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Government Electronics and Information Technology Association

Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Vienna, VA , Wednesday, October 30, 2002.

I do want to thank GEIA for having me here today and more importantly for the important work that you are doing in the critical field of electronics and information technology.

A European friend of mine once commented that Washington is the only city that he knew of in the world where people found that there weren't enough days in the week for working lunches so they invented the working breakfast. [Laughter] I will admit it's an uncivilized habit but I also admit that I've become accustomed to it. I also want to begin by noting, I think it was Samuel Johnson who was a notorious late riser who said, "Only dull people are brilliant at breakfast." [Laughter] So I promise not to be brilliant this morning. [Laughter]

We've had more than enough brilliance from our men and women in uniform. They are doing absolutely magnificent work. And I suspect there may be at least a few former military folks in this audience, including Dave McCurdy [President, Electronics Industry Alliance of which GEIA is a sector association]. There's probably no one with more "formers" behind their name than my boss, Don Rumsfeld, who was a former Naval aviator, former Congressman, former head of the Office of Economic Opportunity -- you may have forgotten that one -- the former White House Chief of Staff, former NATO Ambassador, and, of course, former and present Secretary of Defense.

On my first day back in the building when Don was swearing me in, he noted that it was my third time in the Pentagon, and he said, "Paul, we're going to keep bringing you back until you get it right." [Laughter] And I felt like saying, "Well, what should we infer from your coming back for a second time?" [Laughter] But I'm not that dumb. [Laughter] In fact, it really is an enormous privilege and pleasure to be serving with him, and indeed, I can't think of a more inspiring time to be a part of America's national security team than right now. It's an unusual privilege to be able to serve with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Colin Powell, Condi Rice and Don Rumsfeld. It's an

extraordinary team and I think the American people have every reason to be both proud and appreciative of the people who are putting together our policy now.

Certainly, this organization is one that's committed to those national security objectives that this team is serving. And DoD hasn't only been a big customer of information technology; I think we can claim to be a big developer of it. In fact, I believe it's correct, we have a legitimate claim to being, if not the father of the internet, than perhaps the grandfather or grandmother of the internet thanks to some early work of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. But, of course, in typical government fashion, someone forgot to take out options on our invention. Just think about it: if they'd thought ahead maybe we wouldn't have to go back to Congress for annual budgets. [Laughter] But there we are.

I'd like to talk to you a little bit this morning about some things we've learned in Afghanistan where we've seen already some remarkable inventions and innovations. And certainly information technology and electronic warfare are helping our troops in the air and on the ground fight more efficiently and more effectively. And then I'd like to take a brief foray into the issue of the day, which seems to be that other country that I spent some time on that begins with an 'I.'

I will make an observation. I remember during Desert Storm, during the first Gulf War, when people for the first time saw the extraordinary phenomena of Tomahawk cruise missiles literally turning right angle corners in the streets of Baghdad, and pictures of a bomb that had just gone down a chimney, it was remarkable. We said at the time though, "This is really just the beginning of the application of precision." And indeed I think the statistics bear that out, and I'm doing this from memory so forgive me, but I think fewer than five percent of the bombs that we dropped during Desert Storm were precision guided bombs. By the time of the Kosovo campaign it was up to 40 percent. In Afghanistan it was up over 60 percent. And I think one might say that we're still only in the mid point of that revolution. I think if that's true, I think that one could probably say that the war in Afghanistan was kind of the dawn of the network information age. It is only just the beginning, and yet it is, for all of that, just like precision was remarkable eleven years ago. The application of information technology in this conflict has been truly phenomenal.

One of the things that I think is most remarkable to come out of this conflict has been the integration of literally a nineteenth century military capability -- the horse cavalry -- with bombers that were as old as the grandfather's of the men who flew them -- 50 year-old B52s -- integrated thanks to the miracle of satellite technology into a truly twenty-first century capability. I'm sure many of you have heard that when Don Rumsfeld was asked at one of his famous press conferences what he had in mind by bringing the horse cavalry back into the U.S. military, he said, "It's all part of our transformation plan." [Laughter] And indeed, I think it's fair to say that transformation is as much about using old things in new ways as it is about new things. But we wouldn't be able to use those old things in new ways if it weren't for some new technology as well -- some amazing technology.

There are other examples of innovative transformational innovation in Afghanistan today. One that impresses me in particular is the way young, non-commissioned officers were routinely integrating multiple intelligence collection platforms by simultaneously coordinating what my daughter calls a

‘chat room.’ They were integrating, in real time, intelligence from Rivet Joint and Joint STARS, satellite information with SIGINT and Predator in a truly remarkable fashion. And, in fact, this ‘joy stick’ generation, if we can label them that way, display an agility in doing those things that clearly comes from being completely comfortable with this new technology, a comfort that I think they developed in childhood.

Over the last three decades, we have invested billions of dollars in collecting and analyzing electronic intelligence. The new challenge before us is how to integrate electronic warfare capabilities and intelligence into a transformed, distributed network-centric expeditionary force. Such a force would be key to any future operations we may embark on and they are probably our single greatest force multiplier.

There is clearly a lot that we still need to do to align the department more fully with the ongoing information revolution, and, of course, sometimes it seems for every year we are catching up, we are falling two years behind. It moves that way, and you know that. But throughout history, warfare has assumed many of the characteristics of the technology of its age. Today we see this trend continuing as we move from industrial age warfare with its emphasis on mass, to information age warfare which highlights the power of network distributed forces and shared situational awareness.

But the agility that we need to continue meeting threats here and abroad depends on more than just technology. It’s also tied to organizational changes in new ways of thinking and embracing new concepts. I think that’s true of most transformational changes in the course of military history. It certainly was dramatically true in the 1920’s and the 1930’s when it wasn’t the invention of the tank that was crucial, it was the concept of how to use it.

That wonderful example of bringing the horse cavalry into the twenty-first century demonstrates it’s about more than what we buy and it’s about more than how we spend on new technology. It’s also a matter of changing the culture, as Secretary Rumsfeld has said, into a culture of innovation and intelligent risk taking. We don’t want people to do ‘stupid’ things, but we don’t want to punish them for taking risks, because risks will inevitably involve some degree of failure.

That emphasis on innovation and intelligent risk taking is one of the drivers behind the strategy laid out in last year’s Quadrennial Defense Review. I’d like to briefly mention two of the more important conceptual elements of the QDR, as we call it for short, which I think was an unusually important document – by the way, it was largely completed before September 11th and yet we found that quite a few things that we had identified over the summer as crucial capabilities to be ones that we have leaned on very heavily in the intervening twelve months. One of the more important concepts was that to confront a world of surprise and uncertainty in which it was increasingly difficult to predict who would threaten us – not that it’s ever been all that easy – we shifted our planning from a threat-based model that guided our thinking through most of the Cold War years and through the first decade following the Cold War with that focus on two major regional contingencies, shifted from a threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach. We don’t know and can’t predict who may threaten us – or when or where – but we can have, I think, a much better idea of what they may threaten us with, what our

vulnerabilities are, and what our unique advantages to be exploited could be. We also have a sense of which capabilities of ours, and in particular information superiority, can provide us with decisive new advantages. And second, to support that capabilities-based approach to force planning, we worked to define more precisely the goals that would focus our transformation efforts.

We identified in the course of an extraordinary number of very high-level meetings with the Secretary and his senior military and senior civilian advisors – in fact, I think some of us were thinking we were starting to develop ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ from being closeted together for so long – we identified very carefully what would be the six transformational goals to guide our efforts. And it’s worth noting, and you can go and read this in the QDR, that one of the most important of those goals is how to leverage information technology to give our joint forces a common operational picture and the ability to integrate together. I might say that one of the other five is how to counter enemy efforts to disable our dependence on information which is obviously going to be more and more critical.

But in many respects that leveraging of information technology is the foundation of all of the other five transformation goals that we hope to achieve. And doing that poses, I think, three major challenges. First, we have to be able to make information available on a network that people are willing to depend on and trust. Second, we have to populate that network with new types of information – the kind of information needed to defeat future enemies to make existing information more readily available. I think that also means having a network that pulls information rather than one that pushes out from a central place. And third, we have to deny enemies information advantages against us.

I’d like to commend this organization for what you’ve been doing in helping us to meet all of those goals and what I know you will continue to do so – it is very important work and this is an important group. It’s the kind of crowd that when you tell them what your requirements are, they seem to find a way of coming true.

Let me shift gears here now and say a word about the problem with Iraq, and I would like to begin by emphasizing – although I’m going to talk here about some of the issues involved in thinking about the possible use of force – that what the President is doing, making every effort to do, is to bring about the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction without the use of force. That the goal here is, if possible, to achieve a peaceful resolution of this very serious problem and this very serious danger to our country and, indeed, to the world.

I think it’s helpful in going into this discussion to frame it with two quotes, which I think helped to frame part of the grim reality that we faced there. One describes a security situation, the security threat from Iraq. In a more general context, speaking to the House International Relations Committee earlier this year, Secretary of State Powell said, "Since September 11, 2001, the world is a more dangerous place. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks on that day, a new reality was born: the world had to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat, a threat that could not be deterred because of this connection between states developing weapons of mass destruction and terrorist organizations willing to use them without any compunction and in an undeterrable fashion." That I think is the strategic security problem.

The other quote says something about the internal situation in Iraq. It comes from somebody whose been in the news quite a bit lately saying other things, a former inspector named Scott Ritter, but he did at one juncture recently describe part of the horrible reality of what he had saw inside Iraq. And he did so quite openly. He said he was doing so reluctantly and he even said that what he was describing was even more horrible than what he would say because he didn't want to say quite how horrible it was because in his words, he's "waging peace now." But what he did say was to describe a prison in Baghdad whose stench he said was "unreal," an amalgam, I quote – "of urine, feces, vomit, and sweat" – unquote, a hellhole where prisoners were, quote, "howling and dying of thirst," unquote. And a remarkable thing was that in this prison, the oldest inmates were twelve, the youngest were toddlers. Their crime was to be children of political enemies of the Iraqi regime.

It's hard to imagine a more grim symbol of a regime that rules by terror and that embraces terror as a policy against those who oppose it at home and abroad than a children's prison. And I think there are very few, if any, in this country at least, who would deny that the President of the Iraqi regime is an evil one and a dangerous one. And it would be difficult, I think, to find Americans who would not agree that the world would be safer and the Iraqi people would be much better off if that regime no longer rules. That's not the issue. The issue is: what means are appropriate to achieve that goal.

The real issue we face is how to weigh the risks of using force should it come to that, and that's what I would like to talk about briefly now. Those risks are very real. No one in our administration is discounting the risks associated with the possible use of force. As President Bush has demonstrated over and over again, he takes those risks extremely seriously and, in fact, I would like to repeat what I said a few minutes ago – that's why the President is making every effort possible to achieve a peaceful disarmament of Iraq that would resolve this issue, that would resolve this danger to our country and the world without the use of force.

So the debate in this country is not between those who desire peace and those who desire war – I don't know of anyone who desires a war. The issue is how best to achieve a peaceful outcome. But there is a seeming paradox at work here that takes some effort to grasp. Our only hope—and let me emphasize, in my view, our only hope—of achieving that peaceful outcome of achieving a peaceful disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction is if we can confront that regime with a credible threat of force behind our diplomacy. To be effective, the two have got to be part of a single policy. They are not two separate policies.

We know from eleven years of stubborn defiance of sixteen UN Security Council resolutions that Saddam Hussein is not going to easily give up the horrible weapons that he has worked so hard to obtain and paid such a high price to keep. No one should be under any illusions that Saddam Hussein will give up the weapons that he's not supposed to have simply because the United Nations passes another resolution. He will only do so if he believes that doing so is the necessary price for the survival of his regime and for his personal survival.

Over the last twelve months, President Bush and his advisors have been weighing very carefully the

risks associated with the various courses of action available to us. And while everything possible is being done to minimize those risks, no one, as I have said, is discounting them. The fundamental question is how to weigh the risk of action against the risks of inaction, and how to weigh the risks of acting now against the risks of acting later.

One of the questions that has been asked frequently, perhaps even more frequently since that horrible attack in Bali, is whether an attack on Iraq would disrupt or distract the United States from the global war on terror. The answer to that, I believe, is actually a very simple one. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said, "Iraq is part of the global war on terror. Stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war." And as the Secretary said further, "We can fight all elements of this war simultaneously." I would add that we have to do so. And we must do so – not only with our military power but, as the President has said, with every available resource and with every element of national power. This war is unlike any war we have seen in history – it is not just a military operation, in many cases, it isn't even primarily or secondarily a military operation. It involves an integration of the military with every other element of power we can bring to bear, including very importantly, intelligence and law enforcement.

But the war on terrorism is a global war and one that must be pursued everywhere. It's impossible to see how a policy of denying terrorists sanctuaries in countries like Indonesia, Pakistan and Yemen, places where we are working hard in various ways to deny them sanctuary, could be assisted by a policy that leaves them a sanctuary in Iraq with one of the most murderous dictators we know. We cannot continue to allow one of the world's worst dictators to continue developing the world's worst weapons. And it's worth remembering when we got to safe houses in Afghanistan, we discovered documents and captured terrorists who helped us to break up plots in Southeast Asia, North Africa and around the globe. And when we drove al Qaeda out of sanctuaries in Afghanistan we were able to capture some key terrorists, like Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi Binalshibh, and not only get them off the street but to get important intelligence from them. Similar effects can be expected if there is a decent government in Baghdad that can help us to uncover evidence to capture terrorists and deny them sanctuary.

Another question that is often asked is, "Why act now? Why not wait until the threat is imminent?" Again, it seems to me, in many ways the answer is fairly simple and it was expressed very clearly by Senator Joseph Lieberman in the Rose Garden the day the original joint resolution on the use of force was introduced. Senator Lieberman said, and I am quoting, "I have felt for more than a decade now that every additional day that Saddam Hussein is in power in Iraq is an additional day of danger for the Iraqi people, for his neighbors in the region; particularly for the people in the military of the United States, and indeed for the people of the world." I would add that I share that view strongly.

The notion that we can wait until the threat is imminent assumes that we will know when it is imminent. That wasn't true even in 1962 with the very obvious threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba. As President Kennedy said at the time, and I quote from him, "Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation large or small. We no longer live in a world," the late President said, "where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril." If that

was true forty years ago of a threat that was comparatively easy to observe, how much more true is it today of threats developed by evil people who use the freedoms of a democratic society to plot and plan, even in our midst, and in the midst of our allies in Europe, and around the world?

Ask yourself, when was the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon imminent? Was it imminent on September 10th? Was it imminent in August 2001? Was it imminent in the spring of 2001 when all of the hijackers had arrived in the United States? Was it imminent in early 2000 when all of the pilots arrived in the United States? Or was it imminent even earlier when the plan was hatched in Hamburg and wherever else it was made? We cannot tell with these threats, unfortunately, when they are imminent until they have actually happened.

Some people ask, "Why run the risk of provoking Saddam Hussein? Doesn't the only danger that he will use those weapons of mass destruction come if we threaten his survival?" And there is no doubt a very serious concern here, and we must certainly plan on the assumption that a moment of maximum danger will come if Saddam believes that his survival is in peril and that he has little to lose by using his most terrible weapons. But it's important, I think, to recognize how many assumptions, in my view, very dubious assumptions, underlie the contention that this is a danger that we can avoid forever if we simply seek to contain the Iraqi regime indefinitely.

First it assumes that we understand the way in which Saddam Hussein's mind works. Moreover it assumes that he will always avoid actions that would risk his survival. And it makes that assumption despite an enormous body of evidence to the contrary. It is quite clear that we do not understand the way Saddam Hussein's mind works and it is quite clear that he is a risk taker who has frequently taken actions that put his regime in grave danger.

But the most dangerous assumption of all, I believe, is the assumption that Saddam would not use terrorists as an instrument of revenge. That's the very danger that Secretary Powell warned about so eloquently in the quote I read you a few minutes ago, the use of terrorists as an undeterrable weapon for delivering the most terrible weapons of all.

Finally, and this is the last question that I would like to address in these remarks, a lot of people ask whether Iraq will be even more unstable and dangerous after Saddam Hussein is gone. Of all the risks involved, should it come to the use of force? Again, I want to emphasize the hypothetical character of that statement. The President, as I have said, is trying to find a peaceful solution here – he has definitely not made a decision to use force.

Of all the risks involved, and there are many, and we are trying to examine them all, the one risk, it seems to me, to be frequently exaggerated is the risk that the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime would be a cause of instability in the region. In fact, one might observe that the control of that regime has already been removed for ten years over the northern part of Iraq and the effects have not been instability but some rather remarkable progress by Middle Eastern standards.

Do the pessimists really believe that the only way to preserve what they call 'stability' in what is

perhaps one of the most important countries in the Arab world is by preserving indefinitely the rule of one of the world's most despotic tyrants? If so, then I sincerely doubt that many people actually believe that. If so, they would have to explain how this so called 'stability' is going to be preserved after the demise of Saddam Hussein. Do they believe that his rather dubious sons, Qusay and Uday, will successfully carry on his despotism after him like the sons of Hafez al-Assad in Syria or Kim Il Sung in North Korea? Hardly something I would imagine anyone could wish for. In fact, for better or for worse – and I'm convinced it will be for far, far better – sooner or later the Middle East and the world will have to cope with the reality of an Iraq without this regime and it would be far better for that admittedly enormous change to take place when the eyes of the world are upon Iraq and when the United States and a strong coalition are committed to seeing that change through to a successful conclusion.

Indeed, I have to say that I am quite surprised that so many people who know the Middle East well, who admire, as I admire, the great talents of the Arab people, believe that the demise of this despotic regime would be harmful to the Arab cause. To the contrary, it seems to me that there is a great opportunity here to liberate one of the most talented populations in the Arab world. And indeed, to bring back perhaps some significant fraction of those four million Iraqis who have fled their country with positive effects throughout the Middle East and indeed, I believe, throughout the Muslim world: including that largest Muslim population that I spent three years with in Indonesia.

We saw that potential in Afghanistan when women tore off their burkas and girls went back to school and the threat of famine disappeared for four or five million people who were on the edge of starvation. That kind of change that we saw in Afghanistan also gives us a huge strategic advantage if force ever becomes necessary because Saddam Hussein, like Joseph Stalin before him, rules by fear and only by fear. And when his people no longer fear him, he will have to start to fear them.

So let me conclude by saying that this regime has turned Iraq, one of the potentially richest countries in the Middle East, into the most savage kind of prison. But as we have seen in Afghanistan, when the yoke of terrorism is removed, people use their newfound freedom to build a better future for themselves and for their children. There is no question in my mind that if it comes to that, that if we can do all of that with the world's help, we will not only have removed another haven for terrorists, we will have made a significant step forward in helping the Muslim world to build a better future for themselves and for the rest of us.

To those of you here that are helping us in the Defense Department to build peace, to help us also to build what President Bush referred to in his State of the Union message, as a better world beyond the war on terror, a great and important mission lies before our country. We will not be deterred from the truth. And the truth is that the greatest threat to peace and freedom in our time is terrorism. So, this truth we must also affirm. That the future does not belong to the terrorists. The future belongs to those who dream the oldest and noblest dream of all, the dream of peace and freedom. Thank you [Applause]

QUESTIONS:

QUESTION 1: Could you please comment on the new policy of preemption or preemptive strike? Do

you see this as a quote, "long-term initiative or policy?"

Wolfowitz: I guess I would say that I don't think it's as new as a lot of the commentary suggests. Indeed, that quote from President Kennedy from forty years ago makes it quite clear that we were, if it had come to that, prepared to pre-empt in Cuba. It didn't come to that, and I'd like to emphasize again, it's another object lesson in the importance of combining force and diplomacy that you achieve a peaceful result. Khrushchev did not remove those missiles from Cuba because he liked the sound of President Kennedy's voice. He removed them because he saw a credible threat if he didn't. But, frankly, I kind of prefer a broader term, which is 'preventive action.' And 'preventive action' includes a lot of things, including diplomacy and economic leverage and political influence. What it seems to me as undeniable, and we probably should have understood this before September 11th of last year, but certainly September 11th I think made it clear, is that the danger posed by terrorist states that have the most terrible weapons in the world and that are connected to terrorists who will literally stop at nothing, either in terms of who they hurt or what they do to themselves, is a danger that we can't just continue living with. For roughly twenty years, or arguably for fifty years, we thought of terrorism as something that was nasty. I wouldn't say acceptable, but something nasty that you lived with. And I think September 11th was kind of a wake-up call that as bad as that was, as bad as it was to lose 3,000 people in a day, to lose 30,000, or 300,000, or God forbid, 3,000,000, is simply not something you live with. So we've got to take preventive action—but it doesn't always mean military action. Take the case of North Korea which people are often fond of saying, "Well, if we're threatening war with Iraq, why aren't we threatening war with Korea?" I think each one of the countries that we are dealing with is different and just to point out one of the more obvious things about North Korea, our economic leverage over North Korea is potentially enormous. There are many other differences but that's just one. So we broadly need to address how to prevent these kinds of things from happening. I think in the long run it's also very important by way of addressing what's often called 'the root causes' here, I think we need to address the root causes. I think we also need to understand what the root causes are and as much as I hate poverty and believe we should work to alleviate poverty, I think the root causes here have a lot more to do with misery and resentment and envy in large parts of the Muslim world and I think focusing on reform, focusing on helping countries like Indonesia and Turkey, that are moderate countries that are trying to make progress – Morocco is another one that I would add. Bahrain, I would note, just had elections for the first time in their history. Promoting positive developments throughout the Muslim world I think is an important way of demonstrating to the world's billion Muslims, the great majority of whom, in my view, would like to enjoy the benefits of a free, open and prosperous society.. And if you'd just stop and look at the world as faced by virtually all Arabs and most Muslims, it doesn't look as though they've been given an even chance. I think it's very important to demonstrate that they do have an even chance and that 'even chance' comes from following the path of freedom and democracy, not the path of terrorism.

QUESTION 2: With emphasis on coalitions, will there be a renewed interest in interoperability?

Wolfowitz: Yes and even more so. I mean it's also a renewed emphasis on jointness, which if Goldwater-Nichols hadn't come along fifteen years ago we would have had to have invented it now. I mean one of the things that we have always understood is the importance of joint operations. But the

ability to network widely distributed forces makes jointness absolutely critical, an order of magnitude increase or two order of magnitude increases is how important it is. And as much progress as we've made in the last fifteen years, again I think we're just at the early stages. We're spending a lot of time in my 'COO' capacity looking at how to build that reliable network that people can, in fact, have trust and confidence in. We're also spending a lot of time thinking about the issue of joint training. We have, as I think a lot of you already know, some of the most remarkable training centers in the world and I think some of the most remarkable ones in history. I remember going with Secretary Cheney into Southern Iraq after the Gulf War and meeting with some troops of the 2nd Armored Division and one very tough looking Senior Master Sergeant was asked by the Secretary of Defense whether it was tough and he said, "Not nearly as tough as the National Training Center" [Laughter] Well, when you train like that you fight well. But one of the things we have to look at is whether we're training enough together. We don't have a joint National Training Center. That is something we're working on. We're still some distance from having a combined, that is in coalition, National Training Center. But, as we develop the Joint Forces Command down in Norfolk into our transformational command, we're also looking at having that command play a new role with our allies – particularly our NATO allies – in doing transformation in a coalition fashion, and that definitely includes interoperability. But I think it's important to say that interoperability over the last ten to twenty years came to be thought of as simply the ability to communicate over common networks. That's just the start of it. Real interoperability not only means communicating but having common rules and procedures that you can understand and understand in real time on a battle field. It's very interesting to hear the stories from troops who were involved in Operation Anaconda about how quickly they had to learn to communicate with the pilots and bombers overhead about what was "safe distance." Safe distance when you're on the edge of a 3,000 foot cliff is a lot closer than it is under normal rules. So they were trying to get pilots to execute strikes that would normally have been considered much too close to friendly forces, but they wanted them done and it took a couple of days to get it worked out with the pilots overhead. It took a couple of more days to get the senior command levels to understand that the troops on the ground knew what they were talking about when they were changing the rules. That's just one dramatic example to me of what goes into true interoperability. But obviously if you cannot talk to one another, then you clearly can't do it. Thank you very much. [Applause]

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