



NEWPORT PAPERS

A Series of Point Papers
from the Naval War College and the
Navy Warfare Development Command
For Senior Leadership
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

United States Naval War College
Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island

Contents

Newport Papers

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Points of Contact</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Page</u>
<u>Strategy and Policy</u>				
<u>01</u>	Strategy and Policy Considerations: The Terror War	Prof. George Baer Prof. Andrew Ross CAPT Robert McCabe, USN	24 Sept 01	1
<u>02</u>	U.S. War Objectives	Prof. Tom Mahnken	24 Oct 01	4
<u>03</u>	U.S. War Objectives: How Narrow or Broad?	Prof. Andrew Ross	25 Oct 01	7
<u>04</u>	U.S. War Objectives: Near, Medium, and Long Term	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	12 Nov 01	10
<u>05</u>	Terror War: Is a Formal "Declaration of War" Needed?	Prof. Nick Rostow COL Fred Borch, USA	12 Oct 01	14
<u>06</u>	What Is The Kind Of War Upon Which We Are Embarking?	Prof. Bill Fuller Prof. Mac Owens	22 Oct 01	16
<u>07</u>	The Terror War: Perspectives on Coalition Issues	CDR Stephen Kenny, RN Prof. Christopher Bell Prof. Bruce Elleman	28 Nov 01	20
<u>08</u>	Enemy Objectives	Prof. Ahmed Hashim	11 Dec 01	23
<u>09</u>	The Strategy of Usama bin Laden and <i>Al Qaeda</i> Annex A: The Worldview and Motivations of Usama bin Laden	Prof. Ahmed Hashim	19 Dec 01	26 31
<u>10</u>	Potential Adversaries in the Terror War: Individuals, Groups, and States	Prof. Ahmed Hashim Prof. Geoffrey Wawro	1 Feb 02	36
<u>11</u>	Russia and the Terror War	Prof. Lyle Goldstein	11 Dec 01	42

<u>12</u>	China and the Terror War	Prof. Jonathan Pollack Prof. Bruce Elleman Prof. Lyle Goldstein	4 Jan 02	46
<u>13</u>	Japan and the Terror War	Prof. Bruce Elleman	4 Jan 02	50
<u>14</u>	The Terror War: Alternative Futures	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	14 Feb 02	54
<u>15</u>	Pakistani Militant Groups: Policy Challenges and Solutions	Mr. Owen Sirrs	20 Feb 02	58
<u>16</u>	The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Terror War	Prof. Geoffrey Wawro	14 Mar 02	62
<u>17</u>	Setting Our Course in the Terror War: Symposium Executive Summary	Prof. Lawrence Modisett	2 Apr 02	66
<u>18</u>	Central Asia and the Terror War	Prof. Lyle Goldstein	1 May 02	75
<u>19</u>	NATO and the Global War on Terror	Prof. Catherine McArdle Kelleher	21 May 02	79
<u>20</u>	Grand Strategy for the Terror War	Prof. Mac Owens	22 May 02	84
<u>Operational Concepts</u>				
<u>21</u>	Maritime Homeland Security: Concept of Operations	CAPT Michael Critz, USN	25 Oct 01	88
<u>22</u>	Homeland Security: Maritime Command and Control	Prof. John Ballard, USN CAPT Michael Critz, USN	23 Oct 01	92
<u>23</u>	Maritime Homeland Command and Control: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks	LCDR D. Scott Bauby, USCG	23 May 02	96
<u>24</u>	Employing Aerial Coercion to Combat Terrorism: Recommendations for the Theater CINC	MAJ Mark T. Damiano, USAF	23 May 02	102
<u>25</u>	Terrorist Application of Operational Art	LCDR Marc E. Tranchemontagne, USN	23 May 02	111

National Security Decisions

<u>61</u>	Navy Decision Making in the Terror War: "Home Games" vs. "Away Games"	Prof. Jim Giblin	26 Oct 01	124
<u>62</u>	Justice as a U.S. War Aim: The Legal Implications	COL Fred Borch, USA	14 Nov 01	131
<u>63</u>	The Use of Force in the War on Terror: A Legal Perspective	COL Fred Borch, USA	05 Dec 01	134
<u>64</u>	U.S. Naval Reserve: The Navy's Team for "Home Games"	Prof. Jim Giblin	16 Dec 01	136
<u>65</u>	How Are We Doing? Assessing Progress in the War on Terrorism.	Prof. Tom Mahnken	16 Dec 01	140
<u>66</u>	Military Support to Civil Authorities: "Navy Roles and Responsibilities in Domestic Support Operations"	CAPT Steve Morris, SC, USN	18 Dec 01	144
<u>67</u>	Carrier Deployments: One Option (Classified paper, view on: www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil)	Prof. Jim Giblin	17 Dec 01	NA
<u>68</u>	Economic Dimensions of the Terror War	Prof. Peter Dombrowski	1 May 02	152
<u>69</u>	Technological Mobilization for the Terror War	Prof. William Martel	21 May 02	157
<u>70</u>	Pakistani Madrassahs and the Spread of Militant Radicalism	Mr. Owen Sirrs	22 May 02	162
<u>71</u>	How Now Shall We Fight? The Relevance of the Law of Armed Conflict to the United States and Its Coalition Members in Light of the Terrorist Attacks of 11 September 2001	LCDR Tony F. DeAlicante, JAGC, USN	23 May 02	165



NEWPORT PAPERS

A Series of Point Papers
from the Naval War College and the
Navy Warfare Development Command
For Senior Leadership
In Response to Critical Issues

Strategy / CONOPS / Doctrine / Decision

United States Naval War College
Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island

Newport Paper: 15

**PAKISTANI MILITANT GROUPS:
POLICY CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS**

Objective: To examine the problem of Pakistani extremist groups and possible responses to their activities.

Background: Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan has pressured long-time rival India by directly endorsing and supporting extremist groups in Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir. The jihads engaged in by these groups have also had serious internal repercussions on Pakistan: motivated by radical ideologies imported from the Persian Gulf, a generation of Pakistani extremists have waged a brutal sectarian war against their country's religious minorities. Moreover, there is evidence that extremists have infiltrated the very foundations of the state itself, notably the armed forces and the intelligence service. Finally, Pakistan's terror wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan have not brought it any modicum of security. Quite the opposite. Islamabad's Taliban clients in Afghanistan were swept away by America's war on terrorism, leaving uncertainty in its wake along this vast border region. A suicide attack on the Indian parliament in mid-December 2001 brought Pakistan and India to the brink of war. Rarely has there been a greater challenge for the U.S. foreign policy establishment than the resolution of the multiple, interrelated security dilemmas afflicting South Asia today.

Discussion: Pakistani militancy is a multi-faceted phenomenon encompassing a multitude of conflicting agendas. Several groups are focused solely on internal sectarian violence in Pakistan proper, while others concentrate their efforts on "liberating" Indian-held Kashmir. A third cluster cultivates close ties with international Islamic terrorist groups, including Osama Bin Laden's *Al Qaeda*. Clearly, it is this latter grouping that poses the greatest threat to American regional interests and the protection of U.S. forces in the region, although the others cannot be ignored.

Collective Strengths and Weaknesses

Collectively, all of the Pakistani militant organizations enjoy a similar set of strengths and weaknesses. The United States can maximize the effectiveness of its counter- and anti-terrorist policies by exploiting these strengths and weaknesses and seeking out the terrorists' centers of gravity.

(1) Strength: Jihad Culture. A critical strength is the "jihad culture" that permeates Pakistani society, especially the youth. Decades of poverty, corruption, dictatorships, Afghan wars, and Gulf Arab donations have ensured a steady stream of angry young men for Pakistan's terrorist groups.

(2) Strength: Weak Central Authority. A chronic lack of central authority is another strength common to all Pakistani militant organizations. Regardless of whether the country is run by elected cabinet or military dictatorship, Pakistani governments have generally proven less than capable in confronting their militants. At the local level, anemic government responses have granted Pakistani militants latitude to effectively "take over" vital sectors of society, such as social services and parts of the national education system.

(3) Strength: Funding Networks. Pakistani militant groups tap into a rich vein of financial support from émigrés, the Gulf Arab oil states, and Iran. These states help fund not only the groups themselves but the religious schools that disseminate the motivating ideologies of the militants.

(4) General Weaknesses. For all their strengths, Pakistani militants are weakened by a number of significant shortcomings. The performance of Pakistani religious parties in national elections has been distinctly unimpressive. Furthermore, the groups themselves are badly fragmented by political squabbles, personality clashes, and infighting. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Pakistani Islamists lack a galvanizing, charismatic leader of the same caliber as Ayatollah Khomeini, Musa Sadr, or Osama Bin Laden.

Importance to the United States

In the aftermath of 11 September, Pakistani militants have become an important national security concern for U.S. policymakers. Not only do they possess links with the Taliban and *Al Qaeda*, they also pose a potential threat to the stability of Pakistan itself—the Muslim world's only nuclear power. Finally, the mid-December suicide attacks on the Indian parliament by suspected Pakistan-backed terrorists have escalated tensions between India and Pakistan to levels not seen since their 1971 war.

(1) *Al Qaeda Lives On.* As America continues its war on terrorism, it is increasingly clear that some senior *Al Qaeda* leaders are likely to be hiding in Pakistan. Indeed, Osama Bin Laden himself may be sheltered by the Pakistani extremist groups that he sponsored, trained, and armed. At least three of these pro-Bin Laden groups are U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including *Harakat ul-Mujahedin (Movement of Holy Warriors)*, *Jaish-e Mohammed (Army of Mohammed)*, and *Lashkar-e Tayiba (Army of the Pure)*. They can be expected to assist *Al Qaeda* in reconstituting its capabilities as it prepares for a new round in the war on America.

(2) *The Danger to Pakistan.* A coup by *Al Qaeda* sympathizers against the government of President Musharraf is not out of the question. Numerous reports have emerged regarding Pakistani intelligence and the extent to which it has been compromised by Islamist sympathizers. Washington does not want to face the prospect of serious unrest in Pakistan at a time when the hunt for *Al Qaeda* and Taliban leaders is paramount. Pakistan is a volatile, potentially unstable state: the presence of nuclear weapons makes this country a current, critical U.S. national security concern.

(3) War with India. The activities of Pakistani militants have brought Islamabad and New Delhi to the brink of war. Forces have been mobilized, the rhetoric has escalated, and the specter of nuclear war has been invoked. The United States has been heavily engaged in ameliorating those tensions; however, Pakistan's support for terrorism in Kashmir lies close to the heart of the problem. The onus, therefore, is largely on Islamabad to determine whether its support for terrorism will continue to be in its national interest.

Possible U.S. Policy Options

Several options are available to U.S. policymakers in defusing the Pakistani terrorist threat, including intelligence sharing, public diplomacy, the designation of more groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, aid programs, and a possible settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Clearly, many of these solutions require discrete diplomacy, careful monitoring, and sufficient financial resources for direct assistance.

(1) Intelligence Sharing. Intelligence sharing with India and the Central Asian republics will undoubtedly improve U.S. capabilities to monitor and ultimately neutralize extremist support networks. All of these states have suffered the consequences of Pakistani-sourced terrorism, be it the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Jaish-e Mohammed group in Kashmir. Intelligence sharing is a key step toward eradicating that threat.

(2) Public Diplomacy. The U.S. must also continue to publicly highlight the dangers posed by Pakistani extremists not only to Americans but to key regional allies such as the new government in Afghanistan, the Central Asian states, and India. Continued press revelations have made some Gulf Arab states distinctly uncomfortable and could dissuade them from blatantly funding extremist schools and militant groups in Pakistan.

(3) Designate more Terrorist Organizations. The United States recently designated two Pakistani-backed militant groups—*Jaish-e Mohammed* and *Lashkar-e Tayiba*—as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO). Other Pakistani extremist groups such as Sepah-e Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Companions of the Prophet), and Lashkar-e Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi) merit reexamination as FTO candidates, given recent revelations of their links to both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This is more than a symbolic gesture. It ensures that public diplomacy is engaged and could dry up potential sources of financial and logistic support.

(4) Foreign Aid. Washington must also explore foreign assistance programs that directly improve Pakistan's ability to monitor and neutralize extremist groups. Towards that end, U.S. aid programs could help Pakistan shut down the radical religious/terrorist training schools, dismantle the terrorist training camps, and clamp down on sectarian violence. For example, the United States could fund police training and passport/visa monitoring equipment.

(5) Kashmir. Finally, the United States cannot ignore the looming problem of Kashmir, since this dispute impacts so heavily on Pakistani national security decision making.

Only a partial or complete resolution of the Kashmir conflict, be it through plebiscite, independence, autonomy, or related mechanism, will ensure minimum security for both India and Pakistan. If Indian sensitivities prohibit direct American involvement in a Kashmir resolution effort, Washington might encourage a low-key, third-party approach such as the 1993 Oslo Process which facilitated greater Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.

Recommendations/Actions: Policymakers must be sensitive to the problems posed by Pakistani militants both for the region as a whole and Pakistan itself. The war on terror must encompass those Pakistani groups that are clearly antagonistic to U.S. interests and pose a direct threat to U.S. forces and citizens. Furthermore, the U.S. must be engaged in facilitating a resolution to the Kashmir dispute, for this conflict underpins much of the region's current tensions and instabilities.