are.

I also have some concerns regarding the role of the State Department in the intelligence reorganization. The State Department has an analytical body in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. INR directly supports the Secretary of State and the desk officers. How we cooperate, support, and utilize the intelligence efforts of other countries. The Secretary of Defense has argued that the military needs analytic capacity in DoD to support our war efforts. I am concerned that the State Department may have a similar need to support, for example, back channel diplomacy and its own policy process.

I would like to again thank the Chairman for holding this hearing today. It is an important first step in addressing the complex questions raised by the report. I have focused on two specific concerns, and I look forward to discussing these and more.

RESPONSES FROM THOMAS H. KEAN, CHAIR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (9–11 COMMISSION), TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Question:

The Commission has recommended the creation of a National Intelligence Director, overseeing national intelligence centers and the agencies that contribute to the national program. Additionally, it is recommended that a National Counterterrorism Center be created. As it stands now, the State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism develops, coordinates and implements American counterterrorism policy, among other things. How will this change with a new National Intelligence

Director, if at all? The report was also silent as to how the Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) should fit into this recommendation.

Response:

The State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism will continue to be a key figure in U.S. counterterrorism policy. As the representative of the Secretary of State, the Coordinator will have the lead in diplomatic and related efforts against terrorism. The Coordinator will be an active participant in the National Counterterrorism Center. The Commission's recommendations would not change the role of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. It will continue to provide assessments and analysis to the Secretary of State, and its analysis would also be utilized by the National Counterterrorism Center.

Question:

Do you have any specific suggestions on how the State Department's intelligence and counterterrorism offices can more effectively assist in the war against terrorism?

Response:

The National Counterterrorism Center will have the responsibility of better integrating the efforts of all the agencies of the U.S. government. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Coordinator for Counterterrorism will play a significant role in the fusion of intelligence and operations, respectively. This should result in the State Department's efforts becoming part of a larger strategy in defeating terrorism.

Question:

Does the State Department, as a whole, need to be reorganized, too? How?

Response:

Our investigation did not indicate that the State Department needed reorganization. We made no recommendation to that effect.

Question:

What should the State Department's role be in the bigger picture of our national security strategy, especially in relation to the Department of Defense?

Response:

We believe the State Department must have a robust role. We cannot defeat terrorism through military and intelligence means alone. Such means will never address the root causes of terrorism. Enlisting the aid of key allies, building coalitions, developing and implementing effective public diplomacy strategies, addressing the issue of terrorist sanctuaries, and providing weak but friendly governments with the means to deal with terrorists are all in the responsibility of the State Department. These are enormous tasks, and thus the Department must be adequately funded and resourced to fulfill them.

Question:

As Vice Chair Hamilton may recall, I introduced legislation in the 103rd Congress which would have established a Joint Intelligence Committee. I appreciate the Commission's suggestion that we return to the question, with a view toward creating a Joint Committee.

The Commission's also suggested, in the alternative, that the intelligence appropriations and authorization processes are combined within one committee. This is something of "inside baseball" to the public. Could you explain just why you made this recommendation?

Response:

Too often the appropriations process has been too far removed from the expertise of the intelligence oversight committees. Vast amounts of money have been spent on systems that, in the case of counterterrorism, have done little to confront the actual threat we face. We recommend combining appropriations with authorization to ensure that those with the deepest knowledge of the threats we face have the power to fund and resource the measures necessary to deal with these challenges.

Question:

In many parts of the Arab world the press is full of false, unfair, negative stories about the United States. These Arab states are not democracies, and newspaper editors know what they may and may not say. They deflect criticism from their own leaders and place the blame for their nations' problems on America or Israel. This seems, for example, to be the case in Egypt, which receives billions of dollars from

us annually. Rather than blaming the editors, shouldn't our Ambassadors be telling the governments that we understand what is going on, and that it must stop? How can Ambassadors be held more accountable?

Response:

Ultimately, accountability for the performance of U.S. Ambassadors must be determined by the President and the Secretary of State. The problem the question raises is a real one. An overall national counterterrorism strategy would address this problem, consider the pros and cons, and issue tasking to the State Department and through it to specific ambassadors. The National Counterterrorism Center that we recommend, we believe, is the forum where this strategy can be developed and specific taskings assigned.

Question:

The principal objective of U.S. foreign aid, as the general policy statement of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 explains, "is the encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives." The Act goes on to emphasize five principal goals of U.S. development aid: alleviation of poverty, promotion of self-sustaining economic growth, encouragement of individual civil and economic rights, promotion of economic integration, and promotion of good governance. Are these still the right goals? How can these goals be pursued to the fullest while also rewarding countries cooperating in the war on terrorism?

Response:

As a general statement, these goals still appear to be appropriate for U.S. foreign assistance. Terrorism breeds when and where there is no hope for a better life. Thus, creating economic and educational opportunity, and opportunities for political participation, would go far toward dealing with several of the root causes of terrorism. Promoting individual rights and tolerance are also important goals. Diplomacy, foreign assistance, and public diplomacy are essential to defeating terrorism. Our investigation revealed that lack of attention to Afghanistan and Pakistan came back to hurt us on 9/11. We must use all instruments of national power in a coordinated strategy, and certainly foreign assistance is critical. These efforts must be well funded to be effective.

Question:

What does the Commission believe that the U.S. can do to promote a more open relationship with Saudi Arabia, as recommended? How can we promote political reform and economic opportunity within Saudi Arabia? What can the U.S. do to get concrete action from the Government on the recommendations made by the various National Dialogue sessions? How do you view the recent Saudi decision to exclude women from voting in next year's municipal elections?

Response:

15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis. Our investigation revealed that before 9/11 Saudi Arabia helped us only sporadically in confronting terrorism. Nearly all American officials believe that after the trauma of the attacks in Riyadh in May 2003 Saudi leaders grasped that terrorism was a threat to them as well as to the United States and the West. We recommended that our relationship with the Saudis must be open and public and founded on more than just oil. The Saudis need to make the fundamental determination of what kind of society they wish to have 20 years from now. We believe that Saudi leaders understand that the country needs to change, become more open and tolerant, or it will be passed by and left behind by the rest of the world. We should help them make these hard decisions and support them in implementing them. Clearly, Islamist extremists advocate the subjugation of women. We believe that Saudi Arabia must move in the direction of affording women more rights, giving them more possibilities of engaging in society. Ultimately, moving in the direction of greater democratic reform and openness will benefit all Saudis.

Question:

The Commission Report states that helping the Afghan government to extend its authority over the countryside requires a "redoubled effort to secure the country, disarm militias, and curtail warlord rule." Could you give us more details on how to that? Should the U.S. and the coalition actively disarm the warlord militias, including those that are U.S. allies?

Response:

Commission officials traveled to Afghanistan and met with Afghan officials and U.S. and allied military leaders. We believe that supporting the Karzai government is critical to stabilizing the country. The Afghan National Army will be central to doing that. The United States and its allies should continue to train and support that institution. Clearly the warlords who oppose the legitimate government of Afghanistan pose a problem. The precise methods for dealing with that problem go beyond the scope of our final report. The appropriate methods should be decided by Karzai and his government, the United States, and key allies involved in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Question:

The Commission's report highlights the need for increased assistance for educational reform and economic reform in the Muslim world as essential elements of United States' counterterrorism strategy. While educational and economic reform are essential in targeting those segments in the populations of Muslim countries that are susceptible to terrorist recruiting, strengthening civil society in the Muslim world is just as essential in promoting political and democratic reform in these countries. The report does not focus on the importance of strengthening civil society as an element of promoting reform in the Muslim world. What is the Commission's position on strengthening civil society in the Muslim world and how can the United States improve its programs that assist civil society organizations in the Muslim world?

Response:

We support the goal of strengthening civil society in the Muslim world. We believe that the U.S. government should support governments in the Muslim world that are dedicated to promoting tolerance, respect for the individual, and protection of civil rights. In addition, we must seek out and support influential voices of peace and tolerance. Reinforcing programs to assist civil society organizations in the Muslim world should be a major element of our overall national counterterrorism strategy.

Question:

The Commission suggested that the Broadcasting Board of Governors get more resources to carry out broadcast activities in the Muslim and Arab world. What level of resources would you recommend? Some are also concerned that those who listen to U.S. broadcasting discount the news they hear. Do you think there is room for making broadcasting programming more effective? In addition, did the Commission look into whether the U.S. structures for broadcasting and public diplomacy are sufficient? Are there any changes you would suggest?

Response:

Support of broadcasting in the Muslim world is essential to our overall national counterterrorism objectives. Our report does not address what level of funding is required. The amount of funding is best left for the administration and Congress to work out. But we believe the funding should be robust. Half measures will not do much to eliminate the threat we face. We are encouraged by U.S. initiatives such as Radio Sawa and al-Hurra television. We understand that some will view these entities as U.S.-originated and as furthering U.S. purposes. But they are a good start in getting out the U.S. message, and refinements in their operations can take place over time. We would recommend engaging with a wide variety of Muslim opinion leaders from the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia to obtain their insights into how best to design and implement broadcasting programs that will have the greatest reach and impact.

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